ML19290A025

Deposition of Lh Barrett (NRC) on 790728 in Washington,Dc. Pp 1-80

ML19290A025
Person / Time
Site:	Crane
Issue date:	07/28/1979
From:	Barrett L, Pearson E Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE ACCIDENT AT THREE MILE
To:
References
TASK-TF, TASK-TMR NUDOCS 7908290064
Download: ML19290A025 (81)

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1 UNITED STATES OF M1 ERICA 2

PRESIDENT'T CO!G1ISSION ON THE ACCIDENT AT 3

THREE MILE ISLAND 3

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DEPOSITION OF:

LAKE H. BARRETT 5

9 10 11 Room 714 12 2100 M Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C.

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'M July 28, 1979

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14 2:15 o' clock p.m.

15 16 APPEARNANCES:

1; On Behalf of the Com:nission:

18 ERIC PEARSON Associate Chief Counsel 19 2100 M Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C.

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2 INDEX i

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REDIRECT _

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_ITNESS:

2 Lake H.

Barrett 3

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FOR IDENTIFICATION NUMBER:

6 Deposition No. 1 3

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IS 19 20 21 nn.

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MR. PEARSON:

Mr. Barrett, are you aware that this, o

is a deposition taken prior to your testimony and in 3

preparation for your testimony before the President's 4

c' Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island?

o THE WITNESS:

Yes, I do.

6 MR. PEARSON :

If there are any questions that I ask you that are unclear, or if you don't understand anything 3

that I say, please stop me and I will be more than happy g

to rephrase the question as necessary.

to I would first like to identify this document which 11 I have noted as Deposition Exhibit No. 1.

in (Deposition Exhibit No. I was 13 s) marked fe;r ideni.i'ication.)

14 Whereupon, 15 LAKA H. BARRETT 16 having been duly sworn, was called as it witness herein, and 17 testified as follows:

,g DIRECT EXAMINATION 19 BY MR. PEARSON:

20 Q

Would you tell me what this F.ocument is, please?

23 A

Thiat is a summary of my prc fessional qualifications,

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I for my present job.

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Is this summary to the best of your knowledge 74 3

accurate?

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A It is, p

Q Is it accurate tc ahe present time?

2 3

A Yes.

4 0

Does this summary contain any information concerning p

5 your educational background?

6 A

Yes, it does.

7 0

Does that cover your educational background to the 8

present time?

9 A

I had some other courses, but it is details.

It to is covered.

11 O

Okay.

Thank you very much.

For the record, would 12 you tell us your full name and address?

13 A

Lake H. Barrett, 7805 Potters Mill Court, Derwood, y

14 "aryland.

15 Q

Would you give us a brief description of your 16 education since high school?

17 A

I received a bachelor degree in mechanical 18 engineering in 1967, and I received a masters degree in 19 mechanical nuclear engineering in 1971, both from the 20 University of Connecticut.

21 O

Have you taken any educational courses since 20 your T. asters degree?

9 23 A

Yes.

I completed about a third of a masters of 24 business administration degree and various courses as part y

25 of training in my job.

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Does your educational background include any t

,4 training with respect to emergency preparedness er evacuation 9

of communities or anything related to those areas?

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A Not specifically.

I am more of a systems engineer, 4

l rad waste systems, not emergency planning.

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Could you characterice again brieflyyour q

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Do you want to go backwards or forwards in time?

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Q Either.

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In 1967, I joined the Electric Boat Division of I

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General Dynamics where I was a fluid systems engineer.

I In 1970, I transferred to the radiological control department of General Dynamics, and for two years I worked b,)

I on the design and operation of shore-based rad waste systens.li I

is In 1973, I joined the Bechtel Power Corporation

g where I was senior nuclear engineer in the design of rad waste systems.

At Bechtel I became a group leader in i

charce of six professional people in the design of rad waste

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o l In 1974, I joined the Nuclear Regulatory Commission ;

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as a senior nuclear engineer in the Effluent Treatment o,

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Systems Branch where mv orincipal duties were the review 2:

Of prcposed rad waste systems.

24l In 1976, I was transferred to the Environmental f)

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Evaluation Branch of Operating Reactors.

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"yy, m s .f 6 .- tI f In April of 1976, I was appointed section leader 1 in the Environmental Evaluation Branch. My duties in the EnvironmentalEvaluation Branch are generally reviewing 3, radioactive waste treatment systems, radiological assessment 4 of effluents, radiation protection, and overall safety and 5 environmental assessment and analyses as they pertain to 6 operating reactors. Q Would you briefly tell us what a rad waste system 3 is? 9 A A rad waste system is a system either air, liquid 10 or solid which is used to control any radioactive materials 11 within the reactor plant in general. in Q So when you review a rad waste system, what do you 13 do? 14 A You technically look at the various components and 15 the way the system is designed to assure that the licensee 16 or the applicant has adequate control over radioactive 1-materials within the reactor to prevent their uncontrolled 33 release to the environment. 19 Q You indicated that your job responsibilities also 20 include an assessment of radiation effluents or something 2, l of that regard? 1896 312 f 2: A That is correct. v> 0 Would you explain that for us, please? y [)) A In my duties as section leader, one of the functions 25 Acme Reporting Company

cr d 7 c ./ ofthe section is to perform do*eg!esti=ates of the releases 1 } 2 of radioactive material from nuclear power plants in the 3 environment. Given a certain release, people that report to me are responsible for making calculations to determine 4 5 does rates in the environment and the impact of those dose 6 rates upon members of the public. 7 Q Do you perform these assessments of dose estimates 8 and so forth during the period at which a proposed reactor l 9 is being considered by the commission? 10 A Usually there are changes to an operating reactor. 11 For example, if an operating reactor wishes to install a neu 12 niece of rad waste equipment or run the facility differently ) than he initially proposed, we would review that. 13 14 I do not do reviews for construction permits or 15 operating license applications. 16 Q If I can understand, you would review a modification 17 to a plant to determine whether the radiation that might 19l be emitted from that plant due to the modification would be 19 within some specified range? 20 A That is correct. i ) 21 Q And you would only approve the modification () p presumably if that range was within the limitations allowed 22 i 23 by the NRC? ] 89 h 3 }'k 24 A That is correct. () I 3 Q Ycu indicated before that ac part of the dose 5= Acme Reporting Company ,em.......

.n - m-- n : py :w.n. ~.- - -- -. -, - -. 8 i estimate that you do, you consider the impact to the public. i f 2 What did you mean by that? g 1 3 A What we will do, we will usually for a given release ~ calculate the maximum individual dose, that is, the highest g 4 3 dose any individual in the environment would receive, and P 6 verv often we will calculate a popu,lation dogs which would ftp/n/ & be the integrated dose to the tava.or:. nt, usually specified as a 50 mile radius around the facility. a 9 Q Is it fair then to say that your concern with j io radioactivity releases from plants is not only with respect to the total amour of radioactivity that would leave the it 32 plant, but also how that radioactivity would affect the 13 surrounding vicinity and the peoople living there? A That is correct. 14 13 0 So you do essentially two separate calculations? A

Yes, 16 i-0 You indicated you had a third responsibility with is respect to radiation protection.

I don't have a clear note of it here. 19 3 A Radiation protecuion is the protection of the plant 21 workers frcm radiation sources. One of the basic functions i t-is is to implement the ALARA as low as reasonably achievable u 3 d J \\\\ 21 ! philosophy with regard to occupational exposures, so very i!l

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9 occupational exposures. 1 O I see. Does the ALARA test only apply to ) occupational exposures? 3 A No. The ALARA also has to do with the releases 4 l r t the envircnment. We also have the same philosophy, the 5 ALARA philosophy, for radioactive effluentyin the power 6 1 4 Plant, as well as the in-plant exposures. Q How do you determine what is an appropriate ALARA i 3 i level? I g A F r radioactive effluent, our guideance is provided 10 o in Appendix I fl01(cC.FR, part 50 of the Commission's 33 i pdnai22 ue,jn.s,,,_i regulations, which specifies various dose limits and a c g method of doing cost-benefit analysis for/i-n-plant ' g h i oceupaY1onaJ. exprELJres. j g i There is no specific regulation other than licensees 15 should maintain their doses as low as reasonably achievable. 16 I Guidance on various methods of doing that is provided in a Nuclear Regulatory Commission guide which has a number 3g l of regulatory guide 8.8. l ig l i 0 Is it fair to say that your determination with 20 respect to ALARA level for occupational exposures is .;1 judgmental rather than based upon a regulation? h I 23 1 A Repeat the question again. } 8$$ }} $ .I I y !! Q Is it fair to say that in determining what would h 0 'j be an ALARA level with respect to occupational exposure, it

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10 I is based upon the judgment of the decision maker, that is, 2 yourself or others within NRC, rather than based upon a i i 3 regulation that the NRC has previously promulgated? i A That is correct. There is no specific numbers for 4 5 it, 6 0 Lastly, you indicated that your job responsibility 7 involved protection of operating reactors with respect to 6 radiation. Is that a fair characterization of your testimony? 9 A I don't remember saying that. 10 Q Okay. 11 (A discussion was held off the record.) 12 BY MR. PEARSON: 13 ) Q Uould you tell us how your present job responsi-14 bilities relate to radiological accident analysis? 15 A Okay. Some of my people evaluate the accident, 16 potential accident analysis, evaluate potential accidents 17 at the reactors. IS This would involve things like failures of waste 19 gas systems, failures of liquid tanks and the consequences 20 that these would have on the environment. 21 Some of my people also perform analyses for the 22lh' classical accidents, the LOCA, loss of cooling accidents. ) I O i 0 When you are analyzing consequences to the ,.j i89A 316 .h environment, how do you do that? I D ji A Generally in terns of radiation doses, again similar Acme Reporting Company q a,.a......

11 to what I described before, the maximum individual dose, 3 as well as the overall population dose. 2 i O Co your current job responsibilities involve in any. way dealing with the area of emergency preparedness? 4 A

ot directly; in the Environmental Evaluation Branch 5

there are two sections. One is called Section A. One is 6 called Section B. I am section leader of Section 3. Section A is the section that has responsibility 3 for energency planning. Very often the section leader for 9 be Section A may not be t'..are or the brandh chief may not to i and consequently I may be called upon to handle l

there, 11 it is not emergency planning issues 's they may come up, but 12 a primary function of mine.

It is a secondary function. 13 Q What does your section of the Environmental y Evaluation Branch do? 15 A Generally rad waste systems. 16 0 Okay. t-A Radiation protection, offsit' dose impacts. p Could you tell us who your immediate superior is? 0

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George Knighton, 29 n 0 What is his title? l 22 A Branch chief, Environmental Evaluation Branch. l 1 ) l' ni 0 Who is his superior? i it at the time 24 A Do you want it now or do you want 25 of the accident? We have changed. 895 317 Acme Reporting Company . m........ e,m..; =+e "5.- a M -' '_,33 -- - r:w =,,_.

y n %d.siidb CL*LM JD&-.N, C%,w^*Abkn. mr W.NN % = % %yy ..r W W M " ~ + -,,, -. - - ??d d W MM *- .. f. 12 O At the time of the accident. 3 A At the time of the Three Mile Island accident, 2 Brian Grimes was the assistant director. 3 l 0 Who is his superior? 4 A Victor Stello, who is the director of the. Division O of Operating Reactors. 6 0 Who is Mr. Stello's immediate superior? A Harold Denton, who is director of the Office of g Nuclear Reactor Regulation, g 0 Let's focus a little more n the events relating to g Three Mile Island. 33 Can you tell us when you first knew that an incident g or some problem might be Irising with respect to Three Mile 33 Island? 34 A Wednesday, March 28th, in the morning. 15 0 Do you know what time in the morning? 16 A About 8.:30; I was in Brian Grimes' office and he g got a call to go to the Incident Response Center--something 33 to do with Three Mile Island. )g O Do you know who called? go 189-5 318 a I m not sure. 3, I ~ What did you understand as being the information O relayed to Mr. Grimes during that telephone conversation? 23 A I saw him in his office. It wasn't a telephone .3,, conversation. He just said that he had to go to the Incident g3, A,--- o---..:. e--.---..

