ML19291C082

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Forwards Summary of CSNI 791107-09 Meeting in Madrid,Spain Re Regulatory Review Process in Various European Countries
ML19291C082
Person / Time
Issue date: 12/28/1979
From: Israel S
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To: Ross D
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
NUDOCS 8001180391
Download: ML19291C082 (4)


Text

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+*g "8%qk UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION i

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 December 28, 1979 MEMORANDUM FOR:

D. F. Ross, Jr., Acting Director, DPM FROM:

S. L. Israel, Section Leader, Reacter Systems Branch, DSS

SUBJECT:

CSNI MEETING ON REGULATORY REVIEW IN THE LICENSING PROCESS A CSNI meeting was held in Madrid, Spain, on November 7-9, 1979, to discuss the regulatory review process. Delegates from 15 countries attended the meeting as noted in Enclosure 1.

The program (Enclosure 2) covered a wide variety of general organizatiorial matters; however, several of the papers presented interesting points which are discussed in my summary (Enclosure 3). The papers are attached as Enclosure 4.

Commissioner Kennedy made an opening address which stressed an international effort on reporting significant events and the utilities' ultimate responsibility for plant safety. Apparently CSNI is prepared to sponsor the international collection of significant events, however, K. Stadie (OECD) is upset with the definition of reportable data being promulgated by 00E. The delegates appeared to heartily concur that the utilities are ultimately responsible for the plant safety; however, several questioned whether the U.S. will really adhere to this concept because of public pressure.

% LJ L l Sanford L. Israel, Section Leader Reactor Systems Branch Division of Systems Safety

Enclosures:

1. Attendee List
2. CSNI Program
3. Meeting Summary
4. CSNI Papers

Contact:

Sandy Israel, NRR 49-27591

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ENCLOSURE 3 Summary of CSNI Meeting A large number of papers were devoted to organization of the review process in the various countries. The organizations appear to be similar to NRC as indicated by Giuliani's paper which compares the licensing process in the NEA member countries. Those countries which do not have an indigenous nuclear industry are heavily dependent on practices and requirements in the countries from which they purchase their plants. There appears to be an acute concern about staffing the regulatory agencies in some countries. One delegate expressed dismay that NRC was still expanding while his organization was having trouble staffing their present functions.

The following are highlights of some of the more significant discussions at the meeting.

Probabilistic Analysis In many countries, probabilistic analysis is being used to evaluate different system designs in conjunction with the deteministic approach.

In the U.K.

and France, reliability analysis for certain safety systems are included in the safety evaluation for reactors under construction. Sweden, Italy, Gemany, Finland, Austria, and the Netherlands also have employed probabilistic analyses when reviewing specific systems. The studies are mostly limited to system comparisons without a detemination of risk levels.

The Germans are just completing a risk study based on a 1300 MWe pWR extrapolated over 25 sites in Gemany. The methodology and data base used in this study is mostly WASH-1400, however, they have made some modifications to account for knowledge / criticism over the intervening years. The mean core melt probability was 9 x 10 5 with small LOCAs and loss-of-offsit; power the main contributors.

Human error based on WASH-1400 data and limited to maloperation, not unscheduled intervention, accounted for 50% of the small break LCCA core melt probability.

It was interesting to note that the consequence modelling included all of Europe so that potential political considerations are significantly mere complicated than in the United States.

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,_ A great deal of interest was shown in the proposed consequence modelling seminar to be held at Oak Ridge in the spring 1980.

TMI-2 Generally, the comments about TMI-2 were polite and the actions taken by individual countries largely paralleled activities in the U.S.

In Finland, the block valve on the PORV line was closed while in Gei'nany, an automatic closure feature was incorporated. Primary system pressure control without offsite power will be tested during startup of Lo2 in Finland to evaluate the need for the pressurizer heaters on emergency power. The Dodewaard (BWR) plant in the Netherlands was inerted because of hydrogen assessment following TMI-2. Plans for primary system venting are being actively pursued in Finland and the Netherlands. The English cautioned a wait and see policy with regard to T?il-2; however, one Englishman suggested that "the" lesson from TMI-2 was to ensure containment integrity.

Miscellaneous The French promoted the concept of having a standard reactor design which was criticized by delegates from other countries with multiple plant designs. The pros and cons were never clearly articulated.

The Danes are considering precluding any manual intervention of safety systems for 30 minutes after they have been automatically initiated.

In Sweden, they require that all actions be automated within 30 minutes of an accident.

The Spanish are very concerned about decomissioning and the potential radio-logical effects on the workers. They believe more emphasis should be placed on the plant design at the CP stage to facilitate decommissioning the plant.

The Austrians have provided emergency battery power to the oil supply of the HPCI pumps (BWR) to ensure their operation during switchover from offsite to onsite pcmer during an emergency. Thcy are developing a computer printout that would help the operators in detecting multiple failures in safety systems following an accident.

The Belgians have requirec a sump pump in the ESF compartments in the auxiliary building to pump any leakage back into containment. This feature addresses the potential cnronic leak problem following an accident.

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Distribution for memorandum dated December 28, 1979 w/ Enclosure 3 only R. Mattson F. Rowsome J. Lafleur D. Eisenhut A. Spano D. Crutchfield T. Novak G. Mazetis S. Israel Central Files NRR Rdg. File RSB Rdg. File h C POR )

ACRS (21) 178834l