ML19290A026

Deposition of NRC by Lh Barrett on 790728 in Washington,D.C. Uncorrected Copy.Pp 1-80

ML19290A026
Person / Time
Site:	Crane
Issue date:	07/28/1979
From:	Barrett L, Pearson E Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE ACCIDENT AT THREE MILE
To:
References
TASK-TF, TASK-TMR NUDOCS 7908290068
Download: ML19290A026 (81)

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA n

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PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE ACCIDENT AT o

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. o DEPOSITION OF:

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CIITED STATES OF AMERICA 2

PRESIDENT'T COSSIISSION CN THE ACCIDENT AT THREE MILE ISLAND 3

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.i DEPOSITION OF:

LAEE H.

BARRETT S

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Washington, D.C.

13 Julv 28, 1979 14 2:15 c' clock p.~.

15 16 AP PEAR!IANCES :

t; Cn Behal." of the Ccemission-l ERIC PEARSON 14 i

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19j 2100 M Street, N.W.

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MR. PEARSON:

Mr. Barrett, are you aware that this 2

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preparation for your testi=cny before the President's 4

Ccenission on the Accident at Three Mile Island?

o gi THE NITNESS:

Yes, I do.

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ask you that are unclear, or if you don't understand anything that I say, please stcp me and I will be more than happv 9

10 to rephrase the question as necessary.

I would first like to identify this document which

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12 I have noted as Oeposition Exhibit No.

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,3 (Ceposition Exhibit No. I was

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14 Whersupon, 15 LAKE H.

BARRETT

,6 having been duly sworn, was called as a witness herein, and 1-

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3Y MR. PEARSON :

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Would vou tell me what this document is, please?

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accurate?

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A It is.

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s it accurate

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Yes.

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Dces this summary contai any information concerning 5

v. cur educational backereund?

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Does that cover your educational background to the 3

present time?

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I had some other courses, but it is details.

It 10 is covered.

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Ckay.

Thank you very much.

For the record, would 12 you tell us your full naree and address?

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Lake H.

Barrett, 7303 Potters Mill Court, Cerwced, 14I Maryland.

I 15 Q

Would you give us a brief description of your 16 education since high schoc.l?

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I received a bachelor degree in mechanical 13 engineering in 1967. and I received a masters degree in i;

i 19 i mechanical nuclear engineering in 1971, both frc= the 20 :

University of Connecticut.

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Eave you taken any educa:icnal'ccurses since 4

-- I vcur masters degree?

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Yes.

I completed about a third of a masters of i

24 l business administra:icn degree and varicus courses as par:

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cf training in my job.

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Q Cces vour educational 'ackground include any c

2 training with respect to emergency preparedness or evacuation 3

of communities er anything related to those areas?

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Not sc.ecificall.v.

I am more of a systems enc.ineer, 3

rad waste systems, not emergency planning.

Q Could v.ou characterize again briefiv cur

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I eme. le.vment ex erience?

A Co you want to go backwards or forwards in time?

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In 1967, I joined the Ilectric Boa Division of it General Dynamics whers was a fluid systems engineer.

12 In 1970, I transferred to the radiological control 13 department of General Dynamics, and for two years I worked 14 en the design and operation of shore-based rad waste systems.

15l In 1973, I joined the Bechtel Power Corporation 16 where I was senior nuc; ear engineer in the design of rad 1.

waste svstems.

At Bechtel I became a.c.rouc. leader in 13l charge of six professional people in the design of rad waste

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20l In 1974, I joined the Nuclear Regula:Ory Ccemission j i

21 as a senior nuclear engineer in the Effluen: Treatmen:

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Of c. roc.esed rad waste sv_ stems.

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l In 1976, I was transferred ec the Envircnmental 24 i

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Evaluation 3 ranch of Cperating Reactors.

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Invironmentalzvaluation 3 ranch are generally reviewing radioactive waste treatment systems, radiolcgical assessment 4

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Would you briefly tell us what a rad waste system

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A A rad waste system is a system either air, liquid 10 or solid which is used to contr, any radicactive materials 11 within the rer; tor plant in general.

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So when you review a rad ~aste system, what do you t

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,O the way the system is designed to assure that the 1 censee 16 or the acclicant has ade9uate control over radioactive 1_.

1 materials within the reactor to prevent their uncontrolled

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release to the environment.

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Q You indicated that vour job responsibilities also 1

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sec._4c. 4s.- e :o.-... s.nes ._s._4.,.~, ws o .u.e e,o.ao.es .. f G 0 of radioactive material from nuclear pcwer plants in the 3 environment. Given a certain release, people -ha reper: 4 to me are responsible for making calculations to determine 5 does rates in the environment and the impact of these dose a * =_ s " o.....a....' e s o. ..k.e y u 1 4 c. l Q Do you perform these assessments of dose estimates 3 and so forth during the pericd at which a proposed reactor 3 is being censidered by the Ccemiasion? 10 A Usually the.e are changes to an operating reactor. 11 For example, if an operating reactor wishes to install a new 12 piece of rad waste equipment or run the facil ty differently 13 than he initially proposed, we would review that. s 14 - a a- .4 o. y. a-s-. . -. s.... ~ _4 _. e... 4 u. a-a .a u. f 15 operating license applications, f.6 Q If I can understand, you would review a =cdification 1 u-a mif.,...* *o cec _o_-..4 e ..w.. o. u.k.e -

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i S t estimate that you do, you consider the impac: to the public. 2 What did you mean by that? I 3 A Uhat we will do, we will usually for a given release' 4 calculate the maximum individual dose, that is, the highest dose any individual in the environment would receive, and 0 ve rv. often we will calculate a population does which wculd O we w. 4...., a '..o d. --.ae ..".a. =..."..'..-.....e..., 4- "s"a--;" specified as a 50 mile radias around the faciliev. e 9 Q Is it fair then to say that your concern with to radicactivity releases from plants is not only with respect it to the total amount of radicactivity that would leave the 1o. clant, but also how that radioactivity would affect the I3 surrounding vicinity and the pecople living there? A That is correct. 14 i 15 Q So you do essentially two separate calculations? A Y8S-16 Q You indicated vou had a third respctsibility with 1. respect to radiation protection. I don't have a clear note 12, I of it here. 1897 035 9 A Radiation protection is the protection of the plant 29 i i workers from radiation scurces. One of the basic functions .,1 22 is to implement the ALARA as low as reasonably achievable o3 chilcsechv with regard to occupational exposures, so verv i. 1 I i 44l often we will evaluate proposals for changes in the licensee's I i -33 plan sith regard to the impact it may have upon the l i l Acme Reporting Company

i 9 occuo.ational exe.csures. O I see. Cces the ALARA test only apply to 3 occupational exposures? A No. The ALARA also has to do with the releases 4 to the environment. We also have the same philosophy, the .a ALARA philosophy, for radioactive effluent in the power D I 6 olant, as well as :he in-plant exposures. ~ Q How do you determine what is an ac.croc.riate ALARA 3 level? g A For radioactive effluent, our guideance is provided 10 in Appendix I (10 ) (c) FR, cart 5 0 of the Ccmmission's 11 regulations, which specifies various dose limits 2nd a g 13 method of doing cost-benefit analvsis for in-plant occupational exposures. 14 There is no scecific reculation other than licensees la. should maintain their doses as low as reasonably chievable. a 16 Guidance on various methcds of doing that is provided in 1 a Nuclear RegulatorI Commission cuife which has a number 19 i of regulatorv guide 3.8. t 19 Q Is it fair to say that your determination with .0 rese.ect to ALARA level for occuc.ational exe.csures is l .,3,, i i g; judgmental rather than based upon a regulation? l A Repeat the cuestion again. 1897 036 33 i Q Is it fair to say thau in determining what would l g, 4 i i I be an ALARA level with res:ect i

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,0 I is based upon the judgment of the decision maker, that is, 2 ycurself or others within NRC, rather than based upcn a i 3 regulation that the NRC has previously prcmulgated? 4 A That is correct. There is no specific numbers for 5 4 6 Q L a s t i v., you indicated that your 4cb responsibiliev I' 7i involved protection of operating reactors with respect to 3 radiation. Is that a fair characterization of your testimony? 9 A I don't remember saying that. 10 0 Okay. 11 (A discussion was held off the record.) 12 gy gg, pgAggo3: 13 0 Uould you tell us how your present job responsi-14 bilities felate to radiological accident analysis? 15 A Okay. Scme of my people evaluate the accident, 16 potential accident analysis, evaluate potential accidents l~ at the reactors. 13 This would involve thines like failures of waste i i 19! as systems, 29ll failures of liquid tanks and the consequences v that these would have on the environment. 1897 037 - l .v' Some or. m v. c.eoc.le also c.erform analyses :or the i i i i 2l classical accidents, the LCCA, loss of cooling accidents. i i ~, -, O When you are analyzing c.nsequences to the l o i 24, environment, hcw do you do that? I 25 A Generally in terms of radiation doses, againsimilarl t I j Acme Reporting Company l l l

l l, l to what : described befcre, the maximum individual dose, 's well as the overall population dore. 2 3 Q Oo vaur ce rent.icb responsibilities involve in any. 4 q way de-in with the area of emergency preparedness? 5 A Not directly; in the Environmental Evaluation Branch g there are two sections. Cne is called Section A. Cne is t called Section 3. I an sectica leader of Section 3. f Section A is the section that has responsibilley a for eter ency planning. Very of ten the section leader for 9 v Section A may not be there or thebran6h chief may not be to I there, and consecuently I may be called upon to handle 11 emer~ency planning issues as thev may come u=, but it is not 1,. v a crimarv function of mine. It is a secondary function. 13 t \\ 0 What dces your section of the Invironmental 14 Evaluation Branch do? 15 A Generally rad waste systems. 16 1. Q Okay. n.- Radiation protection, offsite dose impacts. A 1 i 19 0 Could v.ou tell us who v.our i:nediate superior 1s? i 20l A George Knighton. 1897 038 O What is his title?

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3 ranch. chief, Environmental Ivaluation 3 ranch. 23 23 ' Q Whc is his superior? t I A Do you want it now or do you want it at the time l g4 l of the accident? We have changed. .,a.- I Acme Reportin Com en i

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.\\ L; _, a_ ., a..c-acnsaan,, a .a 0 Brian Grimes war the assistant director. 3 Q Who is his superior? 4 A Victor Stello, who is the director of the Division o of Operating Reactors. i 4oi I e Q Who is Mr. Stelle's immediate supericr? I A Harold Centon, who is director of the Of fice of g Nuclear Reactor Regulation. g Q Let's focus a little more on the events relating to 10 Three Mile Island. ,l i Can you tell us when you first knew that an incident 12 or some problem might be arising with respect to Three Mile 3 1 s 1s., so. 1,, A Wednesdav, March 29th, in the morning. to. O Co vou know what time in the morning? 16 A About 8:30; I was in Brian Grimes' office and he 1. get a call to go to che Incident Response Center--semething to do with Three Mile Island. 19 Q Co you know who called? l 20 1897 039 _l A v m not sure. t Q What did you understand as being the information j i 1 =w*a"#ad -a'

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i b w w g %e -w A I saw him in his office. It wasn't a telephone l .,4 i a ccnversation. He just said that he had to go to the Incident j .,a I. Acm R orti C

,~3 1 ..esponse Center, and it was Three Mile Island, and that i 2 was all. Q At that point did you do anything with rescect to -o this? 4 A No, I didn't do anythine. with that. I went about a -i my business, normal dav.'s work. o i Q When was your next involvement personally with the 4.,. c _4 ; o_.,.. a

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s _ -.. c,. w w A About shortly after 9 o' clock, Eleanor Adensam 9 who was the section leader of Section A, asked if she could 19 use sor.e of my people to do some dose calculations for 11 Three ' tile Island, and I said yes, so we were doing 12 ca"culations at that time, and also I did some work with 13 i ,4 m v. c. ecole en the dose calculations. This was in the morning of the 23th, about 9, 10 o' clock. 15 16 Q After year conversation with Ms. Adensam, what did vou do with resrect 1. to Three Mile Island? A I didn't do anythinc c her than what anvene needed g, I i some helo. on. I was trv.ing to get some other work out. ,9, 1 I I ,0 :' O Can you characterize for us your general involvement 31l throughout the day of Wednesday, the 23th? 1897 040 i i A Yes. The cuestions kept getting more complicated I y i .,3 l as far as doses and radiatica levels, and I went up to - i i i 24 : Victor Stello's office in the same build.ing where I am, l that is the Phillies.Buildine, where 21eanor was to get n.o. l Acme Reporting Company

