ML19289G290
| ML19289G290 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 07/03/1979 |
| From: | Kosiba R BABCOCK & WILCOX CO., PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE ACCIDENT AT THREE MILE |
| To: | |
| References | |
| TASK-TF, TASK-TMR NUDOCS 7908160380 | |
| Download: ML19289G290 (57) | |
Text
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x P RE S IDENT ' S COMMISSION ON THE iBg ACCIDENT AT THREE MILE ISLAND
x
/
DEPOSITION of BABCOCK & WILCOX, by RICHARD ERWIN KOSIBA, held at the offices of.
Babcock & Wilcox, Old Forest Road, Lynchburg, Virginia, on the 3rd day of July, 1979, commencing at 2:35 p.m.,
before Robert Zerkin, Notary Public of the State of New York.
1891 195 BENJMIIN REPORTLNG SERVICE R
CERTIFIED SHORTHAND REPORTERS FIVE DEEx31 AN STRELT 7908166 g sew vonn.xew vonx too38 k
[212] 374-1138
1 2
2 3
FOR_gAggggK_g_WILggX:
4 MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS, ESQS.
Attorneys for Babcock & Wilcox 5
1800 M Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C.
20038 6
3Y:
GEORGE L.
EDGAR, ESQ.
KEVIN GALLEN, ESQ.,
of Counsel 8
-and-9 JOHN G.
MULLIN, ESQ.
House Counsel 10 FOR THE COMMISSION:
11 12 WINTHROP A.
ROCKWELL, ESQ.
Associate Chief Counsel 13 3pgg_g3pSgNT:
15 RONALD M.
EYTCHISON 10 CLAUDIA A.
VELLETRI 17 18 19 "O
o0o 21 22 1891 196 23 24 25 B ENJ AMIN R EPO RTIN G SERVICE
1 2
3 3
R I C H A R D E R W I N K O S I B A,
having 4
been first duly sworn by linthrop A.
- Rockwell, 5
Esq.,
t k the stand and testified as follows:
DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. ROCKWELL:
i Q
Would you state your full name, please.
8 A
Richard Erwin Kosiba.
9 Q
Please state your current business address.
10 A
My current business address is manager, Customer 11 Service Department, Nuclear Power Generation Division, 12 B&W, Lynchburg, Virginia.
13 Q
And your current employee?
A Babcock & Wilcox.
Q I take it you have given us your present l a, position, which is manager of the Customer Service 16 Department?
l' A
That is correct.
18 (Document described below herein marked 14 Kosiba Deposition Exhibit 60 for identification, 20 this dtce.)
21 Q
Do you have in front of you a resume that
,n you have brought with you today which is marked Kosiba
]) ]g[ Deposition Exhibit 60? A Yes, I do. 2% Q Was that prepared by yourself? 25 BENJAMIN REPORTING S E.kVIC E
1 Kosiba 4 o 3 A Yes, that was. 4 Q !s it current and up-to-date? A Yes, it is current and up-to-date. o Q Mr. Kosiba, I see from looking at your resume that you became manager of Customer Service in 7 February 26, 1979, is that right? 8 A That is correct. o Q You indicate that before that, for approxi-10 mately nine months or so, you were senior technical 11 consultant to the general manager. Is that 12 Mr. MacMillan? A Yes, that is. 13 Q What was your role as senior technical consultant? 15 A I undertook special assignments for Mr. MacMillan. 16 The most frequent area in which I did work for him was 17 in the area of availability improvement. 18 Q Does that relate to the on-line avail-10 ability of power plants? 20 A Yes, that does. n1 Q Were you involved in other special projects during that time period? on A Yes, there were some other projects. I did some work on our activity to prepare for repairs to the 21 jggj j}} Florida OTSG. 25 BENJAMIN R EPO RTI N G S ERVICE
1 2 Kosiba 5 3 Q What were the other major projects that 4 you undertook during that period as senior technical consultant? .a A Those encompass the major projects; the avail-b ability activity had a wide scope, ranging from indi-b vidual equipment work to systems work, to organizing 8 the management, setting up our availability program. 9 There were many sub-tasks under that title. 10 Q When you began your work as senior technical 11 consultant, you had just returned from roughly two 12 years in Germany? A That is correct. 13 Q I am showing you what has been previously marked as Willse Deposition Exhibit 2. My under-15 standing is that some of the names may have changed, 16 any particularly yours, as manager, but this chart 17 shows that Mr. Olds, and you obviously now hold that 18 rcsition? 19 A No, that is not correct. That chart is for the 20 Nuclear Service Department. 31 Q Isn't the Customer Service D e p a r tme r.t the successor to the Nuclear Service Department? A Yes, it i s,- b u t it includes rearrangements, additions and subtractions; it includes many of these 21 functions, but it also includes additional functions 25 1891 199 B ENJ AMIN REPORTING S ERVICE
1 2 Kosiba 6 3 that were not existent in this organization. 4 Q So this is not a fair representation of the structure of the Customer Service Department today? a A That is correct. 0 Q Is it accurate with respect to training services structurally? 8 A Training Service in the Customer Service 9 Department reports directly to me. 10 Q And it does here, as well, does it not? 11 A It reports to Olds here. 12 Q aut in terms of Training Service, it reports 13 directly t the manager of the department? A That.is correct. Q In your case? l a, A To clarify, some of these other activities stayed 16 under Mr. Olds, whereas Training Service was pulled out I-to give it a s tros; gor position. 10 Q Do you have a management chart or diagram 19 which reflects a current organization of the Customer 20 Service Department? 31 A I have one to the first level, yes. Q Would you provide that to us when you have an opportunity? A I certainly will. 21 1891 200 Q Let me see if I understand. 25 BENJAMIN R EPO RTING S ERVICE
1 o Kosiba 7 3 The Customer Service Department took some 4 of the functions of the Nuclear Service Department and other functions of Nuclear Service went elsewhere? .a A No. Primarily, we added functions, but rearranged e and restructured what was in Customer Service, and we 7 now include two additional functions, In-Service 8 Inspection and Nuclear Parts Center, but then this we' 9 restructured somewhat. If it would make it more 10 convenient, it would only take me a minute to get you 11 a little chart and you can see that. 12 Q I think we can proceed for the time being. A Fine. 13 MR. EDGAR: We will get it at the break. MR. ROCKWELL: Fine. Thank you, l a, (Continued on following page.) 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 ^3 1891 201 21 25 SENJAMIN R EPO RTIN G S ERVICE
R" 2 le 1 Kosiba 8 .n 3 Q When you took over on February 16, 1979 as manager of the Customer Service Department, did you receive a briefing from Mr. Olds in preparing 5 for assuming your new duties? 6 A From the time of my appointment, there were ~ many briefings in the days that followed which led 8 to my establishing the organization of the Customer 9 Service Department, to my memory, sometime in the 10 first week of March, so there were discussions with Olds, as well as with the other key managers. ); 12 Q Was the reorganization of the department fr m Nuclear Service to Customer Service coincident lb 13 with your taking over? A I was first appointed, and my charter was to set up the organization that I wanted, so the re-16 organization or the putting together of the elements, 17 that was the first task I undertook after being IO appointed. It was not arranged beforehand. It was 19 sequential; my appointment, and then the organizational 20 setup. gt Q It was at that time that the name was also changed? 1891 202 a Yes. 23 Q Did you review the role and function of 24 the Training Service Group at the time of your 25 reorganization? BENJAMIN R EPO RTIN G S ERVICE
1 Kosiba 9 2.2 3 A Yes. I did-Q At that time, did you confer with 4 Mr. Elliott, who was manager of Training Service? 3 A During that period, yes, I did. Q Did you confer with others in the Training 4 Service Department, in terms of your review of the 8 role and function of the Training Service Department? 9 A No, I did not. 10 Q so your primary contact, then, in assessing 11 and evaluating what the' Training Service Department I was doing and what its role should and ougnt to be 13 was with Mr. Elliott? 14 A Mr. Elliott and Mr. Olds, plus my own background. Q What did Mr. Elliott tell you with regard 16 to what the Training Department had been doing and 17 what its focus was when you talked to him during thie reorganization period? Ig A His task was to assist utilities in providing g training to their operators. He described a variety 20 of services that were available. He described the 21 area in which most activity occurred, namely, the simulator training activity. He discussed potential '3 areas for additional product development in areas 2% that had not heretofore been active, that he was 25 interested in looking to and developing. - 9 203 B ENJ AMI N R EPO RTIN G SERVICE
