ML19289F385

Suppl to 790228 Petition to Intervene & Listing of Contentions

ML19289F385
Person / Time
Site:	Comanche Peak
Issue date:	05/07/1979
From:	Ellis J Citizens Association for Sound Energy
To:
References
NUDOCS 7906070305
Download: ML19289F385 (58)

Text

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NRC PUBLIC DOCUMENT ROOM g;;$5 y

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O4x UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION U

In the catter of l

i APPLICATION OF TEXAS UTILITIES l

Docket Nos. 50 kh5 GENERATING COMPANY FOR AN l

and 50 kh6 CPERATING LICENSE FOR COMANCE l

PEAK STEAM ELECTRIC STATION l

UNIT #1 and #2 (CPSES) l SUPPLEME C TO PETITION FOR LEAVE TO INTERVENE AND CONTENTIONS BI CASE (CITIZENS ASSOCIATION FOR SOUND ENERGY)

CCMES NCW Citizens Association for Sound Energy (hereinafter referred to as CASE), on its own behalf and on behalf of its members, and files this its Supplement to Petition for L3 ave to Intervene and Cententions in the above-captioned =atter pursuant to Section 2 714 of the Nuclear Regulatory Cc= mission's Rules of Practice, and for grounds therefore would show the following:

I.

INTERESTS TC BE AFFECTED CASE incorporates each and every allegation contained in its February 28, 1979 filing herein for all purposes, and in addition would show the following:

CASE alleges that the applicant has failed to ecmply with certain regulations of the Nucle r Regulatory Ccx=nission and that to allow the applicant to possess, use, and operate the Cccanche Peak nuclear power plant will endanger the property, business interests, health and lives of CASE and its members.

7 906 070 3C7

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_2 II. CONTENTIONS CONTENTION No. 1: The applicant cannot be depended upon to adequately protect, either in the normal or the emergency operation of the Conanche Peak nuclear power plant (CPSES), the health and safety of the public and the individuals represented by CASE, and should therefore not be allowed to operate the plant.

EXPIANATION: Texas Utilities has consistently demonstrated the correctness of this contention, as evidenced by statements made by officials of four environ-mental protection agencies that the cc=pany is " reluctant to comply with regula_

tions, slow in =aking corrections, negligent in reporting violations and uncooperative in supplying data to regulatcry agencies." The co=pany has repeatedly violated air and water pollution standards.

The following four agencies are taking or considering action against the company:

1.

The Texas Air Control Board. The board's staff decided in late March 1979 to sue the company for putting a boiler into operation at the Martin Lake lignite power plant earlier this year before the proper air pollution control equipment was ready and running it for more than two months. One board member, Joe C. Bridgefarmer of Dallas, requested the proposed suit be put to a vote of the board; that delayed filing of the suit until at least the board's next meeting on Friday, May L,

9 On May L,1979, the Texas Air Control Board approved a recoc=endation which allowed the staff to send the suit to the attorney general's office for filing. The suit alleges several violations by Texas Utilities, the most serious 2231 117

r 3-of which is that the company started a new boiler at Martin Lake in February without turning on the equipment to reduce emissions of sulfur and particulates.

The suit charges the company with leaving the particulate-reducing equipment off for 22 days and the sulfur scrubbers off for about 80 days. The suit seeks an injunction and fines of between $50 and $1,000 for each day of violation.

Under questioning before the Texas House Environmental Affairs Ccmmittee on May 4, the following information was brought out:. Joe C. Bridgefarmer owns "1,300 or 1,600" shares of Texas Utilities stock. He has known T. Louis Austin, Jr., Chairman of the Board of Texas Utilities, for "q.uite a number of years" and had discussed the matter of air pollution at the company's plants with him.

Bridgefarmer said he asked the suit be delayed so he could get more infor=ation on it; but he gave conflicting statenents on what his intentions were at the time he asked for the delay. At the air control board meeting in the morning, he read a prepared statement saying that because of his ccmpany's relationship with Texas Utilities, "I did not then and do not now intend to vote or otherwise participate in the board's resolution of this matter." But in the afternoon, he told the House committee that he was unfamiliar vita the ethics rules and had not decided from the start to disqualify himself from the vote. Bridgefarmer, in addition to owning stock in Texas Utilities, is general manager of the Dallas office of Gibbs & Hill, Inc., a firm that has collected millions of dollars frcm the utility for designing the Comanche Peak nuclear power plant. Befe.e joining Gibbs and Hill in 1977, Bridgefarmer was president of Forrest & Cotton Inc., a Dallas engineering company that has also done work for Texas Utilities.

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F 4-From the start, Texas Utilities has been reluctant to install required pollution control equipment. As each of the company's three lignite plants began operations, the air control board had to go to court or threaten court action to get the company to install the equipment. Although the company installed sulfur scrubbers and other equipment, air control board officials say the equi'inent is either inadequate or the company doesn't bother to use the devices at times.

The agency is considering taking legal action against the company for other violations, in addition to the above:

(a) Pollution control devices on the two other Martin Lake boilers were off for periods of a week and three weeks, respectively, in February, and the board was not notified; (b) Smoke from the stacks of the first two boilers at Martin Lake was too opaque almost one out of every two hours during the first three months of the year (opacity is a measurement of the particulates in the snoke); (c) Smoke from the stacks of the caspany's first lignite fr.cility, the eight-year-old Big Brown plant, exceeds the opacity standard as much as 99 per cent of the time; (d) At the Menticello plant, the caspany let one boiler operate even though samples failed federal air standards, and one day last August the ecmpany let the plaat run for seven hours with the particulate-removing device turned off, emitting roughly 100 times more particulates than normal.

According to Dennis Haverlah, who is in charge of boiler permits for the Texas Air Control Board, at least one other utility in Texe duces the power production frcm its coal plant to bring emissions

..ance with the standards. Texas Utilities not only doesn't do that, but it t

.st't use its 2231 119

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pollution centrol equipment any more than it has to to meet the standards, he says.

2.

The Tixas Department of Water Resources. The Department has asked the State Attorney General's office to sue the company for unlawful discharges into Martin Lake over a four-month period last su==er and for failing to report the discharges. The water contained traces of the toxic metal selenium, which is strongly suspected of killing thousands of fish between May and October 1978 and bringing all fishing since then to a virtual halt. The company admits the discharges were made last su=mer but not that it is the proven cause of the fish-kills. It says the dumping has been halted.

The Department is also taking le. gal action for discharges from a lignite mining area at Martin Lake that exceeded permissible levels for total suspended solids and iron.

3 The Parks and Wildlife Depart =ent.

The Department is considering suing Texas Utilities to pay for the replacement of fish in Martin Lake. The Department began a study the week of April 30, 1979 to determine the seriousness of the fish loss.

h.

The U. S. Environmental Protection Agency. The EPA has called the company before it this month (May) to explain what it says are 18 alleged violaticns of federal vater pollution standards last vinter. EPA also charges the ecmpany with failing to report a violation and has ordered it to bring the discharges into ecm-pliance with stan&Lrds by May 26, 1979 Contention #1 is further supported by the December 6,1978 letter to P. G. P-ittain, President of TUSI (Texas Utilities Services Inc.) and TUGC0 (Texas Utilities Generating Campy), from Harold R. Denton, D1'-actor, Office of Nuclear 2231 120

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g Reactor Regulation and John G. Davis, Acting Director, Office of Inspection and Enforcement, NRC, Washington:

"The purpose of this letter is to direct your attention to our continuing concern for the accuracy and completeness of information submitted to the NRC by licensees and applicants. Our statutory responsibilities require that information received as part of the regulatory process be accurate and complete. This includes information provided in license applications, responses to licensing questions, enforcement letter responses, event reports, and IE Bulletin responses.

"As you know,10 CFR 50 30 requires that an application for a license, or amendment thereto, be provided under cath or affirmation. While other in-formation is not required to be provided under oath or affirmation, this in no way detracts from the necessity that all information submitted to the NRC be accurate. The information submitted should be substantiated by data, records, calculations and sound technical judgment. The required promptness of reply may, under certain cirewnstances, contribute to an inadvertent sub-mittal of incomplete or inaccurate information. Under such circumstances, we expect your prompt detection and immediate NRC notification of any in-accuracies and inecmpleteness in the information supplied to the NRC.

"You are no doubt aware that failure to meet the expected standards of accuracy and ccmpleteness has resulted in enforcement action. Enforcement action will continue to be considered for inaccurate or incomplete informa-tion amounting to material false statements. Such action is necessary, as inaccurate or incomplete information could lead to decisions which adversely affect the health and safety of the public.

"It is imperative that licensees and applicants meet their responsibility of positively assuring the accuracy and completeness of all information provided to tne NRC. It is expected that each licensee and applicant will have an active program to assure an awareness at all levels in their organi-

ation that nothing less than complete and accurate information is acceptable.

" Sincerely, (signed) Harold R. Denton and John G. Davis."

Additionally, there are certain actions which have been taken by the company in the past which are, if not actually illeg11, at least highly questionable 2231 121

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and which raise the question of the company's ability or desire to abide by regulations and guidelines which are set up to protect the best interests of the public. Two exa ples of this were demonstrated in the recent hearings into the transactions between the affiliated companies of Texas Utilities (Docket 1903 before the Texas Public Utility co= mission):

A.

