ML19289E724
| ML19289E724 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Maine Yankee |
| Issue date: | 05/03/1979 |
| From: | Gilinsky V, Hendrie J, Kennedy R NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| To: | |
| References | |
| REF-10CFR9.7 NUDOCS 7905290031 | |
| Download: ML19289E724 (55) | |
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NUCl. EAR REGUL ATORY COMMISSION i
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J 1UBLIC MEETING
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j BRI!EIUG ON STATUS OF MAINE YAUKEE - ACTIONS REQUIRED
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BY SHOW CAUSE ORDER OF 3/13/79
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OfficialReporten 7005290001 444 North Ccpitol Street Washington, D.C. 20001
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l DISCL.AIMERJ This is an unofficial transcript of a meettng af the United States 3 May 79 in the Nuclear Regulatory Commission held on Thursday, The Commission's offices at 1717 H Street, H. W., Washtr:gr.on, D. C.
Th'is transcript meeting was open to public attendance and observatici.
has not been reviewed, corrected, or edited, and it may contain inaccuracies.
. The transcript is intended solely for general informa'tfenal purposes.
As provided by 10 CFR 9.103, it is not part of the formal or infor:.al record of decision of the matters discussed.,
Expressions of opinion in this transcript do not necessarily reflect final determinations or
.io pleading or other paper my be filed with the Co;nnission in beliefs.
any proceeding as.the result of or addressad to any statement or argu:nent contained herein, except as the Com.ission may authorize.
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2 CR4530 1
UNITED STATES OF A:1 ERICA 2
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 3
PUBLIC MEETING 4
i BRIEFING ON STATUS OF MAINE YANKEE - ACTIONS REQUIRED l
5 BY SHvW CAUSE ORDER OF 3/13/79 I
6 i
7 Room 1130 l
8l 1717 H Street, N.
W.
l l
Washington, D. C.
9 Thursday, 3 May 1979 10 l
The Commission met, pursuant to notice, at 11:50 a.m.
11 BEFORE:
12 DR. JOSEPH M.
HENDRIE, Chairman 13 l
VICTOR GILINSKY, Commissioner I
14 RICHARD T. KENNEDY, Commissioner 15 PETER A.
BRADFORD, Commissioner 16 JOHN F. AHEARNE, Commissioner 17 ALSO PRESEdT:
18 Messrs. Denise, Denton, Gossick, Kenneke, Eisenhut, 10 Bickwit, Russell, Reiter, Chilk, Hoonan.
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1 PEQQEEDINQE 2
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
I would like to move on to the other 3
subject, which is a briefing on the status of Main Yankee, the l
i 4'
actions required by the show-cause order of March 13.
i 5,
The first thing the Commission will do on the subject i
I 6; of the briefing on Main Yankee and the show-cause order is:
I 7
will ask my colleagues to join me in voting to hold a short-8; notice meeting, since I don't think we published the notice, and.
l 9
I would like to be on the safe side of the protocol for the 10 meetings.
j i
II I Would you please vote aye for short-notice meeting?
12 COMMISSIONER Y.ENNEDY:
Aye.
i 13 l COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Aye.
I I
Id COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Aye.
15 !
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
So ordered.
16 '
Lee, fire away.
O I7 MR. GOSSICK:
Harold.
18 MR. DENTON:
Last week we briefed the Commission on I9 !
the status of our review of the five plants that were shut down i
20 '
because of seismic deficiencies.
We indicated we would be back i
21 l shortly with a proposal on Main Yankee.
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22 Darrell is prepared today to describe to you the
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23 results of our review of Main Yankee and present our staff 24 l recommendation.
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MR. EISENHUT:
Thank you.
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I I will just summarize, basically go back through a 2
little bit of what we discussed last week.
You recall Main
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Yankee had a shutdown order on March 13.
That shutdown order i
i d' speficially asked the licensee to show cause why he should not Sj reanalyze the piping in the plant that had used the algebraic 6l: summation method, why it should not make modifications as neces-t I
7 sary, and why he should not shut down during this reanalysis and 8
modification period.
9 As a result of that, if you recall, five plants were 10 shut down.
One or two at the time were shut down for other II !
reasons.
I2 The Main Yankes situation is that it's the lead plant I3 l that is the first plant that has completed its reanalysis.
The Id order that went out on the 13th specifically told'the licensee
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15 l to go back and reanalyzc those pieces of piping that used or were i
16 analyzed with an algebraic summation method.
There were 19 such I7 l pieces of pipe, or 19 pipe runs, so to speak, or p'iping cal-18 culations that had to be done as a result of that.
Those 19 I9 !
pipe runs had been reanalyzed.
They had been reanalyzed with a l
20 !
couple of different methods, some of which were new computer 21 codes, which had not been previously looked at.
22l The 19 runs were analyzed and shown to be conserva-u 1
23 ltively designed.
That is, the new piping analysis method yielded 24 ;! stress values less than what was previously there, less than or co Federal Reporters, Inc.
25 t l equal to.
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1 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
Excuse me?
2 MR. EISENHUT:
Less than or equal to the situation as :
3 it was previously analyzed.
There may have been some equal to.
1 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
You say less than or equal to 4'l 5!
the situation previously analyzed?
I i
6; MR. EISENHUT:
In the old calculation with the previous i
7l code that had algebraic summation method with it.
8i COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
In other words, you're saying it 9; yielded values less than or equal to were found acceptable?
l 10 MR. EISENHUT:
Found acceptable if it was less than I
11 !
or equal to the code allowable, the threshold of acceptability 12 1 before.
13 The calculated the 19 pipe runs and found this to be 14 lithe case.
They also looked at piping supports and found that i
15 two piping supports needed some modifications, because these two 16 l piping supports had stress values that went up very slightly at i!
I7l these two locations.
Those supports are the modifications of i
18 l the type that we generally permit without a license review.
19 '
There is not a license amendment required.
They made those 20 modifications.
i 21 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
They made them?
i 22 MR. EISENHUT:
Those two supports in the plant, they I
23 lll did modify.So, where we are today --
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COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
These are, then, to acceptable
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standards?
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1 MR. EISENHUT:
Yes, sir.
The 19 pipe runs, therefore, 2 i checked out, and they have reanalyzed those features in the i
3 plant which we requested by our order of May 13.
The staff --
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COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
When you were here previously 5
on this issue, Darrell, you had pointed out that the licensee i
6!hadmadethosestatements, "the 19 were acceptable, and only two i
71 supports," et cetera, that at that stage the staff had not I
8!
reviewed that.
You me saying those 19 are acceptable?
You're 9
saying the staff has not reviewed it?
10 MR. EISENHUT:
Yes, sir.
The staff has reviewed the I
11 l licensee's analysis and has concluded that they were acceptably 12 done and yield acceptable results.
13 l The staff went a couple of steps further on this 1
i 14 evaluation.
First, it looked at the methods used to analyze 15 these 19 pipes, the 19 pipe runs.
Some were done by hand cal-16 !
culation methodology, which I will discuss in a moment.
Most 17 { were done with computer programs, either Shock 3 or new pipe.
18 These two computer programs were looked at by the staff; they i
19 were examined first by looking at the actual listing of the 20 program, what the program contains.
That approach found that 21 they were acceptable.
22 We did two other things:
One is, we sent some standard 1
23 h problems to the licensee and asked the licensee to analyze these-o 24 hl standard problems with his computer program.
He has..done that Federal Recorfers. Inc.,
25 approach to our satisfaction,and, in fact, that exercise has also g
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shown that his code yields results which we would predict.
2 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
Darrell, why would we not 3
instead do that ourselves?
1 4'
MR. EISENHUT:
We did.
We did it in sort of two i
5 different directions.
We gave him three standard problems, 6 ! three or four standard problems, that we wanted him to run as he i
7' runs them on his computer with his programs.
And we know what I
i 8j the results would be.
.l 9:
We also asked him for some of the piping runs in the l
10,
plant, the detailed configuration, and ran it on our own com-P 11 l puter program, which is actually we ran it on another independent 12 i computer program to sort of reverify the program both ways.
i 13 l It checked out going both ways.
I 14 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
You don't test the system if you 15 l just get his computer listing down, and our people hang it up on 16 h our computer and run it?
You want it run on his computer with d
17 !
his people?
18 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
Against a preestablished answer.
1 19 l CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Yes.
20 MR. DENTON:
Bill -- let me ask Bill Russell if he 21 would like to expand on what we actually did in coverification.
22 Bill is our team chairman for all the plants that were shut down.
23 ll We have here today the actual team for Main Yankee.
24 MR. RUSSELL:
With respect to coverification, we
-Federal Reoorters, Inc.
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actually had three pieces to our program.
The first was actually i
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I reviewing the code listings to determine that algebraic summa-l 2
tion was not included and also looking at it in sufficient 3
detail to determine that there were not other obvious errors.
i 4l Then we had a two-part program.
