ML19294B655
| ML19294B655 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Erwin |
| Issue date: | 12/14/1979 |
| From: | NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19294B656 | List: |
| References | |
| REF-10CFR9.7 NUDOCS 8003050247 | |
| Download: ML19294B655 (71) | |
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poeggTc3 usnac Mr. Samuel J. Chilk FEB 7 G30 >
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Washington, D. C.
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Attention:
Docketing and Service Branch N,.
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Dear Mr. Chilk:
In reference to the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission's Federal Register request of December 13, 1979, I have enclosed the State of South Carolina's formal comments regarding the Commission's proposed changes to emergency planning regulations for nuclear facilities (10 CFR, Part 50).
These coments support the general views that I expressed at the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Workshop in Atlanta, Georgia on January 24, 1980.
The State of South Carolina is committed to the development of effec-tive response capabilitites for the protection of life and property should a nuclear incident occur.
These comments are sutriitted for the Commission's review and consideration in its rule making for emergency planning.
erely q
uA Lee M. Thomas Director LMT/i1CS Enclosure 4%%d;cd by card' ' A ""'*****';)
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Division of Peblic Safety Programs Edgar A. Brown Building, 1205 Pendleton Street, Columbia 29201 8003o3n2 g
STATE OF SOUTil CAROLINA COMMENTS ON PROPOSED NRC RULE MAKING (10 CFR, PART 50-DECEMBER 13, 1979)
JANUARl 24, l980 The general principios set forth in the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC) proposed changes (December 13, 1979) to regulations on emergency plans for selected classifications of nuclear f acilities would require that:
1.
NRC licensing or continued licensing be contingent upon NRC concurrence in state and local emergency response plans.*
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2.
Emergency response planning considerations be extended to the 10 and 50 mile radiuses for Emergency Planning Zones (EPZ) as outlined in NUREG-0395.
3.
Detailed emergency response implementing procedures be submitted to NRC for review.
4.
A minimum level of radiological response training and exercises be conducted.
5.
Public information programs outlining potential hazards and appropriate public response in the event of a nuclear facility incident be conducted on an annual basis.
Tbc State of South Carolina strongly supports the principle of th_ese proposed regulations which is to insure the availability of effective response capabilities should a nuclear f acility incident occur; however, it appears that NRC has, in its provisions addressing standards and assuming direct review authority for off-site emergency response plans, entered into an area outside its statutory responsibilities and, most importantly, without a clear understanding of the environment in which state and local government must operate.
Furthermore, in its intent to withhold or suspend an operating license in the absence of " concurred in" off-site response plans, NRC has placed on the industry a requirement that neither the industry nor NRC has the capability or authority to insure implemenetation of and indicates a presupposition that litt,le or no effort has been directed toward the development of state and local preparedness capabilities.
While there is a definite need to improve such capabilities, it is the inherent responsibility of state and lucal government and could be more effectively addressed from the national level by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).
Comments on the specific changes to 10 CFR Part 50 proposed by NRC will be submitted based on the principics of a separation of federal responsibili ies (i.e., on-site, NRC;-off-site, FEMA) in assuring the availability of effective response capabilities should a nuclear facility incident occur.
In the event an appropriate division of federal responsibilities in this area is not forthcoming, preference in the available alternatives outlined in the proposed rule will be expressed.
Additional comments for NRC's consideration will also be submitted.
2
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Concurrence of Off-site Response Plans While there is a need to provide assurances regarding the adequacy of offsite response capabilities, NRC does not possess the statutory responsibility to impose, directly or indirectly, standards or to assume review authority for state and local plans.
NRC should concentrate its efforts on necessary regulations and guidance for the development of on-site response capabilities to include provisions for effective communications and coordination with (off-site) state and local government authorities.
The protection of life and property off-site is the responsibility of state and local government, not the facility's.
Imposing the development of effective off-site response capabilities as a condition of licensing is not 'a proper assignment of responsibilities, nor within the authority of NRC.
In order to assure the availability of effective off-site response capabilities, the responsibility for the development of such capabilities should be clearly identified with government.
As off-site response is essentially operational, with the exception of the technical response of a state radiological health agency, necessary federal oversite would appropriately be exercised by FEMA.
The designation of 10 (primary) and 50 (secondary) mile EPZ's with a requirement to establish site-specific perimeters for nuclear power facilities appears to be an appropriate basis for identifying off-site planning needs.