In the April 20, 1979 Order of the Public Utility Commission of Texas, the Co=sission ordered the three operating subsidiaries of Texas Utilities Co=pany (Dallas Power & Light, Texas Power & Light, and Texas Electric Service Company) to refund $3 2 million to their customers and approved an end to aute=atic fuel adjustment charges on consumer electric bills. The PUC staff is to come up with a new way to figure the fuel adjustment charge. In its Order, the PUC stated:

"In previous rate case final orders...this Co==ission removed frcn the rate base of each operating co=pany...all advances cade from each operating ccmpany to TUGCO. It was determined that such advances should be treated as loans and that interest charged on such loans be considered as a portion of expense related to fuel expenses and be passed through to customers as part of such fuel expense. In addition, the Co=sission did not require that the income derived by the ccupanies frce these interest rates be deducted from their costs of service. In each case, the interest rate allowed was established at seven percent (7%) per annum. Subsequent to such rate orders and prior to refinancing by TtDCO frcm other sources, each utility increased the rate of interest charged without obtaining approval of the Co= mission. Each utility (TP&L, TESCO and DP&L) increased its rate charged to TUGC0 to nine and one-halfpercent(#)perannum...TheCo=missionfindsthatsuchincreasewas improper and in violation of the Act (Sec. kl(c)(3).. For a utility to be able to unilaterally increase the interest rate charged to its agent and, in turn, have that expense charged back to itself as a part of the fuel ex-penses is inconsistent with proper rate =aking...the utilities are not then free to change that rate at their own discretion and pass it through as a cost to its customers. To hold otherwise vould, in effect, permit a utility 2231 122

to utilize the fuel adjustment clause to unilaterally increase expenses and income over which it has ccmplete control by simply raising expenses, such as interest rates, to its affiliate...Each of the operating companies will be re-quired to refund to its customers those amounts charged by reason of the increase in the interest rate frcm seven percent (7%) to nine and one-half percent (9y%)

per annum..."

"The evidence in this case reflects that certain abuses can and do cccur in the fuel adjustment clause as it is now constituted...The purpose of the fuel clause has, to some extent, been exploited or misused."

B.

Again from the PUC Order, " Basic Resources, Inc. is a subsidiary of TU (Texas Utilities Company), organized to engage in research and experimental projects to provide additional sources of fuel to the operating companies. The operating companies are not financially involved in the funding of Basic."

Although dealings between the operating companies (DP&L, TP&L and TESCO) and the service companies (TUCCO, TUFC0 and TUSI) are done on an at-cost basis, this is not the case with Basic Resources (or with Chaco). Basic Resources was set up as a profit-making subsidiary of Texas Utilities. From the PUC Order:

"In December 1977 TUFC0 transferred to Basic Resources, Inc., a TU subsidiary, its interests in an in situ lignite gasification project previously obtained frem V/o Licensintory of Moscow. As part of the transfer, TUFC0 also conveyed its interest in a 369 acre tract of deep lignite in Anderson County, Texas.

The above transfers were made at book cost to TUFCO."

Although'The Cc= mission concludes that the transfers of TUFCO's interests in the projects described...is consistent with the public interest..." the PUC recognized the potential for abuse and misuse in this transaction:

provided that upon perfection of the deep lignite in situ gasification project in Anderson County the gas prcduced frcs such lease be made available to the operating companies at a price based upon the price paid to TUFC0 and not at the market price of such gas."

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9-Neither Texas Utilities Company or its subsidiaries involved in this transaction had made any such provisions.

Information contained in contentions which fo11cv regarding the vorhanship and adherence to procedures and rules at the Comanche Peak plant add further weight to Contention No.1.

In addition:

(a) The cost of increased incidence of cancer resulting from releases, routine and accidental, will outweigh benefits of CPSES.

(b) Cost of decommissioning will outweigh benefits derived from CPSES (see Contention No. 6.1).

(c) Alternative sources available show the cost of CPSES outweighs benefits in eccparison. See facts supporting Contention No. 5 (d) The past record of the applicant indicates an unwillingness to voluntarily co= ply with procedures and regulations necessary to assure the health and safety of the public and the individuals represented by CASE, and gives every indication that the applicant will operate the CPSES in a manner such as to endanger the health, safety, property, and lives of the people who will necessarily be relying on the applicant to protect their best interests.

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. CONTENTTON No. 2: Because of new information available since the preparation of the final environ = ental impact statement, prepared in connection with the con-struction permit which has been inadequately dealt with in the Environmental Report - Operating License Stage (ER) submitted by the applicant, applicant must amend that report before the NRC can consider its request for an operating license, and when the new information is taken into account, a weighing of the costs and benefits of licensing the plant (cost / benefit analysis) to operate and the availability of alternatives necessitate the denial of the operating license.

EXPLANATION: As a requirement for obtaining an operating license for the Comanche Peak nuclear power plant, Units 1 and 2, (CPSES), regulations of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) require in 10 CFR 51.21 that the applicant submit an environmental report entitled " Environmental Report - Operating License Stage" which discusses the same matters described in Section 10 CFR 51.20 to the extent that they differ from those discussed or reflect new information in addition to that discussed in the final environmental impact statement prepared by the NRC in connection with the construction pennit.

Under 10 CFR 51.20, the ER must discuss the following:

1.

10 CFR 51.20(a). Alternatives to the proposed action which pursuant to paragraph 5 must be sufficiently ec=plete to aid the NRC in developing and exploring appropriate alternatives.

2.2 3 1 1 2. 5

, 2.

10 CFR 50.20(b). A consideration and balancing of environmental effects of the facility and alternatives available for reducing or avoiding adverse en-vironmental effects quantifying the factors involved. The report must contain sufficient data to aid the NRC in its development of an independent cost / benefit analysis.

3 10 CFR 50.20 (c). The radiological effects even though the facility may satisfy NRC standards and criteria pertaining to radiological effects, to-gether with all effects of the facility and alternatives.

These criteria have not been satisfied, as shall be exhibited specifically in contentions which follew.

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. CONTENTION No. 3: The requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act and 1C CFR Part 51 have not been met in that the forecast of tne need for power which the plant vill supply, as contained in the Applicant's Environmental Report (ER),

is inaccurate.

(See also Contention No. h.)

EXPIANATION:

1.

Applicant has failed to update its filing to incorporate actually known demand for 1978. Although these figures are now available (and indeed, were avail-able at the time of their filing of October, 1978), CPSES/ER (OLB) Tables 1.1-8 and 1.1-Sa, which compares Texas Utilities Company System (TUCS) Capabilities, Demands, and Reserves, indicate that the figures are actual only through 1977 A revision of the 1978 figures would necessitate a corresponding change throughout the balance of the tables, and reduce the figures frcm 1978 forward.

2.

CPSES/ER (OLS) Table 1.1-8a "Cc=parison of Past and Present Projections TUCS Capabilities, Demands, and Reserves" indicates under "Present Filing" the following increases in " Demand":

minus 97 W frem 197h to 1975 plus h97 W from 1975-76 523 W, 1976-77 (the preceeding are all actual figures)

Projections indicate an increase of:

752 W from 1977-78 574 W,1978-79 608 W,1979-80 1,028 W, 1980-81 2231 127 683 W,1981-82 725 W,1982-83 767 W, 1983-84 813 W,198h-85

. The above figures were derived simply by subtracting each year's MW demand from the following year's demand.

The 752 MW figure from 1977-78 is obviously too high and should be changed to reflect the actual amcunt of increase, as stated in No.1. above.

CASE submits that the increase in MW stated for 1980-81 is incorrect. No explanation is given for the huge increase of 1,028 MW in 1980-81, followed by a subsequent reduction back down to a more logical progression of increase.

In any event, the applicant should explain or revise this figure. Suen a revision would, of course, necessitate a corresponding revision throughout the balance of the tables, decreasing the total MW demand and increasing the total reserve capacity.

3 Applicant has failed to utilize model for projecting growth in electric demand that takes account of all significant factors affecting demand.

4.

Applicant has failed to account for the impact of energy conser.ation measures (both voluntary and involuntary) on demand.

5 Applicant has failed to consider the effect of alternative price designs, suen as peak load pricing, which will discourage demand.

6.

Applicant has failed to account for the effect of possible federal, state and local incentive picgrams to encourage the use of alternative systems such as solar.

7 Applicant has failed to consider the effect of industrial measures to lessen electrical demand, such as co-generation.

d.

Applicant has failed to include _l1 costs of the plant, such as vaste disposal and decc=missioning, in the rates, thereby failing to give the ratepayers 2231 128

proper signals regarding cost which would most probably lead to further conservation.

'4 hen this is done, it will quite probably necessitate a corresponding 1cwering of future demand pro,jections. Applicant has failed to provide for complete interrdi-cation of all significant external costs so that the total cost of electricity is enarged to those using it.

In particular, applicant has failed to censider in rates the proper cost allocation to business and industry as the primary source of demand leading to the building of new power plants.

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. CONTE:rI' ION No. 4: The Enviroccental Report (ER) prepared by the applicant clearly indicates that there is not a legitimate need for the operation of the Comanche Peak nuclear power plant (CPSES).

EXPLANATION: Table 1.1-8, sheets 5 and 6, of the ER, indicates that the Texas Utility System will have an average percentage reserve in 1981, when the first unit of CPSES is to come on line, of 315%; a reserve in 1983, when the second unit of CPSES is to come on line, of 17.6%; and a reserve in 1985 of 14.4%; all without CPLES being in operation.

Table 1.1-9 of the ER indicates that even without CPSES, the Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT) system, of which Texas Utilities is a part, will have a projected reserve margin of 30.2% in 1981, 26.2% in 1983, and 19 9) in 1985 These reserves could help the TUCS should there be an unexpected demand on the system.

