ML19305A704
| ML19305A704 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 09/19/1979 |
| From: | Chin R, Gerusky T NRC - NRC THREE MILE ISLAND TASK FORCE, PENNSYLVANIA, COMMONWEALTH OF |
| To: | |
| References | |
| TASK-TF, TASK-TMR NUDOCS 8001240592 | |
| Download: ML19305A704 (69) | |
Text
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I N U C L E A R R E G U L A T O R '( COMMISSION i
i O
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i IN THE MATTER OF:
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THREE MILE ISLAND SPECIAL INQUIRY DEPOSITION i'
i DEPOSITION OF:
THOMAS M.
GERUSKY U
P00R'OR G NAL HARRISBURG, PA, 4
p g,,,,
Date -
September 19, 1979 Pages 1 thru 59 i
l hd T.t. phon.:
i (202)347 3700 j
ACE - FEDERAL REPORTERS,INC.
OfficialReporters du North Capitol Street Washington, D.C. 20001 8 0 01240 [p 7
NATIONWIDE COVERAGE DAILY
1 NOR-4895 1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA em 2
3
__________________________________..x 0) w 5
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION'S TMI SPECIAL INQUIRY GROUP 6
7
X 8
9 (Oral deposition of THOMAS M. GERUSKY) 10 11 APPEARANCES:
12 j
l 13 l
NRC SPECIAL INQUIRY GROUP:
O k'
ROBERT CilIN, ESQUIRE 34 MALCOLM ERNST FREDERICK IIERR IS ROBERT SIIAMBERGER 16 PETER SICILIA, JR.
17 i
18 TAKEN AT:
39 1
HOLIDY INN 1:00 p.m.
20 2nd & Chestnut Streets Wednesday, September 19, IIarrisburg, Pennsylvania 1979 21 23 24 25 ht O hsC M $1ENOCRaPHiC 4E nYtC f.
1413 OLD MsLL RO AD. WVOMISSING. P A 19650
2 INDEX WITNESS EXAMINED B_Y:
PAGE NUMBER Y
Thomas Gerusky Mr. Ernst 4 - 56
~
Mr. Chin 56 - 58 Mr. Herr 58,
EXHIBITS Number Marked 1
Letter of confirmation to 3
Thomas Gerusky from the NRC TMI Special Inquiry Group 2
Resume 4
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\\.v 3
Seven-page document, "NRC 29 Procedures for Decision to Recommend Evacuation" O
c MO%sCM Sf f h0GR APMSC $$ NVICE. $403 OLD MitL ROAD WTOMIS5thG, PA 99610 -
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3 PggqEEglHgE 2
THOMAS M. GERUSKY, 3
was called as a witness and, having been duly sworn, was
( }.
4 examined and testified as follows:
5 BY MR. ERNST:
6 Q
Plv se state your full name and title for the record.
7 A
My name is Thomas Michael Gerusky.
I am the B
Director of the Bureau of Radiation Protection, Pennsylvania 9
Department of Environmental Resources.
10 (Exhibit No. 1 marked.)
11 MR. CHIN:
I would like to put into the record 12 a letter from the NRC to you and put it into the record as 13 Exhibit No. 1 Is this the document?
14 THE WITNESS:
Yes.
15 MR. CHIN:
Do you understand the information l
16 set forth in this letter including the general purposes of
~17 this inquiry and the fact that you may have an attorney 18 present if you desire and the fact that the informat ion may 1
19 cventually becomo public?
20 THE WITNESS:
Yes.
Are you represented by counsel toda y?
22 THE WITNESS:
No.
v 23 MR. CHIN:
I would like to note for the record 24 that Mr. Gerusky is not represented by counsel today.
(
25 Mr. Gerusky, if at any time during the interview e40 h e C M ST E %CGR A PHICsSERVIC E.
1413 OLD MILL RO AD. WVOMsSSING. PA 99610
.)
4 I
you feel that you need counsel or have counsel present, please 2
(
advise and we will adjourn the interview to give you an 3
opportunity to'make arrangements.
Is this procedure all right
[]_
4 I with you?
v 5
THE WITNESS:
Sure.
6 MR. CHIN:
I would like to note here as Exhibit 7
No. 2 a resume of two pages entitled " Thomas M. Gerusky."
8 Is this the document?
9 THE WITNESS:
Yes, it is.
10 (Exhibit No. 2 marked. )
11 MR. CHIN:
Thank you.
12 BY MR. ERNST:
13 Q
Mr. Gerusky, the first quest ion we have, I guess, 1t 14 relates more to the general responsibilities of BRP at TMI 15 and also the interphases subsequently with DOE and EPA and 16 HEW.
And regarding the collection analysis and disemination 17 of radiological data, and maybe this is a time-dependant.
18 question.
Who is so-called in charge and how was the effort 19 coordinated?
20 A
Well, during the first two days of the accident, 21-
'the data that came from our staff and from the DOE staff, the r~s 22 RAP t eam, was collated by our office.
But on about Saturday, N5 j
23 I believe when we realized that the -- that would be the 30th -
24 when we realized the da ta was just too much to handle and 25 beginning to be too much to handle, then our office, we i
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requested the DOE team which was set up at the Harrisburg-York 2
Airport, to collate all the data from all the agencies and 3
hold a briefing and -- daily on all the data that they had 4
obtained during the day.
That was done and carried out for
(~)N L
5 approximately the next three to four weeks until they left.
6 Q
Based on your experience in this area, is there a 7
more effective process for handling this function, or wo uld 8
there be a better way from the start to handle it?
Or do yua 9
have any general observations?
10 A
Well, I don't think we got very much data from the 11 utility and/or the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
The input 12 into the other -- into the pool of all the data wasn't very 13 Ereat from the utility and the NRC people, mainly because ja they were not there to do the kind of environmental surveil-15 lance work that -- that the other agencies were.
16 The aircraft data, for example, all of the utility 17 and of the NRC was not made available.
Only the aircraft 18 data from DOE was made available.
So there is some outstand-39 ing data even though all the data is all supposed to be 20 reported to epa and they have just come out with a document 21 that collates all the data.
I haven't gone through all six y lum s.
I have the first three volumes. There are some errors 22
)
but I don't think all the data is there that the utility and NRC 23 24 collected particularly.-
I haven 't gotten to the point in the i-25 data about DOE information, so I can't comment on that either.
i I
i MONICK ST E NOG R A PHIC *S t.R v eC E.
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I don't know what they submitted yct.
2 Q
Were you not getting data from Met-Ed and the NRC 3
during the first three days?
{}
4 A
No, we were getting data over the phone, and we 5
have -- and I believe you have a copy, I guess, of our log 6
books with all the data that we were getting mainly from the 7
utility.
But that information wasn't being fed by the utility 8
to NRC who then would turn it over to the DOE people for 9
collation at the end of the day, I don't believe.
10 Q
But you were getting it directly?
11 A
We were getting it directly from the plant on an 12 open line on a routine basis.
They would call in and give 13 readings of all their data.
//^)
L 14 Q
Generally, what type of information were you 15 receiving the first three days from Met-Ed and the NRC?
16 A
We were receiving data from radiation surveys, on 17 site and off site, and airborne radio activity levels for 18 iodine in particular off site and -- aff site only.
39 Q
I gather then you were collecting most of the H
20 information from DOE and Met-Ed and NRC, but to whom --
What 21 analysis function did you perf orm and to whom did you send 22 data and the results of the analysis?
%)
23 A
Well, the data was being scanned for anything 24 abnormal.
What we were finding in the environment -- what 25 everybody was finding in the envu onment was Xenon-133 and MONICE Sif NOGR A PHIC*SERW4C E, l# i. Of D MILL RoaO. WYO8 S$aNG Pt 't9410
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and some small quantities of radio iodine in the air samplar.
2 So that -- and there were samples of milk, soil, vegetation, 3
everything you could think of, animals that were being
(~)'
4 analyzed by a variety of people.
And most of the people were v
5 coming up negative.
The only things that we were seeing was 6
radiation levels measured with a Geiger counter -- open 7
window Geiger counter and some small increases in milk samples 8
in iodine.
Nothing else was being found.
9 So, I don 't know how -- it is awfully difficult to 10 say -- only with the small amount. of -- a large quant ity, but 11 very -- but it was one isotope that was causing our problem.
12 Unless we saw something different in tile data that r
13 the -- the iodine data or the air sample data or the milk O
ja data, or just high radiation levels, we weren't -- there was 15 no real cause for concern because off site levels were in the 16 range of one to 10 mr/hr, and we were told about hourly that 17 that would go down to zero within the hour from both the 18 utility and the NRd' people on site, that the problems.had j9 been solved and the releases would stop until Friday 20 Q
S, there wasn' t any widespread dissemination of 21 this information unless you saw something untoward or differ-ent?
22 fm()
23 A
We didn't try to put the information in one location 24 and hand it out to everybody.
We tried to summarize it at 25 press conferences and to our people and to people that called MOhaC ut SY tNOGR APM*C 4tnytC E.
14 53 OLD MeLL n0 A D. wvouessiero P4 testo
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in and asked for the data.
But not collating and handing it 2
out to reporters.
There wasn't anything wrong with it.
We 3
just didn't have time.
p 4
Q Ilow many profes.sionals do you have on your staff V
5 roughly?
A Oh, I think with the laboratory people there are 6
7 19 now, and we had two vacancies of professional health 8
phyic ists.
9 Q
And about how many of these were used in response to TMI?
10 A
18, jj Q
18?
12 A
Yes.
There were people from our Pittsburgh office 13 O
and our Reading office that woro called in to assist.
ja Q
Are all of these what you might say qualificd in 15 their ability to evaluate radiological hazards and nuclear 16 pwcr --
17 A
No, nc ? h'il of them.
We have got certified health 18 phys icists.
The three main people who are involved in eval-j9 20 unting the incident were Margaret Reilly, Bill Dornsife, 21 ur nuclear engineer, and myself.
Maggie and I are both certified health physicists.
We have an additional certified 22
'O health physicist in our office in Harrisburg and one in 23 Pittsburgh.
Ilowever the one in Pittsburgh did not come into 24 IIarrisburg to work.
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The rest of the people have been mainly involved in
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2 the x-ray inspection program, and prior to that time it was 3
very difficult to get them interested in reactors because
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4 they believed what everybody was saying about there is no 5
P.*oblem with nuclear power.
And just to try'to get them to 6
come in and attend a reactor emergency course was tough 7
because they just -- they were more interested in the x-ray 8
problem than the "real problem" Qudteca quote, unquote.
9 They thought it was a real problem any way.
10 Q
Generally, what kind of equipment do you have 11 ability to measure different kinds of isotopes in the lab as 12 well as in the field?
qT 13 A
Well, the laboratory equipment is pretty solid with ik / -
1-4 multi channel analyzers, low background counting, tritium 15 counting equipment.
