ML19296A239
| ML19296A239 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | General Atomics |
| Issue date: | 02/23/1979 |
| From: | Mowry W EMVGA |
| To: | Goller K Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| 67-1032, NUDOCS 7903020331 | |
| Download: ML19296A239 (8) | |
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j GENERAL AToMC COMPANY PO BOX 81608 In Rep 1y SAN DIEGO. CAUFORNIA 92138 (7143 4ssxoo February 23, 1979 Refer To:
67-1032 Mr. Karl R. Coller Assistant Director for Operating Reactors Directorate of Licensing U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555
Subject:
Facility License R-67; Docket 50-163 Submittal of Annual Report (3 copies)
Dear Mr. Coller:
The following is an annual report for the Mark F reactor prepared in the same format as that required for the Mark I (R-38).
While the Technical Specifications for Mark F require no annual report, the numbered sections below are the sections referred to, for example, in Section 9.6e of the Technical Specifications of the R-38 (Docket 50-89) reactor.
Part 1 A brief narrative summary of (1) operating experience (including experi-ments performed), (2) changes in facility design, performance character-istics and operating procedures related to reactor safety occurring during the reporting pcriod, and (3) results of surveillance tests and inspections.
(1) The Mark F reactor (R-67) was operated during the year to provide steady-state irradiation for numerous experiments. A limited number of pulses uere performed as part of a pulse test of LEU fuel develop-ment.
The steady-state operations included irradiations of samples or pieces of equipment, King furnace high-temperature fuel studies, production of cold neutrons for neutron radiography, and reactor training exercises.
uuring this year, significant experiences associated with Mark F oper-ation being reported are:
(a) The LEU fuel tests that were started in 1977 have continued to be successful.
Six LEU fuel elements (two 1-1/2-in, diameter pins and four 1/2-in. diameter pins) have occupied the B-ring most of the year (1978).
Sixteen pulses were conducted to test the response of the LEU to pulsing. All survived the tests with no evidence of problems. The six LEU fuel elements are still in the core at the start of 1979.
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Karl R. Goller 67-1032 (b) Evidence for a small amount of tramp uranium was found in the core in November, December 1977. The situation is no more serious than reported earlier (in Annual Report, 1978).
It continues to appear and may disappear on occasion for several weeks only to reappear.
No correlation has been found between the appearance of this tramp uranium and any of our various phases or modes of operation.
(cl For most of 1978, neutron radiography was p arformed using a cryogenic source of cold neutrons. This operation accounted for most of the reactor usage.
(2) No changes were made to the Facility in 1978.
Certain wiring changes were made in the control console (see Part 4, Item 11 below).
(3) Surveillance tests and inspections were performed as required by Sections 4.0, 5.0, and 6.0 of the Mark F Technical Specifications.
Summary results are presented below.
Fuel Surveillance The FLIP fuel was inspected visually and for bending and length changes on 7/17/78. All elements were satisfactory for continued service.
In addition, the special fuel test pins were inspected frequently. All passed the required tests.
Control Rod Surveillance The visual inspection for deterioration was conducted on July 18, 1970.
All control rods were found to be satisfactory. The fueled followers located on some of the control rods were inspected for bend and found to be satisfactory.
Pulsing System Surveillance The mechanical components of the pulsing system (pulse control rod, air piston, lip seal, anvil, and accumulator) were inspected, cleaned as required, lubricated and reinstalled on January 20, 1973. The mechanical componente of the pulsing system were inspectri again on July 19, 1978.
Reactor' Safety Surveillance As specified in the Technical Specifications, Channel Tests of the reactor safety system channels, Channel Calibrations of the Power Level monitoring channels, Calibration of the Temperature and Chan-nel Checks of the fuel-element temperature-measuring channels were performed.
The tests were perforned at least as of;en as required, and the results were satisfactory.
In no case was a required safety c
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Karl R. Coller 67-1032 channel scram found to be operating outside the specified safety limits. The reactor power-level monitoring channels were cc11brated at least monthly during the reporting period, the last in the year on December 18, 1978.
Five of these monthly tests required changes in the calibration of at least one channel by an amount greater than 5% but less than 15%.
The monitor and survey systems were under surveillance during the
+2 porting period. The frequency of calibrations was as indicated belev.
Continuous Air Monitor Alarm setpoints were checked daily. The system was calibrated semiannually with three U-235 sources in front of the detector (600 ces/ min,1500 ets/ min, and 5500 cts / min).
Eberline Area Monitors Operation is checked daily; response to a source is observed weekly to activate alarms; calibration is performed semiannually with a 4 mci Cs-137 source.
