ML19289F958
| ML19289F958 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 04/25/1979 |
| From: | Mccabe E NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | Grier B NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| References | |
| TASK-TF, TASK-TMM NUDOCS 7906210217 | |
| Download: ML19289F958 (3) | |
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t'EMCPANCGl FOR:
- 8. H. Grier, Director, RI 7-dd f
I THRU:
E. J. Brunner ief, RO&NS Branch, RI FRC';:
Ebe C. McCabe, Jr.. Chief, RPS 2, RO&NS Branch, RI SUBJE C:
REPORT OF ACTIVITIES AT THREE MILE ISLAND This memo is submitted in response to RI Announcement No. 79/20, dated April 17, 1979.
1.
Narra tim: of Time at the TMI_ Site 29 6
I arrived on site during the evening of March 4&",1979, and departed 16, 1979.
Work periods varied frca about 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> to about 6
en April 28 hours3.240741e-4 days <br />0.00778 hours <br />4.62963e-5 weeks <br />1.0654e-5 months <br /> at a stretch, with the longer stretches cccurring during the earlier parts of the stay.
Work hour inputs for PMS recording have been made.
s.
2.
Strmary of Activities Performed a.
Liaison with licensee personnel.
upervision of IE inspectors.
e c.
Liaison with NRR.
d.
Liaison with RI and IE:HQ.
Response to Media Inquiries.
e.
i f.
Contacts with the State Police on material and aircraft routinJ and control.
3.
Com.ent,/Cbservation Reca rding Licensee Ocera tion It was my observation that licensee personnel were perfoming a.
calmly and professionally when I arrived.
This corrobora tes the statements made in this regard by RI inspectors (Gallina and Higgins) and NRR:0LB (Holman).
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2 B. ji. Grier 25 W b.
The NRC input after the accident had the potential of becoming too many voices giving too many directions anct, thereby G
detracting frcm the licensee's perfomance.
Ac time progressed, G the licensee personnel " edginess" about this became evident.
This appeared to be a.coblem which did not result in unsafe conditions but one which does require considerable attention.
4.
Cements About NRC Ocerations at the Site a.
Public pronouncec it should be made from the site by the Senicr NRC official.
Ccmunications difficulties, both tech-nical and human, tend to inaccurately represent actual condi-tion because of tige delay variances, lack of information, and the inevitable dist. te occurring when co m unications are
@ sh '.
relayed through a number of intemediate individuals on a rush basis.
The media usn the scene of an incident as a prime input.
Differing inputs frca distant sources tend to confuse them and the public.
Inputs frcm less knowledgeable and/or objective people get publicized when a knowledgeable NRC source is not available, and such inputs do not appear to ccee' frcm the less excited members of the populace.
Inputs from licensee management are not likely to be accepted by the public and local government without NRC corroboration.
b.
There has been considerable controversy about whether the NRC role in a serious incident should be investigative or partici-patory.
In my opinion, this incident has shown that our response must be participatery.
The NRC must play a primary role in providing input to responsible government officials and the media, and that role must include our assassment of plant conditions and our reccmendations.
It must be couched in terms which do not cause panic or license a frightened or sensationalistic media to do so.
(Ky impression was that the media output was conducive to public panic but that the local media was much less panic provocative than the rest.
I also felt that panic was, at times, the greatest hazard to the public.)
It was not until Harold Centon arrived that a voice sufficent to override inflamatory tendencies was present to assure the public that they were in no imediate danger.
c.
Self contained, mobile quarters should be available to NRC officials responding to prolonged incidents.
A number of key people will have to remain on site for prolonged periods, and the ability to shower, shave, eat, and sleep at the scene could be a key factor in prolonging their endurance.
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1 MR 2 51979
- 8. M. Grier 3
d.
Co:m:unications capability was inadequate for some tice. We were unable to contact Congressman Ertel as he recuested. We were often unable to get an outside line to anybocy.
Two independent and mobile means of corntunication should be pro-vided.
e.
Requests for information were voluminous.
Communications ability is counter productive if it hampers the " scene activity.
(9 Stringent gmphasis should be placed on the " Operational Signifi-cance" M information requests.
Any data / inputs which cannot G-change the course of the on scene response must '1 ave a low priori ty.
Requests for infomation which is needed but which is not obviously involved in the on scene response should include the use for the infomation in order to permit better priority assigrar,ent on site.
f.
A " scrounger" is a necessary part of on scene response.
His function is obtaining supplies, phones, airplanes, sample containers, trucks, cars, trailers, etc., and liaison with the Sta'te Poli.e on delivery of ma terials.
(He must start ' M ' wdb.t d phone that works and,a great deal of ingenuity.)
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The connunication link to IE:HQ should be carefully examined in regard to ensuring that on scene persennel in cnarge function properly without being bypassed.
h.
Public pronouncements about NRC Fv~N'- actions should not be
@ s'/l made during an incident.
Media dissemination of such statements can adversely affect the morale and perfornance of licensee personnel needed to implement corrective and incident response actions.
i.
Medical care is important and not just for injuries.
Key personnal should have immediate access to treatment for ill-ness / infection.
S
/W Ebe C. Mc abe, Jr.
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