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r = ~1-1 ~~am- - - <~~~~-e-I 13 i 1 i Response Center, and it was Three Mile Island, and that l p was all. t 4 3 Q At that point did you do anything with respect to this? 4 I A No, I didn't do anything with that. I went about 5 l I 6 my business, normal day's work. i i Q When was your next involvement personally with the incident at Three Mile Island? g A About shortly after 9 o' clock, Eleanor Adenscm 9 who was the section leader of Section A, asked if she could l 10 use some of my people to d^ some dose calculations for I ti Three Mile Island, and I said yes, so we were doing ig calculations at that time, and also I did some work with h 13 I I my people on the dose calculations. This was in the morning j 34 of the 28th, about 9,- 1 0 o ' c l o c k. 15 k i Q After your conversation with Ms. Adensam, what did 16 i you do with respect to Three Mile Island? g A I didn't do anything other than what anyone needed i 3 some help on. I was trying to get some other work out. 19 0 Can you characterize for us your general involvement 20 throughout the day of Wednesday, the 28th? f@g6 3}9 2 A Yes. The questions kept getting more complicated 44 h ~~ ! as far as doses and radiation levels, and I went up to 3 Victor Stello's office in the same building where I am, 24 that is the Phillips Building, where Cleanor was to get 25 I j Acme Reporting Company

f - V M u .s a.3~r r u m a 2 --rwmx --- r.er wax nmumm-w ~n - m. 14 1 more firsthand information on what was going on. h 2 Victor Stello was at the Incident Response Center,' 3 so he was not in his office. I talked to her, checked what 4 g information she had, and we discussed it a little bit. 5 At that time, we did some dose calculations as far 6 as given a certain dose rate offsite, what might be the I releases or how out of the'. ordinary the radiation levels 6 were. It seemed like it was developing, so I stayed up in 9 Victor Stello's office starting about 11 o' clock. 10 Q That is 11:00 a.m.? 11 A On the 28th; I stayed in the office there with 12 the phone lines to the Incidence Response Center answering 13 g various questions as they'werc. phoned in to us of a 14 radiological nature, and at 4 o' clock, I went home in my 15 carpool because I needed to get them home, and came back 16 about six. 17 Q What was your impression at the outset? What was 18 your impression as to what was happening at TMI? 19 A At the very beginning, in the morning, I personally 20 did not know if this was a drill or if this was a real event. 1895 320 ,_1 O Why was that? 22 A I asked Eleanor and she didn't know, and she was h 23 closer to it than I was. I asked George Knighton and he 24 g s'id he didn't know, and he said it really didn't matter if 25 it was a drill or was not a drill. You respond in the same Acme Reporting Company

,h $!S$EEN3 W U93ddfdOf-hvm M W W R E T N ~~ - C 15 l 1 I I way. O Had there been instances in the past where you 2 would be called upon to respond in situations where it turned, 3 out to be a drill at a particular nuclear facility? 4 A I had never been directly involved in any incident 5 response actions at the NRC. 6 0 I see. Had others with whom you were speaking that morning been involved with past incidents? a A There was one other incident that was at Fort g St. Vrain which I believe was in '76 or '77 where there was 10 a reported high release rate of radioactivity, but there 33 really wasn't one. Eleanor was involved in doing some dose 32 calculations on that. 13 I was not usually on incident response things. 9 Eleanor would go before I would because I was more on the 33 systems side, and she was more on the hard accident analysis 16 and she had the emergency planning section, and she would 3 call me as she needed assistance. 33 0 Why did the thought strike you that this might be 39 1895~321 a drill, it might not be the real thing? 29 A Somebody had told me that there was supposed to be 23 an exercise of the Incident Re sconse Center sev 3ral Javs i D .n. t 23l just beforehand, and it had been postponed because various I management people could not attend. They were out of town g 24 25l or something, and I thought it might have been possible that Aema Rannrtina Comoony

.F l 36 i. l this was the drill that was described to me, and I had no 3d u ,l reason to believe otherwise, but again, it didn't matter if. .i l' I it was a drill or not a drill as far as the actions that we 3 4 lI did. ) i 5l Q How can you characterize your impression of the I state of the system at TMI on Wednesday? 6, I l -h A What dme Wednesday? It depends on very much what r 1i time. Was it early or late? -,1 e il 9h Q How about the morning when you first heard of the o problem? 13l A I guess around noontime it appeared that we knew i they had a turbine trip and a reactor scram, and that that 1., t i i there were some releases. 13, ') The reason we felt that there was some release, y l 15l they were getting some radiation levels of a few millirems l per hour in the parking lot, so consequently I felt they 16 were having some problem and having some releases, 3-That is basically the extent of our knowledge, that-isl igf Ve asked a lot of questions like what were the fail-fuel l monitors reading, but we didn't get any response back. 20 i895 622 2 Q To whom were you asking those questions? 1 A We would ask those via the telechone to Brian 3., y i Grimes who was in the Incident Resconse Center who then 3, f / s, Ye yL cze Aud a..<5e> pan nif cs.v...c. 4 p.Q. -c /L J ./via telephone could-talk to either Region 1, that is the y- .) King of Prussia, Philadelphia, or-to I believe they had an -s t n.J ^ Acme Reporting Company a w.u.

7 17 I open line to the site. 3 O Do you know why there was difficulty in getting t information or answers to your quesrions? 3 I ans A No, I do not know why. I assume just standsn9 4 ) communications problems they were having. We did start-- 5 Sometime the time 3 escape me now--this was four months ago. 6 C.</ in the morning there were discussions about some monitors 64, the dome monitor in the containment)around noontime or g 1 o' clock, as to the readings on that monitor. g During that afternoon, there were reports that the 10 monitor was reading 20,000 R per hour. 3 0 Were those reports, to the best of your knowledge, 37 from TMI itself? g A The information must have come from TMI. It had a g long pathway to get to us, but it must have come from there la. I believe. 16 There was some question was it a real reading? 1 There were many people who did not believe that was a true 13 reading, that the monitor wasn' t operable, so we did not 1g know exactly what the situation was. 20 Did this uncertai:. situation and your understanding O g of the uncertainty with respect to TMI persist throughout gg i895 323 the afternoon? A The uncertaintv as to whether it was a drill or not? ^ 24 (.) A The uncertainty as to the state of the system at TM: .0 Acme Reporting Company .a w .a......

18 I A Yes. We were uncertain as to exactly what the 2 ') situation was. We answered various questions as they were '. 3 phoned to us, and we did not have all of the information. 4 We just had small pieces of information. 5 There were others in the Incident Response Center 6 and onsite that knew far more than we did. We were just a I small auxiliary group off to the side doing specific tasks. a Q When you returned at 6:00 p.m. or thereabouts on 4 the evening of Wednesday, what did you do? 10 A I went back to Victor Stello's office and we were 11 involved in doing various tasks as they were phoned to us-- .o dose calculations, trying to keep abreast and figure out I3 .lj what was happening. We would get various information, dose rates here, dose rates there, that sort of thing, tried 14 15 to make assessments as to which monitor mightt be right, which monitors might be wrong. l 16 17 Q Would it be fair to characterize your r.' ole at that time as a responsive one where you would be asked to do a specific task and you would perform it and relay the ( 19 'O information back? ,i A That is correct. 4 .) --n i, Q How long were you back at the NRC af ter you returned - 23l at 6:00 p.m.? I895 324! I n4 A I stayed there until about 1 o' clock in the afternoon. 7) u I stayed all night and the next morning. Acme Reporting Company i . m....... i

19 1 Q Luring that period, did you stay within your 2 l offices? J 3 A !!o. About 11 o' clock at night Brian Grimes, who .) was at the Incident Response Center, went home, and I went 4 6 to the Incident Response Center to replace him. 6 Q Did you go at Mr. Grimes' recuest? 7 A That is correct. S Q When you arrived at the Incident Response Center, 9 what was the general atmosphere within that room or area? 10 A Very busy. The Incident Response Center had, I 11 don' t know, 10 to 20 people in it. It was physically very 12 hot I remember because the door was open and the fan was propped on the door blowing air into the room to try to cool 13 () 14 it down somewhat. 15 There were phones ringing. There were several squawk boxes, which is a telephone intercome box. There 16 17 was one of those working where the telephone message coming is in, which I believe was Region 1 or the site, I am not sure 19 which, was very soft, but the response back from the man on 20 the telephone was very loud and booming. It was a very busy 21 place. 1895 325 22 Q Was it a spacious room? ) 23 A It was a good-sized room. I don't know the 24 dimensions of the room. I think it was a littlt hit over-() 25 loaded when I was there, but people were functioning. There Acme Reporting Company .na, .a......

nw-urr: z=u==i x - e-=- = =- - - = - - - - l 20 I was inconvenience with various noise and people had made o J the best of the situation. They brought in some partitions 3 and put them around. Several people brought headsets so 4 / they could hear better to keep out some of the background 5 noise. 6 Q Did you have windows in the room at all? I A No. This is an inside room. There is no windows G at all. There is one window in the Incident Response Center. 9 That is generally called the technical side. There is a 10 window that goes into the EMT. That is the Executive 11 Management Team room. I believe that is what they call it. 16 There was a window so you could look into the other room 13 i,) and they could look at us and there was a doorway next to 14 the window and the doorway was always open so you could walk 15 in and out. 16 Q How was the Incident Response Center set up? II A There are two rooms. There is the Incident Response IS Center. Then there is the Executive Management side where 19 the management recole are. ~ ~ 1896 326 20 The Incident Response Center technical side had I i 21 ; believe four tables, one long table in the front where the i l l ) --n,i phone calls would all come in, and there the person who i u' l 23 administ.ratively ran it, who was Bernie Wiess, would sit i l I l') 24{ with several secretaries and an assistant who would direct 4 1 the chone calls to the right people--what I call the I Acme Reporting Company i I

i s 21 administrative table. pj b. 1 Then there was what I call the I&E That is the o ..) i 3 Office of Inspection and Enforcenent, operations table where-they had direct lines hooked into I believe Region 1, and E 4 d /4. ? as. j vf i I believe also to the siteh',,,t- -one e'cir another. There

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a were several people there, and then there was the 6 radiological table where the I&E radiological people operated l fr n, and that is where I went and sat with the I&E 6 I g radiological people. j i There was another table that was sort of a catch-all I 10 table that I know the state programs people used sometimes ti 12 and some of the I&E operations people also used. 13 The Incident Response Center is operated by the Office of Inspection and Enforcement. 14 NRR people in the Incident Response Center are 15 basically there to assist the I&E people so when I went 16 $n ie t s k. there, I talked with Jim In:${i% who is an I&E director of fa./ Pia ll.nq l 2nkn t) Sig.Nmpdin p some thit.g--er--othe r. He w'as the head of I&E radiolo ical. g I said how do you want me to function? aat can I. r ig do to help? It was a rather informal organization. I.would-20 )M5 @ do whatever some. basically asked of me. s 21 Q You indicated the phones were ringing when you i O were there. Can you tell us a little more about what the 23 noise level in the room was? .y ) 25 A I don't remerber phones ringing real loud, but it A.:m e Reporting Company l

22 i was just general office noise, but it was I guess fairly 6 louder than most offices. I have worked in much worse o 3 places than that,but it was loud. You could think. Whee. I _ycs'

• C ' ad, ((t was loud enough that you put a hand over g

4 5 your other ear when you talked on the telephone. I guess 6 that might be indicative of the noise level. You could carry on a conversation with somebody without difficulty if you g put your hand over the other ear. 9 0 You also indicated that the squawk box was very to loud when the information was coming in I believe, 11 very soft as it was going out. How was the information flow between TMI and the 12 Incident Response Center, to the best of your knowledge? 13 h A Okay. There were many telephone lines in the y Incident Response Center and,the EMT. The ones that I 15 f~:2., % s dL &~ J l'yhRt gm was most familiar withf t e direct lineftotheE&Ioperations 16 table, They had one person with a pair of headsets on who 3-would listen and write things down, and then they had other is people that would gather around the squawk box to listen ig to what the talker on the other end was saying. They were 20 21l a major source of information to me. 1895 328 "j In addition, on the radiological table we had m D telephones that we would talk to various people at the site, 23q! 24l the radiological people at the site, and at Region 1 or any [) I 23 other places we needed to call. We would call from those Acme Reporting Company i 2n,,,....

