ML19289F866
| ML19289F866 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 05/15/1979 |
| From: | Jason White NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | Grier B NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| References | |
| TASK-TF, TASK-TMM NUDOCS 7906200477 | |
| Download: ML19289F866 (3) | |
Text
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MEMORANDUM FOR:
B.,ce H. Grier, Director, Region I t
THRU:
George H. Smith, Chief, Fuel Facility and Materials Safety Branch FRCM:
John R. i4hite, Radiation Specialist
SUBJECT:
RE?CRT OF ACTIVITES AT THREE MILE ISLAND 2CA THE E0 0F AFRIL 9, 1979 (3. H. GRIER TO O'REILL't, KEPPLER, SEYFRIT AND ENGELKEN)
The following is a su= mary account of my involvement with the incident at Three Mile Island (TMI).
On March 28, 1979 I was at my residence, on sick leave.
At about 1200 M. Slobodien called and informet se of the events at TMI and read the FN.
I reported to the office approxi=ately 1330 and stationed myself in the incident center.
I was subsequently assigned to the incident center for the 0800-1600 watch.
On 3/28 and 3/29 1 remained over to lend assistance to the 1600-2400 watch.
At abeuw 1100 on 3/30/79 G. Smith infor=ed
_e that I would be going to IMI.
I was asked to also inform G. Yuhas of the same.
I called G. Yuhas at about 1330 and infor=ed him that we were being restationed at III.
Travel orders were initiated.
G. Yuhas and =yself left Region I at approximately 1500 and arrived at ntI at approxi=ately 1700 3/30/79.
At TMI, duty assignments were made.
I was assigned as shift leadar for in-plant health physics for the 0800-1600 shift.
My duties included coordinating the activities of other NRC health physicists stationed in-plant; monitoring the activities of the licensee's performance regarding the radiation protectica program; making independent
=easurements and following-up en information requests fra the II cc= mand trailer, R:I and II Headquarters.
I also attended the daily NRC/ licensee health physics meeting held between 1700-1900.
For the period of time I was at DII, I observed the licensee's HP program and noted the following:
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Memorandum for B. H. Crier 2
i 1.
The entire HP progrcs including radioactive waste handling was the direct responsibility of cne man, D. Dubiel. Though Dubiel appeared capable, this responsibility during the situation was more that he could ef fectively handle.
The result was a degrsdation of the per-formance of the health physics program during a period of time when the program should hava been its most effective.
2.
The HP function appeared to be without strong leadership or direc-tion. There was no coordination of activities, no for=ulation of a plan as to how to proceed.
3.
It appeared that the licensee had abandoned his in-plant health physics procedures, particularly access to high radiation areas and Radiation Work Permit procedures.
4.
Surveys particularly, air surveys were spurious (in s ome c as e s,
non-existent).
Sampte cumo.;cund u c; leng as 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />.
5.
In affort to aug=ent the HP progrms, General Dynamics-Electric Boat Division was brought in to provide technical and manage =ent support. Due to baternal problems between E3 and the licensee, the organizational plans in the health physics area were changed quite frequently (almost daily).
The result was that in-plant health physics operations were largely ine fficient and inadequate in dealing with the increased radiological hazards. Examples include:
a.
Failure to perform adequate air sampling to support ope *ations in the Unit 2 Auxiliary Building; b.
Failure to adequately control High Radiation Areas (an arca having dose rates as high as 450 R/hr was found unlocked or otherwise uncontrolled); all = embers of the security force ware found to have keys to all outside ground level doors to the Auxiliary and Service Buildings, some at which permitted access to High Radiation Areas)',
c.
F:ilure to adhere to procedural requirements regarding access to controlled areas, Radiation Work Permits, radiological sur-vays and respiratory protection program; and d.
Failure to adequately train or otherwise instruct personnel in the ha:ards associated with occupancy or work at the TMI facility.
240 036
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Memorandum for B. H. Grier 3
i 6.
Though some of the inadequacies in the Radiation Protection Program might appear to be the result of the immediate emergency situation, my general impression is that the entire radiation protection group was probably generally inadequate l
in normal operations.
Evidence such as failure to have sufficient air sampling equipment ("hi-vols","lo-vols" CAMS, etc.), failure to require adherence to radiation protection procedures, failure to implement normal health physics practices, failure to recognize the need for a frequent and reliable air sampling program, and failure to implement the i 2spiratory protection program, would lend credence to this argument.
In the early part of the event (March 23-April 3,1979), it l
/.
appeared justifiable to assign IE to a " consulting" position in order to assure that personnel exposure would be minimized.
However, it is increasingly evident that it is necessary to permit IE to perform enforcement activi
>s.
I observed that from April 3 to April 11, 1979, very little positive action was taken on the part of IE to induce to the licensee to com-ply with regulatory requirements in the radiaticn protection area.
I believe it is imperative to return IE to regulatory status as soon as possible in order to assure that the licensee's performance is in accord with these requirements.
W/
E MM John R. White Radiatio.n Specialist cc:
G. H. Smi th H. W. Crocker G. L. Snyder 240 037 ee "N"
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