ML19296D554
| ML19296D554 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Erwin |
| Issue date: | 11/06/1979 |
| From: | NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19296D553 | List: |
| References | |
| REF-10CFR9.7 NUDOCS 8003050241 | |
| Download: ML19296D554 (34) | |
Text
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
/
IN THE lAATTER OF:
CLOSED MEETING NFS-Erwin t
Placo - Washington, D. C.
Dato.
Tuesday, 6 November 1979 Pogos 1 - 34 Telephone:
(202)347 3700 ACE-FEDER AL REPORTERS,1NC.
OfficialReporters 444 North Capitol Street Woshington D.C.20001 NATIONWIDE COVERAGE. DAILY 4003050 t
e....
.a.
CR8145 1
j UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 2
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 3
4 CLOSED MEETING S
\\
NFS-Erwin 7
~~~
8 9
Room 1167 1717 H Street, N. W.
10 Washington, D.
C.
11 Tuesday, 6 November 1979 12 The Commission met in Closed Session, pursuant to notice, 13 at 2:30 p.m.
14 BEFORE:
15 VICTOR GILINSKY, Commissioner, Presiding 16 PETER A. BRADFORD, Commissioner 17 JOHN F. AHEARN.?, Commissioner 18 PRESENT:
19 Messrs. Snyder, Partlow, Burnett, Gillespie, and 20 Satkowski.
21 22 23 24 rederal Fleporters, Inc.
25 i
2 45 01 01 pv BdH I
PR0CEEDINGS 2
COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
I believe we have to vote 3
to close this meeting.
I propose that we vote to close this 4
meeting on the Erwin inventory differences, and I am told 5
that the proper exemptions that apply here are 1, 3, 4, and 6
7.
7 (Chorus of ayes.)
8 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
The presentation will be 9
made by Mr. Burnett.
10 MR. BURNETT:
I just learned that recently.
11 COMMISS IONER GILINSKY:
Ple ase go ahead.
12 MR. BURNETT All right, Mr. Commi ssioner.
13 In accordance with brevity and also some plane 14 sched ul es, the FBI is here to brief us today as to some of 15 their findings.
16 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
I understand they have to it catch a plane, and I have to catch a plane about the sams 18 time, so we are all going to cooperate.
19 MR. BURNETT:
I will try to keep the whole thing 20 as short as possiole, but ask the FBI -- I will catapault 21 them right to the beginning right now, and they can give us 22 some gene ral ideas.
23 I would like to introduce Mr. Bob Satkowski and L u fA n Ai
- { F 24 L ee la4 hum o f the FBI.
Of course, you know, Bob, I think.
25 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Please come up here.
de 9
3 45 O! 02 pv BWH' I
are pleased to have you.
2 MR. SATK0WSKI:
We have conducted approximately 60 p
3 interviews, both at NFS salaried employees,,wl age employees,
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4 people outside af the NFS.
/le have made dcertain allegations 4
5 regarding the operation of the plant or a specific 6
individual in one instance of the plant.
e The general consensus of those interviewed was 8
that there was no diversion or thef t; security ~was good a t 9
the plant.
The folks there would have no reason to engage 10 in any of that because of the good salary they make for the 11 area.
12 On the other side, there were f actors brought up 13 that seemingly need to be addressed.
One is the 14 55 gallon drums that were sent to South Carolina for 15 burial.
Ano ther is the supposed ine f ficiency of the 16 measuring s'ystem o f the stac ks down there.
Another was the il f atigue f actor with the salary employ ees working various 18 phases of the production process and not for the entire time 19 frame of the strike.
Salaried employees were moved around 20 to di fferent areas to work.
This was pointed out as perhaps 21 leading to miscounting, misanalysis, this type of 22 situa tion.
23 Tha t i s, in a nutshell, what we came up with.
24 Tne interviews regarding allegations made 23 specifically on the one employee proved to oe incorrect.
r 4
45 01 03 7[d /pg3 g pv BWH' 1
There.ias another allegation made about the B
2 approach at a cocktail party, which appears to be a figment gleamed
- }f3 of the imagination of the particular writer who,cicised-what 4
she deemed appropriate and formulated the story and wrote 5
it.
There appeared to be no substance to what she said.
6 COMMISSIONER BR ADFORD:
tiha t story is that?
/
MR. SATK0WSKI This was the situation of an 8
individual making inquiry at a cocktail party of an NFS 9
employee concerning containerization.
10 COMMISSIONER BRAD?ORD:
Did that appear in a' paper 11 somewhere?
12 MR. SATK0WSKI:
Yes.
13 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD.
hich one?
14 MR. BURNETT:
It came in.
It recently ran in the 15 Atlanta Cons titution.
But when I was down on the visit, 16 which was around September 18 or 19, an employee contacted a 14 newspaper, telling a story that he had heard of an NFS The.
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18 employee talking about overseas canisters produc tion thereof 19 and shipment of uranium.
That was reported to a reporter in 23 the area, by the name of Linda Sanders.