23 i telephones, so it was telephone communication. We would 3 make the calls ourselves and receive calls, and the I&E i 2 operati ns people had open lines. 3 0 Was there any difficulty sometimes in hearing the j 4 i message that was coming in? 5 A If I was on the telephone, no, I could hear it 6 coming in all right. Q Okay. When you arrived that evening at the g cMer.t ?,e sponse CeMer WM w. hor. E you speak to Md 9 ut the situation at TMI? 10 A There was no formal shift change or anything like 33 that. When I got there, I spoke with Brian Grimes and he g briefeu me as to what he knew was happening and I talked to ) 13 the various I&E people, and they would tell me what was 4 hsppening. 13 0 What did Mr. Grimes tell you, if you recall? 16 A I don't remember at this stage. It was probably g technical things, what various monitors were reading, what 3g monitors they thought were working and what ones were not. 1g O Did his conversation relay to you any cause for gg a greater sense of urgency with respect to the on. going 3 i i 'l problems at the plant? 95 329 g A No. We thought it was a fai:ly minor release. It 23 was fairly minor as far as a major 7.ccident situation. Doses b .,4 were fairly low, and they were all basically onsite at that 3., Acme Reporting Company .au,ss.a...

1. Muum -

a;,n,n !.s i l 24 i I time. We were starting to get some offsite readings. I can 3 try to look up some times if you wish. 0 If you"can approximate the times that would be 3 l fine. I A Generally of f site readings were less than one 5 i '<R per hour. About at 1930 on the 28th, we had a reading 6 of 12 MR per hour at the Harrisburg Airport. That was when j it was reported. I am not sure that was the time we had g l received the information. o~l There were during that evening various numbers, with' g 1 varbus offsite sourcas. The Office of I&E kept records of 33 I these things and I am sure they are available. 3; i Q Was it during that evening that you received the i 33 information from the plant with respect to the sample of 14

3 primary coolant they had taken?

16 A No. This was Wednesday evening, Wednesday night we I t-are talking. During Wednesday day, we had various pieces l I si of information coming in that we were digesting. ? l 19l One of the things we had been asking for all along i

i was a sample of the primary coolant so we could try to fetermine how much radioactivity was in the coolant which g

would indicate the amount of fail fuel that we had and the amount of core damage. i895 330 We could not get samplec taken. The word we got g back for the reason was the radiation levels were too high and Acme Reporting Company

• A m.; m

_.2,. x, m __ - - - - ,) 25 f people would become overexposed trying to obtain the samples. We did obtain some information that, samples that were taken carly Wednesday morning before 7 o' clock that indicated 3 that fairly small amounts of fuel damage, less than 1 percent fuel damage, had occurred. 4 5 0 You speculated concerning the degree of fuel damage 6 based upon the information on the primary ccolant? 7 A That we had early in the =crning, assuming tha t--we e were not aware ofthe fact that on-going fuel danage was 9 happening during Wednesday day, We assumed that any damage that had happened had happened early and things should be 11 decreasing, but we were informed the core was covered, at 12 least I had thought it had, though I think cther people at 13 the Response Center on the systems side may have had more 14 information than I did. 15 We were trying to look at the radiation monitor 16 information that we did have and try to make scme sense out 17 of that as to what the current conditions were, kept pushing i is trying to get primary coolant samples taken during Wednesday and Thursday. 20 0 Did you have any cause for 'celief during Wednesday 21 and Thursday that the situation at TMI was deteriorating? 22 A No. I didn't think it was detericrating,though B what was the big question was why the offsite doses were 24 i just up and down with no seeming logic to it. The activity ,5 l }09b 33! Acme Reporting Company

26 was coming from somewhere. I guess it was probably late Wednesday, Thursday morning we established some theories as to what might be happening, that they were keeping the reacto: coolant letdown system in cperation, and they were bringing primary ccolant, which always contains some of the a radioactivity, into the auxiliary building, and that there was various leaks in the letdown system, in the makeup system which pumped the primary coolant back into the g reactor system. 9 That would allow some radioactivity to escape into g the building atmosphere which the ventillation systems then swept that radioactivity out into the environment after it passed through filters. g We were concerned about any leaks in containment, 14 and we always cuestioned that. We were told that the 15 JY L containment was, the atmospheric pressure was slightly o 16 a IJ11Opbt #1C. sub-radicar+ 4 :p pressure, so we weren't too concerned about 1, I' radioactivity escaping that way. O Did you have other concerns or are these basically the theories you had postulated? .g A We were concerned about occupational exposure for 3 people in the plant. We were concerned with offsite doses, l h trying to get a hand on were these significant or were they .a 3l small. We were trying to get an understanding of what was t,' happening. That was our biggest problem. We didn't l 1895 332 l Acme Reporting Company m........

.,.....,s,n... u ~ 27 understand why we should be getting these kind of 3 radiatien readings. Also one thing that did happen Wednesday evening, J, the problem with the water on the floors is probably worth 4 l mentioning. It was reported that, we knew that water had 5 g tten on the containment floor from the pressurizer power 6 cl operatc relief valve, and that the sump pumps were reported I to us to have been on earlier in the accident and pumped some of that water on to the auxiliary building floors and g flooded the building floors to a depth of an inch or so of g water, and this water was highly radioactive, with a direct g gamma measurement in the 10 R per hour range over puddles on g the floor, and the licensee had isolated the sump pumps so g that was not occurring any more. g We were to find out later that the major reason for la. that activity was not the sump pumps, but something else, but g i we were concerned about that. We had learned about that g chronologically when I was home changing cars about 6 o'clocP g, that evening. .g 4 1895 331 Q This is Wednesday evening? .,g ( A This was Wednesday evening because I had a call 3, i d O at home about the sump pumps being lin2d up. That happened s, d i d before 7 o' clock in the morning, so that just is indicative i l ,3 I gl of how long it took sometimes to get information. 0 When you were there on Thursday, did any change in 25 Acme Reporting Company

I 28 l circumstances or information arrive tlat would alter your assessment of the situation at the plant? A Yes. Thursday I went home at 1 o' clock in the 3 afternoon on Thursday, tried to get some sleep, and I got 4 a call about 6 o' clock that evening frcm Stewart Bland, who 5 wou!ld reliev( me, hs .1 saying that they had obtained a primary 6 i I coolant sample, and the only information they had was I ~ radiation measurements taken on the sample using hand-held 3 survey meters, which is a very crude way of determining the 9 radioactivity, but it was the best they had, and he had the 30 radiation reading of over 1,000 R per hour contact on a g 100 milliliter sample. He asked me to help him convert that 13 in ?c ri into milsicurie per milliliter, which is a determination of 13 radioactivity concentration in the water. a The amount of radioactivity in the water would 13 be indicative of the amount of failed fuel and the amount g of core damage that had occurred. These were extremely g high numbers, much greater than what we thought we would see, 3 i which was indicative of that we had severe core damage with r 39 y,j possibly the rupture of most of the pins in the core, with y l: +N chW n9 the release of substantial amounts of radioactivity [ f895 33 I performed a quick calculation using a little

2 card I kept in my wallet from my days eight years ago at

_s ,i

4 j General Dynamics that I also kept as a handy conversion table l

Jn iC Vc P'r to calculate out the millicurief. milliliter concentration.

i i

1 Acme Reporting Compony i . :o.......

a. All we could say w'as it was greater than 10 to l i in ? crc ~ the fourthymitbicurie per milliliter. e C /C T) I had to base this on Cobalt 60, which was the -J Je Tt wculd isotope we worked with in the Naval Ship Yard,whe: 4 ):/ H Q) b873ITferent for Three Mile Island, which would have a i 5 different spectrum. 6 some information an hour or so after We later got concerning the sample which was one milliliter of the sample I 3 i had a radiation reading of 100 MR per Four at a distance of I g one meter from the sample. 10 this would Again making a cuick calculation, it y; IL tl indicate a concentration of about 10 to the fifth skilicurie 12 per milliliter. g That would be higher than the earlier calculation? Q y That was higher than the earlier calculation. A 15 Was the second information concerning the radio-0 16 activity of the primary coolant more reliable than the first? g-You get a better reading if you have a small A Yes. IS sample a distance away from the meter. ig You indicated a moment ago that.this information 0 20 indicated to you that there might be " severe core damage." gi You Can you be a little more specific on that? w h indicated there would be damage to the pins? j@}$ }}} A What I mean by severe core damage was that the 24 fuel which consists of about 200 bundles of pins, each 23 Acme Reporting Company . m..a......

x-- 30 1 bundle would have about 200 pins in a bundle, that the core 2 had everheated enough that these pins had probably burst t or fractured cpen & dor allowed the radioactive fission products 3 that are normally contained within the pins to escape into 4 5 the primary coolant. 6 What I mean by severe is we had significant core 7 fractions of radioactivity probably in the water. What S I mean by significant is maybe over half of the nobel gases and probably substantial fractions, by substantial fractions 9 to I mean maybe in the 10 percent range, of radioactive iodines 11 or other fission products; a considerable amount of core 12 inventory was out into the primary coolant. 13 Q Explain one thing for me that I am not clear on. 14 You would have the primary coolant, as I understand it, I and you would get a measurement as to its radioactivity? 15 16 Is that accurate? 17 A That is correct. IS Q And then after you perform your calculation, you micr2 1 19 would have a reading of ten to the fourt of metiscurie? 2') A Per milliliter concentration. i' 21 O How do the two figures relate to each other? If f l 22 the first one indicated radioactivity, what. does the l i second one indicate? 1895 336 i l A While they both are figures of the quantitative I amount of radioactivity that is in the primary coolant, the m Acme Reporting Company .nz,..4... i

31 higher the direct radiatiot from the sample, tha greater the activity concentration within that sample because you have, 2 a known volume. 3 O So it is just a more. specific analysis or an 4 assessment of the radioactivity? 5 A That is correct. 6 Q Okay. Now if you can explain it in layman's terms, how do you go about making this calculation? You indicated 3 that vou used a conversion factor contained on a card for 9 Cobalt 60. Could you be a little more specific there? 30 A That was an empirical formula. What we used to do 11 in the shipyard--I have to go back a little bit. When I was 33 at General Dynamics, one,of my duties was to respond to 13 incident response drills. We never had an incident at the 34 shipyard, but we had periodic drills,and one of the things I 33 had done was a card made for the various other radiological 16 g engineers that we could use as a crutch to perform on-the-spot quick calculations. You didn't have time to have ig access to computers or calculators and that sort of thing. i 19 I i What we had surmised may happen in some situation 29, i is that you might have a spill and you would quickly take j 21 -5 a sample in a bottle and want to be able to assess what that -a ti 23 l T.eant as far as pecple drinking the water or fishing the 24 water or whatever, so what we did is we took a sample of j 25l water and spiked, put a known amount of radioactivity in it

395 337 Acme Reporting Company s

32 i and measured it with a hand-held survey meter and were able i to say for so many millirems per hour on the survey meter, e 0 we would correspond to a specific radioactivity concentration 3 1 in the bottle. I was able to use that conversion which is 4 good for a particular isotope, Cobalt 60, to approximate 3 what concentration we had for Three Mile Island. 6 For the second analysis, very crude analysis, but 1 analysis nonetheless of the one millileter sample, we used 3 a rule of thumb for Cobalt 60 that one curie would yield a o. radiation level of one R per hour, one meter, from a point

o A one milliliter sample is sufficiently small from source.