,.4 i 4--- u -,2 - - - a -.u.a.. A.i.,.: -,...a <,, o,. .a...,~. ..aa 3 -..c. . ~,,,. n 2 Victer 5tello was at the Inciden: Response Center,' 3 so he was not in his office. I talked to her, checked wha 4 information she had, and we discussed it a little bit. 5 At that time, we did sc=e dose calculations as far 6 wi.a*. ..i ~.".~. ' e .".e I as i"a_r. a ca-*ain done aw-o##='_a_, a 3 < 7 .a i a --- ases o-g.cg o u*. o . h.e.o A.4.,.m *.7 ..w a_ -24 2-; 1 1-o.. eue-a 3 were. It seemed like it was developing, so I stayed up in 9 7 4, -- gual,o a-e o:4 4 -a a---.4..g a ou.. 3, e w o c,ccq. s. 10 Q That is 11:00 a.m.? 11 A On the 28th; I stayed in the office there with 12 the chone lines to the Incidence Resc.onse Center answerin~ e 13 <1 taricus questions as they were phoned in to us of a 14 - = d i a ' c c. i - = '

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3-2 a way. 'ad there been instances in th2 past where you 2 Q d 3 would be called upon to respond in situations where it turned ou*. *o "e a d 4 a*- = ea-~-ic"..'a-."c'ea

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A I had never been directiv involved in any incident a response actions at the :iEC. o. i O I see. "ad others with whom you were speaking that -..vo va d wi '". a s ~. 4..c i d a... s '. w n..n. 4 i ...o m i.ne, e e A There was one other incident that was at Fort 9 St. Vrain which I believe was in '76 or '77 where there was ,0 a -e o-*ad b.4 g". .-=.1 a a s e = ' = o.# - = d i - a c '. 4 " 4 ' v,, "u ".a e 7 12 really wasn ' t one. Eleancr was invcived in doing some dose calculations on that. 13 I.was not usually on incident response things. 14 Eleanor would go before I would because I was more on the 15 systems side, and she was more on the hard accident analysis t o. and she had the emergency planninc section, and she wculd 1 ca33 me as sne neecec ass stance. 1, 3 1e 'ihv, d.i d _k. a. ".^ u e,.".. =- .i.s a v, o u ..k. = - .'. 4 s.. 4 ~ ".. "e. I, 13 ; Q I m.4.c.".~...c he '.".e a=' .h i..c '. U 4' a A-4, .,0 i A Scmebody had told me that there was supposed to be .,1 i t i an exercise of the Incident Response Center several days l 33 __ i l I "e-="se ~= " "-*- l i 'a-- ad "e a --- d 4* k --~~ c"ed-J"s"- e#c-ab=-d' 4 r * " -r 23 manacement people could not attend. They were cut of town _34. l 1 '.av a. " a_ a_. ooo4"'= ..". a - .c.e.."4..c_, o..d .".c u r ". ~. -.... c;.".. d-i e 3 73 I i, i 1 l Acme Reporting Company

Ao this was the drill that was described to me, and I had no t 2 reason to believe otherwise, but again, it didn': matter if 4-was a d di' c-o - = d i l ' s ---#=- = "a -4^- s --

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w=- a 3 did. 4 0 Ecw can.vou characterize.your im=ression of the -a state of the system at TMI on Wednesday? -o A Wha dme Wednesdav. ? It decends en verv. much what time. Was it early or late? 9 Q Ecw about the morning when you first heard of the 10 problem? A I guess around ncontime it appeared that we knew 11 that they had a turbine trip and a reactor scram, and that 12 there were some releases. 189/ 043 1 The reason we felt that there was some release, 14 they were getting scme radiation levels c3 a few millirems 15 cer hour in the carkinc lot, so consequently I fel: they lo-were havinc some croca,em anc naving some releases. 1, That is basically the extent of our knowledge, that 3 6 i we asked a let of questions like wha. were the fail fuel l tg l monitors reading, but we didn't get any -response back. .,0 Q To whcm were you asking those questions? 3, i 1 A We would ask those via the telephone to 3rian 22 I Grimes who was in the Inciden Response Center who : hen 33,, l' via telephone could talk :0 either Region 1, that is the 34 ., a. ' Kinc of Prussia, Philadelphia, or to I celieve they had an j i j Acme Reporting C o m p a n y-l

3,f o open line to the site. t O De vcu know whv. there was difficul:V in c.e ttinc. information or answers to vour cuestions? 3 A No, I do not know why. I assume just standing 4 communications croblems they were having. We did start-- .a ~ the times e sca:e r.e now--this was o four months ago. Scmetime .i..n. +: - ...C.-,.. _4.. 3~ u.u. c.. a...e _ e A _s - -,. s s _4 n e. s .s.u.o b. t a C 6..e. ~.n.,. 4. n.e. a- _. n .v aw. v. 4 the dcme monitor in the containment around ncontine or o 1 o' clock, as to the readings on that monitor. 9 During that afterncan, there were reports that the 10 monitor was reading 20,000 R per hour. 11 Q Were those reports, to the best of your knowledge, g from TMI itself? 13 A The information must have come from TMI. It had a g long pathway to get to us, but in must have ::me from there la. I believe. le, There was some cuestion was it a real reading? 1., There were manv. ceople who did not believe that was a true

i..a g~ l' reading, that the monitor wasn't operable, so we did not 1897 044 know exactiv what the situation was.

.,0 Q Did this uncertain situatica and your understanding 3 of the uncertainty with respect to TMI persist throughout l g ""a a#~a_-.. cr.'. w-y I A The uncertaintv as to whether it was a drill or not? 24 A The uncertaintv. as to the state of the system at TMI. n,. I I I l Acme Reporting C o m p o., y

13 1 A Yes. We were uncertain as to '.xactly wha: the e situation was. We answered various cuestions as they were o 3 phoned to us, and we did not have all of the information. 4 We just had small pieces of information. O There were others in the Incident Response Center 6 and casite that knew far more than we did. We were just a i small auxiliary group eff to the side doing specific tasks. S Q When you returned at 6:00 p.m. cr thereabcuts on 9 the eveninc. of Wednesday, what did vou do? 10 A I went back to Victor Stello's office and we were 11 involved in doing various tasks as they were phoned to us-- 1"- dose calculations, trying to keep abreast and figure cut 13 what was happening. We would get various information, 1 dose rates here, dose rates there, that sort of thing, tried 15 to make assessments as to which monitor might, be right, 16 which conitors might be wrong. U Q Would it be fair to characterize your rfole at that l"a ' c t me as a responsive one wnere you wouic e as.<ec-to co a i I l E! specific task and you would perform it and relay the i 20 informatica back? 1897 045 21 A That is correct. i -i Q How long were vou back at the NRC af ter vou returned ! 23 i a: 6:00 p.m.?_ l 44 I A I stayed there until about 1 0' clock in the afterncen. ^5 I stayed all night and the next morning. l Acme Reporting Company

19 1 Q During that period, did you stav. within vcur 9 offices? O 3 A No. About 11 o' clock at night Brian Grimes, who 4 was at the Incident Response Center, went heme, and I went 5 to the Incident Response Center to replace him. 'I G Did you go at Mr. Grimes' request? I A That is correct. 3 O When you arrived at the Incident Re sponse Center, 9 what was the general atmosphere within that room or area? 10 A Very busy. The Incident Response Center had, I 11 don ' t knew, 10 to 20 c.eo.cle in it. It was phxsically verv. 12 hot I remember because the door was open and the fan was 13 propped on the door bicwing air into the room to try to cool 14 ._2-._... m e...e w... 15 There were phones rincing. There were several 16 squawk boxes, which is a telephone intercome box. There 17 was one of those working where the telephone message coming 13 in, which I believe was Region 1 or the sine, I am not sure j 19l which, was very soft, but the response back frc= the man on 20 the telephone was very loud and beccing. It was a very busy paaCe. -- i 1897 046 i 22 r r.7a s., a. - a y a C _4 L,a-C..o. 3 x w i e 23 I A It was a goed-sized rcom. I don't know the 24 dimensions of the roca. I think it was a little bit over-25, loaded when I was there, but people were functioning. There I t i l i i i i Acm R ort' C i

20 3' was inconvenience with varicus noise and people had made 6 the best of the situation. The.v brouc.ht in some carcitions' n - 3 and put them arcund. Several people brought headsets so 4 they could hear better to keep out so'me of the background .a noise. 5 Q Did you have windows in the rcem at all? A No. This is an inside room. There is no windows 3 at all. There is one window in the Incident Response Center. 9 That is generally called the technical side. There is a 10 window that goes into the EMT. That is the Executive 11 Management Team room. I believe that is what they call it. la The~re was a window so you could lock into the other reca 13 (' and they could look at us and there was a doorway next to 14 the windcw and the doorway was always Open so you could walk 15 in and out. 16 Q How was the Incident Response Center set up? l~ A There are two recms. There is the Incident Response i ,.d Center. Then there is the Executive Management side'where i 1 19 the managenent people are. 1897 047 20 The Incident Response Center technical side had I 21 believe four tables, one long table in the front where the M ^ he r.a a ' ' a-wou'd- =-- +- a.i..,