The first was asking; I
5i them to run three sample problems on their codes, and we would 6
compare the results of those runs to documented results which i
7l we had available.
The second approach was to take actual piping I
8! problems from the plant and do independent analyses of those 1
9 problems on our code E pipe.
l 10 So, we did it both ways, and those results are com-t II l plete for four independent analyses, and they have checked within 1
12 10 percent.
On two of the three sample problems they are com-13 plete.
The third one is not yet complete.
But that -- it's not Id complete, as a result of the programmers being taken off to do l
15 l other work for Main Yankee, associated with the Shock 1 code.
I 16 i They just didn't have enough people to go around.
I 17 l We have seen enough to conclude that the codes are, 18 in fact, accurate and have been verified.
COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
How much more work would be 20,
involved in completing it?
21 MR. RUSSELL:
We expect it would be done within the 22 l#11 next few days.
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CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
What units are you talking about?
I 2h MR. RUSSELL:
We checked the frequencies of the vari-4 3
ous modes of response to piping to make sure the frequencies are i
4 the same, the actual displacement of pipe, forces on the pipe, i
5l moments on the pipe and various places of interest.
Those 6
results agree very closely.
And the stresses.
7 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
What would be an acceptable 8;
amount of difference?
9 MR. RUSSELL:
10 percent is acceptable in accordance 10 with the standard review plan which we use now.
We require them 11 I to more closely model it until they get results which agree on 12 successive runs within 10 percent.
13 MR. EISENHUT:
Basically, that was the approach we 14 l used on following up on the codes used to analyze or to recheck i
15 j the piece of analysis that was required in the order.
We went 16 on to discuss a couple of aspects in the plant.
We went on to l'
17 l look and see what methodology was used and what approach to i
18 l analyze the remainder of safety-related piping in the plant.
i 19 It was basically there done two different ways:
One i
20 was the hand calculations, and one was another computer sub-21 routine actually in the program called " Shock 1."
i 22 Let's take the hand calculations first.
The hand
!l 23 I calculation methodology was, again, reviewed against today's I
24 l requirements, today's requirements being what it says in the co Federal Reoorters, Inc.
25 standard review plan.
The methodology checke~ out to be 4
2045 203
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10 i
I acceptable.
That is,the approach they used is acceptable to the 2
i approach we would require for hand calculation methods today.
i 3
There is some difference in the sizing of piping that i
4 we analyzed using the hand calculation method, because today wei 5
would require that they only analyze small-sized piping, and 6'
there was larger-sized piping and analyzed by hand calculation 7l methods before.
i 8
Those were generally short runs, straight runs, lower >
9' in the facility,with less amplification.
I think they went all f
10 the way up.
There were some 16-inch pipes that were analyzed I
Il i by hand calculation.
That methodology and that approach checked 12 l out acceptably.
13 The third piece, and actually the larger piece --
Id l1there is a lot of piping out in the plant, perhaps 70 or 80 15 f percent, which was analyzed by a method which was not really 16 l addressed in our order of March 13.
That piping was analyzed by E
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a subroutine called " Shock 1."
It had several versions Some 18 of the versions were called " Shock Zero," for sake of discussion.
I9 l There are four versions of Shock 1.
Shock 1 -- let me just tell l
20 l you what it does, and then Bill is going to discuss where we are 21 and what our results are of those rechecks.
22l Shock 1 is basically somewhat of a one-dimensional-in--
I 23 two-directions approach.
It looks at X direction earthquakes or 24[ one horizontal direction going into the plant, and it ohly co Federal Reporters, Inc.
generates a response in the X direction; that is, it'd
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1 interfere with the other three orthogonal directions and puts it 2
in the second direction, and it generates and propagates it i
3 through so that it does not interfere with the other two.
It's l
4' a two-dimensional earthquake in that sense; it goes into the t
5 plant.
6 We looked at the code itself; that is, the program 7
listing of what is done, from a basic principle -- first-8 principle standpoint.
You can't make a direct comparison between that kind of a one-dimensional or two-dimensional 9,
i 10 approach and the new three-dimensional codes today.
The only I
11 !
real way you can do it in this case is to actually run the same 12 j problem both ways and see the results.
13 The reason for that is:
Although it only looked in 14 the X direction in one-direction earthquake, if the ground is 15 l moving in one direction and it assumed a pipe that can move in 16 that direction, that piece of equipment could have several dif-17 l ferent peak accelerations, and it has a frequency distribution.
18 The analysis in the plant used the absolute value of the highest i
19 ' peak, and the square root of the sum of the squares of some of I
20 '
the remaining peaks, which is conservative for that one input.
21 It then took those conservative input in X conservative input in.
22 l Y and propagated them through the analysis, which is not directly' 23 correlated taking three components, adding them 24 together some way and seeing the results.
ca Federal Reporters, Inc.
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So, what we have done, recognizing this was somewhat 4
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'2043 205
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1 removed from the order of the specific piece, we still wanted 2
some confidence that the rest of the piping in the plant had 3
been analyzed by an acceptable means.
I 4
So, hat we embarked upon is a program to look at the 5i codes which we recognized didn't have -- we weren't going to be l
6l able to draw some strong conclusions, and we asked the licensee 7'
to do some calculations on the same kinds of problems with dif-8l ferent kinds of computer codes as a recheck.
And Bill is going i
9 to summarize what those results are as we found to date on these 10 various different --
II l COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Who actually does these calcu-I 12 '
lations?
13 l MR. EISENHUT:
Stone and Webster.
I I4 MR. RUSSELL:
The comparisons that were made, when we 15 l were down here last Thursday and advised you that we had not I
16 '
checked comparisons on the latest version of Shock 1 and had I
17 '
reviewed that and found it acceptable, and that was compared to 18 a newer code, a code called "new pipe," the other three-version i
19 '
comparisons were made to the latest version of Shock 1 to do 20,
a cross-check comparison.
21 Then, we also compared each of those versions to new 22 d pipe.
So, we've checked it both ways:
to the latest version of.
b 23 ll Shock 1 and to new pipe.
And we find that they are comparable.
l 24 l And because of the margins that exist because of the results a Feer.i ne=rms w.
25 computed in the code allowables, comparisons would be well within i
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code allowables so that we would conclude that the piping which i
2 ! was designed using these various versions is acceptable.
3 MR. EISENHUT:
So the basic approach has been to go i
4l to this other approach that has been used on the rest of the i
Si safety-related piping in the plant to also reverify that that I
6' approach was an acceptable method and gave acceptable results.
7 That has all been done.
We have one more outstanding 8
calculation we are due to receive today.
Everything up to this 9j point is checked out.
10 Because of this and because the licensee and his con-i 11 tractors have reanalyzed portions of the plant that we requested 12 them to and we have gone through in sort of stage process to 13 check the additional safety-related piping in the plant, we have l
14 ;
come to the conclusion that with regard to the seismic problem 15 l
-- that is, the order that shut them down -- we believe at this 16 ;
time we are prepared to recommend that the plant be allowed to 4
17 l start up.
l 18 !
COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
Darrell, as to the last set I9 of calculations, it sounds as though we are very heavily i
l 20 ' dependent on Stone and Webster's -- on the reverification of --
21 what is it?
Shock 1, in the calculation, the right way to say 22 l it?
23 l MR. EISENHUT:
We are, and we aren't.
The hand' cal-24 ;
culations we have looked at the mechodology, the tables, methods wFwml Rwonm, W. ;
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OP494t24}7re 25 used, et cetera, and we have rechecked that to th Il l,
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1 we're pretty sure that it does meet all of our standard review i
2[planapproachesfromamethodologystandpoint.
l 3
The Shock 1, I believe, there were -- I think it's 4
three runs --
i 1
5 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD :
From a methodology?
You're 6
not saying we would let somebody do it that way today?
7 MR. EISENHUT:
Yes, we would.
The hand calculation 8l methodology meets today's requirements.
i 9!
COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
You said it meets the standard 10 review plan?
Il !
MR. EISENHUT:
Yes.
On how you go about doing hand 12 calculations.
With regard to Shock 1 --
13 MR. DENTON:
I guess I should mention it's restricted '
I today to smaller pipes than they used it.
But the areas where 14 1
15 l they used it apparently were simple runs of pipe where the staff 16 ! feels the use of hand calculations is appropriate.
!l 17 !
MR. EISENHUT:
That's the point I made a little 18,
earlier about the difference in the size of the pipe.
I9 With regard to the second part of your question con-20 cerning the four versions of Shock 1, we do have some independent i
21 verifications, sort of second-hand, because the fourth version, 22 the licensee has three safety-related problems he ran on Shock 23 l 1, version 4, I'll call it that.
24 '
He has also run those same problems with new pipe. New co-Federal Rooorters, Inc.
