ML19290A027
| ML19290A027 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 07/26/1979 |
| From: | Sidell G, Weiss S Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE ACCIDENT AT THREE MILE |
| To: | |
| References | |
| TASK-TF, TASK-TMR NUDOCS 7908290069 | |
| Download: ML19290A027 (95) | |
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V T!C PRESII;ENT'S CO!OtISSION CN f-ACCIEEST AT TPREE MII2 IS'2iD f
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IN THE MATTER OF:
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TESTIMONY OF SEr10UR H. WEISS I
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Thursday, July 26, 1979
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a CERTIFICATE I certify that I have read this transcript and corrected any errors in the transcription that I have been able to identify, except for unimportant punctuation errors.
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Seymour H. Weiss 1897 109
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I _N _D _E _X i
WITNESS DIRECT CROSS REDIRECT RECROSS
! Seymour H. Weiss 2
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WITNESS'SEXHIBIT NO.
FOR IDENTIFICATION E
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No. 1 7
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1897 110 L
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PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THREE MILE ISLAND ACCIDENT i
..---------x In the Matter of:
President's Investigation into the Three Mile Island Accident i
i l ------------------x I
l Nuclear Regulatory Commission 7920 Norfolk Street Rooms 432 and 442 Bethesda, Maryland Thursday, July 26, 1970 o
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l Deposition of SEYMOUR H. WEISS, a witness of lawful age, 3
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l taken by staff on. behalf of the President's ccmmission on b
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Three Mile Island Accident, pursuant to notice, at the offices E
of Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 7920, Norfolk Street, Bethesda, aC" i Maryland, at 2:00 p.m., Thursday, July 26, 1979.
i APPEARANCES:
On behalf of the Witness:
l i
Office of General Counsel j
Nuclear Regulatory Commission l
BY:
TRIP ROTHSCHILD, Esquire I
Washington, D. C.
I j
On behalf of the President's Cc= mission:
GARY M. SIDELL, Esquire Assistant Chief Counsel, President's Ccesission l
2100 M Street, Northtest lg97
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t Washington, D. C.
20555
fi y - - ----
l 2
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i lWhereupon, I
SEYMOUR H. WEISS, l;a witness of lawful age, having heen duly sworn, was examined I>and testified a: follows:
l
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DIRECT EXAMINATION I
I (BY MR. SIDELL:
2 Mr. Weiss, would you state your name for the record, l
O.
jplease.
U l
A.
Seymour H. Weiss.
Geo Q.
And what is your current position at the NRC,---
s 3
C 1
- r. Weiss?
M E2 3
A.
Section Leader, Reactor Safety Branch, Division of Cu
!JOperating Reactors.
Q.
Would you tell me what your current responsibilities
! are in that office?
I A.
My Section is currently responsible for reviews in
~l llthe Reactor Safety 3 ranch on the S&W, C.E.,and research and
{
itest reactors.
j Q.
What kinds of review?
i A.
Reloads, operating reactor safety probisms; problems i
i pertaining to the reactor core, the fuel, thermal hydr 611cs,
- and safety systems of the core.
1897 112 i
b I
3 i
l I
Q.
Specifically operating reactor safety problems, I I
believe you just mentioned, what does that involve?
I (Whereupon, there was a pause in proceedings.)
i l
Q.
Do you recall the question, Mr. Weiss?
l i
A.
If there is a problem in an operating reactor and i
1 l
they require a tech-spec change and it has to be reviewed, i
we would participate in that review.
Q.
So does your review include only those reactors o,
that are within the organizational structure of DOR?
u o
A.
Yes.
2 i
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5 l
Q.
For instance, you would not be involved yet in any
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4 review of potential safety problems with TMI-2.
5 2
A.
o t-That's right, ma u
Q.
Because that's currently not within the organiza-l tional structure of DOR?
I i
i A.
That's right.
Q.
Do you know who has authority over that reactor at this point in time?
A.
TMI-2 would h' ave fallen under the Division of Systems Safety until it is transferred -- and Division of l
Project Management until it is transferred over to DOR.
Right new there are a number of task force groups
- looking into it.
jggJ jj}
b 4
I i
l Q.
How do you find out about possible safety problems?
i i Does cameone in the field, for instance, notify you that i here is a potential safety problem I think you should take a I
i l look at, or do you review license event reports to determine j what safety problems may exist, or what is the basic method you use to find out if there is going to be a safety problem j with an operating reactor?
A.
License event reports are routed through the branch, l and we do not have a formal review effort that goes on.
The formal review of the licensing event reports is carried out E
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g by the INE office that is involved.
S II
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l Q.
A regional office of INB?
m i
A.
Right.
ao"
. Q.
Wherein the particular reactor is located?
i A.
Yes.
Q.
When you mentioned that you do not now have a formal process for reviewing LAR's, are you referring to the j situation that existed at the time of the accident at Three Mile Island?
l A.
Yes.
Q.
Has there been a change in the procedures to review LAR's that you know of?
A.
That is really out of my knowledge right now.
1897 114
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l 5
l f
Q.
You don't know of any change in precedures that may or may not exist?
A.
We have groups looking into this.
i l
l Q.
For instance, the Lessons Learned Task Force is I
investigating whether or not to have a specific group of
- ?
people review LAR's?
A.
That's right -- well, yes, they would have to comment I
though on the specifics, what it is they are doing, I can't.
Q.
But at this point in time you are at least aware o,
u g
l that there is a proposed change in procedures?
A 5
A.
- Yes, k,
?
Q l
Q.
So you review LAR's and find possible safety prob-E I'
sa lems, is that correct?
a l
Cu l
A.
That's right.
l l
Q.
Is that the exclusive means you have of getting
! information as to what is going on out in the field with l
l operating reactors?
I A.
Yes.
Q.
Have you ever had occasion to be infor=ed of a l possible safety problem by an alternative method, not an LAR?
i I
(Witness pauses.)
A.
I would say no, and I guess it is really depending on how you define "a safety problem".
,l897 13 1
6 w
I Q.
Let me just back up a minute, Mr. Weiss.
Have you ever had your deposition taken?
A.
No.
Q.
Let me briefly explain then the process which I should have done at the outset.
Your testimony, which is sworn, is under oath, and even though we are sitting in your office in the NRC building in Bethesda, it is the same in terms of force and effect it o.
would have as though you were sitting in a court before a o
i g
l judge or jury.
2 5
Therefore, should you not understand any of my c
questions you should ask for clarifications so that you can g
as 3
be absolutely sure as to what I am asking for and, therefore, ou j tailor your response accordingly, so that your response is as i accurate as you can make it.
i At the conclusion of the deposition the tapes will i
l be transcribed, and that transcription will be presented to you to read and correct, if necessary, and for your signature.
I Should you find any changes that you deem necessary to make, and we deem them of a substantial nature, you will be entitled to.co= ment on those changes which may affect your l credibility.
In responding to my questions, and since the 1897 116
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7 s
I i
l reporter cannot take down two people speaking at the same I
time, obviously, I would ask that you wait intil my questions I
- are finished, even though you may feel that you know where the question is going, and I will certainly try to allow you I
to finish your responses before I pose my next question.
It is also important to remember that you should answer audibly and avoid responses such as nodding your head or gestures, since the reporter cannot easily record those for purposes of the deposition.
6u g
j Did you bring a resume with you, or have one A
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l available?
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Q l
A.
Yes.
5 l
2
^
c (Witness hands document to Mr. Sidell.)
a Ou j
A.
Would you want that?
Q.
We would want that as an exhibit for the deposition.
l So if it is inconvenient for you to give us this one, we could
! wait and have another one.
~
A.
You may keep that one.
(Pause in proceedings while Mr. S-idelluredds u the.>:re s=me ; )
.I j
Mr. Sidell.
Mark this as Exhibit 1 to the deposi-l (Whereupon, the above-referred i
to document was marked Exhibit No. 1 for identification.)
1897 117
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l' l
8 l
l l 3Y MR. SIDELL:
i Q.
We have marked your resume, Mr. Weiss, as Exhibit No.
i
! 1 of this deposition.
Is this resume complete and accurate in the informa-tion that concerns about your background?
I
- i A.
Yes.
Q.
I previously asked you if there were any alternative means for you to obtain information concerning safety problems in operating reactors other than SNR's, and you indicated that 6
o 3
l there was not.
Is that correct?
=2 a
j A.
Yes.
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Q.
You have never had an occasion to receive informa-E
', tion concerning safety problems, or potential safety problems n
sao l from field investigators?
u A.
We have had direct contact with the INE people to provide them with technical advice, respond to technical 1897 i18 l questions.
f It is not clear to me that I would say that these are related to safety problems.
But we do have inspectors i
who will call up, asking us to respond to scme questions that f they have.
Depending en the area it is in, it will get refer-
! red within the staff to the proper eachnical pecple.
O.
How are you defining " safety problems," Mr. Weiss?
s l
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A.
For the purposes of our discussion right now, I i
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! would say it is something that would result in an IIR, or violation of the tech-specs.
Q.
And hew would something he included in technical specifications?
A.
I don't understand what your question is.
That's a very broad --
1 l
Q.
In order for you to consider a problem involving a safety issue, you stated that it would have to be a violation
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of the tech-specs, correct?
i A
l A.
For the conversations we are engaged in right now,
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yes.
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Q.
My questien is, how would something be included in l
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j tech-specs in order to be a possible safety matter?
In l other words, there must be a further definition of safety other than a tech-spec violation.
A.
The plant is designed to cperate within certain t
l linits which are specified in the technical specifications 1897 119 and their basis.
Q.
Who initially specifies how the plant is to be i
! operated in terms of safety facrors?
It ' hat sc=ething the
- operator, the licensee proposes, or is that sc=ething che NRC requires, or some ccmbination of the two?
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10 i
I A.
I would call it a combination of the two; the licensee proposes, the staff reviews and approves.
It is l done during the licensing stage.
Amendments and changes to the tech-spec would be reviewed by our division.
Q.
To your knowledge, is there any negotiation that goes in between licensees and the NRC as to what actually.is going to be included in the tech-specs?
A.
What do you mean by " negotiation"?
j Q.
For inttance, does the licensee say, we don't want oo j
iten X included because we don't deem it a safety problem, A
l o
therefore, we see no reason why it should be included in the
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m tech-specs?
E A.
If tha licensee can justify that and the staff, i
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I after review, agrees with it, then that would be approved.
l But it is not a bargaining session.
Q.
Well, in the situation you just referred. to, I 'take i
i f it that the NRC essentially has a veto power over the original f proposals of the licensee.
Is that correct?
)h9[ ]2]
I i
A.
In the Division of Operating Reactors, yes.
Q.
So that the NRC, as prior history would indicate, i
does not say to licensees, you shall have items one through 10 included in tech-specs, because we consider them safety-related.
Is that an accurate conclusion as tc your knowledge,
I 11 i
l of prior histories of tech-specs?
I i
l A.
I guess I wouldn't want tc comment on that.
The tech-specs ccme to me already formulated.
I'm not involved in that process at all.
l Q.
Are you the first point of entry for resolution of 1
=
l safety problems from LAR's; for instance, do they come to you before they got to anyone else in the Division?
A.
No.
l Q.
Where do they go first?
o u
i G.
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A.
The LiR's go to Inspection and Enforcement.
=
W 5
Q.
And they determine whether or not there is a viola-(
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tion of the tech-specs?
3 TheyreviewtheLkR.
If there are problems with it A.
a Ou
! that they feel it is beyond their scope, or it may be generic, I
! there would be a transfer of authority, a transfer of jurisdic-nr l tion from IN5 to NRR.
[
Q.
When you use the term " generic," how are you defin-r l ing that?
i A.
Pertaining to a number of plants.
i j
Q.
Is it =erely more than one plant with a ec= mon prob-
! le=?
i897 121 A.
I guess you could say that, yes.
Q.
Not necessarly all planrs of a particular design?
8 4
7 l
l 12 t
A.
True.
IE F
Q.
So, upon IME's reviews of LAR's, they may or may not find a safety problem, correct?
A.
Yes.
Q.
If they find a safety problem -- strike that.
If they do not find a safety problem, is that the end of the matter?
A.
The LAR is still circulated.
Q.
