ML19291C284
| ML19291C284 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 01/09/1980 |
| From: | NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19291C285 | List: |
| References | |
| REF-10CFR9.7 NUDOCS 8001230330 | |
| Download: ML19291C284 (29) | |
Text
1 NUCLE AR REGUL ATORY COMMISSION
/
IN THE MATTER OF:
PUBLIC MEETING MEETING WITH AIF ON LICENSING PAUSE Place - Nashington, D.
C.
Date. Wednesday, 9 January 1980 Pages 1-28 1793 006 t' - :
(:c:1347 3700 s
ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS,INC.
OfficialReporters 444 North Cecirci Street Wcshington, D.C. 20001 NATIO NWlOE COVERAGE. DAILY 8001230,3,3 6
1 R9088 DISCLAIMER This is an unofficial transcript of a meeting of the United States January 9, 1980, 1:30 pm in the Nuclear Regulatory Commission held on Commissions's offices at 1717 H Street, N.W.,
Washington, D. C.
The This transcript meeting was open to public attendance and observation.
has not been reviewed, corrected, or edited, and it may contain
' inaccuracies.
The transcript is intended solely for general informational purposes.
As provided by 10 CFR 9.103, it is not part of the formal or informal record of decision of the matters discussed.
Expressions of opinion in this transcript do not necessarily reflect final determinations or beliefs.
No pleading or other paper may be filed with the Comm.'.ssion in any proceeding as the result of or addressed to any statement or argument contained herein, except as the Commission may authorize.
1793 007 0
2 dsp2 1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 2
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 3
4 PUBLIC MEETING S
i 6l MEETING WITH AIF ON LICENSING PAUSE i
i 7'
i 8) h 10 i
11 !
l 12 l Room 1130 1717 H Street, N.W.
13 Washington, D.
C.
14 Wednesday, 9 January 1980 15 ;1 The Commission net, pursuant to notice, at 1:33 p.m.
1 16 ll BEFORE:
ll 17 JOHN AHEARNE, Chairman 18 JOSEPH HENDRIE, Commissioner 19 :
VICTOR GILINSKY, Commissioner 20,
RICHARD T.
KENNEDY, Commissioner i
21 !
STAFF PRESENT:
ALSO PRESENT:
22 LEONARD BICKWIT BYRON LEE, JR.
23,
JOHN HOYLE FRANK STASZESKY 24 ;
E.
HANRAHAN ROGER SHERMAN Ace t weral Reporters, Inc. l 25 CARL WALSKE THEODORE STERN a
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3 j
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P_ R_ O C E E_ D I N_ G S_
2 lI CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
We come this afternoon to hear b
i 3'
from the distinguished panel put together by the AIF.
And
[
t i
I i
4; prior to beginning, I would just like to turn to our general 5
counsel to set out some of the procedural issues.
l l
6 MR. BICKWIT:
This is a meeting that was requested i
1 7
by the Atomic Industrial Forum to speak on the issue of I
I 8
AIF's comments on the licensing pause, j
9 The Commission agrees to the meeting on the
?1 l.
1 10,
conditions that the ex parte rule would be observed.
The 11 reason for the question having arisen is obviously that a I
12 number of proceedings are now pending before boards of the 13 Commission to which the licensing pause is relevant.
la l I have had discussions with Mr. Wiggin, and in the 15 course of our conversation conveyed to him, one, my understanding 15 that while our rule requires that communications be barred
~
unless requested by the Commission, even on generic matters, that my understanding that the Commission was prepared to hear the AIF on these matters constituted a request.
And secondly, I conveyed to him my understanding T
that the matters discussed would indee' have to be generic 22 in all senses.
They would not relate directly to the merits 22 of any proceeding now before the Commission.
24 He indicated that that was the intent of the AIF.
. R ecor*ert, f ric..
25 " I then read him -- I then referred him to some legislative 1793 009
j 4
l I
dsp4 history in the government in the Sunshine Act which constituted I!
i j
rather important directives to the Commission,in my opinion, 2.
Il I
h on the subject.
l I
And he agreed to take a look at that before he 4
i j
l arrived today.
1 il CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
Mr. Sherman.