16 The field equipment was lacking, and we did not 17 have the capability to do iodine monitoring or any air 18 monitoring with portable equipment.
We did not have any j9 portable air sampling equipment.
We were in the process of 20 getting it, but we didn't have it.
21 So, the first day we had to rely upon -- at 10:45 22 when they started to detect levels outside on the 28th, we 23 had to rely upon the data given to us by the utility health 24 physics people.
And when there was some question'about that t.
25 data because of high background levels from Xenon, then the WOM6Cet STENOGnaPHIC SERVsCE. 14 9 3 OLO MILL mO A O.' w v0 MIS 5the.
- A 19660
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samples were pulled into our laboratory and analyzed and 2
found not to be significant in iodine.
3 Q
Was your equipment calibrated for Xenon?
r-4 A
No, it was not.
Nobody's equipment was calibrated V) 5 for Xenon.
It was checked afterwards down at the National 6
Bureau of Standmnfs,and everybody came about in the same 7
ballpark.
As a matter of fact, I believe that the estimated 8
exposures -- the DOE estimated exposures probably can be 9
reduced by a factor of three based upon some new information 10 from NBS indicating that the GM were only a factor of three 11 high rather than a factor of 10 high.
So, probably the 12 exposures can be reduced -- their estimates of exposures can 13 he reduced.
-(p 14 We were very enthusiastic about the quality of 15 people that DOE brought in from the various laboratories.
16 Many of them we had worked with before.
17 I personally had worked with the Brookhaven. people 18 and we had known them very well.
We just -- in this kind of 19 an incident, when health physicists are out there working, 20 you don't -- you don't ask questions about their competence 21 if you know them.
You know them from experience and dis-22 cussions with them and knowing how to handle themselves, the 23 kinds of equipment they brought in.
You just assume that the 24 information you are getting is close to being correct.
Good 25 for health physics purposes.
Good within a factor of plus or Mo%iCM ST E h0GR APHIC *S ERVIC E.
14 8 3 OLD MILL RO AD. WTOMISSaNG. P A 49 10
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two within these levels.
That is aAl we were worrying about.
2 Q
I think you said on about ilaturday, DOE sort of 3
took over --
1 4
A I can't remember.
The first three or four days are 5
all one big day, 'and I had about two hours' sleep for four 6
days.
Except I do remember Friday morning.
Friday caused 7
the large influx of federal agencies;ind I believe on 8
Saturday was.when DOE came in force and set up at the airport.
9 And at that time we asked them to handle the data.
It could 10 have been Sunday.
It was early -- it was six months ago, 11 and trying to remember one day -- one hour was a problem 12 then.
One minute.
Minute to minute things changed.
13 Q
I think you documented this question in a memo of
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14 April 6th, which we have a copy of.
15 A
Yes.
16 Q
Was there a formal request earlier than this?
17 A
Yes.
We had in just general discussions requested 18 that this be done.
And then because of an apparent conflict 19 between NRC and -- who felt they had responsibility to collate 20 the data -- and DOE, we felt that we might as well put it on 21 paper requesting that agency to do it.
22 Q
That was April 6?
)
v 23-A Yes.
24 Q
There was no document before that?
25 A-No.
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Q Was there any problem either physically -- because 2
of the location of people -- or technically in communicating 3
with DOE representatives?
And I might sort it out a t other 4
DOE regions, and maybe DOE headquarters.
5 A
I am not sure exactly what vou mean by th'e question.
6 Q
Well, there was -- it seemed like there might have 7
been a problem with communications when DOE moved in and then 8
moved out to the airport to set up t heir headquarters there.
9 I was wondering if there was a physical problem, 10 people getting together, or some other kind of technical gj communication problem or something that --
A When they came in, they brought radio equipment.
12 13 We also provided them with radio equipment from our forestry (f3
.a' network.
So we were able to communicate with them by radio.
14 Q
II w about communications between you'rself and DOE, 15 16 n t field to DOE but between yourselves?
A No, we did that by radio and telephone lines.
17 18 Q
There was 'no problem with communications from your office to the airport?
39 A
No.
As a matter of fact, on Saturday again --
20 Saturday or Sunday, telephone lines were installed and a DOE g
person came in and set at a desk with a tele-direct line to g
w the DOE headquarters.
An NRC person came in and set with a 23 direct line to the NRC headquarters and I believe to the 24 rai er n site.
25 MomeCK stE NOGR4PM*C 4ERVICE. 14 5 9 OLO MILL RO AD. wYOMissiNo
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1.
FDA came in and had a direct line to FDA headquarters 2
in Rockville.
I think we had three direct lines or. top of 3
the open line to the plant, and they were manned 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> a
/"s 4
day.
(_)
5 Q
What are your established criteria for recommending 6
for the various protective actions such as take cover, 7
evacuation --
8 A
It is in our emergency plans, the EPA --
9 Q
Okay.
So that your guidelines would be established 10 in the plan?
11 A
RJght.
By the way, the plan that you people have 12 is our plan, not t he PEMA.
The plan written for our agency 13 and not for --
,'O 14 Q
It was a DER plan?
15 A
Right, this one (indicating) dated September,
'77.
16 And you have a copy of that.
17 Q
Is that the one we have a copy of?
18 A
And thesd'are the protective Action Guides, one to 19 live, twenty-five to seventy-five, five to seventy-five, one 20 hundred twenty-five.
21 Q
I would have to refresh my memory.
I don't remember 22 if it talked about the use of potassium iodido or not.
V 23 A
It did discuss that.
But the problem was there was 24 no potassium iodide available to us prior to the accident.
25 So, it was not included in a procedure because it wasn't MONICK Sf f h0GR A PHIC SE RVIC E.
949 9 OLD MILL ROAD. WTOMesteNG. PA les ^
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available, although we had tried to get it available.
2 Q
Any criteria or sheltering or putting cows on --
3 shelter cows or putting them on stored feed?
(])
4 A
I believe that is in there.
Margaret Reilly, she 5
wrote this and -- the methodology is in here, but I am not 6
sure -- yes, here we go.
7 The dose commitment for the entire episode for a 8
suitable sample in the thyroid and the affected milk shall 9
not exceed 1. Rem -- in the affected milk shed shall not exceed 10 1 Rom.
Then by calculation, one can determine that the maxi-11 mum milk concentration is 8.3 nanoCuries/ liter.
That correspor ds 12 to a pasture deposition of 67 nanoCuries/sq. meter.
13 And if that is anticipated, then the milk protective
'D 14 action options are:
removing from pasture, diversion of the 15 processed food products and confiscation and disposal and 16 deliberate dilution to acceptable levels.
That is in the 17 document you received.
t I
18 MR.' CHIN:
I would like to note for the record 19 that -the witness is referring to the Department of Environ-20 mental Resources, Bureau of Radiological Health Plan for 21 Nuclear Power Generating Station Incident, Se ptember, 1977.
22 THE WITNESS:
And there is an addendum to 23 that for.the Three Milo Island Plant specifically.
And there 24 is no data on that.
That was prior to the start of the Three i
25 Mile _ Island that you also have.
MONICM Si t NOG R A PH'C.S E Rya t t, 14'S OLD MILL ROAD. WVOMIS$lNO. P4 19410
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MR. CHIN:
The witness is referring to "Threc 2
Mile Island Nuclear Station Annex to the Pennsylvania Plan 3
for the Implementation of Protec tive Action Guides," undated.
(}
4 TIIE WITNESS:
And it also says
" draft" on it.
5 Miss Reilly believed that the plan was going 6
to be changing so of ten that every version had a draf t on it.
7 BY MR. ERNST:
8 Q
The Burgandy request and possible use of potassium 9
iodide, as I recall there was a little bit of confusion 10 betwoon your office and the Department of Health.
We were 11 curious though currently who is responsible for supply, 12 storage authorization, use and distribution and use.
13 A
Currently?
O 14 Q
Currently.
15 A
The Department of Health.
16 Q
For all of this?
Anything to do with potassium 17 iodide is the Department of Health?
18 A
Yes.
19 Q
But I assume you would make-the recommendations 20 regarding the action?
21 A
Right.
The problems with the potassium -- well, I 22 think it is in one of the testimonics that I gave.
The
)
23 problem -- we just didn't have a resource available to us to 24 handle the KI problem.
25 And since it was coming in from FDA and they had i
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16 1
experts in the Department of Health on drugs and knew how to 2
distribute medicine, in effect, we felt that the Department 3
of Health would be the responsible agency -- would be a
(~)
4-responsible agency and do the job and get it out to the people.
%)
5 We were disappointed that they were not, but it was not put 6
out in locations where the peopic were, but it was beyond our 7
control at that point.
8 Q
In one of your testimonies, I recall you indicated 9
problems in communicating with the press during the apparent 10 fall-out from bomb tests.
I am just sort of curious what 11 these problems might be and whether the*/ were similar with 12 TMI.
13 A
No, the problems were that we weren't able to do 4sU 14 our work because of having to talk to the press on a rather 15 routine basis and appear on television shows and bo forth, 16 when what we should have been doing was collecting information 17 and making decisions and not talking to the press.
Someone 18 should have been taiking to the press.
A press officer should 19 have been talking to the press.
20 Our press officer during that -- at that time was 21 located in another building and was not very knowledgeable 22 about radiation.
It is interesting in this case -- the new
,_\\j 23 press officer for the department sat in our offices during 24 the '76-episode just to watch and see how we were handling 25 the matter.
And he realized what the problems were with the MON 6CR ST ENOGna P***C SE RVtC E.
14 5 3 OLD MIL L RO A D, WYOMIS$5NG. PA.
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press.
And as soon as we got hold of him, then all calls 2
from the press were referred to his office or handled at his 3
office upstairs.
()
But he was in the building and he was relatively --
4 5
but everything 1 all the top level people in the administra-6 tion, including most of the public inf ormation officers, were 7
new to their jobs in relation to state government.
8 Q
You have indicated problems with telephones.
- Well, 9
let me pursue press business for one more instance.
10 Some of the same problems, I gather, occurred 11 during TMI?
12 A
Yes.
Calls came in from the press immediately.
13 Q
And what is the solution?
You mentioned the press 14 officer sitting in your offices.
Is that an effecf ive way 15 to go, or what is an effective way to communicate?
16 A
I have no idea.
It in just too big a j ob f or --
17 there has to be a technical person there to answer the techni-18 cal questions and to explain to the press officer -- give 19 technical data.
20 We just didn't havo the resource people there who 21 understood the problem to be able to put that into a perspective 22 that a newspaper man or even a TV reporter would be able to 23 then take to the public.
