ML19305B386
| ML19305B386 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Rancho Seco |
| Issue date: | 02/12/1980 |
| From: | Lainas G Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Reid R Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8003190597 | |
| Download: ML19305B386 (1) | |
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MEMORANDUM FOR: Robert W. Reid, Chief, Sperating Reactors Branch M, i
Division of Operating Reactors FROM:
G. Lain:ss, Chief. Plant Systems Branch, Division of Operating Reactors
SUBJECT:
RANCHO SECO FIRE PROTECTION FOR SAFE SHUTDOWN INSTRUMENTATION plant Name: Rancho Seco Licensee: Sacramento Municipal Utility District Docket No.: 50-312 Project Manager:
D. Garner Status:.?ee Enclosure 1.
Our draft Safety Evaluation Supplement on incomplete fire protection items was transmitted to you by memorandum of February 4. 1980. At that time we had not completed our review of Item 3.2.3 concerning protection for Class II instrumentation required for safe shutdown. By letter of January 23, 1980, SMUD provided drawings showing the proposed routing for Class II instrumentation after modification, and described the protection to be provided in those areas where the redundant instrumen-tation is in the same area. We have reviewed this infonnation and find that it resolves concerns related to protection of Class instru mentation. Accordingly, attached as Enclosure 2 is a revised Section 3.2.3 to be used in the Safety Evaluation Suppiement.
gb G. Lainas, Chief
/ Plant Systems Brs.nch Division of Operating Reactors
Contact:
H. George, X27136
Enclosures:
1.
Review Status 2.
Safety Evaluation Supplement l
8003190i g 7 F
ENCLOSURE 1 FIRE PROTECTION REVIEW S1ATUS RANCHO SECO __
50-312 Staff Required Licensee Item Evaluation
Response
3.1.1 Control and Computer Room Complete None 3.1.5 Turbine Desk Corridor Awaiting Info.
Late 3.1.8 West 480 Volt Switchgear Room Complete None 3.1.11 East 480 Volt Switchgear Room Complete None 3.1.21 Electrical Penetration Area Grade Level Complete None 3.1.22 Main Corridor - Grade Level Complete None 3.1.23 North Diesel Generator Room Complete None 3.1.24 South Diesel Generator Room Complete None 3.1.27 Corridor to (-) 47 Level Ongoing None 3.1.29 Containment Penetration Valve Area West Ongoing None 3.1.30 Containment Penetration Complete None 3.1.31 Makeup Pump Room Complete None 3.1.33 Reactor Building Complete None 3.1.36 General Ongoing None 3.1.37 Smoke Detectors Complete None 3.1.39 Radio Comunication - Reactor Buildirg Complete None 3.2.1 Fire Stop Qualification Complete None 3.2.2 Effects of Fire Water Piping Failures Complete None 3.2.3 Class II Instrumentation
' Complete None 3.2.4 Themal Barriers Complete None 3.2.5 Fire Zones Complete None 3.2.6 Administrative Controls Complete None
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i ENCLOSURE 2 3.2.3 Class II Instrumentation Our SER noted that certain instrumentation required for safe shutdown was defined as " Class II", or non-safety related, and, therefore, was not routed to any separation criteria. The licensee has perfonned an evaluation of the location and routing for this instrumentation and has proposed the following:
(1) to provide two channels of such instrumentation with one providing indication in the control room, and the other at a local panel outside of the control room; (2) each channel will have separate elements, transmitters, and power supplies; (3) cabling and equipment for each channel will be located in separate fire areas wherever possible; (4) when in the same fire area, maximum separation will be maintained; and (5) when redundant channels are in proximity, adequate fire protection will be provided so that a fire would not cause loss of both channels.
Additionally, by letter of January 23, 1980, the licensee provided further infonnation describing the separation and protection to be provided when cables for both channels of instrumentation are in the same area. We have reviewed this infonnation and find that after modifications, adequate separation and/or fire barriers Will De provided so that a fire will not c6use loss of Jo;h channels of safe shutdown instrumentation. Subject to implementation of these modifications, we find that fire protection for Class II instrumentation satisfies the objectives of Section 2.0 in our SER and is, therefore, acceptable.
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