a.. d -.".a - =..". =.. a a w..

~~~ t n..- 23 administratively ran it, who was Bernie Wiess, would sit 24 with several secretaries and an assistant who would d rect t. .,5 the phone calls ec the ri1h:.ceccle--what I call the Acme Re artin Com

21 administrative table. t Then there was what I call the I&E. That is the 2 3 Office of Inspection and Enforcement, cperations table where-they had direct lines hcoked into I believe Region 1, and 4 I believe also to the site at one time or another. There .a were several pecple there, and then there was the o radiological table where the I&E radiological pecple c?erated from, and that is where I went and sat with the I&E 8 radiolacical.teoc.le. 9 There was another table that was sort of a catch-all 10 table that I knew the sta e proVrans people. used sometimes 11 and sete of the I&E operations people also used 13 The Incident Response Center is operated by the 13 \\ Office of 2nspection and Enforcement. 14 NRR ceccle in the Incident Response Center are la. basically there to assist the I&E ceocle so when I went 16 there, I talked with Jim Snee:ik who is an I&E director of t. scrething or other. He was the head of I&E radiological. 13 t 19l I said how do vou want me to function? What can I do to help? It was a rather informal organization. I would ^0 i do whatever someone basically asked cf me. i897 048 31 i Q You indicated the phones were ringing when you 22 were there. Can you tell us a little more about wha: the _33 noise level in the room was? 24 A I don': remember phones ringing real loud, but it 05 i l Acme Reporting Company

42 1 was just general office ncise, but it was I guess fairly i h 2 louder than =cs: offices. I have werked in much worse 3 places than that,but it was loud. You could think. Nhen vou talked, it was loud enouc.h that vou cut a hand over s v.our other ear when vou talked on the telechene. I ~uess 9 a that might be indicative of the noise level. You could carry, O I l L i semecccy wit, cut cir::cu_,tv. 1:...vo u i on a conversation wit. a j .a. put your hand ever the other ear. 3 Q You also indicated that the squawk box was very 10 loud. ~ when the information was ccming in I believe, it very soft as it was going cut. How was the information flow between TMI and the 12 Incident Response Center, to the best of your knowledce? '3 A Okav. There were many telephone lines in the 1, l. Incident Response Center and the EMT. The ones that I to-was most familiar with, the direct line to the E&I cperations le-table, chev had one persen with a pair of headsets en who 1. would listen and write things down, and then they had other ,a i 19l people that would gather around the squawk box to listen i to what the talker en the other end was saying. They were l 20 ., i-- a major scurce of information to v.e. 1897 049 In additicn, en the radiolecical table we had .>n i i 23 telephones that we would talk to various people a: the site, j i f o=c - i -"e ad i o l oc' - * ' ece'a- - = - -- e a - =- r ad 4-4- d i = :- 24 r l c her places we needed to call.

• de would call fron these 3-o.i l

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23 telechones, se it was telephone ec municatien. We would 1 make the calls curselves and receive calls, and the I&E perations people had cpen lines. 3 O was there any difficulty semetimes in hearine the 4 =essage that was coming in? .o A If I was en the telephone, no, I could hear it b a,, n n.. <.,. : -- h. a- -e. m. Q Ckay. When you arrived that evening at the e Incident F.esponse Center with whom did ycu speak to find g out the situation at TMI? to A There was no formal shift change or anything like ,1 that. When I got there, I spoke with Brian Grimes and he briefed me as to what he knew was happening and I talked to 13 .\\ the varicus I&E people, and they would tell me what was g hancening. 15 Q What diO dir. Grimes tell you, if you recall? 16 A I don't remember at this stage. It was probably 1. technical things, what varicus =cnitors were readinc, what is. I onitors : hey though: were working and what enes were net. l 19 i Did his conversation relav to v.ou any cause fer 0 ,0 l a greater sense of urgency with respect to the en a-cine. 3, 1 i problems at the plant? I 1, { N. o. Ne *..'a.c '.".. d - ~aa = ~ i-1" .i ^- -='a - - = - - - ; m-.~. - - - - = a e. ,,g was fairly minor as far as a major accident situation. Cosesl were fairly low, and they were all basically onsite at that .$ 8 .o - i i i Acme Reporting Company

24 e some ^#_# _4 _ =_. e a d i.".3 s. .' ean . 4...e. e.qe wm _.. =-... 4.. 3 ~ ^ s ~ .A a .. w 2 try to leck up sc=e cimos if you wish. 3 Q If you can approximate the times that would be fine. 4 3 A Generally offsite readings were _ess than one

a..

MR cer hour. Abcut at 1930 en the 28th, we had a reading i i of 12 MR per hour at the Harrisbur9-Airport. That was when 3 it was reported I am not sure that was the time we had received the information. 9 10 There were during that evening various numbers, with var =us offsite sources. The Office of IsE kept records of 11 these things and I am sure they are available. 12 13 Q Was it during that evening that you received the informatiin frem the plant with respect Oc the sample of u 15 primary coolant they had taken? A No. This was Wednesday evening, Wednesdav nicht we 16 are talking. During Wednesda.v dav., we had various pieces 1, c# _i.. _# o.-... = ~ 4 c ".

c. ^... 4.. 3 i

..k.. we we.-=. d 4 -a_ a- _ _'.. ~ 1.3 One of the things we had been asking for all along tg was a sample of the primary ccclant so we could try to 20l determine how much radioactivity was in the ccclant which 21 would indicate the accun of fail fuel that we had and the i 23 i a=ount cf ccre ea= age. 1897 051 i 23 i We could not get samplec taken. The word we gc: 24 I, .. a d - _3 h. A M. .O f Q,_o -e 3 . A. f ak 1.A. - g W

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25 r.eoc.le would become overexe.csed trv.ing ec obtain the samples. t We did cbtain sc=e informaticn that, samples that were taken G early Wednesday morning be fore 7 o' cicek that indicated that fairly small amounts of fuel damage, less than 1 percent 4 rue 1 damage, had occurred. 5 Q You speculated concerning the degree of fuel damage ,e. i _ l based upon the information on the primary cocian ? I -aa"-.i .c. " " a * - - w. a. n'

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.".ad e ' - 1".i.n '..". a ..o.-. d.c, = - - ~. s 3 were not aware ofthe fact that on-going fuel damag.e was haocenine during Wednesdav day. We assumed that any damace ~ ~ 10 that had hac.cened had happened early and thines should be g decreasing, but we were informed the core was covered, at least I had thoucht it had, thouch I think other people at 13 s-the Res=cn.se Center on the s'Estens side may have had more 9 information than I did. 15 We were trying to look at the radiation monitor t o, information that we did have and trv. to make seme sense out , _3 of that as to what the current conditions were, kept pushing w w C,,._... s e 4.. y.,, s _. e.,.. _. m.... -, _ xe, _.e a 2.. ...4.,. c.....y.-_,... i .w ....--j we 19 j i i a..J Thursday. 1897 052 Q Did you have any cause for belief during Wednesday l 21 i and Thursday that the situation at TMI was deteriorating? 4_., ..a a-e.,.,-,.:.,,.. u.-..x. - 2: 2,, ..n.- n a ,Jo. n 23 I what was the big cuestion was whv the offsite doses were 24 l just up and dcwn wi h no seeming icgic :0 i. The activity j I i I j Acme Reporting Company

to was coming frcm screwhere. guess it was probably late Wednesday, Thursday morning we cstablished sc=e theories as g to what might be happening, that they were keeping the reacto coo '.an t letdcwn system in o.ceration, and they were bringing 4 primary coolant, which always contains some of the a radioactivity, in:0 the auxiliary building, and that there i was various leaks in the letdown system, in the T.a%eup i system which nume.ed the c.rimary coolan: back into the l reactor system. g That would allow some radioactivity ec escape into 10 the building atmosphere which the ventillation systems then swept that radicactivity out into the environment after it cassed through filters. 13 ~ We were concerned about anv leaks in containment, 14 and we always cuestioned that. We were told that the u containment was, the atmospheric pressure was sli~htiv 4O sub-radicactiJe cressure, so we weren: too concerned about 1. radioactivity escaping that wav. ,2 t Q Did you have other concerns or are these basically to I e the theories vcu had costulated? m, 189/ b, ,,l A We wers concerned about occupational exposure for Ceccle in the c.lant. We were concerned with effsite deses, i, .m. "e - a_ ..".a." l ..-y 4... " a. -e *. a '.. =..d c. we - a. .". a. s e =- i -. _' _" _4. =.a..

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~_ _3 .,..3 i I small. We were trying to get an understanding of what was I

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27 understand whv. we should be c.enting these kind of 1 radiation readings. Also one thing that did happen Wednesdav eveninc, 3 the problem.<ith the water en the ficors is probably worth 4 mentioning. It was reported that, we knew that water had o gotten on the containment ficer frcm the pressuri:er pcwer a operatcr relief valve, and tha: the sump pumps were reported to us to have been en earlier in the accident and c.umced 3 9 some of that water on to the auxiliarv building ficers and - ficoded the building ficors to a depth of an inch or so of 10 water, and this water was highly radicactive, with a direct 11 gamma measurement in the 10 R per hcur range over puddles on 1, the floor, and the licensee had isolated the sumo cumes so 13 s\\ that was not occurring any more. 1,, We were to find out later that the ma"4cr reason for to. that activity was not the st== cumes, but something else, but is we were cencerned about that. Ne had learned abou: that 1., chronologically when I was home changing cars about 6 o'cicek y.. i that eveninc. ~ 1897 054 Q This is Wednesday evening? 20 i i A This was Nednesday. evenine. because had a call .,., i at home about the sump pumps being linad up. That happened w e-- =- '1 ^ ' c ' ^ c.k .4.. ..".e m.e.-.. i. m~, ao..~' ""-a~- -a .4..d i c = ~ 4 ". a of how long it tcok sometimes to get information. ,3 G When you were there en Thursday, did anv change in

h. t, 1

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,n eG t circumstances er information arrive that wculd alter your assess e

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= - -e 'a 2 3 A vas- """ sda" 7 a-~ "--a a-' o'c'ock 4-"-e - ^--- ---- 2 4 afternoon on Thursday, tried to get scme sleep, and I got 5 a call abcut 6 c' clock that evening from Stewart Bland, who wculd relieve me, sav.ing that they had obtained a c.rimarv ,e coolant s a m c. l e, and the cniv informatica chev had was g radiation measurements taken on the sample using hand-held 9 survev meters, which is a very crude way of determining the 10 radioactivity, but it was the best they had, and ne had the 11 radiation reading of over 1,000 R per hour contact on a 12 100 milliliter sample. He asked me to help him convert that 13 into millicurie per milliliter, which is a determination of radioactivity concentration in the water. 1897 055 y The amount of radioactivity in the water would t o. be indicative of the amount of failed fuel and the amount 16 t-of core damage that had occurred. These were extremely 3 high numbers, much greater than what we thcught we would see, i 19l which was indicative of that we had severe core damage with 20 possibly the rupture of most of the pins in the core, with 31 the release of substantial amounts of radioactivity. .m. i I performed a quick calculation using a little f .33 card I keo.t in av. wallet from mv. dav.s eic.ht.vears ago at l i General Dynamics that I also kept as a handy conversion tablei 3 4 I l .I . o c a 3 -,a,,. o. uw ..w.o_ ..,, 4,,, _4.. .6_4 _,,,, -,-4 o n c o....- -. o... .,2 e l Acme Reporting Company i

29 i All we could say was it was greater than 10 to n, ~..".e .# ^ u.-..k. ~..,_i _' ' 4 u .4 e ye.-.. d.'.' _i.'.d * =_ _. I I had to base this on Cobalt 60, which was the 3 4 isotoce we worked with in the Naval Ship Yard where it would 5 be different for Three Mile Island, which would have a d_ _4 _# _# a_ _- a_.. ~. s e. ^.. -... i -e. i l We later got some information an hcur or to after 3 concerning the sa=ple which was one milliliter of the sample 9 had a radiation reading of 100 MR per hour at a distance of one meter from the sample. to 11 Again making a quick calculation, this would indicate a concentration of about 10 to the fif-illicurie? 12 s e D .r 13 FG Cilliliter-1 ~w Q That would be higher than the earlier calculation? 14 A That was hicher than the earlier calculation. .a 16 Q Was the second information concerning the radio-activity of the primarv. scolant more reliable than the first? 1. A Yes. You get a better reading if you have a small t3, i e sample a distance away frc the meter. ,9l l ..ic ~..e.. a g v ".m="- ~a._' _4.._#.-~..a._'^-.. l o. ycu, i.a.d.d ca a d a- ^ m o m .39. g l indicated to ycu that there might be " severe core da.r.:sge. " 21 I Can vou be a little more specific cn that? You m.., l indicated there would be damage to the pins? y, 0 r .a 34 i A What I mean by severe core damage was that the i I ,00 bund.es c:. pins, each

uel which consists c: arcut 4

1 _3a 1 Acme Reporting Company l