It was a difficult situation to 24 explain, not only what the basics of radiation were, which we 1
25 had to do, the basics of nuclear reactors, which is what we i'
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had to do, and also explain what the doses meant and how 2
serious they were and whether or not we believed that they enough 3
were serioug/ to cause any concern.
['
We tried to get -- to feed our press of ficer with 4
5 all of this information.
And every time we had a chance or.a 6
break in any kind of activity, we would fill him in on what 7
had just happened and then try to keep him up to date on 8
wha t our opinions were on exposures and why we didn't think 9
it was necessary to evacuate and so forth.
10 Q
What type of person would it take to provide this 11 interphase, do you think?
12 A
I think it has to someone who has dealt with the 13 press and is -- probably I would like to see a technical --
.p,
'U 14 a be cith physicist of some kind who has been around for a 15 while and knows what to say and what not to say.
16 You are not trying to hide things, but there are 17 ways of saying things that can be -- that you can give the 18 same information out in two; ways:
one to scare the hell out 19 of everybody or one to be just straight forward and relay 20 facts and questions.
It depends on what you want done at the 21 time.
If you need to scare people to get,them out, then the 22 person should be ablo to do it.
But if you want them not to p;J 23 go and you don't feel there is a need to move the people, 24 then it has to be done in a different way.
25 I think Denton is a classic examplo of the person M OheC et S f t h0G N APHIC AERWIC E.
14 9 3 OL D MsLL ROAD. Vu YOMit tsNG. P A 880'O
19 1
who could calm the people down.
I don't think that using the 2
typical -- a typical press officer is the way to do it.
The 3
person has got to be technically knowledgeable.
Met-Ed tried 4
that and it didn't work at all.
Nothing worked with Mot-Ed.
5 It didn't make any difference.
It had just lost all their 6
credibility the first couple of days.
7 Q
Do you have any opinion as to why they lost their 8
credibility?
~
9 A
I think it was attitude.
The attitude of the 10 people who were making the statements to the press and to 11 the public.
It was unfortunate.
The people were qualified 12 to make the statements, but the way they made them, down-13 playing the interests or the conceras of the public and the i
government, and downplaying the -- downplaying the episode ja 15 itself as just another little incident when nobody was really 16 sure at that point whether it was just another little incident 37 or not.
18 I think t'liey were trying to tell the truth.
It was 39 just the way they told it.
I don't think they tried to lie 20 to anybody.
If you look -- hearing what they said, they 21 were telling what they thought was going on.
It is just that 22 they were not aware of what really was going on either.
O 23 And I don 't think NRC -- the NRC people at the site 24 were aware of what was going on.
That is all in retrospect.
25 I don't think they wore aware of what war going on until i
MONeCM S T t NOG R A PMtc.S t Rw sC E t ela OLO MILL ROAD. WVOutSSING. PA testo
20 1
headquarters got deeply involved.
2 Q
What aspect made Denton credible in your judgment?
3 You mentioned --
4 A
I don't know.
He is one of the -- his slow easy-m]
5 going style.
He was somebody fresh.
The President 's hand-P cked man.
There were all kinds of things.
And he told --
i 6
7 went out and told everything he knew, answered all the 8
questions and was -.
He did not downplay anything.
I think 9
that was one of the things.
He didn't try to say that the 10 accident was no big problem.
11 He said it was a big problem and what we were trying 12 to do about it.
But I think -- more his southern, soothing 13 drawl than anything else that calmed. people down.
I don't
(,
la know how he did it.
In the north, that is not a qualification 15 normally the peoplo up here don't believe the southern drawl.
16 So, I don't know.
j7 It was different.
Probably Vic Stello could have 18 done the same job. People accepted him because they believed he know what he was talking about and he was being honest 39 with them.
i 20 Q
You had also indicated problems with telephones and 21 l
22 had to even use, I gather, walkie talkies in the offices and 1
23 also some loss of communications with PEMA from time to time.
24 I was wondoring, at least from your perspectivo, I
what has been done to remedy this situation?
1 25 j
oome, m oo...mc....v.c r.
im om mu..o o. mom..mo.
. imo Y
21 i
A Telephones are being installed from the utility to our offico, a hot lino.
Those are direct lines, ring, pick-2 up-type phones from each utility -- from each control room 3
at each reactor to our offico.
And a direct lino is being p
4 C
set up between our office and PEMA offices.
5 In addition, it has been agreed that next timo --
6 next timo.
I informed my boss if there is a next time, ho 7
that has got my resignation right away.
Once is enough.
8 we will station someone over in PEMA headquarters to be able 9
to explain to them what is going on.
10 Since the evacuation was never carried out except jj for the pregnant women and children, we didn't koop PEMA g
inf ormed the way we would normally do in an accident.
It was
{
just an oversight on our part by not contacting them and g
telling them what the levels were and what we were finding and so forth.
And also the results of meetings with Denton and the NRC people and meetings in the governor's office.
g During the first couple of days, they were in 18 attendanco in the governor's of fice and we didn't feel we 9
needed to fill them in.
But after that, they weren't in g
attendanco.
And we felt that the Lieutenant Governor, who is g
in effect PEMA, was informing the PEMA people of what had 22 happened in the meetings with Denton and the Governor.
23 Apparently that wasn't the caso.
24 cy Mdn't have any informaM on and Ocy 25 M O N IC 8L ST E NOGR A P>tsC sSE RVICE, 1413 040 MELL ROAD WTOMESSING. PA 19610
22 1
couldn't get information out to the counties who were very 2
upset because they were getting all the calls.
3 One of the problems that I saw as a result of the
{}
proposed press conferences, Denton would come in to us and 4
5 talk with the Governor before going to a press conference 6
where he would give out the same information.
And then have 7
available a summary of the information that he was going to 8
give out at the press conference.
That summary was not made 9
available to us that could be given to civil defense or PEMA 10 that could put it on the wires to the locals so that that 11 could be made availablo to them.
Instead of listening to the 12 press conferences over the air, they could have been made 13 available of it while it was happening.
_s 14 There was no request for it, although once I was 15 asked for copies of it, h'e s a id, "Come on down to the press 16 conference."
17 But that did disturb me a little bit.
But at that 18 poir'. I wasn't concerned about public information as much as 19 they were.
I was suspecting that the Governor's office was 20 prob;bly getting copies.
But they did not want information 21 to go out prior to Denton's release of the inf ormation.
22 Q
This was passed out in the Governor 's meetings?
s 23 A
No, it wasn't passed out.
24 la It wasn't even passed out to people there?
(
25 A
No, they came to the meeting -- Denton usually came MOhiCK STENOGR APM C army:CC, 14 9 3 OLD MILL RO A D. WYOMIS5tetG. P4 19610
23 j
to the meoting with Joe Bashard', and Bashard* would have with 2
him a copy of the statement that Denton was going to make at the press conference.
And he would take it with him as f ar 3
as I know.
I never saw a copy of it.
n 4
V Q
So this is the NRC status report or press release --
5 A
That was going to be handed out at the press meeting.
And all the technical inf ormation -- it was agreed to by 7
Saturday that all the technical inf ormation would come from 8
Denton at the site and/or in a joint conference with the 9
Governor.
But the local people, who were really up tight of 10 what was really going on, never found out except by listening g
to the radio.
Q Y u were present at most or maybo all of the 13 (V
O q
Governor's meetings from Friday on?
g A
Most, not all.
Q But most?
g A
Yes.
j7 Q
And pEMA was not represented by;the Lieutenant 18 Governor?
19 A
There was some meetings that PEMA -- where PEMA was at that I wasn't there where they were discussing evacua-tion plans and how things were to be carried out.
The methods 22 O
\\_/
of evacuation were not our responsibility and so we weren't 23 involved.
I didn't even know that ovacuation plans were being readied for 20 miles until I got home one day and there was 25
- spelled phonetically posicie svs mocaarwic ps avice, isos oto mLL nomo. wrouiss4NG. PA 49610
24 1
a little note tacked to the door saying, "This is whero you 3
2 50 if you are evacuated."
And that was like Sunday.
I hud no -- it just didn't occur to me that that 3
much work on evacuation was taking place up to 20 miles.
'N 4
(J Q
Who put this on your door, do you know?
5
~
A The Civil Defense.
6 Q
Civil Defense?
7 A
The Cumberland County Civil Defense.
8 l
Q It wasn't a business-related note?
9 A
No, it was just given to everybody.
"This is the 10 route you will take and where you should wind up. "
We were jj supposed to go to Chambersburg.
12 Q
In y ur vi w, who was really responsible for 13 I&'
c ommunicat ions, or is there such a responsibility?
j4 A
There are two kinds of communications.
There is g
communications to get information back and forth between the g
parties who need to know.
Then there is communication with the public.
18 I have a hard time with the public one.
I don't 9
know how to resolve that one.
But communication among the agencies and among each other, I think -- and among the state, j
g the people who have to make decisions at the state level were 22 solved pretty well by Friday when we started using the Civil g
Defense w:11kie talkies because telephone lines were tied up.
24 And what we would do is call someone on the walkie 3
MONiCK ST f h0GR APHi&S$ 4 Wit t.
9 4 0 3 OLD MILL AC AD. WYOMeSSING. P A 19610
25 I
talkie and ask them to call us on a certain lino that was 2
open.
And that way we could talk over the telephone and give 3
some inf ormat ion -- say we didn 't know anything more, rather 4
than put the information over the air and have everybody who 5
wanted to listen to that frequency who was capabic.
And that 6
happened during the whole episode, people monitoring NRC fre-7 quencies and then giving us a call saying, "What is going on 8
down there?
They are out checking for iodine."
It caused 9
problems.
10 We are getting an additional radio system for our 11 own vehicles.
We have purchased an environmental monitoring 12 vehicle, a big van, which will have a massive system which 13 could be used anywhere in tho state and can be used as a 14 massive communication on any kind of disaster and will have 15 equipment for radiation detection work in t'ne field similar 16 to the van that NRC headquarters had and what epa has down 37 in Montgomery, and New Jersey has.
18 Q
There was 'also -- and I don't know the kind of 39 communication problem this was -- but there apparently was 20 a lack of communication in the state police.
A Oh, boy, yes, was there.
I didn't know about it 21 22 until I went to a meeting with all the agencies that were O
23 involved and the state police gave a sequence of events and g
what they understood to be happening.
And I couldn' t believe 25 what they thought was going on in their official document MONaCR ST E NOGR APHIC*$E RVIC E, 1413 000 MsLL RO AD wv0M*S SING. P A l$410
= - - -
26 1
compared to what wo know was going on.
/
2 Q
Is that the meeting you had in Harrisburg?
3 A
It was wild.
We have at tempted to workii; with the 4
state police in getting them up to speed on accidents.
There 5
was -- we had met with them in the past, prior to about three 6
or four years ago.
All activities relating to emergency 7
planning for reactor accidents were handed out of our office.