6 MR. SHERMAN:
Thank you.
I am Roger Sherman, chairman i
l of the board, Ebasco Services, and here in my capacity as l
h I
chairman of the Atomic Industrial Forum.
9' I
My colleagues at the table are, on my far left, 10 '
Byron Lee, vice president of Commonwealth Edison, and here 3;,
in his role as chairman of the AIF's Policy Committee on Follow-up to the Three Mile Island Accit.nt.
Next to me on my left is Frank Staszesky, president of Boston Edison, and here as vice-chairman of the Atomic Industrial Forum.
,3 On my far right is Theodore Stern, executive vice president, Nuclear Energy System, Westinghouse Electric Corporation, and here to represent the nuclear steam supply system point of view.
And on my right, Carl Walske, president at of the y ] Forum.
In the audience there are representatives of all or at least most, I believe, of the utility companies that
,44
'm 9ecorters' Inc.25 i have near term licenses -- license applications in, and also 1793 010
l 5
dsp4 many who have construction permit applications before the i
Commission.
2:
i Frankly, gentlemen, the industry simply does not 3'
see safety reasons for holding up consideration of the i
4, l
l 1
issuance of the new operating licenses and construction permits'.
5:
I We believe that the fundamental safety fixes from TMI are l
6 j
either accomplished already or well underway.
I 7
First, while we in no way minimize the serious 1
4 consequences of TMI, the basic cause of TMI arose from the i
9]
I i'
confusion in the operator's expedence as a result of the 10 stuck open power operated relief valve.
,j,
And we no of no other small loss of coolant 12 )
I j
accident, other than from the steam space of the pressurizer, 13 J that could have so misled the operators.
And the problem was corrected, basically, by new instructions to operators immediately following the accident in the form of how to recognize and respond to a similar event.
Second, many other aspects of the TMI accident were exhaustively explored by the cream of the NRC staff and the industry's technical community.
The results of these efforts were the NRC Lessons Learned Task Force Report and 1
the changes it has led to for reactors and their operation; I
internal safety reviews by each utility; generic safety recommendations for the industry by the AIF Policy Committee g
9ecorters. Inc. l v
on Follow-up to the TMI Accident, and its six subcommittees, g
1793 011
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a tremendous amount of work done by very skilled people; 1;
)
the formation of NSAC and its report on TMI -. for example, 2,.
i 3,
the analysis of the Three Mile Island Unit Number 2 accident, l
which we have here;and the launching of the Institute for s
l Nuclear Power Operations.
5 I
All of these were aimed at the substance of the f
o, i
lesons.' earned at TMI:
improvements in nuclear power plant I
3 design, the competence of its operators and the procedures l
8j followed by the operators.
9' They were approached vigorously with an open mind 10,
and experienced technical judgment.
The heightened awareness 11 l
of top utility executives to safety is contributing to across 12 the board improvements.
13 lj I
The Ad Hoc Nuclear Oversight Committee under the la chairmanship of Floyd Lewis, chief executive officer of
'5 Middle-South Utility Services, has been working testimony to this new commitment.
The new industry organizations, INPO, NSAC, and the Mutual Insurance Company to cover replacement power costs represent major commitments of funds and resources which will improve and maintain greater safety.
.Y i
In particular, the Institute of Nuclear Power 22 J Operations, now headed by an extremely well-qualified president, 2'
Eugene P. Wilkinson, was designed to contribute to new safety 24
- "'"'"'! as it establishes benchmarks of excellence in reactor operations 25 1793 012'
I 7
i i
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- j and examines performance to make sure these benchmarks are t
i met and reviews operating experience to revicw safety concerns, 2sii l
significant.
3 i
The Nuclear Safety Analysis Center has specialized 4
and concentrated technical resources -- that is, providing f
8 5
1 technical reviews and remedies to the concerns arising from 6
i i
the TMI accident.
This competence is clearly reflected in 7.i i
its authoritative report analyzing the detailed sequence of g
9] events at TMI.
Another example of NSAC's activities is coordination i
g of the industry's safety relief va' N test program.