1 n Kosiba 10 2.3 3 Q What were the additional product develop-ments that Mr. Elliott told you about? 4 A Primarily in the area of training to assist in a maintenance, and training by the use of developing 6 video devices as training assistance. ~ Q Had the department been using video 8 devices up to that time? 9 A There had been occasional uses of video devices, 10 and the gist of the conversation that I remember is II that we have done this once in a while, but there is 12 an opportunity, and there is a need for additional 13 development of this area of effort. 14 Q I take it your charge from Mr. MacMillan 15 was to take a hard look at the department and assess it and then reorganize it in whatever fashion you 16 felt appropriate after consultations that you wished g to undertake? 18 A That is essentially the charge. I don't remember 19 anything about a hard look, but merely to look over 20 the situation and recognize the present-day situation 'l with regard to the operating plants, to provide good 22 coordinated services in support of the operating 23 plants. 2I In the way of background, obviously the business 25 had developed for us in supplying new plants, and there 1891 204 SENJAMIN R EPO RTIN G S ERVIC E ~
1 2 Kosiba 11 was some thought that maybe we had not given adequate 2.4 3 attention to how we handled this service in support 4 of operating plants. He charged me to look at it a afresh and see if by rearranging and refocusing, we 6 could do a better job of assisting operating plants 7 and give it the emphasis so that there was no connota-8 tion that the support of operating plants was a, let 9 me say, second fiddle to supplying NSSS; that does 10 not say that was the case, but to look at it afresh 11 and see what we should do to do a good job to assist the operating plants. gg 13 Q Did Mr. MacMillan reduce his charge to you to a memorandum outlining roughly what he was g 'asking you to do and what he expected you to end up l a, with in the sense of the process you were going 16 through? 17 A No, I know of no such memorandum. He did make 18 an announcement to be issued on the bulletin boards 19 communication to the entire division, but that as a 20 is a very short announcement which, in effect, provides 21 the basis from which I would be free to discuss the various options with the different managers in the division. ,,a Q Then do I understand correctly that the 74 charge which you were given from Mr. MacMillan was ,a, i891 205 BENJAMIN REPORTING S ERVICE
1 2 Kosiba 11a 3 formulated and articulated in conversation between 4 you and him? A Yes. We had several conversations discussing, a oftentimes in the framework of availability, but some-6 times other occasions, the support of operating plants, 7 and there was no written directive other than the 8 announcement, which was quite brief. 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 1891 206 25 B ENJ AMI N REPORTING S ERVIC E
1 2 Kosiba 12 r:/ew 3 Q Did Mr. MacMillan tell you what had given 4 rise to, number one, his request to you to evaluate 3 ' and possibly reorganize the Nuclear Service Department, a or what the source of his concern was? 6 A Just the trend in our business where the operating 7 plants had become a larger and larger segment of the 8 s ainess, and that the evolution of the Service 9 Department and the Nuclear Parts Center and the In-10 Service Inspection Group had proceeded to the point 11 where he thought a fresh look at the total capability 12 to service operating plants was needed and would benefit the performance of the division in the future. 13 Q Did he tell you that he had had any specific comments or complaints from anyone which prompted him l a, to give you the charge he was giving you? 16 A No, I had no such notion from talking with him. 17 Q Did he tell you that he had had any IO specific concerns that specific areas within the 14 Nuclear Service Department needed attention? 20 A The one area that we talked about that might come 31 under those words in my mind, we had a couple of conver-sations about the area which in my organization is called special products, which is the activity we have to produce special tools, instruments, measuring 24 schemes, as a supporting activity for the maintenance 1891 207 25 BENJAMIN R EPO RTIN G S ERVICE
1 2 Kosiba 13 3 testing of plants. He had felt that that area had 4 started up without a dedicated organizational unit, but just as a development of opportunity, and he felt that a there were enough activities in that area that I might consider setting up a dedicated organizational unit to 7 provide that kind of expertise and learning and based 8 on my review, my conclusions were such that I did set 9 up an organization unit for special products. You 10 might recognize that name within that organizational 11 unit is the loose parts monitor people that you may 12 have heard about. Q Other than his reference to the special A 13 products area, did he tell you that he had had feed-back from any source or that he had concern in his own 15 mind about any of the components of the Nuclear Service 16 organization which he wished you to address in 17 particular during your review and reorganization? 18 A I recall no others. 19 The general caveat we had was to put the whole 20 operation together so that we put ourselves forward to the customers in a unified way as opposed to talking g} ~ to them from separate organizational units, but I have a recollection of no specific poor performance type 23 basis. 21 Q In the process of your review, did you ask 25 1891 208 SENJAMlN R EPO RTING S ERVICE
1 1 Kosiba 14 3 Mr. Elliott for a critical analysis of his own depart-4 ment? A No, I did not. 3 Q Did you ask Mr. Elliott for anything other than simply a factual statement of what was happening? 7 Did you ask for any kind of analysis of what his role 8 was and where it was going or where it had been? 9 A I talked to him about where he had been, where 10 he was, and where he wanted to go in terms of his busi-11 ness planning, and that was the kind of conversation 12 I referred to earlier where he indicated to me that he 13 thought there were additional opportunities in the area of maintenance training and video training devices. Q Other than Mr. Elliott's references to additional business opportunities, did he talk to you 16 at all or did he offer any observ tions about the job 17 that the Training Department was doing? 18 A No, I don't remember any. 19 Q Did you ask him at any time what he thought 20 the strengths and/or the weaknesses of that department 21 were in his own mind? A We reviewed the qualifications that his people that is had for conducting the training and we about it, and to address the issue of whether that 2? capability was sufficient for the future. 25 1891 209 B ENJ AMIN REPORTING SERVICE
1 2 Kosiba 15 3 Q In regard to addressing whether that capa-4 bility was sufficient, what was Mr. Elliott's opinion? A I believe there was one person that he needed to O hire and was trying to hire; I am not perfectly clear 6 on that, but I believe he felt he was shy, and was 7 recruiting and attcipting to hire one person, but that 8 question was the type of question that resulted. 4 Q Based on your review of the organization 10 and in your conversations with Mr. Elliott and based 11 on what you could observe of the Training Department, 12 what was your analysis of that department at the point at which you finalized your reorgani=ation? 13 A My view is that that department had the po te ntial to contribute somewhat more to our overall performance than they were contributing. I felt that 16 they were the experts in the building on how the 17 product operated, and I wanted to have them be recog-10 ni=ed as those experts and, you know, act as those 19 experts and contribute to the evolution of the product. 20 I did not have any specific data to say that they were 31 not doing this, but I felt that the way the product was s operated was very iuportant, and I encouraged him to assert himself as the operating competence in the 3 buildin?. 21 Q In what fashion did you suggest to 1891 210 25 BEN 6 AMIN R EPO RTIN G SERVICE
1 2 Kosiba 16 3 Mr. Elliott that his department could assert itself 4 as the center of operating competence? A I didn't go into details on what fashion; I don't a remember the words I used with him, but he seemed to understand my words and the actions that followed were merely from time to time, in the short span of time 8 before the 28th of March, to bring him into discussion o and to involve him in actions that came to my attention 10 that involved operator knowledge, and that was one of 11 my intentions in setting up the organization to 12 strengthen that voice. It was not be. sed on any 13 knowledge of what history had been, but just a belief that it is part of my background experience. Q In your opinion, was the Training Department l a, expert with respect to the operation of B&W plants at 16 the time you made that evaluation? 17 A I had no basis to judge that. (Continued on following page.) 19 0 2 21 22 2? 21 25 1891 211 8 ENJ AMI N REPORTING E ERVIC t:.