Is there the opportunity then for someone other oo than INE to determine that there is, in fact, a safety problem:
e 3-A.
Yes.
\\
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Q.
Who would that be?
Es2 A.
It could be -- the LAR is circulated to the staff
'I aou within this branch; the Branch Chief gets it, he reviews it.
Q.
Who is the Branch Chief?
i l
A.
Paul Check.
I i
Q.
Do you know the spelling of his last name?
A.
C-h-e-c-k.
1897 122 I
Q.
Please go ahead, t
A.
He reviews it.
He passes it on to the appropriate l
section leader relative to whatever plant it was; if it was i
- an B&W or C.E. plant it would get routed to me.
I would
=
! reivew it.
If I felt that I had seen a number of these LAR's, l
l
13 i
I i
l l
l or something outstanding, I might pass it on to someone else 1
l and ask them, to please look into this, find out what is going i
i on, is this something we should be aware of.
I i
I Q.
When you just stated when you see a number of prob-1 ems in an Lia you would determine then that it was a generic problem.
If you see five problems relatively similar involv-l ing the same piece of equipment, would you consider that signi-i ficant number to be generic?
Oue A.
I would also take into account what the piece of n-
! equipment was.
o i
t a
u t
Q.
For instance, if you have five instances o# failure l
l
^ ML a
i of a POR7, pilot operated, or pressure operated revalve, do a
t au you consider that to be a safety problem?
l A.
I probably would not have at the time before Three I
! Mile Island.
Q.
And why would you not have considered that to be-a 1897 123
- safety problem?
A.
I don't think that the PORV was classified as a safety grade piece of equipment.
Q.
And, therefore, that would not have been included in l
- the tech-specs?
A.
Right.
t i
14 i
l Q.
So that based on the original determination between i
f the licensee and a division of the NRC by omitting, or failing to include PORV in tech-specs, that would essentially resolve your evaluation of the problem concerning the PORV?_fIftit i
wasn't in the tech-specs it is not of consequences, as far as you are' concerned?
A.
As a first cut in my review, yes, that is true.
Were i
I to see a number of these coming through -- and you gave for i
o, example five or six, I would prcbably ask someone to t-
.( a u
f o
l look at it, irregardless of whether it was in the tech specs z
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5 or not.
\\
b Q.
What would they be looking for?
E 2m A.
What the safety significance is of the failure of a
the particular piece of equipment.
1897 24 i
Q.
The alternative is that if something is included in i
l 55 the tech-specs, INE does feel that it is a possible safety
' l violation, what would happen in that situation, where would EE
! the problem move from INE7
[E A.
If IEE did not resolve the problem, they could trans-fer the jurisdiction of the problem ever to the Division of Operating Reactors.
i It would then come into the Project Manager, who would make a decision as to which branch should do the review.
i
4 l
I 15 i
l 1
Q.
Depending upon which type of plant it was, B&W or I
I i
C.E.?
l l
A.
Depending on the area; if was an environmental prob-I j
lem, site problem, secondary piece of equipment, secondary site problem, or whether it had to do with the reactor primary
{
systems, safety systems.
There are a number of branches in I
i the Division of Operating Reactors that do technical review, t
Q.
So in essence, you would see possible safety viola-i i
tions, whether or not they were included in the tech-specs, if O
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! they were not included in the tech specs, I:22 would not be
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5 i likely to determine it was a safety yroblem, and, therefore, r
a.
y p
g
- would end the matter; but, nevertheless, the LAR's are passed ca2o around and you would still see it.
Is that correct?
a ou l
A.
Yes.
i i
UE l
Q.
If, on the other hand, INE determined that it was a l potential safety problem, they would forward it to someone in i
Iyour division, and that would eventually filter down possibly l to you or another section leader?
1897 125' A.
Yes.
Q.
Does it make a difference what INE's origina11 i
recc:::mendation is to deterrJ.ne what you are going to do with the problem?
A.
I don't think so.
I think we would do an independent i
_.._ a -
16 l
i review.
i Q.
Now, would you be doing these independent reviews l personally, or would you have someone on your staff perform i
1 l them?
A.
I would have someone on my staff perform them.
Q.
How many people do you supervise?
I I
l A.
At the present time, six people.
We have had some minor reshuffling recently.
I l
Q.
At the time of March 1979, how many people did you e
o g
- supervise?
E i
8 A.
About six or seven people, s
b
[
Q.
And in December of 1978, how many people did you 5
3 supervise?
ao" A.
I would guess about five people.
t Q.
In December of '78, were five people adequate, from your perspective, to perform the work that you required of l them?
In other words, were you short-staffed in December?
i A.
I don't think so, no.
1897 126 Q.
You had adequate personnel?
l A.
We had adequate personnel to handle the work that was in at the time.
We were looking, I think, at the ti=e for additional people.to handle what we were anticipating the future work 1 cad would be.
l t
17 i
j l
The numbers of people that I am giving you are, you know, recollections.
I don't know how accurate they are.
Q.
General ballpark figures, for instance --
A.
If it were necessary that this were an important item, we would have to go back and pull out this information out of our records.
Q.
For instance, in December of'78, you didn't have 50 people working for you?
A.
That's correct.
ooe Q.
Now, when someone on your staff reviews a problem z
A g
that you have given them that you have gotten either frem
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reviewing LRR's, or on the recommendation of INE, what happens?
E i
3 Let's assume for instance that a safety problem is a
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i found, where does the matter go next?
A.
The matter would go back to the Project Manager -- I l ques there are a couple of ways we could handle this.
i If the reactor were shut down at the time and we had some flexibility in our time schedule, I would probably
} do this in writing:
There would be a safety evaluation report i
written to transmit the information to the Branch Chief and f the Project Manager.
1897 127 I
O.
And that would be the project manager at the NRC?
A.
Yes.
We are just talking now about NRC people.
I 18 i
l i
l Q.
Do you know what procedures they follow when they receive information dealing with the safety problem?
A.
No, not really.
Q.
Do you know whether or not there are formal estab-lished procedures for them to follow?
i A.
Yes, I think there are.
O.
But you have no firsthand information as to what those precise procedures might be.
Is that correct?
l I
A.
That is correct.
Ou 3
Q.
Do you know whether or not those procedures have F
j changed since March 28th, 1979?
o b,
, ~.
A.
I don't knew.
E2 Q.
So if they have, you are unaware of it?
3 o
l u
A.
Right.
l' Q.
Does there ever come a time when the people here in
! NRC who analyze possible safety problems subsequently decide, in fact, that there is a safety problem and get back to the 7
I licensee?
f i
A.
Yes, and it wculd usually be with the project manager i
j on the phone.
Q.
Ncw, in terms of project manager, is that --
A.
This is NRC's Project Manager.
i897 128 Q.
Here in Bethesda?
Il 19 t
i i
l A.
Right.
Q.
Calling the licensee?
A.
Right.
Q.
Who in particular at the licensee would be contacted ?
A.
The equiva' e.t of a project manager here --
Mr. Rothschild:
You know, there is one project manager for each plant.
Mr. Sidell:
Right.
I Mr. Rothschild:
So it's not one individual within o.
u i
g
{ NRC.
If you have seventy operating reactors, you have seventy i
C o
project managers.
D e
i THE WITNESS:
Each project manager would normally b
l 2
1 3
i have a couple of plants, cperating plants.
C I
u l
l BY MR. SIDELL:
i Q.
But we're talking about one person with a specific problem.
A.
If there's a specific problem with plant X, we have
! cne person who follows plant X as project manager.
j Q.
He calls up someone at the licensee and says, you i
have got a safety problem --
A.
In such and such an area, en such and such an item.
t Q.
Generally, what sort of time frame are we talking i
' about between when there is a first determination =ade that 1897 129
20 i
i i
i there may be a safety problem either -- I guess it would have l
to be in an LAR, and the ultimate resolution where someone has i
i determined, in fact, there is a safety problem?
A.
If it has to do with the plant's continued opera-
~
tion, or shutting down, this can happen quite rapidly.
Q.
What do you mean by "quite rapidly"?
A.
It happens all verbally.
The reviewer would talk i
to me.
We would i= mediately get the project manager and/or his branch chief, possibly =y branch chief, and to get on the
,o I
v i
g j phone to the plant.
A 8
Q.
Are we talking about a day or two?
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i A.
Less.
E 2g l
Q.
What sort of problems would require that sort a ou notice?
I i
l A.
I guess there are a number of instances -- (witness l
l pauses).
I guess it was a Westinghouse plant where there was i
some concern as to whether all the rods would go into the core I
j upon a scram.
Q.
Are we talking about contrcl rods?
A.
Yes.
This was handled on an expedited basis by the staff.
I think it took about a day.
Q.
And, as I believe you previously mentioned, any problems with the PCRV, since they are not considered or 1897 130
t 21 i
l, i defined to be safety-related, would not be included in the tech-specs, and, therefore, would not receive, certainly, a Ic violation determination by I'NS; therefore, they would be unlikely to produce as fast a response if someone for some reason did conclude there was a safety problem involved with l
i the PORV?
i l
A.
If someone did conclude that a non-safety grade I piece of equipment was not considered -- and could cause a cafety problem, that could happen very rapidly, the resolution O,
u l
e of that and the action that would be taken.
E>
g j
Q.
Well, if we had a problem with a PORV, would 14 I
l j
months between an initial questioning of whether there was a
^'
5 l
l problem and final determination that yes, indeed, there was a a
i C
problem be considered timely?
l A.
If the decision had been made that there was a i
- safety problem with the PORV, within my section, I would i
anticipate we would act on it faster.
j Q.
So 14 months would be considered by you untimely?
i A.
Uh-huh, yes.
l Q.
What about a problem with loss of pressurizer level indication?
Pressurizer is not a safety-related itam, is it?
A.
No, it's not.
Q.
So that wculd be comparable to malfuncticns or 1897 13l-
t i
22 problems with the PORV in terms of how some =alfunction, or other than proper function was to be resolved.
Is that cor-rect?
A.
No.
Q.
You would resolve problems with the pressurizer level indication level faster?
A.
I don't think that is a good example to give. The pressurizer is part of the primary system.
It does not have any backup.
Were you to rupture the pressurizer you would d
have problems.
3 l
g Q.
Are you saying the pressurizer level indicationlis b=
a safety-related item?
5 l
m
]
1 A.
I'm not sure level indication is.
You were talking l
ao about the pressurizer as a piece of equipment.
(Witness pauses.)
I I
The staff would be concerned about the pressurizer level from the standpoint of potential for draining the pressurizer.
lgg7 j}{
l Q.
Only draining the pressurizer?
A.
Or going water solid in the pressurizer.
i Q.
What would be the respective concerns be with draining
{ the pressurizerlas well as going off-scale high on the pressure level indication?
A.
It would be possible to, if you drained the pressurire
w l
23 i
i pull a bubble, an air bubble, or steam bubble into your primary system.
That would be part of your concerns.
Q.
What would other concerns be?
A.
I think our concern for water solid operation is that it is not a prudent method of operating a plant in terms of pressure transients.
We would also be concerned that the power operate i
l relief valves were to allow water to go through, might not operate correctly after that.
ou g
O.
What is the basic problem with having voids in the E
i 5
primary system?
b c:
4 A.
Well, for one thing, it can prevent natural circula-5s 3
tion from taking place; they can possibly cause cavitation of Cu
! the pumps;. it could.possibly also disturb the cooling of the i.
core if the air bubbles did get into the core.
Q.
What are the problems with pressuri::er level indica-i tion going off-scale high?
jjg/,) 3[
)
A.
Well, as I just mentioned, the water solid operation
- the pressure transients on the p' ant; plus the possibility that the PORV might open and allow water to go through, and they are not designed for water operation, 1
t Q.
Well, how does an operator use pressurizer level indication in running the reactor?
9 j
24 I
A.
I'm not that f amiliar with that aspect.
I don't know.
O.
Are you aware that operators rely in a primary instance on the level in the pressurizer to determine the state of inventory in the core of the reactor itself ?
A.
Yes, as an aftermath to the TMI incident.
Q.
You were not aware of that before TMI?
i t
A.
No.
Q.
Is there any direct indication that you know of to Ou j
j determine inventory in the core?
p I
A.
I can't respond.
o
=
h i
Q.
