ML19290B942
| ML19290B942 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 10/19/1979 |
| From: | Brickley R, Hale C, Yin I NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III), NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19290B940 | List: |
| References | |
| REF-QA-99900523 99900523-79-1, NUDOCS 7912140545 | |
| Download: ML19290B942 (7) | |
Text
U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT REGION IV Report No. 99900523/79-01 Program No. 51200 Co;npany: Fluor Power Services, Inc.
200 West Monroe Street Chicago, Illinois 60606 Inspection Conducted: September 26-28, 1979 Inspectors:
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R. II. Brickley, Pghcipal Inspector Date Program Evaluation Section Vendor Inspection Branch bo T. /d Bak'
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p. T. Yin, Reactor nspector datd Region III Approved by:
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!b'l@-79 C. J. 'lla44, Chief Date Program Evaluation Section Vendor Inspection Branch Summary Inspection conducted September 26-28, 1979 (99900523/79-01)
Areas Inspected:
Special inspection of FPS activities on IE Bulletin No. 79-14.
The inspection involved thirty two (32) inspector-hours on-site by two (2) NRC inspectors.
Results: There were no deviations or unresolved items identified.
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2 DETAILS SECTION (Prepared by R. H. Brick 1cy)
A.
Persons Contacted
- C. E. Agan, Project Manager
- L. L. Anderson, Production Engineer, Northern States Power
- J. E. Cooper, Manager QA/QC
- B. L. Dickerson, Senior Stress Analysis Engineer P. L. Lin, Project Stress Analysis Engineer D. W. Sauer, Nuclear Engineer, Wisconsin Public Service Corporation (WPS)
- Denotes those in attendance at the exit interview.
B.
Seismic Analysis for As-Built Safety-Related Piping Systems 1.
Objectives This was a special inspection of Fluor Power Services, Inc. (FPS) activities with respect to IE Bulletin 79-14. The inspection con-sisted of two (2) phases.
a.
Phace 1 The objectives of this phase of the inspection were to deter-mine the following:
(1) The licensees that are inspecting systems to the latest drawings and comparing the results with the seismic analysis input used.
(2) The number of people that will be comparing the marked-up drawings with the seismic analysis input, a general description of their qualifications, and the schedule for these activities.
(3) The guidelines that will be used to identify the noncon-formances of the marked-up drawings to the seismic analysis input used.
(4) The identification of units where eccentric masses have been modeled.
b.
Phase II The objectives of this phase of the inspection were to deter-mine that:
1579 090
3 (1) The IE Bulletin 79-14 activities are being conducted in a documented, planned, and systematic manner.
(2) The inputs to the seismic analysis for this system can be readily identified.
(3) Identified nonconformances are analyzed and the results properly documented.
(4) Personnel conducting these activities have received indoc-trination and training.
2.
Method of Accomplishment a.
Phase I The preceding Phase I objectives were accomplished by discus-sions between the inspection team and FPS representatives, and examination of the following:
(1) Kewaunee (a) FPS letter KPS4741 (Initial Evaluation of Discrepan-cies) to WPS dated September 12, 1979 (b) FPS job descriptions for personnel performing IE Bul-letin 79-14 activities.
(2) Prairic Island, Units 1 & 2 (a)
Internal Correspondence dated September 7, 1979, directing FPS personnel to prepare documentation a addressing the Phase I items.
(b) Procedure for the Verification of the Seismic Pipe Stress Analysis in Accordance with Field Walk Downs Performed by Teledyne Engineering Services, Rev-ision A dated September 25, 1979.
b.
Phase II The preceding Phase II objectives were accomplished by an examination of the following:
(1) Kewaunee (a) Letter from WPS to FPS dated August 24, 1979, transmitting inspection results consisting of tables listing discrepancies identified during 1579 09i
4 the inspection, stress isometric with discrepancies circled, and sketches of pipe hangers with potential problems.
(b) Walk down isometric 237127A - SKM 1449 (Auxiliary Feed Water Piping to Steam Generator IA & IB).
(c) Thermal, Static, Seismic and Combined Stress Analy-sis - Auxiliary Feedwater Piping - Part I & II 1A, IB, dated March 20, 1972.
(2) Prairie Island, Units 1 & 2 Inspection packages No. 24 (Chemical and Volume Control System), 26 (Chemical and Volume Control Piping - Seal Water Return), 31 (Chemical and Volume Control System -
from Penetration 14 to 2" take off), 22 (Feedwater, FW-224), 7 (cooling Water, CW-233), and 131 (Auxiliary Feed Water to Steam Generator 1 & 2) were examined. These packages consisted of the stress isometric, support drawings, Teledyne Summary Sheet, and checklist No. 1 (Verification of Piping Seismic Analysis).
3.
Findings a.
There were no deviations or unresolved items identified on either project.
b.
Kewaunee (1) FPS provided WPS with a new stress isometric to use for the walk down inspection. This isometric was made from the version of the stress isometric actually used in the seismic analysis.
(2) Three (3) stress analysts plus one support person are as-signed to perform the engineering judgment and reanalysis tasks. Some of these people are Registered Professional Engineers and all have a degree in engineering or science.
