ML19296D515
| ML19296D515 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 07001308 |
| Issue date: | 02/28/1980 |
| From: | Rothschild M NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE LEGAL DIRECTOR (OELD) |
| To: | Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19296D516 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8003040709 | |
| Download: ML19296D515 (29) | |
Text
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of
)
GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY Doc ke t No. 70-1308
)
(Renewal of SNM-1265)
(GE Morris Operation Spent
)
Fuel Storage Facility)
)
NRC STAFF'S STATEMENT OF POSITION ON AMENDED CONTENTIONS OF THE STATE OF ILLIN0IS I.
Introduction On February 14, 1980, the State of Illinois (hereaf ter Illinois or Inter-venor), an Intervenor in this proceeding, filed a pleading entitled " AMENDED CONTENTIONS," in which it withdrew the contentions contained in its " Petition for Leave to Intervene,"l/ and filed eleven new contentions. The Staff has previously responded to the contentions set forth in Illinois' Petition for Leave to Intervene, supra.
In its response,2) the Staff included a discussion of certain legal principles which the Staff believes should govern considera-tion of the contentions.
In the Staff's view, these principles also govern admission of Illinois " Amended Contentions." Based upon these principles, and as explained below, the Staff believes that, subject to clarification at
_1]
See " Petition for Leave to Intervene," (May 21, 1979).
2)
See "NRC Staff Statement of Position on the Contentions of the State of Illinois," dated November 20, 1979.
nj 800304o FvjP
the prehearing conference, Illinois' contentions 6.a), b), d)(1-iii), 7.b.
and 8 may be admissible. The Staff opposes admission of contentions 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6.c., 6.d.
7.a),9,10.
The Staff believes that the Board should defer a determination on the issue raised by contention 11 until com-oletion of the hearing.
II. Discussion Statement of Contention (1.)
The amended Consolidated Safety Analysis Report (hereinaf ter "CSAR") pre-pared by the Applicant does not provide reasonable assurance, as required by 42 U.S.C. 5 2232(a) and 10 CFR Parts 40, 50, and 70 that the continued operation of the Morris facility will not endanger the health and safety of the public due to accidental release of radioactivity.
The retraction of the risk analysis of the Rasmussen Report, WASH 1400, and the acknowledgement by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Staff that Class 9 accidents are indeed a possibility
- indicate that accurate accident analyses are necessitated for nuclear facilities of all types. Without further adequate risk analysis the public cannot be assured that continued storage of spent fuel at Morris will not be hazardous to the public health and welfare.
The CSAR does not adequately describe and analyze the risk of all credible accidents and the consequences thereof including:
a) the effects of the Morris facility of a Class 9 accident at the adjacent Dresden Nuclear Reactor; b)
The consequences of simultaneous accidental radioactive releases from the Dresden Nuclear Reactor and the Morris Spent Fuel Storage Facility; c)
The risks and consequences of the release of radioactive elements in excess of Part 20 regulations as a result of any credible accidental occurence at the Morris facility including, but not limited to, tornado related incidents; See Statement of Mattson, NRC, TMI Task Force In the Matter of Public Service Company of New Jersey.
(Salem Nuclear Plant Spent Fuel Pool Expansion), ALAB-Docket No. 50-272.
r
Staff Position The Staff opposes this contention on the grounds that it is vague and does not satisfy the specificity and basis requirements of 10 CFR @ 2.714 With respect to the introductory paragraph to the contention, the Staff notes that the proposed licensing action at issue here concerns the appli-cation by General Electric Company (GE) for renewal, pursuant to 10 CFR Parts 30, 40 rad 70, of its license for the Morris Operation Spent Fuel Storage Facility (hereinaf ter "GE Morris" or "GE Morris facility").
10 CFR Part 50 " Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities" does not govern the proposed licensing action at issue.
Illinois' continued reference to 10 CFR Part 50 / indicates lack of understanding as to the nature of the proposed licensing action and the applicable regulatory requirements.
The remainder of this contention is vague and completely lacking in basis.
The contention is so vague in its reference to "all credible accidents" that the Staff cannot determine what accidents Intervenor asserts must be described and analyzed.
The problem is compounded by the implication that the categories of accidents in subparagraphs a), b) and c) are not the only types of accidents which the CSAR allegedly fails to address.
In addition,
-3/
See the introduction to the former contentions of Illinois, which were set forth in its Petition for Leave to Intervene.
Illinois refers there to 10 CFR Part 50. The Staff noted in its Statement of Position the inapplicability of 10 CFR Part 50 to the proposed Licensing action.
4-there is no indication as to the meaning of "further adequate risk analysis."
Illinois provides nothing which would suggest what type of risk analysis would be considered " adequate."
With respect to the tenn " Class 9 accidents," the Staff notes that ttis term stems from a 1971 AEC proposal to place nuclear power plant accidents in nine categories to take account of such accidents in preparing environmental impact statements.
The proposal was put forwdrd for comment in a proposed
' Annex' to the Commission's regulations implementing NEPA.
26 Fed. Rea.
22851-52 (December 1, 1971).
The nine categories in that ' Annex' were listed in increasing order of severity.