In fact, this is one of the primary reasons for the existence of ERCOT -- to help assure its me=bers of back-up supplies in the event of emergency needs and to lessen the need for excessive reserve capacity by its members. The basis is not 61ven for the projected figures, and based upon past experience, it is to be expected that the ERCOT reserve capacity will be even great-- than has been indicated.

The applicant has admitted in the ER, Vol. I, page 111, that 15% is the reserve requirement both for ERCOT and TIS (Texas Interconnected System) members.

In Section 1 3 3, " Capacity Reserves," the applicant states:

" Reserves for the Texas Utilities Company system is higher at this time than when the Comanche Peak units were planned (refer Table 1.1-ea). It has been necessary to pursue con-struction of new generating capacity, including Cccanche Peak, even when reserves 2231 130

. appear adequate, because of the fuel supply situation." However, at the time the Co=anche Peak units were proposed, the applicant cited as reasons for needing the units that they would be needed to supply projected de=and (which did not materialize as expected) and that there was a need to switch from oil and gas to alternate fuels; so there is no justification to be found here for the ec=pany's incorrect assessment of reserve capacity. The projections which led to the supposed need for the Cccanche Peak plant simply have not =aterialized, and there is presently no such need.

As previously indicated, the figures for de=and must, be adjusted downward frcm 1978 forward. However, even before these adjustments are made, the reserves figures are based on demand projections that are inflated. The projection submitted in the original environ = ental report as shown on Table 1.1-8 shows that for the years 1974-1977, the applicant has seriously overestimated the anticipated de=and (according to actual experience) and seriously underestimated the anticipated percentage of reserves. Applicant's projections fer 1978-1985 also seriously overesti= ate de=and and underesti= ate reserves. Once the figures are appropriately adjusted, the reserve without the operation of CPSES is significantly higher than that projected, and is considerably higher than that needed for the system.

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. CONTENTION No. 5: The ER fails to adequately discuss and consider new infor=ation concerning alternatives available to the applicant to the operation of CPSES.

EXPIANATION:

1.

An opinion and order of the Railroad Cocsission of Texas, Gas Utilities Division, entered in Docket No. 600, 12/17/75, provided in part:

"...that on or before January 1,1981, gas deliveries to boiler fuel users who consumed an average of 3,000 MCF/D, or more, during calendar 1974 or 1975 vill be reduced by ten percent (10%) below that users' level of gas consumption in calendar 1974 or 1975, whichever year is higher; and that on or before January 1,1985, gas deliveries to such boiler fuel users will be reduced by twenty-five percent (25%) below the calendar 1974 or 1975 consumption, whichever year is higher."

That order was repealed on April 30, 1979, to became effective May 20, 1979 Therefore, restrictions on the use of natural gas as a boiler fuel by the applicant have been lifted, and Docket No. 600 can no longer be used as a legit 1= ate reason for the need for CPSES.

2.

The only other legal restriction with which the applicant must carply is the Pcver Plant and Industrial Fuel Use Act, which mandates a conversion to coal by 1990. It has been reported that attorneys for the Department of Energy are working on an amend =ent to eliminate the 1990 ban on uses of natural gas as a boiler fuel.

3 T. L. Austin, Chairman of the Board of Texas Utilities Ccepany, has publicly stated that if the company knew when the plant was being considered what it knows acv about alternate generating sources, there is a good chance 2231 132

. Cc=anche Peak would not have been built. In effect he admitted that the ecmpany made incorrect assessments of the alternatives which are now obviously available to the operation of CPSES, stating:

"If I knew then what I know now we might not have built it, but we did this nine years ago and at that time I did not know we were going to be able to negotiate for New Mexico coal, we did not have the lignite we have now, and we were being curtailed 100 percent on gas."

4.

Numerous recent reports indicate that available supplies of natural gas, from Mexico, New Mexico and the Gulf Coast, plus supplies of coal available at an econxiically feasible price for use by public utilities exceed those con-templated at the time the environmental impact statement was prepared in connection with the construction license, and have not been adequately considered in the ER submitted by the applicant. For example:

(a) A report by the Pitts Energy Group, which has done extensive research on natural gas supplies, indicates that the a=ount of natural gas available will I

be far greater than was previously thought.

(b) Carter Oil Co., the coal affiliate of Exxon Co. USA, estimates production of lignite in Texas to triple by 1985 Joe M. Hamner, planning manager for Carter Oil Co., said the state's production by 1985 vill approximate 50 to 55 million tons compared with the current output of about 19 million a year. Carter estimates Texas lignite recoverable reserves at more than 10 billion tons. Carter has extensive lignite acreage in East Texas where Exxon is studying the feasibility of building a plant to gasify some of the reserves.

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. 5 The Texas Utilities system has purchased patent rights to in situ coal gasification technology, has tested that technology, and has determined that it is feasible and can be pursued given appropriate econcmic circumstances.

(See Contention No. 1. B. for further details.) Further, the system possesses extensive rights to deep lignite coal deposits which could be used to fuel any such facilities so that that process and that technology is an available alternative which needs to be appropriately evaluated in the ER, and the availability of that technology presents an alternative to the operation of CPSES.

6.

Extensive holdings and contracts for natural gas, oil, lignite, and coal are detailed in Texas Utilities Company's January 23, 1979 Prospectus for the sale of 5,000,000 shares of cc:=on stock. The applicant should be required to translate the figures for these resources into how many natural gas, oil, lignite, coal gasification or otner types of plants could be fueled for their expected lifetime.

Only by so doing can an accurate evaluation be made of the real need for CPSES.

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. CONTENTION No. 6: Neither the applicant nor the staff have adequately considered certain cost elements which should be included in any cost / benefit analysis of the operation of CPSES, included in the required Enviroc= ental Report.

EXPLANATION:

1.

Again, T. L. Austin, Chair =an of the Board of Texas Utilities Ccmpany, admitted in a public statement that any estimate of the cost of decccmissioning after the end of the useful if.fe of CPSES or if it must be decocsissioned because of an accident is "a figure sort of pulled out of the air."

According to the CPSES/ER (OLS), pages 5.8-2 and 5.8-3, the amount chosen by the applicant was $24 5 million (in 1975 dollars); this cost was escalated at 8% to the yer.r 2022 (hl years after the first unit of CPSES is to be placed in service) and then discounted at 10% back to 1981, yielding a figure of $18.4 million (in 1981 dollars). "In order to =aintain consistency with other financial data in this report, this sum is converted to 1978 dollars, resulting in an allowance of $14.6 million for deccx=nissioning." The applicant states that "An Atomic Industrial Forum study entitled ' An Engineering Evaluation of Nuclear Power Reactor Decommission-ing Alternatives' was chosen as the best information to date on the subject and was checaed to insure that it was consistent with other expert opinion concernirg decccmitsioning." Ecwever, no ecmparison figures frem other studies are given, and therefore this is not an adequate basis for arriving at the stated figure.

CASE challenges this figure and the study by the AIF, and asks that the NRC require 2231 135

. further proof in the form of comparisons with other studies by the applicant to substantiate the stated figure.

The report " Nuclear Power Costs," a report by the subco=mittee on Environ-ment, Energy, and Natural Resources of the Committee on Government Operations of the House of Representatives, released April 26, 1978, yields far different figures. It states, in part:

" Dis =antling a nuclear plant now may cost anywhere from $31 million to more than $100 million in 1977 dollars -- between 3 percent and 10 percent of the

$1 billion capital cost. Even the higher figures, however, do not include perpetual care costs for rubble from the plant containing radioactive nickel which may re=ain hazardous for up to 1 5 million years. After 30 to h0 years, the expected lifespan of a nuclear plant, decommissioning costs would quad-ruple (assuming 5 percent annual inflation).

"But these figures are all estimates, from the lowest to the highest, and no one really knows how much it will cost or who will pay the bill to de-commission this Nation's co==ercial nuclear reactors. Decommissioning costs therefore represent substantial unknown costs of nuclear-generated electricity

-- costs ratepayers may be burdened with 40 years after the reactor startup date."

If the amount for decommissioning the CPSES vere figured to be 3% or 10%

of the current cost of construction, $2.2 billion ($1.7 billion plus $500,000 estimated for the cost of correcting the error in design of the second reactor *),

it would yield a figure of between $66 million and $220 million.

In the May 7,1979 issue of FORTUNE magazine, Peter N. Skinner, an environ-mental engineer in the New York State attorney general's office, is quoted as saying:

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• See Contention No. 6. 2, following.

. "He figures it might cost a formidable $249 million, in 1977 dollars, to decommission a 1,150-megawatt reactor -- about a quarter of the cost of building it.

His estimate is based on the most thorough-going form of de-co=missioning, in which the highly irradiated reactor vessel and piping are cut up and the pieces are completely removed from the site for deep burial. To accumulate the necessary funds, Skinner says, utilities would have to set aside as much as four mills per kilowatt-hour, far more than most of them now do."

It is interesting to note that this same article refers also to a study by the Atomic Industrial Forum:

"Two studies by the Nuclear Regulatory Coc: mission and by the Atomic Industrial Forum, and industry group, put the cost of dis =antling and complete removal of a 1,000-megawatt plant between $40 million and $50 million.

G. Wayne Meyers of Rockwell International's Atomics International division, which recently took apart a m,all research reactor in California, calls the numbers in both studies ' pretty good.'