RZ 4 le 1 2 Kosiba 17 3 Q Did you attempt to find assistance in 4 your evaluation which would enable you to judge that? A No, I did not at that time. 5 Q Have you since the accident? 6 A I have made several -- I have spent a fair amount of time in the simulator room since the 8 accident, where I could observe and listen and have 9 considerably more opinion than I had at the time of 10 the reorganisation. 11 Q So one step you have taken is to take a 1 more personal role in o.bservation, is that correct? 13 A
- yes, 11 Q
Have you brought anyone in from the outside 15 to help you assess and evaluate the Training Department? 16 A No, I have not. 17 Q Have you reached any conclusions based on 18 the more personal observation that you pursued since 19 the accident, of the Training Department? A I have reached the conclusion that I want to 20 be involved further or more so in the activities of that department, and I am very glad in retrospect 22 that I set it up,as a separate organizational group. 23 I believe it is an important group in the Customer o g Service operation and deserves, you know, the n5 stronger position. 1891 212 B ENJ AMIN R EPO RTING SERVICE
1 2 Kosiba 18 4.2 3 At the time I made the decision, it was not 4 nearly so cleancut solid a decision, but in retrospect I am comfortable with the intuition that made me do that. O 6 Q Let me try to come back to the question I asked a moment ago. Based on the observations you t have made of the Training Department, the more intense observations you have made since the accident, including 9 your presence in the simulator room, and I take it 10 your observation of training, have you come to any 11 conclusions, or have you formed any opinions in your 12 own mind as to what you have seen regarding the 13 effectiveness of the training, the value of the training? ~ 14 A I have not formed any overall conclusions. 15 I have made a couple of suggestions from the visits 16 there, but nothing of major scope. 17 Q Can you give me an example of the kind of 18 suggestions yo. have made. A I suggested after one of the sessions the use gg of a critique at the end of an exercise, which is the practice, but I made comment that to try to strengthen 21 the way in which the critique is done, you know, in na ~ effect emphasizing the importance of a critique '~3 after an exercise, such that might encourage it to 2I be given additional emphasis -- I guess that's the lOhl 25 word for it. S ENJAMIN REPORTING SERVICE
1 2 ~ Kosiba 19 4.3 3 Q Have you since the accident called on, and I may have covered this, but I am going to ask 4 it more specifically, anyone with experience and a knowledge of the training and training techniques in 6 other industries where there is a potential for great 7 pressure and crisis and great consequences if the wrong 8 mistakes are made, such as aerospace, or such as 4 potentially the Navy Nuclear Reactor Program, or other 10 comparable industries? 11 A No, I have not. 12 Q Do you have any plans to do so? 13 A No, I do not. 14 Q Do you think it would be valuable to draw 15 on the experience that those organizations have acquired in training to see how the B&W training program com-16 pares, and to see if there is anything useful to be learned? 18 A I may take that in two steps at a time. 19 Q sure. 20 A As far as the Navy program goes, I have 'l extensive Navy experience and familiarity with the 22 Navy nuclear program, such that I would feel somewhat 23 inappropriate to call someone in, even if I could get 24 such a person, because I spent 13 years in the Navy nuclear program and was involved with startup of a .3 BENJAMIN R EPO RTIN G S ERVICE
1 2 Kosiba 20 3 lot of submarines; the ENTERPRISE, the first nuclear-4 powered aircraft carriers and five years with the 5 Refueling Branch, and I have read the Admiral's testimony about how to train operators, and did not 6 find anything new in there, and his testimony was very recent. I believe that is a very good basis which 8 is more applicable to reactor operation than what 9 I might find out in an airplane cockpit. 10 Q I take it that you have not made the 11 inquiry as to what potentially there is to be learned from either training of airplane pilots or NASA 13 training, at least up to this time? 11 A No, I have not asked for NASA airplane 15 training assistance. Q You have been away from the Navy since 19657 A I left the Navy in 1962, although I, as a civilian, continued in the Navy Nuclear Reactor 18 Program until 1965. 19 MR. EDGAR: Off the record. '~O (Discussion held off the record.) 21 A I am sorry. I did misspeak myself. I left 22 the Naval Reactor Program in 1970. I am sure you 23 understand I did not take the care in writing my g; summary to differentiate between the Nuclear Reactor Program or AEC or Navy Ships. I really ,a_ !891 215 BENJAMIN REPORTING SERVICE
1 2 Kosiba 21 3 would have had to do some hard digging last night to do that. I believe people familiar with the program 4 know that if you are in the Navy Nuclear Reactor Pro-a gram, you wear two hats, and the hat you have at any 6 one time makes no difference to your function. 7 Q In the time between the 16th of February, when you became manager of Customer Service, and the 9 accident at Three Mile Island, did you become familiar 10 with the specific programs and operations of the 11 Training Department? 12 A I am wondering what extent of detail you mean. 13 I would say this, and this might help answer your 14 question. 15 I reviewed each of the units that would make 16 up the department. I spent more time on the creation of new organizational units, as I think is appropriate, g than I did in the unit which was merely, as a body, being elevated to a higher elevation, so I did become 19 acquainted with the Training Service Group, the people, 20 what they were doing, but I did not learn their 'l business as I anticipated I would at a subsequer. time. 22 (Continued on Page 2 2.. ) 23 24 1891 216 23 B ENJAMIN R E P O RT' N G SERVICE
1 2 Kosiba 22 r:/ew 3 Q When you took over the department from 4 Mr. Olds you have indicated that you had an ongoing 5.1 series of conversations with him, is that correct? a A Yes. 6 Q Did you ever ask him for his assessment or 7 his evaluation of the training group within either the 8 Customer Service or Nuclear Service Sections? Which 9 one is it? 10 A The old organi=ation was the Nuclear Service 11 Department, which ceased to exist when the Customer 13 Service Department was established, and things were
- "9"d*
13 Q In any event, did you ask Mr. Olds for his evaluation of the Training Service Group? 15 A No, I did not. I did ask him the overlapping 16 question, namely, how was the training operation going, 17 and how was Mr. Elliott doing in running that operation, I8 but I did not ask the question of training itself. 19 I asked how that business was being conducted, and 20 asked his comments on the way in which Mr. Olds was 21 managing that operation. Q Mr. Elliott, you mean? A Yes, Mr. Elliott; excuse me. 23 Q What was his evaluation of Mr. Elliott? 24 A His evaluation was that Mr. Elliott was managing 25 i891 217 BENJAMIN R EPO RTIN G SERVICE
1 2 Kosiba 23 5.2 3 the operation very well and was on top of his job, and 4 if I remember correctly he was quite satisfied with Mr. Elliott's performance. 3 Q When you became manager of the Nuclear O Service-Customer Service Department, and I know the 7 name change occurred in that period of time, were you 8 ever advised of a memorandum which had been written o approximately a year earlier by Mr. Bert Dunn in the 10 Engineering Department calling attention to a serious 11 concern that he had for the potential of erroneous 12 operator action in circumstances defined by a transient at the Davis-Besse plant in September 19777 13 A No, I had not. Q Did you ever know of that concern from any source up to March 28, 1979? 16 A I did not. 17 Q Have you had occasion to become aware of 10 that memorandum since? 10 A Yes, I have. 20 Q Have you made that inquiry within your :sn 31 organization as to the handling of that issue since the ( accident? A I did in the immediate days after I gained 23 knovAedge of it, and I had some knowledge of the 24 O d: gqigher q* : r hcndling. I believe it was one or two days 25 107 Liu B ENJ AMIN REPORTING S ERVICE