25 pipe was the code we htve independently verified by this cost l
~ 2043 208
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15 I
check of sending them problems and taking the same problems and 2
running them on our code.
So, we have cross-correlated it.
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l 3
What we have asked for since the last week's meeting, I
we have asked them to take a sample problem on versions 1, 2,
j 5
and 3 that were run with Shock 1, and asked them to do the same 6
thing; that is, run them with a code that we have ourselves I
7!
verified as being an accurate method of going.
I 8l In addition, the licensee has taken problems analyzed i
9 with versions 1, 2, and 3 of Shock 1, which he now calls " Shock 10 Zero," to confuse things a little, and he has reanalyzed some of I
11 ! those with Shock, the fourth version, which we have independently i
12 t l
Verified.
Because early a week ago, we had confidence in the 13 version 4, not as much as in the first three versions.
Since 14 lthen he has gone through the iterative process to do those 15 '
calculations.
1 16 l As I said, there is one outstanding calculation, which l-17 l is due in here today.
18 I
MR. RUSSELL:
We received that last calculation about i
19 8:00 a.m.
this morning.
The staff has not had a chance to com-plete its review.
We have the reports from the licensee that it t
21 l I
does compare acceptably.
And we will review that and recheck 22 t
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! the conclusion, also.
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CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Let's see.
Harold, is it your 1
2 recommendation --
3 MR. RUSSELL:
We'll review it to determine if that 4
conclusion is accurate.
5 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Would it be your intent -- let's 6
see.
You signed the show-cause order.
Would it be your I
7 intenttorelievetheimmediatelyeffectivenessprovisiononit?l l
8 MR. DENTON:
Pending review of the information that 9
came in this morning and any other loose ends that we haven't gotten to.
10 l
II CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Yes, of course.
12 MR. DENTON:
Also, we issued a bulletin regarding the 13 TMI incident to Main Yankee.
We are still looking at the l
l response to that.
l Id I think I would want to be sure that they have i
15 i
responded adequately to that bulletin, in case there are any 16 17 loose ends in that area.
I also think we vanted to call your i
18 attention today to the fact that this plant was built before l
I 19 the advent of the Appendix A to Part 100 regarding seismic 20 design.
So I think Dick Denise from the staff will describe l
21 that issue.
22 But pending resolution of the first two, my recommen-l 23 dation is that I be permitted to issue an order for sending --
24 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
What about the resolution co-Federst Reporters, Inc.
of the third?
2043 210 i 25
17 te 2.
I MR. DENTON:
Resolution of the third, maybe we should 2
start -- go to that one and start more from the beginning.
3 Let's let Dick Denise of staff describe where we are.
4 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Before we get off on that, let 5
me ask the counsel.
So far as I know, there is no bar to that 6
action.
7 MR. BICKWIT:
None.
8 I CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
I note there was a petition from 9
the New Hampshire Legislative Utility Consumers Council, which 10 was filed.
But as I read it, it says, if you have a hearing in i II which Maine Yankee is arguing with the shutdown order, we would l 12 l like to be permitted to be a party in that hearing.
And that's l 13 not the case, so I assume that it does not create a bar to the i
I4 proposed action?
15 MR. BICKWIT:
That's right.
16 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Okay.
Do you want to talk about l
i 17 the third area.
r 18 MR. DENTON.
The third area is not the seismic j
19 design of the plant, which was the focus of the order, but i
20 rather, the selection of the safe shutdown earthquake.
Let me 21 ask Dick Denise --
22 MR. EISENHUT:
This is basically the question that f
1 23 Mr. Bradford asked last week.
l 24 (Slide.)
l co-Federst Reporters. Inc.
l 25 MR. EISENHUT:
You recall this was the slide Dick was l
2043 211 l
18 te 3 i
1 going to make some amplifying e nments concerning this one last 2
week.
3 MR. DENISE:
Well, I will make some amplifying 4
comments, not only on the slide, but on some of the background.
l 5
The basis for the shutdown of the plant, as you recall, had l
6 nothing to dokith the seismology of the area or the earthquake 7
probability, but rather, the adequacy of the piping.
In some I
8 consultation since the shutdown order, we provided some perspec ;
9 tive on the probability of earthquakes and the severity of l
10 earthquakes.
But this is approximate perspective information.
I 11 In the briefing which you had on April 26th, given 12 by Mr. Eisenhut, he showed you this viewgraph.
The staff is 13 concerned that this perspective this viewgraph presents is l
14 well understood and complete, and we're concerned how it will 15 be used in the decinionmaking process.
So let me just quickly 16 say a few things about this viewgraph.
17 First of all, I will say that the design that was i
18 approved in 1968 was based on the Housner Spectra, anchored at l
19
.1 g.
That was in 1968.
If we did license it today, our l
20 guide or our hope would be that it would be licensed to the 21 spectra presented in Reg Guide 1.60, and it would be anchored 22 somewhere between 1.3 -- between.13 g and.2 g.
We don't know 23 where in that range it would be anchored because we've done no 24 detailed investigations about that particular site since the l
a FMwal Repo,ters,1N.
25 time it was licensed.
i 2045 212 i
I
19 te 4.
l 1
So we went about estimating probability of the design 2
spectra being exceeded, noting that it's very difficult to get 3
an absolute number, because you have differences amongst experts; i
4 on what the input parameters should be to any correlations, and ;
i 5
also on what assumptions should be made.
So we did find in 6
previous studies, though, that the relative probability of f
i 7
earthquakes or of exceeding certain ground motion levels at the l l
I 8
site remained stable.
That is, no matter which correlation you j i
9 used, if you asked what's the difference between reaching an i
10 intensity 6 ground motion and an intensity 7 ground motion, i
i 11 they stayed relatively stable.
l 12 What we did in getting some perspective on the earth-i i
13 quake hazard was to analyze the probability of exceeding any 14 particular value at the site, and we found that if we only 1
15 dealt with peaks of acceleration, that the probability difference i
16, between exceeding.1 g and.2 g was a factor of 5.
That is, j
17 you were 5 times as likely to get peaks of.1 g than you are 18 to get peaks of.2 g.
19 When we looked at the spectra, that is, the Housner 20 versus the Regulatory Guide 1.60 spectra, we found that the 21 spectral amplification that went into that reg guide resulted j
t 22 in even greater effect.
So if you use a Regulatory Guide 1.60 23 spectra shape and anchor it at.2 g, you get a factor of 25 in l
24 the probability of exceeding certain ground level motions.
l wFwwW Roomn, lm.
l 25 That is, for the.2 g Housner spectra -- I'm sorry, let me 2b'5 2!)
20 te 5, l
j start over.
2 For a.1 g peak acceleration, and using the Housner 3
spectra, you have a certain probability of exceeding that, and 4
that probability is 25 times as high as it would be for l
5 Regulatory Guide 1.60 spectra anchored at.2 g.
Now, the only l
i 6
reason I've chosen those two numbers is because we think i
7 Reg Guide 1.60, anchored at
.2 g, is about the range we would i
t 8
require for a modern plant at that site.
We will recognize t
9 that it's possible to do site-specific work, as has been done i
i to in other plants, and arrive at a spectra which is different I
f 11 from Reg Guide 1.60, and we're perfectly happy to do that.
But 12 all we're working on now and operating on now is 1.60.
i 13 We have also done some work on the absolute risk of j
i 14 exceeding the design value, and it appears to us, based on l
l 15 recent American and Canadian work, the chance of the ground 16 motion exceeding the intensity that was associated with the 17 present design is about one in 100 per year.
Now, I'm going i
i 18 to contrast that in a rather rough way and say that the chance i
19 of exceeding the safe shutdown earthquake for a plant licensed
-4 20 today under our current. regulations is about 10-3 to 10 21 In summary, it's a relatively high probability that 22 the Maine Yankee seismic design basis spectra -- and I must say,i l
23 emphasize I'm talking about input motion to the structure and l
l t
24 nothing to do with strengths of the pipes -- is relatively high !
l wFMwM Rmones, W.
25 and the probability that it will be exceeded is relatively high.
2045 214 j
i I
te '6, 21 i
1 We don't see a clear and present danger, but our staff recom-2 mendation would be, if the plant is restarted, that we follow 3
up this with some investigations of whether that seismic design 4
input is appropriate.
5 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Could you go back over those l
l 6
numbers?
What is one i, 100?
7 MR. DENISE:
I'm saying that therr. is one chance in i
8 100 -- this is approximate number -- that is, one chance in 9
100 per year that the seismic design input basis for Maine Yankee 10 as it presently exists will be exceeded.
11 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
At that site?
12 MR. DENISE:
At that site.
j 13 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
You mean the ground motion 14 felt at that site will exceed the design criteria?
15 MR. DENISE:
The ground motion at that site would 16 exceed the ground motion used to establish the design basis.
17 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
Which says nothing --
18 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Careful, that --
i 19 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
That says nothing about, or I
i 20 does it, the plant response to that ground motion?