It is costing $7 2 million to dismantle the California reactor, which is tiny compared with a ecx::mercial installation.

But Meyers says the dismantling cost does not increase proportionately with size. Some utility men believe deco =missioning might cost roughly $100 million in today's dollars."

Therefore, applicant has failed to assess, discuss or state the true cost of decommissioning CPSES. The true dgcommissioning cost will show the cost of CPSES to outweigh the benefits.

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. 2.

The applicant has failed to properly update the construction costs portion of its filing to include costs of approximately $500,000 for making corrections so that the reactor vessel for Unit No. 2 of CPSES will fit correctly, or to adjust the fuel load date for Unit No. 2 accordingly. According to a report in THE DALLAS TIMES HERALD 2/28/79, the reactor vessel for Unit No. 2 " won't fit correctly on the supports built to hold it.

The four steel supports are not aligned correctly with the parts of the reactor vessel that are supposed to rest on them. If the reactor vessel were to be rotated to fit correctly on the supports, then some pipes would not line up correctly." According to a television news report, a company representative stated that the cost for correcting the error would be approximately $500,000 and that the completion of the second unit would be delayed somewhat. It was reported that the problem arose because the second unit's reactor vescel was to have been a mirror image of the first, but was actually a duplicate instead.

Further, the costs of the facility need to be re-evaluated in the light of the " Nuclear Power Costs" report referred to in Contention 6.1.

The findings of that report have not been dealt with by the applicant, and they cast serious doubt on the cost portion of any cost / benefit analysis which must be made.

3 The " Nuclear Power Costs" study indicates that '4estinghouse, the supplier of the Conanche Peak reactors, along with other manufacturers of nuclear plants, may be facing i=nense financial losses due to the decline of orders for nuclear plants. The report states:}

"' Flatly stated, the manufacturers just cannot go c conditionc. Ibe minimum healthy market for one of 5 to 10 new orders a year,' Dr. Eupp, a subcommitte York Times. "Dr. Bertram Wolfe, general manager of nuclear engi of General Electric Co. in San Jose, Calif., said t average of 16 to 20 orders a year, 'the present str is not going to be able to hold out.' " Westinghouse has said its commercia] nuclear divis-2 years ago. (It received only four domestic order; 1975 and none since then.) " General Electric reportedly faces losses of $500 mi faces a $200 million loss, and Atomic General, a Gu] forced to withdraw from the nuclear business in Nove "The decline in orders for nuclear plants is primari forces. The financial co=sunity cannot afford to ti capital that sit idle for 10 to 12 years and take at In light of this, Federal suboidies to nuclear power and development grants and limited liability insuran Funds used for such purposes could be used instead t sources of energy." Indeed, a close 1cok is currently being taken at the referred to above, pernaps with the results as indicated. In 11 ht of the preceeding, a serious look should be 6 financial comitment and ability with respect to the fut.. This is especially true because of the fact that, accordi. from cocpany representatives in the recently-completed he-between the affiliated companies of Texas Utilities: "In September,1975, Westinghouse inforned TUSI and - customers that had purchased uranium from Westinghou; to deliver approximately sixty-five million pounds c; terms of existing contracts. The contracts, whien c-tne next twenty yearc at a base price of approximatt. 2231 139 .3-}^m W] D

. only minor price-escalation provisions. When uranium prices jumped threefold to $24 from $8 a pound, Westinghouse unilaterally canceled the contracts, maintaining it was legally excused under the ' commercial impracticability' doctrine in the Uniform Ccesercial Code. By =eeting its contractual obli-gations, Westinghouse could foresee a potential loss of at least $2 5 billion. In settlement of its obligations Westinghouse proposed to allocate its exist-ing uranium supplies among the utilities notified. "Upon rejection of the Westinghouse contentica that it was excused from full performance of its contract, TUSI (Texas Utilities Services Inc.), in October,1975, filed suit in United States District Court seeking spe-cific performance of the contract, damages and other relief. Similar suits were filed by other utility companies. Thereafter, Westinghouse notified TUSI that its contract had lapsed and withdrew its offer to allocate its existing uranium supplies. " Westinghouse filed a suit in federal court in October,1975, that in effect requested the court to take jurisdiction over the uranium that the company had available to meet part of its supply contracts with utilities..." "On December 27, 1977, TUSI and Westinghouse reached an out of court settle-ment whereby TUSI would receive a package deal consisting of Westinghouse equipment and services, cash, uranium and rights to certain mining properties." The fact that Westinghouse reneged on its contract with TUSI (Texas Utilities Services Inc.) brings further questions to light regarding Westinghouse's financial coc:mitment and ability with respect to the future operation of CPSES. 4. The ER also fails to take into account serious increases in the cost of uranium, the fact that long-term fuel contracts for the life of the plant are unavailable, and that any future contract for supplies of uranium are suspect in light of the recent litigation involving the Westinghouse contract. Further, the applicant has failed to indicate an adequate basis for the fuel costs estimated in CPSES/ER (OIS) 8.2.1.2 (pages 8.2-2 and 8.2-3). A more 2231 14U

. accurate basis for such esti=ates is necessary in light of the state =ents contained in the January 23, 1979 Texas Utilities Company Prospectus, page 17, under " Nuclear": " Additional contracts for t'"anium ore concentrates and nuclear fuel cycle services will be required in the future; however, it is not possible to pre-dict the ulti= ate availability or cost thereof." And under " General": "The companies are not able to state what problems may be encountered in the future in obtaining the fuel they will reqpire for use in generating electric energy to serve their custa=ers, or predict the effect upon their operations of any difficulty they may experience in protecting their rights to fuel now under contract or in acquiring fuel in the future, or the cost thereof, although the cost of fuel or increases therein is generally recoversble under the fuel cost adjustments referred to under Regulaticn and Rates." In addition to the fact that the source or cost of future fuel is unknown, the fuel costs are no longer recoverable automatically under the fuel cost adjust-ments (see Contention No. l.A.). 5 The cost of future vaste storage has not been adeqyately considered. Again, T. L. Austin, Chairman of the Ecard of Texas t'tilities, in a public state- =ent indicated that the exact cost of per:anent vaste storage remains an unknown. He stated: "Peopla put figures on per= ament stora6e but you can't depend on them." Not only has the financial cost not been adeqpately considered, but neither has the possible health cost, especially in light of new studies which indicate that the possible conseqpences of an accident at a vaste storage racility would approxi= ate the conseqpences of an accident with the spent fuel at a nuclear power plant (see Contention No. 7 following). 2231 141

. In the " Nuclear Power Costs" report previously referred to, the fact that no one knows the costs or availability of waste disposal solutions is confirmed and items 8 and 9 of RECONENDATI0tG states: "8. The Department of Energy should develop a schedule of fees and expenses adequate to cover the full cost of radioactive vaste and spent nuclear fuel management, including disposal, perpetual care, and reasonable contingencies, and should issue guidelines necessary to accurately estimate deco =missioning Costs. "9 The Nuclear Hegulatory Co==ission should require applicants for construction and operating licenses for nuclear powerplants, as a condition of such licenses, to amortize the full cost of radioactive vaste disposal, spent nuclear fuel management, perpetual care, contingencies, and deco =missioning ec3ts over the expected useful lifetime of each pcwerplant. This should be done in accordance with the schedule of fees and expenses for such purposes issued by the Depart-ment of Energy. Funds sufficient for such costs should be levied by the power facility on its customers, and such a=ounts should be held in trust for purposes of such costs." 2231 142 l CONTENTION No. 7: Neither the applicant nor the staff have adequately considered the costs in terms of health as well as the econcmic costs of a possible accident in the on-site storage of spent fuel. EXPLANATION: New information cas been generated indicating that there are serious potential dangers involved with the on-site storage of spent ftel from the operation of a nuclear reactor, and neither the environmental report nor the environnental impact statement properly assesses the potential econcmic and health costs of such an accident in light of such new infor=ation, including the folleving: 1. The potential effects of an accident in an on-site storage of spent fuel are much more serious than previously thought, as indicated by Report No. 290 (NRC Translation #161) " Studies Cceparing the Greatest Possible Failure Se-quences in a Processing Installation and in a Nuclear Pcwer Plant." This report indicates that in the worst possible accident involving a meltdown of spent fuel pool, radiation doses of k7,000 rems (75 times the lethal dese) are possible 62 5 miles fran the spent fuel pool. Higher doses would occur closer to ' he pool. With unfavorable vinda, the whole body dose to an individual at 62 5 miles would be 6,300 rems, still 10 times the lethal dose; in this case, the doses would be spread over a greater area. Since ingestion of contaminated food and water is not considered in the report, the doses are significantly underesti=ated. Aside fran the mechanism of sabotage, tornadoes and earthquakes causing a spent fuel pool meltdown, there is an alanning possibility of a reactor meltdown precipitating a fuel pool meltdova, if the cooling systems of the reactor and

. the spent fuel pool are linked together. This possibility is not id>2tified in the German study. Spent fuel contains enormous quantities of cesium and strontium -- in fact, a spent fuel pool vill contain more strontium and cesium than a nuclear reactor itself. A release into the atmosphere and surrounding area of this deadly material could be catastropic -- eren more so than from a core =eltdown.