Every 11 !
g:
utility fo,rmed a special task force to look at safety, in many ases employing outside consultants to obtain specialized 13 i and independent expertise.
g The recommendations of industry's TMI safety review committees under our sponsors; iip at AIF assisted individual utilities and other organizations in their internal safety reviews on generic issues, such as emergency response planning, operations, control room considerations, safety analysis criteria, systems and equipment criteria, and post-accident recovery.
Synergistic interactior.= between industry and 3
NRC staff efforts were healthy and very productive.
The recommendations of the NRC Lessons Learned Task Force were g
- ta 3eDorters, Inc. I 73 produced by the most competent of the NRC staff; these have 1793 013
l 8
l l
I l
dsp7 I
been substantial, constructive, and comprehensive.
I!
The industry's response to these has been positive 2
and cooperative.
The sum total then formed the foundation 3
l I
and substance of a pyramid of safety improvements that drew i
4:
i 5l from the best insights into the TMI lessons.
Third, as a result of all this intense and even i
6 dramatic effort, your own director of nuclear reactor 4
1 regulation wrote to you on August 20, 1979 with a strong j
3.1 sense of conviction.
9;
?
i d
And I quote from that:
"It is my judgment that 10 ;
the TMI related actions being taken by NRR on licensing I
- )
I emergency preparedness" -- see indicated bulletin -- bulletins 12 and orders -
" followup primarily in the areas of auxiliary 13 gq feedwater responsibility, loss of feedwater, and small break, loss of coolant accident analysis, emergency operating guidelines and procedures, and operator training, and short term lessons learned, if accomplished generally en the schedule we have selected, are necessary and sufficient for the continued safe operation of operating plants and for the resumption of staff licensing activities on pending construction permits and operating license applications."
That is the end of his quote.
We agreed then with Mr. Denton, and still feel he was c' in believing the house was in order for resuming g
ltDCFlers, Inc.
li ensing at that poiat.
We began to believe that the progressive 25 1793 014
9 l
l I
dsp8 attitude of both the industry and the NRC staff toward 1
i
} I' implementing constructive changes in safety requirements was f
i l
3 paying off in both safety and in the NRC attitude toward i
i l
4l subsequent licensing.
i S]
When the Kemeny Report came out on October 30, 1979,l 6l there were no surprises regarding safety concerns.
Theactionl 7
programs already underway took into account the substance of l
1 I
8i the recommendations.
l l
9 i We in the industry were amazed by the Commission's l
licensing pause in reaction to the Kemeny Report, even 11 l considering the extreme criticism of the NRC in that report.
12 The Herculean effort by the NRC staff and the industry in the i
13 'i last seven months was case aside.
e i
I 1
It was as though the Commission felt it necessary to escalate the review process by an order of magnitude.
The result was the current action plan in PUREG-0660, which is simply a reiteration of TMI observations that have been made across the past seven months along with a collection of many controversial issues resurrected from the halls of NRC:
~
for example, the approach to seismic protection and specifying criteria for systems interaction that have been under active examination by industry and the NRC staff for the past several years.
They are difficult issues, then; in some respects
, y, 25 controversial; but hardly new to the scene since March 28.
i793 015
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of the "act that both industry dsp9 This NRC reaction is u-the.
_3 of the report have shown 2l and the NRC staff, n ma r additional safety insights not previously considered 3
i by industry and the NRC in their studies.
Though the issue 02 possible NRC reorganization l
5 has been introduced as a new factor, this consideration, which 6
d j
may take some time to resolve, should not be permitted to 7.
I 4
restrain the Ceaunission from exercising its present duties j
responsibly.
g The action plan with its additional recommendations 10 is aimed at improving safety.
But we believe it will have the 33,
effect of diluting the more important effots underway.
No g
- 33) valid reason now exists for delaying case work review in which the major lessons already learned can be incorporated in direct licensing reviews.
In the longer term the action plan item should bu systematically explored and measured in importance;while continuing to explore new ways to improve safety, we should recognize that current reactors in large measure have proved their essential safety through their operating records.
Throughout all the studies thus far, neither the Kemeny Commission, the NRC staff, the Commission, the ACRS, the President, nor the Congress has proposed shutting down operating reactors, 3
c teorters. inc. j Furthermore, reactors that are ready for commissioning o
g 1793 016
11 6
i l
i l
I dr-10 will take ir.to account all past experience, including the I
I I
2'q lessons from TMI and be as safe as those reactors now operating.