21 MR. DENISE:
Does not.
i 22 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
Okay.
l l
23 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
What you're saying, I think, is 24 that you assess some such number to the likelihood that peak m Fewe namnus, ire.
25 amplitude, the amplitude of peaks woul. ac a above a tenth g.
I 2045 215^
l
22 te 7.
i 1
MR. DENISE:
Yes, sir, I'm saying that.
But let me l
2 say more about it.
I 3
Bob, if you're back there, put on the spectral ampli-i I
4 fication viewgraph.
We have here three charts.
l 5
(Slide.)
6 Three lines.
You see, what we have plotted here is 7
the response spectra.
The top line is a Reg Guide 1.60 anchored 8
at.2 g.
That's off the graph, down at about 33 hertz.
Then 9
the dotted line is the Reg Guide 1.60 anchored at.1 g, which 10 is the anchor point for the present design used in the Housner 11 spectra.
I i
12 We drew on there the equivalent Housner spectra l
13 anchored at.1 g.
Now, the way we got the Housner spectra in 14 that shape is to look at amplification factors between about 15 2 and 10 hertz, which is the region of interest, using 16 Regulatory Guide 1.60 amplification factors to draw that parti-17 cular curve.
I 18 It may'te a little bit approximate.
What this shows, 19 I suppose, in a nutshell, is that that Housner spectra which we j 20 say is anchored at.1 g, if it were a reg guide spectra, it l
21 would be anchored at.05 g.
So you're seeing a difference in j
l 22 shape as well as a difference in anchor point.
Now again, this l l
23 applies to the spectral amplifications in the region of interest, 13 24 about 2 to 10 hertz, a-FMeral Rmorters, lm.
l 25 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
What's the relati@n1 216 ship f-z 1
l l
23 te 8 this estimate of likelihood of amplitude to the likelihood of j
an earthquake occurring in this range?
i 2
MR. DENISE:
I think it's one to one, but maybe one 3
of the seismologists, Dr. Reiter, could answer that.
4 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
Is it one to one?
l 5
DR. REITER:
We don't have it.
We have very few 6
measures of strong motion in the East, and the way we arrive at 7
i the estimate of excedance is through the occurrence of the earth 8
quake.
So it is a one to one relationship.
9 10 What we're saying here is, we have estimated the 11 present design, following present procedures, would be the 12 equivalent of intensity 5-6.
We're estimating the occurrence i
-2 l
13 of intensity 5-6 at the site is ab7ut the order of 10 or one ja per 100.
i CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Well, all of the plants which were 15 I
16 designed and received construction permits prior to, I don't j7 know, about '70 --
i l
MR. DENTON:
1973.
I think Appendix A to Part 100 j
18 l
was adooted in '73.
j9 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
We were picking up Reg Guide 1.60.
20 I
We were going over to the Reg Guide 1.60 spectra, as a result i
21 22 of a fairly long analysis that was done by Newmark and Hall and 23 some other people, and reported, it seems to me, you know --
24
'69 or '70 sticks in my mind.
co Federal Reporters, Inc.
25 Prior to that time, this was typical of the' 2h45 717
te 9 24 1
establishment of the seismic design base, and coupled with this 2
would be an assessment by a consultant like Nate Newmark that 3
this spectrum anchored at a certain zero period value and I
4 coupled with certain design conditions in terms of allowable I
5 damping factors for the two earthquakes and so on, was a conser-6 vative and acceptable design basis for the plant.
l 7
I can recall numbers of occasions as the 1.60 spectra 8
were introduced and we would argue about whether a plant whose 9
designses being presented on the basis of the older spectra and i 10 damping factors, how it compared with the new ones.
And wa i
11 ought to ask engineers to do some check calculations on typical !
12 structural components, equipment, equipment supports and piping i
13 systems, comparing the 1.60, the results of the 1.60 spectra i
14 and damping values with the older, with the Housner spectra or i
1 15 whatever they had used and the other damping factors.
i 16 By and large, those comparisons didn't turn out badly,l 17 among other reasons, because while the spectral aspects for the j i
18 input motion were certainly more conservative on the 1.60 basis '
19 than had typically been the case on consultants' evaluations i
20 such as this one in the Housner spectra, the elbow damping 21 values were considerably smaller that went with the older 22 spectra.
And by the time you got through calculating the on 1
23 response nf structures and pipes and equipment and so cni, 24 the two-face issue, often found that there wasn't a great deal I
m FemI Rmonen, W.
I 045?IB 25 to choose between them.
a
te '10 25 1
MR. DENTON:
We've looked at that here.
Let me ask 2
Bill or Darryl to comment on the response to the structuring 3
equipment to the larger earthquake.
l t
4 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Before Dick disappears, can 5
I ask him another question?
I 6
Could you, Dick, to make sure I understand something 7
you said -- did you say that the current reg guides, using 8
that would lead you to say that the chance of exceeding safe
~4
~
9 shutdown earthquake is about 10 to 10
?
10 MR. DENISE:
Yes.
It isn't in the regulatory guides 11 or in the regulations, but some of the probability evaluations 12 we have done indicate that the probability of exceeding safe 13 shutdown earthquakes for plants that use the modern correlations 14 in the reg guides which we used, it would be on that order,
-3
~4 15 10 to 10 per year.
16 MR. DENTON:
I might mention that the quantification 17 of the total seismic margins in a plant that meets regulatory 18 practice either in '69 or today has been the subject of interest 19 in research for a number of years.
There is a research program 20 ongoing in the research division to try to quantify the margins.
21 Also, for plants that were built even prior to 22 Maine Yankee, we have an SEP program and a large part of that 23 SEP program is using the -- Is it Livermore?
24 MR. EISENHUT:
Yes.
l AmFewal Regmners. Inc.
25 MR. DENTON:
To look at those plants and take the f
2043 219l 1
i
te 11 26 i
way they were built and take the seismology as we see it today i
2 and attempt to assess what the level of risk from seismic designi 3
is. This plant is not in the SEP program.
You recall the 4
Commission approved a selection of about a dozen plants c. so I
5 to be in the SEP program.
i 6
Depending on the results of that SEP look, we would 7
be back to the Commission proposing what plants to move in i
8 earlier.
There have been two plants which were shut down 9
because of seismic consideration, but they more due to culpable i 10 faults than they were to selection of the original values, suchl 11 as Humboldt Bay and Palisades.
l l
12 Perhaps you should answer, Darryl, what the staff's 13 general views are regarding the availab ity of Main Yankee l
14 to withstand somewhat higher ground motions.
15 MR. EISENHUT:
Yes.
Youcrecall th= other day, in 16 connection with going through this, after you go through it i
17 you have to ask yourself the question also, in light of that, i
18 whether you really think -- what the plant would withstand j
l 19 today.
It's our view the major structures in the plant, for 20 example, today could take a 0.2 g peak acceleration, when you 21 consider all those margins without failure.
So we believe 22 there are adequate margins to go to that upper limit, even 23 recognizing like how it was designed in the old days.
24 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Is this based on calculation?
co Federsi Reporters, Inc.
f 25 MR. EISENHUT:
Yes, to a certain extent it is.
On 2 0 4 ~
-} -} u
\\
)
i i
te 13 27 t
1 Maine Yankee it's more based on just knowledge gained from othert U s2 2
plant evaluations.
3 For example, as Mr. Denton just mentioned, the SEP i
4 program, we have considerable amount of work going on both at 5
Livermore looking at seismic conservatisms -- in each stage of i
6 the process, we've been analyzing some of the even older plants l 7
in the U.S. and we're about ready to complete some of those 8
reviews.
This is sort of fall-out from what we're lemrning 9
from those other reviews.
I i
10 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Let me just go back to your 11 earlier point, which I didn't fully understand.
Are you saying, 12 in effect, the safe shutdown earthquake is a one in 100 year l
13 earthquake?
14 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
He said one in 1,000, i
15 MR. DENTON:
There has been a changing view on the 16 geological and seismological --
l 17 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
What he said was one in 1,000 18 to one in 10,000.
t 19 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Oh, you re saying that's for j
20 modern plants with modern standards.
I'm talking about I
l 21 Maine Yankee.
j 22 MR. DENISE:
Well, on Maine Yankee what I said vas 23 that the chance of exceeding the ground motion that was used 24 as input to the design appears to be one in 100 per year at a re me an= nen ine.
l 25 that site.
That has nothing to do eth what we are doing now j
2043 22%
l 4
te 13 28 l
1 and the fact that it's much lower in maay plants.
2 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
I understand that, but is it i
3 correct to characterize the safe shutdown earthquake for that 4
plant as a one in 100 year earthquake?
5 MR. DENISE:
I am only giving you a partial answer l
6 because we're only dea.'.ing with part of it.
7 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
You know, we have had the recorded t
8 history up there, runs back at least 200 years.