2. Additic: - ly, the applicant has not dealt adeqpately with the additional hazard involved in the possible storage of spent fuel in closer proximity than originally planned. Manufacturers of high-density storage racks which signifi-cantly increase existing storage capability also have not dealt with this addi-tional hazard. In the January 23, 1979 Prospectus of Texas Utilities Cc=pany, it is stated:

"...there will be on-site storage capacity for spent fuel to acecmmodate the operation of the units and this storage capacity can be increased if needed." If the method to be used for increasing such storage capacity is by the use of high-density storage racks, this particular qpestion needs to be addressed by the applicant. 3 The report SAND 77-1371, September 1978, " Spent Fuel Heatup Following Loss of ' dater During Storage", prepared by Sandia Laboratories for the NRC, also indicates significant dangers from a spent fuel ace 4 dent and supports r.any of the findings in the German study. b hkk

l k. In the limited analysis of possible spent fuel accidents contained in the ER submitted, only accidents in handling the fuel are censidered, and the ER fails to take into account the potential harm of releasing into the environment certain transuranic elements other than those specifically listed in the report frce an accident involving spent fuel. I i I 2231'145

. CONTENTION No. 8: The ER fails to analyze the probability of and potential costs in terms of health and dollars of a Class 9 accident defined in the ER as follows: "These events involve sequences of postulated successive failures more severe than those postulated for providing design bases for protective systems and engineered safety features. Although their consequences could be severe, the probability of their cccurrence is very low, and therefore the probability of this event is 1cw." Clearly this statement is inadequate. No basis whatsoever is given for such a statement, and there is no indication as to how the applicant arrived at such a conclusion. Applicant should indicate the factual basis on which this statement is based. Recent events and reports indicate that the possibilities of such an accident are not nearly as low as had been previously thought and they are deserving of serious consideration both in terms of the costs and health hazards and as they relate to the cost / benefit analysis. EXPLANATION:1.Recent events including the Three Mile Island accident and the accident which occurred earlier at Brown's Ferry indicate that both ccc=on mode failures and conson event failures involving successive failures of various systems due to a common incident or a failure common to all the systems involved are much more likely than had previously been believed. This is also borne out by nu=erous accident reports which indicate that the likelihood of major accidents from a number of events previously considered highly improbable should be taken into account. Thus, with the probability of such an accident being much more significant 2 l h

. than had previously been anticipated, the environ = ental report should take into account the possibility of such an accident and should assess the possible da= ages from such an accident in order to permit an effective cost / benefit analysis to be made. 2. If the probability of such an accident is based on the Rasmussen Report (Reactor Safety Study, WASH-1400), such use is no longer valid. In a January 18, 1979 Statement regarding the RSS, WASH-1400, the Nuclear Regulatory Cccmission adopted the findings of the independent Risk Assessment Review Group and stated specifically: "... absolute values of the risks presented by WASH-lkOO should not be used uncritically either in the regulatory process or for public policy purposes and (the NRC) has taken and will continue to take steps to assure that any such use in the past will be corrected as appropriate. In particular, in light of the Review Group conclusions on accident probabilities, the Comnission does not regard as reliable the Reactor Safety Study's numerical estimate of the overall risk of reactor accident." 3 The accident in Pennsylvania at the Three Mile Island plant suggests that the probability of a class 9 accident, as defined by the applicant, may te as high as one in 72. By actual experience, one in 72 operating reactors has experienced such an accident. Actually, by the applicant's definition of the class 9 accident, these odds should actually be more like 2 in 72, since the Brown's Ferry accident in 1975 would also fall into the Class 9 accident category. This would indicate that the odds are actually more like 1 in 36 that a class 9 accident will occur. 4. The ER states that the Class 8 loss of coolant accident is the most severe 22'31 l47

. accident that the CPSES is designed to withstand on the theory that a Class 9 accident is too lov to consider. From the CPSES/ER (OLS), 7 1.8 DESIGN BASIS EVENTS (CLASS 8), page 7 1-10: "The events discussed in tnis section encompass the most severe accidents that the CPSES is designed to withstand; therefore, they establish the design basis for plant safeguards systems." Again, there is no basis given by the applicant for reaching the conclusion that a Class 8 accident is the most severe which should be considered. Additionally, since there is clearly the possibility of a Class 9 accident, the applicant must address itself to how this can be dealt with, and the plant safety systems should be upgraded to vithstand a Class 9 accident; otherwise, the plant should not be allowed to operate. 2231 148

. CONTENTION No. 9: Neither the applicant nor the staff have adequately considered the effects of low-level radiation on the population surrounding CPSES in the cost / benefit analysis required in the ER. EXPIMATION: Recent studies since the preparation of the original environ = ental impact study indicate that the possible radiation effects of the operation of CPSES and of possible accidents on both the environment and persons surrounding the plant have been understated and must be re-evaluated because: 1. An analysis of '.ae figures contained in the environmental report indicate a heavy reliance on Reactor Safety Study (Rasmussen Report, WASH-lh00). As indicated in Contention 6.2. the figures in this study have been called into serious question by the NRC itself, the risk assessment review group report (theLewisReport)totheU.S.NRC,NUREG/CROh00,andTheRiskofNuclearPower Reactors, Review of the NRC Reactor Safety Study, Wash.1k00, prepared by the Union of Concerned Scientists, and studies referred to in those reports as well as other studies, such as: (a) "Offsite Distribution of Plutonium in the Respirable Dust on the Surface of the Soil in de Vicinity of the Rocky Flats Plant" - Report to the Jefferson County, Colorado, Board of Health, by Carl J. Johnson, M. D., Director of Health - March 31, 1977 (b) " Evaluation of the Hazard to Residents of Areas Contaminated with Plutonium" presented to the IVth International Congress, International Radiation Protection Association, Paris, France, April 1977, by Carl J. Johnson, Jefferson County Health Department and the University of Colorado School of Medicine, Iakewood, Colorado 80226 (c) " Rates of Leukemia, Lung Cancer and Congenital Malfor=ations by Census Tract in Areas Contaminated with Plutonium" presented to the First Inter-national Congress on Human Ecology, Vienna, Austria, Oct. 26-31, 1978, by Dr. Carl J. Johnson, Director of Health, Jefferson County Health Department, Lakewood, Colorado 2231 149

(d) " Epidemiological Evaluation of Cancer Incidence Rates for the Period 1969-1971 in Areas of Census Tracts with Measured Concentrations of Plutonium Soil Contamination Downwind from the Rocky Flats Plant" -

A report to the Jefferson County Board of Health, the Colorado Board of Health, and the National Cancer Institute, N.I.H., P.H.S., U.S.D.H.E.W., by Carl J. Johnson, M. D., M.P.H., Director of the Jefferson County Health Department, Lakewood, Colorado, February 9, 1979 (e) " Plutonium Hazard in Respirable Dust on the Surface of Soil" SCIENCE Magazine, 6 August 1976, by Carl J. Johnson, Ronald R. Tidball and Ronald C. Severson (f) "X-Ray Exposure and Premature Aging" - JOURNAL OF SURGICAL ONCOLOGY, 1977, by Rosalie Bertell, Ph. D., Roswell Park Memorial Institute, Buffalo, N. Y. (g) " Measurable Health Effects of Diagnostic X-Ray Exposure" - Testimony before the Sub-committee on Health and the Environment, U. S. House of Representatives, July 11, 1978, by Rosalie Berte11, Ph. D., GNSH, investigation partially supported by grant from National Cancer Institute, DHEW (h) Testimony by Dorothy B. Jones, Another Mother for Peace before the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce Subcommittee on Health and the Enviror ent, January 25, 1978 (1) " Health Hazards frcm Low-Level Radiation" by Sr. Rosalie Berte11, Bio-statistician at Roswell Cancer Research Institute, Buffalo, N. Y., specializing in the relationship of radiation to cancer, reprint of a speech at Seabrook, N. H., 10/23/76. (j) "At the Crossroads" by Dr. Helen Caldicott, Boston's Children's Hospital, reprint from December 1977 NEW AGE Magazine (k) "Toward a Realistic Fission Dose Estimate: Methodology and Case Study" by Land Educational Associates Foundation, Inc., Stevens Point, Wisconsin, February 17, 1979 (1) "Honiker vs. Hendrie - A Lawsuit to End Atomic Power" by Jeannine Honiker, Petitioner, 1978 - petition to the NRC (m) ' Protocol - Epidemiologic Study of Civilian Employees at the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, Kittery, Maine" - Sept. 28, 1978, Div. of Surveillance, Hazard Evaluations and Field Studies, National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, Center for Disease Control, Public Health Service, U. S. Dept. of HEW (n) Memorandum from Director, Dept. of HEW, Public Health Service, Center for Disease Control, National Institute for Occupational Safety ard Health, to Acting Director, NIOSH (National Institute for Occupatioral Safety and Health), Oct. 25,1978, Re: Progress Report: Portsmouth Naval Shipyard Study (nn) " Oregon Malignancy Pattern Physiographically Related to Hanford Washington Radioisotope Storage" by Robert Cunningham Fadeley, Director of Research of the Foundation for Erreiron= ental Research, Golden, Colorado, JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH, May-June, 1965 2231 150