Part 2 A tabu 3ation shocing the energy generated by the rear or (in megawatt-hours). The energy generated in 1978 by the thrk F was 431.56 megawatt-hours.
Part 3 The number of emergency shutdowns and inadvertent scrams, including the ef-fect, if any, on the safe operation of the reactor, and the reasons for any corrective maintenance required, if any.
Two inadvertent scrams occurred on Mark F this year:
(1) An electronic noise pulse caused a scram in the K2 channel while criticality was being established at 1.5 FM.
(See Part 4, Item 10.)
2/6/78.
(2) A scram occurred on channel K2 while at steady state 1.5 151 due appar-ently to effect of xenon burnout.
(See Part 4, Item 10.) 6/6/78.
Part 4 Discussion of the major maintenance operations performed during the period, including the effect (if any) on the safe operation of the reactor, and the reasons for any corrective maintenance required.
Karl R. Coller 67-1032 (1) When the shock absorber for the transient air cylinder was examined, dirt and grit were found inside the system.
This had no adverse ef-feet on the rod performance.
It was cleaned and returned to service af ter the semiannual check (1/20/78).
(2) A rusty nut was replaced on the CTR rod shaft at the semiannual check.
All other control rods were free from such rusty items (1/20/78).
(3) The Log Power channel in the Wide Range Channel would not respond to the calibration check. The trouble was a broken wire in the calibra-tion switch. The instrument channel was recalibrated (4/24/78).
(4)
One of the required Keithley power monitor channels failed to scram on the daily checkout of the high-power mode. A thorough check re-venled an incorrect wiring harness for the three power channels.
With the incorrect hookup, instead of disabling the high-sensitivity channel when at high power, the circuitry disabled the scram of one of the required high-level power channels. This situation was remedied immediately by correctly connecting the Keithley scrnas and high-voltage disable. To assure that such a situation will not recur, a new item was inserted on the Daily Checklist to assure that all modes of the scram capability are checked prior to any operation. The Commission was noti-fled in writing of this occurrence and the remedy (4/25/78).
(5) For a special fuel test program, a different Transient rod was installed to replace the air-follower type with a water-follower type. This pro-vided a larger flux gradient around the fuel in the test (6/19/78).
(6) The transient rod for the special pulsing program was replaced with the standard air-follower control rod (7/19/78).
(7) The semiannual inspection of the Transient rod and its air system was conducted (7/19/78).
(8) The Reactivity Computer would not zero; it was repaired by the Electronics Department and recalibrated (7/10/78).
(9) One of the three fuel temperature scrams (Tl) would not scram promptly as required.
It was repaired 'oy the Electronics Department.
No license condition was violated since two other functioning temperature scrams satisfied the license conditions (10/4/78).
(10) While approaching full power, the Reg Rod drove out continuously regard-less of whether the Up button was depressed. To keep from scramming on power, the operator drove another rod in to balance the Reg rod when it was full out.
Investigation of the event showed a faulty Up switch on the control console. A new one was installed by Electronics.
Region V was notified of this occurrence on 8/31 and 9/15/78.
Karl R. Coller 67-1032 Note:
In light of the above problen, the Reg rod may have actually been the cause of the two inadvertent scrams reported in Part 3 above. The operator could only report the probable cause of the two scrams under the circumstances and nature of the scram (8/30/78).
(11) Final wiring changes on the console were completed by the Electronics Department in October 1978 and were reviewed by the Safety Committee.
This effort finished a complete review of the console and its drawings to be certain that no more problems remain of the type reported above in Part 4, Item 4.
Several items were found that made this console per-form differently from others, but no items were found that violated the Technical Specifications. These differences were eliminated, thus bringing this console into agreement with the performance of other con-soles. All changes were reviewed and approved by the Safety Committee (10/25/78).
Part 5 A summary of each change to the facility or procedures, tests, and experi-ments carried out under the conditions of 10 CFR 50.59 is presented below.
The operating procedures were updated in a number of areas.
(1) Provision was made for a " duty senior reactor operator" to be readily reached by phone if operations are conducted by a reactee operator with no senior operator in the Facility (1/16/78).
(2) The chain of responsibility from the TRIGA Facility to the GAC vice pres-ident in charge was clarified (3/17/78).
(3) A waiting time of 1.5 minutes was established before entry into the reac-tor room is permitted af ter a neutron radiography run at full reactor power
(;4/24/78).
(4) Checklist changes were instituted to assure:
(a) That the power scrans are tested in all models during the Daily checkout.;
Ob) That the vacuum pumping system for the cryogenic system is secured at the end of each day's operation; and (c) That the Security Office has verified the operability of the high-temperature alarm for the cryogenic system at the end of each day.