You don't know one way or the other?
En 3
A.
I would go for help in that area to some of the t
ou people that work for me.
Q.
So at this point in time you don't know whether or t
not there is a direct indication of inventory in the core?
jgg7 j34 A.
I don't think so.
l Q.
And, therefore, the reason for the pressurizer i
! indication is to assist the operator in determining what is
- j actually in the core itself?
A.
Yes.
Q.
So that if the pressurizer level indication goes off-scale low, it virtually voids the pressurizer, what would i
i
.~
l 25 l
-s l
be the consequences'from an operator's perspective, what l
l would he conclude would have gone on with the core if the
! presurizer indication was accurate?
l A.
You're saying -- your question is, if he lost pressurizer level?
Q.
Correct.
A.
What would his action be?
1897 135 t
A.
In terms of turning on high pressure injection Cu pump and that type of thing to ref'.11 the system, yes.
e E-5 Q.
If you were an operator, with your experience in be NRC involved with nuclear reactors, and your pressurizer E
s f level indication disappeared from view, went off-scale low, s
o" i
how would you react -- or, first of all, what would you con-clude had happened to the reactor itself, the core?
A.
If I were shut down, it's possible that I could be undergoing a rapid cool-down transient.
I could have an
} event whereby my plant tripped, my auxiliary feed system came i
j en which provided the secondary side of the steam generators l with cool water, which would tend to cool down my primary i
l side, and this cool-down would result in shrinking of the primary system coolant.
O.
So you would be tending towards uncovering the core.
1 h
i l
26 i
~
i I
Is that correct?
A.
Depending on the design of my plant and the lcops and whether my primary coolant pumps were running or not, that would be a possibility, I gaess.
i i
Q.
Dealing specifically with the B&W plant, would you i
I be tending towards core uncovery if, assuming the accuracy I
l of the pressurizer level. indication, it went off-scale low?
}b97 l36 A.
I don't know.
Q.
Do you knew what the associated problems with going o
u t
e
! off-scale on the pressurizer high would be; again, if you 3
i
! were the operator of the reacter and you.saw your pressurizer b
l
~
)
level indication completely filled with water, what would you 3
i s
n assume had happened in the reactor core itself?
a O
i o
A.
That my heat-up rate had been high, or that I had
- had an inadvertent safety injection, scmething like that.
I would be concerned with operating the plant in the water-solid mode because I would not have anything to da= pen any pressure transients.
I Q.
Running the risk, therefore, of a LCCA?
l A.
No.
I think the concern with pressure transients goes back to the ability of the pressure vessels in the prinar; system to wichstand pressure transientss after they have been under erradiation for sometime, such that, I think that
I 27 6
we have a certain number of times that, you know, a plant can undergo a pressure transient.
Again, this is really out of my area.
Q.
Well, would you be concerned about breaking a pipe if you had a solid system?
A.
Yes.
I Q.
That is "the" primary concern about going solid, is i
- it not?
l897 137 i
A.
No; no.
o
?
u s
e Q.
Okay.
A choice between going solid and, therefore, n
i
+
g j breaking a pipe, and having voids in the primary system, or b
- )
j losing inventory in the core, and, therefore, exposing or 5
- uncovering the core; in your experience, which would be the a
O I
- potentially more serious of the two?
A.
The core uncoveryng.
j Q.
So, giving a choice between core uncovery, and i
l breaking a pipe, which would you choose?
I l
A.
Well, I object to your " breaking a pipe".
l Q.
A LOCA: if the plant went solid.
4 A.
If the plant went solid it would not rupture if I
- you had a pressure transient.
But there are a limited number of times where you would want this to happen.
So you would not be classifying this in the same category as pipe rupturing I
t l
28 i
i j or anything.
You're not worried about it that way.
t Q.
Are you suggesting it would be preferrable to have the system go solid as a method of operation?
A.
No, than as opposed to uncovering the core.
Q.
You would choose going solid?
A.
Yes.
Q.
Are you aware that as a result of the operator's reliance, at least in part, if not exclusively on pressurizer l level indication, he =akes a determination as to what to do in oue terms of terminating the ECCS system, specifically the HPI?
t w
i A.
I was not_ aware of that before TMI.
b
.\\
Q.
Are you aware of that now?
E i
A.
Yeah.
o I
o Q.
So that presumably, if the operator views an off-sca: e l high situation with the pressurizer level indication, he l
would assume his core was being flooded, and, therefore, turn i
l off the HPI.
Is that correct?
A.
I can't really comment on that.
I don't know.
l Q.
Well, in either case, off-scale high or low, you l would not want to lose your pressurizer level indication, f would you?
A.
I guess not.
Q.
And you were of that opinion before the accident at 1897 138
i i
29 I
Three Mile Island?
l I
A.
I guess the point -- the point never came up that way before Three Mile Island.
You are unaware that prior to TMI in March of '79, you were presented with any problem involving loss of pres-surizer level indication?
A.
Well, in a different context, yes.
Q.
What context?
A.
We had the questions and discussiens relative to I
ou g
Davis-Besse sometime in December, at which the pressurizer l level came up, and a question about draining the pressurizer 5
S I
l came up.
5 Q.
Going off-scale low?
u A.
Yes.
i l
Q.
And do you recall when those matters came up?
A.
December of '78.
Q.
Specifically, do you recall being involved in a pressurizer level indication problem which had occurred at
! Davis-Besse on December 22nd, or 23rd of last year?
A.
Would you repeat that again now?
You are saying l
l that an event took place?
i j
Q.
No.
i Your involvement with the problem previously occurring l897 139
~
30 I
at Davis-Besse dealing with loss of pressurizer level indica-tion began on approximately December 22nd, or 23rd, 1978.
I'm interested in determining when you first became involved with the Davis-Besse problem.
A.
Okay.
In late November, or possibly early December
~
of '78, Davis-Besse wanted to perform a number of tests that arein their start-up test program.
i I guess one of the test was the loss of off-site i
power.
I think the other one might have been to have reactor o
shutdcwn frem outside the control.
2 r
g I'm a little hazy now as to whether the licensee b
3 came in with a tech-spec change at the time, or the project E
manager.came in with a request that we should look at this, o
l Q.
Do you have any notes that would refresh your 1
I recollection.
l j
A.
Yes.
Okay, =y notes start on December 8th.
Q.
1978?
l l
A.
Yes.
And my notes indicate that there was a meeting l of six people of the NRC staff relative to the tests that i
j Davis-Besse wanted to perform.
f The plant had said that during these tests they wanted to control the steam generator level to 35 inches
' rather than having it automatically controlled steam generator i
I s
1897 i40
s i
I
- e.
j l
1 l
I level to 120 inches.
i Q.
What would be the purpose for that change?
f A.
Okay.
When you have loss of off-site power, the I
auxiliary feed pumps automatically would raise the steam I
generator level and keep i*. at 120 inches.
This is now a roughfnumber,I'mnotsureifitisexactly.
I But this amount of cool water would cause a rapid i
cool-down of the core, and could possibly cause you to lose C,
pressurizer level below the indicator.
But it's not clear v
g that you would actually drain the pressurizer, but let's say E
5 you might lose it belcw the indicator.
b=
I Q.
But from the operator's perspective they are both 5
l s
t the same,are they not?
3 I
oo 1
A.
That's right, h3 would not see.
Q.
He would presume that he had uncovered his core?
A.
No.
It's not clear that if you just went to the bottom of your pressurizer you would uncover your core, no.
i Q.
Frcm an operator's perspective?
l A.
He would not know.
But the operator -- what the licensee was proposing was the operator take manual control j of his auxiliary feed pump and limit the steam generator level to 35 inches, and that he analyzed that this amount of cool water in the steam generator would allcw them to cool down at i
i897 141
i l
32 i
i i
I
- acceptable rate.
l They proposed that they would install a dual-level
! set point which would distinguish between a transient that
! requires automati: auxiliary feed, like a LCCA, and keep the steam generator level up to 120 inches versus the loss of off-site power that would control to 35 inches.
j Q.
Who specifically proposed the dual-level set points?
l A.
The licensee, i
Q.
Davis-Eesse, that would be the Toledo-Edison owning o
u e
utility?
=
4 W
f A.
Yes.
b 7
i Q.
Are you aware -- strike that.
E Did you receive any analysis from Toledo-Edison C'
I i
! about this dual set-point proposal?
A.
Yes.
O.
Did you know whether or not that analysis was per-i I formed by Toledo-Edison?
l A.
I think it was performed by the vendor, B&W.
I Q.
But, in any event, you saw the analysis --
A.
That was submitted to Toledo-Edison.
I Q.
To you?
'l897 142 A.
Yes -- not to me personally, to the staff.
It would
- have come into the Project Manager.
He is the contact with the
E P
I l
l 33 i
l plant.
I I
Q.
Who would that have been?
A.
Vissing.
Guy Vissing.
Q.
He, in turn, provided the report to you?
A.
Yes.
Q.
What did he want you to do with it, if anything?
(Witness examines notes.)
l (Pause in proceedings.)
A.
I guess the question was specifically whether they o
- could perform the test, and whether it was okay for the E
E operator to take manual action.
2 we Q.
And this analysis was provided exclusively as a 5
h result of their desire to perform this test.
Is that correct?
j I
ou A.
I think that was the case, yes.
l Q.
It did not involve any problems they may have i
f experienced during the November 29, 1977 loss of pressurizer I
j level indication?
l A.
I think that's true.
To the best of my recollection $
1 l I don't think that other event came up.
Q.
So you were not involved with your concerns of
! pressurizer level indication problems as they may have related to the November 29, 1977 Davis-Besse transient.
Is that cor-
= * "
l
]897 143 P
f
b 9
i i
l 34 l
t I
A.
That's correct.
i Q.
At anytime up to this date?
l A.
That's correct, up until -- what is the date and what is the question again?
i I
Q.
You were not involved in any resolution of the loss I
i of pressurizer level indication problem occurring at Davis-Besse November 29, 1977 to this date, July 26th, 1979.
A.
That's correct.
Q.
If there was any pressurizer level indication problen,
,o v
j at Davis-Besse on that date, you were uninformed of it.
Is c
n>
that correct?
a b
Q A.
Right.
a l
2 3
l Q.
Do~you know if anyone else on your staff was involved o
i u
with any loss of pressurizer level indication considerations which occurred at Davis-Besse November 29, 1977?
l A.
Well, the date in question, Davis-Besse was not a DOR followed plant.
Davis-Besse was still early in its startu; test program and had not been transferred over to DOR.
i Q.
Was it within the province of licensing?
A.
Yes -- well, don't use " licensing".
It was in the l province of the Division of Systems safety and the Division of
.......a Project Management who handled the GPOL work.
Q.
What was the date that Davis-Bess was transferred to i897 144' 4
35 l
l DOR, if you know?
i I
A.
I think that's October 31st, 1978.
Q.
That was the date of transfer to DOR?
A.
I think that, -- to the best of my recollection, that f is the dace.
We would not be involved in something like that.
l l It's handled by the project manager and his branch chief.
i Q.,
But he would inform you shortly after the transfer, would he not?
l i
A.
Yes, I guess -- yeah, I guess that's a good way to
,o I
v i
e l put it.
=
l Q.
And he would inform you so that you would be essen-l j tially on the lookout for any problems with this newly-acquired E
l 3
! plant that you might run across in LAR's?
a i
O u
A.
._Yes.
i Q.
Would he inform you of that for any other reasons?
I A.
Potential tech-spec changes that have come in that I he wants to assign to someone; reviews that he needs done.
i Q.
But those matters would be originating with someone i
else rather than reviews of LAR's which originate with you or your staff?
l
[
A.
Yeah.
Q.
Were you ever involved in a situation where DOR did not fornally have control of an operating reactor, but you,
i897 145
s I
l l
36 1
l 3,
nevertheless, performed scme analysis, or did some work for someone's concerns about possible safety problems involving I
l that plant?
A.
Yes.
Q.
When was that?
A.
Sometime earlier than the December date we're talk-l l ing about.
i l
l Q.
Earlier than December 1978?
A.
Right.
c' l
u l
Q.
Well, which plant was involved?
ez A
i i
A.
Davis-Besse.
o S
Q.
Now, when you say earlier than December 1978, can E
i 2
s i we put another end on the time frame?