1 n Kosiba 24 5.3 3 the 28th or 30th that I, while standing watch at our 4 control room up above, was provided a copy of the memorandum, read it, and in between standing watch I a did ask for some checks to be made on what had 6 happened, and I did see some additional memorandum i which I do not -- which responded to but did not 8 resolve the question. 9 Q Was that Mr. Hallman's memorandum of 10 August 3, 1978? 11 A Hallman is the right name, but I wouldn't know 12 whether the date is right or not. 13 Q Did y u ever talk with Mr. Hallman? A No, I did not. Q Have you ever to this day talked to him? l a, A No, I have not. 16 Q Other than apparently seeing Mr. Dunn' l~ memorandum and any follow-up memorandum which you think 18 may have come from Mr. Hallman, did you do any further 19 investigation as to the handling of that concern within 20 your department? 31 A As I say, at the time I was on watch I had addi-tional conversations; I talked with Mr. Olds about that, and pointed out, requested that he look into how that a was handled, and particularly from a point of view of 21 handling other activities within the department, the 25 BENJAMIN REPORTING SERVICE
1 2 Kosiba 25 5.4 3 need for resolution of questions. 4 Q But you have never talked to Mr. Hallman? A No, I have not talked to Mr. Hallman. 3 Q Have you talked to anyone else in the department at any time since the 28th about how that issue was handled other than to Mr. Hallman and 8 Mr. Olds? 9 A I did not talk to Mr. Hallman. 10 g I am sorry for the misstatement on my part. 11 A I talked to Mr. Olds, yes. I have talked about 12 that memorandum or about that event to one other 13 pers n, and that was Mr. Wascher,to the effect that the review of the Davis-Besse incident should be added to our work list, and once again be evaluated as to whether there were further actions that should be 16 taken. 17 Q Other than Mr. Olds and Mr. Wascher, have 18 you discussed the issue raised by the Dunn memorandum 19 with anyone in your department between March 28 and 20 today? A I don't recall speaking to anybody else about it. 31 s Q Have you ever raised it with Mr. Elliott? A Not the Dunn memo. 23 Q Have you raised the issues addressed therein? 21 A I have raised the issue or reviewing operating 25 BENJAMIN R EPO RTIN G SERVICE 1891 220
1 n Kosiba 26 5.5 3 events or incidents and having the operations, the 4 training people review and involved in responding to such operating events. o Q And that was with Mr. Elliott? A Yes, I have discussed that issue. I can't recall 7 whether it was before the incident or after the 8 incident. I believe we have had more than one conver-9 sation about the subject of having the training people 10 involved in reviews where operations of the plant was 11 the substantial factor in the.way the product performed. 12 In fact, I, thinking further in line with the avail-13 ability impr vement program, I believe in January we had some conversations, and that was before I was involved in the department, which addressed the issue that the input from the training people could be very 16 valuable in understanding and supporting the operation 17 of the plants. 18 Q As of today, I take it, you are aware that 19 the Dunn memorandum expressed concern and in fairly 20 strong terms about the potential for premature termina-ni tion of HPI in the Davis-Besse September 1977 accident? A That is correct. n, Q I take it you are aware that the Michaelson memorandum had entered this organization sometime in 21 = }} the spring of 1978 expressing at least in part a _a BENJAMIN R EPO RTIN G SERVICE
1 a Kosiba 27 3 similar concern? 4 A Yes, that is correct. Q I take it you are also aware that a memo-a randum by Mr,. Novak apparently written sometime in January 1978 had come to B&W before the accident at Three Mile Island? 8 A No, I am not aware of that. 9 Q You are not aware of that today? 10 3 no, 11 g with respect to the Michaelson and Dunn 12 memoranda, has that raised in your mind a question of the ability of your organization to absorb information 13 and put it to use? A Yes, it raises that question, l a, Q Have you done anyuhing to look into the 16 matter to see whether the s t.ru c tu r e of the organisation 17 is adequate to get that kind of information through to people 18 who need it? 19 I have been addressing that question long before the 20 incident, again, as part of the availability effort, ,1 and I had not and do not today recogni:e any problem in structure that prevents those issues from being addressed because there is a long collection of items concerning things like this which are addressed. I do 21 feel and have felt for a long time within B&W and in 25 1891 222 BENJAMIN R EPO RTIN G SERVICE
1 2 Kosiba 28 3 my past activity that one needs to be continuously 4 pressing to recognize the essence or the substance of various events as opposed to the superficial or g symptomatic characteristics of an event. I think that is one of the most interesting parts of the engineering business, and particularly the nuclear business. It 8 sometimes is not subtle in retrospect, but in looking 9 forward it can be quite subtle. 10 MR. EDGAR: Can we go off the record. 11 (Discussion held off the record.) 12 (Continued on following page.) 13 11 15 16 17 18 10 20 21 22 23 24 ,8a1 723 i- .3 BENJAMIN R EPO RTIN G S ERVICE
6 le 1 2 Kosiba 29 3 Q In order to understand what your testimony is on this point, Mr. Kosiba, we have a memorandum from 4 within your own organization, and in fact within your a own department, which raises what apparently are 6 + quite strong terms, a concere that goes to one of the 7 most serious consequences of a nuclear accident, namely, 8 a core uncovery, and nothing happens for 15 months 9 to advise the operating utilities of this concern. 10 Am I correct in understanding that you do not 11 feel that that problem or that fact requires any 12 particular attention at this point? I am sure you did not 13 A Well, let me just intend to say it, but the Dunn memo was not from anybody 14 in my department. l a_ 16 Q It was addressed to at least a couple of people in your department. A It was addressed to Mr. Taylor, who is not in my department. 19 Q There were at least two people in your 20 department who, as I understand it, received copies. 21 A Who received copies? That is correct. Would nn ~~ you tell me now what your question is. 23 Q Do I understand correctly that even 24 though apparently this memo raised the issue in a very 1891 224 25 BENJAMIN REPORTING SERVICE
1 2 Kosiba 30 6.2 seri us fashion and indicated that it was a question of 3 very serious concern to the writer, and even though a.pparently a number of people within the B&W organi-a ation here in Lynchburg received it and knew about 6 it, and then nothing happened for 15 months: in light 7 of ; hat, you still do not believe that any particular 8 attention is required to the flow of information? 9 A I don't understand your question. Your question 10 implies that I still do not think. I say I have been 11 concerned about the flow of inform % tion and r.ad been 12 actively working on it since January, so why do you 13 say I still don't think? Have I said something 14 - Q D y u believe that that incident requires actn n r requires being addressed in any specific 15 fashion by your department? A I don't understand your question. The incident, 17 when I became aware of it, I asked Mr. Olds, who is 18 the manager in charge of Field Engineering and Service, lo to look into how that is being handled, and further 20 with respect to the specific event, asked that it be 21 added to the work list to review what was going on. 22 In the generic sense, I had an active project 23 started before the Three Mile Island event to address 24 all of the elements of obtaining information from operating plar.ts and digesting it and using it. We .,a 1891 225 BENJAMIN R EPO RTING SERVICE