If you quote l
.i 9
recurrence intervals of 100 years -- is that what you've got?
10 MR. DENISE:
Yes, sir.
We've taken a quick look at l
11 it.
It appears to us that there's been 3 or 4 earthquakes in 12 the past 300 years that could have given quite readily spectra 13 or ground motion at that site equivalent to the input for the I
i 14 design.
l 15 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
Would they have had to have 16 been centered right at the site, or are you saying somewhere in 17 the vicinity?
18 MR. DENISE:
No, they can be local or distant.
19 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
To achieve this response at the 20 site, it has to be local.
You are saying there have historically 21 been several earthquakes in a region that can reasonably be 22 regarded as the tectonic province for Maine Yankee which have 23 been of this size?
i 24 MR. DENISE:
No, sir, I'm not going to limit it to
- FewW Reenws, W.
25 that.
I think there are local and distant effects.
For example 2043 2221 l
i 1
te 14 29 i
1 in the La Mar Bay area up in Canada tnere appears to be a rather 2
large earthquake, based on historical recorch, occurring every 3
50 years or so and a high-intensity earthquake or a high-4 magnitude earthquake up there in the 6 or 6 to 7 range can give 1
5 you these kinds of accelerations at the Maine Yankee plant as 6
well.
So it's not a local earthquake.
It can be a distant 7
l 8
COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
So you're saying, Dick, that i
9 the historical record is that over the last 200, 300 years, 10 there are 3 or 4 earthquakes, given where they actually occurredi 11 could have led to this value at the site?
12 MR.'DENISE:
At the site area.
I don't know if we i
13 could say right precisely at the site.
14 COMMISSIONEP AHEARNE:
But essentially in that area?
l i
l 15 MR. DENISE:
Yes, in that area.
16 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
What then happens if such an l
17 earthquake occurs and that value is exceeded in terms of what 18 the staff has nce learned from its review?
19 MR. DENISE:
I think this is a structural answer, isn't 20 it?
21 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
I'm not necessarily addressing 22 it to you.
I'm coming bac. to Darryl.
t thinkyouneedtogobackinaslightlyf 23 MR. DENTON:
I 1
24 different, bigger perspective.
There's been little historical j
a-FMwet Remnen Inc.
l 25 activity at the site since the plant was licensed.
l 2043223l
e IS 30 1
COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
That's only a couple of years, 2
though.
3 MR. DENTON:
Most of the data on earthquakes in this t
4 area were available at the time the site was originally reviewed; 5
by the USGS and at that time by NOAA, and at that time tbs i
6 attempt was to select a vicinity that would be unlikely to be l
t 7
exceeded during the life of the plant.
It was to be a remote i
l 8
There's been a lot of information gained in earth-.
9 quake knowledge from other parts of the country, but very littlei 10 in East Coast earthquake.
i II Another thing we have done is picked up the spectrum 12 1.60, which is an ensemble of earthquake motions.
No earthquake 13 in particular is likely to have exactly that bundle of energy i
l 14 spread out.
So maybe Leon would like to comment on the difference 15 in the way East Coat seismicity is perceived over the last. ten l
16 years.
Actually, the data record has not changed much, and l
17 the staff practice supposedly -- we adopted in our regulations 18 a computation of the way it had been done before, but it's 19 fair to say that we have, over the past dozen years, raised our 14 20 views on what SSE should be for East Coast earthquakes.
i 21 i
l 22 23 i
24 l
ca Federal Reporters. Inc.
2045 224
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31 1
COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
If I have followed all of this-2h--andthiswaaSotonepicturethatwasworthathousandwords--
3, (Laughter.)
I 4'
-- What I seem to have garnered is that there is a 5i rough probability of one in a hundred that an earthquake could 6-happen that would produce accelration above.1 but not above.2 i
7' G.
Is that a correct summary of what Dick was saying?
8 DR. REITER:
What we are saying is:
We are not talk-j 9 l ing about the peak acceleration; we are talking about the i
10 spectra as a whole, and we now realize that peaks can vary.
We Il can get very small earthquakes with wry large peaks, and large 12 i earthquakes with small peaks.
But we would like to think of the.
I 13 ground motion as a spectra as a whole.
14 It is our estimate that this, the ground design basis 15 ! earthquake here, the Housner Spectra, anchored at.1 G is equiva-16 lent to a certain intensity.
That intensity is probably inten-li 17 sity 5-6.
The probability estimates:
We think that the chance 18 of this being reached or exceeded is about the order of one in a l
I9 '
hundred.
And looking back in the historical record over the 20 past few hundred years, it seems to be that there are at least 21 three or four instances where this may -- this intensity may i
22]4 he.ve been reached.
23 I thf.nk Harold Denton was essentially correct in that l
24 ! we are working just being east and west here, and we don' t have co Federal Recorrers, hc.
25 eastern records; we have mostly western records.
We're trying O-20 %
225 1
pv2 32 I
to take those western records and look at them and interpret 2htheminthebestwaywecan.
i 3
Some people have done some studies of ground motion I
4 intensity.
It seems the way we use the reg guide today, it is 5
not a bad characteriuation of ground motion with specific 1
6 intensity falls somewhere between the mean and the mean plus one i
7 sigma.
8l COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
But what you are telling me --
i 9
there's just no way, with the best will in the world, that you j
10 will make a seismic expert out of me today, or piping expert --
i 11 !
but you're telling me there is a probability of one in a hundred 12 that something that is part of the design basis of that plant i
13 will be exceeded.
14 '
What I need to know in terms that I can understand is I
15 '
what will happen if that happens?
16 i
DR. REITER:
We are just limiting ourselves to the F
17 design, the input motion.
And what happens after that, I think I
the structural engineers can answer a lot better than we can.
I 19 '
MR. EISENHUT:
I would like to have Vince Noonan
^0 address that, if we could.
21 MR. NOONAN:
Yes, sir.
Since we are now talking about:
22 new criteria, let me also talk about new criteria for structures.
'3 Il l The plant, as licensed according to the FSAR, are based on the 24 i old Criteria and are much more conservative type criteria.
co-Federal Resorters, Inc.
25 Basic criteria today now has been somewhat, relaxed 22b
)
' 1 m
a il
pv3 l
33 I
because we find out in the course of events that we can take 2
higher loads.
We have done a quickie study based on just some i
3 numbers that we looked at from the standpoint of trying to 4
determine what earthquake is today und how much more it could i
5; tolerate.
6 Clearly, if we went to the Reg Guide 160 earthquake i
7j used in today's criteria, there would be some modifications I
8l required for the plant.
Probably no question of that.
How 9'
extensive those modifications are would be some judgment on my 10 part.
g II l COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
Let me stop you there.
What's 12 '
the difference between what you just said and Darrell saying 13 that in the staff's judgment the plant would, in fact, withstand Id the design basis acceleration that you'd expect today?
15 MR.
NOONAN:
Withstand from failure point, failure i
16 point being -- I think what Darrell was saying, failure being I7 some ultimate r', cure or some total failure of structure.
1 18 ;
I am going back to the point where I want to keep my i
I9 plant within the elastic range or elastic limits of the struc-20 ture, so I am going to stay within my failure criteria; I am 21 going to keep myself down into the elastic range so I still have 22 l margins over and above that to some ultimate failure of the 23 ll structure where I would expect some connection breaks.
I 24 '
l So, that's our difference.
When Darrell says --
ca Fede,at Reoorte,s. inc.
COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
With Darrell's criteria, t
t L
20/~
227
pv4 34 I
something like BEMP.
But you don't even want it to BEMP.
2 MR. EISENHUT:
I am talking to ultimate criteria of 3
the facility.
It could clearly take
.2.
4 COMMISSICNER AHEARNE:
Are you talking about operating i
5 basis?
l i
6 MR. NOONAN:
I am talking about operating reactors.
i 7
COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
No.
Operating basis.
l 8
MR. NOONAN:
I am talking about safe shutdown earth-9 quakes.
I i
10 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
You weren't trying to use that j 11 as a criteria?
12 MR. EISENHUT:
If you designed the plant today or if 13 you made it meet today's requirements, you'd need to make modi-14 fications, because, by definition, if it meets today's require-15 ments, you've got a considerable margin, even on top of that.
16 That's all we're saying.
i 17 MR. NOONAN:
Right.
And looking at today's criteria, !
18 it looks like we could -- just accounting for the increase in l.
19 today's criteria, we could account for factors of about three, 20 3-1/2, over and above -- making the assumption that maybe 50 l
21 percent of the earthquake, the allowable number that the plant 22 was designed to was for the earthquake number, we could probably 23 tolerate factors of three, 3-1/2, just on using today's criteria i
24 numbers.
And that does not account for any type of factors a-FMml Rworms, lm.
1 25 involving materials or factors involving dynamic amplification j
204.5 228
pv5
~
35 i
1 or dynamic short-term loads.