21 She, in turn, informed us at the f acility and, I 22 think, also, the regional FBI.
That was where the FBI got 23 involved in that case.
He was just relating it.
It appears 24 to oe less credible than when her words were first 23 accounted.
_. _ _. ~... _....
45 01 04 S
pv BWH 1
COMMISS IONER GILINSKY:
Where does this leave you?
2 MR. SATK0WS KI We are currently in a status quo 3
or a holding pattern, if -you will, concerning any additional 4
interviews until we can get some clarification on the j[
5 speci fic incident that we hadg (11s#T/ONE D 6
COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
How did you choose the 60
/
that you interviewed?
What was the criteria that was used?
8 MR. SATKodSKI:
The criteria set forth by 9
headquarters to Knoxville to interview salaried employees 10 were in all phase s of operation -- accounting --
11 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
A random sample?
12 MR. SATKOWSKI:
Yes.
The breakdown was 31 13 salaried employees, 18 wage earners, six security people, 14 and, I believe five others.
15 CO MMISSIONER AHEARNE:
It was basically a random 16 sample to see if you came up with anything, and you didn't?
I, MR. BURNETT:
One thing that was going to come out 18 further in this presentation, as you know, we have been 1) unable to close the balance of this inventory period.
We 23 know that tne classified number was
[$ -
21 They have accounted for
-y 22 leaving us a balance of
.J 23 Based on that, I did go bac k to Mr. Sa tkowski and 24 asked him to reinstitute his interviews.
He elected at that 25 tima to wait until the plant report was in. -It was
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f 15 01 05 6
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delivered to us last Friday.
It has been turned over to 2
Bob.
He has not indicated to me what he may or may not do 3
based on this inf orma tion.
- f P4 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY
das the 5
changed, made up of changes all in one direc tion; or is that 6
made up of pluses or minuses?
i MR. BURNETT:
That was the bottom line, and it was 8
a find.
9 C0MMISSIONER BRADFORD:
A s ingle f ind?
10 MR. BURNETT Or lots of finds that go into that.
11 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
Pluses or minuses?
12 MR. BURNETT:
Minuses, I am not sure.
- Mostly, 13 they were pluses.
14 MR. GILLESPIE:
It comes out that everythin~ was 15 lumped together.
There was no real identifiable pluses and 15 minuses.
It is the number --
Il MR. BURNETT:
This is Frant Gillespie, from Region 18 2, and Jim ?artlow.
l>
COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
How many employees?
2]
MR. BURNETT:
Four or five hundred.
About 250 of those have access.
22 MR. BURNETT:
We have someone to give you the 23 technical f ac ts.
I moved him from later so we can go bac k 24 now into that area.
25 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE!
That is essentially all the
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7 45 01 06 pv BNH' I
you have gone through what you conclude to be an adequate 2
sampling and have reached the conclusion that without 3
f urther information there is nothing there that you can see 4
as a lead to indicate diversion?
5 MR. SATKONSKI:
That is correct.
6 CO MMISSIOJER AHEARNE:
Thank you.
t COMMISS IONER GILINSKY:
Thank you.
8 MR. BURNETT If I could go to the first page of 9
the documentation that we put before you.
It'is a 10 chronological event list to show you where we started, as 11 you remember, on the 17th, where the ID came in.
I went 12 down on the 18th in charge of a team to start trying to find 13 the material.
The ARMS flight or the overflight by DOE c ame 14 in on the 20th.
It did not start on that da te, but the FBI 15 entered the scene on the 21st.
I will skip some of those.
16 I' put out an order on the 18th of October 17 requiring N.7C approval to resume.
The first order that went 18 out really just moved them ahead in their schedule, f orced a 19 reinventory.
It was silent.
Once that reinventory was 20 completed, they could restart.
We tied off that knot.
21 Really now dropping to the bottom of the line, we 22 have now received -- we have a report from the licensee.
23 Page 2 is just a brief summary of the inventory 24 differences.
25 COMMISSIO.iER AHEARNE:
At the present time, under
.. _ _. _. ~ _....
8 15 01 07 pv 8M '
I the order not to start?
2 MR. BURNEIT:
That is correct.
There is no facet 3
of the facility running right now.
4 COMMISS IONER AHEARNE:
There are some shipments 5
leaving?
6 MR. BURNETT:
Yes.
Last week I authorized moving j]i
/
out some finished product.
There is approximately 8
kilograms of material which is also again classified on site 23 5 9
in di ffering stages.
of that was finished 10 product.
So, at this point in time it seemed advantageous i
11 to move it to the receiver, in this (J )
12 case, so tha t they can make a check on it and give us really 13 another indapendent check of that material.
It does not 14 endanger any of the safeguard aspects.
la Looking at this list, you can see that we have GE 16 been runninIg -- the f acility has been running Z3 F' i,
until we hit this August I, which
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18 and we do show as being reclaimed.
,Jf I ?
It is interesting to notice that
.there 20 was a sizeable cleanup effort involved in this reinventory.