' Class 9' accidents involve sequences of postulated successive failure more severe than those postulated for the design basis of protective systems and engineered safety features. 36 Fed.
Reg. 22852. The Annex concluded that, although the consequences of Class 9 accidents might be severe, the likelihood of such accidents was so small that nuclear power plants need not be designed to mitigate their consequences, and, as a result, discussion of such accidents in applicants' Environnental Reports or in Staff's environmental impact statements was not required.
Id.
While the Annex has never been fonnally adopted by the Commission and is therefore no inding upon it - its guidance has of course been followed by
. the Commission's adjudicatory boards,b nd it has withstood challenge in a
the courts.E The most recent expression of the Appeal Board's view of its consideration of Class 9 accidents is found in the case of Offshore Power Systems, Inc.
(Floating Nuclear Power Plants), ALAB-489, supra. The Appeal Board there interpreted the r,roposed Annex A to Appendix D to 10 CFR Part 50 as setting forth the Commission's policy on Class 9 accidents.O g. at 210.
It was noted that, though Appendix D had been deleted on the adoption of Part 51, the Annex had not been changed and, in fact, the Commission at that time stated that Part 51 did not affect the Annex. H. The Appeal Board also noted that the Annex was not an absolute bar to the discussion of Class 9 accidents.
It pointed to the previous decisions where rulings had been made that the discussion of Class 9 accidents would be permitted if an intervenor could show that, with respect to the reactor in question, there was a reason-able possibility of the occurrence of a particular type of accident generically regarded as being in Class 9.
Long Island Lighting Company (Shoreham Nuclear 4j See the decisions cited in Offshore Power Systems (Floating Nuclear Plants), ALAB-489, 8 NRC 194 (1978), at 210 fn. 52.
y See, e.g., Hodder v. NRC, 589 F.2d 1115 (D.C. Cir.1978), cert. denied, U.S.
,100 S.Ct. 55 (1979); Pcrter County Chapter of the Izaak Walton League v. AEC, 533 F.2d 1011 (7th Cir.), cert. denied 429 U.S. 858 (1976); Carolina Environmental Study Group v. United States, 510 F.2d 796 (D.C. Cir.19 76).
y The decision of the Commission in Offshore Power Systems (Floating Nuclear Plants), CLI-79-9,10 NRC (September 14, 1979) has confinned that the existing policy on Class 9 accidents has not been set aside, but that the Comission is nonetheless rethinking the policy.
. Power Station), ALAB-156, 6 AEC 831, 836 (1973).
The Appeal Board interpreted the proposec: *
=
to mean that neither Staff, applicants, nar adjudicatory boards could voluntarily consider Class 9 accidents absent the showing of a reasonable possibility of occurrence of a particular Class 9 accident at a particular plant.
Id.
Illinois has failed here to make the requisite showing.
Illinois merely cites the retraction of the risk analysis of the Rasmussen report, WASH-1400, and the acknowledgement by the Nuclear Regulatory Connission Staff that a Class 9 accident occurred at the Three Mile Island, Unit 2 facility.U Illinois makes no showing that a particular Class 9 accident at Morris or Dresden is a reasonable possibility.
It has been held that mere citation to the Commission's withdrawal of endorse-ment of some of the conclusions in WASH-1400 does not provide an adequate basis for a contention that the consequences of Class 9 accidents must be considered in a particular proceeding.
Pennsylvania Power & Light Co.
(Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-79-6, 9 NRC 291 (March 10,1979). As noted by the Licensing Board there:
"... the Commission has, since long before WASH-1400, taken the position that the consequences of such accidents need not be discussed because of the low probability of their occurrence, and this position has been upheld by the courts.
Porter County Chapter v. AEC, 533 F.2d 1011,1017-18 (7th Cir.), cert denied, 429 U.S.
945 (1976); Carolina Environmental Study Group v. AEC, 510 F.2d 796 (D.C. Cir.1975); Ecology Action v. AEC, 492 F.2d 998 7/
Illinois cites " Statement of Mattson, NRC TMI Task Force In the Matter of Public Service Company of New Jersey.
(Salem Nuclear Plant Spent Fuel Pool Expansion), ASLB-Docket No. 50-272."
(2nd Cir.1974); see also Offshore Power Systems (Floating Nuclear Power Plant.s), ALAB-489, 8 NRC 194 (1978); Long Island Lighting Company (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station), ALAB-156, 6 AEC 831 (1973). The policy in no manner was premised upon the results of WASH-1400. Moreover, unless and until repudiated by the Comnission, the policy is binding upon us." -Id. at (emphasis added).
The statement of Roger Mattson cited by Illinois does not provide adequate basis to support a contention such as that proposed by Illinois in subpara-I n response to the grapha). This statement was filed by the NRC Staff i
Salem Licensing Board's inquiry of the Staff as to whether the accident at the Three Mile Island facility wLs a Class 9 accident. That statement concludes that "The accident at Three Mile Island was a Class 9 event." To the extent that Illinois seeks a general exploration in this proceeding of the consequences of Class 9 accidents, on the basis of this statement, Illinois' contention must be rejected.