2 So, there is considerable margin in the structures to l
3 tolerate these kinds of loads.
Letmetellyousomethingthatl 4
COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
5 bothers me a little bit here.
When we got started with these 6
concerns about the ability of the pipes to withstand stresses, 1
7 we were talking about the safe shutdown earthquake being one 8
that occurred -- I don't know -- once in 10,000 years.
And one 9
of the reasons we were particularly concerned was that if you l
l 10 looked at the stresses that we had on that Monday or Tuesday, I
t 11 it looked as if --
12 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Stress on the plant?
i l
13 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Stresses in the Beaver Valley l 14 plant; right.
The numbers for the operating basis earthquake, 15 the degree to which those numbers -- let's say the stresses on l
16 the pipes, when subjected to the operating basis earthquake, I
l 17 seemed to be comparable to those that you got for the safe shut !
18 down earthquake, and since the operating basis earthquake was a l 19 lot more frequent -- that is to say, one you could expect more 20 frequently, perhaps once in a hun 3 red years -- that's something l
21 you are worried about.
Inotherwords,youcangetuppasttheelasticlimits!
22 23 with that sort of frequency.
That struck me as one of the most 24 disturbing aspects of the table of numbers we had gotten then, wFMwal Flemners, lrw.
25 of more concern than the fact that the safe shutdown earthquake i
?04 22?
l
pv6 36 i
I numbers were exceeded.
2 MR. DENTON:
I look upon the seismic design require-1 3
ments of the Commission as a package, that it's not just -- at i
4 any given time in the evolution of our seismic design criteria, 5
there have been procedures for determining the SSE, for determin4 6
ing the spectrum that is to be allowed, the damping values, the !
l 7
working limits for stress, and the methods.
So at any one time l l
8 there is a complete package, and you can't pick and choose 9
among these packages.
t 10 I think what Vince was trying to say is the building 11 package that went with the 1969 vintage had some conservative j
12 assumptions in it with regard to damping and so forth.
If you 13 move up in time till recent times, the SSE values have gone up, 14 but in some areas the building conservatisms have been relaxed.
15 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
I understand that.
16 MR. DENTON:
You have to look at things in a uniform i
17 package.
i 18 I think my concern with regard to the Beaver Valley I
19 numbers was:
Within this package there had been a design error 20 made,that we couldn't clearly identify what the result would be r
21 because of this arithmetic error when we had the Beaver Valley l
22 numbers.
l 23 MR. EISENHUT:
I think, on the Beaver Valley numbers, 24 the table you refer to, there should be another point, I guess, i l
m Fxcel Reporte,s. IN.
25 pointed out, and maybe Vince or Bill could clarify it.
I was
{
i 2043 730
pv i
37 l
l 1
only peripherally involved, but as I recall, the table initially, 2
where people had numbers showing that the new values -- that is, 3
the recalculated values -- for piping had gone up above SSE values 4
and above some OBE values, has since been shown to be erroneous.
5 Those values are wrong.
That was because -- they were off by l
i 6
perhaps an order of magnitude.
7 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Nevertheless, they affected I
8 decisions.
9 MR. EISENHUT:
They certainly did.
But I am saying 10 the bases we used for those decisions was based upon information!
II supplied to us by Beaver Valley and their Vendor, or their architect engineer.
l I2 13 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Sure, but that strikes me as 14 a separate point.
I 15 MR. EISENHUT:
It certainly is.
I am just saying, to l 16 correlate the two you need to realize that now what we are saying, i
17 the numbers are considerably that much lower, too.
18 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
I understand that.
But we're applying a certain criteria.
I9 20 MR. DENTON:
Maybe I missed your point.
21 MR. EISENHUT:
I did, toc.
22 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Well, my point was simply this:
23 In looking at that table of numbers, we came to the conclusion 24 that you could e<ceed the limits that we had set for the safe ca Federal Reporters, Inc.
shutdown earthquake, not once in a thousand:
gor 2}dcein 25 l
pv I
38 l
1 10,000 years, but perhaps once in a hundred years.
And that is l
2 something that is of some concern.
3 Now, here we seem to be saying that it isn't of any 1
4 concern.
5 MR. EISENHUT:
I don't necessarily think we're saying 6
it is not of concern.
I think, as Mr. Denton just pointed out -
7 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
I overstated that a little bit.
t 8
MR. EISENHUT:
Certainly, you have got to look at the 9
package of the plant.
In theory, you could have a package 10 in your licens;, approach which calculates a very small earth-II quake as long as you have considerably larger margin in the 12 structures.
You could have a larger earthquake input, and you 13 could have, therefore, comparable -- you could have smaller I4 M rgins in the structures.
15 Both ends of that have been revised over the last 10 16 years.
The way we calculate the inputs to the earthquake cal-I I7 culations to see whether the structure and systems components l
18 equipment is going to survive or not, that piece has gone higherj 19 That is the threat, so to speak, the input. The way we calculate 20 it today is higher.
21 But we have also learned something on the other side; 22 that is, learned something about the capabilities of structures i
I 23 and the way they respond to earthquakes.
And those two er16 products are not totally -- they're not nearly as much diffarenti co-Federal Reporters, Inc.
as it would appear by looking at this one piece. 2043 232 i
25
39 t
1 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
I understand that.
2 MR. DENTON:
I think I see your point now.
And what I, i
3 had intended to answer about the package is:
Within any one 4
given package you had to do those calculations right, and I was i l
5 concerned with the Beaver Valley package.
They were getting
{
l 6
answers that showed they exceeded SSE values when done within 7
that package.
I 8
Here at Main Yankee, if they redo them within the pack $
i 9
age that is appropriate for Main Yankee, I am not made that much 10 uncomfortable by the fact that the SSE that was used to go into II that package was not the same one we put in today, because that t
12 package goes from building on is different.
13 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY :
Beaver Valley was calculate Id along the lines of Reg Guide 1.60?
i i
15 MR. DENTON:
I will have to ask Bill.
16 l MR. RUSSELL:
The reanalysis that was done for Beaver i
I7 Valley was done based upon the specific spectra that was approved i
18 in the FSAR.
That spectra is close to Reg Guide 1.60, however.
But it was based upon what was approved and what was in the 19 20 license for that unit as a package.
2I MR. NOONAN:
I wonder if I could maybe make one com-22 ment.
It's a little unfair to compare Beaver Valley to the Main 23 Yankee plant, because on the reruns that we have seen to date, 24 the stress levels i. the plant are by far much lower than what co Federal Reporters, Inc.
25 was being reported to us in the Beaver Valley plant.
In fact, l 2043 233 j
l
40 j
1 I can't quote the exact numbers, but we're seeing stresses down 1
2 in the range of maybe two to three thousand psi, wher e your I
3 allowable values would take you up to 27,000 psi.
4 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
I am not addressing so much 5
the actual stresses so much as the standards we are applying in i
I 6
the two cases.
7 MR. NOONAN:
I guess the point I am making:
There is i l
8 a lot of capability in that plant to withstand a
higher seismic 9
event, and comparing the numbers we saw in Beaver Valley, the 10 days that we were working on that one, we lost all confidence, II even in the fact that trying to use new criteria. The numbers 12 being quoted to us were so high we didn't even have the comfort 13 of trying to extrapolate to new criteria numbers.
14 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Vince, what kind of damping 15 factors were you using?
Are you using the same damping factor I 16 now?
Would you apply the same damping factor?
i 17 MR. NOONAN:
I think we're using a half a percent 18 damping for the piping, which is very conservative damping value:
I 19 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE :
Now, if you were using the Reg l 20 Guide --
21 MR. NOONAN:
Reg Guide, I think, would be two percent.
22 ge.d be allowed to use like two percent.
23 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Harold, let's assume that you do end up finding these other ends that we talked about and you l 24 a FWeral Reporters, lm.
j do let the plant go back up.
Would you propose to take any l
25 i
2045 234 l
1
41 i
I add'.tional actions or ask Main Yankee to do a.y additional reviews i
2 to address this particular question that you have now raised?
I 3
MR. DENTON:
I wouldn't propose that they address the 1 4
selection of the SSE until we have completed our review of the 5
plants that cre even older than Main Yankee to see how they 1
6 turned out when looked at in detail, coupling the SSE and the l
7 Main Yankee reviews.
In other words, I think there are a large 8
number of plants in the same class that were built before the j
9 present criteria were fully in place and implemented.
10 I
COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
So you are saying that your II level of comfort with the conservatism that you see is such that 12 you wouldn't require them to do a reevaluation, say, using new 13 pipe and Shock 1, et cetera, for current damping factors?
14 MR. DENTON:
I say that because it appears we're making 15 some progress in resolving the sole issue of seismic margins 16 for plants that are even older than Main Yankee, and I would I
17 suspect if there is a problem in Main Yankee, even the older l
18 ones might have more of a problem.