. (o) Statement of W. D. Rowe, Ph.D., Deputy Assistant Administrator for Radiation Programs, Environ = ental Protection Agency, before the Sub-committee on the Environ =ent and the Atmosphere, Committee on Science and Technology, Ecuse of Representatives, June 7,1978 (p) Testimony of Saul Levina, Director, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Ccx=nission, before the Subcommittee on the Environment and the Atmosphere, House Committee on Science and Technology, June 7, 1978 (q) Statement by James L. Liver =an, Acting Assistant Secretary for Environ-ment, U. S. Department of Energy, before the House Ccemittee on Science and Technology, Subcommittee on the Environment and the Atmosphere, June 7, 1978 (r) " Reanalysis of Data Relating to the Hanford Study of the Cancer Risks of Radiation Workers" by George W. Kneale, M.A., Alice M. Stewart, M.D., and Thomas F. Mancuso, M.D., Dept. of Industrial Environmental Health Sciences, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, Pa., Presented at the International Atomic Energy Meeting, Vienna, Austria, March 13-17, 1978 (s) "Ls-Dose Radiation" by Kneale and Stewart - THE LANCET 7/29/78 (t) " Radiation Exposures of Hanford Workers: A Critique of the Mancuso, Stewart and Kneale Report" by Terence W. Anderson, Dept. of Preventive Medicine and Biostatistics, Faculty of Medicine, University of Toronto, Ontario, Canada, HEALTH PHYSICS 12/78 (u) Statement by Arthur C. Upton, M.D., Director, National Cancer Institute, on Ionizing Radiation Research, before the Subcoz:xnittee on the Environ-ment and the Atmosphere, House Ccemittee on Science and Technology, June 7, 1978 (v) "A Dosage Response Curve fem the One Ra4 Eange: Adult Risks from Diagnostic Radiation" by Irwin D. J. Bross, Ph.D., Marcella Ball, Ph.D., and Steven Falen, M.A., AJPH, Feb. 1979 (v) " Radiation Exposures of Hanford Workers Dying from Cancer and Other Causes" By Thcznas F. Mancuso, Alice Stewart and George Kneale, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, Pa., HEALTH PHYSICS, 1977 (x) " Nuclear Power Costs" Report of the Ccxmnittee on Government Operations, U. S. House of Representatives, April 26, 1978 In addition, there are currently studies underway, such as the monitoring of the health of persons living near and working at the Three Mile Island plant by the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, hearings before a Senate health subcocmittee chaired by Sen. Edward Kennedy, a National Academy of Sciences study " Risks Associated with Nuclear Pover" due to be released very soon, hearings 2231 151

. on the Nevada and Utah nuclear weapons tests before the House Oversight and Investigations Subco=mittee chaired by Rep. Bob Eckhardt, etc. 2. On May 4,1979, Joseph Califano, Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, revised the estimate of the level of radiation leaked from the Three Mile Island plant and changed his earlier assessment that there was no health risk to near-by residents. He said there is now a statistical probability that the tspact of the low-level radiation on the 2 million persons living within 50 miles of the plant would produce two cases of cancer, one of them fatal, and cause birth defects in one child. But even the latest esti= ate may prove too lov, Mr. Califano said. Some scientists believe there could be up to 20 additional cancer cases, half of them fatal. He further indicated that "We expect the revised staff estimate of the total dose to increase again" in a report to be released next week. In light of these facts, the effects of low-level radiation on the population surrounding CPSES should be re-evaluated in the cost / benefit analysis. 2231 152:

. CCNTENTION No. 10: Neither the applicsnt nor the staff have adeqcately considered the econcmic effects of accidents occurring in light water reactors located else-where in the United States which are similar in design to those of CPSES. EXPIANATION: The recent accident at Three Mile Island has indicated that an accident in one plant h.s potentially serious economic repercussions not only for the plant affected but also for all other reactors constructed by the same caspany or pursuant to the same or similar design criteria so that the possibility and probability of an accident in any Westinghouse reactor and the economic consequences of such an accident in terms of downti=e of CPSES as a result must be taken into account in any cost / benefit analysis for CPSES. 2231 153

. C0tTfENTION No. 11: The applicant has projected a useful life of CPSES as being 30 t) 40 years for purposes of the cost / benefit analysis, while in reality new factors indicate that CPSES will have a much shorter life. EXPIANATION: 1. Public statements by personnel of applicant have indicated that the operation of CPSES is viewed as a "short tern" solution to the energy needs of the region it will serve, and due to the availability of alternative sources of energy which will be cheaper and less dangerous it is unlikely that CPSES will be required for lenger than 20 years. 2. Applicant has failed to adequately consider t.,e effects of cumulative radiation on the plant and the likelihood that its effects will seriously shorten the operating life of ceSES. 12231 154

. CONTENTION:No. 13: Neither the applicant nor the staff have adequately considered the need and the possibilities for evacuation of the Dallas / Fort Worth area in the event of a major accident at CPSES. EXPLANATION: In the event of a major accident at the plant under adverse weather conditions, it would be necessary to evacuate the town of Glen Rose and significant portions of the Dallas / Fort Worth metroplex. Howevar, no plans are included in the final safety analysis report (FSAR) for such an evacuation. There has been no attempt to identify state or regional authorities responsible for such plans or who have special qualifications for meeting such a contingency, nor have agree-ments been reached with local and state officials and agencies for the early warning of the public and public evacuation including the identification of the principal officials by titles and agencies. Therefore 10 CFR Appendix E to Part 50 has not been satisfied. 2231 155

42 - CONI'ENTION No.14: Neither the applicant nor the staff have adequately considered the problem of emergency treatment and transportation which would be necessary in the event of a major accident affectirg the area i==ediately surrounding the plant. EXPLANATION: Appendix E described in Contention No.12 requires a description of arrangements for the services of physicians and other medical personnel qualified to handle radiation emergencies and arrangements for transportation of injured or contaminated individuals to treatment facilities outside the site boundary, and such plans for fulfilling these requirements have not been made. Therefore, the requirements of 10 CFR Appendix E to Part 50 has not been satisfied. CONTENTION No. 15: Adequate plans for testing by periodic drills of emergency plans and provisions for participation in the drills by persons whose assistance may be needed other than the employees of the applicant have not been formulated. EXPLANATION: Applicant has not done this; therefore the requirements _ of 10 CFR Appendix E to Part 50 has not been satisfied. 2231 156 - 1

L3 - CONTENTION No. 16: The requirements of the Atomic Energy Act, as amended, have not been met in that the applicant is not financially qualified to construct the proposed facility. EXPLANATION: 1. On Friday, April 27, 1979, Dallas Power & Light Co., one of the operating ecmpanies of Texas Utilities Company, filed for a rate increase. The sa=e company just received a rate increase in June of 1978. DP&L President Jerry Farrington, in a public statement, said reasons for the increase include "the additional costs of co= plying with a myriad of new regulations, the company's deteriorating financial condition". 2. In recent rate hike requests, Texas Utilities' operating companies (Dallas Power & Light, Texas Power & Light, and Texas Electric Service Company) have obtained only about one-half the rate increases applied for. 3 The Texas Pablic Utility Cacmission on April 20, 1979 ordered that the three operating companies of Texas Utilities pay back to its consumers $3 2 million. (See Contention No. l.A.) It is assu=ed that this money 'iill have to come from the stockholders. 4. Texas Utilities' operating companies no longer can autcmatically pass on to customers fuel costs through the fuel adjustment clause. See Contention No. 5 1. 5 The general demise of utilities stock on the open market which have resulted from the accident at Three Mile Island and the loss or lowering of bond 2231 157

kk - ratings can severely curtail the applicant's ability to raise capital. (a) Recent items from local newspapers, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, and BARR0N'S indicates the mood of the stock market: " Nuclear stocks off sharply;" " Stock prices fall in reaction to nuclear accident;"" Energy stocks take decline - The stock =arket in general, and nuclear-power industry issues in particular, declined for the second straight session... Analysts said last week's accident at a nuclear power station in Pennsylvania had raised new concerns in investors' minds about the energy outlook."; General Public Utilities, owner of DtI (Three Mile Island)" asked that a trading halt in its stock declared last Friday be continued;" " Utility stocks pushed lower. Nervousness over the future of nuclear power pushed utility stocks lover Thursday as the stock =arket retreated." (b)TheApril 24, 1979, WALL STREET JOURNAL reported: " Virginia Electric & Power Co., or Vepeo, doesn't own any part of the stricken Three Mile Island nuclear plant,but the utility vill nonetheless be ' paying' for the accident at Harrisburg for years to come. "Vepco, which got 35% of its power last year from its three nuclear plants and is building three more, came to =arket here with a $100 million construction bond issue on April 3 -- Just six days after the crisis at the Harrisburg reactor began. " Nervous undervriters charged Vepco $1 million to distribute the bonds, or about 50% above the usual fee, and skittish investors forced up the utility's interest cost by 0.2 percentage point, or an aggregate of $3.6 million over the expected 18-year average life of the bonds. If that same percentage-point increase were applied to all utilities' estimated nuclear borrovirgs over the next decade, it would aggregate $2 billion over the probable' average life of the bonds. 2231 158