1 2 Kosiba 31 3 had just added our own experienced resident engineers at each of the sites to help in that process becauce 4 we were concerned about that concern. I do not be-a lieve that is consistent with any tone of still not 6 being concerned, and yet the notion that that task 7 will be fixed by any one memorandum or any one meeting 8 or any one consultant, that is not part of my life; Q that is going to take a lot of work, and that is a 10 continuing problem for all programs. 11 The naval reactor program had that problem, 12 and the space program had that problem, and the nuclear 13 industry has that problem and will be working on it for a long time, and I intend to work at it very hard. 14 15 Q Do you understand the mechanism by which that particular issue got begged down in your 16 organization? g A I do not understand beyond the fact that questions raised by Mr. Hallman, and there were separate dis-10 cussions between additional paties which were not in 20 agrtement as to what action should be taken, and in 'l that disagreement the item stagnated. 22 Q Has there been any discussion as to whether '3 there ought to be some sort of review group to_which 24 issues can be referred which are of a safety nature, 25 and which a person raising the issue feels deserve 1891 226 BENJAMIN R EPO RTIN G SERVICE
1 2 Kosiba 32 3 review by a special group? A I personally in my experience believe that 4 committees for review of this sort are not nearly as a accountable and reliable as line organi=ational com-6 mitments; that is a personal opinion. 7 Q Have you had any discussion with respect to the NRC's role or requirements for training, as 9 that training is offered by B&W7 10 A May I hear that one again? 11 Q Let me rephrase it. Do you know whether the NRC has any role with 13 respect to B&W training? 3 14 A Yes, I understand that there is a role for NRC 15 in B&W training. 16 Q What was your understanding as tc what 17 that role is? 18 A The simulator training course has been qualified by the NRC as an acceptable simulator training course. 79 Furthermore, I have reviewed the standards that exist 20 and that are requirements for training for nuclear 21 operators. no ~ (Continued on Page 33.) 23 21 1891 227 25 B ENJ AMI N f!EPO RTIN G SERVICE
1 o Kosiba 33 sr/ew 3 Q Is there any other role to your knowledge 7.1 4 that the NRC has? To what issues did the NRC standards address themselves, do you know? a MR. EDGAR: I would like to get these o standards if we are going to get into those. 7 Q I would like to know if Mr. Kosiba has a 8 general idea of the issues addressed by the standards. 9 A Addressed by the standards are the selection and 10 training of operators, and those NC or NS standards 11 are basically endorsed -- I don't know if that is the 12 right word -- by the NRC, and that is the basis for selecting and training of operators. 13 Q Is there any standard for the selection and training of trainers? l a, A I am not aware of a standard for selection of 16 trainers. 17 Q Has B&W established its own standards and 18 requirements for the selection and training of 19 trainers? i891 228 20 A I am not aware that we have, except the iqplicit 31 standard which is the selection and assignment of training instructors from which one can infer standards. Q Have you, since you assumed your present position, ever discussed with any of your operating 21 utilities their exposure to and evaluation of training 25 BENJAMIN R EPO RTIN G SERVICE
1 2 Kosiba 34 7.2 3 programs offered by B&W? A No, I have not. 4 Q What is the role of Customer Service in the a 6 any, of utility operating and review and approval, if emergency procedures? 7 A I don't believe we have a role in approving. 8 Q Who would in the organization here at 9 Lynchburg? 10 A I don't believe any would. 11 MR. EDGAR: You may have misspoken. You 12 said " approval." Q okay. Do you have any role in review? 13 A Within the Service Department I know of no role in review of procedures. 15 Q Who to the best of your knowledge has the 16 role in review of procedures here at the Nuclear Power 17 Generating Division? 18 A I blieve we may be. I don't believe we review 19 operating procedures for the plant here in the division. 20 If I could mention that, we do contract service people to assist the utilities, and some of those people, when gy s employed in helping the utility for startup program or later test program, do perform the function of writing 23 or reviewing procedures. 24 We also have a sort of review in that in 2' i891 229 BENJAMIN REPORTING S ERVICE
1 2 Kosiba 35 7.3 3 the training simulator work we use the utilities' 4 procedures, but we do not do a review per se of the procedures, but we do see the procedures and have -a available to us procedures that we look at and use. Q Other than the contract service work that 7 your engineers may do from time to time on utility 8 procedures, to the best of your understanding there is 9 no review within B&W, is that correct? 10 A That is my understanding. I don't believe we are 11 contracted for to do that review. We provide procedures 12 for startup plant, and in certain instances where it is e ntracted to us, we provide either guideline 13 procedures or draft procedures at certain operations. MR. EDGAR: Can we define " review" and 15 make sure we have got the term pinned down? 16 Do you have a particular meaning attached to the 17 term? 18 MR. ROCKWELL: In my use of the term 19 " review" I mean does anybody have a chance, here 20 in the organization, have a chance to look at 21 the procedures and have a chance to comment on them if they wish to to the utility. A In handling the training simulator work, there is a chance to comment on it, but in the context of the 21 procedure being provided to us with the objective of 23 1891 230 BENJAMIN R EPO RTING S ERVIC E
1 2 Kosiba 36 3 having us review it and c o mme n t on it, that would only 4 occur in my understanding in a casual way on some particular issue or question. If there was, for a example, if our draft procedure or our guideline procedure had a step in it that was a question to the 7 utility, then there would be questions. But there 8 would be additional information provided. But the 9 notion of having operating procedures submitted to us 10 for review with the objective of getting comments, 11 that is not within my understanding. 12 Q When your engineers are provided on a e ntract service basis to write procedures, is their 13 work reviewed here at all here in Lynchburg, that is? A Normally I believe for the most part it would 15 not be reviewed here. Again in those instances where 16 there are questions or where there might be some 17 novelty or some change in the design of the plant which 18 was not within the experience and practice of the 19 previous operations on a case-by-case basis I believe 20 I have seen evidence of traffic addressing new points r questisn points. 21 Q Why is the mechanism of a contract service used for the B&W. involvement in writing these utility 23 procedues, where it is involved? 21 A I really don't know how that originated. 25 1891 231 BENJAMIN R EPO RTIN G SERVICE