21 The ra was some material that was generated through that 22 e ffor t that wouldn't normally be generated in just a normal 23 inventory.
And we have tried to keep track of that to see 24 how much of that really wouldn't be associated with this 25 inventory period.
de are pursuing that.
15 01 08 9
pv BWH' I
If I could ask Mr. Frank Gillespie -- he was the 2
lead MC&A on the site to cover the exhaustive search that 3
went on.
4 MR. GILLES P I E:
I would quickly go through the 5
goals that we set out.
The initial actions in the first 6
three days were to look at what Nuclear Fuel Services had i
done, assess the adequacy of their actions, and verify that 8
they did an acceptacle review.
9 Having determined that, then we went to the next 10 part, which was area searches.
We had instrumentation 11 brought in and searched outside the production areas because 12 they were still in the process of closing the plant down.
13 When they completed the plant closedown, we went in and 14 searched everything in the production areas to ensure 15 everything was in the vaults for inventory purposes.
16 W'e did a one-for-one observation of everything 1/
that the licensee, NFS, did in their inventory to assure 18 that they were absolutely complying with their procedures 19 and that nothing was missed.
We went in and independently 20 verified to the extent possible the holdings of Nuclear Fuel 21 Services of our own instrumentation, and with the exception 22 of some samples for analysis which were 23 cither weigned, ga mma-scanned, or observed them 24 gamma-scanning and weighing everything that was on 25 inve n tory.
45 01 09 10 pv BWH 1
We did a comp 1'ete security review.
That was one 2
of the immediate steps when we got on the site.
Me were in 3
the p roce ss and -- of investigating measured discards, which 4
we continued right through wi th this, and.we still have --
3 CO MMISSIONER AHEARNE:
You say you were in the 6
proce ss ?
e MR. GILLESPIE:
Nuclear Fuel Services had what we 8
viewed as a continuing problem with accumulation of losses.
9 de ha d sta r t e d --
10 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
You mean prior to this?
11 MR. GILLESPIE:
Prior.
And we had started more 12 than routine intensive review of that, including complete 13 duplicate samples of all of their liquid streams, and having 14 gone in and verified the inventory be fore this loss.
So, we la had some idea in this case that the inventory that started 16 this period was a pre tty good inventory.
17 In looking at what Nuclear Fuel Services did, we la had a team of people in there.
These are people who were 19 there.
We showed up on site the af ternoon of the ISth.
It 20 lasted until late that night.
We found no problems with 21 what they did.
22 Now, in reviewing what they did, we also 23 reconstructed some of their major e ff orts; in particular, 24 looking for problems where things got missed on their 25 inventory just because of the technique, the dynamic
45 01 10 11 pv BWH I
technique they use, of doing an inven tory, there was a 2
possi bili ty tha t s.ome thing just didn' t ge t picked up and 3
listed; and, therefore, if i t was not lis ted, we wanted to 4
ensure that all identifiable items were accounted for.
5 So, in that three-day period, we did ensure that 6
all identifiable items were accounted for, that nothing that was created had been missing.
That three days was a major 8
paperwork raview to review their investigation.
Physical 9
security did interview people.
We immediately started 10 looking into the burials, that Bob had addre.ssed, from the 11 FBI, and did determine that there was one truckload at that
- { f 12 time --
, 55 gallon drums -- that did go to 13 burial to Barnwell.
14 MR. BURNETT:
They did, according to the records, 15 satisfy the license requirements.
It's just that we didn't 16 have the opportunity to oveccheck that ma terial as we had il the remaining material on site.
Do you understand the 18 di f f e renc e ?
19 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
This isn't material that 23 left --
21 MR. GILLESPIE:
It is material duri.g the period 22 that left.
23 MR. BURNETT We are considering going to the 24 facility and digging that. material up.
22 MR. GILLES?IE We had a meeting with the
12 15 O i !!
pv B.iH I
officials of the State of South Carolina jus t to asse ss what 2
i t wo uld tac e if we had to go down and attempt to recover 3
- [
4 ^
COMMISSIONER AHEA3NE:
Do they know where they 5
are?
5 MR. GILLESPIE:
They know approximately in the I
trench where they are, but it is a monumental health and 8
saf ety task to do tha t saf ely.
We are looking into that 9
possibility.
10 de did a very intensive search of the areas 11 exterior to the production f acilities, including the 12 f ollow-up on the EG1G or the NEST team overflights.
We had 13 our mobile van up there.
We analyzed 52 samples of soil 14 and, in general, found in the follow-up of the EG&G NotM g(f' 15 overflights environmental problems which are aumt being 16 handled witn some of NMSS' environmental people and NFS is it doing a study on it to clean it up.
la We have found that all of the uranium 19 contamination tested outside of the area and analyzed by Oak 20 Ridge appear ed to be in exca ss of 12 years old cased on the 21 U235 content ~of it.