Are we talking about ae u
January '78, December '78, or between March '78 and December
'78?
l A.
I don't recall.
I can't find anything on my notes i on that.
Q.
Would you have been involved with any Davis-Besse
- problems before they received their operating license on an informal basis?
A.
Okay.
I don't know when they received their cperat-ing license.
If I had to ecce up with a date I would probably go to whcever it was that contacted me and ask him whatever 1897 146
i 37 I
i l was said.
That would be my guess.
I don't know.
I Q.
Sometime in 1978 you believe you were involved on an
} informal basis with --
l guass it was '78.
a 7
I t
Q.
Well, what was the particular problem that was invol-l ved, that you were analyzing?
A.
I think it was a question from the Region 3 inspector I
i
- as to how Davis-Besse was calculating, or reducing the data from one of their startup tests to compare with what they oa g
were predicting.
c 8
Q.
What do you mean by " reducing data," intentially b
j submitting less data than they had?
E A..
No; no.
The data has to be reduced.
You don't take I
o" a number off of a meter and say, I'm going to compare this with i
l something I calculate.
a I calculate something elre.
I calculate other
' quantities than the meter is reading.
The meter might be i
I reading current, because that's what a meter sees, while I'm i
i
! calculating power level, or the response.
I So you go through a conversion.
You reduce your data to try and come up with a consistent parameter that you can calculate in so-called measurement new.
It's called data reduction process.
F897 147
38 i
l l
Q.
What may be similarly referred to as massaging data?
I A.
No.
Massaging data implies doing something to it.
That is not correct.
That is under the table.
Q.
Is it correct to say that you were essentially reducing these data to common functional forms?
A.
That's what the plant was doing, yes.
And there
! was a question as to how they were doing this.
Q.
What specific problem were they concerned with?
A.
I think it was a dropped-rod test.
O i
u I
Q.
Can you state that it was not a problem involving g
3 5
pressurizer level indication' b
e l
A.
I don't recall, prior to the December dates, any a
i n
conversations in which the pressurizer level indications came 3
I ou I
up.
Q.
Who is the Region 3 inspector you were involved with '
A.
Jim Nreswell.
1 Soyouactuallyspokewithkreswell?
[
Q.
I A.
That's fight.
And we had talked a number of times relative to what goes on in the field, to what goes en at l Davis-Besse; to other reactors that he was inspector of.
He had called for advice or discussions, or techni-cal assistance on things that he was icoking at.
Q.
And you cannot recall him mentioning generic problems i897 148 i
39 l
l l
l i
l of B&W reactors dealing with loss of pressurizer level indica-tion?
h A.
I don't recall it.
At the time we talked, I think I
we talked mainly in the reactor physics area.
Q.
Dealing with what specifically?
A.
Startup tests; the core itself, and fuel.
Q.
Since TMI-2, are you aware of any memos or inspection reportsthathreswellmayhavesubmitted?
A.
- Yes, d
I o
I e
Q.
What plant did they deal with?
=
r I
8 j
A.
I think it was a board notification relative to a b
I j
l -- a proposed board notification relative to all B&W plants.
E i
l Q.
Where did he first becc=e involved with the particu-o" lar problem, which plant?
A.
I guess -- I guess it was Davis-Eesse.
i l
Q.
Is there a specific date of a transient.cccurring c
l at Davis-Besse that concerned Mr. Ireswell that you are aware i
! of?
I t
A.
I guess there is a specific date.
I don't recall it.
j Q.
Could it have been September 24, 1977?
i (Witness pauses.)
4 A.
I weald have to go back to his memo.
If you would
' tell me what the transient was about --
i897 149 1
f I,
40 l
l Q.
Loss of pressurizer level indication, off-scale high, Inine percent power.
l A.
What was that percent?
Q.
Nine percent.
It involved the September transient.
A.
Yes.
If that's it, that's the one.
Q.
No question in your mind at all about that?
l l
A.
I think so, yes.
l Q.
What were his concerns about Davis-Besse in September t
i
! of '77 as you know them?
O e
4 A.
I guess I would have to go back and look at my notes u
i E
f 5
l and find them on that.
s w
Q.
Could you do that?
C E
I s
A.
- Okay, a
a o
(Pause in proceedings.)
u l
Mr. Sidell:
We will take a couple of minutes for I a break while you look for your notes.
(Whereupon, at 3: 20, p.m., a short recess was had.)
l (Whereupon, at 3:35 p.m., upon resumption of the deposi-tien, we were moved to Rocm 532.)
i Mr. Sidell:
Back on the record.
l BY MR. SIDELL:
)
Q.
You have had scme tire new, Mr. Weiss, co check your notes about problems Mr. ireswell informed you of 1897.150
l l
?
41 l
1 1
sometime in '78 concerning Davis-Besse transient of September 24, 1977.
A.
Do you have a date on that?
Q.
A date on what?
A.
On when he and I talked.
Q.
I wish I did.
I tried to get it sometime between l
l January and December of '78.
I can't seem to get it much s
I
{
narrower.
A.
I cannot find anything in my notes.
o l
I e
Q.
You have no information concerning any matters you E
C 5
, may have discussed with Ireswell involving Davis-Besse during
!1978?
E I
2 I
m A.
No.
I can' t find anything in the notes.
The only a
Cu i
l thing I can recall is the questions he had relative to some i of their tests, and these were in the physics area.
Q.
Would they have included loss cf off-site power?
i i
A.
I don't think so.
Q.
That was subsequent to your conversations wigh Ireswell raised by the utility itself?
A.
Yes.
Q.
Did the urility indicate to you why they wanted information on loss of off-site power problems?
They weren't doing a test to do a test, it had seme i'897 151
l l
l 42 i
i
! relation to some operational considerations.
Did they inform I
you of what those may have been?
A.
They wanted to install that dual set-point indicator.
Q.
In other words, make the pressurizer level indicatier more reliable, or more accurate for the operator?
I A.
No.
Frem what I remember, I think the sequence of events went that it was not clear that if the steam generator level went to 35 was it -- well, let's see -- (witness pauses.)
1 Let me see if I can trace this down.
o ue (Witness examines notes.)
E-o (Pause in proceedings.)
b l
l A.
Okay.
Autematically switching -- to switch to 5
s i
control. it automatically to 35 inches instead of 120 inches o
i a
i o
I u
would have gotten them out of trouble with the cool-down and i the potential for draining the pressurizer.
i i
Q.
In other words, they would have --
I A.
Buu --
Q.
-- had less of a repleshment to the core of water?
j A.
That's right.
At 35 inches the cool-down would have l been a lot slower; the transient would have been a lot slower.
i It could have handled that.
~s Q.
So this was a situation where, rather than either an on-off situation, you either got an entire supply of water, 1897 152
5 43 I
I j
or no water for the core.
They reached a medium point.
They i
l got 35 inches instead of 120 inches essentially.
Is that cor-rect?
A.
This is not the core, this is the steam generator.
Q.
Okay.
"They," this is the secondary side.
A.
What's happening in the core is a cool-d'wn by the l
o I
secondary side as the core continues circulating.
Okay, you i
i i
are going to cool it down by what you are doing on the secon-l 1
[ dary side, the steam generator.
,o i
u i
e i
Q.
Did you consider at all, in this analysis, the n
i l
t length of time it would have taken for the steam generator g
}
l to boil dry with 35 inches rather than 120 inches was water?
a i
A.
Okay.
I don't recall doing that.
It might have o.
l been done by the people in my section that were doing the l
review.
Q.
And when they completed their review, what did they i
do with it?
I.
I A.
The review was discussed on the Saturday the c'
23rd with the phone call with INE.
Q.
Saturday, December 23rd, 19787 Right, with b, and later with 5 A.
and the licensee, i
i Q.
And, to the best of your recollection, you were not involved in any matters concerning loss of pressuri=er level
i.
44 t
i
! indication at Davis-Besse in conjunction with this loss of I
l off-site pcwer test they were proposing.
Is that correct?
I i
A.
Okay.
We felt that the problem had been identified as whether Davis-Besse should be allowed to take manual action l
l to control the. steam generator level.
Some of our thoughts at that time were that if you:
f
! were only going to preserve pressurizer level, manual action
!.is okay.
But if you require manual action to survive the
! transient, then this would be an unresolved, or unreviewed I
o
- J safety question which someone would have to do a review.
e e>
8 l
Q.
Well, as a consequence of the analysis concerning b
i
}
the steam generator levels, was that not necessarily tied to a2 I pressurizer level indications and what might happen to that a
I o"
! indication if there was a problem with the steam generator or l
l loss of off-site power? Isn't it in the next link in the chain l of events essentially?
A.
I don't recall any concern about the loss of indica-l tion.
Okay?
Q.
Either direction; off-scale high cr icw?
A.
Right.
The concerns we had were the level high or I
low and the consequences of that.
And during the review, questions were asked.
i Q.
Do you recall whether there were any. questions that i897 ISA
.I
4 I
t 45 i
i I
l
- dealt with the pressurizer level low indications?
I A.
I don't think anything was said about low indications.
Q.
During the December conference call?
i l
l A.
Right.
That is correct.
{
l We were, to the best of my recollection, talking about steam generator levels, and what is what the licensee had ccme in with initially saying that they felt that they could analyzing -- you're controlling automatically 220 inches, e.
and that's leading to a problem -- you control to 120 inches u
j because that's where the LCCA analysis was done for.
- Now, 5
5 lyouhavegotanothertransientthat says I should be at 35 W}
inches.
The licensee could have reanalyzed and redone his Lefd g
Achs analysis at 35 inches.
o i
u l
I think he felt it were easier, possibly cheaper i
l to install this dual level indicator which would allcw him to l
l keep the 120-inch analysis for LCCA, and that if he had a LOCA, to do a level set point for control of 120 inches; if f
- he had another transient, like loss of off-site pcwer, he jwouldcontrolto35 inches.
l Q.
Are you aware of whether or not this analysis was required to close or resolve an unresolved safety item that I
was listed in an inspection report?
~
A.
I don't remember.
l897 155'
I l
46 i
Q.
All right.
Let =e show you what has previously been marked as Exhibit 2 to the treswell deposition, whichis letter from Lowell E. Roe to Robert R$md, dated December lI a
i22, 1978, with an attached additional safety evaluation of transient resulting from inability of operator to control steam generator level at 35 inches, and ask you whether or i not rou have seen these materials?
i C
l A.
(Witness examines Exhibit No. 2 from Ereswell I
' deposition.)
C u
(Pause in proceedings.)
c E
5 l
A.
Where does this exhibit end?
s e
i Q.
Excuse me?
E I
s s
A.
Where is this --
a 8
Q.
Where dces it end?
l I
A.
Yes.
l l
Q.
It's about 15 pages total, I believe.
(Pause in proceedings.)
A.
Okay.
For the last two pages of this exhibit, I do i
' not think I am f amiliar with.
Q.
You have not seen the last two pages of Exhibit No.
!2ofthekreswelldeposition,tothebestofyourknowledge?
A.
They are not -- in the December 22nd, -hey are net
' part of that.
1897 156 '
47 i
Let me go through what else is available, i
l (Witness examines documents.)
(Pause in proceedings.)
l l
Q.
Would it help if you were informed that these last l two pages are backwards; in other words, Page 2 is the first i page and Page 1 is the second page? Might it look more familia: 7 l
Two pages of the document entitled Analysis Supporti:,g I
, Continued Operation of Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Unit One with Dual Level Set Point Control of the Steam Generators; o
u g
dealing essentially with what I believe is the same subject G
l' 5
l matter that we have been speaking about.
a g
A.
I have a December lith letter to Rie,d from Roe.
Thai.
E l
s
> might be that.
I don't know, I would have to go through it.
3 oo i
Q.
_These two documents are also dated December 11, 1978.
l May I see what it is that you are referring to?
i (Witness hands documents to Mr. Sidell.)
I (Pause in proceedings.)
i 1
l Q.
They are one in the same, which is attached, at i
letter dated December 11, 1978 from Lowell E. Roe to i
Mr. Robert Reid of the NRC in Washington producing this analysis supporting continued operation of Davis-Besse.
So that ycu have seen the entire Exhibit No. 2 to che ireswell deposition?
