ML19305A533
| ML19305A533 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 06/29/1979 |
| From: | Marsh B NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7908300126 | |
| Download: ML19305A533 (21) | |
Text
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA l
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION I!
In the Matter of:
2!
IE TMI INVESTIGATION INTERVIEW 2l of William Madden, Physical Security Inspection, Region I 5'
7!,
8l Trailer #203 9l NRC Investigation Site TMI Nuclear Power Plant 10l Middletown, Pennsylvania uj May 7, 1979 12!
(Date of Interview) 13!
June 29, 1979 (Date Transcript Typed) 14 150 15!
(Tape Numoer(s))
16-1 17' i
181 19!
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NRC PERSONNEL:
22l g40(
Robert Marsh 23!
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853 258 i
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l MARSH:
The date is May 7, 1979.
The time is 2:52 PM in the afternoon.
1; I
i I am Bob Marsh and I'm an Investigator with the USNRC, assigned to the 2
Region III Office in Chicago, Illinois.
This afternoon we are at 3
USNRC's Region I Offices in King of Prussia, Pennsylvania for the 4
purp se f interviewing Bill Madden.
5 Bill, you're Physical Security Inspector, right? You've such a title?
6 i
7 MADDEN:
That's true.
8 9
MARSH:
Regarding his experiences and observations while up at Three Mile Island starting on about March 29 - I think you arrived, did you not?
12' 12, MADDEN:
30th.
14!
I 15i MARSH:
30th.
The other oerson in the room is Tim Martin, Performance 16!
Appraisal Team assigned to Headquarters.
Right Tim?
17 18l i
MARSH:
Bill, I am just going to turn it over to you and as we discussed, 19 before I turned the mike on the main thing I aia interested in is when 20 you arrived up there, what's your philosophy of the approach in the 21 situation, what did you try to do when you first arrived, and what 22 were your observations, do you feel you were successful, did you run 23 into problems, what can we benefit from your experiences, how can we 241 l,
benefit for the future.
And I would like to address, in the course of 25j l
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y your comments, how you came to conduct interviews with the people that y u did, On about what dates, and go a little bit into the custody of 2
that material since that date?
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MADDEN:
As Bob said, a Physical Security Inspector in Region I, 5l I
Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
I arrived onsite at fhree Mile at 61 approximately'll:45 hours on March 30, 1979.
The purpose of my arrival, and I had Mike Rogers with me, also a Physical Security Inspector from Region I, was twofold; one, to deliver a safeguards van up there at TMI and secondly, to conduct a security inspection overview of the security programs during the ongoing emergency.
This we commenced to do approximately at 12:00 on March 30 until about 3:00 o' clock in the afternoon on March 30. We looked at the Security Program, we looked 13 at where they had been from the time of the incident on March 28 14j l
through March 30 and we looked at where they were at that point in 15i time.
Around 1500 on March 30, I received a call from the Region 16!
i which indicated tc me that I was now to go into another role and that 17 was to be Regional Administrative Officer Forward.
My direction at 18i j
that point was just to be prepared to set up some form of a camp 191 capability and set up and provide emergency operations support in 20!
l terms of needs whatever they be for the development of what later 21 become know as Three Mile Island Trailer City.
The title, Regional 22 Administrative Officer Forward, looking back on on, it probably should 23 be more appropriately titled NRC Support Officer, or something along 24 those lines because Mike Rogers and myself ended up providing administrative, 25 I
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logistical, communications, procurement, and whatever support, not
.y nly to Region I and the staff, but also to the Office of Nuclear 2
Reactor Regulation and their staff. tie learned that trailers had been 3
ordered by the Regional Office and, of course, at that point in time 4
i it Was only one trailer as a matter of fact that had been ordered.
So I
we were looking at a field, if I may describe the circumstances at 61 that time, there was a field there with nothing on it but the Information 7
Center.
8.
There were no facilities.
I guess our most critical need at that time was communications.
We used a house, a dwelling that was I
located on the field there which had a single telephone capability.
10' Then we got a hold of the State Police, I'm trying to relate how that 11:
developed but I don't quite remember the details of it, knowing State 12l Police units normally have contingency capabilities.
We got a command 13 post from the State Police that arrived onsite about 7:00 o' clock and 14 I think it was operational about 8:00 o' clock at night.
