ML19289F854
| ML19289F854 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 04/13/1979 |
| From: | Verdery E NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | Grier B NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| References | |
| REF-SSINS-0780, TASK-TF, TASK-TMM NUDOCS 7906200439 | |
| Download: ML19289F854 (2) | |
Text
.
gn Ric o UNITED STATES g
jo NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION g
u
~&g -
,7;
[
c (*
q REClONil
{.
g g[Hj;f E
101 M ARIETTA STR EET, N.W.
oj.
ATLANTA, GEORGI A 30003 N v(/
APR 131979 SSINS 0780 E:0RANDUM FOR:
B. H. Grier, Director, Office of Inspection and Enforcement, Region I FROM:
E. H. Verdery, Reactor Inspector, Reactor Proj ects Section No. 2, RONS Branch, Region II
SUBJECT:
TRIP REPORT OF ACTIVITIES AT THREE MILE ISIAND s.
a.
Arrived 3/30/79 at 2230 b.
Departed 4/7/79 at 0200 c.
Time on duty:
3/31 0730-1900 4/1 0730-2230 4/2-4/7 1400-0100 2.
Reviewed proposed Emergency Procedures and Special Operating Procedures in conjerction with ONRR personnel. Verified proposed action against Technical Specifics.tions, provided ONRR personnel with Technical support.
3.
It was readily apparent from my involvement in the procedure review process that there was a signiffcant lack of coordination between the procedure writers and the support personnel from B&W, GPC and Met Ed.
Many procedures failed to recognize the overall plan for recovery or the i=me.iate concerns for not placing the plant into d
Decay Heat Re= oval Operation.
E.e best way to describe the situation
{
would be that each group was operacing in a "vacuu=".
I believe this l
coordination problem could have been resolved by having the "Think Tank", procedure writers and NRC reviewers in close proximity to discuss controversial issues.
Operations personnel appeared weary and were obviously getting frustrated with the disorganization of the groups through which they were working.
4.
NRC/IE operations on site were obviously very confused at first.
However, I felt that IE relinquished control of this incident far too quickly and f ailed to provid adequate G rection to the licensee or the NRC people made available on site.
ONRx personnel were not equipped with the requisite operational experience or plant under-standing to be placed in their decision making role.
To be quite r906200439 J
v n
p
~
2,
Apg i 31973 B. H. Grier frank, the entire operation was a severe condemnation of our compe-tence when operational situations in 'real time' are involved.
While individuals were performing exceptionally well under the most adverse of circumstances, we must recognize cur limitations and be willing to accept justified criticism for getting too deeply involved
'n the operational situation.
IE has the operational responsibility for those situations and if we are to provide the public with adequate assurance that we can handle the job, I believe that some sweeping changes are in order.
Specificially, the IE & NRR personnel should operate as a unified group with one Director in charge. The inter-face with the licensee should be at the utility management level.
Al_ e.vre md plant - : gen n: 1_.
l.
All proposed plant manipulations under the accident recovery process should be approved in concept and necessary specifics by the NRC Director. We would give the licensee certain restrictio@ on what he could or could not do and have IE inspectors be present to review the procedure and observe the operations in progress to verify compliance.
The most important factor is to not attempt to learn how to operate plant syste= fin the middle of an emergency situation.
If you don't know the system beforehand and have experience in ope ating it you cannot expect to j
be competent to approvef' detailed operations.
M E. H. Verdery Resident Inspector 2h e
i