ML19289F848
| ML19289F848 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 04/26/1979 |
| From: | Dyer J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | Grier B NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| References | |
| REF-SSINS-8152, REF-SSINS-SSINS-8, TASK-TF, TASK-TMM NUDOCS 7906200428 | |
| Download: ML19289F848 (2) | |
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APR 2 61979 S.cINS 8152 MEMORANDUM FOR:
B. H. Grier, Director, Office of Inspection and Enforcement, Region I THRU:
James P. O'Reilly, Director, Office of Inspection 00 1
and Enforcement, Region II FROM:
J. A. Dyer, Reactor Inspector, Nuclear Support Section No. 1, RONS Branch, Region II
SUBJECT:
REPORT OF ACTIVITIES AT THREE MILE ISLAND I arrived at the TMI site on March 30, 1979 at 9:00 p.m. and departed on April 11, 1979 at 11:00 a.m.
My average work day was 11 hours1.273148e-4 days <br />0.00306 hours <br />1.818783e-5 weeks <br />4.1855e-6 months <br />.
For the fir =t four days I worked in the IE co=naad trailer as a ec=muni-cator and collated plant parameters as received from the Unit No. 2 Control Room.
The remaindng time was spent on the afternoon shift, in the Unit 2 facility, reviewing operating and emergency procedures sub=itted by the licensee and/or licensee representatives.
This review was in conjuncticn with representatives from NRR.
It was refreshing to note the number of utilities and vendors who offered assistance to Metropolitan Edison.
However, seme means should have been taken to c)ntrol the number and types of personnel on the site.
In my opinion t!.are were far too many personnel on site from all outside organi-rations.
It was obvious that many of the personnel were observers and were not really contrib ting to the recovery operation.
In the procedure area, there were procedures being written by personnel from various utilities and vendors who had no previous knowledge on TMI.
This led to continual co=ments on and rewrites of procedures. Many procedures submitted the first time simply would not work. We had personnel in three separate locations; the think tank, the procedure writers and the procedure reviewers. These personnel should be in one central location so that everyone has access to the sa=e information and to coordinate and speed up the entire operation.
There was too much duplication of effort between NRR and I&E.
The control room was continually bombarded by similar requests for information from the Region I response center, the IE:HQ response center, the NRR trailer, the IE trailer and the NRR response center. We need one central control center, with representatives from various offices, to coordinate requests for information to aid or control the recovery effort.
There were also requests, which had no bearing on plant recovery, and should not have been made.
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}.H.Grier Apg g 61979 If we (NRC) are going to be in control, the personnel who have to make snap decisions on the spot should be in the plant control room where information is readily available.
They should not be in an area where every bit of information cust be relayed by telephone or radio.
In situations such as this one, the majority of personnel involved should have an operational background.
'* A chn A. Dyer Reactor Inspector 2"'Jd. 400
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