Additionally, 15j in terms of communications support, the White House Advance Party was 16!
l there at that time and they had a communications system available.
17' However, we didn't have a trailer to put it in.
So we had the State 18' Police operational and then we got the White House capability and 19l installed it in the trailer which I believe arrived about 1:00 o' clock 20 on the morning of March 31.
From March 31 on that morning through at 21 least the next 3 or 4 days we ended up receiving trailers one after 22 the other to the tune I think of about 36 when they were all finished, 23 I'm not sure.
In terms. of immediate needs, looking back on it, I 24 could see where there was an immediate need for trailers, probably 25l i
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4 contractual arrangements on a contingency basis made somewhere along y
the line at each site.
To spit those trailers out with communications 2
capabilities immediately.
For the most part I know we had ongoing 3
communications between the Control Room and Headquarters and ongoing 4
c mmunications between the Control Room and Region I so really there 5
was n disruption in reporting capabilities.
And, as I say, we didn't 6
get facilities until 1 or 2 in the morning.
Then we got facilities, 7
we realized they were empty so we needed chairs, tables, etc. etc.
etc.
Everybody was standing.
I got a hold of the National Guard units in 1 trea both the U.S. Army, the U.S. Air Force. I don't know l
when this was.
This probably would of been early in the evening, 8 -
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9 o' clock March 30.
Made them aware of our immedate short term needs 12!
I in terms of chairs, tables, administrative supplies, etc.
Also asked 13{
them to consider giving me some numbers where I could have a 24 hour--
14!
t communications capability with the guard units and asked them if they 15i l
would be willing to support us. They did.
There was no problem, there 16i was outstanding cooperation.
For the record, I think I spoke with a 17l Colonel Miles, Commander of Army National Guard in Indiantown Gap and 1
18!
Colonel Cocheck, the Commander of the U.S. Air National Guard unit at 19!
Harrisburg.
As I say, their cooperation was outstanding.
So short 20 term needs were accomplished in the areas of administrative and logistical 21l supplies as best they could.
As trailers arrived we then got chairs 22 and so everything kind of fell into place where, after we received the 23 trailer, we probably had the capability in terms of hours after work.
24 How many hours, I don't recall.
C:.nmunications became a problem 25 i
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i because *:he lines couldn't carry the loads. We put a couple phones in and we exceeded out load capability at that point.
So we had to get 2
the telephone companies to stretch lines.
They, of course, at that 3
point in time didn't realize what our needs would be anymore than I don't think we could specifically determine what our needs would be.
From my own professional opinion, I think, when you have a first time incident it's pretty damn hard to discern what your needs are gonna be in terms of specificity.
So I think, the benefit of Monday morning quarterbacking, now we probably could say safely we need 200 phones 9l henceforth and 25 or 30 trailers henceforth.
However, this also 101 accommodates licensee needs.
But his capabilities of course were 11, critical too because we were able to exploit the armed forces channels 12 in terms of the National Guard but there were a lot of..aterials and 131 l
items that the industry had to provide us from Metropolitan Edison 14!
l resources. We formed a committee sometime on the night of March 30.
15i Myself and Mike Rogers representing the government side of the house 16i and from the industry we had Bill Parker and Don Berry from Metropolitan 17 Edison.
Don Berry cured our communications needs on a round-the-clock 18 basis for at least the next 4 oays working with the telephone company 19-directly and trying to perceive where our needs as best as we could 20l relate them as we started to build up.
Bill Parker provided the 21 logistical support to the government in terms of additional trailers 22 and equipment. Mike and I relayed any requests that we had from the 23 industry to government channels, be they ONRR or be they Region I.
A 241 l
good example I think of the cooperation of all involved was I received 25l l
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y notification, I believe the night of March 30, that we had 230 tons of 2l lead coming in by aircraft and surface transpor'tation from all over the United States.
You'll picture this as being a situation where we 3
didn't even have trailers but we had 231 tons of lead coming in.
5 meh w I'd say that was a smart decision.
Apparently it was, from 5
what best I could determine.- I never was able to confirm who ordered the lead - but I understand it was a Headquarters task out of the Incident Response Center.
I was never really able to confirm that, whether it originated in Region I as a defined need or down in Head-quarters, I don't know.
But anyhow we had airplanes coming at us.
Our next problem there was off-loading.