8 They were handled out of our office because the State Council 9
of Civil Defense, which is what they were called until January, 10 did not want any part of reactor emergencies.
11 So, all meetings with local officials, all meetings 12 with state police barracks as to what they should be doing or 13 as to how they should be acting, all meetings with utilities
.O 14 were -- and all planning was done by, in effect, Margaret 15 Reilly, one person in our office.
And it was one -- it was 16 a hell of a job,because the State Council of Civil Defense j7 just didn't want any part of it.
18 After tho'new director came on board and after they j9 had received quite a bit of money from one of the federal 20 agencies to rewrite their disaster plan --
And as part of 21 that requirement, they had to have a fixed facility radiation 22 plan, then they got involved and we started having inf ormal 23 agreements with them as to what we would do for them and what 24 they would do f or us.
25 8,
finally things in the last three years -- three MOhtCM ST E h0G R A PHIC,$ E NVIC E, 14 f 3 OLD mil L RO A D. WV OM8651NG. P4 99610
27 3
to four ycerc, they worksd out very well comp 2 rod to what it was before.
We were completely on our own and nobody --
2 3
n body believed there was a need for an emergency plan for a O
4 reactor in Punnsylvania.
It was very difficult to convince
\\J 5
people to get involved, including the local township.
We had a meeting of the local people in Dauphin 6
County, the local civil defenso directors in Dauphin County 7
in the five-mile zone surrounding the plant.
And we told them 8
9 what the problems were and what the -- what plans they should have,;
1 and they just walked out and never did a thing.
Very diffi-10 cult to convince local communities to do anything.
l Q
How have you resolved the communication problem with the state police?
()
A Every Monday a meeting is held in PEMA to work on new plans that are boing -- the ten-mile plans and to upgrade the present plans.
That was up through last Monday.
I am not sure if it is still going on.
But stato police represent-atives attend those meetings, and they are now getting informed h
on how to write a plan and what their responsibilies are.
We 19 had to work not with the -- we had to work with the individual 20 i
barracks, and we never got beyond the barracks level on 21 emergency planning.
We didn't.
22 PEMA or civil defense required each agency to submit 23 a plan of action for a -- f or their role in emergencies including radiation emergencies.
I don't know what happened MONIC K ST E NOGW APH8C,SERVsC f.
1413 OLD MILL RO A D. WYOMISSING. PA 196tO
28 1
with the state police.
I think they were forgotton about.
I 2
don't recall.
3 Q
You indicated this problem in communications with
/~3 4
PEMA, and I gather you have said now this would be resolved V
5 in the future by stationing a qualified individual --
6 A
Yes.
We have committed to it.
I just hope we have 7
enough people.
8 Q
Is this additional staffing or exist ing staf fing?
9 A
Well, we have a request in.
We did get an additional 10
$300,000 in the budget this year, and I know $200,000 of 11 3pecial f unds f or equipment.
We are planning on hiring six 12 people.
One will be a nuclear engineer.
The rest are health 13 physicists.
The rest will go for increased lab equipment.
' ("'b 14 And most of the money will bo spent on equipment -- on supplies 15 for the first year.
Next year we hope to bring in nine new 16 people, half of which will be in the laboratory, and the rest 17 will be in our of fices.
That would include three additional 18 nuclear engineers.
j9 We would like to have a nuclear engineer per site s
that -- not on site 'like NRC does, but someone who is 20 21 very familiar with the site, and if an incident occurs there, 22 knows as much as Bill Dornsife knew about this particular site.
He j ust can't handle all of the problems '. a t : each of 23 the sites 'now.
24 25 We are hoping that next year's budget will include M 0 % 'C M Sf tNOOn Arnesc=Sgavect, 6 413 OL D W LL ROAO. WTOMISSaNG. PA 19910
29 1
that.
But we do have approval for one additional nuclear 2
engineer now and one additional health physicist.
And since 3
our people have been through this, we could take some people 4
that we didn't think we could use before and use them now 5
because they have now been brought up to date on what our 6
problems are.
I think it can be worked out.
7 Q
When were you first aware that an NRC document 8
existed which was given to the Governor by Hendrie on Sunday 9
that analyzed possibic future accident scenarios?^?
And I 10 believe it is that document there.
11 A
I believe we got a copy of it on Sunday.
12 MR. CHIN:
The witness is referring to a 13 document titled "NRC Procedures for Decision to Recommend O
ja Evaluation."
15 THE WITNESS:
I didn't pay any attention to it.
I didn 't realize it was there, I guess, and I think 16 17 possibly Bill Dornsife picked the document up or somebody 18 else in our shop. 'But I had not seen it until about a week --
19 a couple of eks later, i
9 I "U"'
20 l
21 MR. CHIN:
And it's a 7-page document.
And it is now marked Exhibit 3 O
23 (Exhibit No. 3 marked.)
24 TIIE WITNESS:
The unfortunate thing is, neither 25 did civil defense or pEMA receive it, and they are still oo~.e..n oc...
.c se.v.c.
... o t o.. u.o.. w,o..., ~........
t
30 l
I working on evacuations up to 20 miles.
1 2
BY MR. ERNST:
3 Q
Have you road the document now, at the present 4
time?
i 5
A I have. read it, but I haven't tried to evaluate 6
whether or not they are correct.
7 Q
Did you find the document understandable?
8 A
Oh, yes.
Yes, I think it was well done for the 9
various events that could occur.
Wo were given the informa-10 tion verbally in the Governor's office about the time frame 11 needed to evacuato people, and it kept getting longer and 12 longer and longer except for certain types of inc idents.
13 But I don't know when I first saw that document.
'O ja It was in our office, but there were so many pieces of paper 15 around that I don ' t know when I saw it.
16 Q
Are you aware of a sort of pseudo command center 17 established in the Governor's offico during this time period?
18 A
No.
39 Q
There were, I gather, a number of people who were 20 essentially the Governor's closest advisors or performing that kind of function.
21 A
I am not sure exactly what they were doing.
22
(~)
23 Q
S, whatevor this group was, you didn't know -- havo 24 much dealing with them?
A No.
25 r
MON'CM ET ENOGRAPMsC 48 RVtCF, Bel a OL D MILL RO A D. W YOMISSING Pa 19410 i
31 Q
On the 28th of March, I guess, at about 2:30 in the afternoon, I think you were present with Herbein and 2
Miller and Miller briefed Lieutenant Governor Scranton.
3 Were there other discussions during this time of steam dump-m (G
i 4
ing and difficulty with depressurization of the reactor and S
some various sources of releases -- technical information like that trying to describe the mechanism by which radioactivity 7
was going into the atmosphere?
A No, I don't believe so.
I don't recall very much 9
f that conversation.
I think they came and gave us what --
10 maybe an update on the status of the reactor that Bill had g
already given previously and not much more.
I don't think
,2 i
Bill Dornsife was at that meeting either, and that was
'O unfortunate because he could have asked some very pertinent questions about the status of the reactor which was beyond me at that point.
I think it was their attitude that just turned everybody off in th'e Governor's office -- in the Lieutenant Governor's office, I bellove.
I am sure -- Governor 's of fice.
But it was again downplaying the incident.
I was not hap py with the information that we got and -- and I wasn't sure we got it all.
Although I had dealt with two of the people very 22 closely before and had no problems with them, and I just 23 couldn't understand what was going on at this time.
I wasn't sure I believed them, and I know I wasn't MO mse C M ET E PeOGR A PHIC*S t h v8C E, 1413 OLD MILL RO A D. WTOMISSINw P A 19810
32 1
happy chen I 1 cit ths mooting, and cycrybody was cad.
And 2
that is when the call went in asking for ImC to come up t' tat 3
evening to fill the Governor and Lieutenant -- to fill us in 4
on what they thought was going on with the reactor.
5 Q
What was the source of Mr. Dornsife's information?
6 Did he go back to the F ant quite of ten?
l A
No, he worked at the plant -- I don't remember what 7
8 time he worked for them, but he worked for a consulting 9
engineering firm at the plant for about six months prior to 10 its operation.
And so he became very f amiliar with how that 11 particular plant was designed.
S, he knew more about -- probably the only -- one 12 f the few off sito people -.
When Denton got there, he 13 wr.s Denton's right-hand man filling him in on wh.et was going j4 n, w a e systems were, where W ngs were, because he had 15 w rked there during the construction phase.
16 He has been with us f or about three years, so it 17 18 was during the early construction phase and trying to -.,
His comments to us were that he was trying to fix the mistakes j9 that were made in the design of the plant, to straighton 20 them out -- back before thov got started.
g Q
During the morning of the 28th of March, Met-Ed ison g
O L/
vented steam in view of the secondary system.
Do you remember, 4
23 perhaps not exactly, but when at least by whom you were informed 24 f dumps of that nature by Mot-Ed?
25 uomicw svamoonarwic sanvect. sais oLo wiLL nomo. wrouisstNG. PA. testO
33 A
1 don't think we cero inf ormed of the steau dumps.
3 Q
Did you understand what the procedure was, the 2
dumping, why it was being done and things of that nature?
3 A
Not why.
I understood what it was.
And at that 4
point, we were concerned that iodine may be getting out 5
through that route because of the possibility of the -- they had previously informed us that there may be a breakdown of 7
the steam generator and/or primary secondary leakage.
- However, g
they told us that that side was isolated and the other side was 9
f ine, so dumping steam really didn't bother us too much unless it was contaminated.
Q Was this the position you were taking with the higher--
like the Governor's staff?
g A
I don't recall.
I just don't recall what position we did take if any.
I am not sure it made a big impression on me anyway.
It may have on somebody else.
We were surprised to see iodine in milk so early.
And we knew the cows were on pasture.
That caused a lot of early concern because we weren't finding it in the air.
We expected -- in a reactor accident, the worst thing is iodine and that is what you are out searching for with everything you have got.
And it wasn't there.
NRC. c on-firmed it wasn't there.
DOE confirmed it wasn't there in 23 any great. concentration.
But then it started showing up in milk.
25 i
uo%ica sithoana rwie.scavecs, esis oto uiLL noso. wrowisssNo. Pa isolo I
l
34 I
j It wasn' t underground. - So, it had to be inhaled, 2
and that is a lot of radioactivity to inhale -- for the cow I
3 inside a barn to get that kind of milk.
It was just detectablo 4
levels, but they were there, which surprised us.
5 Q
Were you made aware of any of the steam dumps, such as the one around 3:00 o' clock Wednesday which apparently 6
caused a problem at the state level anyway?
7 A
I am not sure what you mean by steam dumps.
In 8
9 other words, venting from gas tanks --
10 Q
I guess I used the wrong term.
Let me go back to that one.
Apparently, around 3:00 o' clock, the Lieutenant jj Governor requested that steam venting be stopped.
