ML19305A749
| ML19305A749 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Diablo Canyon, Crane |
| Issue date: | 10/31/1979 |
| From: | Catton I CALIFORNIA, UNIV. OF, LOS ANGELES, CA |
| To: | Okrent D Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards |
| References | |
| ACRS-CT-1188, NUDOCS 8002220044 | |
| Download: ML19305A749 (1) | |
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74,5;ei.:~ g.w..w31 October 1979 T0:
Professor David rent A
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SUBJECT:
TMI-2 Implications Subcommittee Meetius, 3 &:tStrerT979 4 COPY T0:
R.k. Major, ACRS The presentation by the staff on hydrogen hazards seemed to imply that a great deal of infomation was needed before decisions could be made.
This was not my understanding of the state-of-the-art. As a result, I spent some time finding out who is doing work on hydrogen hazards and what would be the best source of information. The best sources are NBS and NASA. Both organizations have been concerned about hydrogen hazards since the late 1950's. NBS publishes abstracts of publications specifically devoted to hydrogen hazards and NASA has published a safety manual. Certain aspects discussed during the last TMI-2 Implications Subcommittee such as how much confinement is necessary to have detonation, have been established.
It is my opinion that eliminating the possibility of a hydrogen detonation in an existing plant by any means other than inerting will not be possible without a great deal of plant modification.
If you want more specific details, I will obtain the NBS and NASA documentation and prepare a sumary for you.
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The report by PGE on seismic implications of the TMI-2 accident to Diablo Canyon addresses control room instrumentation in Section 2.11.
PGE states that loss of the plant process computer will occur and its loss will not compromise their ability to bring the plant to safe shuthwn. The Diablo Canyon plant is an older design than TMI-2 as a result of its many delays and the control room may be of the same vintage as that of TMI-2. Considering the difficulties experienced at TMI-2 during the early hours of the accident, the PGE response to the ACRS concerns is inadequate.
PGE indicated that no seismic failures have been observed in welded pipe. The UCLA reactor piping response contradicts the PGE observation. The 1971 earthquake resulted in primary side leakage. The pipes are stainless steel and operate at low pressure. The reactor was studied by Dr. C. Smith (a UCLA professor) and his colleagues to establish its ability to withstand seismic loads and it was concluded that there would be no problems. The study, however, overlooked the loads on the pipes due to relative motion of two structures to which the pipe was rigidly attached.
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