1 3l Similarly, reactors now under construction and proposed for l
4:
construction permits will incorporate all the relevant safety I
l 51 experience and knowledge.
l 6
The nuclear power reactors presently licensed to i
7j operate -- about 70 -- are supply the nation with electricity I
I i
8' that otherwise would require burning 1.5 million barrels of i
i 9'
oil a day.
Each new large reactor in commercial service will 11 ;,
additionally offset the equivalent of 30,000 barrels of oil I
l
per day.
These new reactors, some of which are awaiting 13 '
licensing decision, are as needed by the nation as -- by the nation as those now operating.
And they, too, are safe.
NRC's failure to license new reactors will not contribute to safer nuclear power in this country.
It will, however, have inflationary impact on consumers and will weaken our nation's energy security.
The Commission must move aggressively to remove
~~
unnecessary in licensing resumption, as President Carter urged on December 7.
We view your current licensing pause as one in l
a series of endless study efforts in which conclusive action is submerged by bureaucratic procedures.
24 only the strong will and sense of purpose of this
, y,,,,n, g q 2'5 '!
Commission can provide the fo_ce and focus for decisive L
1793 017
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l t
dspil re-established licensing actions, and we urge you to provide j
l this essential leadership and to provide it now.
l 2
b I
Thank you, gentlemen.
l 3
CRAIRMAN AHEARNE:
Do your colleagues wish to add 4
some points, Mr. Sherman?
l MR. SuERMAN:
Yes.
syron, Frank, from the utility l
3 7] viewpoint?
MR. STASZESKY:
Well, in particular on the point 8
I 9] that was made about the imr,act on utilitr customers from delay;-
li l
the plants that are delayed that are in construction that 10 t
might be delayed, and certainly construction permits not 33 i
issued so that the plant will be built at a later point in g
time, the costs are escalating, according to our calculations, 13 !l j,"
for one major unit at $15 million a month.
And that really works down to something on the order of 15 percent increase for one year's delay to customers' g
bills.
And if there was some really significant safety issue that couldn't be resolved during the construction of the-unit, that is one thing.
But we know of none, and we think that the delay simply increases cost with no improvement in safety 22 ;j that could not be achieved during the construction period.
MR. SHERMAN:
Ted?
MR. STERN:
I want to comment on the action plan 24
= ewms, inc.1 i
items.
We've only had a few weeks to review the issues that 25 1793 018
13 dsp12 are under discussion before the Commission, and'I certainly l
I!
2l would be the last to say these issues should not be considered.!
l i
But the new --
3 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
You would be the last one?
4, i
l MR. STERN:
The last one to say they should not be i
5 1i considered.
l 6J But on the other hand, safety issues have always 7..
I n
8 al involved -- and nothing new -- and nothing that has changed 1-this procedure because of TMI.
As new analyses are developed 9
.and the impact is evaluated on safety, they have always been evaluated in terms of thaimpact on any of the plants, whether i
operating under license or proposed for license.
And we feel that on the basis of our preliminary analysis of the action plan itens that they are not of a i
sufficient magnitude to justify the licensing pause.
MR. LEE:
I might just add from the policy committa-effort:
again, we did have a major effort on the part of, I think, the top people in the industry in our policy committee and in the review of the potential, the lessons to be learned from there.
As Bob said, we had a significant interaction with
,, j the staff.
I think that out of that we evolved with positions and direction for the industry that they have taken on in significant areas that he mentioned, INPO and NSAC.
,4 4
q bcorters inc.
In other areas, we believe the area where effort 3 j 1793 019 s
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needs to be put the greatest is in the improvement of the i
2]
capability of the operations, the operating people, thestaffsj a
3 there.
s
And the industry is moving very vigorously in that l'
I l
There have been a lot of things done as a result of area.
a!
6 1
bulletins and orders in the area, certainly in the area of w
operating experience, design, operation, and trainig: again l
0 through NSAC and INPO we'll get into that.