12 A
So that is where that came from.
I don ' t -- we were 13 O
trying to figure out who made that request.
We didn't know j4 anything about that request.
g Q
S, y u are n t aware that this was a request by 16 the stato government?
p A
As a matter f fa t, I
all d the Lieutenant Gover-18 nor's office two weeks ago to ask if -- after reading the NRC 39 Y port and hearing and getting questions from you guys about 20 who was making all those calls and getting more and more g
concerned.
We didn't know who was mak App those calls.
22 p
We didn't even know their scra tsing made until after 23 reading the NRC report on it o2, w h t. t., a couple of months 24 ago now.
And wo tried to f J ad out who it was, and we knew it 25 j
os.c
.n =oo......c.....u.
i.o os o
.u,,o.o mo-i...~o.
35 I
wasn't anyone in our shop.
And I called the Lieutenant Governor's of fice and asked if they did it, and they came 2
3 back and said, "Nobody in our shop did."
I didn't talk to
~N the Lieutenant Governor directly or his chief assistant.
I (d
4 5
can 't remember his name.
6 Q
Did you or any of your staff accompany the Lieuten-ant Governor Scranton on his visit to TMI?
7 A
No, I didn't know he was going until af ter he came 8
back.
9 Q
Do you know who he took with him?
10 A
No.
11 Q
During the day and night of the 29th, plant operators 12 vented the makeup tanks periodically?
7%
13 U
Al Right.
34 Q
When and how did you first learn or were iniormed 35 of this venting procedure?
g A
I am not eure when we were informed of deliberate 17 venting.
Indications that we got from the NRC people on the 18 phone and in person was that the majority of the radioactivity 19 was coming from water that got out of the tanks and was on 20 the floor in the AUX building, and as soon as that water could g
be cleaned up, there would be no problems with releases to g
v the environment, that the Xenon was coming out from that water 23 and the inside of the building was so contaminated with Xenon 24 and other isotopes that the -- the gas isotopes that it was j
25 j
-o ~, c.... ~ o.... c..... c..
.....-,m.............~o i
36 g
taking a whilo for ths Xenon to got out of that big building 2
through the filtering and out into the environment, and s1 wly it would go down.
3 4
Until Friday, I don't think we got involved --
We knew they were indeed -- I knew that they wero at ' cast 5
deliberately opening valves or that valves were being opened by them because of too much pressure.
7 Q
When on Friday did you become aware of it?
8 A
When the 1500 -- or the 1200 mr/hr was reported to 9
us and when we talked to the plant and found that they were 10
-- that there was quote "an uncontrolled release," planned but uncontrolled.
And I think I went to a press conference and said g
it was uncontrolled, and Met-Ed went to the press conference and said it was planned but was not uncontrolled.
1 We have tried to search individual's:. minds at the time and nobody seems to recall.
Bill was down at the plant quite a bit on Thursday and Friday.
So, I don't know if he 18 j
had informed us of that -- that anything he had learned in 19 this 2.rea.
I don 't -- I didn' t -- until Friday, I don't think we were concerned because we didn't know about routine vent-21 ing from the gas system.
Od Q
Ilow about the hydrogen bubble problem?
When were 23 you first informed of that?
l That was a telephone call in the Governor's office 25 aaoh.c= struocaarmc,stavics. uns oto mtL noAo. wwowssina. ma sesso
37 I
1 by ' Joe Hendrie., and that was Friday, I believe Saturday --
2 Friday night or Saturday -- Saturday, I think discussions with 3
Denton indicated that there was a possiblity of an explosion.
4 And by Saturday night or early Sunday morning, I 5
think we had found out what Stollo at the sito -- that the 6
Probab411ty was very slim and it wasn't vally an explosion.
7 But it didn't make any difference.
The f act had been all out 8
in the press and everybody was upset about them.
We sure 9
didn't know then the situation, and nothing about the possible 10 error or the calculations that were being made.
We couldn't jj figuro out why the President was coming.
But that caused the 12 evacuation plan.
13 Q
Did you or your staff have any conversations with
'Q
\\-
Met-Ed or the NRC other than Denton and Hendrie?
ja A
Well, yes.
I don't know who Bill was talking to at 15 the site because he wa's down there f or 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
He would 16 j7 call.us and fill us in on what was going on.
Either that or 18 c me back f or the briefing with the Governor.
39 And he stayed down at the site for a month on a 12-hour basis.
But --
20 Q
Basically, all the ecommendations regarding this-21 Problem were coming from the NRC to the Governor and not 22
()
23 through your office.
x/
A Once Denton came on board, the Governor relied on 24 25 him completely f or information unless we felt that there was MONaces $f f NOGRAPMeC BEnveCE. 1413 OLD MILL ROAD WYOMISSING. P4 19480
38 1
something that we felt was more serious than he was giving --
2 but that was serious enough.. We did not attempt at any point 3
to disagree with him -- to say that his concerns were not C]
4 real.
5 Q
At one point I believe Governor Thornburg stated 6
that he had sent a radiation and nuclear radiation expert to 7
the site.
8 A
That was Bill Dornsife.
IIe also told me to go and 9
we would split a 24-hour shif t.
Bill could go for 12 and I 10 would go f or 12 11 And so Bill was down for the first 12, I think on 12 Thursday.
And I went down -- Thursday -- Friday -- and I 13 went down to find out what he was doing and what kind of (vO 14 information he was getting.
That was prior to Denton arriv-15 iD C -
16 And we just decided that it wasn't -- that the 17 information he was getting down there was not enough.
We 18 could get as much back in the office, and it wouldn't -- we 19 couldn't spare the two people -- two of the chief people who 1
20 knew what was going on to be down there rather than back in j
i 21 the office talking to the Governor and so forth, i
22 S, we decided he would stay and I would come back, s /
23 But the Governor thought we were both down there.
And I 24 showed up'and he said, "How come you are not down there?"
And 3
25 I told him, and he said okay.
M O 8elC K STENOGRAPHtCeSL Av.C E.
let S OL D WILL WOAO. WTOMis$rmG PA 49610
39 1-Q Shifting a little bit.
Apparently, there were right 2
around 200 people in the federal response-involved in the 3
radiological monitoring.
Do you have any comments regarding 4
their level of response for the TMI incident?
O 5
A I think it was adequate for the TMI accident.
6 Because of the 24- -- the need for a 24-hour coverage, that 7
takes its toll, believe me.
It takes its toll.
8 People were very, very tired.
I think there was a 9
need for that many people to get all the data together.
Oh, 10 it might have been over and done after three weeks, but I jj don't -- we were still kind of up in the air as to what was 12 going on at the plant.
The plant wasn't going into cold shut-down.
They had to do some crazy maneuvers.
And so it was --
13 ja I think it was necessary.
I know DOEspent a heck of a lot of 15 m ney, but they sure provided the services.
We would have 16 been in trouble without them, really in trouble.
37 Q
Do you know if there was -- either yourself or'other 18 members of the state -- whether they officially requested support from agencies other than DOE?
39 A
No.
We had affers from other agencies.
And, as a 20 matter of f act, EPA showed up and we -- I assumed it was the 21 Montgomery people from epa that came in.
And we found later g
it wasn't.
As a matter of fact, Charlie Amato,who is with 23 24 epa now and is a nuclear engineer, had to give them a course in h w a r actor works to explain what was going on when I 25 MONIC4 ST E h0GR APHIC _S E RylC f 14 9 3 OLD MILL RO A D. W TOMIStipeG. P A 19410
40 1
didn't know that the Montgomery people were available and 2
were ready and willing to come.
But we didn't request epa's 3
assistance, at least nobody in our shop did.
4 When they arrived, we took care of them.
Somebody 5
in our office got a call from the Montgomery people saying, 6
"We are ready in Maryland," and we looked around and we had 7
so many federal people there we did not need any more.
We 8
were overrun with federal people at that point.
9 If I had known, it sure would have been a great 10 assis tance to our laboratory to run that van right up next to 11 the lab.
And because we were over - -
We just didn't have 12 the lab capabilities to handle all the samples that were com-13 ' iDE iD-
,O 14 Q
Apparently, Met-Ed made a commitment in the NRC 15 licensing process to provide training and the opportunity for 16 your organization to participate in such monitoring and 17 response training in the emergency response training -- in the 18 radiological monitoring and response area.
Are you --
19 A
I don ' t know.
We were involved in each major drill 20 that they had with people either down there evaluating or our 21 people back in the office, mainly telephone contacts, as to 22 what would be done, how it would be done and trying to get the i
(D l
23 proper information over the phone from the utility and --
24 concerning the drills that they were having.
i l
25 Q
I expect that is the training that is being talked MOh8CR ST E NOGR A PHICaSE RVIC E.
1413 CL D MeL L RO A D, WYOMISSING PA 19 10
41 about.
But that was tho extent?
It wcs just notification?
y A
That's right.
2 Q
What kind of information over the phone?
3 A
Not -- usually not the kind that we wanted.
And if 4
U you notice in the Tal emergency plan, there is a sequence that 3
was developed of questions that we would ask of the facility a d we would start down those questions, and they would say, 7
"We don't have any answers for you.
We have a little sheeth 8
of papers that have some information, and that is all I can 9
give you is what is on this piece. of paper. "
And there was 10 no coordination.
11 Q
So, you were asking questions about status and things of that naturo?
13
~
A And at that point we didn't know what the plant statun was.
15 Q
What would they typically transmit to you?
A Oh, heck, I don't remember.
Not very much.
The plant shutdown.
Off site levels are predicted to be so and so, so and so.
Our monitors are out now.
That kind of infor-mation.
20 But, "What is going on at the plant?"
"Well, we had this kind of an accident."
"But what is the status of the 22 what are the safety guards?
What is the pressuro in contain-23 ment?"
You know, all the kinds of things you really need to i
24 know as to how bad that situation is.
And that wasn't part of 25 l
l MOheCK ST f h00h APHIC.S E MwaC f.
9 4 5 3 OL D MtL L RO A D. WTOWiSSING PA teolo
42 1
the scencrio, at least givsn to us over tha phone.
2 Q
What kind of --
3 A
And tne NRC people were sitting watching the pro-4 cedure all along, and local people were invited in to see how 5
the situation was handled.
6 Q
Was there critiques afterwards of these exercises?
7 A
I think so, but I was never involved in them.
8 Q
You didn't participate in any critiques?
9 A
Margaret Reilly did or Bill Dornsife did, but I in 10 didn't.
We never got involved /the full scale exercise where.
11 we sent our people out to -- heck, it was easy.
If we had 12 wanted to make a big deal out of it, it was to participate 13 and show that we couldn't communicate.
And secondly, they
(
14 said, " Heck, well, you know ahead of time that you wouldn't 15 be able to communicate.