31 5 ,,i an engineering point of view to consider a point source, so that is how we calculated the 10 to the fifth number. , s-I Q Do you consider these conversion factors to be y I i fairly reliable or not? g A The order of magnitude could be off by a factor of l ic i J gl 10 either way. If anything, we might have been low because l o Cobalt 60 puts out a higher energy than the spectrum that we l 3 cv l 9-would expect to see at Three Mile Island; in the power e reactor accident we would expect to see basically radioisotopes

. 1 t

cfiodineandradioactivenobk[gasesofXenon. I These have i t 10Wer energy emissions per disintegration than Cobalt does, I so the conversions don't go exac-ly together, but it probably }89h,3h 3 was not underestimated. O Would vou consider this conversion factor to be t I { 1 j Acme Reporting Company i 1 i '202) f29 4989

=,,c _ 33 4 reliable if you were having a Cobalt 60 problem or release? A Probablv within a factor of 2. o O Then you think that, if I could characterize what you have said, that it would be on the conservative side when we are considering releases of Xenon or nobel gases, a i i but it could be offset by a facter of 2 or up to a factor O of 10? A It could be offset by a factor of 10. For the i 3 one milliliter sample, which gave the 100 millirems per hour 9 1 l at one meter for Cobalt 60, I calculated 10 to the fifth 10 541 ((t'$ .=t1 -icurie per CC. Since the fission product spectrum 11 l gives a lower energy than the Cobalt would, the concentration - was probably greater than 10 to the fifth, maybe up to, ar the time I thought it could be as high as maybe a factor of I 10, so if someone were to specifically say what was it, I i lo, I would erobably sav between 10 to the fifth and 10 to the i 16 i sixth. 1_, l At this stage of the game, with the information we 1, g ,I had, if we were in a factor of 10 on a calculation, we felt j 19 i pretty good about that. ,o O Did you feel that even with the margin of error with l respect to your calculations you could still reasonably .. q i conclude this was highly radioactive materia ~.? n 1 i - 1895 339 A Oh, yes. 34 l Q When you had this calculation, what did you do with f I l Acme Reporting Company

a. 34 1 it after you calculated the radioactivity of this? 2 A These calculations--I was at home. I was not at 3 the Incident Response Center at that time. This is probably 4 between 6 o' clock and 10 o'cicck. 5 Q On Thursday night? 6 A Yes, on Thursday night; Stu Bland and Brian Grites l l 7 were in the office so I assumed that this information was 5 beine passed on to the EMT so they knew that we had I I 9 i significant amounts of failed fuel. 10 When I came in about 11 o' clock that evening, I 11 knew that everybody knew that we had real hot primary 12 cooling sample and had a lot of failed fuel. 13 Q When you arrived.at the Incident Response Center 14 at 11 o' clock Thursday night, was the atmosphere within 15 the center changed from when you were there previously? 16 A It was about the same. It might have been a little i l 17 less noisy. People had improvised more. They turned the I ~ time. I think it was a 15 scuawk box off I renenber at that l r 19 little more quiet. People were getting more used to it, but 5 i I 20 I think people were getting more tired, too. Maybe that i 1 O Q.4 Ifn IU/J J7U was one reason they were quiet. " ;1 22] O Were you getting different information from TMI i J 2-frcr what you had received earlier at that point? i I 24 - A We had more information at that time. Again, in i 25 ' the various radiction level readings, we had been getting Acme Reporting Company i m.:......

^ 3gg.y m n.

w =. _.,-- - I 35 i f some information from some of the DOE, Department of i

ln Energy contractors who were flying the helicopter flights,

~ l I phoning in information, concerning' radiation levels offsite f l l 3 and some of our inspectors were phoning in radiation levels, j 4 l so we were getting lots of data ccming in, and we were trying' 5 to assess that data. 6 Also we used this data to determine what the maximum radiation levels were offsite to people. Mr. De nton f had asked on Thursday morning, which Wedne sday night I had g I i to prepare estimates of maximum individual doses and total g, ~n,~ population doses about 6 o' clock Wednesday morning, and also it I did it--excuse me--6 o' clock Thursday morning, and also i: I 6 o' clock Friday morning I briefed Mr. Denton and Mr. John g Davis, who was the acting director of the Office of y i Inspection and Enforcement. g 0 Can you tell us generally what the information that 16 you relayed concerning dose estimates was on that Thursday i-l l and Friday morning? 3, A I can tell you for Thursday morning. For Thursday 19 .. 1 morning, I told Mr. Denton that the maximum individual dose l was well under 500 millirem for any individual. My best estimate was 100 millirem range. I also estimated the l population dose could be less than 2,000 man-rems for a'50 l a' mile radius over the last 24 hours. 1895 341 d 25, O That was the information you relayed on Thursday f L' 1 Acme Reporting Company 1 L

W6iQQQ'M,5k%lW?ltJtiWAMatt2fs%CEe&Mn%2 kitW@%%%22tLY~TJ 36 i i morning? 4 I l A That is correct. Friday morning, I do not have a copy of what I gave them. It should be in the log book-- 3 l '... + 'about ten copies to various people. My recollection was the t i ^ population doses had gone up. It was less than 3,000 man-rems- .o again conservatively calculated, and the maximum individual 6; dose I think was something less than 300 millirem at that time. It was just small amounts of radioactivity that was y being released, but it wasn't large amounts to be concerned 9: I about that we had to do.nything other than we just wanted 30 ] 13 to try to get them stopped somehow. 0 When you relayed this information, are you saying 12 i I that there wasn't a great sense of urgency or a great sense 33 that we had an imminent problem? 14 i A That is correct. There was no immediate concern 15 that we needed to do something or anything like that. 16 i There was no significant risk to the oublic. n i g Q Was Mr. Gossick at the Incident Response, Center 1895 342 at that time?

p 20l A

He was there a lot. I don't remember when. At I 2: ! one of the briefings he was there. I remember I gave him I a cocy. He was there most of the time. He was there a lot. u 1 4 23; I don' t know exactly when he was there and wasn' t there. I i 2;! O At this time did you have a better sense as to what l' 'I was going on at the plant? Before you indicated you had to 25 I I -l Acme Reoortino Comoony

4w-37 postulate some theories as to what the problems might be. 3 I A We were getting more, the information we were s. i I v cetting was bearing out more of the theories that it was e i I leakage from the letdown system that was going into the l 4 building air. We were following things like pumping the 3 water of f the floor and getting it into tanks that would 6 decrease the rate of radioactivity evolution out of the 3j water which was a primary concern we had. I Also the licensee was putting down sheets of g plastic over the floor in which they pumped the water off to g u-ia attempt to minimize the amcunt of iodine that would dr4f.t u off the floor. y We were concerne,d with lodine,always being very g concerned about, with the iodine level in the environrent n going up because we had no effluent information. Effluent 15 monitors, these are radiation monitors that determine the 16 amounts of radioactivity being released from the plant, g were all off scale high, so we didn't have any useful g information from those. 9 We would do things if it started to rain--be sure

9

] the state inspector would take.eamples of rain water and 2: 3

I also look for rain that might wash the iodine out of the i

air on to the grass where it would become picked up in the l

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CLllS.

i cow mik chill

d pathway.

}h9h 343 I I

5 Q

Did you have any information at that time with i I, I l Acme Reporting Company .na,.> a..

u. to the valve letdown of the primary coolant? respect what

}

A Yes. That is when I of ten asked the I&E operations i i I people, and the letdown was very variable. Sometimes it was-3 At other times it was higher-- f4 just a few gallons a minute. i i 20, maybe 30 gallons a minute. The licensee was having 3 trouble with plugging in the letdown line so the letdown 4, flow was very erratic. The best estimates were between 10 1 i ^ and 20 gallons per minute, was-- t> l i l 0 To the best of ycur knowledge, did I&E get their 3 J I information concerning the letdown flow directly from TMI? f p I A I do not know. They got information frc T31, 7 y l believe sometimes and got it from Region 1 sepa*4 res. l i g{ C When you determined the estimate of the flow to be t. between 10 and 20, did you simply take into accotnt the f i, readings that you had and add them up and divide them by I l .J the number, or was there some other c.rocess? .,j a 0 A I didn' t estimate the 10 to 20, I was told the i 3 i I 10 to 20 by the I&E people. t.. G Okay. You have described the situation thus f ar early on Friday morning. As I understand it, on Friday'

ning the situation changed.

1896 344 Could you begin addressing that subj ect? f A Okay. One of the things that we had bee. working f it c:c a - v C U:) I L s Crior to late Friday m6rnih~g, was getting the ICE

ntractor who was going to receive the primary :0olant 5

r I i .[ Acme Reporting Company a ,ae,,.>......

r s 39 sample to do a spectrum analysis on that sample so we would 3 have a better handle on axactly what isotopes were in the sample to better determine core conditions, so we had carried 3 GNC on several conversations with Bettis people, the people to 4 analyze those samples, t a i i one of the primary things we were concerned with g was where the radioactivity was coming from to be sure that all possible actions were being taken to minimize the 3 release of radioactivity. g -v e d In conversEEp with the I&E people in the Incident 19 Response Center /related to the site,)about any ideas that 11 t we had or recommendations that could shed light upon the

.; t situation to them so they could maybe relay in to the 33 licensee, h$ incuired several times about the filter systems 34 as to were thev ocerating.

l J4'p/./ftrj 1 *-

v. c awI iv >.<:?: w w 4-n C-i The air samples upstream and downstreamj \\t6 got 16 basically very little information back thAtjthey couldn't 3

an6Ihe air was going through the charcoal 3 get samples c I filters. 19 20 0 When you speak of the filters, do you know whether it was those that are related to the waste gas decay tanks er [a 2 i895 345 others? a /' A No. The releases to date were coming out from i N 24 j various leaks from the letdown system, the makeup system, I t snr 23l and what we call the reactor cooleng bleed tanks that were l Acme Reporting Company a a. n.....

- A A-yfy ;fd6fAtvUIaSM4 mea.d<hwhaV1%_h4sfJEUdiF%~JN4 MEW.ific i 40 I part of that system where liquid is ;ometimes stored in it, i 2 and it was, radioactivity was stored in those tanks during., 3 the activity of the various floor drain sumps. Also we are probably evolving some radioactivity 4 l 5 through building air. The building air is collected by a j i I 6 building ventilation system, and exhausted through special 7 filters to remove radioactive materials. 'lI These filters contain a charcoal bed which will 9 remove any,radiciodines,. -Most of the radiciodines in the Wt c), atio > c< air,}andjalsotwosetsofparticulatefilters, these.have 10 ! I so m. Il special filters that we call HEPA--high ef ficiency particulate' The releases were being filtered. l7 i The waste 12 air filters. i 13 gas decay tanks can be released.by cpening special valves 14 and those tanks would be released to the environment also i 1; through its own separate HEPA and charcoal filter, but there 16 were no releases from the gas tanks to the environment C through the entire accident through that pathway. t i i B We assumed that for all the nobel gas that we were i i 19 ' seeing, we would be having radioicdine u. leases to the l

I

/ f.'i #g 3 environment, but we were not seeing any,in the environmental i samples, and we were very concerned about that becoming a i =a:or pathway. jpg m We figured we were probably not seeing it because i 4 ' "e charcoal filters were filtering the air. We ?.id have I l i- ~ problems and we were advising people that many of the iodine t-s ,\\9.u,.y:,s/ .i Acme Reporting Company I

a, w 4 41 ' L G,y Hjudd cj} l 1! samples that were being taken offsite werel erroneously i 2 high because nobel gas was contaminating the whole 4 I cartridge and giving people readings that were being o 4 J j interpreted as radiciodines but in reality they were nobel 4 gases, so we interpreted many of the reported high iodine 5 6h numbers offsite as not being real numbers. ~ hl Another thing we were asked about many times was hr - t the status cf the waste gas decay tan'-:s. When they were letting down the primary coolant from the primary coolant 9 Mi svstem, the water would enter into a tank called the makeup l 11 tank. The makeup tank has to operate at a lower pressure 12 than the primary ctolant system, normally 5C PSI, where U the primary coolant system would run at 2,000 PSI, so that any gases would come out of the primary coolant as the H "- t pressure was reduced in the makeup tank and these gases M would have to go some place. t' I' The normal system is any gases that evolve out of the primary coolant as it is sprayed into the makeup tank t ml enters into a piping arrangement called the vent header "h J , ;i system, and the vent header system connects to a waste, gas -r =% y~ i. compressor, and the compressor would compress the gas in n -' 9 waste gas header and put it into a large tank called the waste gas decay tank, which is a tank that could take a t "q 3 l ll ?ressure up to over 100 PSI and store the radioactive i

l i

.x ~ f s ses-i895 347 \\ j, Acme Reporting Compony 1 an.a.a...