In a recent decision, a Licensing Board held that general consideration of the consequences of Class 9 accidents at land-based reactors, merely on the asserted basis of the occurrence of the TMI-2 accident, is inconsistent with the Commission policy as expressed in the proposed Annex and in numerous Appeal Board decisions.
Pennsylvania Power & Light Co. (Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-79-29,10 NRC
, slip. op, at 11-13 (October 19, 1979).
8/
See Public Service Electric and Gas Company (Salem Nuclear Generating Station Unit No.1 (Docket No. 50-272, Proposed Issuance of Amendnent to Facility Operating License No. DPR-70) "NRC Staff Response to Board Question No. 4 Regarding the Occurrence of a Class 9 Accident at Three Mile Island," August 24, 1979, and attached Note from Roger Mattson
" Board Question Concerning Class 9 Accidents," dated August 16, 1979.
. Based upon the above guidance, Illinois contention 1 must be rejected to the extent that it seeks an exploration in this proceeding of the consequences of Class 9 accidents generally.U There is no basis whatsoever for the assertion in subparagraph a) that the CSAR must describe and analyze "the effects of the Morris facility of a Class 9 accident at the adjacent Dresden Nuclear Reactor."
Intervenor fails to provide any indication as to the meaning of " effects of the Morris facility of a Class 9 accident at the adjacent Dresden Nuclear Power Station."
(DNPS). No basis is provided in support of the assertion in subparagraph a) that a Class 9 accident is a possibility at DNPS.
Similarly lacking is any indication as to the particular Class 9 accident which Illinois alleges is reasonably possible at DNPS.
Absent a showing of a reasonable possibility of occurrence of a particular Class 9 accident at the Dresden facility, this part of contention 1 must be rejected. Offshore Power Systems, ALAB-489, supra, Long Island Lighting Company, ALAB-156, supra. More importantly, Illinois provides no indication as to the nexus between DNPS and the proposed GE Morris license renewal.
Likewise, Illinois does not specify how the GE Morris facility may be affected by wents at DNPS, such as that set forth in subparagraph a).
There is no reason to believe that the proposed renewal of GE's license to operate the GE Morris facility will fail to appropriately consider the close proximity 9/
In Offshore Power Systems, CLI-79-9, supra, the Commission announced its intent to complete the rulemaking begun by proposed Annex D to 10 CFR Part 50 and to reexamine Commission policy in the area.
of these facilities. EI There are nunerous references in the Applicant's CSAR, Chapter 3, " Site Characteristics" to the Dresden reactors (see pp. 3-5, 3-6,3-12,3-18,3-19).
Both the NRC EIA and Safety Evaluation Report (SER) related to the increase in the GE Morris spent fuel storage capacity to its present level reflect that the GE Morris site is contiguous to the DNPS site.
For the reasons stated above, contention 1.a) must be rejected.
Subparagraph b) of this contention is also lacking in specificity and basis.
There is no descrip:. ion of the " simultaneous accidental radioactive releases" which the CSAR must allegedly consider nor any basis for the belief that such releases would occur.
Similarly lacking is any indication as to the consequences of these releases which Illinois alleges the CSAR must consider.
Subparagraph c) of this contention is entirely speculative and lacking in specificity and basis.
Intervenor does not specify how the " release of radioactive elements in excess of the Part 20 regulations" might occur or provide any basis for assuming that such releases could occur. The reference to "any credible accidental occurence [ sic] at the Morris facility" is so vague that it is not possible to determine what accidents Intervenor asserts
-10/ The Morris facility site is bordered on the north by the DNPS site (2,300 acres).
See p. 7 of the NRC Environmental Impact Appraisal (EIA) (Decem-ber 1975), which was prepared in connection with the license amendment authorizing increase of the GE Morris spent fuel storage capacity to its present level.
must be described and analyzed. The problem is compounded by the impli-cation that a " tornado related incident" is not the only type of " credible accidental occurence [ sic]" which the CSAR allegedly fails tc address.
To the extent that subparagraph c) of contention 1. suggests that the CSAR fails to consider tornado-related accidents, it is in error.IIl Chapter 8, Section 8.8. " Tornado-Generated Missile Accident" (pp. 8-24 to 8-29) dis-cusses tornado related accidents.
Effects of a postulated missile impact on the basin structure of the GE Morris facility are presented in Section 8.4.
Criticality aspects of a tornado-generated accident are discussed in Sec-tion 8.10.
To the extent that Illinois, in this contention, alleges that the analysis of tornado related accidents in the CSAR is deficient, Illinois does not describe any such alleged deficiencies nor indicate t'ie basis for its belief that such deficiencies exist.
In addition, Illinois does not specify the types of tornado-related accidents which were not considered in the CSAR.
For the reasons set forth above, contention 1. and all its subparts should be rejected.
Statement of Contention (2.)
The CSAR does not provide adequate assessment of credible risks of sabotage related events and the consequences thereof.
11] A similar issue was raised in former Illinois Contention C.4.
1 Staff Position The Staff opposes this contention on the grounds that it is vague and lacks basis and that it is an impermissible attack on the Commission's regulations.
