ML19296C068
| ML19296C068 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Rancho Seco |
| Issue date: | 02/11/1980 |
| From: | Ellison C, Lanpher L CALIFORNIA, STATE OF |
| To: | Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8002250164 | |
| Download: ML19296C068 (4) | |
Text
A 1
p C4
'b y
/
0g8 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 99 fM g@ y NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 9
7 BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD gi,D i
h c
A
)
03 In the matter of:
)
)
SACRAMENTO MUNICIPAL UTILITY
)
Docket No. 50-312(SP)
DISTRICT
)
)
(Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating
)
Station)
)
)
OPENING STATEMENT OF THE CALIFORNIA ENERGY COMMISSION The California Energy Commission
(" CEC") is the state agency principally responsible for the regulation and management of California's electrical energy resources.
The CEC is charged with, among other things, assessing the state's present and future energy supplies, and with ensuring that the state has a reliable and appropriate level of electrical generating capacity.
Given these responsibilities, the CEC can not ignore any portion of California's energy supply.
Although Rancho Seco was licensed before the CEC was created, how Rancho Seco operates is important to us and the state as a whole.
A serious accident at Rancho Seco--one similar to that at Three Mile Island Unit 2--would obviously threaten the public welfare by crippling, and perhaps destroying, a major generating station relied upon by hundreds of thousands of Californians.
For 8002250161/
.N.
r this reason, following the Three Mile Island accident, the CEC authorized its staff to participate in this inquiry into the safety and reliability of Rancho Seco.
The CEC does not bring to this proceeding any predisposition to shut down Rancho Seco.
The facility is an established part of California's energy supply and it represents a substantial invest-ment by SMUD's ratepayers.
Our sole intent is to ensure that Rancho Seco operates safely and reliably.
For that reason, the CEC is participating under the NRC's procedures for interested states, 10 C.F.R.
S2.715(c), and has taken no position on the issues.
Last July, when the CEC authorized its staff to join this investigation, the NRC had published documents describing numerous its staff felt were needed to enhance the safety and measures reliability of Babcock and Wilcox reactors like Rancho Seco.
- Yet, few of these measures had been implemented.
Since that time, however, the NRC has directed SMUD to undertake many of these measures, and we generally support these actions.
For many of these measures, however, it is unclear what will be done, when it will be completed, and what impact these actions may have on Rancho Seco's operation.
Even more importantly, whether these measures will assure the safe and reliable operation of Rancho Seco also remains uncertain.
Until this hearing, the NRC has not publicly explained the basis of its determinations with respect to the plant, nor provided any clear assurance that the facility can indeed operate safely and reliable.
We hope this proceeding will provide those assurances.
2.
2.<
Such assurances are necessary because we, as well as the general public, continue to read disturbing expressions of concern from the NRC staff and others regarding Babcock and Wilcox design sensitivities, small break LOCA analyses, core voiding, clad swelling, and other potential hazards.
We note, for example, that the reactor coolant pumps, hic corically by far the most pre-ferred core cooling method, must now be shut off when symptoms of a loss of coolant accident appear.
In seeking assurances regarding safe c ation of Rancho Seco, we urge the Board to look beyond the au quacy of the May 7 NRC Order that required certain changes cefore the facility could operate.
The additional short and long term measures the NRC has ordered since May 7, 1979 prove, in our view,that the May 7 Order did not, by itself, assure the safe and reliable operation of the plant.
However, we are concerned about how the facility will operate in the future, not the past.
It would be an historic exercise at best, and unfair to the Licensee, to judge the safety of Rancho Seco without considering the measures that have been ordered since May 7.
Accordingly, in this proceeding we ask the Board to examine the afety of Rancho Seco and the adequacy of the May 7 Order in light of the subsequent remedies instituted at Rancho Seco.
He hope the actions taken since TMI prove to be fully adequate.
However, if additional reasonable measures will provide substantial, additional accident protection at Rancho Seco, then this Board should forthwith order implementation of such measures.
3.
r. *,
We are participating in this hearing not so much to " prove" some-thing as to ensure that these concerns are clearly and rationally addressed.
To that end, we plan to offer six witnesses.
These witnesses and the topics they address are as follows:
1.
Clifford M.
Webb B&W Reactor System Design Sensitivities 2.
Dr. Harold Lewis Natural Circulation Cooling 3.
Dale Bridenbaugh and Operator Training and Human Gregory Minor Factors Engineering 4.
Bruce J. Mann Radioactive Release from Containment 5.
Daniel Nix Controlled Filter Venting These experts represent a variety of viewpoints on nuclear power.
None of their views necessarily reflect the views of the CEC staff or of the CEC itself.
But we trust that these views will assist the Board in resolving the significant issues raised in this proceeding.
Respectfully submitted, DATED:
February 11, 1980.
w' M CHRIST 6PHER ELLISON M
$ fdt)
LAWRENCE C. LANPHEY Attorneys for the California Energy Commission 4.