A number of tests were conducted under the terms of 10CFR50.59. They are de-scribed in the following:
Karl R. Coller 67-1032 (1) A request for permission to use a brass vacuum valve for in-tank con-trol of the vacuum system was granted by the Safety Committee.
It has been in use since April 1978 with no signs of corrosion found in the surveillance examinations (4/24/78).
(2)
It soon became expedient to use two vacuum valves in series under-water to control the vacuum line to the cryogenic system.
On April 25, 1978, approval was granted for a period of 1 week to use two brass vacuum valves. This approval was extended on May 8,1978, to allow time to receive the stainless-steel replacement valve. On May 11, 1978, approval was granted to use one stainless-steel and one brass vacuum valve. These two have been in use since early May 1978 and surveillance has shown no evidence of corrosion.
(3) On April 17, 1978, an application was made for approval to test in steady state as well as in the pulsing mode any combination of 1/2-in.
diameter Romania fuel (93% enrichment) and 1/2-in and 1-1/2-in. diam-eter LEU fuel provided the total number is limited to 10.
Approval was granted on Iby 1, 1978, for the tests. On May 2, 1978, an adden-dum was submitted for the application to seek relief from one of the special requirements established by the Safety Committee for the pro-posed tests.
The requirement stated:
"The replacement 0.5-in. U(93)
TC element must be put in the core at the same time as the initial LEU fuel." Under the conditions offered by the Facility, the requirement was lifted provided no pulsing tests were to be performed.
(4) on 5/19/78, the Safety Committee approved a procedure that leaves the Cold Neutron Source in its normal operating location under normal cir-cumstances over weekends.
(5) On 6/19/78, the Safety Committee completed its review and approved a recuest to permit:
(a) A central water-filled region to accentuate the flux gradient for the LEU fuel tests; and (b) A selected pulsing program without a central flux trap.
In July 1978, a pulsing test was conducted in which 16 pulses were per-formed. The LEU fuel performed without a single problem; however, we did not achieve the goal which was to stretch the clad of cer-tain LEU fuel by pulsing and thereby force the elements to operate at higher steady-state temperatures. The result of the pulsing tests (in this regard) was to raise the steady-state operating temperature only an insignificant amount.
Karl R. Coller 67-1032 Part 6 A summary of the nature and amount of radioactive effluents released or dis-charged to.the environs beyond the effective control of the licensee as meas-ured at or prior to the point of such release or discharge.
During the calendar year 1978, 0.814 curies of Argon 41 were released from the facility to the atmosphere.
All liquid and solid wastes are transferred to CAC's SNM-696 licensed Waste Pro-cessing Facility for ultimate disposal by a licensed disposal vendor.
Part 7 A description of any environmental surveys performed outside the facility.
There have been no significant changes to the Environmental Surveillance Program for 1978.
See reference 38-675 dated February 24, 1976, Facility License R-38; Docket 50-89, Submittal of Annual Report, Attachment I, General Atomic Company Environmental Surveillt.nce Program. The results of this program are submitted in our Semiannual Effluent Report.
Part 8 A summary of radiation exposures received by facility personnel and visitors, including the dates and time of significant erposure, and a brief summary of the results of radiation and contamination surveys performed within the fac-ility.
Facility Personnel Whole Body Exposures for the Year 1978:
(REM)
Number of Employees Monitored High Low Average 4
1.506 0.160 0.737 Nonfacility CAC Personnel Whole Body Exposures foa the Year 1978:
QU21)
Number of Employees Monitored High Low Average 171 0.260 0.000 0.011 Contractor Personnel Whole Body Exnosures for the Year 1978:
CREM)
Number of Persons Monitored High Low Average 156 3.020 0.020 0.069 Visitor Whole Body Exposures for the Year 1978:
(REM)
Number of Persons Monitored Average
- 297, 0.000
Karl R. Goller 67-1032 Routine Wipe Surveys High Wipe 1628 S DPM/100 c 2
Average Wipe 11 S DPM/100 cm2 Low Wipe
<1 S DPM/100 cm Routine Radiation Measurements High 1 Rem /hr at 1 foot Average 100 mrem /hr at - 2 inches Low
<0,5 mrem /hr at 2 inches Should you desire additional information concerning the above, please let me know.
Very truly yours, l (I F %
William R. Mowry Licensing Administrator Nuclear Materials Control Division WRM:hes cc:
R. H. Engelken, U.S. NRC, Region V
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