ML19290D935
| ML19290D935 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 01/28/1980 |
| From: | Gilinsky V NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| To: | Ahearne J, Hendrie J, Kennedy R NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19290D934 | List: |
| References | |
| REF-10CFR9.7 NUDOCS 8002290518 | |
| Download: ML19290D935 (5) | |
Text
psnco
/k, UNITED STATES s
o NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION y,y n
4 3 =,
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 e
- 1 o I-OFFlOE OF THE COMMISSIONER January 28, 1980 MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN AHEARNE COMMISSIONER KENNEDY COMMISSIONER HENDRIE COMMISSIONER BRADFORD
SUBJECT:
GUIDANCE TO TMI LICENSING BOARD RE MANAGEMENT COMPETENCE ISSUE I am attaching a draft order prepared by my office, and reviewed by OGC and OPE, for your consideration.
By copy of this memorandum, I am asking SECY to schedule this matter for discussion.
I continue to believe that we should direct the Board to give expedited consideration to this issue.
At the very least we should give the Board guidance on the scope and nature of its inquiry.
/
,/
Victor Gilinsky
Attachment:
a/s cc:
L.
Bickwit, GC E.
Hanrahan, OPE S.
Chilk, SECY r
6002290
DRAFT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
)
In the Matter of.
)
)
Metropolitan Edison Company
)
Docket No. 50-289
)
(Three Mile Island Nuclear Station,
)
Unit No. 1
)
)
ORDER After reviewing its Order and Notice of Hearing of August 9, 1979, and the Licensing Board's First Prehearing Conference Order, the Commission has decided to provide the Board with further guidance regarding the management competence issues which the Board is to hear in this proceeding.
In determining whether Metropolitan Edison is capable of operating Unit 1 safely, the Board is directed to examine the following broad issues:
(1) whether Metropolitan Edison's management is sufficiently staffed, has sufficient resources and is appropriately organized to operate Unit 1 safely; (2) whether facts revealed by the accident at Three Mile Island Unit 2 present questions concerning management competence which must be resolved before Metropolitan Edison can be found competent to operate Unit 1 safely; and (3) whether Metropolitan Edison is capable of operating Unit 1 safely while simultaneously conducting the clean-up operation at Unit 2.
In the course of examining these broad questions, the Licensing Board should inter alia examine the following specific issues:
4.
- (1) whether Metropolitan Edison's command and administrative structure, at both the plant and corporate levels, is appropriately organized to assure safe operation of Unit 1; (2) whether the operations and technical staff of Unit 1 is qualified to operate Unit 1 safely (the adequacy of che facility's maintenance program should be among the matters considered by the Board);
(3) what are the views of the NRC inspectors regarding the quality of the management of TMI Unit 1 and the corporate management, staffing, organization and resources of Metropolitan Edison; (4) whether the Unit 1 Health Physics program is appropriately organized and staffed with qualified individuals to ensure the safe operation of the facility; (5) whether the Unit 1 Radiation Waste system is appropriately staff with qualified individuals to ensure the safe operacion of the facility; (6) whether the relationship between Metropolitan Edison's corporate finance and technical departments is such as to prevent financial considerations from having an improper impact upon technical decisions;
~
~ ~.
(7) whether Metropolitan Edison has made adequate provision for groups of qualified individuals to provide safety review of and operational advice regarding Unit 1; (8) what inferences regarding Metropolitan Edison's ability to operate Unit 1 safely can be drawn from a comparison of the number and type of past infractions of NRC regu-lations attributable to the Three Mile Island Units with industry-wide infraction statistics; (9) what inferences regarding Metrepolitan Edison's ability to operate Unit 1 safely can be drawn from a comparison of the number and type of past Licensee Event Reports
("LER") and the. licensee's operating experience at the Three Mile Island Units with industry-wide statistics on LER's and operating experience; (10) whether the actions of Metropolitan Edison's corporate management (or any part or individual member thereof) in connection with the accident at Unit 2 reveal deficiencies in corporate management that must be corrected before Unit 1 can be operated safely;
.1 ) whether the actions of Metropolitan Edison's plant management (or of any part or individual member thereof) in connecti on with the accident at Unit 2 reveal deficiencies in plant management that must be corrected before Unit 1 can be operated safely;
7*,
(12) whether Metropolitan Edison has, in light of the Three Mile Island Accident, taken appropriate measures to evaluate the sufficiency of its corporate and plant management and has taken action to correct such deficiencies as have been identified; (13) whether the clean-up of Unit 2 will reduce the technical staff available for the supervision and operation of Unit 1 to levels lower than those comensurate with safe operations of Unit 1; (14) the extent to which Metropolitan Edison possess sufficient in-house technical capability to ensure the simultaneous safe operation of Unit 1 and clean-up of Unit 2.
If Metropolitan Edison possesses insufficient technical resources, the Board should examine arrangements, if any, which Metropolitan Edison has made with its vendor and architect-engineer to supply the necessary technical expertise; (15) whether Metropolitan Edison possesses the financial resources necessary to safely operate Unit 1 in addition to cleaning up Unit 2; and (16) such other specific issues as the Board deems relevant to the resolution of the issues set forth in this order, and to the remedy of any problems which this proceeding brings to light.