1 o Kosiba 37 3 Q In other words, is there any reason for a 4 contract for this to be done on a contract service basis, as opposed to simply procedures coming down a here to Lynchburg and bring written or drafted here in the main part of the organization? 7 A I don't know how the practice started. I could 8 conjecture, but I don't understand that that would help 9 you much. 10 Q I think that is fine, utilities seem to have the 11 A It is the practice 12 practice of hiring service people who are at the site and are within their control to have this work done. 13 That is the pattern. That is not unique to any one location. It is an industry pattern. l a, Q Would it be your expectation that procedures 16 drafted by B&W employees under these contracts for 17 service would reflect the existing state of knowledge 10 and state of the art of the B&W organization? 19 A It would reflect the knowledge of that individual. 20 I can't go further than that. 31 Q The question is whether they reflect the state of knowledge of the organization of B&W. 23 ~ to go further than the fact that A I -have no_ basis ~ they reflect his knowledge, because when he writes 21 those procedures, my understanding is he acesn't involve 25 i891 232 BENJAMIN R EPO RTIN G SERVICE
1 2 Kosiba 38 3 other people except where he judges their point of 4 novelty or question. Q When the service is provided to the utility 3 of writing these procedures through these engineers, b is the utility told that the end result is limited to i the knowledge of one man? 8 A I really don't know. 9 Q Is the utility told that B&W is not repre-10 senting, when the draft procedure goes back, that the 11 draft procedure represents the knowledge of B&W as an 12 organi=ation? A In my mind we are mixing up a e uple f three 13 things here in the way the question is asked of me. When we send them draft procedures, that is a different l a, situation than when we are contracting out a man to ~ 16 write procedures at the utility's location. l~ Q ! am talking only about contracting out a 18 man to write procedures in the utility. 19 A When he writes procedures, I would not say it is 20 limited to wha,t he knows because he does call upon 31 assistance as he judges necessary, but it is his judg-ment as to whether what he is writing is being adapted -- a procedure that -has been used, for example, from one plant at a site to a second plant at a site, in which 21 case he would feel quite competent to make these 1891 233 25 BENJAMIN REPORTING S ERVICE
1 2 Kosiba 39 3 changes in value of numbers or configuration apply; 4 as contrasted with the situation s are he might be inv lved in a situati n where he might not have 5 precedent, in which case he would ask for help. Q Does B&W take responsibility for and stand 7 behind the procedures that are written by your 8 engineers undar this contract for service basis? 9 A You are getting into legal terms. 10 MR. EDGAR: You are asking for a '. e g a l 11 opinion. 12 (Continued on following page.) 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 2' 1891 234 25 BENJAMIN REPORTING S ERVICE
SR 8 lc 1 o Kosiba 40 ~ 3 Q I am asking as the manager. 4 MR. EDGAR: You are asking a question 5 about the terms of the contract. g Let me restate the question. As manager of Customer Service, would you stand behind what your 8 engineers working under contract for service supply 9 to a utility? A I d n't know what you mean by " stand behind." 10 11 Q Would you say, "Yes, that represents the best knowledge of my organization? 13 A No, I would say that that represents the best knowledge of that person, who is a qualified person. 14 Q Do you know whether B&W tells the utilities l a. that the product of that engineer -- 16 A I believe the utilities understand perfectly. 17 Q Let me finish the question. Do you 18 understand whether Babcock & Wilcox tells the utili-19 ties that the work product of that engineer working 20 under a contract for service represents only his 21 knowledge and not the knowledge of B&W collectively 33 as to organization? A I don't know. '. do know that it is well _n,a understood that when such a person is contracted out to do this work, I am confident it is understood that 1891 235 25 BENJAMIN REPORTING SERVICE
1 2 Kosiba 41 8.2 3 the utility knows he is not sending the procedure back here for five or six or seven other disciplines 4 to review it, which is the kind of review that I infer a from the way your question is asked. They know that 6 that work does not come back here to get reviewed by 7 the instruments and so forth disciplines. They know 8 this man does it at the site. It is perfectly clear 9 to them that he does it there. The time schedule is 10 such that he must do it there. 11 (A brief recess was taken.) 12 Q Mr. Kosiba, what responsibility does B&W 13 feel it has with respect to those operating and 14 emergency procedures in use at its operating utilities which apply to the NSSS systems, with respect .t o whether l a-chey are adequate or not? MR. EDGAR: Technically adequate? g MR. ROCKWELL: That is correct. 18 A At any given day, we may not even have the pro-19 cedures, that is, in the control room. Therefore, a 20 rigorous answer to your question says that ye cannot 'l have responsibility. A substantive aTswer is that ., n we have over a period of time provided information 23 and continue to provide information, such as the 34 site instructions which followed the Three Mile Island incident, which is a mechanism we use regularly, n. _a and is not unique to Three Mile Island, by which, if BENJAMIN R EPO C! TIN G SERVICE 1891 236
1 2 Kosiba 42 3 we learned from the experience of any one of our 4 operating plants, or from any one of our analyses or any one of our vendors of any steps tha tsho uld be taken a in the operation of our product, we provide that to the operators. But we do not have the involvement to 7 know that when that information is provided that it 8 is put into the operating program and is really being 9 ~ used. That is not part of our role in the business. 10 So in the rigorous sense, the answer to your 11 question is none. In the practical sense, the answer 12 is that we have substantial responsibility and do 13 exercise that responsibility by providing information to our operating plants as quickly and completely as 14 we are able t d with the understanding we have of 15 the plant design and operation. Q I take it it would be a fair statement to 14 say that B&W stands in the position of greatest expertise with respect to the designing and theoretical 19 basis for the NSSS systems which it manufactures. 20 A Yes. I would add to that statement that the 'l way in which the interfacing balance of plant systems na may be installed or may be modified with time is in a 23 different category with respect to our knowledge of 1891 237 34 what is happening. 25 In other words, your question was NSSS, but I BENJAMIN R EPO RTIN G S ERVICE
1 2 Kosiba 43 3 am adding to that statement to say that the way the NS SS behaves is influenced by the intervening systems, 4 which are not part of our design, and our knowledge a is considerably less, and the currency of our knowledge 6 is subject to considerably more question. 7 Q Do you have any understanding of what 8 kind of contact or communication existed between the 9 Training Department and the Engineering Section or Group 10 before March 28, 1979? 11 A I have casual knowledge, namely, I am aware 12 that there was a practice of, on an occasional basis, 13 taking some plant behavior question, and the Engineering Analysis people would go down with the. simulator 14 people and do some checking to see if they could get l a-further understanding of the particular phenomenon. 16 But I cannot tell you whether that happened once in 17 six months or what frequency, but there was a connec-18 tion.there on an occasional problem, particularly those lo which in'olved overall plant operations. 20 Q Have you established any policy with
- 1 respect to the contact and flow of information which 22 you think is necessary between Engineering and Training?