Intervenor fails to specify what " credible risks of sabotage related events" are or what the consequences of such " events" might 'oe.
Similarly lacking is any indication as to what an " adequate assessment" is. This contention is too vague and lacking in basis to reasonably alert the other parties as to the matters which they must address and the contention should therefore be rejected.
Insofar as protection of the GE Morris facility from sabotage is concerned, the Staff notes that the GE Morris facility is subject to the requirements in 10 CFR 6 73.50 for physical protection of licensed activities and that the Commission has determined that GE Morris satisfies these requirements.
To the extent that this contention alleges that the physical security regula-tions in 10 CFR @ 73.50 are invalid or inadequate, this contention is barred by 10 CFR Q 2.758.
Under 9 2.758, the Commission has withheld jurisdiction from a licensing board to entertain attacks on the validity of Commission regulations in individual licensing proceedings, except in "special circum-stances." Potomac Electric Power Co. (Douglas Point Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-218, 8 AEC 79, 88-89 (1974).
10 CFR S 2.758 sets out those special circumstances which an intervenor must show to be applicable before a contention attacking the regulations will be admissible.
Illinois has not made any showing of special circumstances.
For the above reasons, contention 2 must be rejected.
Statement of Contention (3.)
The CSAR underestimates or does not state fully the projected effects on the hea' % of personnel, their families and the public from exposure to radiation:
a)
The CSAR does not state total whole body exposure to occupational personnel for the expected life of the Morris facility; b)
The CSAR does not project expected genetic effects on personnel or to the general population caused by such whole body exposures; c)
The CSAR includes only irradiated fuel and contaminated basin water as radiation sources. Other tanks and pipes should be included.
(See G.E. " Status of Existing Licensing" 2/21/79, Exceptions to Compliance With Regulatory Guide 3.44 % 7.2 "RadiationSources".)
d)
The CSAR does not account for additional radiation exposure to occupation personnel during testing or experimertation with fuel disassembly, dry storage or compaction, of all [ sic] which are projected for the near future at Morris, e)
The CSAR does not address the absence of effective effluent monitoring.
i.
There are no devises [ sic] to measure flows of air, 11.
There is no routine procedure to measure kr (SeeG.E.
" Status of Existing Licensing" 2/21/79, item 15.)
Staff Position The Staff opposes this contention on the grounds that it is vague and lacks basis and that it appears to be, in part, an impermissible challenge to the Commission's regulations.
The contention is vague because there is no identification of the " projected effects on the health of personnel, their families and the public" which the
. CSAR or other documents underestimate or omit. With respect to subpara-graphs a) and b) N the Staff notes that the environmental impacts of the Morris facility, including " Morris Operation Effluents and Containment" is discussed in Chapter 5 of the Applicant's environmental document " Operating Experience:
Irradiated Fuel Storage." Chapter 7 of the CSAR discusses
" Radiation Protection," which includes " Personal Exp p re Assessment" (Sec. 7.5), " Health Physics Program" (Sec. 7.6) and "Es timated Man-Rem Off-Site Assessment" (Sec. 7.7).
These documents provide ample discussion and evaluation of radiation exposure to :llen petitioner to particularize whatever concerns it has, if any, under subparagraphs a) and b). Despite this, petitioner has failed to provide anything more than vague assertions without bases.
The Applicant has calculated the whole body exposure to occupational per-sonnel and such doses have been determined to be within the limitations set forth in 10 CFR Part 20, " Standards for Protection Against Radiation." See Sec. 7.5 of the CSAR. To the extent that this contention alleges that Part 20 standards are inappropriate, the contention constitutes an impermissible challenge to the Commission's regulations, which is barred by 10 CFR 5 2.758, absent "special circumstances" that specify how these radiation protection standards would not serve the purposes for which they were adopted with respect to GE Morris.
No such showing of special circumstances has been made.
1_2/ These parts of contention 3. are nearly identical to fomer Illinois Contention G.
Subparagraph c) is impennissibily vague.
Illinois fails to specify what "other tanks and pipes" should be considered in the CSAR discussion of radiation protection (See CSAR, Chapter 7).
In addition, Intervenor is mistaken in asserting that the CSAR includes only irradiated fuel and con-taminated basin water as radiation sources.
Section 7.3 " Radiation Sources" describes the sources of radiation that are the basis for the radiation protection design and which are used as input to the shield design calculations.
Included as radiation scurces is " Irradiated Fuel," ($ 7.3.1.) and " Storage Basin Water" (Q 7.3.2).
In addition, Section 7.3.3 discusses " Airborne Radioactive Material Sources," which includes five potential sources that could release radioactive material to the ventilation air (where it would be passed through the sand filter with some fraction exhausted to the outside air via the stack).
Absent any or particularization of the tanks and pipes which should be considered as " radiation sources," this subparagraph of contention 3 must be rejected.
Subparagraph d) of this contention is speculative and lacks specificity and basis. There is no indication as to the meaning of " testing or experimentation with fuel disassembly, dry storage or compaction." Ncne of these activities are authorized by GE's license, the licensee has not sought authorization for such activities and any concern about alleged impacts resulting from such activities is entirely speculative.
