ML19289D848
| ML19289D848 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 07002623 |
| Issue date: | 02/15/1979 |
| From: | Spitalny B NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY & SAFEGUARDS (NMSS) |
| To: | |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7903190157 | |
| Download: ML19289D848 (15) | |
Text
2/15/79 L
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U UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 2'y%if NUCLEAR REGULATORY C0f2ISSI0tl BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of DUKE POWER COMPANY Docket No. 70-2623 W
9 (Amendment to Materials License Station Spent Fuel Transportation )
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NRC STAFF RESPONSES TO CAROLINA yw ENVIRONMENTAL STUDY GROUP (CESG)
INTERROGATORIES OF JANUARY 21, 1979 In accordance with 10 CFR Section 2.720(h)(2)(ii), the NRC Staff S
responds to CESG's interrogatories of January 21, 1979 as follows:
Interrogatory 106 Explain the discrepancy in the number of trips from Oconee to McGuire stated by Applicant, 420, and the number stated in the NRC Environmental Appraisal, 300. Cf. contention 2.
Answer In Duke Power Company's application dated March 9,1978, the Applicant performed an accident analysis assuming a total ttansfer of 300 assemblies to McGuire. Subsequent conversations with Applicant indicated they may
_lf The affidavit of B. Spitalny is attached to the Staff responses.
The Staff is filing contemporaneously its objection to one CESG interrogatory.
yA 2983 /7C/57
_2-be interested in shipping greater than 300 assemblies.
If greater than 300 assemblies were to be shipped, such an action would require an amendment to the application along with a new accident analysis. As indicated in Duke's response of October 20, 1978 to question 5, no further immediate action was being taken regarding the number of assemblies to be shipped. The Staff, therefore, imposed a license condition limiting the number of shipments to 300.
Interrogatory 107 The AEC/NRC present a " defense-in-depth" concept in relation to nuclear station safety. How many layers of " defense" are there in the in-cask transport of a spent fuel assembly? Cf. contention 2.
Answer A description of the NFS-4 cask is provided in both the NFS Safety Analysis Report and the Staff's Safety Evaluation, both of which CESG has either been furnished with or provided access to.
Interrogatory 108 The Charlotte Observer of January 5,1979 carried a story on pp. lA and 5A relating to the NRC and Duke.
Provide fully and in detail all NRC documents and written communications in regard to the matter in which the bo),t in 'a cask were not properly tightened. Cf. Contention 2.
Answer A ttached are the following described documents relating, in part, to the Charlotte Observer story referred to by CESG wh'ich we have located to date.
If any additional documents are located subsequent to this response, they will be forwarded to CESG:
- 1.. Letter dated November 20, 1978 from Jack T.
Sutherland, Region II, NRC, to Duke Power Company (DPC) (Attn: Mr. William 0. Parker, Jr.).
2.
Letter dated October 25, 1978 from William 0.
Parker, Jr., DPC to Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director Region II, HRC.
3.
Letter dated September 29, 1978 from James P.
O'Reilly to DPC (William 0. Parker, Jr.).
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENS:NG BOARD In the Matter of DUKE POWER COMPAtlY Docket No. 70-2623 (Amendment to Materials License SflM-1773 for Oconee fluclear Station Spent Fuel Transportation
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and Storage at McGuire Station)
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AFFIDAVIT OF BRETT S. SPITALNY I, Brett S. Spitalny, am employed by the Nuclear Regulatory Comission in the Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, Fuel Reprocessing and Recycle Branch, as the project manager for the amendment to Materials License No. SNM-1773.
I have prepared, or supervised in the preparation of, the responses to Carolina Environmental Study Group Interrogatories numbered 106, 107 and 108.
These answers are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.
O m G N l = S' f..f Brett S. Spitalny i
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1 Subscribed and sworn to before me this /t,t E day of fe,B 20/: At},17 7tf.
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In Reply Refer To:
NbV 2 01978 RII:CMH 50-269/78-15 50-270/78-15 50-287/78-16 Duke Power Company ATTN: Mr. William O. Parker, Jr.