Why wouldn't you go over and get the 16 cars and the radios and go out like that?"
17 So, it was between a rock and a hard place in 18 responding --
If'We weren't told ahead of time about the 19 drill, I think -.
And they said some time in the next couple 20 of weeks there is going to be a drill and we want your full 21 participation as if there is a real accident, then we might 22 have found out -- then we might have been able to be credible 23 when it was reported that we didn't have the things that we 24 said wo didn't have.
25 I testified before the legislature trying to get MONacR STENOGR APMic $EnveCf. 1413 OL D MILL RO A D. W 70 MIS teNG. P A 18610
43 1
funds for our progres over since I have been with the stato 2
to get a good emergency response capability including radios 3
and communications and so forth, p
4 Q
This is communications, van, people --
V 5
A Equipment, 6
Q Portable iodine equipment?
7 A
Right.
And they look at you and say, "For reactor 8
accidents?
No way."
9 Razmussen came out and said' that the probability 10 was greater of getting killed by a meteorite.
You haven't 11 been killed by a meteorite.
12 Q
Did you complain at all other than to Met-Ed, the 13 operator getting the information, that this isn't the kind of O,
14 information you need?
A I don't think -- I think so, but I didn't personally.
15 16 Q
Bef ore March 28th, other than the testing problem, 17 were you aware of any problems between you and the utility 18 prior to March 28th?
A No, we had reasonable rapport.
j9 Q
You had reasonable rapport?
20 A
Yes, and we still have reasonable rapport at the 21 technical level.
The problem is above that and decisions 22 b'l 23 being made and statements being made to the press where there v
24 is -- where the public gets all upset and we have to answer the questions and we don't have the answers because we weren't 25
- phonetically spelled MO8stC K SitNOO R APHIC.S t av8C E.
t o t a OLO MIL L HO AD. WTOMISSBNG. PA 19600
44 1
informed in the first place.
2 I got a call last night at 7:00 o' clock saying later 3
that evening they were going to discharge 7400 gallons of 4
water from Unit I and what the concentrations were, what the 5
percent of mpc was, and they wanted to inform us ahead of 6
time that they were dumping.
Well, they had been doing this 7
routinely, and everybody gets up tight all the time.
8 I think there was a guy at Peachbottou the day beforo.
9 This guy was having a heart attack at Peachbottom and they 10 were informing us.
We are getting all kinds of crazy calls.
11 Q
But to your knowledge, the only identified weakness 12 between your organization and Met-Ed was one of unrealistic 13 tests?
1 14 A
Yes, but that was the same in all the facilities.
)
15 That,wasn't any different at Peachbot t om.
Ibachbottom was 16 probably less.
17 Q
But there wasn't any perceived weakness in planning 18 or communications,'just in inf ormation transmittal in a mock 19 problem?
20 A
Yes, it was -- what was really happening, they had 21 this inf ormation; they could answer our questions.
We didn't 22 write the scenario.
We didn't review the scenario, so there-O^
23 fore we couldn't get our inputs into the scenario to start 24 with.
25 And the poor guy on the telephone, I wasn't goin g to mo s c..n ~ o.... ic......c r.
.. os o -, u.
- o. o. mo-i.., ~........
45 1
blast him because he couldn't give ma the answer I was asking.
2 Q
Any comments on the overall effectiveness between 3
Met-Ed and your organization f or the first few days or any 4
temporal changes?
5 A
Well, one of the things that we had -- did not do 6
during the first three days was try to determine very much 7
about the reactor status af ter NRC arrived on site.
We felt 8
that NRC people had the responsibility for the on site problens 9
and we would take care of off site problems.
10 All of the information from that point on that we from were getting/the utility were from their health physicists 11 12 crew and their monitoring data, not with the control room 13 Operations and what was going on there.
Because, you kn ow,
O, 14 there were nuclear engineers in there and reactor inspectors there.
We thought they were doing their job.
We didn't go 15 16 in to check to see if they were doing their job.
We just 17 thought they were.
And I don't know if they were or not.
18 Q
Other thah your comments on communications with the j9 public, do you have any personal perc.eption concerning Met-Ed's response to the emergency?
20 A
Well, I think all utilities -- I think it was lucky 21 22 it was Met-Ed rather than Philadelphia Electric becs asa it 23 would have been five or six hours af ter release occt s t/. beforc-24 we would have been-notified.
The notification procedures as 25 set up were a constant problem from reactor site to reactor MONiCM Sit h0GR APMcC.$ ? Rv*C E.
1413 OL D MILL RO A D. W YOMa$$tNG. P A 19610
46 1
cito.. And wo tried to get all of th2 utilities to como into 2
compliance with one set of procedures for notification.
3 Philadelphia Electric didn't want any part of it.
4 They had to go acd have a conference call among their top O
1 1
5 brass before not if ying anybody.
And all the utilitles wanted j
6 to do it in a different way.
Call outside, have their 1
7 director of operations make the call to us and so forth.
8 The actual call that came in was from the plant and 9
from the plant shif t supervisor at the time according to the 10 emergency plan, I believe, that they had.to make that call to ij us because of the potential for -- that when they declared a 9
12 site emergency, they called.
13 And prior to that time, they didn't have to call 14 immediately according to their procedures.
They know they 15 had,roblems and they should have called, but they also know 16 that tl.ey had problems before and -- I don't tSink they j7 realized it was as. serious as it was.
18 I don't have any problems with their calling at 7:00 39 o' clock in the morning.
If we had known at 3:00 o' clock or 20 4:00 o' clock when it started, it would have been just three I
i 21 more hours of waiting for more data.
l 22 Q
In the overall sense, did you believe that the l
f l
23 stato emergency plan was adequate?
24 A
Yes, the plan was adequate.
I mean the problem is, I
25 can you carry out the plan?
You can write -.
The overall MONICK ST E NOGR APHIC,$t R v8C E.
14 9 3 OLD MILL RO AO. WYOMISSING P A $$610
47 l
1 stato plcn was ad3qunto.
2 Now, our plan was adequate.
The civil defense plan was not adequate.
The local > communities ' plans were not adquate.
Our plan was adequate for the purpose it was intended 5
and with the limitations we know we had.
If their -- I mean I didn't realize how bad the 6
situation was with the evacuation, 7
8 We had, at the Three Mile Island hearings, the 9
operating from the hearings, there was a couple of weeks of 10 testimony on evacuation plans by State Counsel of Civil Defense, the assistant director and by Kevin Molloy, who was jj the Dauphin County director.
And the information he gave to 12 us or he gave to the board was that they could evacuate people 13 with a reasonable period of time from the five-mile zone.
g no I had/ reason to question his capabilities.
He was j3 an expert in his field, and I was one in mine.
And I didn't ---
16 evacuation wasn't my bag.
But he never told us the problems 37 he was having at the local level.
18 And there is the attitude, the concern that every-39 body has brought up about panic if an evacuation is going to g
take place.
The Governor was very up tight about a possible g
panic, and that also came from the White House on Friday, the g
cn rn f panic.
That people -- if an evacuation was ordered 23 when there wasn't really one needed, that it might cause more 24 problems than help.
I don't know.
In most disasters, you 25 i
uomien struoci.ar c,sanvice sus oto uiu. nono, wrouissima. c.
insio
48 1
don't have panic.
But this isn't -- this was ---
I don't 2
know what radiation would have done.
So, I couldn't comment 3
to the Governor on it.
4 Q
So --
5 A
I was concerned that there wasn't a state of disaster 6
called and that they didn't ask the President for a disaster 7
proclamation or an emergency proclamation.
But apparently, 8
that was resolved between the White House and the Governor 's 9
house, that that wasn?t needed and doing that would scare the 10 people, that it wasn't needed.
11 Q
I gather your testimony on the license hearings and 12 on the adequacy --
13 A
I didn't testify, 14 Q
You didn't testify?
15 A
No, it was on the evacuation portion.
The testimony 16 was on the evacuation portion of the plan.
It was the inter-l l'7 venors had raised the contention that ovacuation plans were 18 not adequate.
Andso it was evacuation only that was being 19 testified to.
20 Q
Okay.
Who were your principal NRC contacts during 21 the thing, and I guess I am talking more about offices.
And 22 let's get it even broader than that.
(_)
23 We have the region people on site, the region people 24 in headquarters.
You have got Washington and Washington i
25 people on site.
Did you do business primarily with the site l
Wohsen Sit hoGm4PHtce tteveCE t.13 OLD MetL moAD, WTOMI$14NG PA 19410
49 1
people?
2 A
Yes, although we wera getting calls from headquarters 3
on Wednesday and Thursday, usually from the Office of State r3 4
Program people and the emergency response people.
Somebody V
5 told me that I even talked to " Doc" Collins.
I don 't recall 6
talking to Doc Collins, but he said he talked to me.
I might 7
have talked to him.
I talked to a lot of people.
It wasn't 8
very important, whatever he said, so it didn't stick.
9 Q
Did you have many conversations with site people?
10 A
Yes.
11 Q
Region people at the site?
12 A
Mainly with Chick Gallina who we have known for a 13 long time and trust.
And hc was usually on the other end of 14 the telephone or available at the other end of the telephone.
15 Q
What was the nature of conversation primarily?
Was 16 it radiological status?
A Radiological data.
Plant status never came up until 17 18 Friday.
19 Q
Did you conclude that NRC communications were a two-20 way path or one-way?
A To us?
21 j
e 1 22 Q
Yes.
A I don't know.
It is not something I thought about
^
23 24 very much.
It was a one-way path from Washington to here.
I 25 think it was two-way communications with the people on site.
MONiC R ST E NOGR A PMsC.SE RVICE. 9413 OLD Mf LL ROAD. WYOMISSING. PA 13610
50 1
I went down, spent some time down there. talking to Phil Stohr, 2
another person who was down at the site most of the time who 3
had brought their van down to get the data and found out what
(}
4 kind of data they had.
There was free flow of inf ormat ion 5
back and forth.
6 And we had attempted to have free flow of informa-7 tion back and f orth between the people we were used to dealing 8
with at NRC.
Maybe -- I don't think I had talked to Joe 9
Hendrie since I was his health physicist at Brookhaven. So, 10 untif the day he called and I told him he was full of baloney -
11 I didn't say that.
Under my breath I said he was full of 12 baloney.
13 Q
What were -- historically, do you think the NRC D
V 14 provided you with current and complete reports regarding 15 results of inspections and --
16 A
Yes.
17 Q
-- and things of this nature?
18 A
Yes.
We'would get daily reports in from NRC with, 19 you know, thick documents and -- that were -- that had to be 20 reviewed.
And it just got to be a routine and probably too 21 routine.
22 Q
These are the inspection reports and things of that 23 nature?
24 A
And all the correspondence between changes in the 25 licenses and --
M O Nic et $1E NOGR A PHIC SERVfC E.