It was also low-enriched ma terial, or a 22 mixture of material, an enrichment that was nowhere near the 23 90 (inaudible) drums, boxes, very intensive search around 24 the facility Justified to us many of the containers.
It had 25 depleted uranium, U233.
It was an instrumented search that
45 01 12 13 pv BWH I
took several days, and the final follow-up action was just 2
completed the day before yesterday.
3 de observed their inventory, and that portion of 4
it was just out.
It was an observation of everything they 5
did on a one-for-one basis.
They normally have two-m an 6
inven tory teams, and we had an inspec tor with each two-man I
team for both the recovery plant production area 8
invan torie s.
9 10 11 12 13 14 0
15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
~ --
14 45,02 01 kapBWH I
de were measuring, scanning, weighing these, We 2
serialized them with tJRC tags, knowing we will go back in 3
and do our complete inventory of the facility.
So of the 4
invan tory holdings on hand, we are confident that they have 3
now accounted for all of tha containers.
All of the 6
containers contain high-enriched uranium, and the weights I
are correct.
We dia find discrepancies in some of the 3
weights, so what we were doing did turn up problems.
9 That was particularly in the scrap plant, and all 10 those have oeen followed up on by the licensee.
So at this 11 time we are confident that what he has on the site is as he 12 reflects it.
We independently, basically, inventoried the 13 site af ter he did, to ensure it was the same hol,d-up 14 measurements.
There is always a ques tion of fuel 15 facilities' hold-up, and burial measurements were done oy 16 Region II.
LASL came in and gave us a fast review.
We did li find problems in this problem, but nothing that would quxQ gh 18 accumulate to the quaFitres of materials we were looking l9 for.
20 COMMISS10lER AHEARi1E:
When you say " problems,"
21 you meen 'fou found material?
22 MR. GILLESPIE:
As part of our long-term program 23 we were already in, we found that they are approximately 24 understating their burial by about 16 percent, based on 30 25 containers that we measured ourselves last week.
15 02 02 15 kapBdH I
COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
This is burial being 2
shipped off site?
3 MR. GILLESPIE:
Right, shipped off site to 4
Barnwell.
5 COMMISSIDAER AHEARNE:
What did you assume abo ut pp DRugg 6
the 55 geems, then?
I MR. GILLESPIE:
The are already there,
8 that they would be in this 16 percent category of 9
understatement, out maximum quantity they ship in any one 10 container is 50 grams.
It is not a significant quantity in 11 the sense that we are looking for kilograms.
12 It does become significant when you are looking at It does 13 the long-te rm program, minus the single event.
14 require follow-up action on our part, for its overall 15 e f f ec t.
15 MR. SNYDER:
How about hold-up in the plant ie itself?
18 MR. GILLESPIE:
They measure approximately 1000 c-\\
- TP l>
points, and Region II LASL has been in there several time s p
23 in the last couple of years.
Hold-up in general does not 21 change from time to tim.
It is a very constant figure.
22 Although people may say the number itself isn't perf ect, 23 the numb.er Joes not change.
24 So we are saying it is a stable condition.
At 2a this time, they went in and cleaned out a main duct header.
45 02 03 16 kap Bod i
They cleanea out some smaller headers, and came up with 2
approximately 500 or 600 grams over what their scans had 3
show3d in those pipes.
But they have cleaned those down to 4
a background measurement now.
That 500 or 600 gram gain, as
- pT' 5
it were, is part of and that is a ttributaole to 6
activity for a whole year.
So there are some qualifiers on 7Q
/
the 8
COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
On the places they went in 9
to clean out, the only likely candidate responsible is 10 hold-up?
11 MR. GILLESPIE:
No, they do have hold-up a ssigned 12 to other major portions of the ventilation _ system.
This was 13 the oiggest portion, the main trunk, where they expected to 14 find the mos t combina tion of material.
15 COMMISSIOJER AHEARNE:
You say they have 1000 15 points?
And they had been predicting a certain amount of 1/
hold-up oas2d on that measurement'.
13 MR. GILLESPIE:
Yes.
They predict normally in the 19 ranga of six to seven kilograms.
20 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Then they went in, and as a 21 result of actually physically cleaning out some parts, they 22 found anoth3r half a kilogram?
23 MR. GILLESPIE:
Right.
24 COMMISS IONER AHEARNE:
My question would bet what 23 is the confidence if they went in and cleaned out the other
45 02 04 17 ka pBWH I
places -- although those aren't as significant a possibility 2
for hold-up?
3 MR. GILLESPIE:
Indeed, they could come up with 4
more.
5 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
The question would bet how 6
much more?
I MR. GILLESPIE:
That you don't know until you 8
disassemole the plant.
Actually take down the pipes and 9
clean them out.
10 MR. BURNETT:
That is what i t take.s to do i t.
MR. GILLESPIE:
What they are doing --
12 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
(inaudible.)
13 MR. BURNETT:
From the Apollo decommissioning that 14 is going on, where they had assigned approximately 10 g[f 15 kilograms to hold-up, they have now reclaimed So pf 16 obviously there was a more e rror somewhere.