30 1 bundle would have about 200 pins in a bundle, that the core 2 had overheated enough that these pins had probably burst 3 or fractured open er allowed the radioactive fission products 4 that are normally contained within the pins to escape into 5 the primary coolant. 6 What I nean by severe is we had significant core 7 fractions of radioactivity probably in the water. What 5 I mean by si nificant is maybe over half of the acbel gases m 9 and probably substantial fractions, by substantial fractions 10 I mean maybe in the 10 percent range, of radioactive icdines 11 or other fission products, a considerable amount of core 12 inventory was out into the primary coolant. 13 Q Explain one thing for me that I am not clear on. 14 You would have the primary coolant, as I understand it, 15 and you wc Cd get a measurement as to its. radioactivity? 16 Is that accurate? 1897 057 1. A That is correct. is g sa .eu ..mu.e.e-- m -,-- - - -- -- - -_4,., ,,3--, - _n - u.w c. - - - - -m. m. 19 would have a reading'of ten to the fourt of millicurie? 20 co. .4 _, 3 _4 _,,.. c o nc e n..._. _4 o n. .s m 21 Q How do the two figures relate to each cther? If 1 So 6 tne :..1rst ene indicated radioactivity, what. dces tn.e l l, 8 03 second one indicate? 24 A While they both are fic.ures o# ""a c" = - 4 = - 4 ve 25 amount of radioactivity tha: Is in the primary coolan, che Acme Reporting Company l

6 3' w 4.,w.e.- ..w.e m _4 _-._ ~. a d _4 _= ~_ _4 c ". # - m...". e s a...f _' a_, _.".a_ 3.- a a =_ _- _.. e 2 t activity concentration within that sane.le because.vou have t a known volume. 3 4 Q So it is just a more specific analysis or an assessment of the radicactivity? -c a 1897 058 A ".k..a. _4 - c o - _ a_ c ".. a Q O k a v.. New if you can explain it in layman's teims, 3 how do you go ahcut making this calculation? You indicated 9 that you used a conversion factor contained on a card for 10 Cobalt 60. Could you be a little more specific there? 11 A That was an empirical formula. What we used to do 1n_ in the shievard--I have to co back a little bit. When I was 13 at General Dynamics, one of my duties was to respond to s incident response drills. We never had an incident at the 14 la-shi=vard, but we had periodic drills,and One of the things I had done was a card made for the various other radiological 16 1_, engineers that we could use as a crutch to perform on-the-

a..

spot quick calculations. You didn't have time to have i 9 scrt of thinc. access to ccmouters o- -=7-"'a ors and that t i 00 What we had surmised may happen in some situation ,1 is that you might have a spill and you would quickly take ' - d__" a samole in a bottle and want to be able to assess wha: cha: l i

u

,- gg e c e _,.,_ a . v. i.., ~..u.o. yg.n-. .. - _.a.._a.. g _..u.a_ l .c - ...e g.n... gg 2,, y t 9. water er whatever, so what we did is we :cck a sample of ' ^a a - a~^- 3c-%=5' u- = k cw" = oc~~ =^-4^ae '" v '~ '- 25 r i I i i Acm Recorti Cm i

i 32 and measured it with a hand-held survev meter and were able 1 2 to say for so many millirems per hour on the survey meter, 3 we would correspond to a specific radioactivity concentration in the bottle. I was able to use that conversion which is 4 good for a carticular isotope, Cobalt 60, to approximate -a what concentration we had for Three Mile Island. g '897 059 i k For the second analvsis, very crude anal /=;s, but 3 analysis nonetheless of the one millileter sample, we used a rule of thumb for Cobalt 60 that one curie would yield a 9 10 radiation level of one R per hour, one meter, from a point source. A one milliliter sample is sufficiently small from 11 an engineering point of view to consider a point source, so 12 that is how we calculated the 10 to the fifth number. 13 Q Do you consider these conversion factors to be 14 fairly reliable or not? 15 A The order of magnitude could be off by a factor of 16 10 either wav. If anythinc, we mi-ht have been low because 4 to Cobalt 60 puts out a higher energy than the spectrum that we ,e. m I I would expect to see at Three Mile Island; in the power 19l .0 to see basicallv radioisoccoe,s reactor accident we would exrect of iodine and radioactive nobel gases of Xenon. These have 21 l 22 lower energy emissions per disintegration than Cobalt does, l so the conversions don't go exactly tacether, bu: it crobably .33 was not underestimated. 24 Would you consider this conversion f actor to be Q .,o Acme Re artin Com on i

3, reliable if you were having a Cobalt 60 problem or release? A probably within a factor of 2. Q Then you think that, if I could characteri:e wnat 3 you have said, that it would be on the conservative side when we are censidering releases of Xenon or nobel gases, a but it could be offset by a facecr of 2 c: up :c a fac:cr O of 10? A It could be offset by a factor of 10. For the 3 one milliliter sample, which gave the 100 millirems per hour g to millicurie cer CC. Since the fission product spectrum 11 gives a lower energy than the Ccbalt we'uld, the concentration was probably greater than 10 to the fifth, maybe up to, at to, s the time I thoucht it could be as high as maybe a factor of 14 10, so if someone were to specifically say what was it, I la, would crobabl.v sav between 10 to the fifth and 10 to the 10 "i**h-1897 060 t-At this stace of the came, with the information we 15 ~ \\ ,i had, if we vere in a factor of 10 en a calculation, we

1. =1-19 I

20 ' good abcut that. cretty i I Q Did vou feel that even with the margin of error with 21 to.vour calculations you could still reasonabl.y rescect .,a l i conclude this was highly radicactive material? ,s A Ch, ves, ~y l Q When you had this calculation, what did ecu fo wi n .,a . I A R a Co eenv

34 1 at after you calculated the radicactivity of this? 2 A Thase calculations--I was at home. I was not at 3 the Incident Response Center at that time. This is probably 4 be tween 6 o ' clock and 10 o ' clock. 5 Q On Thursday night? 6 A Yesi en Thursdav. nic.ht: Stu Bland and 3rian Grimes 7 were in the office so I assumed that this information was S being passed on to the EMT so they knew that we had 9 significant amounts of failed fuel. 10 When I came in about 11 o' clock that evening, I 11 knew that evervbcd.v knew that we had real hot primar"/ 12 cooling sample and had a lot of failed fuel. 13 Q When vcu arrived at the Incident Response Center st 14 at 11 o' clock Thursday night, was the atmosphere within 15 the center changed from when you were there previously? 16 A It was about the same. It might have been a little 17 less noisy. People had improvised more. They turned the 1 l is scuawk box off I remember at that time. I think it was a 1 I 19 I little more quiet. People were getting more used to it, but 20 I think people were getting more tired, too. Maybe tha 21 was one reason they were quiet. 189~ 061 I 22 ! Q Were you getting different informatica from TMI l l i' I i 23 ' from what.vcu had received earlier a: that point? 24 A We had more information at that time. Again, in t i 25 the various radiation level readings, we had been getting I I i A R C ~

l 35 t scme information from some of the COE, Department o f 2 Energy contractors who were flying the helicopter flights, I 3 phoning in information, concerning~ radiation levels offsite and some of our inspectors were phoning in radiation levels, 4 so we were cetting lots of data ccming in, and we were trv.inc. a to assess that data. Also we used this data to determine what the 3 maximum radiation levels were offsite to people. Mr. Centon 9 had asked on Thursday morning, which Wednesday night I had to creoare estimates of maximum individual doses and total 10 11 population doses about 6 o' clock Wednesday morning, and also 12 I did it--excuse me--6 o' clock Thursday morning, and also t3 6 o' cicck Friday morning I briefed.NL:. Centon and Mr. John Dav 3, who was the acting director of the Of fice of ,4 t 15 Inspection and Enforcement. .s Q Can you tell us c.enerall.y what the information that i 1, '/ou relav.ed concernin9 dose estimates was on that Thursdav , a rw - . -. _ ca,;. .~n '~ j i A I can tell v.ou for Thursdav. m o r n _ n c.. Fcr Thursdav. ,9 1 morning, I told Mr. Centon that the maximum individual dose l .y3 t. was well under 500 millirem for any individual. My best ,1 i estimate was 100 millirem rance. I also estimated the i .so. population dose could be less than 2,000 man-rems for a 50 e" 1897 06 i mile radius over the last 24 hours.

4.,. i l

i Q That was the information vou relaved on Thursda.v _3a I i l l I i

e 4 30 i. morninc? 2 A That is correct. Friday morning, I do not have a con.v. of what I gave them. It should be in the log book-- 4 about ten copies to various reco.le. My recollection was the population doses had gone up. It was less than 3,000 man-rems-0 acain conservatively calculated, and the maximum individual -O dose I think was something less than 300 millirem at that time. It was just small amounts of radioactivity that was 3 g being released, but it wasn't large amounts to be concerned about that we had to do anything other than we just wanted to 11 to trf to get them stopped somehow. 1o. Q When v.ou relayed this information, are v.ou savinc that there wasn' t a great sense of urgency or a great sense 13 i that we had an imminent problem? 14 I A That is correct. There was nc immediate concern 15 16 that we needed to do something or anything like that. There was no significant risk to the public. 1. Q Was Mr. Gossick at the Incident Response Center , a_ i . i89/ 067a a* " a" "-4 e'- 19 i A He was there a lot. I don't remember when. At .;0 .; t one of the briefings he was there. I remember I gave him 22 a copy. He was there most of the time. He was there a lot. 23l I dcn't know exactly when he was there and wasn' t chere. I 24 g .q - ..,._4- _ _i...a_ d _4 A_ "o u '.. ' ". a_ _ '. e _ _ = _ _t e..s e _= s ~ ^. w ".a. m a l = e _a - -._ . - _i.. m_ _ _,._,a_ m- - u,= ... a u-. a. yag c_ a _;..c. 2,. m. 2 l 4 I l Acme Re artin Com on

l 37 1 costulate some theories es to wha: the problems might be. A We were getting =cre, the informatien we were 2 3 getting was bearing cut more of the theories that it was leakage from the letdown system that was woinc. into the 4 building air. We were following thines like cumo.ine. the a water off the floor and gettinc. it into tanks that would -o decrease the rate of radioactivity evolution cut of the water which was a primary concern we had. 9 Also the licensee was putting down sheets of 10 clastic over the ficar in which thev..eumc.ed the water off to 11 attempt to minimize the amount of iodine that would drift off the ficor. 12 13 We were concerned with iodine,always being verv. \\ concerned -about, with the iodine level in the environment 14 15 going up because we had no effluent information. Effluent monitors, these are radiation monitors that determine the 16 t-amounts of radioactivity being released from the plant, were all off scale hich, so we didn't have any useful 1 a. i 897 064-information from those. 19 i 29j Ne would do things if :: started to rain--be sure the state inspector would take samples of rain water and .,3 lock for rain that micht wash the iodine cut of the also +3 air on to the grass where it would beccme picked up in the .v- .a 24 cow mir< chilled pathway. 25 Q Did you have any information at that time with i l l Acme Reporting Company

38 .-as3

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.e "va_ve -_.d^w.. c' -.".a_ - _i..,a _-v_ ^ ^ c ' a... '. a 'a t y-A Yes. That is when I eften asked the I&E cperation,s 2 3 cecole, and the letdown was very variable. Scmetimes it was-4 just a few gallons a minute. At other times it was higher-- 3 20, maybe 30 gallons a minute. The licensee was having 6 trouble with plugging in the lendown line sc the letdown " _' ow wa s ", a_ _ v_ a_ - _ _=

• 4 ^

7..". a. " e a- _ a_o -'..=

a_=- =_ _- =_ ~" e _ "a e a...'O ~ and 20 callens.cer minute was the letdown ficw. 3 9 Q To the best of your knowledge, did I&E get their 10 information concerning the lendown ficw directly from TMI? A I do not krow. They cot information frca TMI I 11 12 believe scmetimes anC. got in from Regicn 1 sometimes. 13 Q When you determined the estime.te of the ficw to be between 10.and 20, did vou simolv take into account the 14 to. readings that vou had and add ther,up and divide them bv 16 the number, or was there some ether process? A I didn' t estimate the 10 to 20. I was told the 17 10 to 20 by the I&E cecole. 18 I 9 Q Okav. You have described the situation thus far t earlv on Fridav morninc. As I understand t, en Fridav .,0 morning the situation chanced. .n i897 065 i 23 Could you begin addressing that subject? l 1 1 'aa- "c '< " c 03 - A Ck=v-C"-a ^# '- a -"' 7s ' - = - "e ' = 4 ~ r 24 on prior to late Friday morning -as getting the ICE c-.. =c c.- w".o "-aa-c.i.. c. .o - a c a_ _4. a_ _ " e o _4.. ~= _- --^' = _... 25 l Acme Reporting Company

39 t sample to do a spectrum analysis on that sample so we wculd 2 have a better handle on exactly what isotopes were in the

• a 7a *o "e'"e-de-=--i-a c

=- - di-io"a' so '"e "ad " - -=--- d ^--ia 3 on several conversations with Bettis ^eople, the ceccle to 4 e analv:e those samples. o 6 One of the primary things we were concerned with .i was where the radioactivity was coming from to be sure that 3 all possible actions were being taken to minimize the 9 release of radioactivity. 10 In conversing with the I&E people in the Incident Resconse Center related to the site abcut anv ideas that 11 we had or recommendations that could shed light upon the 12 situation to them so thev could maybe relay in to the 13 ,s' licensee, we incuired several times about r the filter svstems 4 L a. as to were they operating. 16 The air samples upstream and downstream, we cce basically verv little information back that they couldn't tu g get samples, and tne air was going through the charcoal i --.3..__.. I e4 ,a. I i i O When you speak of the filters, do you know whether .,0 t the waste gas decay tanks cr;i gtl It was those that are related to i o n.u.e. s,. 18 l t 3., e The releases to date were couing out frca A No. .,3 j various leaks from the letdown system, the r.akeur system, I I .,4 i and what we call the reacter cccling bleed tanks that were .,a Acme Reporting Company l