At that point in time the I
military was trying to feel its way through and these were guard 12!
organizations so the resources weren't there, the people weren't 13 l
there. So agreeably, they immediately volunteered Colonel Cocheck to 14!
solve the loading riddle by recalling the National Guard resources in.
15; They combined and, I might point out, officer and enlisted crews of 16i i
every rank and each rank up and down the line in the emergency and got 17f the lead off-loaded.
The next question was do we need the lead over 18{
l at the site at this point in time and what quantity and in what form 19l is the lead needed.
Of course to find that out, one has to go over to 20i i
the airport and look at the lead after it's off-loaded to determine 21l i
wnether or not there's any application.
So I got in touch with back 22l through our little committee back in the Metropolitan Edison channels 23 and they formed a lead committee, let's call it.
And they went over 24 to the airport and sampled what they had received, that they weren't 25l I
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7 even privy to it at that point in time and perceived what they felt they might need in short term.
So there you had Metropolitan Edison involved in discerning their own needs for whatever reason they needed 7
the lead.
Then we went back over to the Army because they didn't have a labor force.
Everybody was tied up with the ongoing emergency 5
situation.
There weren't any resources.
So we went back to the Army 61 1
and ask for troop support from the Army and they provided labor support.
7 So some of the lead was off-loaded, some of it was transferred that they felt they needed from the airport, from the Air Force side of-the airport, over to the site where it was staged.
I get the impression that the bulk of it, however, was staged at the at the Air National 11!
Guard in a location in the Air National Guard area where you had a 12' little biti of security over it because of its location and, secondly, 13 out of the way of air traffic control problems.
So anyhow the lead 141 problem came to pass.
That was probably the most shocking challenge 15:
that occurred during that period.
Communications then started to 16i l
build, facilities started to arrive, equipment started to arrive, and 171 things went very well.
They continued, I think, to go that way.
It 181 l
was really strictly a question of knowing the capabiitties, I think, 19) that you had available.
Fortunately I had spent a day at Harrisburg 20 with the Guard unit about 4 years ago and I knew their capabilities 21.
and I knew who was there and I think that helped a little bit.
The 22 guard units or military units being what they are they have contingency 23 capabilities and they ceuld be exploited very easily in a situation 24 like this.
As a matter of fact, I think we need interface agreements 25 l
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I gj with military forces in terms of stockpiling capabilities like this I
and being capable of rapid deployment.
I don't think that anybody 2
c uld afford the stockpiling in the kind of resources we need never 3
knowing if you are going to use them.
However, even without an inter-agency agreement, I just have to point out that there was never a no.
I think we all agreed out there that work with each other, that there 6
wouldn't be any'no's and I never had anyone say no to me on any request 7
for anything no matter how big it was or how small it was.
Nor did we say no to the industry.
So philosophizing a little bit I, problems s
became opportunities instead of problems.
Administratively, logisti-10l i
I cally and as things came up, like communications -we had the U.S.
11!
Forestry Service, they arrived and, God bless whoever Bernie Weiss, I 12!
I think it was, at Headquarters - ordered them.
They arrived with a 13 1,000 pounds of radios.
Now our next problem there was to perceive 14j j
what our needs are in terms of radios capabilities.
Mike Rogers can 15; tell you much more in detail the communications end of the picture 161 because he kind of just went ahead and run with that program.
They 17 stretched antennas as far away as Carlisle, 50 or 60 miles west of the 18(
plant.
They stretched repeater antennas all over the plant.
So they 191 immedi neiy within I guess, 24 or 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />, we had the capabilities 20 speaking to one another no matter where we were, whether.we were out 21, air sampling, were we flying, the ARMS teams, were we in the weather i
22 business, like the National Weather people that came in over at the 23 airport.
In any event there was an interface in communications set 24 up, I would say in about 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />, even though there were no specific 25 i
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definitive guidelines that one could look at and say this is how many 2;
nets we need this is where they need to be deployed.
It just became a 3
byproduct of everybodys' professional experience.
I'd say it worked I
q rather well.
I'd say that the U.S. Forestry Service was just absolutely 5l utstanding.
They're used to putting fires out and they are used to responding to emergencies, they really don't need to be told.
All 6
they need to do is look at the situation to per eive what your e.aeds 7
are.