Vice President, Steam Production P. O. Box 2178 422 South Church Street Charlotte, North Carolina 28242 Gentlemen:
- -Thank you for your letter of October 25, 1978, informing us of steps you have taken to correct the items of noncocpliance concerning activities under NRC Operating License Nos. DPR-38, DPR-47, and DPR-55 brouS t to your attention in our letter of September 29, 1978. We h
will examine your corrective actions and plans during subsequent inspections. e
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- ,We appreciate your cooperation with us.
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i M,a N-t c Jack T. Sutherland, Chief
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Fuel Facility and Materials
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Mr. J. E. Smith, Station Manager Oconce Nuclear Plant P. O. Box 1175 Seneca, South Carolina 29678 5i ' t.n y, 4...
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Hr. James P. O'Reilly, Director U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission f
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Region II 101 Marietta Street, Suite 3100
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Atlanta, Georgia 30303 RE: ' RII:CMH 50-269/78-15 50-270/78-15 g
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Dear Hr. O'Reilly:
29, 1978 which' transmitted OIE Inspec-(thregardtoyourletterofSeptember50-269/78-15, 50-270/78-15, 50-287/78.-16, Duke Power Company does tion Report Attached are responses to not consider this information to be pr'oprietary.
the two items of noncompliance listed in the report.
Your letter also indicated concern with apparent weaknesses in the contamina-l d
tion control program at Oconee and requested that those actions taken or p ann to improve this program be described. awareness of the need to improve th Actions have been and are being taken as discussed below:
program.
The primary frisking points to avoid spread of contamination to other As noted (a)-
station areas are the exits from the Radiation Control Areas.
in the inspection report, background levels prevent many exits from To improve this situation, a modifica-being used as frisking points. tion is being processed to shield sample lines c three of the main frisking points. Other piping inter-ground levels at these locations ferences have prevented shields from being installed at d.
..however, and relocation of the sample lines is being evaluate
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Five other areas where the background levels cannot be pinpointed'tof specific problem components are to be improved of the installatio frisking booths.
booths are to be installed was required and it is expected that the booths will be available by January, 1979.
O To assure that personnel are properly frisking themselves, periodic checks have been and are continuing to be made by Health Physics personnel.
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. James P. O'Reilly, Director
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Page Two i
(b) The smear survey frequencies in the Interim Radwaste Building corridors have been changed to weekly as committed at the time of the inspection.
It should be noted however that the primary method of contamination control in this and other Radiation Control Areas is the "stepoff pad."
These pads serve as the boundary between clean and contaminated areas.
Each "stepoff pad" is checked daily for codtamination.
If the step-off pad is found contaminated from improper use, then the areas around it are checked and the limits of contamination spread are defined, posted and cleaned..The corridor checks are an additional verification that contamination is not present. The personnel friskers provide further assurance that contamination is not present. The recently installed
' portal monitors are a third verification that contamination is not present on personnel leaving station areas.
I (c) The " Contamination Area" outside the radwaste solidification area has been cleaned up.
In addition, reemphasis has been given to the station organiza-tion responsible for housekeeping matters in that area. It is anticipated that this action will result in more timely cleanup of contamination hazards.
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Three portal monitors have been previously ordered to be used to check individuals leaving the Restricted Area.
At the time of the subject A
11nspection, these were not in use as actions to provide electrical power 7-The monitors and procedures covering their use had not yet been completed.
are currently in service and, to the extent that they can be maintained operable, provide a check on e=ployees who leave the Radiation Control Area.
The above and other efforts will continue as necessary to assure the quality of the contamination control program at Oconee.
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6 OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION
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s Response to OIE Inspection Report
'50-269/78-15, 50-270/78-15, 50-287/78-16 W^
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ITEM A:
10 CFR 20.201(b) requires that each licensee shall make or cause to be made such surveys as may be necessary for him to comply with the regulations in this part.