But the individual, utilities and the manufacturers are doing significant -- have l 9
increased their efforts significantly in that area to see that 11
a repeat of a Three Mile Island type of event does not get by I
3 us and it gets to all of the people that are required.
a l ' "l We believe the review of the control room layout is
~i I#
something that is necessary, but can only be done in an orderly fashion; it's a major job, and I think we have to be careful we don't create bigger problems than we're try ing to solve by making changas.
I think we've had a couple of examples where we do that:
we make a change and find out we've gone in the
~~
wrong direction.
And I think in the emergency response program area that was an obvious area that we needed some improvement.
I think the industry has made a major step in trying to cover that and trying to develop a program that will improve our 24
..=,oonen,inc.j operations.
25 '
I think also that our committee has felt that the 1793 020
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area that can be the most productive to us in the future is l
,1 i
I 2 "j in the use of the fault tree analysis effort.
l ti 3
The problem is there are a lot of items here in the,
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action plan,but I think it's a question of priorities and l
I t'
5 trying to put our efforts in the area where we'll get the 6{ most gain.
And I think we have to do that by going through 7l ij this, some type of an analysis, rather than just shotgunning a
0 the effort, and then we'll not get the major benefits.
9 10
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12 I 13 4 14 5
22 x
24 a.corters. inc. l 25 ",
1793 021
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MR. WALSKE:
Well, I could add a different point of 2
view and that is just to reiterate what our Chairman said with 3
regard to the feeling that the licensing pause is unnecessary.
4 I am probably more than the others at the table, a 5
focal point for receiving comments from the industry; and while j 6 l the industry has been very supportive of efforts to upgrade safety after Three Mile Island, thereisnounderstandingonthe!
7 8
part of industry of the current licensing pause that you have 9
as being related to safety.
10 I won't characterize it in other ways, but it cannot II be characterized by people in the industry as being related to
\\
l I2 ! safety.
i 13 f CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
Thank you.
Vic?
J, COMMISSIONER GILINSKY.
I guess I'm unclear on what 15
! your asking us to do.
Are you asking us to hurry up doing what 16 we're doing or to drop what we're doing and get back to reviewing 1
17l applications?
18 i
This morning, for example, we had a discussion on i
19 1 a subset of the items in the action plan, which are particularly i
20 l related to a resumption of licensing and we're looking at these 21 very hard.
22 We'll be discussing them in the coming days and 23 weeks.
Now, what is it, specifically, that you are proposing?
24 '
MR. SHERMAN:
On that basis, I guess we're trying to s c......r.: neoorms, inc. j 25 get a feel for what you are planning next; and on that basis, i
1 1793 022
f.
- 17 dspl6 when would you be getting back, would you say, to operating 1
l 2
licenses?
3 MR. WALSKE:
We think you're just inventing things 4
that do not require a licensing clause.
5 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
The message of these that I was l
6 getting was that -- at least I would characterize it; and tell f
7 meifit'swrong--isthatyoudonotbelievethosethingsthatj 8
we have identified are really of sufficient safety significance;!
9 that we should require any action to be completed on them prior 10 to resuming licensing.
i 11 l That seems to be the fundamental --
l 12 i MR. LEE:
I think the answer to the question, get on 13 with licensing, get back to licensing and continue in an 14 expedited fashion on what is being done.
15 l COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
There is a certain problem 16 l in simply making use of the people that are available; and up to i
17 now, they have been devoted to putting together a set of 18 requirements, proposed requirements.
19 MR. WALSKE:
Less we misunderstand, they put together 20 ;
a set of requirements that led to Denton's conclusions in August '79 to you that basic conclusions had been drawn and you're 21 l 22 ready to go on it.
23 If you look at the things that are additional, there 24 l is nothing additional in what you're looking at right now, which:
Ac......r
- ne m r m s,inc.'
25 is so crucial that it requires a licensing pause in order to I
t i
1793 023'
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deal with it.
~
2 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
That's what I'm asking.
3 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
Let me ask at least, Carl, to 4
accurately characterize both what Harold did at that time, and 5
what he has been doing.
6l First, the short term's lessons learned was i
i 7
characterized explicitly as a rapid look at what specific 8
actions ought to be taken immediately.