Furthermore, Illinois fails to specify in what manner the CSAR must account for " additional radiation exposure to occupation [ sic] personnel" or provide any basis for the belief that there would be such additional exposure as a result of any of the activities mentioned.
Subparagraph e)E s entirely speculative and lacking in specificity and i
basis.
Illinois does not provide any indication as to what constitutes
" effective effluent monitoring" nor any basis for the conclusion that there is an absence of " effective effluent monitoring."
The mere bald assertion in subpart 1. that "There are no devises [ sic] to measure flows of air" does not provide an adequate basis for the contention proposed by Illinois. Contrary to Illinois' assertion in subpart 11. regard-ing the lack of a routine procedure to measure Kr, the CSAR indicates that 85 releases of Kr are calculated and analyzed and further implies that such releases are capable of being measured. See CSAR, 9 7.3.3.3., " Airborne dadioactive Material Sources," pp. 7-9 and 7-10.
Accordingly, there appears to be no basis of any sort for the assertion in subpart e)ii, contrary to the requirements of 10 CFR S 2.714(b) that bases be set forth with reasonable s pecifici ty.
If Intervenor is alleging that the CSAR is deficient because it fails to describe the Applicant's environmental monitoring program, Intervenor is not looking to the appropriate document for a description of the environnental monitoring program. The Applicant's environmental monitoring program is described in its environmental document, " Operating Experience, Irradiated Fuel Storage," Chapter 5.3.
In addition, the Applicant's environmental document contains " Environmental Monitoring Reports" for 1974,1976, and 1977.
See Appendices A.,
B., and B-1.
Intervenor has provided no basis for 1_3/ This subparagraph of contention 3. is similar to fonner Illinois Contention E.
the allegation that the Applicant's monitoring program is inadequate or specified any such alleged deficiencies.
Based on the foregoing, the Staff believes that contention 3. and all of its subparagraphs should be rejected.
Statement of Contention (4.)
The CSAR is incomplete in that it does not discuss prospective plans (in 1980) for testing of fuel, reconfiguration of storage, experimentation of storage modes, and other innovative techniques which General Electric has planned in cooperation with other private corporations and Government agencies.
Staff Position The Staff opposes this contention on the grounds that it is vague and lacks basis.
Illinois provides no identification of the " prospective plans" referred to nor any indication as to the meaning of " testing of fuel, recon-figuration of storage, experimentation of storage modes, and other innova-tive techniques," which GE allegedly has planned.
Similarly vague are the references to "other private corporations and Government agencies." GE's present license does not authorize such activities and there is no basis for assuming that they would be authorized in 1980.
Similarly, there is no basis for asserting that such activities are even being contemplated and, in fact, the assertion is pure speculation. This contention is so vague and lacking in basis that, in the Staff's view, it is not possible to determine whether further inquiry is warranted or what, in fact, must be addressed.
For these reasons, this contention must be rejected.
Statement of Contention (5.)
The decommissioning and emergency plans submitted by the Applicant as part of its application cannot be adequately judged at this time. With the assistance of the NRC Staff, the Applicant has attempted to adapt its CSAR to the proposed 10 C.F.R. Part 72 which they presume will eventually regu-late Away From Reactor storage.
However, as the regulation has not yet been adopted by the Comission it is now impossible to judge whether the decom-missioning and emergency plans will be adequate to conform to the finally approved regulation. The NRC Staff is well aware that the Decommissioning plan presented by Apolicant in the CSAR may demand revision.
See letter of March 1,1979 to D.M. Dawson, Manager, Licensing & Transportation, Nuclear Enemy Programs Division, General Electric Co. from Leland C. Rouse, Acting Chief Fuel Reprocessing and Recycle Branch, Division of Fuel Cycle and Material Safety, NRC whereia the Decommissioning plan for Morris is referred to and it is stated:
It should be pointed out that new decommissioning criteria for nuclear facilities are now being developed. When issued, these criteria may require revision of the plan.
Until the final promulgation of Part 72 the Decommissioning Plan mst be considered inadequate.
Staff Position The Staff opposes this contention on the grounds that it lacks basis and constitutes an attack on the Commission's regulations and regulatory frame-work, although the Staff believes, as stated infra, that Illinois has pro-posed other adequate contentions which raise issues related to the adequacy of Applicants' decommissioning and emergency plans.
The crux of this contention is that the adequacy of Applicants' decommis-sioning and ememency plans cannot be judged until final promulgation of Part 72.b Ther2 is no basis for this assertion.
GE has filed an appli-cation for renewal pursaant to 10 CFR Parts 30, 40 and 70, of its license to operate the Morris facility.
Whether the facility may ultimately comply with a prop:, sed regulation, when and if that regulation is issed in final fonn, is not relevant to consideration of GE's application for license renewal pur.uant to the previously cited existing regt.lations.
Proposed Part 72 has no force and effect. A contention asserting that the license may be deficient for failure to confonn to proposed regulations has no place in this proceeding.
Merely asserting that the developmen; of new criteria my demand revision of the decommissioning plan does not raise an issue capable of litigation ir, this proceeding. Accordingly, this contention must be rejected.
Statement of Contention (6.)