Il You could anticipate that when you decommission this, that 18 from history you are liable to find more than maybe we are 19 attributing to that area.
20 MR. GILLESPIE:
Having ceen associated with Apollo 21 f or several years before shutdown, Apollo did no t do -- d id 22 not do the extensive program that NFS doe s on hold-up.
They 23 measured more like 12 to 15 points, versus 1000 points, 24 which I think is a fault of some of the Apollo work.
It is 23 about that time that NFS was -- thera was a task force going e
18 45 02 05 kapBMH l
on at that time that got into the hold-up thing.
The 2
question came up, and yes, they might get more.
But if it 3
doesn't change from period to period, they do have limits 4
when they clean sections out.
When it reaches a certain 5
limit they take it down and clean it out.
6
.MR. BURNETT Really, that number, whatever that I
clean out number would be would have to be a ssoc iated with 8
the life of the facility.
You have to subtract it from the 9
MUF numbers of the lif e.
The impact for this~ one event 10 would be minimal.
Il MR. PARTLOM:
Los Alamos was in there for a brief
- r F' 12 lookien-at the hold-up. They gave N?S an upcheck and said, 13 "Look, their assignment looks reasonable to them.
They have 14 looked in areas where NFS doe s not me asure, and they didn't 15 find anything significant."
16 de are likely to be heavily surprised when you go Is to tearing things out, as we have been at Apollo.
I think 18 the consensus is, yes, there might be a build-up there which 19 i s re sponsible for this tendency to lose material over the TI 23 years, but there is not a
( sudden hold-up 21 situa tion.
22 MR. GILLESPIE:
We have had three diff erent 23 groups, NFS, Los Alamos and NRC, going in there and 21 indapendengly measuring all the same points, and granted we 7 f 23 are a ll '%osing the Los Alamos technique, whic h -- the y are l
46 02 66 19 kapBWH I
the people who are the best in it, and wrote the tech spac 2
on it.
And using the same technique -- and we are all 3
coming up with approximately the same results.
They are 4
consistent.
It is not a sudden Jump in any one point.
- f "
5 MR. PARTLOWs There may be in some spill i
6 troughs that has not been assigned to hold-up by the i
licensee, which LASL identified, but again, it is a matter 8
of accumulated losses over the history of the plant.
It is 9
not a matter of a sudden accumulation.
10 MR. GILLESPIE:
Inspection efforts still currently 11 underway, are the UF-6 ventilation system, which has been 12 ques t iona ble in some of the FBI reports, and questioned by 13 many of us there as, Could this be responsible? Right now, 14 it appears not to be -- that it would not be responsible for 15 releases of this size to wet scrubber sys tems in series.
16 UF-6 hydrol'yzes very f ast on contact with moisture.
It ie appears right now doubtful that this would have gone out la although we have f ound problems with the self-aosorption 19 f actor they were using in their calculation of activity.
20 The re fore, the grams appear to have been calculated low, out pqS 21 this would look like it means grams per period.
22 Again, if you are looking a t small qualities via 23 systems, that is of interest, but it is
, grams
.g 24 which does not come to the magnitude --
25 COMMISS IONER AHEARNE:
You mentioned it showed up
45, 02, 07 20 kapBWH I
in the FBI reports.
That means some of the people that 2
they were talking to gave this (inaudible ).
3 MR. BURNETT As a possibility.
4 MR. GILLESPIE:
The NRC put a press release out on 5
a release in August, which caused us to really start looking 6
into the UF-6 ventilation system.
As a re.sult of that -- we I
have a man on-site now looking into that.
de are trying, if 8
it is possiole, to devise a test of the system and minimiz 9
the actual release.
It is very difficult to test the -
..a 10 without putting out a known release.
11 MR. BURNETT:
Unless we use depleted gas, which is 12 understated.
13 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
But what I was trying to 14 get at is the way this issue came up -- or one way it came 15 up was some people that were being interviewed suggested 16 this as a p'o ssible --
le MR. GILLESpIE:
We were already working with these la people on-site in investigating the same sys tem.
19 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
It was their concern that 20 the instrumentation was inadequate, 21 MR. GILLESPIE:
They did not have confidence in 22 the measurements being made.
We have received word 23 informally f rom people when we walk around the plant.
The 24 resident inspector has talked to dif f erent people.
They do 23 not have a lot of confidence in the e fficiency of these
- 45. 02. 0,8 21 k apB.1H I
scrubbers for removal of UF-6.
2 Again, it would appear the perimeter alarns, 3
perimeter monitoring systems around the plant, do not 4
indicate that there was any release and we do know that on 5
the release they did have they did pick up that.
They saw 6
the increase in activity.
The overflignt, we were able to
/
Justify all the areas of increased background in the 8
overflight, doing hand-held instrument type surveys, where 9
we found environmental problems, but nothing related to :.igh 10 enriched uranium.