23 A I am working to establish a pattern in concert 34 hopefully with our customers which will assure a bu_lding on the start we have made in operating 0~3 i891 233 BENJAMIN REPORTING SERVICE
1 2 Kosiba 44 3 guidelines, whose essential elements include having the analysis people, the test people and the training 4 people all participate and in concert, in agreement, a on the behavior of the plants under certain perttabances. 6 I assume that you know that we prepared such i guidelines for the small break in response to the TMI 2 8 event. I am hopeful and believe it will be valuable 9 to the industry to enlarge upon that practice as a 10 means of communicating not only mengst the various 11 operators and ourselves, but also within our own 12 department to assure that the best possible informa-13 tion is made available to the operater in a manner, in a shape, in a form that is more readily taken g4 aboard and understood by the operator. l a. 16 Q Have you made any specific changes within the Nuclear Services Department based on the experience with the Dunn memorandum? 18 A No, I have not. g 20 Q What efforts or changes that you have made since you became manager of the department do k you think can address the issue of moving information 22 through the department and getting it to the place 23 ]}}} }}} where it needs to go in a timely fashion? 24 A-Can I hear that again? 25 BENJAMIN R EPO RTIN G S ERVICE
1 2 Kosiba 45 3 (Previous question was read back.) A I would like to discuss that for a few seconds 4 to assure myself that I am answering what you uere a asking me. 6 My impression of the Dunn mamo was that the communication was made tc people in responsible 8 positions and that the errors in execution, speed 9 of execution. was a disagreement between several 10 people with knowledge and understanding. 11 In that regard., the actions I have taken don't 12 address that failure to reach agreement and con-13 summate action. I have taken actions, and actians 14 are still under way step by step to make improvements 15 in the system or information flow between the 16 perating experience at the plant to the division and back out again. But I really don't think those g actions address the fundamental failure of the Dunn 18 meno. I think those actions tidy up, make more effi-19 cient, make more visible, items that get lost. But 20 I don't think the Dunn memo got lost. I think it 'l vt s given and known to Dunn, Hallman and several other 22 people, and the disagreement is what caused the problem. 3 The actions I tcok on our system per se would not resolve a disagreement between several people 24 25 on an item. It may have given it more visibility BENJAMIN R EPO RTIN G SERVICE
1 2 Kosiba 46 3 and indirectly helped a little bit, but I view the actions that I have taken to be to streamline, step 4 by step, the many problems that come in, because we a do have many problems ranging in difficulty from 6 trivial instances which have now large follow-on 7 repercussions to complicated problems which have 8 follow-on repercussions. Sifting through that is 9 a process that one keeps watch on and tries to 10 tighten up. Those were the actions that I took. 11 (Continued on Page 47.) 13 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 21 25 BENJAMIN R EPO RTIN G S ERVICE
1 Kosiba 47 o sr/ew 3 Q Do you see a need for addressing the issue 9.1 4 of resolving differences and consummating in action at least in those areas where the issue raised is serious? o A I would like to have all those solved very ( quickly and would work very hard to do that. 7 Q That is a " Garden of Eden" answer. 8 A That is similar to the question. 9 Q But structurally in erms 10 A That is my understanding of your question, "Would 11 you like to have problems solved," and I certainly 12 would, yes. Maybe you intended more in your question. (Previ us question was read back.) 13 A I am very much in favor of that, and anyplace where I know of inaction taking place, I work very hard 15 to cause action. I don't have a gimmick for making 16 that happen. I would be glad to hear of one. I will 17 copy anybody. 18 Q Do you think where a serious issue, such 19 as the Dunn memorandum, is raised that it is appro-20 priate for discussion to continue for, in that case, 13 or more months without advising the operating ny utilities that it has been identified as a serious concern and that.you are examining the question? 23 A I would like to hear that one again. 24 (Previous question was read back.) 25 1891 242 B ENJ AMIN R EPO RTIN G S ERVICE
1 o Kosiba 48 9.2 3 A I really don't know the answer to that question 4 in my own mind because I'm not sure of what you are communicating to me. Our first intention in any instance where there is an inaction or a serious issue left open like that, 7 is to escalate it and resolve it. We are in favor of 8 doing that. I am in favor of doing it. 9 I find it hard to comprehend the situation where 10 myself or any other manager -- understood a manager 11 a serious problem wasn't getting solved and putting 12 himself into the position of telling the customer that, "I have a serious problem that I won't act on." I 13 just can't see myself in that situation. Given a serious action, the action is to resolve it. I can't 15 imagine myself in the context of the question. 16 Questions that impact the design of the plant to the 17 operation of the plant should be resolved. 18 Q In your opinion, how is B&W going to 19 prevent this kind from happening again, and by "this 20 kind of thing" I mean identification of a serious safety 31 concern, the organization being advised of it, at least certain members of the organization, and then no action occurring, and then potentially an accident arising 23 related to the safety concern that has been raised? 24 A We have taken the action, ongoing action, of 25 1891 243 B ENJAMIN R EPO RTING S ERVICE
1 o Kosiba 49 9.3 3 improving the visibility of these problems that are 4 identified from the site. This particular problem did not come from the site. O In the same tone, we expect to have a continuing involvement of the various parties involved in the 7 operating guidelines to facilitate discussion and 8 transmission of intelligence to the customer. I feel 9 that that is going to be a very positive help, and that 10 were that vehicle or habit in place, it woul'd have 11 facilitated communication of the concern and possible 12 solution. 13 By the same token, we have a mechanism which concerns itself with preliminary safety concerns, and by the training and example of working with our various managers we would expect that one of these 16 several modes of communicating this kind of problem 17 would be effective, and I believe the strongest part 18 of it is training the habit or persistent attention to 19 detail of question, and that is an effort we are going 20 to make. 31 Q Is there any internal training or education that you think is useful in accomplishing that? A I know of no training that has been instituted in response to the Three Mile Island event as of now. 24 I am quite familiar that we have ongoing training o-eD i891 244 BENJAMIN R EPO RTIN G S ERVICE