I9 So, what we have attempted to do in the SEP program is'i l
20 look at the plant as it is really built,to determine its overall 21 resistance to earthquakes and the contribution of earthquakes 22 and risks for those plants.
And I guess Darrell is indicating 23 the way it seems to be coming out is that there is a fair amount 24 of resistance of those older buildings when you look at the entire Ms-Federal Reporters, Inc.
j 25 way SSEs were built in --
l nz04..
235 l
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1 MR. EISENHUT:
Certainly, those that had seismic i
2 design, specifically.
Some of the first couple of plants really 3
didn't have at all the kind of seismic design we've got today.
4 If you look within the 11 SEP plants which are 11 of l
5 the earliest plants, as Mr. Denton said, they are turning out 6
the preliminary information, the margins are there.
7 MR. DENTON:
At the time, which wasn't all that long 8
ago, about '69, I guess, we had three of the world's experts -- !
l 9
that's Newmark, Coulter, and Murphy were the three geologists --
y l
10 seismology and seismic design.
We didn't have the in-house staff 11 at the time to do this review ourselves.
12 I think what I want to call to the Commission's atten-13 tion here, it doesn't meet today's standard practice, but I 14 guess, in my view, it comes close enough to await th e outcome of i
15 the SEP look.
For most plants, I don't see necessarily a i
16 linkage between the issue of the order and seismic design, SSE I
17 input values at this level between.1 and
.2.
18 If today we felt the SSE ought to be.5 or something, end#'.5 19 then I would have quite a different view.
I t
20 21 22 23 h_Oh3 2
b 24 c..p.e.r : Reporters, inc.
25 l
CR 4530 #16 MIMI)'p.v 43 i
l CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
The show-cause orders were to deal 2
with a specific condition found, apparently, Beaver Valley. sad 3
used an incorrect procedure within the seismic design framework 4
that had been authorized in its time, and the same was expected 5
-- we thought we had good reasons to think that Main Yankee was 6
the same situation.
7 It seems to me that the current discussion deals with 8
that, primarily, and these other matters.
i 9
You would propose, then, to finish checking these l
10 things out, that Bill has got this morning?
And I think there f
i II was one other.
And then lift the immediate effectiveness of the l
12 order, or write a new order saying restart, or what?
13 MR. DENTON:
Yes.
14 MR. BICKWIT:
Mr. Chairman, maybe we ought to focus on 15 which of those two is being contemplated, whether you're con-16 templating lifting immediate effectiveness and leaving the pro-17 ceeding in place, or whether you're actually terminating the 18 entire proceeding and the order?
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Well, let's see.
Main Yankee has l
I9 20 replied to the order.
2I VOICE:
That's correct.
22 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
So where does that leave us?
23 VOICE:
What we need now to do is to terminate that l
l show-cause order, and that is what we would propose to do with d
24 co Federal Reporters, Inc.
l 25 if Harold follows through -- would be to terminate the 20 b 237
44 i
1 proceeding.
In other words, the show-cause ort.J and the licensee 2
or licensee license would be intact.
3 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
Which would be write a new 4
order.
5 VOICE:
That's correct.
It would be a separate new l
6 order that would essentially terminate the proceeding.
7 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
In the old oder you had:
"The 8
cold shutdown shall remain in such mode until further order of j
i i
9 the Commission."
So, what you're saying, the subsequent order 10 would be that one referred to?
11 VOICE:
that's correct.
12 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
- Well, I,
for one, concur in that 13 proposed lin-of action.
14 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
I would not concur until I 15 knew that, in fact, the rest of the work had been done.
I would 16 assume that all other things working down, I would be able to 17 at that time.
But it seems to me the right point for us to con-18 cur is after everything is in, and we are not quite there yet.
1 I9 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
By the "everything," you mean --
20 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
When will everything be finished?
21 MR. RUSSELL:
What we have remaining is a review of l
l 22 one run under one of the three versions of Shock 1 that was 23 delivered this morning.
People were not able to reveiw it this 24 morning because we were on our way down here.
m-FMwat Reporters, lm.
l 25 MR. DENTON:
I think we may have left you with a wrong!
2043. 238 al
45 l
1 impression of one of the areas that you said we stopped working.
2 We have verified two out of three, and the third one we sort of 3
didn't have enough manpower to verify.
I assume the reason we i
4 stopped is because you had become confident enough after that i
5 look.
I 6
MR. RUSSELL:
That's correct.
The sample problems I
7 which were provided to Stone & Webster to run on their computer i
8 to get new pipe and Shock 3 results, two of those three are 9
completed.
In addition, we have done our independent verifica-l 10 tion problems on four other problems.
The one problem that is 11 remaining is not felt to be necessary to reach a conclusion on 12 the acceptability of either the Shock 3 code or the new pipe l
l 13 code.
That is what is yet to be done, which will be done during' 14 the week.
However, that is not necessary for the staff to i
15 reach a conclusion, and we have reached that conclusion and 16 documented it in our draft safety evaluation.
i 17 The one item that is remaining is a single new pipe l
18 run on a Shock Zero version which has been completed now and wasl 19 provided to the staff thia morning, which has to be reviewed.
20 We expect that that can be done on the order of a few hours.
21 We have been verbally told what is in that package.
We have justnothavehadanopportunityyettolookatthatpackageandl 22 23 reach a conclusion.
24 What we have seen on the other ones is acceptable, and co Federet Reporters, Inc.
25 we have reason to believe this will show the same type of results.
2~045 239
pv4 I
46 i
1 MR. EISENHUT:
Yes.
I think Vince Noonan's branch is 2
doing the calculations.
He indicated they will have it done 3
early this afternoon.
l 4
MR. DENTON:
The other things I wanted to look at was j l
5 their response to the TMI-related Bulletin where they say they 6
would see where they stand with regard to those items.
7 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE :
What kind of time do you think 8
that will take?
9 MR. DENTON:
It may have already been -- whenever we 10 were satisfied with their response and whenever the staff was l
11 satisfied with the areas they had mentioned is when I propose 12 to issue the order.
13 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Are you tying that to the 14 operation of the plant?
15 MR. DENTON:
Well, I don't know what the extent of I
l 16 linkage might be, but I want ot know where they stand before I i
17 decide to restart.
I don't want to say it's an absolute neces-l l
18 sity, but I want to see that they have accomplished the major i
19 actions.
l i
20 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Harold, how difficult would it i
I 21 be for Vince or you or Darrell -- probably Vince would be the 22 best person -- to write down one or two pages of the kinds of 23 conservatisms that you're talking about that exist?
And I don't 24 mean the specifics in the detailed numerical, but just a list of m-FMwel Rmorurs, lm.
l 25 the types of conservatisms that lead you to have that kind of l
2043 240 I
l l
pv5 I
confidence that you have?
2 MR. EISENHUT:
Vince can correct me if I am wrong, but i
3 I think the conservatisms in the plant of seismic design alreadyi 4
exist.
I think they've been presented a number of times in a f
5 number of places, a number of forms.
I think it is published. l 6
The staff has a consultant exercise under way that we have been l l
7 working with for a couple of years, actually, with one of our 8
contractors, where they have gone through on some dozen different 9
items and quantified these conservatisms, even.
So, it does 10 exist.
i Il COMMISSIONER AHEARNE :
So you could provide that rather 12 readily?
13 MR. NOONAN:
Yes, we could.
14 MR. DENTON:
The seismic design is one field in which 15 there are about a half a dozen different specialties involved 16 between the start of the issue and the equipment.
It's hard to i
17 find in any one specialty a lot of conservatisms necessarily that 18 people aren't willing to admit that there aren't a lot of con-19 servatisms.
20 But when engineers looked at the net recult of the l
21 structural or equipment that result from this process, it seems 22 to result in massive structures and, in fact, structures that 23 ride through without incident whenever tested.
There have been 24 very few model tests on seismic design structures.
a-FWesl RMmners, Inc.
l l
25 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
But, Harold, Darrell just said
^ q 't E 7d}
48 l
1 there are these kinds of --
2 MR. DENTON:
Yes.
t 3
MP. EISENHUT:
We're not really looking at the input 4
in, you know, the earthquake, where it's located.
5 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
I am not asking that.
6!
MR. EISENHUT:
We did that, in fact, specifically, in j 7
o, der to reach the decision concerning going forth with the SEP l l
8 on teismic review, and that was part of our bases of deciding 9
which spora- '
_.a.
10 MR. DENTON:
I think the kind of list that we would 11 provide you would be one that contrasts some of today's damping 12 values; for example, the two percent with the half percent.
13 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Fine.
If you would do that, l
14 I would much appreciate it.
About how long do you think it might l
15 take you to do that?
l 16 MR. DENTON:
Let me ask Vince, since he probably is I
17 the person I will assign this to.
18 MR. NOONAN:
I am sorry.
I missed the question.