11 Wa are now looking at doing a complete records 12 audit to finish up what we started, to see how much of that
- pf 13 is in fact attributaole to this period, 14 because they did clean up a significant quantity of sludge 15 from tanks, for the first time in a year.
15 The ventilation system.was taken down and cleaned Ie out for the first time in a year, so there were quantities
- 7{
18 of with only 1/12th or 1/6th that could be 19 attributed to this period.
Liquid effluents, we have 23 480-some samples that were sent to New Brunswick.
We were 21 on an intensive sampling program at the time, which covered 22 this period.
On 300 samples we have gotten back so f ar 23 there is no indication that there is any proolem.
They do 24 hava questionable samp1ing techniques because of the piping 22 stru:ture in the plant itself.
22 45 02 09 kapBNd i
So, what we are checking is the laboratory, and 2
for any massive release -- and there st!11 are sampling 3
problems.
The facility's sampling procedures have failed to 4
be able to take representative samples on two different 5
occasions, f rom a major liquid stream coming off the scrap 6
plant.
Me are in the process of trying that again.
s (Commissioner Bradford:left the hearing room.)
8 MR. GILLESPIE We are 1 coking at burial 9
materials, small or 16 percent understatement means a total
- } [
10 of approximately kilograms for a total year of Il activity.
For an individual period we are only looking at 153 12
- again.
That material is on-site.
Me were 13 there, an inspector was there when they disassembled evet,
14 piece of material they were going to send to burial, opened 15 the boxes, took everything out of them, and we inspec ted 15 them completely.
le Right now nothing leaves the site without being la basically disassembled and reviewed and measured by the 19 inspe ctors on-site.
20 That is aoout as quick as I can go through that.
We have asked N. S -- of course, it 22 is their responM aility to come on the line and say where 23 they stand at this point.
That was done in a letter to us Gewt4 21P 21 Yesta rday, their findings at this point.
At this point they 25 don't know what happened.
They have dor.e, to a large
23 45.02.10 kapBWH extent, the things that we have done -- reviewed the 2
physical security system and so forth.
Other than the s
3 inventory diff erence they have found no direct evidence, no 4
f acts that would indicate that the material was taken from j g[gA 5
the plant.
23f6 Their best explanation right now is to -4 harkens 7
back to some of the things that Bob Satkowski said, that 8
there were -- this was a special period in terms of the 9
pressures that were on the plant as a result of the strike.
10 This resultad in upsets in the process, low product yields, 11 high scrap generation and so forth.
12 They are saying, For a four-month operating period
[]i" 13 we have had a difference of If we acknowledge 14 that in the past our system has been biased and not acting JJf 15 correctly, and that we have had 21 k 15 and if you acknowledge that even
- 3 P i4 that is uncertain to about the
' level by
- Jf 18 measurement.of uncertainty, they are saying it is reasonable 77) 19 to say that this inventory cifference
'is really 20 mora of the same of what we have had in the past, problems 21 with effluents measurements and so forth, as a result of the 22 strike pressures.
23 So they have nothing specific going on now. They 24 are c ooperating with us in terms of some re-mea sureme nts 25 that we want done at the plant, but their finding is they
24 15 02'11 kapBdH I
have shaken out this inventory difference.
They have no 2
hard explanation for it.
3 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
(inaudible. )
4 MR. BURNETT Basically, the last page is just 5
putting the problem out on the table.
What would we do if 6
indeed we had found there was a diversion?
Answers the FBI 1
wou'Id be called into the case.
We have done that.
8 Wnat would we do if we could not prove what 9
happened?
We would be looking at, Can the f acility run 10 safely?
What are the tradeof fs and how would that ce done?
11 And in light of the need of this material to the Navy for 12 the security program, what are their long-range needs?
21Y 13 Should they be looking If so, how?
14 Basically, in this last paper I am just 15 summarizing (1 ) the plant doesn't think there was a 13 diversion.
de have not been aole to substantiate in an Is evidence form that there was one.
fou can never say there 18 wasn't.
There doesn't seem to be an indication that it went 19 into the environment, and y2t ou. facts look pretty clear 20 that it is missing, so something has happenad.
21 00'4MI SSION ER AHEARNE:
What is the base on which 22 you are measuring, in the sense that you have said that you g-p 23 have
, you found but then you pointed out that 24 part of that may, actually -- is going to end up --
,g) 26 MR. BURNETT:
Is a ttributed to somethirs else.
45' 0'2 12 25 kap BWH I
MR. GILLESPIE:
To give you a ballpark idea, I 2
think most would be attributed to earlier periods and that 3
should not exceed 4
MR. SNYDER:
Don't you look at the accumulative 5
( inau dible ) of the facility, though?
6 MR. GILLESPIE:
You have to.
i MR. SNYDER:
That is 8
MR. GILLESPIE:
Yes.
9 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Diversion or no diversion.
T7 10 it doesn't that they have an effective material 11 accounting system.
a 0
12 MR. BURNETT Their management system cannot 13 control this material.
That is tne bottom line.