40 1 part of that system where licuid is sometimes stored in it, 9 =.d i-aas, r = c' i e a e 4 ", 4 v, was s'. .ed o ..'.r e =..u' a-d " c; a 3 w.a. c+.4v4.y o_< ..e ,/ -4ou.=. 1 o_ c' a4.. =-m. s. = 4 Also we are probably evolving some radioactivity 5 through building air. The building air is collected by a 6 building ventilation system, and exhausted through special ..'_,ters to remove radicactive ma*=-'. =,s. a 3 ..wsese <<,..-o -.. a 4.,. e a c..a-a, u_ e .. s.4 - w-.. .._4, A w 9 remove any radiciodines. Most of the radioicdines in the 10 air and also two sets of particulate filters, these have 11 sweci='.'.i l

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- - - - - _- =- -. ~. ".e '~ a a-. = "4'-a A d - - -- = s e s we -= 5 e.4..c. .----u -t 13 ( c.as decav tanks can be released by opening special valves 4 a.s w...cse anua .-,.3; w o,,, a -- .w u..e ..,4--.-on. a so _e -.- se-v- -e-u -m 15 through its own separate HZPA anc charcoal filter, but there 16 we-=..o.-=.'e=ses

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-..".a e.r." '_ _- ...e... 17 through the entire accident through that pathway. t3 ' Wa ass" ad '.h=-.".. = -".e c"e'- ,a o- "a. "n-s=. =. a o I 19 i s eein~e, we would be havine. radioicdine releases to the i l ... a 2...~,4 _-r..e.n.. = _' i 20 a.nv 4 -.....a r..,

u. we we..

.c. se2.4..3 a.. v. 4.. .w 21 samples, and we were very concerned about that beccming a 22 I l major cathwav. 189/ 067 23 We figured we were probably not seeing it because 44 ..".e c.".a.- o -.i #41.=..s wa-= .' - -. a.. d .c. ..'.o. a'. Wa. d4" ". a v a. - I 4'- i 1 25 probiens and we were advising people that many of the iodine ; I

41 1-samples that were being taken offsite were errcneously l 9 2 high because nobel gas was contaminating the whole 3 cartridge and giving people readings that were being 4 interpreted as radiciodines but in reality they were nobel 5 gases, so we interpreted many of the reported high iodine numbers offsite as not being real numbers. I Another thing we were asked about many times was 5 the status of the waste gas decay tanks. When they were 9 lettin7 down the primary coolant from the primary coolant to system, the water would enter into a tank called the makeup 11 tank. The makeue tank has to operate at a lower pressure 12 than the primary ccolant system, normally 50 PSI, where 13 the primary coolant system would run at 2,000 PSI, so that i 14 any gases would come out of the primary coolant as the 15 pressure was reduced in the makeup tank and these gases 16 would have to go some place. 1; The normal system is any gases that evolve out of 15 : the crimary ccolant as it is sc.rav.ed into the maketc. tank I i 19 enters into a piping arrangement called the vent header 'O system, and the vent header system connects to a waste gas l l M, compressor, and the compresscr wculd compress the gas in a l 22 waste gas heacer anc cu~ a lar:e tank called the - i l 23 waste gas decay tank, which is a tank that cou'A -=ke a 24l oressure un to over 100 PSI and store the radicactive I 5

gases, i

i } i A ~

42 Under normal reactor operations, one tank is aligned to receive gases from the makeup tank, and the other tank is left isclated with cas ~ 3 ~ from the orevious time such that you get several months decay such that the radicactive 9ases would decav. awav. and the cas in the tank 0 would be released to the environment through filters at inconsec.uential levels because the radicactivic.v had all a decayed away. We were concerned about the gas that would be going to these tanks, but we knew under the failed fuel conditions 10 that we had, based on the primary coolant sample, that the gas entering the waste gas decay tanks was highly radioactive ,o i_ and we were concerned that these tanks had enough capacity to keep receiving this gas, that we would not have this gas 14 being released directly to the environment. As long as it was being stored in the waste gas decay tank, it would not be released. We knew the licensee 17 had plans underway to hook a temporary connection to allow ,,a, r i i the waste gas decay rank to be vented back inside the 19 l 20l' i centainment building. It was very logical that you had a l lot of radioactive air in the building and it was a tight 21 I building, subatmospheric pressure, to put the radioactivity l .m. I back in the containment, and then you could use the other 23 i tank to keep receiving this and basically run the radioactivity 24 l l back to containment again. I 1897 069 l P

43 We could never seem ec get any firm information 1 on the status of the waste gas decay tanks. 2 Q De vou know whv? 3 A I don't knew why. I think it was a matter of 4 communications. We would get numbers now and then, but get a different numbers. 6 Q Did you ever learn whether they did establish this pipe to vent material from the waste gas deca; tank 3 back into containment? g A Thev did I believe. They finally did that Fridav 10 afterncen. It was used, but it was a fairly long task to 77 out it in because peop_e had to work in highly radioactive 1,,_ areas with protective equipment on, and had very. limited stav 13 times becadse of the high radiation levels inside the g auxiliary level. la. O How would the utility have known if the cacacitv 16, in the waste cas decav tanks had been used? 7 A There were cressure c.auc.es on the waste gas decav. 1,- i I tanks such that as vou ke.ct addinc. gas to the tanks, the

g pressure would keep risinc.

You wculd eventually reach the 20 design pressure of the tank *. i Tc procact the tank, here are relief valves on the i waste cas decav tanks which would lift at a cetuain set i _,3 I pressure before the tank would rupture to protect :he tank i ., 4 I uneer any eransien: conei:1cns. 1897 070 l i A R I

44 1 n. ..w. 4 a u, -...a 4 a_v?. ..cu,, a .-_a. 3, a 2 A e.u, a - -,,, y. - _..- ar 4..c_;^aded ~='"as ." a, 4- -w ...e y 3 you would have to go to the 7alves to try to stop them from 4 oc. e ninc.. 5 Q Wculd that have been feasible under these situations? 6 e -"ab_'y..o

m..'.e "

"e e -a _1-^a ad.i. '- =~.s eca~.4"a'" I ~ high radiation level area. I am not exactly sure where they 5 are, but there was no discussion about trying to get to those 9 valves, so we were concerned constantly through this since 10 Wednesday about the status of those tanks. 11 Q But at this time had.vou ever heard recorts from 12 the utility indicating that those tanks no longer had 13 mmac4

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w _.o_ - _ w = v, - 2, .. w.. s _1 _, q a. a o c_ c r.. r. o a 15 don' t remember new what the relief pressures are somethinc. r 16 like maybe 80, but they were belcw the set pressures en the 1 relle:. valves. r ta, ".. e a.3 - - - e ma a ". '.'.a. " = ' o u a-a- ";.=. =... ac =...a-au u l 1 19 da + a.. 4..e " ~.w. a *m..3" - es*.4cno. C.a. o _# '..".e " *.v 5. a *. _4 _# " s 20 questions we locked at was what if you lif ted the relief 21 valves, where would the gas go? We pulled the drawines out t l 22

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4a the Incident Response Center? I. A That is correct, o-O When you say we looked at them-- 3 A We--mvself and some of the I&E operations people 4 and other radiological people. o Q Did vour information change at some point? b .'o a: .. 4..,.,. a : e. vas. C o. -;4A 23 A n.- - 3 ..m - m. 4.,.,, ,a-t 9, o.. a. ^# .. *. = -a.,4-aa s =- r- - - - - 9, e,-o w . e -.. ,.n .u. -o --= 5 the ILE operations desk, that was the fellow who had the 9 phone lines, ca3 led me over and saac,.ne had some information 10 on the waste gas system for me because he was one of the 11 fellows I had been talking with all through the night as to o_ the status of the system. ,0 ji 1 \\ . o was t..ais e. erson, do you remember,- Q wn 14 A I do not remember his name. I know who he is. 15 7 -^u'd

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46 t had just received information from some place, the some 2 place was probably Region 1, but it could have been straight from the site. I'm not sure. 3 Q He 'didn' t mention with whom he spoke? 4 A He just said I have this information on the waste 5 6 cas system, so I did not cuestion where his information came from. 3 H's information was that the makeup tank pressure had risen, and it had to be vented, which would be what 9 10 the physics would have to be as time gee; on, as vcu kect 11 the letdown happening. The gas was being vented to the waste gas vent to ~ h. header, and the waste gas compressors were on and were 13 puriping the gas from the waste gas vent header into the 14 waste cas decay tanks, that the waste gas decay tanks were to. now full and could not receive any more gases, and that 16 the relief valves on the waste gas decav tanks were open and 1. consecuentiv lettine the cas that 13 was beinc--cumred into the waste gas decay tank from the makeuptank to be allowed i , o. l released directly to the environment. This would to be .,0 bypass the filters and go on out. i897 073 i i .,.2 O Would this have been the first discharge of j i 23 radicactivity from the plant that you knew cf that was ,,. _m_ _,._. - a_ a_, .,4 i A Yes. There might have been ve ry, very small amcunts 23 i i l i Acme Re artin Com an

47 1 cf radioactivity that came frcm the primary, secondary leak h 2 we had earlier exiting through the turbine building. Those 3 were not significant whatscever. This was much, much higher. 4 Q Given the f act that there was a steady letdown cf 5 some cuantitv, was it your assessment that this dischar3e gl wo;1d continue er wculd it be sporadic? A This is one of the major concerns, that this was .a a significant change in the status of the plant, that before 9 we had had gases leaking to the auxiliary building through 10 various little leaks around seals, leaking valves, this sort it of thing. 12 Now we had a direct path that unless you stop 33 the letdown or could get the pipe hocked back to containment, a 14 there was no way you were going to be able to stop this. We discussed a little bit about how could you stop 10 it. We didn' t have any ecliective answers on hcw to stop to-it other than reduce the letdown. 1-

n..

We knew letdown was important because you needed to have the letdown running to keep the main coolant pumps 19 .,0 operating and the operation of the main coolant pumps was .,1 verv imecreant at this sta9e because vou wanted to keen 22 forced ficw through the core to keep the core cook, sc you 23 could cool through the steam generators. 189~/ 074 4_4 It wasn't clear if you could run a main ecolan: 25 pump without letdown without damaging the main coclant pump i Acme Reportin Com an

48 1 shaft seals, and if you damaged the seal, you may not be able G 2 to run g3e pump, 1 3 Q Did you suggest to anyone directly or indirectly 4 that they perhaps should reduce or shut down the letdown? 5 A I did not. I am not sure if any of the IsE pecple 6 did or not. I think there was a discussion. We discussed 7 the alternatives on the letdown. It is hard to tell. 3 I am not sure. It is obvious that if this 9 situation was happening, that the TMI people, the licensee, 10 were aware of it, and that they were assessing the situation 11 that they had and would trv. to minimize the release in anv 12 way they could without--maybe that was the lesser of the 13 evils, depending on what the situation was at the plant. 14 What I did do was try to assess what the consequences 15 of that might be. I just quickly in about 30 seconds time is made a calculation of how many curies per second would be 17 coming out of the makeup cank and being transferred directly i ISl totheenvironmentbasedontheconcentrationofradioactivichl i 19 in the primary coolant sample. 20 Q And based upon the estimated flow? jgg7 QJ3 21 A I asked them what the flow was, and he said between l 22 10 and 20 callons a minute. I used 10 because t was a 23 i round number and I could do it without a calculater, sc I l 24 multipled the numbers together and came out with a release 1 25 rate of abcut, the number was 63 curies per second, and I

49 don't know if I said anything, but I turned around and 1 John Davis who was the acting director of the Office of 2 I&E who normally was in the EMT was standing bv mv shoulder, 3 and he said is this new information? I said ves, it was new 4 information different than what we had before concerning 3 the status of the waste gas system. e He said whv don't you come in the EMT and tell me about it. 3 O When vou computed the 63 c"aes per second, did 9 you again use the card with the conversion for Cobalt 60? 10 A No. I didn ' t need the card. It was just straight 17 10 gallons a minutes, and vou multiply by 500 to convert to 13 counds cer hour, and convert from hours to seconds, times 13 sy 10 to the fifth millicuries ner second. 14 Q It is a rather simple calculation? la-A It is a simple calculation. 16 Q When you came up with the reading of 63 curies per ,o_ second, was that your assessment of the amount of radicactivity that would be leaving the plant? 1897 07 6 A With the tanks full and the release valves opening, l 20 that was what was coming dcwn, that would probably eventually .,1 l go back. It might have been a little bit on the high side, i but probably not too much--depends upcn the temperatures in 23 the makeup tank. 3 Q This would have been an assessment right at the plann 25 l Acme Reportin Com on