1897 157 i
48 i
l l
A.
At one point or other, yes.
i Q.
Now, is this the document, referring to Exhibit 2 of I,
l the Ireswell deposition, which was forwarded by Toledo-Edison I
! to you for analysis, or if not analysis, approval?
A.
Okay, I think so, but I'm not sure because it was
{lbeforeIstartedactivelymonitoringwhatwasgoingoninthis l
l review.
So it could have come directly into the project l
lmanagerandthengiventoaparticularpersonthatwasdoing i
i the review.
d u
Q.
Do you recall receiving a telecopy of the Davis-Besse ez A
I i Analysis late Friday, December 22nd, 1978, dealing with the a
S.
I l dual set point matter?
C E
I A.
Friday the --
8 l
0 22nd of December, 1978.
A.
No, I did not.
Q.
You did not receive what has been referred to as t
i Exhibit 2 to the Kreswell deposition Friday, December 22 of i 1978?
Did you receive any analysis frem Davis-Besse or Toledo-Edison on that Friday afternoon?
I897 158 A.
I don't think I received any.
l l
Q.
Do ycu recall when you did see what has been marked i as Exhibit No. 2 to the Kreswell deposition?
e e
49 l
I i
l A.
The next morning, I think, Saturday morning, if I'm not mistaken.
Q.
Saturday, December 23, 19787 A.
Right.
Q.
Do you know whether or not anyone else in your sec-tion of the NRC received the Davis-Besse, Toledo-Edison analysis that we have referred to as Exhibit 2 to the ire'well deposition?
A.
Yes.
I think it was received by Gene Imbro in my o
i ue section.
z A
y Q.
Gene Imbro reports to you?
\\
W t
Q j
A.
Yes, or did at the time.
E E
O.
To the best of your knowledge, he received the o"
j Davis-Besse, Toledo-Edison analysis we have referred to as Exhibit 2tothehreswelldepositionlateFridayafternoon, I, December 22, 19787 l
A.
My records indicate that that Friday night, December 22nd, I got a phone call from the project =anager.
l l
Q.
That would have been Guy Vissing?
A.
Right, talking about the submittal.
}hhf lbh l
I think he indicated that Gene I= bro had gotten a copy.
It's not down in my records, but I think I talked with Gene then on the phone that night.
Arrangemenrs were made for
l 50 i
i i
i then a Saturday morning meeting to look at those, review it, and ask any additional questions that were necessary of the licensee, and also to talk to DB-3.
Q.
And this analysis, to the best of your recollection, was concerned exclusively with the proposed Davis-Besse test?
i A.
Yes.
1 Q.
Alternatively, it was not involved with any particu-t lar transient that may have been experienced by Davis-Besse.
Is that correct?
doe A.
Yes.
E 8
Q.
And I believe you previously stated that you were b
j unaware of any specific use or-reference to the pressurizer
_=
l I, level indication that Davis-Besse may have wanted this data a
O" before, is that correctv.' data to be generated by the proposed test they were seeking approval for?
I l
A.
A pressuriser level?
Q.
Yes.
I
~
A.
No, I was not aware that this had anything to do f
with pressurizer levels.
(It had to do with concern on draining the pressurizer, but not level indication.
=W Q.
Can you repeat what you just said, or stated about
' the pressurizer?
l 1897 160
51 j
i I
i A.
Wel1~, one of the reasons you control the steam generator level to 35 inches is to prevent the cool-down that
! would cause you to lose level indication.
They had analysis they had done on the vendor, that B&W had done, so that such an event they would lose level i
indication, but they would not drain the pressurizer.
I I
Q.
So that in fact, the proposed test by Davis-Besse was directly related to pressurizer level indication?
A.
No.
I think Davis-Besse' wanted to do a test, in e
I u
, this particular matter with the operator taking manual control, e
i 3
l g
because they anticipated that they would put on a dual level b
j set point indicator sometime in the future, and they wanted 5
3 this test to bre consistent with the way the plant would be i
o l operated after it was installed.
l Q.
Alernatively, they wanted to ensure that they would I
i maintain pressurizer level indication based on, for instance, I
llossofoff-sitepoweraffectingthesteamgenerators,and, l! therefore, the pressurizer.
Is that correct?
A.
Hit me again with that.
I think you lost me.
Q.
Well, the purpose of the test dealing with the steam
,! generators was it not, was to ensure that the operator of the reactor would not be faced with the loss of pressurizer level indication if the plant was to experience an off-site pcwer i
1897 161
1 52 l
I loss?
A.
Okay.
Yes.
i Q.
Essentially, the operator was not doing a test for jtest sake, it had seme degree of practicality or functionality l frem the operator's point of view.
A test was required as a i
part of the startup test program?
But, nevertheless, the testing program was not I
i performed merely to satisfy an id1& requirement, there is
! some practicality involved with it?
,ov i
l A.
Yes.
e 3
5 l
Q.
And the practicality with regard to this particular
(
t i
)
l tett was to ensure the operator always hdd pressuriser level 5
ag indication in the reactor, correct?
o u
i A.
I guess that I'm not an expert on the startup test.
l I would defer an answer.
I would talk to someone else active in it.
i Q.
Does the conclusion I just posed seem an unreasonable i,
! one based on your knowledge and your years with NRC?
A.
No, it doesn't seem unreasonable.
O.
Have you ever seen a copy of a report by Rchert t Winks of B&W dated December 23, 1978, entitled Minimum Pressurizer Level for Various Reactor Trip Transients?
A.
Never.
t
I i
53 l
l Q.
I believe you indicated that Gene Imbrof, who repcrts I
j to you, received a copy late Friday afternoon, December 22, s
l
! 1978, of the Davis-Besse analysis which has been marked as 1
1 i
(
l Exhibit 2 to the Kreswell deposition.
i Did he perform any independent review of that i.
f I
l analysis between late Friday afterncen when he received it and a
t u
g
- Sturday morning when you had your conference call?
A I
e
(
o i
A.
Yes, he reviewed it.
He also discussed it with me E2 l
3 l on the phone very late Friday night.
ou r
f Q.
Do you recall what time that may have been?
i A.
Midnight; between 11 and 12.
And he was not at the I conference call the next day.
t Q.
What tine was the conference call?
I (Witness examines notes.)
(Pause in proceedings. )
A.
I don't recall.
We set up a schedule the night before that we would meet, the staff in 3ethesda would try to l
1897 163
i l
54 I
l l meet at nine a.m., ar.d discuss the memo from -- well, it's Exhibit 2, I guess.
We would then have a meeting at 10 a.m.,
with Brian Grimes, who was the Assistant Director of the Project Manager branches; we would try at around 10:30 in the morning to call Region 3, and at 11 a.m., we would talk to the licensee, with Region 3 on the line.
I don't know what really happened.
Q.
Scmewhere close to 10 a.m., Saturday, December 23rd, 19787 N
2 A.
Scmewhere around there, yes.
3 1
5 Q.
When Mr. Imbro called you around midnight on Friday, b
what did he relate to you about his review of the Davis-Besse 53 l
3 j analysis?'
0 I'
A.
I think the major question he had was:
What if
! the plant went completely solid on high-pressure injection l and it continued to pump out this safety PORv's, would they l
l then stick open and not reclose?
Q.
And he got this conclusion frem his analysis of the-4 Davis-Besse report?
i A.
I think so,:yes.
Q.
Do you know specifically where he came up with that conclusien?
(Witness pauses.)
i i
14397 164
i 55 t
i i
i Q.
Take a icok at Exhibit 2 to the 'Ireswell deposition, the Davis-Besse Analysis, and if you can, determine where Mr. Imbro concluded there might be a PORV fail-open as a result of this test.
A.
Oh, it is not clear that it would be in here.
Okay?
Q.
If it was not in there, how could he conclude that that might happen?
A.
Just based on his review of what happened, or what could happen.
6 u
i We were asked not only to review this, but you e
i Ew review this for completeness; are there things that are left b
. out that you think should be addressed, or, are the scenarios 3
l
! that are ecssible the licensee didn't address that you think g
u
! should be addressed.
According to my notes here, we had a question on
! what happens if the plant goes completely solid on high-pressure injection and continues pumping, and then you pump i
l out the safety valves, would they stick open?
l Q.
What prompted the.t conclusion?
t l
A.
I don't know.
Q.
Had Mr. Imbro, to your knowledge, had prior exper-ience with fail-to-open PROV's?
A.
I don't think so, i897 165 i
I 56 i
l i
i Q.
This analysis was done in December 1978, is that correct, your analysis?
I 1
A.
(Indicating in the affirmative.)
I Do you.kntw how many fail-open P5cv's' existed in Q.
I
- B&W reactors at that point in time?
I A.
No, I don't.
?
Q.
I would represent to you that I believe it was I four instances, with the exclusion of the most recent instance at TMI-2 which we are now investigating.
o Four instances of fail-to-open PROV's would not be z
G l
g l sufficient to peak ones curiosity in that matter, would it, 3
j based on your prior experience, your responsibilities, 5
E l Mr. Unbro's responsibilities?
i o"
A.
It might.
I I think the question in his mind was:
Could he 1
l picture the plant water solid and going through the plant what are the potential events that could happen, where is all this ater going to go as you continue pumping?
i
[
I would assume that his background and knowledge of i
l plant systems then led him to a conclusion that the PORV's
! are only designed to operate in a steam environment, and that
! if they pumped water through it you don't know what would
<d97 166 happen.
n 1
1
l l
I Q.
Do you know whether or not Mr. I= bro was aware of the Novak Memorandum at the time of his analysis?
A.
I don't thjnk that staf f in COR was aware of the
! Novak Memorandum.
I Q.
How about the Michaelson Report?
I A.
No, I don't think the staff of DOR was aware of the i
! Michaelson Report.
Q.
So, presumably on his own, Mr. Inbro concluded there i
i might'be a PRCV problem when a reactor, specifically a B&W
,o i
u i
e reactor, went solid?
E I
w l
A.
This was itemi=ed as one of the points to question b
l f the licensee about the naxt day.
E2g Q.
Do you have a listing of those points availablecin 8
i I
your notes?
l l
A.
This is the point.
I I
Q.
Can I see those notes, please?
A.
Surely.
9 I
(Witness hands notes to Mr. Sidell.)
i (Pause in proceedings.)
Q.
Do you have the original to this note?
A.
Yes.
Q.
Could I see those, please?
(Witness hands original notes to Mr. Sidell.)
i897 167.
t i
58 l
(Pause in proceedings.)
j A.
They would indicate the Guy vissing phone call.
i i To the best of my recollection it a~so included a subsequent l phone call with Gene Imbro in which the discussion of the memo B
resulted in that question.
l Q.
And you believe that Guy Vissing received the origi-l nal Davis-Besse submission as well as Gene Imbro?
\\
l l
A.
Only Guy Vissing received.
Guy then distributed it.
[ I think Guy gave it to Gene Friday night.
And it's possible
,oo g
l Guy discussed it with Gene on the phone, I don't know.
I
(
5 know I discussed it with Gene on the chone,
~
b i
c l
Q.
And these notes were made on the dated indicated, 5
s 3
l December 22, 1978, December 23, 1978?
o u
A.
Yes.
These notes were made scmetime after, or i
around that time.
Q.
You don't take your record book home on Friday even-i l
ing with you?
A.
Yes, I did.At that particular time, I did, i
Q.
Why did you?
jgg7 jgg A.
I don't know why.
It depends.
I don' t make an attempt at keeping an official record in a record book.
I use that bound book just for note-taking.
It might include notes of meeting; it might include phone conversations, or it
l I
i l
59 i
I i
i i might not.
It might include just general co=ments.
It's i
fjustaconvenientplacetokeepnotes.
Scmetimes I take it i
! home; sometimes I don't.
I don't make any point of doing it one way or the other.
Q.
Did Gene Imbro mention to you before you left the office Friday that he would be calling you later Friday even-ing?
l A.
No.
l l
Q.
Was Carl Berlinger a part of this conference call?
d j
A.
No.
Oh, okay, where are you?
i i
g Q.
I'm on the back of what appears to be a page across b
i c
from the page at the top indicating "f",
loss of off-site E
i trea j
l pcwer first, then small break loka.
a o"
A.
Right.
i j
Q.
