ML19308A363
| ML19308A363 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 06/04/1979 |
| From: | Harold Denton Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Jennifer Davis, Levine S, Minogue R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE), NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REGULATORY RESEARCH (RES), NRC OFFICE OF STANDARDS DEVELOPMENT |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7907110194 | |
| Download: ML19308A363 (2) | |
Text
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,8 JUN 41979 Reference Action Control Ticket Nos: 06284 06277 06278 MEMORANDUM FOR Saul Levine, Director, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research John G. Davis, Director, Office of Inspection & Enforcement Robert B. Minogue, Director, Office of Standards Development William J. Dircks, Director, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards FROM Harold R. Denton, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation SUBJECT RESPONSE TO ACRS RECOMMENDATIONS In connection with its continuing review of the TMI-2 accident, the Advisory Comittee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) has most recently issued three letters dated May 16,1979 (see attached). NRR has been assigned the lead in coordinating the response to the Comittee's recomendations included in these letters. Some of those recomendations involve considerations (e.g., legal issues, research and administrative proce-dures) which fall outside the normal scope of NRR's purview. Your assistance is requested in addressing those items. Enclosed is a Sumary Listing of all recomendations made to date by the ACRS in connection with its TMI-2 review (including those in the May 16,1979 letters attached). Our judgment regarding appropriate assignment to the various offices of " lead" and " shared" responsibilities in responding to the recomendations is indicated in the left margin of the Sumary Listing (lead office is the office listed first; office (s) sharing responsibility for specific recomendations are indicated following slash marks). Please respond by cob June 7,1979, indicating: a) agreement with assignments as indicated, or proposed changes b) the branch (es) and individual (s) within your organization responsible for items assigned to your office c) actions planned or already taken within your organization in response to any of the recommendations listed in the enclosure d) your best estimate of when any necessary future or follow-on actions will be initiated and completed for items assigned to your office, either in a lead or shared responsibility role. Include consideration of ACRS views on priority to be given specific reccmendations (as stated in the referenced ACRS letters) in making these estimates. 03b Ib2' 79071101M )
JUN 41979 James H. Conran is the principal contact within the Lessons Learned Task Force for coordination of the responses to these recommendations; please direct your replies to him. Mr. Conran's office in the Phillips Building is Room 243; he mcy be reached by telephone on 492-7745. Harold R. Denton, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation cc: L. V. Gossick K. Cornell T. Rehm H. Ornstein N. Haller R. G. Ryan R. Fraley, ACRS NRC PDR I 835 163
[~ ~~~ a arc J, UNITED STATES [%'g i NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION g g..,g:x., j ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS ,g/ f g wasmNGToN. o. C. 20555 May 16, 1979 Honorable Joseph M. Hendrie Chairman U. S. Nuclear Regulato'.y C0cmission Washington, D. C. 205',5
Subject:
REPCRT CN CUANTITATIVE SAFEW GCALS Cear Dr. Hendrie: The Advisory Coccittee en Reactor Safeguards recemends that con-sideration be given by the Nuclear Regulatory Cornission to the establishment of quantitative safety goals for overall safety of nuclear power reactors. '1his could be helpful, for example, in developing criteria for NRC actions eencerning cperating plants. The ACES recogni::es the difficulties and uncertainties in the quantification of risk and understands that in many situations engineering judgment will be the enly or the primary basis for a decision. Nevertheless, the ACRS believes that the existence of quantitative safety goals and criteria can provide i=portant yard. sticks for such judgment. q The ACES believes that such NRC goals and criteria should be pro-posed for cement, not only by the pablic but by the Congress. Ultimately the Congress should be asked to express its views en the suitability of such goals and criteria in relation to other relevant aspects of our technological society, such as large dams, and manufacturing, stcrage, or disposal facilities for hazardeus chemicals. The ACRS believes that it is time to place the discussien of risk, nuclear and nennuclear, en as quantitative a basis as #easible. Sin rely, / ~ Max W. Carten Chairman 835 164
.p* * %q [ .k UNITED STATES y 't ie,i NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMt.11SSION 3 '/ ' 8 ADVit ORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARC S t,,4$ /,/ waswisoron. o. o. :essi May 16, 1979 Honorable Joseph M. Hendrie Chairman U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, IX' 20555
Subject:
INTERIM REPCRT NO. 3 ON 'IEREE MILE ISIAND NUCLEAR STATILN UNIT 2
Dear Dr. Hendrie:
During its 229th meeting, May 10-12, 1979, the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards continued its review of the recent accident at Three Mile Island Nuclear Station Unit 2 ('IMI-2), including implications drawn from the occurrence of this accident. The Cecmittee has several addi-tional recommendations to make at this time. Reactor Pressure Vessel Level Indication n e Committee believes that it would be r udent to consider expeditiously the provision of instrumentation that will provide an unambiguous irdica-tion of the level of fluid in the reactor vessel. We s0ggest that licens-ees of all pressuri::ed water reactors be requested to submit design pro-posals and schedules for accomplishing this action. 2 is would assure the timely availability of reviewed designs if the Staff ongoirg studies should indicate that early implementation is recuired. t e Committee believas that as a minimum, the level indication should range from the bottom of the hot leg piping to the reactor vessel flarge ar?a. Ocerator Trainina and Qualification The NRC Staff should examine operator qualifications, training, and li-censing to determine what changes are needed. Consideration should be given to educational background, to training methods, and to content of 1 the training program. Attention should also be given to testing methods, with specific concern for the ability of the testing methods to predict operator capability. Examination of licensing procedures should deter-mine whether they are responsive to new information thac is developed about plant or operator performanc determine whether results of exami l DUPLICATE DOCUMENT 4 83.5 165 ator ability... equal.fication tra. Entire document previously entered into system under: b ANO No of pages: 'p-g'-- 'E 3.m g
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// WASHINGTCN. o. c. 20555 g May 16, 1979 Honorable Joseph M. Hendrie Chairran U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission Washington, DC 20555
Subject:
INTERIM FIPCRT NO. 2 CN THREE MILE ISLAND NUCLEAR STATICN UNIT 2
Dear Dr. Hendrie:
During its 229th meeting May 10-12, 1979, the Advisory Committee en Re-actor Safeguards centinued its review of the circumstances relatirg to the recent accident at ihree Mile Island Nuclear Station Unit 2 (7MI-2). The recommendations presented orally to the Commissioners en April 17, 1979 were reviewed by the full Comittee and are repeated in semewhat amplified form herein. Amplification of these items is responsive to the request of Acting NRC Chairman Victor Gilinsky dated April 18, 1979. Natural Circulation - Procedures It is evident from the experience at IMI-2 that there was failure to es-tablish natural circulation of water in the primary system and failure to recogni::e in a timely manner that natural circulation had ret been achieved. The need for natural circulation under certain circumstances is commen to all mRs. The Committee recemends that procedures be developed by all operators .f P4Rs for initiating natural circulation in a safe manner and for pro-viding the operator with assurance that circulation has in fact been es-tablished. These procedures should take into account the behavior of the systems under a variety of abnormal conditions. As a first step, *5e NRC Staff should initiate a operating procedures for achievirg natural c r n inclu ing he es est. At the same t.ne, the ocerators of al., ralys's of the be-ap n s. d ra e e wavior of their plants, ta enu ad %,M(( la the priT3 1-acc normal cend. 3..~*,= acc1" e~r: rep % DUPLICATE DOCUMENT 073 sources, or inst.menta len* Thes ' 4 g{ {Q into system under: Entire document pre '7 90 (vo7af 34, ^=_ No. Of pages:_ f 4 9 =}}