ML19296C046
| ML19296C046 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Black Fox |
| Issue date: | 05/25/1977 |
| From: | Head D Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19296C015 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8002250118 | |
| Download: ML19296C046 (9) | |
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EXHIBIT E
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4 TN UNITED STATF.S OF MERICA E-6 Ig2 7 G77 h k 2
NUCLEAR REGULATORY CT4ISSION p
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g BENRE THE ATOMIC SAFEN AND LICENSING BOARD
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In the Matter of
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ASSOCIA1 o ELECTRIC COOPEATIVE, INC.
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Docket Nos. STN 50-556 and
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Snl 50-557 WESTEN FARMERS ELECTFl0 COOPERATIVE,
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INC.
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(Black Fox Station, Units 1 and 2)
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IGDRANDUM AND ORDER The purpose of this Memorandu:n and Order is for the Atcnic Safety and Licensing Board (the Board) to rule on certain penddng matters. These matters include the contentions relating to Class Nine accidents (Third Prehearing Conference Order, pp. 7-8) and the contention relatir6 to the handling, disposal ard enWm. ental effects of radioactive wastes (Third Preheardng Conference Onder,
- p. 14). In addition, the Board has under advisement a motion by the Intervenors CASE and Ilene Younghein to ccr:pel discover / with regard to Interrogatory 105 submitted to the Applicants.
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Class Nine Accidents f
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In its Third Prehearing Conference Order the Board elected 3
to take under advisement the matter of nNnsibility of contentions concerning very large (loosely, " Class Nine") accidents. The Boart!
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2 invited submittals by the parties en this subject. The NRC Staff (the Staff) and Applicants were to address whether such contentions
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were generically excluded by regulation cr case law, regardless of
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mechanism.
Intervenors were to address postulated mechanisms for
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such accidents.
Staff subnitted its Staff Memorandum Regarding Treatment of Extremely large Accidents in the Health and Safety Hearing (Staff Memcrardum). Applicants submitted Applicants' Memorardum With Respect to Class Nine Accidents (Applicants' Memorardum). Inter-vencrs submitted two documents, Intervenors CASE, Ilene Younghein, Lawrence Burrell, and Clark Glymcre Response to Board's Request For Credible Mechanisms (Intervenors' Response), ard Intervenors CASE, Ilene Younghein, Lawrence Burrell, and Clark Glymore Supplemental Submissien Re:
Class Nine Accidents (Supplemental Submissicn).
The Board has now evaluated the material set forth in those submittals and is prepared to rule on the matter. As to the thres-hold question, viz, whether such accidents are genericM'y excluded, e
it appears to the Board that they are not. Both the Staff ard the u
k Applicants agree that no such blanket exclusion exists (Staff Memo-
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randum, p. 2; Applicants' Memorandum, passir). Both the Staff and k
the Appliants, however, podnt out that such accidents can be con-sidered only if their potential for occurrence passes some test of
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" credibility".1/
The Board agrees.
Both the Staff and the Appli-
.r cants assert that certain specific mechanisms (e.g., spontaneous E
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pressure vessel failure and failure of a properly aralyzed ECCS 1
system) are excluded by regulation and case law. The Ecard agrees 3
with this proposition.
3 It thus remains for the Board to detemdne which, if any, of the mechanisms proposed by the Inter'/enors might pass the test of credibility and might also yield accidents larger than those previ-ously analyzed.
The mechanis.s mentioned in Intervenors' Respcnse seem to the Board to fall for the most part into four general categories-
[1] Spontaneous pressure vessel failure (7, 26, 27);
[2] Centrol red drop or ejection cencomitant with scra::: failure or other independent failure (1, 2, 3, 4, 6,18,19, 21, 22);
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The Staff states:
... if any credible mechanism or accident event results in
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consequences larger than those of the design basis accidents 4
addressed in the PSAR and Staff SEl, that event must became a design basis....
(Staff Memorandum, p. 5)
E The Applicant states:
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... the consequences of accidents larger than design basis accidents need only be considered if a particular type of f
such large accident is shm to be reasonably possible.
(Applicants' Memorandum, pp. 1-2)
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4 (3] Transien:s without scram (5, 8, 9, 11, 14);
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[4] Sifr.ultaneous independent mechanical failures (10,12,16,17, 20, 23).
One of the mechanisms is not defined at all (25); another is clearly inapplicable to the reacter at harx1 (24); cne raises the issue of sabotage (20); one sir: ply repeats others under varied operating cen-ditions (13); and one assumes spontaneous fuel crumbling (15).
Intervenors' Supplenental Submission censists of th"ee parts:
Parts I and II attempt to establish the credibility of spontaneous pressure vessel failure; Part III suggests that all accidents treated in the Reactor Safety Study, WASH-1400, should be treated in this hearing, however renote their probability of occurrence.
Ln the Board's view, mechanisms based upon the failure of a prcperly designed pressure vessel cust be excluded fran considera-tion because of the Cccmission decision in Consolidated Mison Cancany of New York (Indian Point Unit No. 2), 5 AEC 20, 21, fn. 5 (Oct. 26,1972), $there, as in the case at bar, no special considera-f tions involving the particular facility have been shown to exist.
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In effect, such a mechanism has been defined by the Ccamissicn as not being " credible" cr " reasonably possible" in the sense of the a
Staff Memorandum and the Applicants' Memorandum.
Further, the Boad
5 will take this specific failure as represent 1rg a pa. 6 for a test of credibility.
Using such a criterion of credibility, the Board is led to the conclusion that mechanisms which depend upon independent sir:ultaneous failure of more than ene piece of safety eN,.e equipment also fail the test.