(Reading)
Is it something in FAR? Presumably it's I
s an abreviation for analyze.
They say it was, but don't knew timing.
I And then on the opposite page, Carl Berlinger said, i
i S. G. model not icoked at carefully becau:le S. G. has little
~
- Jalculation?
innact on -- what is that -- ca) e l897 169 l
A.
Calculatica.
O.
Did you speak to Berlinger at this conference call?
A.
No.
One of the points that came up during the i
I t
60 i
conference call, or our discussion before or after, I don't remember, was:
Can one really model a steam generator accuratoli enough such that you could show that there is an effect by going from 35 inches to 120 inches in your LocA calcuat. ions.
And Carl Berlinger is another section leade.r.
Right i
now he heads up the Westinghouse section.
Q.
At the time did he deal with ECCS matters?
A.
Well, prior to, let's say, the sum =er of 1978, the i
branch was organized on a somewhat different basis.
The branch o
u l was organized on a functional basis, such that one section e
3 g
leader was responsible for fuels and materials primarily.
I b
~
j l was responsible mostly for reactor physics.
Carl Berlinger g
was responsible for ECCS analysis systems.
a
\\
Q j
i And we called him up that morning to ask him a ques-I l
tion.
i Q.
Was that before, or after the conference call?
i l
A.
I don't remember.
Presumably it was afterward.
i Q.
What is the abbreviaticn DNB stand for?
A.
Departure from nuclear boiling.
)09
-0 What does that mean?
i' A.
Well, if the heat you are producing gets too high for the volume of coolant passing by to remove you will depart from nuclear boiling and go
.. rough one of the other phases,
i i
l 61 i
I i
I like film boiling.
l Q.
You mean there are different types of boiling invol-l j ved?
I A.
Yes.
In fitn boiling your heat transfer would be reduced significantly because you would have a film of steam, or void, or air between your coolant medium and your fuel, and it could lead to problems in terms of fuel failures.
Q.
You have a note on one page beginning with (reading)
. phone call with Region 3 and Davis-Besse, time in which o
I u
i g
j opt a. t, which I assume is abbreviated, operator action is A
i 5
I required to shut down high pressure injection.
b m
A.
Okay.
We were somewhat concerned that when you
<5 i
s i
g j have high pressure injection you go through your ?ORV's, and o
i u
that was that earlier note on the phone conversation with Gene Imbro, and I made a list of scme of the items roughly as we i
l were talking with the licensee and Davis and Region 3.
I I
l And as much as possible -- there was no attempt here to have this an all inclusive record, or to be the safety evaluation.
It happened cc be just notes I was taking.
But they had indicated that the shut-off heads of.
I
!.those pumps was below the. pressure to open the pORV's, such I that it would not be a problem.
-} 8 9 7
},/ l.
Q.
'4hy were they concerned with operation action turning l
i
- l
=
62 l
l l off the HPI systen?
l This is a question raised by Davis-Besse?
A.
No.
These are questions we raised to Davis-Besse.
Q.
Do you remember whether or not you brought up the operation action turning off the HPI system to Davis-Besse?
A.
No, nothing -- we asked Davis-Besse that we looked at your analysis and we're concerned that if you have your high-pressure injection on during this test, do you have enougr time to turn it off, such that you are not pumping water out cu c
the PORV's?
2 i
A And our response was that the shut-off head of the I
i l pumps --~that the pumps could not pump sufficiently high pres-E i
s sure to open those valves..
So it was not a problem.
g o
i u
Q.
Do you know the set points for those valves, the 1
! PORV,at the time, 1978, December?
A.
In my notes here, I have indicated the value of I
l 1600 PSI, and I think that was pure speculation at the time.
I I don't recall that number as being a good number.
l Q.
1600 is the set point for the ECCS's and'the HPI, i
isn't it in B&W reactors?
i897 72 i
A.
I don't remember.
Q.
Would you accept if I represented to you that the r set point at the time for PCRV was, I believe, 2355 PSI, and I
f l
l 63 i
set point for the co-safety valve was 24 PSI?
I i
A.
Yes, that sound reasonable.
I Q.
Do you kriew what the maximum pressure of the HPI i
system is on a B&W reactor?
A.
At the time I think we assumed it was like in the order of 1600, i
l l
Q.
What abcut the pressure of their makeup pumps?
I A.
I don't know.
l Q.
They would necessarily have to have a pump of greater o
u e
than 1600 PSI pressure, would they not?
n I
+
A.
I don't recall the~way the questioning went at the b
l
)
l time.
We had four or five people in on the meeting.
I don't E
s I
a
- knwo who asked the questions.
The concerns that had been o
u j raised by Gene I= bro the previous evening were discussed.
And
{ I think the project manager then fed the list of questions to
- the licensee.
r l
Q.
That would have been Guy Vissing?
i A.
Yes.
i i897 173 l
Now, the transcript notes of his telephone call --
the transcript of the notes of his telephone call have been
- submitted to your Ccmmission by Brian Grimes, if I'm not mis-taken.
So he would have had the more accurate --
t Q.
Do you have a copy of those notes?
If we have them, 9
I i
64 l
- I'm sure they're well buried in the pile of papers.
l l
(Witness hands document to Mr. Sidell.)
i i
i (Pause in proceedings. )
Q.
Do you recall the amount of time it takes once the EPI system is actuated for the system tc go solid?
Are we i
talking on the order of two or three minutes, or 20, or 30 l minutes?
A.
I don't know.
I don't know.
Q.
So, essentially, the problem with the override of d
I the EPI system was having the operator turn it off soon enough, 2
Is that correct?
2 w
i
{
A.
No.
I think the point Davis-Bisse,'the licensee,
=
5 i
g" I was making is that you_didn't have to worry about the operator a
Cu
! turning off the HPI.
i Q.
So the system could do solid and there wouldn't be
' auty problem?
1 i
A.
That was, I think,- the conclusion, yes. - Again, this l
l is in an area which was not my primary area of expertise, or review.
}Oh[ l7k i
Q.
The last reference on the transcript notes frcs
- Brian Grimes' telephone leg, this is Project Manager, I guess i
that would ge Guy Vissing, frem Guy Vissing's telephone leg I
indicates that (reading) you were awaiting a resolution by I
I l
65 f
I i
I i B&W to determine.whether;their plant design should consider the loss of off-site power in addition to a LOCA.
And Toledo-Edison said that they had not previously analyzed that event.
And either Guy Vissing, or you, or someone involved l in the telephone call requested they provide that information.
i Do you recall that?
i l
A.
Yes.
I think that was the way the conversation ended Q.
Do you recall whether there was a resolution by S&W or Toledo-Edison to that question?
d u
A.
I think it was resolved subsequently, yes.
e E
8 f
Q.
Was it documented?
b I
j l
A.
I don't know.
E Q.
Or did they just call up on the phone and say, okay, J
s o
i l we looked, it's fixed?
A.
I think rather than say "it's fixed," they would I have called up on the phone and say, yes, it was analyzed, i
that transient was done that way.
But I don't remember the i
)397 175 actual resolution.
I Q.
Would they necessarily have provided a copy of the i
I analysis that they performed?
t i
A.
If it was something that was already done that way, they would have said, it's already in, you have it, or some l document like that.
If not, they would have had to submit that,
66 l
I to put it on the record someplace, yes.
Q.
Do you know at this point in time whether or not they did that?
A.
I don't recall.
l Q.
Would that have been Guy Vissing's responsibility, I
to deternine that they did provide the analysis?
j A.
Yes.
Guy would have been the one responsible for receiving the analysis, and probably Gene Imbro would have done a review of it.
ou i
g l
Q.
Would you have reviewed, or checked Gene Imbro's G
l
- conclusions of that analysis?
g I
)
f A.
Not necessarily.
52m Q..
Does' Gene Imbro report to someone in addition to aou you?
A.
No, he reports to me.
l Q.
Exclusively?
i i
A.
And my branch chief, over me.
I l
Q.
All right. But there is no one on an equal level l
j with you to whom Gene Inbro reports?
I A.
No.
i897 176 i
Q.
Do your office colicies recuire you to review or ij consider all the work that the five, or six, or seven people who report to you perform?
i 67 I
I l
l A.
Yes..
l l
Q.
And, as a matter of course, do you, in fact, review I
the work they perfor=?
A.
-Yes.
Q.
But you cannot, at this point in time, recall review--
ing Gene Inbro's resolution of any analysis that may have been provided by Toledo-Edison concerning this problem?
A.
That's r:..ght.
If the analysis was already on the o,
record and they so stated, that could have been done verbally o
i g
l and we would not b, able to trace anything.
If analysis was G
5
! submitted and reviewed, we would be able to trace that.
S i
e i
g l
Q.
Do you recall whether or not you reviewed Gene a
i s
3 l Imbro's analysis, or review of the Davis-Besse analysis that ou j was performed sometima Friday evening, December 22nd, 1978,
! prior to your telephone call on Saturday the next day?
A.
Okay, give me the question again, please.
l l
Mr. Sidell:
Would you read that back, please.
(Whereupon, the reporter read back the previous ques-
\\897 177 l tion.)
I THE WITNESS:
Yes.
Yes, my notes indicate that i
i
- on December 18th, there was a meeting with Brian Grimes, Mort L,-
Fairohs d, Gene Imbro, myself, and Guy Vissing to discuss the Davis-Besse Manual Action Control Steam Generator. Level.
4
a l
68 e
l i
j 3Y MR. SIDELL.
I Q.
But at the time of the December 19th meeting you P
l had not yet received their analysis, had you?
A.
That's right.
l Q.
Did you become aware of what their analysis was before you actually received the document itself?
I f
A.
I thought you were referring to review of work in j
general that was going on in this area.
Q.
No, specifically Gene Imbro's review of what has o
e u
! been marked as Exhibit 2 to the 'Ireswell deposition.
g 5
i A.
No.
He was not at the phone call on Saturday.
The W
i y
l only discussion we had was Friday night.
m 2
i a
Q.
Did he, to your knowledge, do any independent calcu-l 0u lations, or verifications that may be documented concerning
{ Toledo-Edison's analysis?
A.
I don't think he did any independent calculations, 1
l no.
l l
Q.
Merely read over the report?
i A.
That's right.
i Q.
And that was sufficient, from your perspective, to i
j review this type of analysis?
l.897 178
~
A.
Yes.
Q.
Do you know a person by the name of Joel~Kohler?
l r
a l
I l
69 l
i i
l A.
Yes.
Q.
Who is he?
l s
l A.
Right now, he's the resident inspector at Zion.
i Q.
What was his position, if you know, in December 1978?
A.
He was an inspactor in Region 3.
i Q.
Was he involved at all in transients that may have i
i i occurred at Davis-Besse in either September or November 1977?
l A.
I don't think so.
l i
Q.
Yciu don't think he was involved in either September
,o u
l or November of '77 transients occurring at Davis-Besse?
g 5
I i'
A.
I don't think he was.
h Q.
Have you had any communications with him about eithe:
i
- 2 3
j of those two Davis-Besse transients?
o u
l A.
- Sometime early in'79; he had indicated to me that.
i he was going out to Babcock and_Wilcox for, I guess -- I don't
[
remember the purpose specifically, I don't think it was re c
!,to any of the events at Davis-Besse.
I'm not sure.
t j
I don't remember why he was going out there.
And i
I he asked if there was anything I thought he should look for I
i relative to the calculations and analyses that B&W had'done.
t Q.
And this was in early '78, you believe?
A.
Early '79.
}897 }[h Q.
'79?
4 I
I 70 l
A.
Yes, early '79.
He was going to B&W --
Q.
I believe you had previously stated you had not se,'n i any analysis concerning a minimum pressurizer level indications performed by Robert Winks of B&W.
Is that correct?
A.
Right.
Q.
Had you seen any B&W analysis performed dealing with i
pressurizer level indication in December of '787 A.
No, I had not.
Q.
And, to the best of your knowledge, the analysis oog provided by Toledo-Edison was whose?
I A.
It was the first time, o
b y
j Q.
Do you believe that was B&W, or Toledo-Edison?
a A.
I think it was B&W.
\\
8' i
Q.
What leads you to that conclusion?
o f
A.