So, this 14 staff will oe coming back to the Commission in, I would say, 15 two to three weeks, when we complete some of these final
~
16 aspects that we are looking at, properly identify the exact il material of that which can be attriouted to this accounting 18 period, and at that time, the staff will make a 19 recommendation to the Commission, wha t we think should go 23 on.
21 And that could be that the plant is not safe to 22 operate.
It could be to explore the possibility of the Navy 23 opera ting the plant, or it could be to opera te it to support 24 the national defense, but with higher degrees of security 25 and monitoring.
26 45, 03, 01 gshBW I
This is what the staf f has to develop and get back to the 2
commi ssion on.
3 COMMISS IONER AHEARNE:
What is the Naval Reactor's 4
position?
5 MR. BURNETT We have had some contact.
de have a 6
piece of paper.
There was a briefing given to a the i
Secre tary of Def ense, Duncan, by DOE.
They gave us a copy 8
of that -- I'm sorry, Energy.
5
- p{}
9 Co rre c t tha t, ple a se -- DoB.
But they made a statement j
10 in there where they have estimated the oacklog holdings.
If 11 I could read it.
12 13 14 7
15 16 ll 18 MR. PARILod:
19
~)
\\
20 21 MR. BURNETf What I would do in the next couple 22 of weeks is to sit down with him and get a clearer picture 23 of their needs, so that the commission can weigh that, weigh 24 the alternatives.
25 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Let me get back to how we
45,03 02 27 igsh8W I
should end up viewing this at the end of this cycle of a 2
couple more weeks. I gather that you will end up closing 3
your books in the sense of saying you have now -
you 4
believe hign confidence that you know how much material is 5
actually there on site.
6 MR. GILLESPIE:
Yes.
t MR. BURNETT: Co rre c t.
The best number that will 8
be achievable.
9 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Will you at the same time 10 say that you will have high confidence in the material over il the years that enter the site?
12 MR. BURNETT:
Does anyone care to field that?
We 13 have looked at that area.
We haven't de tected any reason to 14 believe that those numbers are f ar off at this point.
15 COMMISSIO.iER AHEARNE:
And when you say that you lo have relatively high confidence in the material that has il been receiva d at places like Lynchourg --
18 MR. BURNETT:
That is another area we are looking 19 at.
g h-44 20 MR. PARTLOW The differences between NFS shif t-s 21 are very smal'.
But they are all 22 measuring it essentially the same way.
23 There.might be something wrong.
24 COMMISS I0 DER AHEARNE:
Bec ause depending, 25 obviously, on your answers on that, it ge ts back to the
- 45. 03 Q3 28 gshBW I
cumulative problem that Bernie just raised.
2 I think on the question of continued operation, you 3
really have to face the question, is this situation where
]{lf' 4
you have got that you have no idea --
5 MR. BURNETT:
A dalta.
6 COMMISSIONER AHEAdNE:
Yes.
4 MR. BURNETT: The shipper-receiver diff erences 8
between this and the receivar are not that great.
9 MR. GILLESPIE:
I think are indications from what la we are looking at now, liquid effluents, gaseous, and 11 burials all impact on the long-term program.
12 Those definitely woulo need to be addressed and cleared 13 up for continuous steady-state type operations.
14 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
One of the 1 : sues that has 15 been suggested at times is that DOE take over the operation 16 of the plan't.
1e Do you have any reason to think that DOE's operation of 13 the plant would lead to a significant improvement in keeping 19 track of material?
20 MR. BURN EIT:
No, sir.
21 COMMISSIONER AHEAR:4E:
Do I interpret from that 22 answer, then, that you believe that the fundamental problem 23 is the type of process?
It is not the management of that 24 proce ss?
25 MR. BURNETT It is either in the type of process
45 03 04 29 gshBhl' i
or a consistent diversion.
2 You know you have to allow for tha t.
3 CohMISSIONER AHEARNE:
But if it is a consistent 4
diversion, then I would hava thought that DOE operating it 5
might help.
6 MR. PARTLOWs I would have to say that I am not s
sure whether DOE operating it would help them keep track of 8
the material or not.
9 In my view, from my experience, it is clearly more 10 e fficient to get to decide what improvements can be done and 11 to spend tha money and to do it in a government-opera ted 12 mode than it is with the ' tension that goes on in a 13 regulatory mode.
14 So to the extent that someone was there to sa'y, by golly, 15 we ought to try this and this and this and this and let's 16 spend the money on it, it might be more e fficient to do it.
17 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
You say that it would be 18 easier to make improvements.
19 MR. BURNETT:
To pass on the cost.
20 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Are you also saying that 21 you believe there are improvements that should be made?
22 MR. BURNETT We did leave that little bit out.
23 There was a Navy study -- if you notice in the chronological 24 events, we showed that a Navy team arrived on site.
They 25 did produce a report that has made some suggested changes.
45'03 05 30 gshBd 1
COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
May we see that?
2 MR. BURNErrs Yes.
In fact, I may have it with 3
me. In f act, I do hste it with me.