The Decommissioning Plan proposed in the CSAR is inadequate for the following reasons:
a)
There is icoifficient detennination of ultimate decontami-nation and decommissioning costs.
Costs have not been adjusted for inflation for the projected time of decontamination.
CSAR pp. A7-13, A7-14. Without an accurate cost assessment GE cannot make a valid commitment to meet decommissioning costs.
b)
There is insufficient assurance that the Applicant will be financially capable to meet decontamination and decomissioning cos ts. Other than a general statement regarding GE's present relative solvency there is no verifiable financial statement to show GE can meet future costs as is required by 10 C.F.R.
S 70.22(a). A bond or other assurance of financial capability should be required to provide a guarantee that decontamination and decommissioning costs will be fully covered.
14] Oa October 6,1978, the Commission published a proposed rule, " Storage of Spent Fuel In An Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation." 43 Fed.
R_e,q. 46309.
c)
There is no contingency planning for emergency termination and decomissioning. CSAR Q A. 7.2.1.
d)
There is no consideration of possible perpetual care and maintenance due to incomplete decontamination or decommis-sioning including:
1.
Inability to dispose of LAW vault material (See G.E.
" Status of Licensing" par.19) 11.
residual contamination of waste vaults or other sta-tionary parts of the facility; iii.
ground water contamination which would require main-tenance to prevent leaching offsite; iv.
unavailability of offsite disposal racilities for dis-nantled facility and wastes.
Staff Position Subject to clarification at the February 29, 1980 Prehearing Conferer.ce, the Staff believes contention 6.a), b) and d)(i,11 and 111) may be admissible or the grounds that these parts of contention 6. satisfy the specificity an d basis requirements of J CFR 5 2.714 and raise issues that are appropriate for consideration in this proceeding. The Staff opposes contention 6.c) and 6.d)(iv) on the grounds that these parts of contention 6. lack specificity and basis and that contention 6.d)(iv) seeks to raise an issue which is beyond the scope of this proceeding.
There is no indication in subparagraph 6.c) as to what constitutes " emergency temination and decommissioning" or why the CSAR must consider such events.
In the Staif's view, this part of contention 6. is too vague and lacking in basis to allow a detemination whether further inquiry is warranted or to reasonably alert the other parties as to the matters they should address.
Accordingly, this part of contention 6. must be rejected.
Contention 6.d)(iv) is vague in that there is no more than a conclusory statement that there is an " unavailability of offsite disposal facilities for dismantled facility and wastes." There is no indication as to what constitutes an "off ite disposal facility" or " wastes." Without such an identification, the other parties are not reasonably alerted as to the matters they must address.
To the extent the contention alleges that there are offsite disposal facili-ties for low level waste, the contention is without basis. There currently exist operating burial grounds for the disposal of low level waste and Illinois has presented no basis for an assertion that low level waste disposal facilities will be unavailable in the future.
The Staff believes that an issue concerning permanent disposal of high level nuclear waste (such as spent fuel stored at the GE Morris facility) may not be con:,idered in this proceeding, because the Connission has initiated a rulemaking proceeding to " reassess its degree of confidence that radioactive wastes produced by nuclear facilities will be safely dispos ~1 of, to determine when any such disposal will be available, and whether such wastes can be safely stored until they are safely disposed of."
See Federal Register notice, " Storage and Disposal of Nuclear Waste," 44 Fed. Reg. 61372 (October 25, 1979).
In this notice, the Commission stated that:
"During this proceeding the safety implications and environmental impacts of radioactive waste storage on-site for the duration of
. a license will continue to be subjects for adjudication in indi-vidual facility licensing proceedings. The Commission has decided, however, that durina this proceeding the issues being considered in the rulemaking should not be addressed in individual licensing proceedings. These issues are most appropriately addressed in a generic proceedina of the character here envisaaed." 44 Fed. R_eo.
61373.
(emphasisadded).E/
For the reasons stated above, the Staff believes that contention 6.a), b) and d(i, 11 and iii) may be admissible and that contention 6.c) and d)(iv) should be rejected.
Statement of Contention (7.)
The Emergency plan in the CSAR is inadequate in that:
a) it does not specify emergency procedures such as that required for unloading the spent fuel pool and transporting or storing irra-diated fuel.
Figure 9-4 " Emergency Plan Relationships for Morris Operation", NED0-21326C, January 1979 supplement to the CSAR in-cludes " emergency transportation of irradiated fuel" as a concept, but nowhere is this concept developed.
M/ While it might be argued that the Commission's policy directing that long term storage not be considered in individual licensing proceedings referred only to individual licensing proceedings involving "at reactor" storage rather than those (such as GE Morris) involving away from reactor storage, there is no such limitation apparent in the Commission's policy statement. Moreover, the principle that long term storage, being considered in generic rulemaking, should not be considered in individual adjudicatory proceedings is as applicable in an individual licensing proceeding involving away from reactor storage (as at GE Morris) as it is in a proceeding involving at reactor storage.
b)
There is no reference to tests or other means by which it can be determined that the existing emergency plans are adequate.
Ade-quate test programs of both communications systems and procedures should be documented prior to licensing.