On December 8th -- okay, as I had indicated earlier, I
I thought this whole thing started in late November possibly.
t l
In my notes I have an indication that there was a meeting on Deca * **er 8th relative to Davis-Besse and the loss i
of off-site pcwer tests.
I think that was a Friday probably.
I i
l I guess Gene Imbro had been working on it a while, i
with the project mananger.
And we had a meeting.
Gene Imbro, myself, the project manager, Guy Vissing, Tom Novak, who is Branch Chief of --
1897 180 I
J 71 Q.
Reactor Assistance Bratch?
,l...
A.
Right, Reactor Assistance Branch.
Q.
Brian Grimes?
_ Ma teTs' s A.
No.
Merzadus, who is a section leader for Novak.
itt And Bob McDermasd, who is in the QA branch and responsible for the startup test programs and reviews of the program.
Q.
Did this meeting involve loss of pressurized level indication?
l A.
Not " indication". Okay? Leave out the word
,ouc indication".
Er 5
According to my notes tnere was a question brought be up -- okay, if the pressurizer is drained we get high pressure Es I
3
- -injection" coming on, and, therefore, there will not_be_a e
o u
~DNB problem.
Now, we were discussing whether the pressurizer i would fill up in ten minutes or less, and would they have_a problem with pumping through the primary safety valves; and, if they did, would they then stick open.
l As an offside -- now, this is dated December 8th, l okay?
So I would suppose now, reading this, this is where it i
first came up that you were questioning me earlier as to the I
- PORV's sticking open, or operating in a non-steam environment.
O.
Was there any resolution about' the PCRV problem?
l897 181
72 i
A.
No.
I don't recall that, and I don't have that on j
i l
my notes.
I
{
The only other thing I have here of interest in i
the question you asked is that rapid cool-down would lower the pressurized level to some, question mark, unknown level
{ below the indicator as a result of a severe cool-down tran-i l
sient.
But that is the only reference to indication or indicator.
I don't think we were concerned with it as an ou indicator, or as.the operator relying on the indicator itself.
e
=
i I
Q.
Is there any other function for the pressurizer?
b A.
We were' concerned, as I indicated earlier, for having 52 l
g it too high and getting water out of it through the FORV, or o
I u
j draining it and getting some sort of void.
t i
Q.
But the operator can take the appropriate actions.
i A.
But we didn't think of it at the time.
In trying i
l to --
Q.
Let me finish my question.
A.
Okay.
i In trying to reconstruct what was going on there,
! I don't find any reference to our discussing, or referring, er
' mentioning the operator's use of pressurizer level.
Q.
The operator can take the appropriate action only i897 182 i
i
i l
73 l
I when he sees what is gu.ng on with the pressurizer level indication concerning the inventory in the core.
Isn' t that correct?
A.
Yes.
i Q.
So if there was a problem with going solid, and, therefore, failing to open the PORV with water rather than j
steam, that could be prevented if the operator viewed the i
level of inventory in the core by looking at the pressurizer i
i o,
! level indication, could he not?
u i
e l
A.
That's right.
e i
w 8
So one would ask:.How much time would it take to s
9 w
fill up the pressurizer to.see if'the operator had time to do.
E 3
,.this; always assuming that the level indicator worked; never i
a i
o u
was it addressed that the level indicator would not work.
l Q.
You mean never was it addressed pre-TMI?
i i
i A.
Yes', that I'm aware of. Okay?
I l
Q.
Are you aware of the Novak Memorandum?
i i
A.
Now, not then.
I Q.
The Michaelson Report as well?
A.
Now, not then.
Q.
Idrswell's inspection reports concerning the.Septen-t i
her '77 Davis-Besse problems?
A.
Now, not then.
1897 183 l
4
f 74 i
f Q.
And all three of those documents were dated at. var-I l
ious times, but all preceding TMI-2.
Is that not correct, to l the best of your knowledge?
I e
A.
I don't know when Kreswell's -- I don't know when --
i O,
I'll represent to you that he filed three inspection i
I f reports; one, October 25, 1978; one, February 7, 1979, and one l March 28th, 1979, the date of the accident.
I How long have you known Joel Kohler?
A.
Four, five years; four years, o
u i
e Q.
Did you work with Mr. Kohler when he was employed b
I g
in Washington for the NRC?
l A.
Yes.
He worked in the Accident Analysis Branch, l
E
! and I worked in the Standards -- Division of Standards Develop--
I o
I ment. And I guess we worked on a joint-regulatory guide toge-ther.
Q.
'Did that involve a close degree of professional i
i work?
~
}
A.
Yes.
l
~~
j Q.
For what period of time was that?
A.
Oh, I guess about a year.
Q.
How would you assess Mr. Kohler's professional i competence based on your one-year's project involved with him?
A.
I think he is a good man.
'j @
l 75 l
Q.
Ccmpetent?
i l
A.
Yes.
Q.
Qualified?
A.
Qualified.
Q.
He knows what he's doing?
i l
A.
Yes.
Q.
Did you have occasion to socialize with Mr. Kohler; in other words, did you go cut with him for dinner after working hours; have any occasion to see him outside the office?
,,eo A.
I don't think so.
Maybe at a going-away luncheon or g
A 5
two.
t Q.
But nothing -- you went to lunch with him during S_
t y
the. course of the year that you worked with him?
o I'
a A.
I don't know, we might have.
I don't think so.
i j
Q.
After Mr. Kohler left Washington, did you have any
! further contacts with him?
i l
A.
Yes.
We used to talk occasionally when he was at l
l Region 3; how things were going there; how he liked his job; l
l what he was up to.
Q.
Would you characterize him as a friend of yours?
i l
A.
Yeah.
I guess so, yes.
kb9 Q.
Do you believe he is honest?
A.
I think so, yes.
i i
i
l 76 8
i Q.
Trustworthy?
i A.
Yes.
Q.
Would you question any statement he may make?
A.
Probably not.
Q.
In other words, if he said something, you probably would believe him?
l A.
That's right.
If I had to try and recollect phone l
i calls that I don't have notes of, and presuming they took place, I would ask him what he recalled.
o, I
u E
Q.
Did you have any conversations with Mr. Kohler in December of 1978 dealing with pressurizer level indication a
b C
problems at Davis-Besse?
E 2
I n
A.
I don't recall that.
aeu Q.
In other words, it's possible that you did, but you l cannot currently recall?
I i
A.
That's true.
Q.
Do you recall at this point in time whether or not, l if you did, have conversations with Mr. Kohler concerning pressurizer level indication problems at Davis-Besse you per-formed any independent analysis for him?
I A.
I don't think so.
1 Q.
Do you recall whether or not you advised Mr. Kohler i
- that there was no safety problem concerning pressurizer level 1897 i.86
77 I
i l indication at Davis-Besse, - specifically with reference to 1
! November 29, 19777.
l A.
I don't recall.
Q.
In other words, it's possible, but at this point in time you cannot recall whether or not you advised him of any?
A.
So far as I recollect, I don't think I was aware of the November 1977 Davis-Besse event until sometime close to I TMI problems.
Q.
In other words, March of 1979?
due A.
Yes.
=
i I
Q.
When is the last time you have spoken with Joel b
Hohler, if you recall?
E!
A.
Earlier this week.
i I
o" Q.
How did that come about, did he call you, did you i
! call him?
l A.
I had called him.
l Q.
Concerning what matter?
A.
In our interview last week, you had asked scme ques-l tions relative to the ones you are asking now, not specificall:r i
as topic, but mainly had he and I talked after December of '78 l And the only thing I could recall was the t h
cut to B&W.
And he confirmed that.
We didn't really go through any kind of detail of, I
I 78 l
l l
! you know, record of the conversations.
i i
Q.
Did Mr. Kohler inform you that he has given a i
i deposition to the President's Commission investigating the l
l accident at Three Mile Island?
A.
Yes.
i Q.
Did you discuss the substance of that deposition I
l I with him?
l A.
Not in any great extent, no.
The only thing we discussed was the one conversation oue
! we had about his trip to B&W.
That was the only thing.
2 i
3 g
I Q.
During March of 1979, did you become aware of the S
j l Region 3 investigation by Mr. Kohler and Mr. James Foster 5
i i dealing with some matters Mr. James Kreswell was concerned o"
! about at Davis-Besse plant?
l I
A.
No, I don't think so.
l t
Q.
So you would not have spoken with Mr. Kohler in i
March of '79 dealing with pressurizer level indication problems at Davis-Besse in November of 1977.
Is that correct?
i A.
Right.
The only things that I recall that would
~
have come up were relative to the analysis that B&W had..done 1897 188
- on the dual set point.
O.
Well, let me read to you scme statements Mr. Kohler t
made to the President's Ccmmission in his depostion which was I
~
79 i
1 i
i I
l
- ,taken Saturday, July 7,1979, when questioned about pressuri-l zer level indication problems occurring at Davis-Besse during l November of 1977, specifically November 29, 1977.
i Mr. Kohler indicates that, quote, "Everything involv-I ing pressurizer level indication at Davis-Besse was turned l
over through our headquarters ceople to NRR, and Toledo-Zdison
! was involved, B&W was involved, NRR was involved."
" QUESTION:
Who was it turned over to at NRR7" l
l
" ANSWER:
If you have an organizational chart I Ne might be.able to pick it out.
They change faces so many a
A t
times around there, I know the individual's name, I was j
trying to think what his branch name is, but I'm not sure E
l it's exactly right.
The individual that I'm referring to o
i i
is a man named Seymour Weiss, and he is a branch -- I think he is a section leader or branch chief, I'm not sure i
how they phrase it there."
. - -.. ~ -
" QUESTION:
And you are certain that Mr. Seymour i
I l
Weiss was referenced in NRR to take over this concern?"
hrV2 '
" ANSWER:
Yes."
1897 i89 h'#x.
" QUESTION:
About Davis-Besse?"
A d) rH -
(
" ANSWER:
They were actively involved in dete. % ing b
in coming to a conclusion as to what were the steps that were going to be taken to -- I won' t say that it will t-
l l
80 I
l i
l never happen again -- but to absolutely lessen the pro-l bability of recurrence of the phencmenon at Davis-Besse."
" QUESTION:
Why was it deemed necessary to take all steps possible to prevent that incident frcm occurring i
i again?"
" ANSWER:
I don't know the answer to that fornally.
Intuitively, to me, I don't care, you know, it's not a good situation to have an indicator that is zero. yYou don't know where you are on the indicator, you don't o
I ue t
whether you really have to -- do have a void or not."
E i
i
" QUESTION:
And that would be the case if it went b
l j
l off-scale high, or off-scale low?'"
E I
" ANSWER:
Yeah.
There's a lot of possibilities.
a i
o" If you could change the tap locatien and absolutely I
i determine that you have water in the pressurizer --
l apparently that was not possible, so there was something I
else that had to be done within the limits of what the l
l indication span was at that time."
End quote.
[
Now, do you recall having a conversation with Mr. Kohler dealing with the pressurizer level indication l matters?
A.
No.
Pressurizer level as an item, as a subject, I would not have been turned over to me directly.
It would have t
1897 190
n f*
/
/
81 I&
been formally transferred from INE to the Division of Operating Reactors, and the Project Manager would have sent it for
! assignment.
I don't recall ever getting involved in that..The-only involvement I had was when.we got into the Davis-Besse dual set point problem.
Q.
Let me again refer to Mr. Kohler's deposition, Page i
}
- 36.
I i
" QUESTION:
But you also believed it was Mr. Seymour
,ou g
Weiss who was designated to actually follow up and look A
5 into it for NRR?"
Ie
" ANSWER:
Well, if you know Brian Grimes, which you
<5 s
3 probably don't -- I'm sure Brian Grimes got involved in o
I it."
'l
" QUESTION:
Too?"
i j
" ANSWER:
I do know personally that Mr. Seymour i
Weiss got involved in it.
I know that personally."
" QUESTION:
Do you know of anyone else at NRR that I
j was involved in evaluating this matter of pressurized I
l level after it was turned over to NRR?"
897 9)
" ANSWER:
No."
End quote.
Do you conclude that Mr. Kohler was mistaken when he i made those statements?
i e
i
l i
82 I
l i
A.
Yes,.I think so, i
The only discussion I would have had with Joel would i
have been on the subject of the tests.
Q.