Indeed, the single failure criterion embodied in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, supports the view that the Comdssion does not intend such mechanisns to be examined.
In this regard, the Board gives no weight whatever to the fact that a study such as that reported in WASE-1400 may have censidered ard evaluated such mechanisms; we do not view " credible" in the present sense as beire synonymous with "wcrth lookirg at" for the purposes of the Reacter Safety Study.
Indeed, the fact that WASH-1400 examined pressure vessel failure, a mechanisa excluded fran our proceedings by Cordssion decision, suggests that the Reacter Safety Study surely reviewed things we may regard as incredible for our purposes.
We are thus led to reject as failing the " credibility" cri-terion the general mechanisms mentioned in Categories [1], [2] and
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[4], supra. Category [3], ALIS, has already been assumed credible, b
and a contention has b'een admitted with it as a basis. A cont a tion 0
9 51 concernirs sabotage has also been adedtted.
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As to spentaneous la1.; scEe fuel crumbling, the Board feels l
this matter is equivalent in credibility to nultiple failures in h
j safety grade equipment. We therefore exclude it.
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We are thus led to the conclusion that the additicnal centen-tions already adnitted in our Thind Prehearing Conference Order at
- m. 5-o adequately pe=dt explcration of extremely large accidents under the Ccr=1ssion's rules. We have further reviewed the centen-tions which Applicants asked us to reject as Class Nine accidents (Applicants' Answer to Revised Petitions to Intervene, dated Febu-ary 8,1977, p. ^3) and we conclude that these contentiens either (1) involve mechani=s excludable by our credibility criterion, (2) do not suggest a specific rechanism, or (3) are effectively covered by the two cententions admitted in our Third Prehearing Confemce Order.
II. Waste Disposal This particular issue was raised by the Petitiener Rob =R a Ann
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l Paris Funnell and it relates to the handling, disposal ahd envfron-mental effects of radioactive wastes.
In pertinent part, the con-tention reads as follows:
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Inadequate consideraticn is being given to the high u
cost and uncertainity[ sic] of waste disposal and the moral and envircrn: ental danages are not being
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7 adequately considered. Eight Billic[ sic] alone (per f
EPSA estirate) for military waste is staggerirg and m
absu"d. Funnell Arrended Petition, p. 5 j
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Applicants failed to properly analyce and safely handle the storage and disposal of wastes. Funnell j
Petition, p. 1.
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4 Applicants have underestimted the enviromental effects of radicactive wastes frat Black Fox. Id.
The Board defer ed ruling on this contention since the Ccxrds-sion had before it censideration of an interim rule en waste dispo-sal. Tnat interim rule was subsequently on March 14, 1977 prce, t'sa-(
ted by the Ccc=1ssion in its " Uranium Fuel Cycle I: pacts Frcm Spent Fuel Reprocessing and Radicactive Waste Management" 42 FR 13803 Further, in a Memorandum and Order of April 1, 1977 coveri.y various proceedirgs, the Ccenission indicated that the interim rule should be used in connection with the NEPA cost-benefit balancing in partic-ular proceedings. The Cc; mission noted that the interim rule should act to resolve proceedings in which the issue of envircrr. ental impacts of the uranium fuel cycle is raised.2/
Vermont Yankee Power Coro.
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(VeI=cnt Yankee Nuclear Station), et al., Ccruission Memorandum and 5
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Order dated April 1, 1977 The contention at issue, however, does not h
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Although this Ccrmission Memorandum and Order was directed to N
n the Appeal Ecard, it is equally applicable to Licensirs Board f
cases in which the enviroer. ental in: pact of waste disposal is sought to be raised.
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relate to the interim rule.
The contention, therefore, must be rejected as not being sufficiently particular, as required by h1j 10 CFR 2.714(a).
Also, the Amended Petiltion attempts to raise f
the issue of the handling, disposal and envircnmental effects of Y
radioactive wastes on a generic basis.
As framed in the Amended 3
Patition, the contention is more properly a subject for any pro-ceedings relating to the interim rule itself rather than to this particular proceeding. The Board, therefore, excludes this con-tention relating to radioactive waste disposal.
III.
Intervenors' Motion to Cancel Discovery
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Intervenors CASE and Ilene Younghein (Intervenors) coved to cctpel discovery from the Applicants with regard to Interrogatcry No. 105 which states:
Describe each instance in which Applicant disagrees with the evaluation perfonned by the U.S. Envircemental Pro-tection Agency en the Rasmussen Report. Reference is made to the U.S. EFA Report dated August 1975 and June 1976 (EPA 520/3-75-012 and EPA 520/3-76-009).
Applicants cbject to the interrogatory cn the basis that it P
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does not relate to any of the issues in centroversy.
O Applicants
'q acknowledge that it could relate to the Class Nine accident con-M H
tention which the Board had under advisement at the time the Appli-n 3
cants filed their response to the motion to compel.
L Applicants
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an undue burden in that it requests a fonslaticn of an analysis i
rather than a disclosure of facts in the Applicants' possession.
In the Board's view, this interrogatory does not have a proper foundaticn.
It has not been established that the Applicants per-forned any aralysis of the EPA evaluation of the Eas=ssen Report and Applicants' response indicates that they have not done so.
Since the Applicar.ts have apparently not performed any such analy-sis, it is not the proper function of discovery to require the Applicants to take such action in respense to an interrogatory.
Therefore, the motion to compel is denied.
BY ORDER OF THE ATGIIC SAFEIY AND LICENSING BOARD Aff Daniel M. Hedd
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Chairran F
i Issued at Bethesda,Iiaryland, this 25th day of May, 1977.
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