Anyhow, from that point forward, through A, il 14, Mike Rogers and I - we can't narrow a title down that was kind of a "whatever the 9!
ongoing requirement was" - we provided the administrative and logistical support to everybody that needed it.
I think that's enough for that role.
The second role, the interview role, was born, if I'm not I
mistaken, Sunday morning, April 1, when two of the operstors... one 13l i
being William Zewe, the Senior Operator, and another licensed operator, 14i Ed Fredericks - came over to the area and indicated a willingness to 15!
participate in a debr afing with the Director of Region I, Boyce 16; Grier.
At this point in time, Boyce called me and introduced me to both of the operators and suggested what we then call a Preliminary 181 Inquiry.
You may change it. or it may not fit administratively but for 19!
i the lack of not thinking of another term we called it a Preliminary 20!
Inquiry.
I might point out, however, that the invitations were extended 21, to the licensed operators. We didn't have need to extend the first 22 invitation.
They came over and voluntarily wanted to do this to get 23 it on record.
If anyone wonders why it wasn't done a little earlier 24 than that, I 'd like to point out that when you have an ongoing fire, 2Sj t
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it's pretty damn hard to try and debrief those who are participating in the resolution of the fire.
These two guys, and all operators were i
2 working 13 to 14 hours1.62037e-4 days <br />0.00389 hours <br />2.314815e-5 weeks <br />5.327e-6 months <br /> a day from the very beginning.
One of the 3
rules that Boyce laid down in terms of debriefing these people were i
not to remove them from the job or detract from the ong'oing emergency.
51 With that in mind, we got together onsite on.'pril 1, myself, Mike 61 Rogers, Bill Zewe, the Senior Operator, and Ed Fredericks, another 7
operator. We sat down in my car and if you'll visualize the situation at this point in Trailer City - it was being built and there was a hell of a lot of noise in the background - and I had one of these 10l little portable tape recorders.
Well I might point out that we first 11!
12,j started to talk and, of ccurse, they expressed themselves in the engineer's language and it was very difficult for Mike and I to stay 13 up with them.
I immediately realized that we needed a recorder. That 141 was the only way we were gonna be able to preserve for the experts a 15i data base that would be useful.
We immediately went from an oral 16i j
discussion, I'd say to the tune of 10 or 15 minutes at the most.
We 17l immediately realized that we just couldn't stay up with these guys 18{
because when their train of thought turned on they just run.
We 191 switched a little portable tape recorder on and we spent probably 20j another hour and asked them to repeat everything that they had already 21}
said to that point. For the records, we did this on a little cassette I
22}
tape recorder - the normal type that is issued in Region I, which I 23l t
and everyone else knows, at this point, was very inadequate. We recorded 24:
what they had to say on the little cassette tape.
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I 11 MARSH:
Bill, let me interrupt.
That's the little micro-cassettes, y
right? The very tiny ones?
2 3!
1 MADDEN:
Yes.
I would suggest that that was about an hour, I don't 4!
n w, m nu es maA e, I'm not sure.
In any event just for the 5
record we later, in terms of custody of that tape, we later recorded 6
that little tape onto...
The first thing I did was get back with the State Police and came up with two decent' tape recordert.
8l 9
MARSH:
Reel to reel?
10' 11!
MADDEN:
Yes.
And they we transcribed from the little portable onto I
the State Police recorder and we got a little bit of amplification.
131 141 MARSH:
Bill, your original, is it a single cassette or is it more 15i than one cassette involved in your (loud noise)?
16i 17 L
MADDEN:
It's a single.
181 191 MARSH:
One single cassette?
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21l MADDEN:
And for the record that's in the safe in Region I.
23 MADDEN:
Along with the tape that we transcribed that onto is in the 24 safe at Region I.
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i MARSH:
y So you have the original and the first copy from that original?
2 MADDEN:
Right.
And they're in a sealed envelope in the Safeguards 3l Branch safe in Region I.
4 5
MARSH:
Between the time they were made and the time they were placed G,i in the safe, in whose custody were they?
7 8
MADDEN:
They were in ours at all times.
We lived with them.
And I 9l l
want to point out just as a sideline, sidelight here.
There were 101 l
obvious indications that we had two forced entries on our rooms, 1 11 i
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MARSH:
Could you go into a little bit of detail with that?
13l 14!
i MADDEN:
Yes.