Do you recall determining that loss of pressurizer; I
i level. indication might be a mere operational ~ inconvenience, and that-it was not a safety concern?
A.
I don't recall ever_ making that determination.
Q.
Do you recall relaying that conclusion to Mr. Kohler, that someone else in the NRC may have made?
eu g
A.,
On December 18th, my notes at a meeting indicate 5
cf that '
'==e-only to preserve indication manual' action was b
l ickay, but if manual action was required to survive a transient E
i then there was an unreviewed safety question.
I o
l Q.
Do you recall speaking with Mr. Kohler on March 13, l
r 1979 dealing with pressurized level indication problems at i
i Davis-Besse?
I f
A.
No, I don't.
l Q.
So you do not recall informing Mr. Kohler that there l
was no unresolved safety matter concerning loss of pressurizer i
11evel indication at the Davis-Besse plant-occuring on'Novem-
~
ber_29,~1977?
)b97 A.
No, I don't.
Q.
Let me show you what has been marked as Exhibi 4 to t
I
l 83 l
i l the Anderson deposition, dated April 25, 1979, which is a l
letter to Toledo-Edison, (reading)
Attention:
Mr. W. A.
Johnson, from Region 3.
Including a report with the investiga-tor J. E. Foster and the inspector J. E. Kohler, which is Joel Kohler, concerning loss of pressurizer level indication at Davis Besse.
And I will ask you if you have ever seen it?
(Witness exanines the aforementioned document.)
(Pause in proceedings.)
,Cu j
j j
A.
No, I have never seen this.
5 I
5 Q.
Have you previously been apprised of the content of sg j
that report?
E i
2 i
A.
I don't think so.
Was this references in Kohler's 3
l 8
l Board Notification?
Q.
What Board Notification?
t A.
His -- not Kohler's, but Kreswell's Proposed Board j
l l Notification.
i m
s 3
I believe Kreswell's Board concerns dealt exclusivel:r ;>
I with the September '77 transient.
This deals with the Novem-r 4
her '77 transient.
l A.
Then I have not seen this before.
jgg7 jg}
l Q.
In Exhibit 4 to the Anderson --
r l
A.
Could I ask something on that?
You know, there is a I
h i
84 I
i j
statement in there made, it's a recent submittal to the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation by Toledo-Edison, Decem-ber 22nd, 1978, contains their analysis and indicates the pressurizer involves small voids would forn and flow through I
the C.I system without impairing coolant flow.
Discussion within NRR, March 13, 1979 indicated there are no open items I
l relative to this LOPLI, (reading).
1 i
j Q.
You are reading now from Page 3 of the Anderson j Exhibit No. 4?
,o u
c i
A.
Yes.
It's conceivable that Joel and I talked on E
8 March 13th.
Any discussion would'have been relative to open b
items on the dual set point, and nothing else; nothing to do E
E with pressurized levels.
Our only concern at the time was o"
the dual set point.
We were getting some submittals coming in describing i
it, how it would be implemented.
That was it.
I I
I Q.
Were they ccming from B&W, or Toledo-Edison?
A.
I think Toledo-Edison.
l Q.
Also in Exhibit.No. 4'of the Anderson deposition,
~
Page 9, in the Foster /Kohler Report the statement that (read-ing) NRR concurred during December 1978 that'LOPLI, loss of j -pressurized level indication, did not represent an unreviewed
! safety. question because EPI would be.available to =aintain I
t i897 194
1 i
l 85 i
i I
l core coverage should RCF's depressurize to 1600 pounds per l
l square inch, and ECCS injection would not be affected.
As of i
i March 13, 1977, NRR advised R-3, Region 3, that they had no more questions regarding LOPLI at Davis-Besse Unit One.
Do you recall any conversation with Mr. Kohler deal-ing with those matters, either in December of 1978, or March l
l 13, 19797 h
l A.
Let me read that.
I Q.
To paragraph, Page 9.
ou l
e l
(Witness reads document.)
3 P
I
{
(Pause in proceedings.)
b i
)
A.
I think that the statements here are not necessarily 5
attributable to me.
I think they are a joint conclusion as a I
o" result of the phone call and the review made by the people involved.
And the project manager might have communicated I
this to the licensee as a su= mary.
l l
Q.
But you do not recall personally speaking with Mr. Kohler about these matters in either December of '78, or l
t i March of '797 i
A.
I don't recall it, no.
I might have.
I would think I
it nore logically would have ecme as a result of that confer-
- ence call and the project manager representing the concensus from that.
1897 195
I 86
_s l
Q.
Okay.
But you do not believe you spoke with l
Mr. Kohler on either of these dates, December of '78, or *.iarch of '79, concering these matters?
A.
I don't recall it.
Q.
Let me read to you again statements from Joel I
Kohler's deposition, Page 55, where he refers to Exhibit 4 of the Anderson deposition, his report with Mr. Foster saying
-- the first complete paragraph it says, (reading)
As of March 13, 1979, NRR advised R-3, while formally on the phone,
,c o
j l Seymour Weiss told me it was finished, they had. reviewed G
\\'
everything as a result of the December discussions; that there bc was no more information that either the licensee or the vendor g
s 3
l were submitting; that they had reviewed it; that a course of o
i o
action had been decided upon, and then that was it.
" QUESTION:
And did Mr. Weiss at that time tell you that the loss of pressurized level indication questions I
then arising out of Davis-Besse did not present any l
unreviewed or unresolved safety questions?"
}8hf
}hh
" ANSWER:
Yes."
i A.
At the time, that question was just referring to the dual point set indicator.
l Q.
That's dual set point en the depressurizer?
A.
On the steam generator.
That represents an accurate
a 87 summary of our conclusiuns on the December 22nd dual set point discussion, nothing else.
Q.
Well, is,there any question in your mind that Mr. Kohler in these statements that I have read to you was concerned with the pressurizer level indication problems at Davis-Besse in November of 19777 That is the subject of that I
I investigation report he and Mr. Foster filed, is it not?
A.
I don't know, I have not seen the report before.
i Q.
Do you want to take a few minutes and look at o
Exhibit 4 to the Anderson deposition?
There are some other E
g concerns in that, but the primary significance is the pressur-g 5
i er level indication problem, t
l (Witness examines aforementioned document.)
ou i
(Pause in procaedings.)
l l
A.
The questions brcught up here about a generic I
{ occurrence at B&W reactor facilities. The only generic occur-
! rence we were concerned with was not loss of pressurizer level f
indication, but whether or not this transient could happen at other 3&W-plants.
And on December 8th, subsequent to the meeting that i
I mentioned at Tem Novak's office, a call was made to B&W I
' ; questioning them as to whether this is unique to Davis-Besse, i
or whether it is a generic problam.
f897197' i
l
~
f l
88 i
I Beamm I
Q.
Was there any resolution on that phone call to B&W7 i
l In other words, did B&W say no, it is not generic?
I A.
Yes.
They said-Davis-Basse puts the water in, ab.a 1
' much faster flow rato at about 50 percent more than the other plants; therefore, it was unique to Davis-Besse.
Q.
Well, the question in Mr. Kohler's deposition, l quote, " And did Mr. Weiss at that time toll you that the loss of pressurizer level indication questions then arising cut of i
l Davis-Bosso did not present any unroviewed or unrosolved du r
e j
safety quostions?"
" Answers Yes."
b l
Is that an accurato statement of your talophone b
j conversation with Joel Kohler concerning* the dual set point E
j problem?
o" A.
Okay. With the dual set point problem -- well, road l
l his statement again.
Q.
Quoto.
l l
" QUESTION:
And did Mr. Weiss at that time toll you j
that the loss of pressurizer level indication questions then arising out of Davis-Besse did not present any i
unroviewed or unrosalved safety question?"
l
" ANSWER:
Yos."
End quota.
A.
Loss of pressuri:or level?
l897 l'1B '
i
^
s 89 l
l l
l Q.
Indication questions.
A.
Okay.
Relative to an unreviewed safety question we discussed at a meeting on December 18th --
Q.
First of all, Mr. Weiss, is that an accurate su=mamf I
i of your telephone conversation with Joel Kohler concerning i
dueal set point on the steam generator?
A.
I don't think so, no.
Q.
So Mr. Kohler is incorrect in his statement given l under oath in his deposition on July 7th of this year?
ue A.
That's right.
2 i
't.i-p g
l On December 18th, we discussed, Grimes, Fairchlid, b
j Inbro, Weiss, and Vissing, action to control steam generator E
i 3
level, whether or not there was an unreviewed safety question.
i o"
And this is of the operators taking manual action.
?
! And the consensus we had was, that'if only to preserve indica-
- tion, manual action is okay.
But if manual action is required l to survive the transient, then there is an unreviewed safety i! question.
Okay?
It's relative to operator action taking the place of the dual set point level indicator, not pressurizer level
- l indication.
We never really addressed that.
And I was not
, aware that Jcel was icoking into that as an issue.
Q.
Mr. Weiss, was it decernined that the automatic i897 i99~
l
.~
l 90 I
I i
i
! systems involved in B&W reactor were insufficient to survive the transient; whereas, manual operation would be sufficient l
l to survive the transient?
I i
i A.
I think that was the work that B&W presented.
Prom i
l what I recall of the review performed they agreed, we agreed I
! with B&W.
i Q.
So B&W essentially said that people worked better I than their machine in this one aspect?
i i
A.
B&W was going to install an automatic device, the
,oue l dual set point indicator.
They didn't have it yet.
Not B&W, 3
8 i but Davis-Besse.
I'm sorry.
I
}
l Therefore, they were going to take manual action.
m Q.
Prior to the installation of the dual set point?
I o"
i A.
hight.
Q.
The machine didn't work as well as the operator?
A.
That's right.
Q.
Do you recall March 9, 1979, speaking with J. F.
! Streeter of Region 3?
i A.
Possibly, yes.
I don't recall an exact date.
Q.
Dealing with the revised loka-analysis by Toledo-Edison?
1897 700 A.
No, I don't recall it.
O.
Why don't you take a look at this copy'.' '
s
i I
91 i
l l
l (Witness examines document.)
I (Pause in proceedings.)
Mr. Sidell:
off the record.
(Whereupon, an off-the-record discussion was had.)
Mr. Sidell:
Back on the record.
Y BY MR. SIDELL:
Q.
Do you recall a conversation now, having icoked at a notation written by J. F. Streeter dated March 9, 1979?
l A.
I vaguely recall talking to Streeter.
I don't d
u l renenber when.
I guess it was relative to open items on the e
5 i
dual set point level.
b Q.
Do you recall whether or not there was any mention 5
! of loss of pressurizer level indication as in open or a
l o
unresolved safety items?
j A.
No.
Nothing was mentioned about the pressurizer level.
The only discussion was in the dual set point.
I Q.
For the steam generator?
f A.
Right.
l Mr. Sidell:
Let's mark this as Exhibit 2 to this i
l deposition.
I f
(Whereupon, the above-referred document was marked Exhibit No. 2 for identificarion.)
11397 201 h
w.
- Mk 1
l I
92 l
l
! BY MR. SIDELL:
Q.
The bottem paragraph on Exhibit 2 to this deposi-I tion states the following. quote:
"This action will resolve all NS-1 outstanding issues related to pressurizer level.
I Therefore, this action will terminate NS-1 involvement in this i
matter."
End quote.
Does that refrn.sh your recollection as to whether l or not pressurizer level indication was involved?
I A.
No, it doesn't.
Pressurizer level indication was Ou j
not discussed.
The cnly thing we were talking about was the A
5 December 22nd and 23rd discussion on dual set point.
6 W
i
~
Mr. Sidell:
Do you have any questions?
5 I
n s
MR. ROTHSCHILD:
No.
aoo Mr. Sidell:
After approximately three and a half f hours this afternoon of being deposed, Mr. Weiss, do you have i
I any changes to your testimony to make?
THE WITNESS:
No.
Mr. Sidell:
Rather than adjourn the deposition, l we will recess it new in the expectation that we will have no i
further question.
However, should we have further information that we would like you to answer or provide, the deposition I
i l will not be adjourned so we may continue in the future.
We will =ake every effort not to have that event
! happen.
1897 202 (Whereupon, at 5:30 p.m.,
the hearing was cut sine hora.)
.