1413 OL D MIL L RO A D. WTOMISS4NG, P A 19610
51 1
Q Would you explain a little more -- when you say too 2
routine --
3 A
Woll, it got to be so you scanned it to see if there
("3 4
was anything really interesting in it instead of reading it V
-5 word f or word.
Like, when Peachbottom first started, every 6
word was looked at in detail.
But not -- we were also getting l
7 copics of the Atomic Energy Clearinghouse and you could see 8
all the correspondence going among the various utilities.
And 9
it just seemed like that is all NRC did, was put out corres-10 pondence.
And they didn't mean too much to us af ter a while.
l 11 Q
What would be a more useful way to communicate?
l 12 A
Well, I think that the documents that are coming in 13 now are being read again in more detail.
'.]
14 Q
All of them?
15 A
All of them.
16 Q
Even those that have something to do with New l
ty England reactors?
j l
18 Is there' a more useful way to communicate?
19 A
Well, if the same kind -- I think a much more 20 useful way to communicate is one-on-one.
That is why we are gj hoping that we can get nuclear engineers to go down to the 22 site and talk to the NRC on site inspector and to keep up
'~
23 with what is going on at the plant and key people on inspectiorts j
24 once in a'while and get a feel for attitude of the utilities I
25 and the NRC.
This was not done.
Although it was requested Mose Cat ST E NO 3 st a PHIC,$ t R v eC E.
1413 OLD MILL RO AD. W YOMISSING PA 19610
52 1
at the regional of fice and was being set up.
We just didn't have time to carry it out, or a lot 2
of other responsibilities on one nuclear engineer.
3 Q
Do you have any general suggestions for improvement 4
of NRC response following an accident of this nature?
5 A
We were always under the impression that NRC would 6
respond only to handle the -- to look over the shoulders of 7
the utilities to find out if they were complying with some-8 body's regulations.
We had -- Maggi; Reilly had pestered the 9
commission, and in particular Collins and his crew, about 10 their emergency plans.
Now, we have to submit our emergency l
jj plans to them.
Why don't you submit your emergency plans to 12 us?
We w uld like to know what you are doing too.
That is 13 Maggie, probably.
We really didn't think that they would 14 resp nd in the manner in which they did.
15 Now, if it had -- it wasn't a typical accident 16 either.
When we thought of what is an accident, we thought 17 y u were going to huvo a pipe break, you were going to release 18 radioact ivit y.
We are going to make decisions bad or good.
)9 We are going to move people or not move people and then 20 suffer the consequences later.
And. we always felt that the first big accident was
\\
g ing to happen in Ponnsylvania.
We just knew it was going 23 to.
I guess.all the other states feel the same way.
But 24 when Maggio called that morning, I said, "Well, here it is 25 MOh4 Cat STINOGR APHIC. S ERY4CE, 1413 OLD M'LL RO AD. WTOMistING. P A 198t0
53 1
the way we predicted.
Let's go."
It was that kind of an 1
2 attitude.
3 We knew we were ready to respond within our capa-4 bilities.
I don't -- I still don't know what NRC will do in
{}
5 the next reactor, accident.
They didn't do well on this one.
6 I don't like the idea though of NRC by-passing the radiation 7
peoplo in the state and going directly to the Governor and 8
making recommendations.
I think they ought to work with the 9
radiation people of the state and together go to the Governor 10 and together make those recommendations.
11 What Doc Collins did on Friday morning is obscene, 12 and I just can't imagine him doing that or going to the people 13 that he did saying we recommend you evacuate without ever 14 informing us of the reasons for that evacuation.
And I hope 15 that never happens again.
That was a dumb decision.
16 Q
What other major deficiencies can you identify with 17 NRC?
18 A
Well, I ha've a feeling and -- from reading some of 19 the documentation af terwards is that when the regional people 20 got in right away that'they didn't do anything, that they 21 really -- they didn't take over, which they didn't want to.
22 But they didn't get involved in the decision making process v
23 as to what was really going on at that reactor.
They weren't 24 looking over their shoulders and saying, "You have got a hot you 25 thermocouple thad aren't watrhing."
They weren't trying to MONeCK S f f NOGR APHtC. SERV'C E.
9 4 9 3 OLD WIL L RO AD. W TOM 6SSING PA l9410
54 1
be helpful.
They wore being inspectors.
They were trained to 2
be inspectors and not trained to run a reactor.
Stello was 3
probably the only one that could run that reactor.
He know 4
enough about the total -- the whole system.
And NRC is made
{v-]
5 up of experts in, system -- in small systems,and they all get 6
together in one spa and everybody argues, and they all work 7
it out and it works out well f or licensing.
But not for 8
operations.
9 And I think that is the biggest problem.
You have 10 got to get some people who are not generalists but who know
!the reactor problems intimately and what -- in the actions ti 12 taken by the operators to mitigate consequences of accidents, 13 this should be something that NRC people would say, "No, don!t
,-(A 14 do that."
15 Instead, they let them go and do things without even 16 approving them.
Turning valvos off.
I don't think they were 17 asked either.
18 I know this is blasphemy, but NRC has been run so 19 long by lawyers that they are so interested in the legal 20 aspects of what you are doing that sometimes they miss the i
21 safety aspects.
If it is not in tech specs or if it is not 22 in the regulation, they don't do anything.
That is a lot of l O
t 23 crap.
And I think that they ought to be able to respond to 24 an accident, have the authority to direct operations if 25 necessary and to countermand the actions of operators if they M O N 6C it $1f psOGR A PHIC,SteevaC f.
1413 OL O mal L WO A D, W YOMIS SING. PA.
194t0
~l
55 1
are properly trained to do it.
I said if necessary and they what
/
2 feel competent that they -- that they are proposing is better 3
than what the operators are doing.
4 I am concerned in general about the quality of the 5
staffs at utilities, at small utilities.
And I don't know 6
how to resolve that one.
They -- especially the health 7
physicist staff.
We have been trying to upgrade health 8
physicists at plants and so has NRC for a long time.
And it 9
just hasn't happened.
They get a fairly qualified guy, and 10 they put him headquarters.
So he is a liason between the 11 commission and the reactor.
And he doesn't get into the day-12 to-day operations.
It 's a -- maybe combining utilities.
13 There are some good utilities.
Some people in some
(( )
14 of the utilities that can really -- that are really sharp and 15 can handle routine emergencies.
I don't think Funnsylvania 16 has any of those.
17 The people at reactors at the utilities still think 18 of a reactor as just a different kind of coal-fired boiler.
_ j9 That is how they came up, through the system, many of them.
20 And then the reactor operators are mainly nuclear navy guys, 21 and I have got a question as to whether the nuclear navy 22 experience on reactors may have hau 'n influence on their
/~
(_)N 23 decisions, for example, not to go solid in the pressurizer, 24 which is something you can't do on a sub but something you can 25 do at TMI.
And they were so ingrained with the Rickover M O Pe CM STENOGnaPHec $tsevic t.
14 9 3 OL D MILL nO A D, WTOMISSING. PA 19610 i
l
56 1
approach to handling the subreactor they may not have -- that 2
there may have been an overriding concern.
3 Q
Anything else?
1
(~s 4
A Maybe they will have to be debriefed.
Rickover has d
5 a hell of a training program for his program, but it is not 6
good enough for the commercial world, or it is not the kind 7
for the commercial world.
8 MR. ERNST:
That is about the end of the 9
questions we had.
Do you have any other observations or --
10 THE WITNESS:
I hope you are the last group.
11 BY MR. CHIN:
12 Q
I have a couple of clarifying questions.- You men-13 tioned earlier during the meeting of Herbein, Miller and 14 Kunder*that you --
15 A
Herbein and Miller.
I don't remember that anyone 16 besides Herbein and Miller being there, so that is why --
17 Q
I think Mr. Kunder*was manning the phone, staying 18 in touch with the plant for Jack Herbein.
19 A
Right, there was another person there.
20 Q
You also mentioned you were dependant on Mr. Gallina 21 for some of the radiological informat ion.
Where were you 22 getting the plant status information?
('
23 A
We weren't.
Af ter NRC arrived, we felt -- unless 24 there was some change in the plant status that they felt they 25 needed to tell us, we didn't ask for it, after they nrrived
" spelled phonetically MON 4CK ST ENOGR A PHIC.SERVIC E, 14 9 9 OLD MILL ROAD. W TOMeSSING, PA 19410
57 1
on Wednesday afternoon in for.co.
2 Q
I see.
Was Mr. Dornsife on site?
3 A
On Thursday?
Not on site.
IIe was on site in the 4
trailers.
5 Q
I see.. You mentioned earlier during your discussions 6
of the IIerbein-Miller conversation with hk. Scranton that you 7
were not aware of the steam dump.
8 A
Yes,-I don't remember steam dumps being brought up 9
at all.
It may have been.
10 Q
I would like to jog your memory a bit.
Earlier 11 that day, you learned of the releases from the plant about 12 10:45 13 A
Yes.
14 Q
And you elected not to try to communicate this to 15 Mr. Dornsife who was participating in the press conference at 16 the Lieutenant Governor's press conference.
Do you recall 17 that?
18 A
No, we did communicate with him and inf orm him of 19 what the releases were.
And at the press conference he -- he 20 didn't communicate that with the Lieutenant Governor.
21 Q
What releases were you talking about at that moment?
22 A
At 10:45 we were detecting of f site levels.
They O
23 were detecting off site levels of 1 to 2 mr/hr and iodine and 24 radio iodine samples scro coming in.
We informed him of the 25 radio iodine anyway because that he mentioned during the M O N iC 8E ST f NOGR APHIC,5E RVeCf. B e t 3 OL D MsLL MO A D. WYOMISSING. P4 196t0
58 1
press conference, and that shook up the Lieutenant Governor 2
because he didn't know about it.
3 Q
Were those releases that you were referring to g3 4
related to the steam release?
I y1 5
A No, we.weren't told that they were coming from the 6
steam.
We were told they were coming from water that had 7
been pumped over from containment into the AUX building floor 8
and the stuff was coming from the AUX building floor.
Maybe 9
somebody can refresh my memory, but I don't remember anything 10 about steam releases.
11 MR. CHIN:
All right.
That is all I have.
12 BY MR. HERR:
13 Q
On the potassium iodide, I believe you stated that Q]
\\-
y you were disappointed the potassium iodide was not put at 15 locations where the people were.
16 A
Where people were able to get it.
j7 Q
You don't mean that it was not distributed as 18 recommended by HEW'but that it was not put in the centralized locations?
39 A
That's right.
20 Q
In preparation for distribution?
21 A
Right.
Okay.
One step further.
Not giving it to 22 eg
/
the people.
No, I think that would have been a major mistake.
23 24 I w uldn't'even request KI for our own people.