1 2 Kosiba 50 9.4 3 programs on conflict resolution that go back as long as I can remember. There is an ongoing program now 4 on conflict resolution. It is part of the training a manual. There are people going through it with the 6 principles of escalation and so forth and so on. 7 with respect to changes in that training from 8 the perspective of the Three Mile Island experience, 9 I am not aware that anything has been done to date. 10 I am aware that I have in the conceptual stage had 11 discussions to establish or reestablish, I should say, 13 training programs for people in the customer Service Department. such training I understand was done in 13 the past, but when I assumed responsibility for the department, I became aware that ongoing technical 15 training programs of the service ilk -- and I want to 16 be careful here because teennical programs for 17 engineering skills were ongoing and available, but 18 specialized programs for people in the service area 19 were such that I thought we ought to re-start that 20 activity as an ongoing activity. gy Looking back on what I have just said, I am not quite sure whether that realization was before the incident or after the incident, and I believe the 23 correct statement for me to mLke is that it was both, 24 namely one must provide continuous training to people 25 i891 245 BENJAMIN R EPO RTIN G SERVICE
1 Kosiba 51 o 9.5 3 because the plants are changing, whether they change 4 physically or whether our understanding of them changes, and one must keep telling people about them. They are a not static, and the decision or indecision that the 6 emphasis of training go over to the engineering-7 technical as opposed to the service-technical, I 8 consider to be part of my charter to give better recog-9 notion to the total service we supply the customer, 10 as opposed to the service which many people by tradi-11 tion had in their mind of supplying NSSS. 13 Those are two different markets and two different worlds that people live in. Q I have one other question. Have you ever talked with Mr. Taylor since March 28, 1979 to ask him 15 what understanding he had of the handling of the Dunn 16 memorandum? 17 A I am not sure. He may have been the person that 18 gave me the copy on the night it was during the 19 night I was standing watch. 20 Q You are aware that it was addressed to him? A I was aware that it was addressed to him. I gy don't recall whether he handed it to me or whether immediately after. reading it he was present also on 23 watch, and we exchanged a few words. I did not in the 24 quiet of the working day go to see Mr. Taylor and talk 1891 246 25 BENJAMIN REPORTING S ERVICE
1 2 Kosiba 52 9.5a 3 about it. Any conversation we had on the memo was 4 casual in terms of our watch standing, which, of course, took up most of our time in Aprt1. -a 10. Q You have had no other conversations with him about that? t A About that memo, no. 8 Q Mr. Kosiba, have you made any statement n since the ace!. dent at Three Mile Island about your 10 knowledge of that accident or about your knowledge of 11 events surrounding that accident, and when I say have 12 you made a statement, what I mean by that is have you made a written statement in your own words or have you 13 given an interview in a question and answer format? MR. EDGAR: For example, to NRC? l a, A Well, we have had visitors. We have talked about 16 it. 17 Q Let me define it further, Mr. Kosiba. What 18 I am talking about is something that ultimately gets 19 reduced to writing or is on tape, not informal conver-20 sations. 21 MR. EDGAR: An NRC inspector, for instance. A I made a presentation which was reduced to view n_o graphs before a Subcommittee of ACRS on operating a information. That was the 31st of May. I remember it 24 because that is when we displayed the T meter. I sat 1891 247 23 BENJAMIN R EPO RTIN G S ERVICE
1 3 Kosiba 53 make a presentation on one as part of the general 3 program of B&W, provided to several subcommittee members of theACRS. 5 Q What was the focus? 6 A My comments were how does B&W process operating 7 experience. O Q And was this with reference to the TMI 27 9 A It was in response to TMI 2, but the question was 10 generic, how do we process operating experience. The 11 generic question was prompted by their interest in TMI 2 and things like the PORV. g Q Do you have those materials still? A I believe I have the view graphs that I used, 14 but I'm not positive. I may have loaned some out for 15 others to use. I would be glad to provide what I have 16 or what I can retrieve. 17 Q Did you prepare any text to accompany that 18 or was it essentially off the top of your head? 19 A I did not prepare any text to accompany that. I scribbled some notes and then talked from the view 20 graphs. Q Could we have a set of the view graphs to
- 2. '.
the extent that itistill exists in your possession? 23 A sure. 24 MR. EDGAR: Off the record. i891 248 .a BENJAMIN R EPO RTIN G S ERVICE
1 2 Kosiba 54 3 (There was discussion off the record.) 4 Q You said that was the first time you had presented the T meter? Is that the meter which is -a sat in the ditital readout over your simulator? A Yes. 7 Q Is that something you have added to the 8 simulator since the 28th of March? 9 A Yes, it is. 10 Q Are you providing that to the op~ ating 11 utilities now? 12 A We have not provided any as of yet. 13 Q Was that something that was implemented in the light of your. analysis of the TMI 2 accident? A Yes, it was. MR. ROCKWELL: Mr. Kosiba, I am going to 16 recess your deposition at this time, which 17 means that you are subject to further recall. 18 We have no present plans to recall you, but in 19 case we do, we are recessing the deposition, 20 and if we need to get in touch with you, we will 21 (Continued on following page.) 23 1891 249 3 25 B ENJ AMIN REPORTING SERVICE
1 n .'.o s i b a 55 3 get in touch with Mr. Edgar and he would let 4 you know in turn. Thank you very much. o (Whereupon, the deposition adjourned at 4:10 p.m.) t 8 Richard Erwin Kosiba g 10 subscribed and sworn to 11 before me this________., 12 day of_________________ 13 1979 14 15 Notary Public 16 17 18 00o 19 20 21 22 23 1891 250 24 e, -) B ENJ AMI N REPORTING S ERVICE
1 2 56 3 I-N-D-E-X 4 E13D925 E1E9EE 5 Richard Erwin Kosiba 3 6 I E-X-H-I-B-I-T-S g Kosiba Deposition for 9 I$993ijigagigg page 10 60 Resume of Richard Erwin Kosiba 3 11 12 13 11 o00 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 2' 1891 251 25 BENJAMIN R EPO RTIN G SERVICE
1 2 57 3 C-E-R-T-I-F-I-C-A-T-E 4 STATE OF NEW YORK ) ) ss: 5 COUNTY OF NEW YORK ) 6 We, ROBERT ZERKIN, Notary Public of the 7 State of New York and STANLEY RUDBARG, Certified Shorthand Reporter and Notary Public of the State of 8 New York, do hereby certify that the foregoing deposition of RICHARD ERWIN KOSIBA was taken before me 10 on the 3rd day of July, 197.. 11 The said witness was duly sworn before the lo ~ commencement of his testimony; that the said testimony 13 was taken stenographically by us and then transcribed. 14 The within transcript is a true record of 15 the said deposition. We are n t related by blood or marriage to 16 any of the of the said parties, nor interested directly or indirectly in the matter in controversy, nor are we 18 in the employ of any of the counsel. 19 IN WITNESS WHEREOF, we have hereunto set "O ~ our hands this 3rd day of July, 1979. 21 22 ROBERT ZERKIN 23 g4 STANLEY RUDBARG, CSR 25 1891 252 B ENJ/ MIN R EPO RTING SERVICE}}