- 4 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
I think we have seen it.
5 MR. BURNETT:
This was forwarded to this agency.
5 It came in to the Chairman.
7 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
And was then distributed.
8 MR. BURNEIT:
And in addition to that, they sent a 9
special letter to the licensee asking for them to review 10 it and their recommendations by the ISth of this month.
11 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
I am a little puzzled.
12 This plant produced material solely for the government.
13 MR. BURNETT: Yes.
14 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: I don't understand why there 15 is a cost problem.
16 MR. BURNETT:
You would think that they could pass il it right bac k.
But they op3 rate under contracts.
18 00MMISSIONER AHEARNE:
My point is that I don't 19 undarstand why if the DOE were operating, it would be -- DOE 20 operating it and selling, transferring it to the governmant 21 is the same as these guys operating it, as f ar as the money 22 goes.
23 MR. GILLESPIE:
No, not for the Naval Reactor 24 program.
It is being run in the Naval Reactor program and 25 it is policing itself.
When it comes to safety or national
15 02.Q6 31 gshBd I
security, there is no limit on the pursestrings.
2 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Let me put it a different 3
way, then.
I don't understand why, if we know -- it we 4
agree that these requirements ought to be laid on it, that 5
is to say you guys -- we were to conclude that these Navy --
6 MR. BURNETT:
Should be pursued --
/
COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Are requirements --
8 MR. BURNETT:
They would pass i t directly to the 9
Navy.
That is a f air assumption.
10 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: It depends,, I think, in 11 part on our having our story together and also, taking a 12 firm posi tion.
13 MR. BURNETT:
Oh, yes.
14 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
In the past, our approach la has been a little rankea, I would say, or we have not been 15 really fi m'on these matters.
14 There has been a certain amount of discussion and la negotiation and we weren't exactly entirely clear just what 19 it was we were to do.
20 When I say the past, I am going oack some ways here.
21 MR. PARTLOW:
My position about being easier is 22 a bout the past also.
There has been a tradition to meet the 23 regulatory requirements.
And we perhaps weren't always sure 24 what our requirements would be, but we have addad them over 25 the years.
And that represents a relatively slow process.
49 di 'O y 32 gshBW I
COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
It seems to me that if we 2
are clear on what needs to oe done and why it needs to be 3
done and adhere to that position pre tty firmly --
4 MR. BURNETT That is exactly what we would come 5
back to you with.
6 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
I think it is particularly
/
so..
I gather with the suggestions that you have are ones on 8
the naval reactors paper.
9 As I recall reading that, they seem to be fairly positive 10 that they thought those things should be done.
W 11 MR. BURNETT To create le ss scrap ^an create le ss 3
htJ F 12 see.
And we have a whole list of regulatory needs, quite a 13 list.
14 MR. PARTLod:
Our ideas are in terms of specific 15 requirements to put on the Me) as it is, then there 16 is the Nava'l Reac tor thing that says, maybe in the long-term is it can be changed to help accountaoility.
la COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
There are related issues 11 that go to how we place our requirements on.
23 Are you going to address that also?
21 MR. BURNETT Yes, sir.
We will make 22 recomme nda ti ons.
You will have considerable latitude.
23 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
I think you have a copy.
24 Bernie, the paper that you guys wrote --
23 MR. BURNETT We have that..
45.03 Q8 33 gshBW I
COMMI SSIONER AHEARNE:
Those issues that you have 2
raised you will addre ss, vou intend to address.
3 COMMISS IONER GILINSKY:
I wonaer if I could raise 4
a personal comment.
I am pleased to see a lot of people 5
participating in all of this in the room, but I wonder if we 6
sometime; doa't have too many persons involved in these I
meetings -
not that I want to exclude anybody who could 8
otherwise be engaged in tracking down these MUFs or carrying 9
on inspections or doing some other 0 3eful work.
10 COMMISSIONER AHEA.4NE:
He is only refe rring to 11 people on the other side of the table.
12 (Laughter.)
13 MR. BURN EIT:
The briefers, of course --
14 COMNISSIodER GILINSKY:
I understand.
But we have 15 a tendency, not only here but going down to Congress, to 16 march down hith armies.
Is As I say, just for myself, I think we might consider 18 limiting the persons involved.
Thank you.
19 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
It sounds like you are 2J doing a very complete job.
21 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: I want to commend you for 22 your briefing and the work that you are doing.
23 MR. BURNETT:
I would like tocomm$ndtheregion.
24 Although headquarters was besically commending it, it was a 25 team effort.
I think it is working very, ve ry well.
34 45*06 G9 gshBd i
COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Thank you.
2 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
If nothing else, if it does 3
start operating, you ought to have a much be tter baseline to 4
Work with.
6 COMMISS IONER GILINSKY:
Thank you very much.
6 (Whereupon, at 3:20 p.m.,
the hearing was
/
a d jou rned. )
8 9
10 O
i 11 e
12 13 14 16 16 1s la 12 23 21 22 23 24 25