~- n = m -- q 42 ' l, Under normal reactor ocerations, one tank is j a other l aligned to receive gases from the makeup tank, and the 2 '; h ,[ tank is left isolated with gas from the previous time such a, the that you get several months decay such that a radioactive gases would decay away and the gas in the tank o ~ would be released to the environment through filters at I t 6 .h incensequential levels because the radioactivity had all i i 1 6 ?, decayed away. e i We were concerned about the gas that would be going l ci - l but we knew under the failed fuel conditions co these tanks, i 1 10 that we had, based on the primary coolant sample, that the j i,

1 gas entering the waste gas decay tanks was highly radioactive !.

i

2 ;

and we were concerned that these tanks had enough capacity l i

3l 1

to keep receiving this gas, that we would not have this gas

4 f

4, being released directly to the environment. l ,3 l Nl As long as it was being stored in the waste gas decav tank, it would not be released. We knew the licensee l i i i 1 l had plans underway to hook a temporary connection to allow l 1 hi I the waste gas decay tank to be vented back inside the i f l It was very logical that you had a i containment building. f Cn 4h4 - l building and it was a tight lot of radioactive air in the.3 " l building, subatmospheric pressure, to put the radioactivity ,, \\ back in the containment, and then you could use the other tank to keep receiving this and basically run the ra'dioactippe i .l 1 3 t ,; J back to containment again. 1895 348-I ~ t h Acme Reporting Company va na, a......

!)i 43 I i t I We could never seem to get any firm information 1 i !d I .,f cn the status of the waste gas decay tanks. O Do you know why? i 0 j II A I don't know why. I think it was a matter of 4 cc=munications. We would get numbers now and then, but get i t I , ij different numbers. 1 . i. O Did you ever learn whether they did establish o I this pipe to vent material from the waste gas decay tank t'.ek into containment? . o o 'I 'l A They did I believe. They finally did th.t Friday g d

j afternoon.

It was used, buc it was a fairly 1cng task to o 'oI put it in because people had to work in highly radioactive m i-y;' areas with protective equipment en, and had very limited stay a .a 'lll times because of the high radiation levels insice the hi,,l i t auxiliary 4evel.d' i g Q How would the utility have known if the capacity - !;t 4 in the waste gas decay tanks had been used? ., j i 4 A There were pressure gauges on the waste gas decay .4 .i 1 3q tanks such that as you kept adding gas to the tanks, the U pressure would keep rising. You would eventually reach the 't i design pressure of the tank. To protecu the tank, there are relief valves on the .p waste gas decay tanks which would lift at a ceftain set pressure before the tank would rupuure to protect the tank under any transient conditions. 1895 349 Acme Reporting Company i a:a,.a.....

Qf$&M@t&Md%GGW"W+%hw*4Mhtm:PEi?F* SizM Ml2 M ilkM M T_ d L, l ji 0 Chis would lift autcmatically? 2 A Automatically. They are spring-loaded valves thats j '3[ you would have to go to the valves to try to stop them from u i O 4 ii opening. i n 1 5i O Would that have been feasible under these situations?; i e A Probably not. They were located in an excessively li 1p hich radiation level area. I am not exactly sure where they

i i/ are, but there was ne discussion about trying to gat to those s

l I 9: valves, so we were concerned constantly through this since i 10 Wednesday about the status of those tanks. i 11 Q Eut at this time had you ever heard reports from 12 i the utility indicating that those tanks no longer had 13f, capacity? I l 14 A No. There were always numbers like 50 PSI. I t 15l don' t remember now what the relief pressures are, something l RC

6i like maybe JO, but they were below the set pressures on the 17 relief valves.

l 19i We also looked at the various system diagrams to t i 19 o determine "what if" cuestions. One of the "what if" ~ i !I I 20 cuestions we looked at was what if you lif ted the relief i l valves, where would the gas go? We pulled the drawings cut 21 ,, 4 -- 1 and they would bypass the filters and would go straight up ,, 4 the vent stack, released into the environment, so any l releases from the tanks would bypass the filters. i 896 3 0' -' q f ^; l 0 You had drawings of the TMI facility with you in f Acme Reporting Company

m. 3 no t the Incident Response Center? i I' I l Ihat is correct. j n C When you say we looked at them-- 1 s i l i A We--myself and some of the I&E operations peco.le e I 4 and other radioloc.ical c. eoc. le. 5' Q Did your information change at some point? 'o 1 A Yes. On Friday morning, just a couple of minutes !) .i ,l before 9, not very much befo. e 9, one of the engineers at i t . q'i the I&E operations desk, that was the fellow who had the s m- ! lines, called me over and said he had some information chone + on the waste gas system for me because he was one of the .4 fellows I had been talking with all through the night as to t i. the status of the system. N p Q Who was this person, do you remember?

4,1 A

I do not remember his name. I know who he is.

s i There are various people at various times.

I could find 1

s t

out I suppose. l ? i ) Q Fine. 8 M! j A One thing, you never ask poople 's names necessarily. t ,4 . l You know who they were, and you talk to each other, you j knew the names and the f aces, but thev didn' t necessarily go i. 1896 351 together. i Slightiv before 9, he mentioned he had some I. w

. we I

i information, so I watksd-over since his table was four feet e t t 1 6 Irem my table. I just moved my chair over and he said he i A::me Reporting Company ji ,,,,..4...

=Mgg gf W uc_auwwa M W w mar,=wMm+wun w I 46 had just received information from some place, the some i 3 . ; place was probably Region 1, but it could have been straight i p 1 from the site. I' m not sure. 3 O He 'didn' t mention with whom he spoke? I, i l A He just said I have this information en the wacte o gas system, so I did not question where his information came 6 h U from. I \\\\ I n 'l -ey His information was that the makeuo tank cressure t, '.h anc it had to be vented, which would be what hac risen, -3 l i the physics would have to be as time goes on, as you kept I ,g ' 1 l i the letdown happening. n I The gas was being vented to the waste gas vent I ,3! header, and the waste cas comoressors were on and were l [ nl pumping the gas from the waste gas vent header into the waste gas decay tanks, that the waste gas decay tanks were 3: 1

,3 !

now full and could not receive any more gases, and that l I l l the relief valves on the waste gas decay tanks were open and l l l .e - consecuently letting the gas that was being pumped into 4 the waste gas decay tank from the makeuptank to be allowed

9 y

t0 he released directly to the environment. This would l I I bypass the filters and go on out. 1895 352 i O Would this have been the first discharge of radioactivity from the plant that you know of that was i i unfiltered? f El A Yes. There might have been very, very small amounts I i n t [ Acme Reporting Company

n * " --

==-- m.w.a wq., rpprmirrar w=:-s n - n s .~~ 47 i of radioactivity that came frcm the primary, secondary leak h i J l Those ,'i we had earlier exiting through the turbine building. f This was much, much higher. i were not significant whatsoever. I } Q Given the fact that there was a steady letdown of I

l some quantity, was it your assessment that this discharge i

3 ;J i d" could continue or would it be sporadic? f i that this was /- j A This is one of the major concerns, I o that before I a significa..t change in the status of the plant, i i we had had gases leaking to the auxiliary building through a il various little leaks around seals, leaking valves, this sort cf thing. i Now we had a direct path that unless you stop t il the letdown or could get the pipe hooked back to containment, there was no way you were going to be able to stop this. i i We discussed a li ttle bit abouu how could you stop We didn't have any collective answers on how to stop 3i l i- ; it other than reduce the letdown. I I We knew letdown was important because you needed to e

i i

] have the letdown running to keep the main coolant pumps j .g l cperating and the operation of the main coolant pumps was I this stage because you wanted.to keep l Very important at M\\ b forced flow through the core to keep the core cook, scJhou -could cool through the steam generators. -1896 353 l It wasn' t clear if you could run a main coolant 4 I, pump without letdown "ithout damaging the main coolant pump l I t i[ Acme Reporting Company

_ %>-7-iRNJidtWM23MSEWiWFM1f?MMhWBJLK^22M13GM-G1MR???t.TEj.fMi; 48 1 shaft seals, and if you damaged the seal, you may not be able l i 4 o l to run the pump. 1 3 O Did you suggest to anyone directly or indirectly 4 that they perhaps should reduce or shut down the letdown? 5 A I did not. I am not sure if any of the I&E pe ple 6 did or not. I think there was a discussion. We discussed i i 7 the alternatives en the letdown. It is hard to tell. I 5 I am not sure. It is obvious that if this 9 situation was happening, that the TMI people, the licensee, 10 were. aware of it, and that they were assessing the situation 11 that they had and would try to minimize the release in any 12 way they could without--maybe that was the lesser of the fj 13 evils, depending on what the situation was at the plant. 14 What I did do was try to assess what the consequences 15 of that might be. I just quickly in about 30 seconds time 16 made a calculation of how many curies per second would be 17 coming out of the makeup tank and being transferred directly IS to the environment based on the concentration of radioactivity 19 in the primary coolant sample. i 1895 354l 20 Q And based upon the estimated flow? 21 A I asked them what the flow was, and he said between 22 10 and 20 gallons a minute. I used 10 because it was a l t 23 round number and I could do it without a calculator, so I 3 24 multipled the numbers together and came out with a release 1 25 rate of about, the number was 63 curies per second, and I i i 4 A<,. D a n n 4. a ranannu

49 don't know if I said anything, but I turned around and 3 l John Davis who was the acting director of the office of 3 3 I&E who normally was in the EMT was standing by my shoulder,- l h* $^ia iS "hiS "** i"f =^*i "? I **id Y**' it *^5 0 4 5 information different than what we had before concerning 6 the status of the waste gas system. dbw He said why don ' t you come in the EXT and tell ;wr-about it. 3 Q When you computed the 63 curies per second, did g you again use the card with the conversion for Cobalt 60? 10 A No. I didn't need the card. It was just straight 33 10 gallons a minutes, and you multiply by 500 to convert to 3g counds rer hour, and convert from hours to seconds, times } 3 i fif th millicuries per sac /I:!.'h% In 10 to the end. 34 Q It is a rather simple calculation? 10 A It is a simple calculation. 16 Q When you came up with the reading of 63 curies per second, was that your assessment of the amount of g radioactivity that would be leaving the plant? ig A With the tanks full and the release valves opening, 40 1 I that was what was coming down, that would probably eventually 73 go back. It might have been a little bit on the high side, gg i but probably not too much--depends upon the temperatures in: '3 ~ 1896 355 the makeup tank. ) 24 ,a. I Q This would have been an assessment right at the plant _ 1 Acme Reporting Company I a,........

.I 50 1 l t release coint? I I gy 2 A Okay. This would have gone out, what came out of j i 3 the makeup tank would have gone we felt to the release tank. Q

Okay, ye. Davis indicated that you might share your g

4 t 5 calculation and information with people in the EMT? I A That is correct, so I went with him into the EMT 6 l 1 and he said tell the people in the EMT what is going on. l 3 0 what time was this on Friday morning again? l A This was a couple of minutes after 9. g l O Okay. When you entered the EMT, who was there? io A Okay. I don't remember everybody who was in the l 13 EMT. I would estimate there were 10 to 20 people in the 12 fg 13 EMT, and they were all located around a horseshoe type table. 1,. Q They were all seated? 15 A I think everybody was seated. Some people got up. 16 There was a lot going on in the room. I was back by the g door which was at a corner of the horseshoe, not the center 33 so I could see everybody, so I--had -f-rom-the--base-of_.the-hec cd cl f4 % 3.) cn hor.s_e_p hoe-onJ ne side 4_. people's backs were to me; I could L ~39 / I rI*El Uf W' ?",see the,. people mainl 4 at w e on the far side. "t' f Pt g. 4 People that I remember being there, I know Lee .,.3 ,\\ I Gossick, the executive director for operations, was there, -33 and then Harold Denton, the director of the Office of Ruclear _34 } I Reactor Regulations was there. 1895 356 3-" Acme Reporting Company s 2..,......

-,._m - --.- m m ---m m z.m m.mu. 51 I i 1 Edson Case, deputy director of the Office of i [) 2 Nuclear Reactor Regulation was there. John Davis, acting l 3 director of the Office of Inspection and Enforcement was f there. Har ld Collins, assistant director in asseement p 4 Jnun,. ,t u 5 statefresponsible for emergency planning was there. I i 6 Also Victor Stello, who was the division director for the Division of Operating Reactors, in the Office of g Nuclear Reactor Regulation, was there: also five or ten more 9 people that I just didn't notice their faces. l l 10 0 Did you notice anybody there that wasn't within the NRC? 11 A I don't know. There could have been some. We had 12 13 various people from EPA and FDA and other people around. 14 I don't recall anybody that I recognized, but it is very 15 possible there might have been someone other than NRC in the room. 16 Q Where was Mr. Denton seated? 3-A He was sitting across, I could look at him; he

g was on the far side of the horseshoe so I could see his face, 19 and Mr. Case's face.