First of all, one attempted entry must of been when I 15j was in the room because there was a chain, I'm talking about the Room 16i
- 269 at the Skyway Inn, in Swatara, Pennsylvania. The name of the 17l motel again is the Skyway Motel or Inn or whatever.
I think we dis-181 covered the attempted forced entry, Mike and myself, on Tuesday morning.
191 Now bear in lind that the population of that community from the time 20t j
of the incident, or let's say from F ch 30, in terms of Commission 21l l
resources we probably had 30 or 40 or 50 or 60 people there and we 22!'
build up in terms of industry, commission and sightseers and the media 23 up t1 a total of about 2,000 over that weekend.
So there were a lot 241 I
of transients in the area.
I think it was Tuesday morning, which 25}
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would of been April 3, that we didn't get much sleep back in those y
g days bdt we may have gotten a couple nours of sleep each night.
We n ted that someone had tried to pry the lock on the door.
We noted 3
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that, in fact, since I had to chain secured, in a secured mode they had in fact pried the chain and ripped the bolt out 'that secured the 5
r chain to the wall.
Mike Rogers was in Room #266 and he went over and E
1 1
ked at his door and sure enough somebody tried to work the door on 7
his room. Well, to make a long story short, we lived with those tapes.
If we were onsite those tapes were with us.
In terms of custody the tapes were ours the entire time from the time they were i
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made on Sunday April 1 through. I'm not quite sure if it's April 2, 3.
From April 1, the first interview with Zewe and Frederick.
There's a 12, question as to whether I did the interview with Faust and Scheimann.
13l
.. these were single interviews, and Fred Scheimaro and Craig Faust, 14 these are two more licensed operators that were on-duty bringing that 15!
total now to 4, Mr. Zewe, Mr. Frederick, Mr. Faust and Mr. Scheimann.
16i We did two single interviews with Faust and Scheimann on either April 17!
l 2 t-April 3, I'm not quite sure.
However, the tapes will probably 18l reveal that.
I think I recorded the dates on there when I did it.
191 20l MARSH:
Using same equipment or had you gone to reel to reel at that 21l l
time?
22' 23 MADDEN:
We went to the State Police recorders.
But we used the 24 little portable issued by the Commission, that was assigned to me on 25i I
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April 1, for the Zewe - Frederick interview.
Then we transcribed that to get some amplification. We transmitted that, I might point out, by 2,
I 3
phone that night to Headquarters, the Incident Response Center.
That was April 1.
Then realizing that we were handicapped with a recording 4
pr blem we went and got the two cecorders from the State Police.
Then 5
we transcribed the little tape onto the big tape.
I would imagine on 61 April 2 we transmitted that by phone to the Incident Response Center.
7 Then we did two single interviews, one with Faust and one with Scheimann.
8 One of the reasons for doing that is to give us a little bit more g
measurement long range wise.
So you heard a dual interview at the beginning and then you had 2 single interviews and then at the very end, on April 3 or 4, we did the group interview with all four operators using the State Police equipment all the way through.
All of these i
interviews now are on for the record, the original cassette tape which 14{
is down in the safe.
The original big tape, the State Police equipment, 15!
is down in the safe of course, copies one copy that has been made 16l since then, was turned over to the investigation team.
17i 18-MARSH: Then we have this?
191 I
i 20i MADDEN:
Yes.
The interviews went real well.
I'd certainly characterize 21!
I the operators as willing and cooperative.
I would say they tried very I
22 hard to be very objective.
Our purpose was merely to develope a data 23 base from which the formal investigation team, once it was constituted, 24j would be able to at least have something to start with and spring from 25!
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there. We were going to get into the Aux Operators and interviewing
-2 them.
I think there was 10 or 11 of them, I'm-not sure.
But at that 3
point in time coincidental with that idea why the beginning of the 4
formal investigation team was being put in place.
I guess authority I
5 felt at that point in time they had sufficient information to go from 6
in terms of a data base.
Looking back on it, I think I probably would 7
have to agree unless there had been any surprises out there that I g
don't know about.
9 10 MARSH:
The time is 3:20 we are going to take a break just a minute to 11 get a drink.
12 MARSH:
The time is 3:21 and we are just resuming now.
13 14 MADDEN:
So you've listened to a couple of roles we played.