It was really focussed, !
t 9
very seriously, on plants still to be continued in operation.
i 10 When Harold gave the, now memorable, I'm sure to him,:
II "necessary and sufficient" back in August, what he was talking 12 about was "necessary and sufficient" to turn his people on to 13 licensing review; not, it is now necessary and sufficient to Id start licensing.
15 There was a subtle difference.
The action plan 16 i followed is still the result of a lot of longer term effort I7 following on from Roger Mattson's short term lesson learned 18 effort.
l l
MR. LEE:
But lessons learned review is a long term 20 l project, in a sense.
It seems we ought to be able to get enough 21 people back on to the normal course of business to proceed again.
22 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
I wasn'2 taking issue with 23 you.
I was trying to understand what it is you're seeking.
.4ce-,..eral Reporters, Inc. !
24 MR. WALSKE:
You've got 700 people, at the most recent count I have, in Denton's division or department or 1793 024
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I whatever it is.
I 2
COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Something like that.
MR. WALSKE:
And some of them ought to be able to 4
work on new licenses.
It shouldn't take 700 people to get the 5
Commission straightened out on priorities for additional issues.l l
6 i
COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
We'2m moving in that direction.
7 Are you saying that we ought to be moving faster or just drop 8
what we're doing?
MR. WALSKE:
I'm saying you shouldn't have had a 10 licensing pause in the first place, after the Kemeny Commission 11 report came out; and you should have kept working on these l
12 issues with yourleft hand, while your right hand kept issuing 13 l licenses.
I 14 '
MR. LEE:
It is always easy to keep passing papers 15 laround and creating new matrices and will never stop developing 16 '
new ideas and new efforst, I m sure.
17 l I hope we never stop, but it seems that what we have 18 done, at least our review of what we have done; which we think 19 !
l is adequate to get on with this business -- to continue operation.
20 I This is a logical step to move on, with the ne::t l
21 1 step.
22 MR. STERN:
Let me add to Byron's comment.
I have 231 been associated with licensing activities for 14 years.
Every i
1 24 !
sc.,.,.i n con.ri. ine. l year we think we're about done, and that we have reached a 25 l'plateau; and no'> know what the rules are.
I i
l 1793 025
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dsA;9 I
The2mfore, we can design these plants on the standard 2
basis.
The operating engineers can design them on a standard 3
basis and the utility can have a feeling of knowing what their l
costs are, because we can define what they are going to have to 5
build.
6 Every year we go through changes.
Now, after 14 yeTrs, I
7 I'm used to this, i
8 (Laughter.)
9 And the action plan is just another analogous term to:
10 lsome more ratcheting, which to me is more --
i j
l COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
This is a speicial year.
12 l l
MR. STERN:
Not really.
Maybe the issues are shiftedi 13 somewhat from what they were before, but we still see some old 14 issues here that are now being regurgitated, but they were there i
15 :
l before.
16 '
Some emphasis has been changed.
I will admit that, 17 ! but never before have we stopped licensing to do this; neither 18 do I suspect that, after all these action plans are finalized, 19 '
that this will be the end.
We're going to continue, and I think that is the 1
21 I l way of life in this business.
We're going to learn from our 22 experiences, and we're going to continue to learn.
We're going 23 to do everything possible to increase the safety of these 24 plants, but that is no justification for stopping the actual sc..,
.r.i s.correri. inc.
25 i
licensing process.
j 1793 026
l 21 dsp20 1
In fact, by the continued experience, we gain from 2
putting in new plants on the line, we're going to continue to 3
draw the information that will let us do a better job of d
licensing the plants.
5 MR. STASZESKY:
I think we're specifically asking l
l 6
that you dedicate some part of the NRR staff to the case by 7
case review, rather than working on the action plan, per se; or t 8
generic issues.
I 9
That's what we're asking.
l 10 COMMISSIONER GIIaNSKY:
We have asked the staff to II select out of that action plan, a short list of items that I2 apply to the resumption of licensing.
That is the fact that 13 L said was subject to our discussion, this morning.
i Id We are, in fact, honing that list and heading in the 15 direction you're recommending.
I'm asking, is it a matter of i
16 j speed or do you think this entire effort is just misguided and i
I7 we ought to drop the action plan and the short list?