I9 MR. EISENHUT:
How long do you think it would take youl i
20 to make up this list?
A couple of days.
21 MR. NOONAN:
Probably no more than a couple of days to 22 put together such a list.
Most of the data exists.
23 MR. EISENHUT:
Tomorrow, maybe?
24 MR. NOONAN:
Okay.
l nFMual Rworws, lm.
l 25 MR. EISENHUT:
It's a matter of pulling it together, 204'5 242
49 1
basically.
I 2
COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
I am not really looking for a f
3 vast list, because, you see, what I am about to say is :
I would.
4 rather hold off on expressing my opinion until I see the list.
l i
5 MR. DENTON:
I guess a question I would raise in this l 1
6 regard is:
In order to be consistent, this is not a unique 7
situation, and I don't see much difference in allowing this plant l
8 to resume operation without being redone to today's criteria than 9
I would any other plant that was licensed before present prac-l 10 tices got fully established.
I 11 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Harold, I think you are absolutely 12 right, and that is why I want to see that list.
And I agree with 13 you.
14 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Assuming that other circumstances 15 are such that the plant could start operation, John, how long are I
16 you willing to have it sit there while you consider these mat-l 17 ters, since they are not part of the order?
18 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Well, except, Joe, the point 19 that has just been raised, really -- and I share Victor's view !
20
-- there is a fundamental question, which is:
the sense of the i 1
21 probability of an unfortunate occurrence that is very similar to 22 the kind of general probability of the unfortunate occurrence 23 that we faced when we shut the plants down.
24 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
If I understand, what they are m FMwet Reporars, W.
l 25 saying is something different from that.
They are saying that l
l l
2043 243 l
i 50 i
l 1
the probabilities of an occurrence are the same.
The ptebabili-2 ties of the consequence is quite different.
3 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Absolutely.
And the reason l
4 they're saying the probability of the consequence is quite 5
different is because of the set of conservatisms that exist.
l 6
And that is exactly my point.
Therefore, I would like to see i
7 something which would raise out a little bit of that set of 8
conservatisms.
9 MR. DENTON:
We can sure lay out what is there.
It is 1
10 because of the complexity of this issue that there is this big l
II research program ta attempt to quantify in more precise terms what these values practice really contribute.
l 12 13 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
I am not trying to find, really i
a list of precise numbers, the results of the research programs l Id l
15 or anything like that.
All I am trying to do is to get a little 16 bit of a sense for myself of what those kinds of conservatisms I7 are.
I am not saying that -- well -- I don't want to argue each 18 one at all.
I am just trying to have a little bit more of an I9 understanding of what has led -- obviously, you people who know 20 the area so well -- to have the confidence in that conservatism.
l 2I And I would expect -- I fully expect that, once I see the list, i
22 that I completely agree with you and I will no longer have any r
1 23 problem.
2#
COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
For my own part, in answer to co Federal Reporters, Inc.
25 the Chairman's question, that would be a three-part answer:
A, 204s 244
51 l
1 I would personally approve the recommendation of the staff; B, i
2 however, I would like to see the list, but my approval is not 3
contingent upon the list.
I would just like to see that list I
l i
4 for the same reasons, essentially; and, C, however, I do not 5
yet understand why, given our understanding of this particular 6
set of circumstances and knowing that this plant is designed to l 7
a different standard than today's standard, why, now that we 8
have ascertained that, we have gone this far into the study of l
9 this plant, we just don't go ahead and complete it rather than 10 wait for the SEP to take its normal course.
11 We are already involved in this plant.
Why don't we i
12 just do it?
13 Now, I am not suggesting that that has to be or should 14 be, in my view, have any effect at this point on whether the 15 plant comes back up, but rather we ought to go ahead and study 1
16 this plant and get it completed.
17 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
I think the best answer, Vic, 18 probably is that there is an enormous, highly skilled, profes-1 19 sional staff investment in each one of these things.
To do the i 20 seismic analysis of one of these plants is hundreds of thousands 21 of hours on the part of some engineers and thousands of hours of 22 staff time to review.
And it would be better to keep the availa-23 ble expertise in the staff concentrated on -- in part on the SEP 24 where there are older plants, and an overall judgment has to be co Federal Reporters, Inc.
25 made, and you have got four more plants who were involved in the 2043 2A5 l
pv10 52 I
show-cause order which -- or set of orders which are down and i
2 which need urgent attention.
I i
3 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
I will accept all that on the i
4 assumption the staff will provide me a simple, straightforward i
i 5
statement of how much time and effort would have to go into thej 6
reanalysis since, in due time, it's going to have to be done 7
anyway.
8 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
I am not at all confident.
I don'tl 9
agree that it is clear that it needs to be done.
i 10 I think there are things which one learns from look-II ing at the older plants, the SEP program.
12 I will point out to you, as I have before on occasion, 13 that this is one of a number of areas in which a certain amount 14 of realism is necessary.
15 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
I hope whoever makes earthquakes nd#16 16 understands that.
17 l
l 18 l
19 I
I, 20 l
l 21 22 23
.s,:.
{ $b _a E *f 24 co Federal Reporters, Inc.
25 i
CR,4530, 53 MIMI t-17 mte 1 1
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
We can reanalyze everything 2
according to today's standards, right.
And tomorrow we may 3
think we learned something this afternoon, and tomorrow we will 4
have a new standard in some area.
Good, we can reanalyze 5
everything according to tomorrow's standards, Monday's standards; 6
and so on.
7 What I'm saying is that you can't remake the world 8
every morning at 8:00 a.m. according to what you think you know l 9
at 7:59.
People who establish the design basis, not only in l
l 10 the seismic area, but other areas of these plants that go back l
11 some distance, felt they were doing it on a reasonable basis.
12 From what we have seen, by and large, certainly in the struc-i 13 tural area, why, that seems to bear up pretty well.
And while 14 I wouldn't propose that we go back to Housner spectrums and 15 the old damping values and the old methods of analysis, but I 16 would in fact want to see the best technology applied as new 17 plants come down the line.
l 18 I just don't think you can go back unless you have I
19 some feeling, which the staff, I think, doesn't seem to reflect i 20 to me, that there are urgent problems or that Maine Yankee as a 21 specimen doesn't meet the adequate protection standard, go i
backandsay,well, gee,youknow,we'vegotRevision12nowtol 22 23 Reg Guide 7, let's redo everything.
24 I think it's neither necessary nor reasonable.
I wFMwel Ruo,wrs, lm.
25 must say, for myself on Maine Yankee, with the staff.'s l
2043 247:
i
te 2, 54 recommendation in hand before us, I will repeat, I would allow j
Harold to -- concur in Harold's action to issue a new order on 2
3 the plant to come back to power at such time soon, here, as he l
4 4
is satisfied on the points he has raised.
It does seem.to me that to the extent that there is de'2y beyond that point, that l
5 t
6 there is a cost being incurred in Maine which is unnecessary.
7 Vic, you haven't had r. chance to --
COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
I would like to wait until 8
9 they have completed the actions, and I would like to reflect on i
10 it for a day.
1 11 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Okay.
COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
I will, as I reflect upon 12 i
13 whatever it is the staff is able to provide me in terms of a brief statement of how much effort would be involved in the l
14 15 analysis I'm talking about, which I believe will have to be i
16 done at some point in time.
i CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Now, do you want another meeting 17 18 to deal with this thing again?
l 19 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
I don't think I would need 20 another meeting.
I expect the staff's answer will be sufficient:
21 for me.
i 22 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
I would be prepared to go on 23 the assumption that we don't need another.
24 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
No, nFeent nwonus. w.
25 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
I don't want to be in a situation l
l 204.i 248 l
te $[.~.%
55 i
1 where I'm going to have to convene a meeting and try to get a 2
vote out of the Commission in order to get some action, and by 3
our procedural awkwardnesses people are going to continue to i
4 buy oil-fired electricity in Maine, if that's not necessary, on i
5 any grounds for which the Commission is responsible.
So I will I
look to you to please let me know if you have any other feeling 6
7 about the need for a meeting.
I i
COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
I'm no more anxious to burn 8
i 9
any more oil in main than we have to be.
I do think it's just l
4 10 as solemn a matter to put a plant back on as it is to take it i
11 off, and we reflected 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> on that subject last week on the l 12 basis of Harold's very strong recommendation at that time.
So 1
j l
13 I am in agreement for going over until tomorrow.
14 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Fair enough.
[
i 15 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
(Nods head in the affirmative.)I 16 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
Yes.
17 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Thank you.
l l
18 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
One last question.
Those 1
19 pipes, it's just a matter of -- they're minor (Inaudible).
t 20 MR. EISENHUT:
Yes.
-17 21 (Whereupon, at 1:10 p.m.,
the hearing as adjourned.)
22 23 l
9 9 M^ ,,.) J p/4 -
74 j
m-FMwal Remners. inc.
25 i
i I