Staff Position The Staff opposes contention 7.a) on the grounds that it lacks specificity and basis. Subject to clarification at the February 29, 1980 Prehea ring Conference, the Staff believes contention 7.b) may be admissible on the grounds that it minimally satisfies the specificity and basis requirements of 10 CFR @ 2.714 and raises an issue that is appropriate for consideration in this proceeding. b Illinois provides no basis for its assertion in subparagraph 7.a) that the GE Morris emergency plan is deficient because of the manner in which the plua considers emergency procedures related to " unloading the spent fuel pool and transporting or storing irradiated fuel."
In this regard, the Staff notes that pursuant to footnote 3 of 10 CFR 9 70.22(i), the elements in Section IV of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E were used by the Staff in judging the adequacy of the GE Morris emerycy plans. Appendix E establishes minimum requirements for emergency plans, but does not, as contention 7.a) suggests, require that such plans cover specific accidents or incidents.
Absent any particularization of basis to support contention 7.a), it must be rej ected.
16/ For example, clarification appears to be required regarding the statement that there is no reference to tests in the plan, since there are provisions for testing in the " Radiological Emergency Plan for Morris Operation."
(NEDE-21894, June 1978), section 8.1.
Statement of Contention (8.)
The discussion of emergency planning in the CSAR is inadequate in that there is no mention of an evacuation plan that would be put into effect should an accident occur at Morris or Dresden which required evacuation of occupational personnel and/or nearby residents. Although Appendix 3 of NEDE 21894 lists
" Evacuation and Personnel Accountability" under " General Personnel Actions" there does not appear to be any specific evacuation procedure included in the Radiological Emergency Plan for Morris Operation" of June 1978 recently submitted to supplament the CSAR.
It has been proposed that nuclear facilities in highly populated areas may face shut down if adequate plans are not made to evacuate residents in a 10 mile rad n of the facility. Morris is located near Joliet, a city of 80,000 pee le. 50 miles south of Chicago. The Applicant should be required to formulatt 4n updated evacuation plan or include in the CSAR an emergency plan that would service Morris.
Staff Position Subject to clarification at the February 29, 1980 Prehearing Conference, the Staff believes this contention may be admissible or, the grounds that it traets the specificity and basis requirements of 10 CFR $2.714 and raises issues that are appropriate for consideration in this proceeding.b Statement of Conte.. son (9.)
The Applicant has failed to analyze the relevant safety and health issues from the perspective of long term storage. Although the license application foresees a licensing period of 20 years, there is no assurance that fuel will not, of necessity, be left for a longer period at Morris.
Prior to a finding of the Commission that storage at Morris beyond 20 years will be unnecessary because government facilities, other than Morris, will then be out a long tern analysis guel, the license application is incomplete with-available for the existin
_17/ For example, clarification appears to be required for the statement that the Commission's guidance regarding emergency planning for nuclear power plants relates to other facilities regulated by NRC such as a spent fuel storage facility. This statement is contrary to explicit language in the Federal Register Notice, " Emergency Planning." 44 Fed. R_eg. 75167, at 75170 (December 19,1979).
1_8/ This contention is nearly identical to fonner Illinois contention H.
8 Staff Position The Staff opposes this contention on the grounds that it is vague and lacks basis and that it seeks to raise an issue beyond the scope of this proceeding.
The contention is vague in that there is no more than a conclusory statement that the Applicant has failed to analyze "the relevant safety and health issues from the perspective of long-term storage." There is no indication as to what issues should be considered "the relevant safety and health issues."
Without such an identification, the other parties are not reasonably alerted to the matters they must address.
FL athermore, the contention lacks specificity in alleging that "long-term storage" must be considered by the Applicant.
The GE Morris license renewal application seeks only renewal of the license for the specified period of twenty years.
To the extent that this contention attempts to raise the issue of storage of spent fuel at GE Morris beyond twenty years, it is seeking to raise a matter beyond the scope of this proceeding and must be rejected. The Staff believes that an issue concerning possible use of the GE Morris facility for long-term storage (beyond the requested term of the license) and/or permanent disposal of nuclear waste may not be considered in this proceeding, because the Commission has initiated a rulenaking proceeding to " reassess its degree of confidence that radioactive wastes produced by nuclear facilities will be safely disposed of, to determine when any such disposal will be available, and whether such wastes can be safely stored until they are safely disposed of."
See Federal Register notice, " Storage and Disposal of Nuclear Waste,"
supra.
In this notice, the Commission stated that:
"During this proceeding the safety i,iplications and environmental impacts of radioactive wastes storage on-site for the duration of a license will continue to be sutjects for adjudication in individual facility licensing proceedings.
The Commission has decided, however, that during this proceedirg the issues being considered in the rulemaking should not be addressed in individual licensing proceedings. These issues are most appropriately addressed in a generic proceeding of the character here envisaged."
44 F_ed. R_eg. 61373. E e
In view of the foregoing, it is clear that any consideration of storage of spent fuel beyond the term of the license is not permissible.
Statement of Contention (10.)
The Design Earthquake dr'; in the CSAR are insufficigg to meet proposed regulation 972.66.