One that 15 16 was kind of multi-functional in terms providing administrative and 17 logistical support communications and what have you for the Commissioa resources onsite and/or for the industry, did they have requirements yg that we could meet.
The second role was when we went into an interview g
20 m de n April 1 through either April 3 or April 4, I'm not quite sure.
We'll have to go.to the tapes and find out.
The third role that we played is was the one that we started off on.
That was, you might say, a continual review of the security program at Three Mile during the ongoing emergency.
Needless to say if anybody thinks that the rules. work in that type of situation they're crazy.
They have a lot 053 2/3 i
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.to learn.
But I might point out that what we tried to do, and I think 2
we have so far, since we haven't had any surprises onsite that I'm 3
aware of, we took the rule and we used it as a protection standard 4
which it is in fact.
Then we bent the rule in those areas where it 5
needed to bend so E. hat we would not hinder produccivity but at the 6
same time we wouldn't lose the safeguards capability in that ongoing 7
situation which was very critical.
Because, like I said earlier, we 8
had about 2. It had gone up to probably, when one reviews the number 9
of badges that were issued out there, we probably had at least 4,000 10 visitors I'd say from March 30 through the next two weeks, April 14.
11 Before it's over with, I can't resist saying it will probably be 50.
p We helped. We built the city, in a way.
We interviewed without 13 taking the operators away from the emergency.
We paid attention to 74 the preservation of the safeguards capability in terms of physical pr tection at the site. We worked with the licensee security management 15 pe ple.
We w rked with, as a matter of fact, the Vice President for 16 Generation.
And collectively, we also invited the Office of Nuclear g
Reactor Regulation down to take a look and do it with us.
We had to g
change the security program several times.
We went, for example, from g
a norm of about 65 or 70 people resources, in terms of security manpower.
21 MARSH:
I am going to interrupt you for just a second and we are going to break again for just a second while I turn this tape over.
The time being 3:23 and a reading of 488 on the meter.
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MARSH:
The time is 3:26 we are resuming now.
Bill you were talking 2
about the security survey that you were conducting.
3 4
MADDEN:
Trying to put this in time perspective now. March 30 when I 5l arrived I said' earlier I looked at it for 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.
Then we went into i
61 a more or less a logistical role.
But each day from March 30 through 7
the first break, for me'was April 14, we did look at the Security 8
Program.
The way we did it was either Mike Rogers or myself went over 9
and did an hour or two whenever, it could be in the morning, it could 10 be at night, it could be anytime. At the same time we used our other 11.
inspectorr that were onsite I might point out this was a plus because 17 we wouldri't of been able to stay with it up without them.
So we are 13 using the other inspectors that were on-duty in the Control Room and 14 in Health Physics end of it to sample the Security Program on an h
ongoing basis at night time.
I'd like to commend, whether it's appropriate i
16j
.or n t, a guy name Yuhas from Health Physics who did one hell of an 17 outstanding job in providing me feedback.
As I say we bent the rules, yg' we also had made sure that we briefed our inspecto.s that were going on at night as to how we bent them the best we could, not in specifics.
7g 20 But we were able to gauge where we were going and what we were doing.
As I say, there was a hell of a threat during this period in terms of anywhere from 2 to 4,000 transients in the area.
I might point out that many of them had desires to go onsite for no other reason than to take pictures.
We assumed in other words, a very potent threat to a security program.
And of course, with all the health physics ramifi-l I
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cations if anybody had accidentally wandered onsite and wandered into, 2;
God forbid the Aux Building or some of the other areas.
So that 3
continued.
neld a total of three management meetings with licensee 4
management during that period.
Two of which were I&E, myself, Mike 5
Rogers and licensee management; one of which included NRR which we 6
invited from-Washington and their response was very prompt.
I don't 7
know when this was.
Probably into the second week, April 7, April 8.
g NRR came down and we had another interface meeting; program, in terms 9
of Part 73.55 as a protection standard, anytime that we bent the rule 10 r had to bend the rule in the name of productivity.
In other words, 11 where we could not afford to degrade the access requirements of people 12 based on emergency needs for those people.
We developed compensatory measures.
Anytime that we bent the rule we may have developed one or 13 two more compensatory measures.
Little measurements that we could use y4 that gave it the kind of redundancy, although that it wasn't totally 5
g conventional in terms of a rule, we think it worked.
And that was the third role.
That was a continuous role and continues to be a role.