(Note: Concerns regarding specific requirements within each EPZ will be addressed below.)
It can be anticipated that in many circumstances the primary EPZ will cross local (i.e., county) boundaries and the secondary EPZ will cost certainly encompass multi-jurisdictions.
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Given this requirement to develop a capability for a coordinated response in a multi-jurisdictional environment, the authority and capability to implement necessary planning rests only at the state level of government.
The principle of concurrence provides an appropriate mechanism to evaluate the adequacy of off-site response plans; however, regulated concurrence implies that state and local government will not assume its ultimate responsibility, the protection of the life and property of its citizens, without federal statutory requirements.
While emergency planning may have received insufficient attention from NRC, the industry, and state and local government in the past; the post Three Mile Island environment has created the most effective mandate, public conc.ern, to insure that necessary efforts are directed toward the development of off-site response plans.
South Carolina and many other states have, in the past months, exerted considerable effort toward the evaluation and improvement of off-site response plans, as has NRC with regard to on-site capabilities.
The most effective contribution the federal government can provide to support this current activity is the development of clear and concise guidelines on potential off-site protective actions that may be required in the event of an incident.
Any form of concurrence exercised from the federal level should not be directed below state government.
Not only would federal involvement at the local level encroach on state responsibilities and authority its limited knowledge of local organizations and resources would limit the accuracy of a federal evaluation of local capabilities.
In addition, given the inherent limitations in local resources of many jurisdictions 4
that may fall within the pri=ary EPZ, conditioning licensing on concurrence in those local plans, without a reasonable expectation that concurrence can be achieved, establishes a requirement that would be impossible to implement.
Appropriate federal involvement in a review of off-site response plans would be accomplished by a direct evaluation of state level plans with assurances regarding local capabilities being provided by means of a state certification based on one of the following principles:
1.
Local plans have been developed and meet federal guidelines, or, 2.
Provisions in the state plan provide for. appropriate response actions to overcome deficiencies identified in local capabilities.
South Carolina strongly supports the assignment of the primary responsibility for any federal involvement in the review of off-site plans to FEMA.
NRC concerns regarding off-site capabilities can best be addressed through technical assistance to FEMA, in the establishment of guidelines to support the development of such plans and active participation in the review of technical elements relating to the response of state radiological health agencies.
With specific reference to the alternatives submitted for the addition of new Section 50.47; Alternative A appears to recognize, to a degree, the need for flexibility in relating the value of " concurred in" or "non-concurred in" plans to the overall decision-making process for licensing.
Conditional support is also expressed for the "show cause" 5
't aspects of Alternative A for the proposed amendments to Section 50.54.
However, South Carolina strongly recommends that the principles addressed above be incorporated into the final version of any changes to current regulations.
Specifically, South Carolina would support a position concentrating NRC efforts and responsibilities on improving and maintaining on-site capabilities while deferring federal oversight responsibility for off-site planning to FEMA.
In addition, there should be a clear understanding that responsibility for the development of off-site capabilities lies with state government and not the facility.
Emergency Planning Zones and Planning Guidance While the designation of EPZ's provides some basis for initiating an offsite planning effort, the absence of clear and concise guidelines will result in unnecessary delays in the development of effective off-site capabilities.
Current guidance, formal and informal, available from NRC is confusing, subject to numerous NRC interpretations and constant revision.
Establishing deadlines (Section 50.54) in the absence of appropriate guidance to support implementation of any form of final regulations will only add to the current high level of confusion.
The current confusion in planning criterion is highlighted by apparent NRC requirements for the development of off-site warning capabilities.
The proposed rule (Appendix E; Paragraph D-3) would require that capabilities must be available to provide effective warning to the general population 6
in the primary EPZ within 15 minutes of notification.
While effective warning is the desired goal for the protection of life in all emergencies, attainment of this goal would require a tone activated alerting device in every household. The !;0AA Weather Radio is an available resource a
that would support such a capability; however, the implied requirement that the facility assume funding responsibility is inappropriate.
There comes a point where the individual must assume direct responsibility for his own protection; the federal government has yet to require other industries to provide similar capabilities where the absence of such warning would pose a more immediate threat to the public health and safety.
The requirement for submission of detailed off-site response procedures to the federal government creates many unanswered questions.
The level of detail is yet to be defined and as discussed should be developed by FEMA.