-20 t release point? A Okay. This would have gone out, what came out of 2 3 the makeup tank would have gone we fel t to the release tank. Q Okay. Mr. Davis indicated that you might share vour 4 calculation and information with people in the EMT? O A That is correct, so I went with him into the EMT 6 and he said tell the people in the EMT what is c. cine on. 0 What time was this on Friday morninc. ac.ain? 3 A This was.i couple of minutes after 9. 9 Q Okay. When you entered the EMT, who was there? 10 A Okav.. I don't remember everybcdy who was in the 11 EMT. I would estimate there were 10 to 20 people in the 12 (i 13 EMT, and thev were all located around a horseshoe tv.ee table. 1,, Q Thev were all seated? 10 A I think evervbcdy was seated. Some pecple 4ct u=. ~ 16-There was a lot coine. on in the roca. I was back bv the 1. decr which was at a corner of the horseshce, not the center, 13 so I could see everybcdy, so I had from the base of the 19 horseshoe on one side, people's backs were to me, I could 20 see the people mainly that were on the far side. 21 i ?eople that I remember being there, I knew Lee 3 Gossick, the executive director for operations, was there, 33 and then Harold Ienton, the direc cr of.the Office Of Suclear 3 Reactor Regulations was there. 23 i897 077

51 1 Edson Case, deputy directer of the Office of 2 Nuclear Reactor Regulation was there. John Davis, acting 3 director of the Office of Inspection and Enforcement was there. Harold Collins, assistant direc cr in agreement 4 state responsible for emer ency clannine. was there. e 3 Also Victor Stello, who was the division director 3 for the Division of Coerating Reactors, in the Office of 3 Nuclear Reactor Regulation, was there; also five or ten more ceccle that I just didn't notice their faces. 3 0 Did you notice anybody there that wasn't within 10 the NRC? tt A I don't know. There could have been sema. We had g ( g various people from EPA and FDA and other people around. ,s I don't recall anybodv that I recocnized, but it is very 14 to-possible there might have been someone other than NRC in the rocm. 16 Q Where was Mr. Denton seated? 1_. A He was sitting across, I could 1cck at him; he 13, was on the far side of the horseshoe so I could see his face, g l and Mr. Case's face. Scmebcdy else was sitting Over there, .,0 i l .,1 and those are the only people I think I could' directly look at. 3, ~ 1897 078 G Where was Mr. Collins seated? ~33 l A He was seated : my left, next to Mr. Davis. His .3,, l 6 I .x. l. back was to me. 1

l 52 I i! Q When you went in 0 the recm, what happened then? 2 A Mr. Davis asked me to tell then what information 3 I had. I told them that the I&E Cperations people had. told me that the waste gas decay tanks had finally filled ue s and that the relief valves were cpen, and that any of the a c.ases that were in the makeuc tank were beine vented, and a the 9ases from the makeuo. tank would be flowine. out thrcuch 3 the open relief valve and the waste gas decay tanks and cut 9 to the environment, hvo.assing the filters. 10 I explained this appeared to be a continuous release that wculdn't be stopped until either the tanks ti 12 were vented back to containment, or the letdown was, secured or decreased. 1 13 I think I might have said is it possible that we 14 to-can stcc the letdown and control reactor pressure through 16 usine the block va1ve on the pressuriner, cower ocerated relief valve, which would be another wav to control the 1. t3 e.

c. rimarv. system cressure.

I think I might have made a statement like let's j 19 try to keep the radioactivity inside containment. It is a .,0 good buildine.. Let's keec. it there. 3 r i n c. i n e. it out inte _3, the anxiliary building 13 now causing problems because we i can' t centrcl it if the waste gas decay. tanks are ful1. j 23, 1897 079 i Q Were cuestions asked of ycu? l 2; A Yes. There was a discussict by scme of the systems 33 h 1 I l A Rp q Co oany

53 cecole first about how letdown was important and they o didn't want to stop letdown., I don't remember who was 3 talking. It might have been Vic Stello. It could have 4 been Denwood Ross I beileve might also have been there. 5 (A brief recess was taken.) 6 THE WITNESS: Scmeone asked me a cuestion. Scmeone I asked how much was the release if the waste gas decay tanks S were full and it was being directed out. 9 I think I responded the ef fluent monitors were 10 off scale so the only way we could do it would be to make l calculations to determine what the release rate might be, 1"- and I said I would roughly calculate it based on the informatio (f 13 we had from the primary coolant sample the other' day. The 14 release could be 60 curies per second. ,5 I said I didn't have numbers for radiciodine, but 16 the radiciodine numbers should be considerably less. II Q You indicated that this calculation you had made a might not apply to this particular isotope being released? 19 A Sixty curies of nobel gas could be released. _ror .'o radiciodine I said I have to make a calculati:n, but 1: -31 would be considerably less than the, less than the 60 curies .,n --l cer second, but I did mention that the release would bvr. ass any of the.. charcoal filters 11397 080 23 as Q st was vour understancine. c:, or was 1: not, ..ne 25 situation that the release would mainly be nobel gases? i l

1 A My understanding was the release would be mainly 9 2 nobel gases. There would also be increased iodine. The 3 curie quantity would be'much less than 60 curies per second. 4 At this stage, I thought we were going to discuss 5 the various alternatives about trying to keep radioactivity 6 inside the containment. Up :o this stage, evacuation had never entered my mind' whatsoever. 3 Scmeone then asked, I believe it was Mr. Denton, 9 asked what the offsite consequences would be with the 10 60 curie per second release rate, and I believe I said I 11 hadn't made a calculation of offsite doses because I just 12 got the information, but I said I could make a real crude 13 assessment by rat cir.g in:ormation we had trem the previous ex 14. .cay. 15 The previous day, we had estimated about a curie 16 per second release rate, which under similar meteorlogical l~ conditions had resulted in about a 20 MR per hour radiation 19 field. 189/ 081 19 The latest informttion I had on the meteorlogy 1 20 was we had a slow wind toward the north gate which was 21 similar to the other day, very unfavorable meteorological 22 conditions, so that we could just straight ratio the 20 by ( i 23l 60, or result in the 1200 MR per hour at the north gate. 24 0 When Mr. Centon asked you for " offs _t? c on s ec.ue nc e s, "I l i i 25 ' did you understand him to mean what the consequences wculd t i t I

__so be at the border of the TM: property or f arther cut into 1 f the surrounding vicinity or what? 2 A I assumed he meant what it'would be at the maximum 3 individual offsite, which would be at the north gate. 4 At the north gate,. there is a series of houses, a five or ten houses right across the street from the north 6 cate en Pennsylvania 441, so the north gate was syr.oncmous with offsite, the nearest members of the public where the g wind was blowing at that time. g Q You had computed previousiv using the information 10 available that there would be an offsite exposure of 20 17 millirems, is that correct? 897 082 g A We went the other way. The previous day several of i( w us had beeh around the olanning board and we had a 20 MR cer 14 hour reading from one that I believe might have been g Goldsbo ro. I'm not sure where, and the meteorologists had 16 given us a dispersion constant for that location called L _, Chi over Q, for that location, and we made some estimates ,3 j i that might have been a curie per second release race. 19 The meteorology conditions, as I unders cod them 20 I to be at the time, Friday =crning, slightly after 9, was j .,1 I similar to what probably existed at the north gate, so 1: g.3 i wo u~' ~d ' e *~ ~4 - ~ ~' v = a"'=- ^~# "^d~~ -"a -=~'s="e~~='=~~ i ~ ~~~~~~"* ~"' ~~ ~' ~~ 23 was 60 times higher, the dose would then he 60 times higher. ,,4 I k think I spoke it as I went through because I hadn't made 3 u I i i A e R tino Comoony

56 a calculatica and I didn' t have the 1200 :1R per hcur number f when I walked into the I:4T. Q u jus calculated i.7 your ' eac without the help n 3 of pen and pad? 4 A That's right. I calculated as I stood there. I o think I said it aloud as I did it, as I went along. o O When you said that the offsite reading might be 1200, i did you at that point indicate your sense of reliability of that judgment? g A I don't remember. I think I had always out 10 cualifiers in front of these things--the estimate is 1200, could be 1200. I think I assumed that they knew as we wer.t g, through the uncertainties of the system that these were 13 (i nothing thdt were hard and firm. It was the best guess was basically how I could categorize that number. t o. I didn't expect to talk about doses when I first g went in there. I expected it to be a systems discussion g about alternatives to letting down and that sort of :hing. j ,a As scon as I said the 1200 :4R cer hour, someone 19 said ch, mv cosh, or ch, mv God, somethinc like that. That 20 is ove r the PAG ' s. The PAG's he was referring to were the EPA protective action cuidelines which one R isJthe icwer ._m_ boundary for initiating offsite actions.

1. 3

~ 1897 083 Q Do vou remember who said that? .n A I don' t know. '*"k it might have been iarcif ,o. t I I i A R o Co cany

3/ Collins. It came from that side of the zahle I believe. 3 Q Where you could not see whc was speaking? 3 A I didn't look down. After it was said, if I looked: 4 that way, his head was the other way anyway. Bob Cefiat was around the Incident Response Center, and he could have 5 6 been there, too. I think it was the state programs guy that had said that, but I am not sure. I don't recall seeing 3 him in there, but there were several pecp'e in there I don't g recall seeing. He might have been there. 10 Then within just a few seconds of ch, my gosh, that's over the PAG's, somebody said the licensee is ,l i 12 measuring 1200 MR per hour. g 13 Q Nas that someone in the room who said that? A I' thought initially someone walked in from the 14 to-Incident Response Center, the technical side where I had 16 come from and announced that, but I was talking to some of u the Commission who had access to the the other cecole at .a-tac.es and thev said that a c. hone call came in on one of the i I ,9 ' rhone lines nhat was in the EMT. It was most likely the l 6 20 person who said that was sitting in the EMT.

a.,.

O Nhen vou first heard someone sav. it, whv. did v.ou assume.it was sc=ebodv entering the room? 1897 084 ,o l Secause I assumed informatic. usually came in A 43 1 l 44 through the Incident Respcase Center, which is the technical I a.5l side. Those are the ceople who have direc: lines and that I il h A e Reco fina Comanny

58 sort of thine. I know the information came fron, Re 7 on 1. i 1l I believe Carl Abraham was the name I heard associated with 2 that piece of information, and it came in en a line that was-3 in the EMT, a telephone line that was in the EMT. 4 O When somebody first stated in the IMT that there a was a reading of ac.c.roximatel.v 1200, where was that person l situated physically with respect to you? f A I kind of thought behind me, which would have been 3 the door. Some people walked in behind me, and I stepped g forward. It could bave been someone to mv left which would 10 have been where John Davis and Hal Collins was sittine, or 11 someone who walked in behind me. I thought someone walked g in behind me and said it, but maybe it wasn't. You should g ~ he able to reconstruct that frcm the tapes. g Q Sut at the time vour impression at the time this 10 was all occurring was that someone was entering the room? 6 A I thought someone walked in and said it, but I am g not sure, i 1, i Q Let me just get off the story for a moment and find ,9 I t i who did tell you later that it migh have been a reading out .y that the EMC received on their own telephone. ]897 085 l g1 I A I was talkinc. about Bernie Wiess who was the fellow i .,n i i i who was kind of overall in charge of the Incident Restense e a.3 s, l Center who has done various things with various people on .,4 i the Three Mile Island followup. .,a I

i 59 He is the c.uv. that knows all the tapes, and I t h was talking to him about it and he said that that message 2 was en a tape and it was en a phene line that went into 3

• "e TM*6 w.

= 4 That line could also have been, some of those had 5 I joint lines, it could have been picked up in the I ?.C. I an ,oi not sure, but either screene walked in with t, or seceone in the EMT said it, but the licensee is measuring 1200 MR 5 per hour. g Q Was it your impression when this information arrived to frcm whatever scurce that it was the first time that the tt people within that room knew of this reading? tg A Yes. That was news to evervbodv. 1 13 Q It was news to everybody? g A I felt it was news to everv.bodv.. I think everv.bodv t o. was a little shocked by it. 16 Q Would it have been possible given the structure of g the EMT that a phone call cculd have been cominc in at the is ! I l tgl sametime that v.ou were briefing the c. ecc. le in the rocm with respect ec your calculations and so on? i89/.086 .0 A That's right. Curing my very short briefing, 3 there were several phone calls going on simultanecusly. ,g ,,,, l There were several side conversa:icns I believe going on .a t simultaneously as well. It wasn't that I was deirrering a 3 briefing to everv.bcdv and everv.one was c.aying attention. .,3 _ i i