FPS activities on this project (both accessable and inac-cessable) are expected to be completed by October 12, 1979.
(3) Any identified discrepancy between the as-built plant and the isometric used for the inspection is being evaluated by FPS. The document identified in B.2.a.(1).(a) above provided the following guidelines to evaluate discrepancies:
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5 Discrepancies discovered from the field inspection are listed and identified. The discrepancies are traced to field modification requests and/or approved design changes if any in records. Discrepancies which are not approved and documented are evaluated on an individual basis. Pipe stress analysis reports are utilized to evaluate major discrepancies.
Hinor discrepancies do not require analytical engineering evaluation for acceptance. The discrepancies described below are considered minor:
Pipe routing changes: Less than two pipe cutside diameters in any pipe run.
Support / restraint location changes:
Less than two pipe outside diameter along any pipe run.
Valve weight changes:
Less than 20% of valve weight.
The following are identified as major discrepancies which require analytical engineering evaluation.
Restraint / support missing or added.
Restraint direction change.
Support / restraint structural assembly and size change.
Valve operator is not included in original seismic analysis.
Valve weight change more than 20%.
Support / restraint location change by more than two pipe outside diameters.
Pipe routing change by more than two pipe outside diameters.
(4) Eccentric masses were modeled for this plant.
(5) Follow-up Items (a) The examination of the Kewaunce stress analysis re-vealed that vertical restraints are required at points 5150, 5210, 5220, 5230, 5240, 5430, 5440 of the Auxiliary Feed Water System for both seismic up and down forces and weight loads.
Only rigid hangers were installed per 1579 093
6 the detail drawings. The inspector stated that, if the analysis shows that the weight of the system is greater than the seismic up lift loads, rigid hangers may be considered adequate. However, if the analysis shows that the weight of the system is less than the seismic up lift loads, then hardware modifications appear to be warranted. This item is considered to be generic issue applicable to both Kewaunee and Prairie Island. Fol-lowing idantification of this item FPS initiated a 10 CFR 21 evaluation.
(b) During the examination of the Kewaunee stress analysis two (2) motor operated valves, F33-1 and F33-2, were selected for evaluation.
In accordance with the stress printout, the weight of the 3" Powell gate valve with Limitorque operator was determined to be 305 pounds located at center of gravity (CG) of 1.8 ft. above the centerline of the pipe.
In review of the vendor draw-ings it was found that no overall CG was shown and no certified weights were provided for the valve body, motor, and worm gearheads. This item is considered to be a generic issue applicable to both Kewaunee and Prairie Island.
(c) During the examination of the Kewaunce stress analysis and hanger detail drawings, Hanger No.
FDW-H53 showed a design load of 333 pounds. This loading did not agree with the loading shown at point 3810 in the stress calculation. FPS repre-sentatives stated that the reason for the discrepancy was that the analysis was revised subsequent to the hanger design. FPS review to ensure hanger and re-straint adequacy appears to be necessary.
c.
Prairie Island, Units 1 & 2 (1) FPS submitted to Northern States Power Company (NSP) a list of piping drawings which were used for both shop fabricated and field routed piping seismic analysis. The physical piping drawing list did not include revision numbers because each FPS revision of these drawings was reviewed by a pipe stress engineer and any analytical part affected by a re-vision was revised. FPSs position is that the pipe seismic analysis agrees with the latest FPS revision of the drawing.
(2) There are nine (9) FPS personnel assigned to this project possessing the qualifications identified in B.3.b.(2) above.
The inspection and analysis of major discrepancies for Unit 1 is expected to be completed by December 7, 1979, and for Unit 2 by March 15, 1980.
1579 094
7 (3) FPS utilizes an analysis review checklist consisting of nineteen (19) major items that the analyst must verify.
The results of this evaluation receives a second level of review by the Engineering Manager.
The document identified in B.2.a. (2). (b) above pro-vides detailed guidance for this activity.
(4) Eccentric masses were modeled for this plant.
(5) Follow-up Item During the examination of Prairie Island package No. 7 it was noticed that the 4" service water line, that was connected to the Unit I cooling water system inside con-tainment in April, 1979, was not field inspected and re-viewed. Furthermore, the effects of the added system into the existing pipe line was not reanalyzed by FPS.
The NPS representative stated that Stone & Webster per-formed the modification work and analyzed the entire system including the FPS designed system. A further review in this area will be performed during a future inspection at NSP.
C.
Exit Interview An exit interview was i. eld with management representatives on September 28, 1979.
In addition to those individuals indicated by an asterisk in j
paragraph A, those in attendance were:
L. 0.Blume, Senior QA Engineer E. V. Claeson, General Manager, Design Engineering W. W. Larkin, Vice President, Engineering and Construction i
D. M. Leppke, Vice President, Systems Engineering i
P. A. Randolph, President C. M. Wuhrman, Vice President, Project Management i
The inspector summarized the scope and findings of the inspection. Man-agement comments were generally for clarification only, or acknowledgment of the statements by the inspector.
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