Somebody else was sitting over there, 20 3 and those are the only people I think I could directly look at. g

g I

l .v) 0 Where was Mr. Collins seated? A He was seated to mv left, next to Mr. Davis. His .my i back was to me. 1895 357 25 Acme Reporting Company

52 i O When you went into the r=;om, what happened then? I A Mr. Davis asked me to tell them what information 3 I had. I told them that the I&E Operations people had told I me that the waste gas decay tanks had finally filled up 4 i and that the relief valves were open, and that any of the 5 6 gases that were in the makeup tank were being vented, and the gases from the makeup tank would be flowing out through 3 the open relief valve and the waste gas decay tanks and out 9 to the environment, bypassing the filters. 10 I explained this appeared to be a continuous i i 1 release that wouldn't be stopped until either the tanks 11 12 were vented back to containment, or the letdown was secured or decreased. ! 13 0 i I think I might have said is it possible that we 14 15 can stop the letdown and control reactor pressure through 16 using the block valve on the pressurizer power operated relief valve which would be another way to control the 1-33 primary system pressure. I think I might have made a statement like let's ig 29 try to keep the radioactivity inside containment. It is a good building. Let's keep it there. 3 inging it out into U Q) the anxiliary building is now causinc problems because we .m can't control it if the waste gas decay tanks are full. 23 24 Q Were cuestions asked of you? 25 A Yes. There was a discussion by some.of.the systems 1895 358' Acme Reporting Compony .au..>......

53 5 I people first about how letdown was important and they I a didn't want to stop letdown. I don't remember who was 3 talking. It might have been Vic Stello. It could have I 4 been Denwood Ross I believe might also have been there. 5 (A brief recess was taken.) 6 THE WITNESS: Someons asked me a question. Scmeone I asked how much was the releaFe if the waste gas decay tanks 6 were full and it was being directed out. 9 I think I responded the effluent monitors were 10 off scale so the only way we could do it would be to make i II calculations to determine what the release rate might be, C t4 /d I,, and I said I would roughly calculate it based on the informatic i () we had from the primary coolant sample the other day. The 13 i 14 release could be 60 curies per second. l 15 I said I didn't have numbers for radiciodine, but 16 the radiciodine numbers should be considerably less, t i l' O You indicated that this cal.ulation you had made 18 might not apply to this particular isotope being released? 19 A Sixty curies of nobel gas could be released. For ao radiciodine I said I have to make a calculation, but it 43 would be considerably less than the, less-r..u...he 60 curies ,s u U per second, but I did mention that the release would b,ypass 189A 359 23 any-ef the charcoal filters t 24 ' [) 0 It was your understanding of, cr was it not, the ^5 situation that the release would mainly be nobel gases? Acme Reporting Company

a..:......

54 1 A My understanding was the release would be mainly 2 nobel gases. There would also be increased iodi.ne. The 3 curie quantity would be much less than 60 curies per second. 4 At this stage, I thought we were going to discuss 5 the various alternatives about trying to keep radioactivity 6 inside the containment. Up to this stage, evacuation had never entered my mind whatsoever. 8 Someone then asked, I believe it was Mr. Denton, ~ asked what the offsite consequences would be witn the 10 60 curie per second release rate, and I believe I said I 11 hadn't made a calculation of offsite doses because I just got the information, but I said I could make a real crude 12 13 assessment by ratioing in#ormation we had from the previous () 14 day. 15 The previous day, we had estimated about a curie 16 per second releace rate, which under similar meteorlogical 17 conditions had resulted in about a 20 MR per hour radiation 15 field. 19 The latest information I had on the meteorlogy 20 was we had a slow wind toward the north gatn which was 21 similar to the other day, very unfavorable meteorological () 22 conditions, so that we could just straight ratio the 20 by 23 i 60, or result in the 1200 MR per hour at the north gate. i / ~) 24 l 0 When Mr. Denton asked you for "offsite consequences," l 25 did you understand him to mean what the consequences would 1895.360 Acme Report.ing Company aca,.......

, 2 m un-~v.wm. - i, ..oo ' I t be at the border of the TMI property or farther out into i 1 the surrounding vicinity or what? i A I assumed he meant what it would be at the maximum 3 t individual offsite, which would be at the north gate. 4 At the north gate, theet is a series of houses, a five r ten houses right across the street from the north 6 gate on Pennsylvania 441, so the north gate was synonomous u iX with of f site,. the nearest members of the public where the j g wind was blowing at that time. g d Q You had computed previously using the information g available that there would be an offsite exposure of 20 millirems, is that correct? A We went the other way. The previous day several of O 6/.k S 13 us had been around the planning board and we had a 20 MR per 14 hour reading from one that I believe might have been 10 r' idsboro. I'm not sure where, and the meteorologists had 6 given us a dispersion constant for that location called Chi over Q, for that location, and we made some estimates ~ id;% $ % Pivj///r thatgmight havo been a curie per second release rate. g The meteorology conditions, as I understood them I g to be at the time, Friday morning, slightly after 9, was similar to what probably existed at the north gate, so it I O i would be simply a matter of ratioing the release rate. It was 60 times higher, _t'.e dose would then be 60 times higher. I think I spoke it as I went through because I hadn't made' [ 3 '897 001 Acme Reporting Compor y i

56 I I r' a calculation and I didn't have the 1200 MR per hour number l i when_ I walked inte the EMT. l s 0 You just calculated in your head without the help l 3 I of pen and cad? I 4 I A That's right. I calculated as I stood there. I o i I think I said it aloud as I did it, as I went along. 6 I i Q When you said that the of fsite reading might be 1200,i I did you at that point indicate your sense of reliability of g that judement? 9 l A I don't remember. I think I had always put j g l qualifiers in front of these things -the estimate is 1200, g t could be 1200. I think I assumed that they knew as we went through the uncertainties of the system that these were kh nothina that were hard and firm. 14 It was the best guess was basically how I could eategorize that number. 10 I didn't expect tc talk about doses when I first g went in there. I expected it to be a systems discussion about alternatives to letting down and that sort of thing. g As soon as I said the 1200 MR per hour, someone said oh,"my gosh, orch,myGod(somethinglikethat} That g is over the PAG's. The PAG's he was referring to were the EPA protective action guidelines which one R is the lower ,l boundazy for initiating offsite acrions. ,3 T897 002 I Q Do vou remember who said that? [() 24 ^ I think it might have been Harrld A I don't know. i ,3 i l l l Acme Reporting Company I i i act, ens asse

57 l i Collins. It came frcm that side of the table I believe. l 1 i Q Where you could not see who was speaking? h 2 y A I didn't look dcwn. After it was said, if I looked! I 3 ddhi$Td. that way, his head was the other way anyway. Bob r: fiat 4 g i was around the Incident Response Center, and he could have 5 C been there, too. I think it was the. state programs guy that 6 had said that, but I am not sure. I don't recall seeing I him in there, but there were several people in there I don't g recall seeing. He might have been there. 9 Then within just a few seconds of ch, my gosh, to that's over the PAG's, somebody said the licensee is it I measuring 1200 MR per hour. 12 Q Was that someone in the room who said that? 13 A I thought initially someone walked in from the 14 1 Incident Response Center, the technical side where I had i 15 come from and announced that, but I was talking to some of 16 n, V L f af f the other./. n. eco. le a* -ka "ommict'n-who had access to the 1-i tapes and they said that a phone call came in en one of the 13 f9w phone 1.ines that was in the EMT. iIt was most likely the 19 person who said that was sitting in the EMT. 20 Q When you first heard someone say it, why did you 23 assume it was somebody entering the room? 22 O l Secause I assumed information usually came in A a.-o ~ through the Incident Response Center, which is the technical 44 /2) side. Those are the people who have direct lines and that , o-1897 003~ Acme Reporting Company .a02........

I i 58 sort of thing. I know the information came from Region 1. 1 I believe Carl Abraham was the name I heard associated with y g that piece of information, and it came in on a line that was-1 3 in the EMT, a telephone line that was in the EMT. 4 v Q When somebody first stated in the EMT that there a was a reading of approximately 1200, where was that person 6 situated physically with respect to you? A I kind of thought behind me, which would have been g the door. Some people walked in behind me, and I stepped g forward. It could have been someone to my left which would 10 9~ yiJ have been where John navis and Eal Collins was sitting, or g someone who walked in behind me. I thought someone walked g i behind me and said it, but maybe it wasn't. You should 13 j) be able to reconstruct that from the tapes. g O But at the time your impression at the time this 10 was all occurring was that son.'one was entering the room? g A I thought someone walked in and said it, but I am g not sure. 3g Q Let me just get off the story for a moment' and find g out who did tell you later that it might have been a reading l .,0 I that the EMT received on their own telephone. .g i 0 A I was talking about Bernie Wiess who was the fellow who was kine of overall in charge of the Incident Response. 23 ) Center who has done various things with various people on i the Three Mile Island followup. 'l897 004 g Acme Reporting Compony l i 2ev .a..... s

59 He is the guy that knows all the tapes, and I 3 was talking to him about it and he said that that message () 7 was on a ta.ce and it was on a c. hone line that went into T the EMT. V 4 That line could also have been, some cf those had a j int lines, it could have been picked up in the IRC. I am 6 not sure, but either someone walkgd-en cr someone Esto s in the EMT said it,'sut the licensee is measuring 1200 MR 3 per hour. 9 n Q was it your impression when this information arrived 10 from whatever source that it was the first time that the ); people within that room knew of this reading? 17 A Yes. That was news to everybody. Q 13 O It was news to everybody? 1,, A I felt it was news to evervbodv.. I think everybodv 33 was a little shocked by it. 16 Q Would it have been possible given the structure of g the EMT that a phone call could have been coming in at the ig sametime that you were briefing the people in the room with ,g r ~ respect to vour calculations and so on? 20 A That's right. During my very short briefing, g3 there were several phone calls going en simultaneously. I g gg i There were several side conversations I believe going on 23 i I i 3 24l simultaneously as well. It wasn't that I was delivering a I .,. i briefing to everybody and everyone was paying attention. -) i i i l Acme Reporting Company 1897 005 I 2 w.......:

I 60 I That was not the case. I would say, I don't know what 3 I e 2 percentage were listening to me. I know Mr. Denton a.d 1 3 Mr. Case vet; j 0 And Mr. Collins? 4 A I think Mr. Collins was paying attention. I am 5 6 not sure John Davis, if somebody wasn't talking to John Davis on another subject. I don't know. I just don't g remember. There were several side conversations and there I g were telephone conversations and everything was going on I o at the same time. j 11 0 You don't remember who announced into the room 12 this new reading? 13 A NO-Q 14 0 I don't want to lead you, but is it or is it not 15 your impression that this information was arriving for general 16 consumption for the first time while you were there? 'E A Yes. It was sort of announced, like it had

g considerable 2mpact when that number was spoken out--the 19 licensee is now measuring 1200 MR per hour.

I don't recall hg, it saying where it was taken. i Q Is that as good a cuote as to how the announcement l Q ri was made as possible--the licensee is now reading 1200 MR I I per hour? 23 l F4 24 A The licensee is measuring 1200 MR per hour, or I 25 the licensee is--measure was used I think, or r.eporting, or '1897 006 Acme Reporting Company m u.-.... i

61 I seen or scmething like that--the licensee is measuring 1200 MR per hour. \\ 3 0 Was it only one sentence made in this announcement, )' or was it a longer description of what the licensee's 4 5 information was? 6 A I think it was just a short sentence. It came I chronologically very quickly, within let's say 10 or 15 S seconds of my stating that my best estimate was 1200 millirem o per hour. It was almost like in the same context, like 10 someone supplementing my sentence. It was like my gosh, Il the licensee just reported or measured 1200 MR per hour, 12 and y was r(ceived by me, and I believe cuite a few others g. ] v n. r //c 13 ) it was _iust confirmation,of-a hypothetical situationk-which j{ ~ ~ c~ 14 was a real situation. ' f c.s/ c - N 94c46, 15 0 What was your impression as to the understanding 16 of the people in the room with respect to the 1.ocation at. J897 007 17 which that reading was made? IS A Okay. I don't remember the message specifically 19 saying the location. I don't remember if it said it was 20 a helicopter reading or not. It is very possible it was ,1 announced as the helicopter is measuring 1200 MR per hour, ., n I - or it may have been, I renenber licensee, the word being v:. qA o, there scmewhere-beoetse the licensees is measuring 1200 MR -T. per hour. It is possible they said north gate. I just do n.' , 5 not remember if they said north gate er just didn't specify Acme keporting Company =.a.4...