. " Talks with officials at utilities and in the nuclear industry, and with their critics, indicate that the Earrisburg accident will add billions of dollars to nuclear-generating costs that already are vastly higher than i=agined in the industry's pioneer days. "The Earrisburg fallout seems certain to further exacerbate nuclear-cost problems throu6h 'more-frequent plant shutdowns, stiffer siting require-ments and new design changes,' predicts Alex Rsdin, executive director of the Washingten-based American Public Power Association, a utility group. 'New operating procedures and additional reactor safeguards may be needed, and if so, the necessary changes will be made,' says Carl Walske, president of the Atomic Industrial Forum. " Charles Komanoff, a New York energy consultant and nuclear critic, believes the Harrisburg accident will force more nuclear plants to be temporarily closed for safety reasons over the next few years. This, he says, will lower the plants' operatin6 rates and will help ensure that nuclear-generated electricity a decade hence will cost half again as much as power fras coal-fired plants. " " Metropolitan Edison Co., which owns that crippled Pennsylvania facility, saw the ratings on its various debt securities downgraded yesterday by Standard & Pocr's. Ratings classifications on the General Public Utilities Corp. unit's obligations were suspended entirely last week by Moody's,the other major rating agency. " Consumers Power Co. put $100 million of fresh bonds up for bids...Its new... bonds... sold slowly at a price of 99 316, to yield 10.45% in 30 years. First day orders accounted for a mere 25% of the issue, dealers estimated. Invest-ment bankers were surprised by the poor showing. "One manager of a large portfolio was candid about why he chose to pass up the Consumer Power bonds. 'We're in an era of fiduciary laws where you can't claim ignorance about a situation,' he said. 'If I buy I figure I can only lose. It =akes more sense to acquire (securities of) a faltering industrial company, if I want to speculate on a recovery situation,' he said. " Provident National Bank, in an investment-research report, said...'The bonds of utilities using nuclear power as a =ajor source of electric generation have rather uniformly responded to the adverse publicity of the Three Mile Island nuclear accident. 21231 159

46 - (c) Metropolitan Edison, owner of the Three Mile Island Nuclear plant, has stated that it will go bankrupt unless consumers or taxpayers share the costs of the accident. The Pennsylvania Public Utilities Ccemission has rescinded a $49 million annual rate increase granted recently. Moody's has suspended all its rating classiff cations on Met Ed and Standard

• Poor has downgraded the ccx::pany's debt and securities ratings.

In the April 30, 1979 issue of BARRON'S, it states: "Perhaps the worst performance of all was turned in by lower-quality electric utility bonds. That entire market sector is clearly showing the strains being imposed by rising interest rates and the Three Mile Island mishap in Pennsylvania. " Indicative of the fallen-star status of Metropolitan Edison, 2008, operator of the strickan Pennsylvania plant a block of its 9% bonds, due reportedly changed hands at an 11 50% level. Prior to the March 28 accident those bonds could cccmand prices returning closer to 9.8%. Ironicauy its liens had been considered by many analysts to be the strongest of any electric utility carrying single-A ratings from both Moody's and STcP." (Emphasis added.) (d) Five class action suits have been filed seeking damages for people who live and work around Three Mile Island. Three of the suits esti= ate that aa-ages will at least equal the $560 million limit established in federal law (the Price-Anderson Act) to pay the costs of a nuclear accident. Although the $560 million limit is still applicable, it has never been tested in court, and a favorable decision for the plaintiffs would further erode the ability of utilities to successfully approach the bond market for funds for nuclear power plants. (e) According to the May. 3,1979 WALL STREET JOURNAL: " General Public Utilities Corp. is scrambling to obtain about $450 million in bank credit lines to help pay for the cost of the accident at its Three 2231 160

. Mile Island nuclear plant and avoid a potential tankruptcy. "In testimony before the Pennsylvania Public Util? ties Co=nission, GPU Treasurer John G. Graham... reiterated tnat to insure the co=pany's financial liability, the cct:: mission would have to quickly pass along to customers some of the cost of the accident. "The need to set up finn credit lines is ccaing largely because of nervousness by current lenders about the utility's fitancial condition... "But as the extent of the verst accident in the history of U. S. nuclear power became clearer, the banks became more concerned. Mr. Graham said they want strict and formal arrangenents, secured in part by about $1 billion of GPU assets. "'Our banks are very uncomfortable and won't continue to allow borrowings far into the future on an unsecured basis,' he said. "... Metropolitan Edison is in a 'very critical and serious financial status,' Mr. Graham said. "Since the accident, the Pennsylvania camsission has delivered sc=e financial blows to GPU. It recently rescinded, in whole or in part, two previously granted rate increases to co=pany subsidiaries. That was because those in-creases had been based partly on having unit No. 2 in service. "...Mr. Graham said GPU is being asked to pledge as security all of the co= mon stock of its two other subsidiaries, Pennsylvania Electric Co. and Jersey Central Power & Light Co. "The banks also vant Metropolitan Edison in the near future to sell them up to $100 million in chort-term bonds. This vould be in place of part of the credit lines...He (Mr. Grnhem) added that inquiries have indicated that there currently isn't any mcrket for Metropolitan's long-term securities." With the " deteriorating financial condition" of at least one of its oper.,ing cc=panies, and the unsettled condition of the stock market regarding utilities with nuclear power plants and of the stability of the Price-Anderson Act, there is no proof that the applicant will be able to raise funds to complete construction of CPSES or to run it once it is completed, especially should there be a nuclear accident, at the CPSES or even at sane other nuclear plant in the country. 2231 161

48 - CONTENTION No. 17: Applicant has not shown that the operation of Co=anche Peak nuclear plant would not be inimical to the co=non defense and security and to the health and safety of the public, as required by 10 CFR 50 57 (a)(6). EXPIANATION: It is impossible to prove o show the effects on the health of the surrounding population without having r.:ade a base-line study showing public health characteristics of said population with particular regard to: age of population, incidence of chronic diseases such as heart disease, diabetes, arthritis, mental retardation, and the specific incidence of birth defects. CONTENTION No. 18: Applicant has failed to adequately assess the cost of the Westinghouse uranium settlement on CPSES in its ER as to how it affects the cost / benefit analysis. EXPIANATION:1.The increased cost of uranium adversely affects the cost / benefit ratio. Applicant should show a detailed cost / benefit analysis of the fuel costs under thz original Westinghou:;e contract and the Westinghouse settlement which was made with Texas Utilities; such analysis should include costs for any fuel originally contracted for which will not be supplied under the settlement. This is especially important since it has been indicated by the applicant that "Addi-tional contracts for uranium ore concentrates and nuclear fuel cycle services vill be required in the future; however, it is not possible to predict the ulti-mate availability or cost thereof." (See Contention 6.3 and 6.4.) 2231 162

l _ 49 - 2. The viability of Westinghouse's nuclear division, considering the present litigation concerning Westinghouse's inability to perform under its contracts with numerous utilities to supply uranium, is not addressed by applicant with regard to replacement of parts or financial responsiveness to breach of warranty. (See also Contention 6 3 and 6.4.) 2231 163

. CONTENTION No. 19: CPSES has not been built in a =anner so as to comply with certain regulations of the Nuclear Regulatory Cccmission, in particular 10 CFR 50 57(a)(2),10 CFR 50 57(a)(3), and lo CFR 50 57(a)(6), and therefore should not be licensed for operation. EXPIANATION: 1. CASE has been told by a worker at the CPSES that on one side of the reactor, where there is supposed to be some rocm between the containment vessel and the reactor, workers could not get the exInnsion joints to work correctly and poured concrete in on one side where the expansion joints are supposed to be. 2. A vitness has told CASE that following a Christmas party at CPSES, where there~ vas considerable drinking and many of the employees were quite drunk, a load of cement that had been ordered arrived for pouring. The foreman, without proper supervision or an inspector being on duty, made the workers pour the cement in the foms. He then had the workers clean up the party area and instructed the workers to put all trash, garbage, cans and bottles into the forms and pour the cement over it. 3 Witnesses have told CASE that they knew, as velders, that the velding of the steel beams and rods at CPSES vould not pass a rigid test. They stated that the reason for this was that a number of workers were allowed to weld vithout having the proper training and being proper;.y qualified. A review of the Inspection and Enforcement Reports (I&E Reports) of the Nuclear Regulatory Co= mission reveals that there have been continuing problems and violations by the applicant in regard to welding. For exa=ple: 2231 164

. (a) Report 78-16, conducted 10/2-31/78: "...it appears that certain of your activities deviate frcm co=mitments =ade in your Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) as indicated below: "A. FSAR Section lA(B), on page 1A(B)-5, states that installation and testing of mechanical (Cadweld) splices in reinforcing bars in the containment structure vill comply with Regulatory Guide 1.10. Paragraph C.1 of Regulatory Guide 1.10 requiras that each member of the splicing crew be qualified by =aking qualification splices. When crew members work as a unit, the crev =ay be qualified as a unit. " Contrary to the above: "It was established, based c,n interviews with cognizant craft and TUGCO quality assurance personnel, that craft personnel who have not been given qulification tests have =ade Cadyald splices independently of the qualified splicer up to the point of loading and firing the filler metal crucible. Such personnel are not identified in appropriate quality assurance records relatable to any given splice, day or crew composition. "This is a deviation." According to the applicant's letter of December 8,1978: " Corrective Action: Use of cadweld helpers per the previous program has been stopped. Corrective Action to Prevent Recurrence: Revision 4 to Brown and Root's Construction Procedure 35-1195-CCP-19 has been issued and no longer provides for cadweld helpers. Personnel ' setting up' and ' firing' cadwelds will be qualified cadwelders in accordance with this procedure. Date Corrective Action and Preventive Measures Ccmpleted: Corrective action was initiated on October 12 and ccepleted on November 19, 1978. Preventive measures were completed on November 15, 1978." Report No. 78-17, conducted Oct. 4-12, 1978: "The Licensee, on October 4, 1978, reported...that a Cadweld splice in the Unit 1 Containment vall reinforcing steel had pulled apart upon application of a light force while preparing the spliced bar foi additional splicing. The mode of failure was such that grossly poor work =anship had to be the cause, either by intent or by negligence. The Cadweld splicer, accordire to licensee quality assurance records, had performed over six hut 1 red (600) other splices throughout the various Category I buildings and involved both Units 1 and 2. The Cadveld eplicer had been terminated in March 1978 for disciplinary reasons not related to his actual work. "The following facts were established from licensee quality assurance 2231 165