Once the Health Department got a hold of it.
So, we were thinking of making 25 MOktCR 57tNOGR APHic stRyaCE. 9 413 OLD MILL RO A D, WYOMISSING. PA 19610
59 1
it up in the laboratory ourselves.
2 Interestingly, all the FDA that were up there had 3
their own little vials in their pockets.
(~)
4 Q
Do you know where they got it?
v 5
A Sure.
From FDA as part of the shipment.
6 MR. CHIN:
In conclusion, this is an ongoing 7
investigation, and although I have completed the questions I 8
have for you today, we may need to bring you back, but hope-9 fully not for further depositions.
With that in mind, I 10 would like to recess this deposition rather than terminate it, 11 but I do thank you very much for your time and patience with 12 us.
13 (Thereupon, the deposition of Mr. Gerusky was
.O 14 recessed.)
15 CERTIFICATE 16 I hereby certify that the proceedings and evidence 17 are contained fully and accurately in the notes taken by me 18 on the hearing of the foregoing cause, and that this copy is 19 a correct transcript of the same.
20
~
4 21
'ing, Reporter-Notary Pthlic Nancy ONell 22 Notary Public in and for the Commonwealth
(
of Pennsylvania, with of fices located at 23 1413 Old Mill Rnad, Wyomissing, Pennsylvania My Commission expires December 13, 1982 24 25 MoroICK STFNOGR APHIC. SERV 8C E 1413 CLD MILL ROA D, WYQMIS$6*eG. P4 19610
c-
$UN h'
- u c%'o, UNITED STATES E h g(f.. pji NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHf NGToN,0. C. 20555
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In Reply Refer to:
,4 NTFTM 790904-02 s
y os Mr. Thomas M.~ Cerusky, Director Bureau of Radiation Protection Fulton Bldg., 5th Floor P. O. Box 2053 Harrisburg, Pa.
17120~
Dear Mr. Cerusky:
I am writing to confirm that your deposition under oath in connection with the accident at Three Mile Island is scheduled for September 19,1979 at 1:00 p.m.,
in a meeting room at the Holiday Inn Town motel, 2nd and Chestnut Streets, Harrisburg, Pa.
Picase bring with you a copy of your resume and any documents in your possession or control regarding TMI-2, the accident or precursor events which you have reason to believe may not be in official NRC files, including any diary or personal working file.
l The deposition will be conducted by members of the NRC's Special Inquiry Group on Three Mile Island.
This Group is being directed independently of the NRC by p
V the law firm of Rogovin, Stern and Huge.
It includes both NRC person el who i
have been detailed to the Special Inquiry Staff, and outside staff and attorneys.
Through a delegation of authority from the NRC under Section 161(c) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, the Special Inquiry Group has a broad mandate to inquire into the causes of the accident at Three Mile Island, to identify major problem areas and to make recommendatiens for change. At the i
conclusion of its investigation, the Group will issue a detailed public report setting forth its findings and recommendations.
Unless you have been served with a subpoena, your participation in the deposi-tion is voluntary and there will be no effect on you if you decline to answer some or all of the questions asked you. However, the Special Inquiry has been given the power to subpoena witnesses to appear and testify under oath, or to appear and produce documents, or both, at any designated place.
Any person deposed may have an attorney present or any other person he wishes accompany him at the deposition as his representative.
You should realize that while we will try to respedt any requests for confiden-
-tiality in connection with the publication of our report, we can make no guar-antees. Names of witnesses and the information they provide may eventually l p) become public, inasmuch as the entire record of the Special Inquiry Group's
-(,
i investigation will be made available to the NRC for whatever uses it may deem i
i a
i-s
e
.I 1
2
[
appropriate. In time, this information may be made available to the public
[.
voluntarily, or become available to the public through the Freedom of Informa-tion Act. Moreover, other departments and agencies of government may request access to this information pursuant to the Priv,a'cy Act of 1974.
The information may also be made available in whole or in part',to committees or subcommittees of the U.S. Congress.
'S If you have testified previously with respect to the Three Mile Island accident, it would be useful if you could review any transcripts of your previous state-ment (s) prior to the deposition.
Thank you for your cooperation.
Sincerely, O
I h
Mitchell Rogovin, Director e
NRC/TMI Special Inquiry Group V
4
-P00R ORIGINAL O
s
bEm3k $2-
. = -
Thomas M. Gerusky Director, Bureau of Radiation Protection Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Resources Born: June 18, 1935, Fort Edward, New York
~
455 Poplar Church Road, Camp liill, Pennsylvania 17011 Present M dress:
Education:
B.S., G"noral Science, Union College, Schenectady New York - 1956 AEC 17cilowship in 1:adiological Physi en, Universit y of Ilochest er, llochester, New York - 1956 - 1957 Employment:
1957-1959 Ilealth Physicist, Brookhaven National 1 aboratory, Upton, New York.
Responsible for directing radiation safety pro. gram at the llot 1,aboratory and the Cosmotron.
Spent approxi-mately nine months as health physicist it the llNI, Graphite Itcactor.
1959-1961 llealth Physicist, Squibb Institute for Medical Research, New Llrunswick, New Jersey, itesponsible for radiation safety in radiopharnaceutical research and production facilitics.
1961 - present Director, Radiation Protection Program, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
Present title:
Director, Bureau of Radiation Pro-O#
tection, Departnent of Environmental llesources.
Responsible for directing a statewide program of ra liation safety relating to all sources of radiation.
Professional llonors and Responsibi.11 tics:
Certi fied, American 11oard of Ilealth Phycics,1962 Member, Panel of E..aminers, American laard of itcalth Physics, 1968-72
?!cmber, American Board of Ilealth Physics, 1972-76 Member, llealth Physics Society, 1957 - pr esent Chai rman, Membership Committec, Ilealth I'hysics Societ y, 1968-69 Member, Radiological llealth Sect ion, American Public ilcalth Assaciation Chairman, Radiological llealth Section, American Public Ilealth Association - 1971-72
. Member, APilA Governing Council, 1972-75 Member, Conference of Radiation Control Program Directors First Dhairman, Conference of Radiation Control Program Directors, 1963-70 Member, fixecutive Board, Conference of Radiation Control
ns Professional 18mors and Responsibilities:
Cont'd, o
h Program Directors, 1968-1971
~
blember, Surgeon Ger. oral's Ad floc Tank Force on blicrowave Ovens, 1970 i
b!cmber, Industrial and Professionai Advisory Committee, School of Engineering, Pennsylvania State University,1970 to 1978.
b!cnber, American National Standards Institute N-12 Committee on Nuclear Terminology, Units, Symbols, Identification nnd Signals, 1967 to present b!cmber, Pennsylvania llazardous Substances Transportation Board, 1966 to present blember DilEW Technical Electronic Product Radiation Safery Standards Committee, 1976-1979 Ffember, Nominating Committee,llealth 1:hysics Society, 1976-1978 Who's Who in Government Who's Who in the East 7x
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!{RC PliOCEDURES FOR DECISI0tl TO REC 0KMEllD EVACUATIO!i Who _ Decides 1.
Co,binaticn of consec,uences and times r equire indiate initiacion d
of evacuation:
Senior f!PC Of ficial on site n?cceends to Governor, b
d 3
'2.
Unplanned event with substantial risk takes place or is in..inent y
or situation judged excessively risky but therc is time for cen-sultation.
Senior NRC Official notifies Gdvernor and NRC HQ.
Chaircan rakes recccreadation to Governor af ter consulting with Comissioners if possible.
3.
Planned event involving significant additional risk.
Chai rran
()
and Ccmissioners rekes recom.:ndation.
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Projected doses of S rr.ns whoic body or 25 rems thyroid cundatory h
c.
7 evacuation of all persons.
11
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Assums general warning already that sem form of evacuation ray
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The table is based on a realistic prediction of the weather for the next'
.few days, based on the April 1 forecast which would result in high doses at a giv,en distance. At the approach to decision time for evacuation, the z
.s U
eppropriate r.eterological condition will be factored into the dose estimates to determine the evacuaticn time, sectors, 2.nd distances for the evacuation, I
2 hRC is predicting the dispersion characteristics of the region for the i
,{, currently measured rneteorology as the incident progresses.
Rain could lead 8
i l
to higher local radioactivity levels.
}
Hea t Generation _
The reactor core is now quite ccol corpared to the conventional dnign-basis calculations.
[VN 1.
The reactor is new. so no fuel 1 as more than 3 nanths cqui.alent operation, coc. pared to 1-2 yecrs avercgc for other plaats.
2.
The neutron chain reacticn has been sliot down for over 4 days.
i It should also be noted that the cencrete ba,o'at of this plant is 4
l 1
i unusually thick.
I As a result of the above differences, calculations for this picnt at this "l
time predict that the core will not telt its way thrcugh the containment.
i Q..
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k O
+
A
- _=.
v
- c., a q liitapf )
S t a t; 3 f c.colw Ofa4%~l70Ei
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_ive pg uco SlotN S.4,P]' cg71.1 vmbt:L Blik}~ h'5Nbuj>
,.o s:,a; 5 tars
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LIea g.W.100' min Cor'e's tcrts to wc unco M R.
(5 'f,7(i:F150 min Core begins to n it ac./f
~
, q.y,..
s d[ilbyh200 min P.olten core is in lower head of reactor vessel, pressure
.,,. fS.t '.
is 2500 psia
!. % 4r?
...T.ine'210 min Reactor vessel fails, contairmat pressure goes to 25 psia
- a. n :w.,
- g'-Qq;,d{;i" ti.ey216 nin Hydrogen burns, co~ntaircent pressure goes to 67 psia Steam explosion possibility.- cinor cons,equence c..,;...,CO.4TAlt.'t:ENT SURVIVES (Failure assumed 130 psia)
. ~~-
. y,.
Tic 810 hours0.00938 days <br />0.225 hours <br />0.00134 weeks <br />3.08205e-4 months <br /> Molten' core has celted about I ceter into basemat yi Iice days
- V- '
cent integrity CAUTIO.'t:
- Keep sprays. running
~
- Keep water cany feet over miten debris (n,)
. c :. ~.
- UITHOUT RECO.'!3HIERS tlydrogen continues td build up SASEPAT SUP.'/IVES Event 1
Conclusion:
This event shuuld not produce majo releases 4'
8:.y.
Event 2
- Sprays'and Coolers Failed Before Flow Soops
-Time=0 to Time =210 min. Sane as Event 1 - ccatair.. ant pressure is 25 psia Time =810 cin Contain.T.ent pressure is 70 psia i
Tib.e=1 day
'. containment fails due to steam (mostly) overpressure -
- about 135 psia
,r3 C0'!TAltlMINT FARS V-T:
Event 2 Ccnclusion:
This event leads to ajor releases.
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