IY Cv s.) t n linp/ju.! th a'YA 6 fc N;dhe, nim wo itcthd,% % We.T<f 4oc.,,f2,. o x ~ e /sc c % M u, +h m,4 i, c,,4 l a location. I don't remember any location being specified. 1 I believe it was taken by many y y': dy. L.<. e f-tn e-It was, p 2 i peoNe to be the north gate because that was the topic i 3, l o f'c[iscus sion j us t prior, -be-forehan<i r-that---was. the ch, my x g g 4 l L.% ui'tg 5 gosh, it is over the PAG 9/ was -imntext-of--tha-tv and i I think most people thought it was the north gate measurement.7 er \\ Q Was there anv discussion or questioning as to where Y l the measurement was taken? s i 9 Q There as none that I can recall. It was just that i nn en,..T,% it seemed that I had made an estimate of 1200, thisjcame 10 through and like i-d made my 1200 hypothetical calculation <y% 11 6 1i.. (. - 4 3 l t-h+l+ it.( burned it in stone and out it on the mountainside ,.c-,. 12 ,, f) 13 as the gospel. It could have been, if it was a helicopter or ground y i l 15 survey measurement, I just can't tell you. I don't know, I i but it was assumed to be at the north gate. IC I g Q All right. After this announcement concerning the l I reading occurred, what happened? is i I A Again, this announcement came within 15 seconds-29 after my initial 1200 MR per hour number, and it,just 20 t897 003 reinforced that. 21 Now the next thing that happened, I think someone g , j again said something about the PAG's again. It is over 3 the PAG's or something like that. It was repeated. I am jb 24 g - sure l'.-ict was the first person, whoever said it the first not 23 Acme Reporting Company l

63 time. I am not sure that same eerson said it 1 a second time, er someone else nicked that up and repeated it. d O You don't know who the someone else was? a A No. It was a voice. It stood out enough over 4 2 the general noise in the room, though I think some of the o side conversations had stopped at this stage of ;ha-grme and b people paid attention to the matter at hand. "9 ^ ^ ' S said something about moving people. The topic of g discussion had now immediately shifted from cne of a svstems 10 point of view of containing the radioactivity to one of moving offsite people. O Do you remember who made the first cention of moving people? A No, I don't. It could have been Mr. Centon or 15 Mr. Case or it could have been anybody. I just don't recall who said that. It is just too long aco. 17 Q Do you remember if the comment concerning moving t e, du..s e n.d people was an exploratory one or an additional type of a 897 009 statement? A I don't know. I can't say one way cr the other on that. Someone said that,and there might have been some b general word spoken about that. Some things I do remember. I remember Mr. Denton and Mr. Case s cke and made 'N 24 ~ some J j comments concerning the ne.w topic of discussion of moving ,,.0 l Acme Reporting Company a w .1,a...

~ 64 te I offsite people. I remember a few phrases like ft is time 11 v e to bite the bullet or If we are going to err, let it be en ' ir 11 ,'r l the side of public safety, Setter safe than sorry,j, 3 ,'seme h 4 concerns like that from Mr. Denton and Mr. Case. I think 5 they both said something to those effects. 6 l The tone of the statements were all positive toward I moving people. No one mentioned any opposition whatsoever 8 to moving people. It was almost as if no opposition was 9 an affirmative decision. I think Mr. Denton in my opinion 10 anyway seemed to be the. center of attention, even though 11 there were still several phone calls going on and still a l' couple of side conversations at this time, 2nd maybe some g 13 systems people asking what a PAG was. I am really not sure, 4 14 but I think the center, I perceivd the center of attention 15 shifting to Mr. Denton at this stage. 16 Mr. Denton had a rather calm, self-assured manner II that he generally has, and I think he commanded attention 1"4 of the room. 19 Q After these comments had been made concerning og ' let's be safe, et cetera, did the focus then shift back to i897 010 21 Mr. Denton? l n 0 --l A I believe it did. At least mine did anyway. He ,.3 -., l is my supervisor a couple of times removed so maybe I looked .,3 -) 24 to him maybe more, but I think it did suif t more toward him, i --l l .,3 i and I don't remember John Davis ever saying anything, who i Acme Reporting Company i n2,..-....

65 .x 9 1 was on paper in charge of the EMT. I guess I was rather j) 2 surprised at the quick, rapid, very rapid progression of 3 events. I did net voice immediate opposition along with 4 everybody else. g, 5 0 Okay. A The next thing I remember occurring was Mr. Denton asked me, he said how far should people be moved? g Q Did this occur in the time immediately after the earlier comments? 9 A Yes. I mean the whole thing frem the 1200 MR per 30 13 hour phone announcement to when Mr. Denton asked me how far should n. eocle be moved I would think was less than 60 1 o. seconds. It was very quick. gg 13 Q Okay. 14 A It almost appeared to me at this stage o&-ene 3 c.. ; 15 4 ~__ that the EMT had decided tcGmove people or3cha to 16 n - N A 3 e -- - 3 g move pe ple, to g eommenc.co% de state, anc now it was a ~~ 1 matter of how far. 13 w Q This shift in thinking occurred you say in less ig 189701i' than 60 seconds? go gil A Well, okay. From the time of the phone announce-l ment of 1200 MR per hour came through to Mr. Denton asking g 32 me how far we should move people was chronologically about 23 60 seconds, and prior to the 1200 MR per hour phone ) 24 announcement I don't think anyone was talking evacuation yet. .,a. Acme Reporting Company

66 O Okay. g A Though-I kick if.ecuculd have -wi4hi-th:- h) ~, lIaJ? hb might have been talking about it-- certainly not two 3 minutes from the time that I first came up with this 1200. 4 5 O Okay. l A Mr. Denton asked me how far people should be moved. e I responded, I said I can't recommend the specific distance. 3 0 Were you surprised you were asked that question? A I was rather surprised I was asked that cuestion. q That is why I didn't give him an answer. I said I can't to tell'you. I don't know a steci9 c die700 to c"a re co le. 11 ~' .7 Cv The reason I said that was the individual states 12 g 13 f-were the ones to do with the emergency planning, and there 14 was a plan. Pennsylvania had a plan. I was not familiar 13 with te plan. I had never seen the plan. I had never worked I p-A m l s 16 with the plan. My systemyresponsibilitiesgand offsite doses / o.T Af r 3 i i-5q not emergency planning, but I was maybe the closest to itll r 13 I was from the branch that was involved in that. In addition, I didn' t cive him a number the first ,9 6 29 time because I didn't have very much information on this gi 1200 number and it might be a continuous thing. I was s s s v,, thinkinc to myself about sectors, whichiwas the wind was 4 3., l

3 blowing, a million things went through my head ve ry quickly, h.

Il 3 24 and I could not digest them all to give a number. 23 Mr. Denten immediately asked, when I' told him I i Acme Reporting Company 1897 012

67 couldn't give him a specific distance, he asked me a 1 second time in a rather commanding voice to tell him how far ) ~\\ l cec. ole should be moved, imolvine that my first no soecific distance answer was totally unacceptable. I 4 ~ Q Did you feel a sense of pressure on yot st this a point? 6 A Yes, quite a bit. It appeared to me that he was not ff3 s. s d >*s u. going to accept ys, a nofresponse as an answer. One c:. g the thoughts that went through my mind was maybe he knew a e, lot more than I knew, which was true I think because he g 6* A c n: s '*, fu o s * /*,*W %, received / sources from-like the systems people that are 11 concerned possibly with the non-condensable bubble blocking the core, and things like the reliability of the main cooling h ,3 pumps under radiation and things like that. Maybe what g I knew was a piece of what he knew because he did have lo. access to much more information than I had. Maybe when you , o_ out it all tocether the situation was worse, so I said g basically who am I to question that decisio_n, so I felt he 15 probably had a clearer picture of the situation than I, and heeded to make a response, so I chose to make a qualified y1 I .,1 f sort of response. _,., [ The best as I can remember, I think I said something ,) 3;I like it is hard to tell, or I don't know, but, or some I ~ 'j' e uncertain' qualifier in front of it, but the 10 miles was more t' } 24 3l than enough or less than 10 miles or something like that. .It 1897 013 Acme Reporting Company na n......

sg s ) had the number 10 in it,/but that was a real outside number. \\m.,/ 0 You were the first to mention a specific succested -) ~' distance? 3 ~ A That is correct. I came up with the first 4 quantitative number, okay, that I felt was..a very conservayive c number, and I guess also if we are going to err, let us err 6 on the side of safety, better too much than too little or something I had heard I guess influenced my thinking because 3 this whole thing ^nt on in less than 10 minutes. This was g i a very rapid development. ig After I said that, a prompt general discussion 11 to k place by several people, and I can't remember who spoke 12 what. Several things were said all at once, the pres and 13 g cons of how far to move people, 14 g I quickly realized 10 miles would include the south v section of Harrisburg. 16 Q Did somebody state that? 1-A Somebody said that. They said 10 miles is part gg l of Harrisburg or something like that, and someone said 5 g-i ~ 7 l miles. Again, I don' t know who, and that was briefly discussed-y, ! " 1 yes, that is okay, it is not okay. l 1897 014 O When somebody said 5 miles, you mean they suggested 0 that as a.or terproposz.1 of sorts? A Yt That is a raasonable way to clarify that. 24 i 23

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Then there was a short discussion on 5 miles. It seemed that i l 4 i Acme Reporting Company n, .>.a...

69 nobody objected to 5 miles. 1 O Dc you remember if Mr. Denten said anything [ 2 specifica_ly with respect to either the 10 mile or the 5 3 mile suggestion? g 4 I don't remember his savinc anything

• -o +mhe 10 mile A

o i succestion. I remember, I think he said somet~4 c; <avorac.le 6 k i There was some cocos 4* ion to the to the 5 mile succestion. 10 mile suggestion because it included parts of IIarrisburg, g There didn't appear to be any cpposition to the 5 ...47 g e r.umbe r. 10 0 The question at that point wasn' t whether to 11 13 evacuate, but how far? A That's right. It shifted. The phone report of the 13 1200 shifted ccmeletelv, after a coucle of 14++,e.s.atements 14 about erring, which wav we are coine to err, and we have to t o-do something and those kinds of words, it w = 5 not a.T.a-+er 16 to do it or not. It was a matter of how far. 1 Q Do you remember if Mr. Collins made any statement 13 with respect to either of these suggestions? 19 A ' don't remember. He probably said seneth.i..g -39 because this is his field, but I don't remember 3PeCifically 21 what he said. The only statements I really re ~a-be-,<:ere Q gg Denton's and Case 's initially when they sort of gave.short 23 soliloquies and statemer.ts about shich way wa 2- - --c gc4ng to .q} .,4 i897 015 err. n Acme Reporting Company ~2 w .1......

r 70 1 O When you were as'ved qut. ay Mr. Denton with !) 2 respect to how far should the evacuation go did you at any', 3 ' time expect that v.r. Collins would at any time make a ) 4 com at that noint? ,,s' ment 5 A I don't know. I kind of hoped he would. I guess 6 I really hadn't thought about it. The time was the whole ~ thing. It developed so quickly. I was thinking of all \\m) E the; things about emergency planning and documents that I Q wishec I had read ahead of time. I guess I would have 10 appreciated any help cn the situation when Denton pressed me for a number, but I didn't get any. I had to stand on la my own. 13 Q Okay. 14 A Anyway, on the 5 miles, nobody objected to 5 miles. 15 I don't remember a motion being presented, and agreement 16 to move people to 5 miles or something like that. There was II never any clear, concise procedure or statement as to what IS the EMT was actually doing. 19 There certainly wasn't any parliamentary type 20 procedure involved, but there was no, I don't-remember anybody i -31 having any objection to moving people to 5 miles so it was 6 sort of an approval by non-objection. '89'l 016 1 sa 5 23 ' I believe Mr. Denton told :'r. Collins to go and ) call the state. I'm not sure. Something tells me, I think 25l he said something to Doc Collins to go up and call. I am Acme Reporting Company l I