60 That was not the case. I would say, I don't knew what 2 percentage were listening to me. I knew Mr. Ienton and 3 Mr. Case were. 4 Q And Mr. Collins? 5 A I think Mr. Collins was paying attention. I am 6 not sure John Cavis, if scmebcdy wasn't talking to John Davis en another subject. I don't know. I just don't 3 ramember. There were several side conversations and there 3 were telephone conversations and everything was going en to at the same time. 11 Q You don't re. member who announced into the room 12 this new reading? t3 A No. s' 14 Q I~ don't want to lead you, but is it or is it not 15 your impression that this information was arriving for general I6 consumption for the first time while v.ou were there? A Yes. It was sort of announced, like it had u to, considerable impact when that number was spoken out--the I I tg licensee is now measuring 1200 MR per hour. I don't recall i 20 it saying where it was taken. N397 087 I l .. I, C Is that as good a c.ucte as to how the announcement t 3 i i l was made as possible--the licensee is new reading 1200 MR 22 i i 23 ' Per h0Cr? i I A The licensee is measurine. 120 0 MR r. e r ho ur, o r ,.4 the licensee is--measure was used I think, or recertine, or .5, i Acme Reporting Company i

t bu t seen or scre: hine. like that--the licensee is v.easurine. 1200 MR per hour. 3 Q Was it only one sentence made in this announcement, 4 or was it a longer description of what the licensee's .3 information was? .o -n h.4,< 4. -u r_ 4,,-. m..o.- ae..ee.-o. ..-ass ; o-chronolec.ically ve rv. c.uick1v, within let's say 10 er 15 3 seconds of my stating that my best estimate was 1200 millirem 9 per hour. It was almost like in the same conte:<t, like 10 someone supplementing my sentence. It was like my gosh, 11 the licensee dust reported or measured 1200 MR per hour, J t> and it was received by me, and I believe cuite a few others, C 13 it was just confirmation of a hypothetical situation, which 14 was a real situation. 15 0 What was your impression as to the understanding 16 of the pecple in the rocm with respect to the location at 17 which that reading was made? ))g/ Q88 ta O k a v.. . c,on,t remember the messac.e sc.ect:1:a:1<r a A 19l a a v. i..g ~..".a. - c = "-.4 -.. 7 A - n '. - a - a...~" e _ _4 _3 4. oa-- __ uas 4 4 ' m 20 i a helicopter reading er not. It is very possible it was 'l announced as the helicopter is measuring 1200 MR per hour, 4-w -, w ..o. 2 e.,~ ...a.. w,....... e o.., - ...o... e ,.-o..ae ,... o w v, - n I 4"e i there sctewhere because the licensee 13 measuring 1200 :12 i i Just. n-cer hour. .t is e.cssicle taev saac noren c. ate. cc 2 1 not retencer -'5 - eney saic nor:n c.are or.,us: cicn.: s c. e c t : v. i. i

o., i a location. I don't remember any location being specified.

o. i It was, I believe it was taken bv manv. of the 3

people to be the north gate because that was the topic 4 of discussion just prior, beforehand, that was the ch, my 5 gosh, it is over the PAG's was in the context of that, and I think most people thcught it was the north c. ate T.easurement. -e G Was there any discussion or cuestioning as to where 3 the measurement was taken? 9 0 There was none that I can recall. It was just that 10 it seemed that I had made an estimate of 1200, this came 11 through and like it made my 1200 hypothetical calculation 12 thing, it burned it in stone and put it on the mountainside 13 as the gospel. \\ 14 It could have been, if it was a helicopter or ground ' 13 survey measurement, I just can't tell you. I don't know, but it was assumed to be at the north gate. 16 t-Q All right. After this announcement concerning the 3 reading occurrec, wnat happened? i I A Again, this announcement came within 15 seconds tg .,0 after my initial 1200 MR per hour number, and it iust T reinforced that. ]89[ Q89 21 _m_ Now the next thing that happened, I think someone l l

• a acain said somethin, about the PAG 's again.

It is ova- _34 the PAG ' s o r some thine. like that. It was receated. I an l I .u, _m_ _ -. ,n. . ya s. u. _ _m__--._,e con,. u n n_.._ s a _i a ~" su_-,_ _a. o .~. a. 25 i Acme Reporting Company

-o s, e time. I am not sure that same eerson said it 1 a second S time, or someone else picked that up and repeated it. Q You don' t know who the scmeone else was? A No. It was a voice. It stood out enouch over 4 the general noise in the recm, though I think some of the side conversations had stopped at this stage Of the game and ,o ceocle caid attention to the matter at hand. Somecne, I think someone, again I don' know who, said something about movinc. c. eoc. le. The tocic of o Y' Y 10 point of view of containing the radioactivity to one of moving offsite people. Q Do you remember who made the firs: =ention of i 13 s moving 'ceocle? 14 A No, I don't. It could have been Mr. Denton or 15 Mr. Case or it could have been anybodv. I 'ust don't recall i ^ 16 who said that. It is just too long ago. 1,. O Cc you remember if the comment concerning moving l c.ecc.le was an exc.lcra:Orv. ene or an addi..tional tv..:e of a i 19 e 1897 090 I statement? i A I don't know. I can't say one wav or the other en ^ 21 that. Someone said that,and there might have been sc=e I I ., i c.eneral word so.cken about that. Scme thine.s I do remember. i I remember Mr. Denton and Mr. Case spoke and made some 3 i Comments conce.7..ing the.ew topic of discussion of ~'.cVing f i I e

f -o4 1 offsite people. I remember a few phrases like i is time 9 to bite the bullet er if we are going to err, let it be on ' 3 the side of public safety, be :er safe than sorry, some 4 concerns like that from Mr. Centen and Mr. Case. I think .3 - b.e v, 'a c..b. sa.4 4-a v ..o...b.4.. g -..'. c s e

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w 6 i .g o. ...,.o. 2 .w.e s... o _= _.. a-w_-m. _2 _4_ m o.4 _ _4.,.. _3w3 2 7 I movinc people.

ic one mentioned any oppcsition whatsoever to moving people.

It was almost as if no opposition was 9 an affirmative decision. I think Mr. Centon in my opinica 10 anyway seemed to be the center of attention, even though 11 there were still several phone calls going on and still a to-couple of side conversations a: this time, and maybe scme 13 ( systems people asking what a PAG was. I am really not sure, M but I think the center, I perceive the center of attention 15 shifting to Mr. Centon at this stage. 16 Mr. Denton had a rather calm, self-assured manner 17 that he generally has, and I think he commanded attention ,e-c - t.ne roca. 19l Q After these comments had been made cencerning-

• O let's be safe, en ce tera, did the focus : hen shift back cc

- i j 21 j g}} })9 } Mr. Centen? .m a u~ e, _i a_ y,_ _i._ u _s _a. a. a ,. _ g_,_ s., 4.. a_ ._a _s a-g..yya..2 =. a_ 43 is my supervisor a couple c:. times removed se may.ce . loc <ec a I. a-I 4 ! . o.. _,... a.jw -w, - wa a ._4..., I w w,,. w 4...<, 24 a...2_ ..c ~ e.~ o, -u. l s.3 and I don't remember John Davis ever saying anything, who A e R Comea

ia oc 1 was en paper in charce of the IMT. I guess I was rather G o. sur rised at the c.uick, rac.id, ve rv. rac.id c. roc.ression of 3 events. I did not voice immediate opposition along with 4 everybody else. 5 Q Ckay. ..w.e . o..x. .w .g 7. ..e.. w. c ~.- ' .c. w a s 'd...re... >. o n asked me, he said how far should people be acved? e 3 Q Did this occur in the time immediately after the earlier cctments? 9 A Yes. I mean the whole thing frem the 1200 MR per 10 tt hour phone announcement to when Mr. Denton asked me hcw far 12 should people be moved I would think was less than 60 seconds. It was very quick. .( 13 s Q Okav. ,4 A It almost appeared to ne at this stace of the came t o-that the IMT had decided to acve people or reccamend to 16 move ceccle, to reconmend to the state, and new it was a 1. matter of how far. 15 ,9 O This shif t in thinking occurred you..say in less 1897 092 l than so secenes? 20 A Well, okav.. From the time of the phone announce-I ment of 1200 MR cer hour came through to Mr. Ien:On askinc .,o. 1 me hcw far we should T.cva pecple was chronoic9ically ahcut . v>, l 60 seconds, and pricr :0 the 1200 MR per hour phone 3 4 l announcemen: I don't think anycne was talking evacuatien yet. .,3 I s

60 t Q Okay. 2 A Thcugh I think if we could have verified the 3 1200, we might have been talking about it-- certainly not two minutes from the time that I first came up with this 1200. 4 5 Q Okay. A Mr. Ien:On asked me how fa: pecple should be moved. I resconded, I said I can't reccamend the specific distance. g Q Were you surprised you were asked that question? A I was rather surprised I was asked that question. 9 That is why I didn't give him an answer. I said I can't 10 11 tell you. I don' t know a specific distance to move people. t2 The reason I said that was the individual states 13 were the enes to do with the e;tergency planning, and chere ~ 14 was a plan. Pennsylvania had a plan. I was not familiar to-with te plan. I had never seen the plan. I had never worked 16 with the plan. My system resconsibilities and offsite doses 1, is not emerc. enc" clanning, but I was ma.vbe the closest to it. 2 l was : rom the brane.n tn.at was invcive c. in that.

o..

I I I a_;>,e._... n i, a r.,. aga.a _s. c.., -..a., g.. ..ue.- .a. .a _t _- - - r u 1 19 ; m-3_ i I -39 : time because I didn' t have very much infcrmation on this I .,1 1200 number and it might be a continuous thinc.. I was t n_a_ thinkine. to myself about sectors, which was the wind was 1 l 23 i bicwing, a million things went thrcugh my head very quickly, l 34, and I could not diges: them all to give a number. l t I '5l! Mr. Ienton immediatelv. asked, when ! Ocid him - I 1897 093 i i Acme Re artin Com an

67 couldn't give him a specific distance, he asked me a 1 e second time in a rather cc=manding voice to tell him how far 2 people should.be mcved, i= plying that my first no specific 3 distance answer was totally unacceptable. 4 Q Did you feel a sense of pressure en you at this o a,.. u.,. ~ g A Yes, quite a bit. It appeared to me that he was no: going to accept no, a no response as an answer. One of g the thoughts that went through my mind was mavbe he knew a 9 1 t m re than I knew, which was true I think because he 10 received sources from like the systems people that are g concerned possibly with the non-condensable bubble blocking g e core, and things like the reliability cf the main cooling 13

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".de. .-adi=*'cr. a..d " k. i., o-14 "a - -. ' <. =.'..b.=~.. .e. = ": - - v. "..a '- new was a piece of what ne,.<new because he g1 nave A t o. access to much more information than I had. Maybe when you is put it all together the situation was worse, so I said basically who am I to cuestion that decision, so I felt he i g, 1 probably had a clearer picture of the situation than I, and 19 ! eeded to make a response, so I chose to make a qualified 0 s sort of response. gg7 ggf i

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=.n - =...a_i. e, 7.. ".. '. >. 7 2 = _4 '_ om...e .i..c, l like it is hard to tell, Cr I don ' t know, but, or sCte I g ". c a_ _- ~. = i.. c,u a ' ' _#.d a_ _- _4.. .#. v-... "v # .d , ' u. .'.e _70 d'as wm=o- . c _- =_ .4 i i than enough or less than 10 T.iles er something like that. I: .,a l l l 1 l

e3 b., ad ".e .. t.. ".e ' O. '.. 4- "u. ..".a ~as ea ou s de.."~.."e = - 7 f 0 You were the first to mention a specific suggested 2 distance? 3 A That is correct. I came up with the first 4 quantitative number, okav, that I felt was a very conservative o number, and guess also if we are going to err, let us err c I cn the side of safety, better too much than : o little or somethine. I had ha= 4 7 c.uess influenced mv. thinking because 3 this whole thing went on r less than 10 minutes. This was g a very rapid development. to After I said that, a cremot general discussion 11 took.clace by several ceco.le, and I can't remember who spoke 1, what. Several things were said all at once, the pros and 13 (s cons or no's f ar to move peccle. 14 I cuicklv realized 10 miles would include the south lo. section of Harrisburg. A Q Did somebody state that? g ,e, - said that. Thev said 10 miles is cart A Somebody 1 i of Harrisburg or something like that, and someone saif 5 i 9 I miles. Again, I don't know who, and that was.briefly discusse,d 20 ves, that is okay, it is not okay. 1897 095 .i 8 0 ~4 hen somebody said 5 miles, ycu mean they suggested l 22 i that as a comnterpreposal of sor:s? .,3 l .q

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-n 07 1 nobody objected to 5 miles. h 2 O Do you remember if Mr. Centon said anything s=e 4"4cav w~'*~h -a*- ec* ~^ e4 -"e- -~ke ~'O m4'a-o- -wa 5 3 - = ~ -~ - mile suggestion? 4 A I don't remember his sav.inc. anythine. to the 10 mile 3 s"33.s-4c.. .- a_. a.-, e, _.. ". _ '... ' < he =a_d4-a v...e..h _'.. 3 .b - -. v.- = " _' a. --a ~ $"^ g 0 to the 5 mile sugvestion. There was sc=e opposition to the g 10 mile suggestion because it included parts of Harrisburg. m..g o. . a44 e. _ - - o..m _. ~e 3..y .,^osi-4^^

• o
• w.k.a 5

.m. _' A' e ., w 9 -w. .yy w-w.. yy -~ numbe r. 10 Q The cuestion at that point wasn't whether to t1 12 evacuate, but how far? ^ Tka"'s 4-*- 7" sh4#-ad --- rhona- -aro-o # -he "ha 13 9"-- - 00 s"'"'ad- - "- r ' a a ' v

- =-"- -

-"-'a li'~'a--- 3-=~a e"-- -^-- --r-- 14 i about erring, which way we are coinc to err, and we have to lo. do something and those kinds of wcrds, it was not a matter 16 to do it or not. It was a matter of hcw far. 1-Q "o v, o u -=..e,_'-a _- _i _' .'d._. C ^ _' _' _'.. s ..a d a 2_... v, =__=.a...a... w..". _esye ".- a__i**e_ v^.# "".ese a " c, e s e _i ^.s- '. e tg 3 A I don't remember. He probably said something -30 I I be ca" se ..h_i s _ a-

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• Denton's and Case's initially when they sor: of gave shor