I g
left the site April 14 and came back to the Region, stayed here through Wednesday, I believe April 18, returned to the site on Wednesday, g
April 18, went back to the site and relieved Mc0 scar as Regional Administrative Officer.
At that point of time we had administration because we had typists, typewriters and facilities.
Of course after you get all the facilities in place, then paper kind of comes in.
The second role I played from April 18 through April 21, onsite, two roles i
24 involved; one replacing John Mc0 scar - of course he came back, I 25
.l 1
053 276
19 1.
think, April 20 - the other role being ongoing monitoring of the i
26 Physical Security Program.
Had no problems.
The only comment I have, 3
I think, is and I was most impressed with this, I never heard the word 4l no, nowhere.
I-think that's the attitude.
There are certain things 5
that government can come up with and they're very resourceful, i.e.,
6 the lead, where the industry is kind of hard pressed, especially for 7
the emergency they were in to even be thinking about perceiving their 8
needs.
9 10 MARTIN:
When you said f.e., are you talking example?
11!
MADDEN:
I meant for example, when you have an ongoing emergency like y
13 the one I thought I appreciated they had., we made a deal, anything 14 that you need you say so and we'll channel it in the government, if 3
you can't get it in industry.
On the other hand, we willingly partici-pated in exploiting anything that the industry could provide that we 16 g
couldn't get through government channels in terms of geography, our separation, our distance and what have you.
So I think the marriage of government, industry and the local community did as best they could g
in terms of that being their first experience of that type of nature which no one had a plan.
I guess we exceeded the plans in a few minutes - all + hat had been written.
I'm sure we'll gain from it.
If anybody wants any guts feelings, whether you want them or not you're gonna get them, I think there is a definite need this is just based on my empathy and all the questioning that I did - be it the interviewing i
Bua 77 7
s
20 1
of the operators or De it gleening out the people around me that were I'
2 involved in the emergency - I think two things:
one, I think somebody 3
ought to write the story on what went well, which is very remiss thus I
4l far.
Along with that I'd like to say that Uncle Sam better think 5
seriously about finding some TV time in an emergency like that because, 6
it was my experience, we I don't think we can rely on the press to 7
translate what they perceive to be a problem and explain it to the 8
public without arousing anxiety.
I kind of believe that it's a government 9
responsibility to do this and be consistent.
So I think if we haven't 10 learned from Three Mile and many of the other emergencies in this 11 nation, I think we should learn.
It's about time we need to buy TV y
time and stick ourselves in a position where we answer the public and 13 we pr vide a continuing revelation of the ongoing emergency from one source.
I think this can be greatly improved and I don't know why in 14 l
the hell we haven't done it yet.
I don't mean the Commission, I mean
.15 g vernment.
The free enterprise system is fine and I think it works 16 well, but I don't think you need somebody to translate for you when g
g they don't know what they are talking about.
I think to some extent that happened - a lot of it.
I think it created the anxiety within the community to some extent.
The second thing that I think can be improved is regulation.
The general jist of responses from the operations people, well just technical people in general that were involved in the emergency both on the government side of the house and on the industrial side of the house, I think genuinely they would probably all agree that there's a need for more specificity in terms of regulation.
25,i l
l 833 278 l
i
m s
21 1
I can say in terms of my own experiences, I think there's a great need 2!
for more specificity in terms of regulation if you're going to get a 3
no-fault performance standard.
To do that you got to build a hell of 4
lot of redundancy into it.
You can take the nicest equipment in the 5
world worth millions of millions of dollars, and people, and all the 6
people that are the greatest, but if you don't build redundancy into 7
and tie it into a performance standard in terms of specific requirements, 8
be it the Control Room, the Safeguards Program, the Health Physics 9
Program whatever, I don't ever think yot are going to G
'5e corollary 10 that you need to maintain what I've always be trained to accept anyhow, 11 is a perfectionary performance standard no less for the Nuclear Safety 12 roles and their applications.
That's all I have to say.
13 I
MARSH:
Appreciate your comments and your recall.
Knowing you're busy 14l 15 and having seen your desk the way you have it heeped up, we'll wrap up 16 the tape at this time and let you get back but we surely do appreciate y ur comments ind your help up there.
The time being 3:36 with a 17 reading f 684 on the meter, I'm going to terminate this tape.
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