"n 9 1c m a c tT M m m E n v sI* h fL s g M ry;py 1 q. n g,yy, p 3 ' R g g-71 l not so sure of tnat, buu I will tell vou what I think i l ) g happened. 3 Q You are not so sure Mr. Denton had said anything i ^ to Mr. Collins? 4 5 A He probably said something to him. He was talking 6i to the other side of the horseshoe table and Mr. Collins was at the other side of the horseshoe table. He would have -l s 1 3 been the one to go call the state, but I couldn't say with li h.a: he told him, absclute certainty he told him to go call u a e ,i / 10 I think.it was something to the effect go call the state s with our cecision. j 11 i Q Did Mr. Collins then get up and leave the room? I

g A

I believe he did. I am crettv sure he got up and

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l-a ~ walked because there was a little anteroom where there was 34 Jli '!' A , telephones. I think he got up and left the room, though he 15 _= 16 could have called from where he was sitting. He had a telephone there, but I hink I remember him getting up and 1 15l g ing into the other room, though it is very possible he i i didn't leave the room. 19 < i l i 20 C Is it possible there was no instruction of any I to call the covernor given, or is that not within the sort .,1 rance of oossibilitv? ) -- l' 1897 017 4., i a3 [ A It is possible. I don't know about the governor - t l i though. I don't ever remember hearing the word. Maybe the j ) 24 word governor was said. I just don't honestly remember. I 25 l i Acme Reoortina Comoonv

q 5 y r a - m.. a n=x= n,- s m e z w w ~ u s x a, m r ~. m +: e m. a s e r.~;; r,r m g ' .F' 72 1 thought there was some communications between Mr. Denton I and Mr. Collins, that side of the table, let's put it that. 2 9 \\ 3 way. I know Mr. Collins get up and went over, and if I wet to give you my best guess, I thought he got a q 4 s 5 message from Mr. Denten, though I could very easily be mistaken in that. e Q Was it your best recollection that Mr. Collins ' f w would get up and call the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania with i a 4 I a recommendation? 9 A Yes, and my interpretation of what happened was that 19 Mr. Collins was <; call the state and say that the EMT, I 11 am not sure how he phrased it, EMT or the NRC whose 12 Commissioners were not involved at this time, was recommend-13 m c i-L 294 ing that he evacra.te to 5 miles. 14 15 0 Okay. I don't know if you are in the position to gg ;smake a judgment on this question, but was it your s.nse l r. that the recommendation for 5 miles would be routinelv. ig accepted by the State of Pennsylvania, or was it your sense that that would purely be a recommendation that would ig .jg have no greater force than that? gg" A Ask the question again. l O Was it your sense that a recommendation from the .n l 23 ; EMT with respect to evacuation would be implemented by the ) 24 state, or was it your sense that it would be purely treated t 23 by the state as a recommendation only? I Acme Reporting Compony

.I 73 i 1 A I guess I don't really--on paper we recommend, but i f 2 an awful lot of the time an NRC recommendation is very i I 3 strongly accepted. I don't know how the state would have i i 4 } 4 received it. I think the state--well, I would just be saying 5 what I think the state would do. 6 Q Okay. Fine. After Mr. Collins gO: up and left, l r 7 which I believe is your best recollection? o' A Yes. If anything, I would het on that one. 9 0 Nhat ha.n.nened after that? i, t 10 A Mr. Denton and various people stated to make 11 telephone calls to I think get hold of the Commissioners. 12 There was some problem getting the Commissioners or whatever. {} 13 They started making phone calls. 14 Q To relay this information? IF 7 A I assume so, to talk to the Commissioners and let if them know what was going on or get their thoughts or whatever.i 1 People were making phone calls all though this whole thing, i 4 i S like maybe people had been trying to get ahold of the !9 Commissioners for the last hour. I couldn't really tell you, . 0 or trying to get ahold of them to discuss the issue before 1 it was .e cide d. I don't know why, but people's attention ') 22 then went to themselves and to their telephones to make 1897 0f9 23 telephone calls. i 4 24 i There seemed to be no more EMT. It disolved into i 25 a bunch of people doing their own separate things. Before I Acme Reporting Company I i

mm m-um 74 the majority of EMT I felt was discussing the issue before 2 it, which was the movement of people. The whole scenario i \\ from the first mentioning of the 1200 to Mr. Collins leaving-

g the roon was three to five minutes.

It was very short. It was very rapid. l D I had received,meanwhile I had someone who came r Ii in and told me that there was a phone call in the IRC for b me from the site. As I stood there, I saw people were now l; , '; doing their thing, and I decided I would take the call because l I had been trying to get a phone call into the site to find -li out more of what was happening. 1 I thinki!. walked out of the EMT and walked through l n the doors. As I was walking out, I think it was Mr. Collins a was walking back from, I saw him standing there and it t, looked like he was heading back the other way. I think he r&/uri my h M-

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p, ,left his seat tWallyfrom the anteroom. L 6 W4fy&C g As I was walking out the door, Brian Grimes who was u my superior at work was coming in the door, who I had Jne/n//, - p relieved. e, Q Mr. Collins was re-entering the EMT. Did you two b9 l speak to each other at all? 2: 1 9 l A I don't recall it. I don't think we talked. I 2,

I h don't think he and I ever talked directly during this time.

l! Other times during the incident we had, butnobnow. I just 2 2, very briefly, about 30 seconds, told Brian what was going on, Il Acme Reporting Company l

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i l 75 and he went into the EMT and he knew radiological issues so he could discuss emercencv clanning better than I could. He, i o dell-3 would hetier to T.e if he needed me, so I went.to answer the 4 telephone call and took the phone call from the site. 5 That is the kind of events as they happened, as I saw them anyway or interpreted them in the EMT. It turns o out an awful lot of the basic information that we had used g was not true. 9 0 When did you discover that? a l.L,y lCnssu A I can't tell you what EMTe h _ng. They are getting 10 feedback from the state and all kinds of other feedback g probably better than what I was getting, but.I was able to let's say over the next couple of hours, I cot information 0 1-" that i-t-was--cce, the waste gas decay tanks were not full, y f M in, RJ W ;iv,': < nn 1Tm ),a y ffz. w 4 a,, Au. v< ir h us> lv i/ i.That mai a ahc--me-ssaSAk ( >. <- 3 ><,uesrcci, J-10 16 The relief valves in the waste gas decay tanks Th.Ac.A ~ at relief valve had opened, but it was g were not open. the relief valve on the liquid side of the makeup tank and-g ~ 19 that 'thev were venting the makeup tank at the time-they wanted to vent the tank to get the water level back in that 20 i had been lost through the valve openinge-so releases were I 23 i 1897 021 increased. .m You could see on the charts that releases had jumped ,3 e4 up over what they were, so there was a spike of activity. i i 25l If we had known, if I had known that, I think it Acme Reporting Company an,.n -...

=- - -_..x___.,z_____ 76 would have had a considerable different light on the i - 1 situa' ion, that it was a transient release. It was not a t continucus, long-term release that was going to keep going 3 1 on for some ceriod of time. 1 Also that we didn't know that the 1200 MR oer a 6 hour reading was a measurement taken 300 feet over the t-e;% d> h s ~ th_y,e ) wht j w 4 . _ n-t e --a-t-t uildi-na 4' 130 feet over the tcp containmenu building. If we had known that, it would have been 3 9 considerably different because doses would be much less where i any member of the public was. Also the wind had stopped 10 and the wind, this was in the morning, and the winds were 11 } light and variable. The wind was basically a flat calm, so '2 I vou built up a pocket of radioactivity, and that is what 13 the helicopter was measuring. 14 1 j If we had known any of those pieces of information, 15 it would have negated the concern that everybody had at the 16 time. g l e-I think we thought the conditions were as thev had been described to us. They can probably resurrect a lot of 19 l ^0 these messages and things, message forms and whatever, but that was what we thought the situation was. 1897 022 g; i Q As you were leaving the EMT and Mr. Grimes arrived, 22 ,) 23 what was his reaction to your description of what had just haocened? 14 ) -~ A I think he was surprised. I forget what he said. 25 Acme Reporting Company

77 1 It was sort of an expression of he-3, vhs., er s c,7,m w _,. i /4 ChT" t 4 2 -that r-an-expre s sion--of disbelie f tha 4 i-t had done tha t,.ar,d, I

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3 y tglked with them, and I know he was very much involved 4 in discussions for the remaining of the morning concerning 5 what to do, what not to do. That was the part I was no*..<.,. E there, and I didn't know what ensued. I 7 O When you spoke to Mr. Grimes, did he tell you at 8 that point why he was surprised of the decision? 9 A No. He just went in there. I i 10 l O Cn your way back to your desk, did you speak with l l 11 anyone else? l f l 12 A I think I saw Hal ro'id-s. Harold Gaut, whoworksforf 3 13 Harold Collins. I think I might have menticned to him-14 because he was a state program guy, very interested in 15 evacuation, that's his line of work,-that Harold Collins was, just had called the state to recommend evacuatgS' People,and 16 he f.hp.mL c i 17 s surprised,anywny I-S e nomeching. le Q Did you speak to anybody else before you got back 19 to your desk to take this phone call? 1897 023 20 A I don't recall. I d.on ' t think so. If I spoke i 21l to Hal, it was a four or five second conversation. Doc d j) 22 ll just called the state to evacuate people out to 5 miles. l

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Ee went in and talked to the other state pecple. i i /} 24 O After this point, did you have any occasion to speak 25 with people in the EMT again concerning the area of ey3euagic,= l Acme Reporting Company I m u, u.. e'#m

78 l I or emergency preparedness? l i (() 2 A No. Brian was in there. at that time and Brian I l 3 talked to them about that, and it was a matter of just Brian-I lQ was in there the rest of the morning,ced qfter that, it was n 4 / 5 the President told them to get the helicopter for 6 Mr. Denton to go to the site and Mr. Denton left, and we were f,nr trying to get the stuff ts4h Denton straightened out on 3 getting the samples analyzed, so I was busy over in the 9 other room, so I never talked to Mr. Denton or Mr. Collins in or Mr. Case on this. I never have talked to Mr. Denton

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Is it fair to say that Mr. Grimes from that point 13 forward replaced you in the capacity of advising the EMT? j y A That is correct. 15 0 Did you have any other direct involvement with g decision making with respect to evacuation or caergency n preparedness during the remainder of the incident? A Just on a far periphery I saw some various things g dw U l 39 and made some comments on the M that Brian.had done., some comments on some side issues. 20 -3; O But they wouldn't be cocments of any policy nature? i I i A No. ) -- l I 3 O Is there anything that we have not covered in our i 3 discussions this morning that you would like to bring out, -) 25 i any areas that you feel you may not have described fully or I i. I Acme Reporting Company i

j 79 in any 1 - other wav? 2 A No, I can't think of anything. It is just the 3 situation, the information that we had that we thought to be the case turned out not to be the case, and we acted on 4 information that was there more rapidly than I would like a 6 to have seen happen, but I think everybody's intentions were good. I wouldn't think otherwise a.nyway. 3 No. I have no more. 9 MR. PEARSON: Okay. That concludes the discussion. in (Whereupon, at 4:30 p.m., the deposition of Mr. Barrett was concluded.) ti 10 ^~ I have read the foregoing pages, 1 l 13 through 79, and they are a true and a s s r n-d sd 14 accurate record /of my testimony 15 therein :9 corded, e l k j[}'? / C' C&Y LAKE H. BARRETT 18 Subscribed and sworn to before me 1897 025 g this dav of ,1979. 20 -' 1 Notary Public l .n My Commission Expires: I 23 i 24 25 Acme Reporting Company .aw.z.a...

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