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a 70 1 O When you were asked questions by Mr. Ien:On wi:h -o respect to how far shcrid the evacuation go, did you at anyt 3 time expect that Mr. Collins would at any time make a 4 comment at that peint? 3 A I don't know. I kind of hoped he wculd. I guess 6l I really hadn't thought about it. The time as the whole i'l thine.. It develoced so nuicklv. I was thinkinc. of all 3 the thin 9s about emer~3ency planning and documents that I 3 wished I had read ahead of time. I guess I would have 10 appreciated any help on the situation when Ienton pressed 11 me for a number, but I didn't get any. I had to stand en l' my own. (. Q Okav. 13 ,4 A Anywav. - en the 5 miles nobed"1 obiected to 5 rules. r s 15 I don't remember a motion bein7 c. re se nted, and agreement 16 to =cve people to 5 miles or something like that. There was 17 never any clear, concise procedure or statement as to wha 13 I the IMT was actually doing, l ,o i 1 There certainly wasn't any parliamentarv. tv. e. e .,0 procedure involved, but there was no, I don't remember any odj i m 1 hav ng any c~cjection to moving people to 5 miles so it was 1897 0 n ac.croval bv. non-objection. s.rt c: i l 3., i I believe Mr. Ienten told Mr. Collins to go and I i i 1+ 1 I call the state. I'm not sure. 5ccething tells me, I think i 25 ' he said scrething to Ice Collins to ge up and call. I am r i 6 i

• 3 i.

a. r ' so su-a o# ""="

"u- ' w'.'.' 'ai' "o " ~+.. = ~ ~..". 4. k 7 9 o. hao. n. ene d. 3 0 You are not so surs Mr. Centon had said anything to Mr. Collins? 4 A He probably said something to him. He was talking 5

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..u... .go..- s.i d a e- ...e '..o-es".re t'"ia a.~.-. Co..s -c l was at the other side of the horseshoe table. He would have 3 been the one to go call the state, but I couldn't say with 9 absolute certainty he told him to go call, what he told him. 10 I think it was something to the effect go call the state with our decision. 11 Q Did Mr. Collins then get up and leave the room? 12 A I believe he did. I am pretty sure he got up and 13 walked because there was a little anteroom where there was 14 telephones. I think he got up and left the room, though he 15 could have called from where he was sitting. He had a ,6 telec. hone there, but I think I reniember him gettinc. uo and t, ,4 going into the other room, though it is very possible he didn't leave the room. tg 0 Is it possible there was ao instruction of any ,0 sort to call the governor given, or is that not within the i . a.,. e 'o. o s o 4 w 4, 4..,., e __ l .,,, i, A It is possible. I don't know about the covernor .o l .,4 though. I don't ever remember hearing the word. Maybe the i word governor was said. I iust don't honestly remember. I ,5 . l u l

72 1 thought there was sete communicaricas between Mr. Centon h 2 and Mr. Collins, that side of the table, let's put it tha: 3 way. I know Mr. Collins get up and went over, and if I 4 were to give you my best guess, I thought he got a message from Mr. Centon, though I could verv easily be a mistaken in that. 6 Q Was it vcur best raccliection that Mr. Collins would get up and call the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania eith e a recommendation? 9 A Yes, and mv interpretation of what happened was that 10 Mr. Collins was to call the state and say that the EMT, I 11 13 am not sure how he phrased it, EMT or the NRC whose Commissioners were not involved at this time, was recommend-13 ine that he evacuate to 5 miles. 14 Q Okav. I don' t know if vou are in the position to la-16 make a judgment on this question, but was it your sense that the recommendation for 5 miles would be routinelv 1. ni accepted by the State of Pennsylvania, or was it your i l sense that that would curelv be a recommendation that would 19

g have no greater force than that?

A Ask the question again. yyy 4.1 ]{}[ G was it your sense that a recccmendation from the 3, l .3,, to evacuation would be imo.lemented bv. the i EMT with reseect state, or was it your sense tha: it wculd be purely treated ., 4 i hv the state as a recommendation oniv? .,a-1 A R t I

i 73 1 A I guess I don't really--On paper we recommend, but 2 an awful lot of the time an NRC recommendation as very 3 strongly accepted. I don't know how the state would have 4 received it. I think the state--well, I would - be saying 5 what I think the state would do. 6 Q Ckay. Fine. After Mr. Collins got up and left, ~ which I believe is your best reccliection? 3 A Yes. If anything, I would bet on that one. 9 Q What happened after that? 10 A Mr. Centon and various people stated to make 11 telephone calls to I think get hold of the Commissioners. 12 There was 'seme problem getting the Cc=missioners or whatever. 13 \\ They started makinc, c. hone calls. 14 Q To relay this information? 15 A I assume so, to talk to the Commissioners and let 16 them know what was going on cr get their thoughts or whatever. 1~ People were making phone calls all though this whole thing, 15 like maybe people had been trying to get ahold of the I I i i l tg Cm-m...4 _c =-4 c,e s .4 .w. _1,a- - .ct. r. - u,., a....._._-- _.,3., ._ _ 3, w

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.-v.4..".g .o e* =n'o'A ~ .'. a.m.. a ac"sa ..".e ' a a- " e " e." - =_ A*- ^ 21 it was decided. I don't know why, but people's attention I 22 then went to themselves and to their telephones to nake 7 100 a3 -a,o-w..une a,'a. I 24 There seemed :o be no more IMT. I disolved into 15 a bunch of people doing their own separate things. Before Acme Re artina Com an i

I 4 s 1 the majority of EMT I felt was discussing the issue before 9 it, which was the movement of people. The whole scenaric o. from the first mentioning of the 1200 :o Mr. Collins leavinc. 3 the rocm was three to five minutes. It was verv short. It 4 was very rapid. .o I had received,meanwhile I had seneone who came e in and told me that there was a phone ca_1 in the IRC for =e from the site. As I stood there, I saw people were now 3 deine. their thine., and I decided I would take the call because 9 I had been trvine to cet a chone call into the site to find 10 out more of what was happening. 11 1o. I think_2.. walked cut of the EMT and walked through the doors. As I was walking cut, I think it was Mr. Collins 13 i was walking back from, I saw him standing there and _t ,4 looked like he was heading back the other wav. I think he la. laft his seat to co call from the anterecm. , e. As I was walking out the door, Brian Grimes who was 1., 1 ~.. " su a_ _dc_ a~. wc.>, uae.-..-..g .'.s A c _, ".v ".o '..a u i 4 a 1;. t l i relieve i 19 i i C Mr. Collins was re-enterinc the EMT. Iid you two 20 l sneak to each c her at all? 1897 101 i a, i l A I don't recall it. I don't think we talk =d 3,, I I a -.. i. _,. _4.,..k '.. = = - d = v a_ _- _ a _i.k e d d _' _- a_ c _ _' 2" - -_ _4.. ~s...".4- ..'...e. d" a .,a . l l C.".e - _ _i...e a-d"- ".., ..".a_ _"..c _i d e. _ "a e ".ad, "u ..^w. a.c w. _~,'"-a- ~ 4 I very brie fly, about 20 seconds, told 3rian what was gcing cc, g I I } l I

--12 and he went into the EMT and he knew radiological issues so 1 2 he could discuss emergency planning be::er than I could. He would holler to me if he needed me, so I went.no answer the 3 telephone call and took the phone call from the site. 4 That is the kind of events as thev. ha=cened, as I 5 saw them anyway or interpreted chem in the EMT. It turns s out an awful lot of the basic information that we had used was not true, -o Q When did you discover that? 9 A I can't tell you what EMT is doing. They are getting 10 feedback from the state and all kinds of other feedback 1,. s 12 probably better than what I was ge tting, but I was able to 13 let's say over the next couple of hours, I got information that it was not,the waste gas decay tanks were not full. 14 That was a bad message. 15 The relief valves in the waste cas decav tanks ,6 i 1. That relief valve had ocened, but it was were not ocen. the relief valve on the liquid side of the makeup tank and 13 ; i i 39 I . we m. . a.,.. 4.. ~ ..".e ...a.k e u. ..=....k _=. .".a_

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-"=- 20 3 i f i I had been lost through the valve opening, so releases were j 21 i increased. .,o-- i897 102 i You could see on the charts that releases had iumr.edl .,3 s ii t up over wha: they were, so enere was a soixa =ctivi:v. ^- 24 I I -"4-k'- 4 waha"d k' "o w"" '

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/ -p so f wou'A h. ava_. d a... s 4 d a_ - = ~" ' a "a ~~m.4_'_'=__-=_... 'd~.'.. .....". e 4 -_3 situation, that it was a transient release. It was not a continuous, long-term release that was going to keep going 3 en for some period of time. 4 Also that we didn' t knew that the 1200 MR per O g hour reading was a =easurement taken 300 feet over the top w.. - -2 4. ..o.. J c_..o. c n.24..e.. w~ u_4 _,a4.,.c,,.ao _so_ _ _. .o.

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e -n building. If we had known that, it would have been g considerably different because doses would be much less where 9 to any member of the cublic was. Also the wind had stopped and the wind, this was in the morning, and the winds were 11 light and variable. The wind was basically a flat calm, so 12 ou built up a pocket of radioactivity, and that is what v too I. the helicceter was measuring. 14 If we had known any of those ciaces of information, lo. it would have.7.egated the concern that evervbedv had at the 16

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I think we thought the conditions were as they had i been described to us. Thev can erobablv resurrect a lot of 19 i .,0 these messages and things, message forms and whatever, but that was what we thought the. situation was. 3, Q As you were leaving the EMT and "r. Grimes arrived, 3,, l 1 was,as reaction to vcur c,escr:.ption 0:_ wna: nac s us n. .a, i, wnat i happened? -34 force:i 897 103 l A I think he was surcrised. wna: he sa'A _3a I i l r' i l Acme Reportin Com n

77 i. 1 It was sort of an expression of hey, what, or something like 2 that, an expression of disbelief that it had done that, andt 3 he talked with them, and I know he was very much involved 4 in discussions for the remaining of the morning concerning 5 what to do, what not to do. That was the part I was not in 6 there, and I didn' t know what ensued. ~ Q When you spoke to Mr. Grimes, did he tell you at i i 3 that point why he was surprised of the decision? 9 A No. He just went in there. to O Cn vour way back to your desk, did you speak with 11 anyone else? 12 A I think I saw Hal Collins, Harold Gaut, who works for 13 Harold Collins. I think I might have mentioned to him 14l because he was a state.orogram c.uv., very interested in l 15 evacuation, that's his line of work, that Harold Collins was, 16 just had called the state to reccmmend evacuated people,and l' he was surprised anyway I guess, or something. 15 Q Oid you speak to anybcdy else before you got back 19 to vour desk to take this phone call? ^ 1897 104 20 A I don't recall. I d.on ' t think so. If I spoke f 21 I to Hal, it was a four or five second conversation. Icc -... _ '_ a_ s. l 2e 4,,- .-__.a ..o .-. a. ,, m my,-"a = eov_'s_ -".

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.s r 23 He went in and talked to the~other state people. l 24 i o After this point, did vou have any cccasion to speak! i i I ( O y y _ h. ..N. ...h. ] O O M. w..M.M. .N. N ..h. j Y..).

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78 tl or emer ency.crecaredness? w 4 A No. Brian was in there at that time and Brian t l 3 talked to enem about that, and it was a matter of just Brian-4 was in there the rest of the morning and af ter that, it was the President told them to get the helicopter for -a I g Mr. Centon to go to the site and Mr. Ienten left, and we were l tryin~ to get the stuf f with Ccnton straightened out on 3 getting the samples analyzed, so I was busy over in the a 9 other recm, so I never talked to Mr. Denton or Mr. Collins or Mr. Case on this. I never have talked to Mr. Centon to about this. 11 tg Q Is it fair to say that Mr. Grimes from that point 13 forward reolaced vou in the capaciev of advising the EMT? A That is 00rrect. 4., a 15 Q Did you have any other direct involvement with 16 decision making with respect to evacuation or emergency t. preparedness during the remainder of the incident? A Just on a far periphery I saw some various things tg, i 19l and made scme comments on the stuff that Brian had done, some! i i con =ents on some side issues. 20 t l _, l Q But thev. wouldn't be con =ents of anv. colicy nature? 3, 1 !897 105 l ^ = i i '3j Q Is there anything that we have not covered in our l discussions this morning that you would like to bring out, ,4 i i u ! anv areas ena: vou : eel vou cav not have described fully cr -s j l t i

a o 79 I in an.v other wav? o. A No, I can't think of anv.thinc.. I: is "ust the s 3 situation, the information that we had that we thought :: be the case turned out not to be the case, and we acted on 4 5 information that was there more rapidly than I would like to have seen happen, but I think everybody's intentions were o c.ood. I wouldn't think otherwise anywav.. 3 No. I have no more. MR. PEARSON: Ckay. That concludes the discussi0n. 9 10 (Nhereupon, at 4:30 p.m., the deposition of Mr. Barrett was concluded.) 11 l ~' I have read the foregcing pages, 1 13 through 79, and they are a true and 14 accurate record of my testimony 15 therein recorded. 16 ~ =

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1., 13 4 I subscribed and sworn to before r.e g this day of ,1979. -31 Notary Public ( l i My Commission Expires: i897 106 23 ' n i i 25 i l l t

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's n h h'. :.. gd I i, v._. 2 . c ,..f....., I 4 ?.9 I 1897 107 .,o ,l i I o..i I 4..d**..*. if t b, w.u. 8, .P., 9. a a.w..... f. $. S. .no. I e i .S, } f 1 4 .9.% i 6 I s I I}}