18 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
I think Carl's description of the I9 f right hand and the left hand -- what they're really saying is, 20 that if we're going to do it, we ought to do it in parallel; not 21 l series.
22 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Sure.
23 MR. STASZESKY:
That's right.
24 MR. WALSKE:
We've got that list from your document Ace.,..eral Reporters, Inc. j 25 this morning.
We were taking a look at it at the same time you I
l 1793 027
22 dsp21 I
were looking at it.
2 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
We saw it even earlier.
3 MR. WALSKE:
While you were deliberating formally.
4 It doesn't strike me that there's anything on the list you can't; i
i 5
come to grips with and get on with licensing.
l 6'
If those are the requirements, then so be it, but 7
say it and get on with it.
i i
Ci CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
Dick' l
9 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
Are you suggesting that we 10 ought to take that action, now; in that face of the fact that II within the next -- I don't know -- couple of weeks, we could do;l 12 1 we should be hearing from the Commission Committee that we, 13 ourselves, commissioned seven months ago to do a thorough Id !
analysis of TMI?
i l
15 MR. WALSKE:
If I were in your shoes, I would have 16 asked Mr. Rogovin if he had come up with any gut safety issues i
17I in his investigation that required delaying licensing and try 18 to deal with them ahead of time.
I9 Since that hasn't been done, and since, as I understand 20 it, you'll get the report in two weeks; in a practical, pragmatic l
21 manner, I suppose you should take a quick look at it to see if 22 l there are any booby-traps in there, before you resume licensing.
23 But on the other hand, I don't -- you know -- the 24 l Presidential Commission reported on the 30th of October, as I
%C9 8..eral Reporters, int !
25 recall; and ycu're sti.11 fiddling around with the Presidential i
1793 028
23 dsp22 1
Commission, and your reaction to it.
2 When you get the Rogovin report, I would hope you 3
would spend 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> and read it and see whether there is 4
anything in it, whether it is crucial to safety.
There won't be, I
5 I'm pretty sure.
6!
MR. LEE:
And you can take that concern one step 7
further.
There are several Congressional Committee reports 8
that are going to be coming out sometime.
If we keep waiting 9
for every future report, we never will get through it.
10 MR. STERN:
Let me add to that.
That at any time, whea there is a serious question of safety; whather it be because i
I2 a report comes out or because an experiment was done in a 13 national laboratory or someplace else or an incident occurs; I#
then, of course, you take action.
15 I know of four instances last year where such actions 6l were taken to shut down plants that were operating until that I7 matter was clarified; or we had 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> to respond to say if 18 whether it applied or didn't apply to specific plants.
I don't i
19 :!see why that same action that you've already taken this las; 20 year with and without TMI, couldn't continue to handle safety 2I issues that have not considered.
22 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
Joe?
23 COMMISSIONER HrNDRIE:
Well, I would comment in many 24 lways, while the configuration in which we find ourselves at ac.-,
.e.i neponen, inc.
25 - present is, I suspect, not one that you would have necessarily i
i
!i 1793 029
24 dsp23 I
recommended to us months ago.
It is not, in fact, very different 2
from what you are recommending now.
3 (Laughter. )
There is some work being done on submissions and 5
materials from applicant's who have -- who were close to action;!
l 6!
looks being taken at those by the staff in the context of the l
I 7
action plan items; a subset of licensing requirements and so I
8 on.
i 9
The Commission is closing as rapidly as it can.
In 10 fact, on both the overall action plan an on the particular license requirement subset items.
12 l I think we're at a place, now, where in a few weeks, I3 we're likely to see some substantial progress in that.
We'll I#
- have Mr. Rogovin's efforts, I guess, probably the week after 15 l next; and it is my sense of the Ccmmission and the staff that 16 '
! whatever Mr. Rogovin produces will b? examined with great care, I
but it will also be in a very aggressive and expeditious manner.
18 So that can be factored in our plans.
19 I think, in fact, we are perhaps in motion on a 20 somehwat better slope and somewhat better velocity than you 21 '
might see from your side.
22 MR. LEE:
I think we would agree that there is 23 activity going on.
24 (Laughter.)