Morris is designed to 0.29 [ sic}-- and the proposed regulation calls for a " peak horizontal ground acceleration of not greater tha n 0.25 g.... "
The Applicant has not satisfied the proposed regulation by establishing the CSAR site specific "g value" by the procedures of 10 C.F.R. Part 100.
Staff Position The Staff opposes this contention on the grounds that it seeks to raise an issue which is beyond the scope of this proceeding.
19/ See discussion on p. 21, fn 15.
g The Staff believes that this shculd rad 0.2 g.
The governing regulations in evaluating the GE Morris license application are found n 10 CFR, the Commission's enacted regulations, particularly Parts 30, 40 and 70.
As previously stated, proposed Part 72 has no force and effect and whether the data in the GE Morris CSAR are in compliance with proposed Part 72 is of no moment.
Proposed Part 72 is not a regulation and is not entitled to be treated as such in this proceeding.
Accordingly, this conter. tion must be rejected.
Statement oi c ntention (11.)_
o The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has an obligation under the National Environnental Policy Act, (NEPA) 42 USC 4332, (1969) to issue an environ-mental impact statement which will account for nonnal operation of the Morris facility and for the environmental impacts of:
a.
emergency evacuation and its consequences b.
decommissioning and/or residual contamination probabilities c.
testing of fuel in the spent fuel pool
- d.
dry storage of fuel in the canyon
- e.
expansion of the spent fuel pool
- f.
contraction of fuel assemblies for compact storage
- g.
storage of waste products or tools from decontamination of the Dresden reactor h.
any other proposed activity, other than simple storage of spent fuel in water Each of these activities is possible at Morris.
Experiments with spent fuel have recently been the subject of discussion with Commonwealth Edison, the DuPont Company and the NRC; Sandia Laboratory is currently testing monitoring devices at Morris; The NRC has completed review of the expansion proposed in 1977 and DuPont is reviewing plans for Dry storage alternatives.
Staff Pocition The Staff believes that the issue raised in the introductory portion of this conter cion is appropriate for con,sderation in this proceeding, as explained be'ow. However the Staff opposes admission of subparagraphs a. througn h.
The Staff proposes that the Licensing Board defer ruling upon the question of whether an environmental impact statement (EIS) need be prepared for this licensing action until it has heard all of the evidence on the potential environmental impacts of the proposed action at the hearing.
The question whether the proposed licensing action is a rajor federal action which signifi-cantly affects the quality of the human environment, thus requiring prepara-tion of an EIS, is botn a legal and factual question that might only be appropriately decided af ter factual information on the extent of any environ-mental impacts is presented and considered.
By the Board's deferral of a determination on the necessity of an EIS until the hearing is completed, all parties, including Intervenor, are given the opportunity to present evidence in support of or in opposition to Intervenor's contention.E The Staff cpposes admission of subparagraph a. on the grounds that emergency planning is appropriate for consideration in the Staff's document reflecting its safety review of the license application (Safety Evaluation Report)
-21/ The Staff would note that this same procedure was followed by the Licensing Board in the Prairie Island and Trojan spent fuel pool proceedings.
See Northern States Power Co. (Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 1 & 2), LBP-//-51, 6 NRC 265 (1977) and Portland General Electric Co. (Trojan Nuclear Plant, Proposed Amend-ment to Facility Operating License NFF-1 to Permit Storage Pool Modi-f' cation), Prehearing Conference, October 14, 1977, Tr. 128.
rather than in the Staff's document considering the environmental impacts of the proposed action.
Subparagraph b, does not raise an issue capable of litigation in this pro-ceeding since the Staff's document containing the findings of its analysis of the environmental issues related to the proposed license renewal will consider decommissioning. To the extent that subparagraph b) of ccnten-tion 11. seeks consideration of " residual contamination probabilit.es," the contention it so vague that it does not alert the other parties as to the matters which they must address.
For these reasons, subparagraph b. must be rejected.
Subparagraphs c. through h must be rejected on the grounds that they lack specificity and basis and are speculative. CE's present license does not authorize the activities stated in these subparagraphs.
In addition, the reference in subparagraph e. to expansion of the spent fuel pool is inappro-priate, since the action which will be the subject of these hearings is the proposed renewal of GE's license for the Morris operation, which would authorize continued operation, but not expansion of the facility.
No basis is presented by Illinois to support its assertion that these activities must be considered, other than its bald assertion that "each of the activities are possible at Morris." Absent any particularization of basis to support the assertion that these activities would be authorized by the proposed license renewal, subparagraphs c. through h. must be rejected.
III.
Conclusion For the above reasons, the Staff believes that Illinois' contentions 6.a),
b), d(1-iii), 7.b) and 8 may be admissible as issues in controversy in the proceeding, subject to clarification at the prehearing conference. Contentions 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6.c), d(iv), 7.a), 9 and 10 should be rejected.
In the Staff's view, the issue raised in the preamble to contention 11 should be admitted, but the Board should defer i. detennination as to the necessity of an EIS until the hearing is completed.
Respectfully submitted, rajoAu./?,%,AlJ Marjorie U. Rothschild Counsel for NRC Staff