. records made available to the IE Resident Inspector: "a. The failed Cadweld splice was :cade on the second shift during the evening hours of December 16, 1977, and was one of four (h) splices =ade that evening by the splicer. "b. The splicer had =ade a total of six hundred eighty-seven (687) splices over a period beginning January 21, 1977, and termirating March 27, 1978. "c. The splicer had been qualified initially and his work inspected and tested ccr::mensurate with the require =ents of NRC Regulatory Guide 1.10 throughout his working period. d. The licensee / contractor quality control organization had rejected a total of eight (8) splices =ade by the splicer for visual defects during the above working period. "e. None of the twenty-five (25) tensile tests conducted on the splicer's work evidenced failure. "f. All but twelve (12) splices made by the splicer vere embedded in concrete and thus were not readily available for examination. Of the four made on the evening of December 16, only one splice in addition to the failed splice was available for examination." (E=phasis added.) CASE has been unable to find any indication that any of the above-referenced splices which were embedded in concrete were ever tested further. We contend that this should have been done immediately upon discovery, and that since that apparently was not done then, that it should be done now. We ask that the entire Report No. 78-17 be incorporated herein by reference and that its contents be reviewed in its entirety. As can be readily seen, there are several areas of particular concern; for example: On page 4, item h.b.: "The B&R (Brown & Root) inspector stated that he recalled the prticular work that evening because of the difficulties aui hazards involved. He stated that much of the splicer setup work was done under poor lighting conditions and that he had had to use a penlight to make his inspections. " (E=phasis added.) 22)l }hh

. There are numerous other I&E reports which deal specifically with problems in velding at CPSES. CASE will be looking at them in more detail in the hearings and plans to have witnesses to testify in this area. h. A review of the I&E reports reveals that there are continuing problems and violations by the applicant in regard to the improper pouring of concrete and concrete's not being up to specifications. As recently as February 20, 1979 the applicant was advised by the NRC of a Notice of Violation for " Failure to Follow Concrete Place =ent Procedure." In an article in the April 4,1979 FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, allegations vere made that untested concrete has been used in con:truction of portions of CPSSS, that quality control procedures heve not been followed, that training has been icadequate, that sampling for sand and gravel was done in ways prohibited by standards the applicant had pledged to follow, that records were falsified. IKE report No. 78-13, conducted August 1-31, 1978, in citing the applicant with a Notice of Violation for " Failure to Follow Concrete Testing Procedures," states: " Criterion V of Appendix 3 requires that established instructions, procedures, or drawings be followed for all activities affecting quality. " Texas Utilities Generating Company Procedure QI-QP-11.1-10, Revision 0, ' Sampling Fresh Concrete,' paragraph 31.2 requires that samples be taken at two or more intervals during the discharge of the middle portion of the batch. " Contrary to the above: "The IE inspector observed on the above date, during placement of concrete in a reactor building interior vall, that a concrete laboratory technician 2231 167

. took a single sample rather than at two or more intervals during the discharge of the middle portion of the batch. Discussions with the technician and the laboratory supervisor confirmed that this was the standard, but undocu- =ented, practice when taking samples where cylinder strength tests are not a requirement." (Emphasis added.) "This is an infraction." There are nu=erous other examples of problems with concrete cited in the I&E reports, and CASE plans to pursue them at length during the hearings and to have witnessas to testify in this area. 5 The seriousness of the applicant's failure to meet the expected standards of accuracy and ccepleteness is borne out by the Dece=ber 6,1978 letter to Mr. P. G. Brittain, President of TUSI and TUGCO, frem Earold R. Denton, Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, and John G. Davis, Acting Director, Office of Inspection and Enforcement, NRC, Washington. See Contentiion 1, page 6, for ccmplete text of this letter. 6. Unit No. 2 has not been built correctly, as evidenced by the fact that the reactor vessel for Unit No. 2 von't fit correctly on the supports built to hold it. (See page 23, Contention 6.2. for details.) This was a =ajor design and construction error,and raises questions about the capability of the applicant to operate CPSES. 7 There are numerous other proble=s with construction ccd procedures which are indicated in the I&E reports, and CASE would incorporate them all herewith by reference. It is our intention to pursue them in detail during the hearings, and to present related testimony by expert witnesses. 2231 168

. 8. The applicant has failed to a '4resa the possible effects on the quality of work =anship which may be caused by: uri of undocu=ented workers; use of inexperienced workers; high number of deaths among workers during construction; long working hours of workers. These matters need to be addressed and assurances obtained that there has been no lessening of quality of work =anship due to them. 9 Applicant has failed to properly address the health effects of the transmission lines from the plant, necussary for compliance with 10 CFR 50 57(a)(3) and 10 CFR 50 57(a)(6). 10. The February 13, 1979 letter from Robert L. Baer to R. J. Gary indicated that the applicaat must provide an Offsite Dese Calculation Manual (ODCM). It is impossible without this mant.al to be assured that 10 CFR 50 57(a)(3) and 10 CFR 50 57(a)(6) have been co= plied with. It should ce supplied, reviewed, and approved by the staff and intervenors before issuing an operating license.

11. Applicant has not adequately addressed the possibility of tornadoes at CPSES, especially in light of possible spent fuel pool loss of water (see Contention No. 7). The CPSES site has been under a tornado watch or warning at least four times in the past two months.

12. Applicant has failed to update adequately its filing in regard to the growing and expected future population in the CPSES area in rewrds to water usage.

13 It is not clear from the applicant's fil;.e tr..t vells which were under the das for CPSES vere capped to prevent possible seepage or contaminants into them. 2231 169

. lb. Applicant has failed to show thu full effects of the transportation of vaste upon the health, safety and lives of the persons residing along trans-ps rtation routes and living in the general vicinity of the plant. Thus, 10 CFR 50 57(a)(3) and (6) have not been ecuplied with. 15 Applicant has failed to take into account hu:::an errors and the failure of certain controls on certain pumping systems and other problems associated with the accident in Pennsylvania, with regard to possible similar events at the CocAnche Peak plant and resultant effects on the population at risk.

16. Applicant has failed to adequately address possible effects on the Dallas /Ft. Worth metroplex area of wind currents and their effect on radiation emissions, either routinely emitted or emitted in the event of a major accident, which may be carried by wind currents which would blow such emissions toward the metroplex area during a considerable portion of the year.

17 It has not been proven that the applicant has sufficient expert, properly trained personnel to operate the Comanche Peak plant in compliance with 10 CFR 50 57(a)(2), (3), and (6). According to Gregory Choppin, a Florida State University chemist, in a public statement, the nuclear industry will soon face a shortage of critical personnel. He said the results of a survey ecx::missioned by the American Chemical Society Division of Nuclear Chemistry and 'rechnology found + hat the number of students enrolled in Ph.D. programs in nuclear chemistry has dropped from 213 in 1960 to 102. 2231 170

e . 18. Non-compliance with regulations and procedures as detailed in the I&E reporta supports and confirms Contention No.1. 19 I&E reports, plus the contentions in Contention No.1, clearly indicate a trend which would prove that 10 CFR 50 57(a)(2), (3), and (6) will not be complied with by the applicant. Therefore, the CPSES should not be licensed to operate. THEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, CASE prays that this motion to intervene be granted in all particulars and that all contentions be accepted, and for any other relief to which CASE may show itself to be entitled. Respectfu21y submitted, ', M z D _' [(Mrs.) Juanita Ellis, President CASE (Citizens Association for Sound Energy) 1426 S. Polk Dallas, Texas 75224 May 7, 1979 223! 171

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that copies of " Supplement to Petition for Leave to Intervene and Contentions by CASE (Citizens Association for Sound Energy)" in Docket Nos. 50 4k5 and 50 kh6 have been served on the following by deposit in the United States mail, first class, or, as indicated by an asterisk, by Certified First Class Mail, return receipt requested, this 7th day of May,1979: Lawrence J. Chandler Mrs. Nancy Holdam Jacobson Counsel for NRC Staff CFUR U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Ccx::=ission lh00 Hemphill Washington, D. C. 20555 Ft. Worth, Texas 76104 Elizabeth S. Bowers, Esq., Chairman

• Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel Atotic Safety and Licensing Bcard U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Co==ission U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Coc: mission Washington, D. C.

20555 Washington, D. C. 20555 Atcx:lic Safety and Licensing Appeal Lester Kornblith, Esq.,Me=ber Panel (5) Atomic Safety and Licensing Board U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Cor::=issien U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Ccc: mission Washington, D. C. 20555 Washington, D. C. 20555 Docketing and Service Section (4) Richard Cole, Esq., Me=ber Office of the Secretary Atcx:iic Safety and Licensing Board U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Cccmission U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Co= mission Washington, D. C. 20555 Washington, D. C. 20555 Nicholas S. Reynolds Debevois & Liber =an 1200 - 17th St., N. W. Washington, D. C. 20036 (Mrs.) Juanita Ellis, President Mr. Geoffrey M. Gay CASE (Citizens Association for Sound Energy) West Texas Legal Services 1426 S. Polk 406 W. T. Waggoner Building Dallas, Texas 75224 810 Houston Street 21h/946-94A6 Ft. Worth, Texas 76102 Richard W. Lowerre, Esq. Assistant Attorney General Envirca= ental Protection Division P. O. Box 125h8, Capitol Station Austin, Texas 78711 22)I, .}}