Ace e..eral Reporters, Inc.
25 I guess our concern is there may be a few holes in I
I 4
1793 030
ll 25 t
dsp24 3;
certain areas that are critical and we'll be 96 percent
!i complete, but the 4 percent will be critical to us in the 2
5 i
d 3 ;j peri d.
So I think se have to be cautious.
CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
Could you explain a little bit 4
more about what you mean that there will be holes in places 3
i 3l that are critical.
i i
MR. LEE:
Certain areas of staff that have been 7
1 gj depleted in the sense they we are not progressing on critical issues.
That, I think --
7 A
COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
Can you give us a "for g
instance"?
- i MR. LEE
I think we're talking in environmental "l
j qualifications, which is a very critical area.
It's become g
a significant issue in licensing.
There is some indication g
that people in that area are all busy working in other areas, and it could be a -- it could be a concern to us.
CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
Well, Mr. Chairman, I recognize the point you and your friends are all making.
As I guess you gather, we aren't going to automatically flip the switch as a result of the presentation, but we certainly will --
MR. SHERMAN:
We thought of that.
(Laughter.)
g CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
We'll certainly take it careful.y into account.
3
> woorters. Inc. J 25!
MR. SHERMAN:
It's really most significant -for the 1793 031
'l 26 dsp25 industry that we get some speed on this.
I' i
ii l
MR. WALSKE:
And for the country.
2!
i MR. SHERMAN:
And for the country, yes.
CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
I guess our view is more the 4
i latter concern than the former; it is the balance.
It is the 5,
l balanced approach, the overall good of the country, which e
might not necessarily mean --
7,;
MR. WALSKE:
To be quite candid, there is nothing 8 1 in that action plan that justifies the pause as being an add-on 9,
to what existed coming out of the pre-October 30th deliberations.
10 >'
l
,, ; We believe that, is CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
Carl, I'm not sure --
1 MR. WALSKE:
We're going through a lot of the mechanics --
M CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
I'm not sure whether you're saying that, thankfully, there is nothing in there.
MR. WALSKE:
Well, you know, the best people in the country --
CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
Carl. wait a minute.
One of the points is clearly that after the view of the effort, the conclusion is reached -- if your conclusion is reached that there is nothing in there so drastic, so significant -- I think Mr. Stern's point was that it would really justify stopping everything -- well, you should say, " Thankfully, g
. ItOOrtef t, irtC. '{
there isn't anything in there that turned out.to be that g
i793 032
27 I
dsp26 significant a change."
l That wasn't -- perhaps it was completely obvious 2,
i to some of you many months ago.
It apparently wasn't l
completely obvious, at least to our staff.
So they had to do i
4,,
I a review.
5i l
l MR. WALSKE:
But you know the staff has done a 6i j
review; I don't want to see that again.
They've done a 7
n
'l short term lessons learned and a long term lessons learned.
81 d
CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
Short and long, if you recall, 9.1 was no reflection of the depth of their review.
"Short" and
.,1l "long" were terms that were used to describe what had to be done in the short term and what had to be done in the long
- term, It wasn't reflecting that they did one review g
quickly and the other they took a long period of time.
, a.
MR. WALSKE:
That's right.
But they were all done before October 30th; they were done.
They were in your hands.
The long term lessons learned was in your hands in September.
And I just want to reiterate so there is no confusion about it that we don't believe anything that has been introduced gl since October 30th which is a gut safety issue arising out of i
TMI and the lessons learned from TMI.
MR. STERN:
Carl, let's not get into semantics.
The 24 EeOOf!tts, tric.
25 l fa t is there isn't anything new, whether it's now done c
1793 033
l 28 dsp27 1l completely or wasn't done before or was done before;
.t's l
beside the point.
2.
il But now that we both agree that that is the case, 3
what is holding us up?
4:
(Laughter.)
j CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
I understand your point.
I i
MR. SHERMAN:
Thank you for your time.
7,l l
CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
Thank you.
l 8i (Whereupon, at 2:12 p.m.,
the meeting was adjourned.)
'l 11 '
12 13 '
is is il 22 '
22 24
% eDorters, Inc, 'I l
25 :
.t i793 034