In addition, the requirement to submit plans during the preliminary Safety Analysis phase of licensing will place an unnecessary burden on the limited resources of state and local government, particularly when concurrent efforts are being directed toward upgrading plans in support of operational facilities also located in the state.
Assurances that necessary planning will be undertaken could be provided by letters of agreement indi sting that initial contact with appropriate off-site authorities has been made.
Any review of off-site plans should be conducted in conjunction with the evaluation of the Final Safety Analysis Report.
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9 Training and Exercising The State of South Carolins strongly supports the concept of minimum standards in the development of a training and exercise program as part of a continuing planning process.
While the 5 year frequency requirement for the conduct of a comprehensive exercise at a given facility, outlined in Appendix E, Paragraph IV-F, (Alternative A), appears reasonable for those states having limited (i.e., 2 or 3) facilities; a standard that, as a result of the number of facilities located in the state, would require the conduct of more than one such exercise in a single year would place an unnecessary burden on state government without an appreciable increase in response capabilities.
This situation'should be recognized in the development of minimum exercise requirements.
Public Information As with training and exercising of response forces, a public education program outlining potential hazards and appropriate response actions to guide the general population in the event of an incident should be conducted on a regular basis.
In addition to annual media participation in such a program, consideration should be given to including similar information in local telephone directories.
Funding The conduct of off-site preparedness programs will require extensive state and local resources (manpower and funding) to insure the development 8
of effective capabilities. The Salomon Report has identified the nuclear industry as the probable source of additional funds and outlined project cost for such a program.
Prior to placing pri=ary funding responsibility on the industry, the following views should be considered:
1.
Nuclear f acilities, although located in one governmental tax jurisdiction and taxed by that jurisdiction, af fect other jurisdictions which must bear immediate and long term planning cost without having access to taxes from the facility.
2.
As the radius of planning requirements becomes greater, few facilities are the concern of a single county.
The planning radius of ten encompasses county lines, state lines, and in some instances international boundaries.
3.
As new regulations are generated to oversee the nuclear industry and old ones expanded, there is an immediate need to address fixed nuclear f acility planning at all levels of government, beginning at the lowest and going to the highest.
All levels of government need access to immediate additional funds to upgrade their response capability.
4.
It is well understood that the consumer ultimately must pay the price for planning, regardless of the level in government at which costs are incurred.
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It becomes a matter of how the consumer will be taxed, who will administer the tax receipts and what is the most effective manner in which to address the problem.
Placing a $1,000,000 one-time license fee on each fixed nuclear facility for planning purposes may be a simple procedure for the agency assessing the nuclear facility; however, it also may place an excessive burden on the facility which must either borrow the sum, or use its own capital, which ultimately is the same.
It also may force utilities, which in most instances own the generating plant, to seek rate relief in an effort to provide some degree of compensation for this a'dditional
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capital expenditure.
If such a fee is placed upon the facility, should it not be in a lesser initial amount extended over a period of time.
On the other hand, when one industry is singled out for a special planning assessment, are we not limiting our vision?
Although planning and exercising the plan for possible nuclear accidents is done to address a particular,roblem, its benefits also cover other hazards which may pose equal danger to the public with a greater chance of occurence.
5.
The basis for effective off-site response capabilities is a sound emergency preparedness program.
Federal support (funding and technical assistance) for the development of state and local off-site capabilities should be incorpora*ed into FEMA's preparedness program for all emergencies.
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The State of South Carolina is committed to the development of effective response capabilities for the protection of life and property in all emergencies and welcomet federal support and assistance in this effort.
It also recognizes the serious need to up grade emergency response capabilities in the event of a nuclear facility incident and has, as have NRC, the nuclect industry, and other states, exerted considerable efforts in r ent months toward this end.
The state supports federal oversight and guidance in the development off-site response capabilities; however, the confusion and uncertainty in planning requirements following Three Mile Island is not a proper environment in which to develop effective capabilities nor does it serve the best interest of our citizens.
The development of effective nuclear facility incident response capabilities will require close coordination and cooperation betweer responsible federal agenci-=, state government, and the nuclear industry.
An orderly and comprehensive approach to this effort makes it necessary that on-site responsibilities be clearly identified with NRC and the nuclear industry while deferring off-site responsibilities to state government with appropriste FEMA oversight and assistance.
JM/jr 11