10 CFR 20.203(b) states that "cach radiation area shall be con-spicuously posted with a sign or signs having the radiation caution symbol and the words: " CAUTION RADIATION AREA "
Contrary to the above, the licensee had not performed the radiation surveys necessary to ensure that radiation areas in the Interim Radwaste Building were identified and properly posted.
Radiation levels exceeding 5 mr/hr (9-25 mr/hr) were measured in three separate accessible areas of the build-ing during a radiation survey performed on August 2, 197B, as requested by the I
inspector.
l This is an infraction.
SPONSE:
The infraction resulted from a personnel error where the individual failed to adhere to the procedural requirements of procedures HP/0/B/1000/54 (Health Physics Shift Routines) and HP/0/B/1000/07 (Roping Off, Barricading and Posting of Radiation Control Zones).
The immediate corrective action was to post the entrances to the interim vastr facility with appropriate Radiation Area signs. Additionally, one major con-tributor to the existing radiation levels was a sample sink drain hose routed to a hallway floor drain.- This hose was rerouted to a floor drain within a po.sted RCZ control boundary.
The Health Physics Technician assigned the responsibility of HP procedure HP/
O/B/1000/54 (HP Shift Routines) for the time of the occurrence received a writ-ten reprimand as a form of corrective disciplinary action.
s TTEM B:
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Technical Specification 6.4.1 states, in part, that the station shall be oper-ated and maintained in accordance with approved procedures. Operating Proce-dure OP/0/A/1510/4, " Spent Fuel Shipping, NAC-1 Cask," steps 6.7 and 6.8 re-quire that, in preparing a loaded spent fuel cask for shipment, the trunnion tie-down nuts be torqued to 50 ft-lbs and the closure head impact limiter bolts S-torqued to 60 ft-lbs.
Nsl Contrary to the above, Operating Procedure OP/0/A1510/4, " Spent Fuel Shipping, NAC-1 Cask," was not followed on July 27, 1978, in that trunnion tie-down nuts Oe4-4 g
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and closure head impact limiter bolts, although tightened, were not torqued as completed.
.specified pri6r to initialling the procedure steps as
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This is an infraction.
RESPONSE
The infraction resulted from a personnel error where the procedure for shipping spent fuel (OP/0/A/1510/04) was not strictly adhered to for the two steps in question.
For immediate corrective action, the bolts on the trunnion bracket and on the The job supervisor was impact limiter were retorqued to the required valves.
counseled on the incident and was instructed to follow procedures as they are written at all times.
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....Sep 2 g is78 In Reply Refer To:
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RII : C.$i 50-269/78-15
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50-270/78-15 50-287/7E-16
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Dub. Fw. Company Attn:
.Sr. Villiam O. Parker, Jr.
uce President, Steam Production P. O. Box 2178 422 South Church Street Charlotte, North Carolina 2E242 Gentlemen:
Thi:: referr to the inspection conducted by Messrs. C. M. liosey and
- t. F.i.'<
- of this office on July 26-28, 1975 and August 1-4, C
1978, of activities authorized by hTC Operating License Nos. DPR-38, DPR-47 and DPR-55 for the Oconee Units 1, 2 and 3 facilities, and to the discussion of our findings held with Mr. J. E. Smith on July 28, 1978, and Mr. R. M. Koehler on August 4, 1976 at the conclusion of the inspection.
Areas examined during the inspection and our findings are discussed in the enclosed inspection report. Within these areas, the inspection consisted of selective examinations of procedures and representative
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records, interviews with personnel, and observations by the inspectors.
We have examined actions you have taken with ' regard to previously identified enforcement matters. These are discussed in the enclosed inspection report.
One new unresolved item resulted from this inspect 2on and is discussed in the enclosed report. This item will be examined during subsequent g
inspections.
During the inspection, it was found that certain activities under your license appear to be in noncompliance with h3C requirements. These
. items and references to pertinent requirements are listed in the Notice of Violation enclosed herewith as Appendix A.
This notice is sent to you pursuant to the provisions of Section 2.201 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice," Part 2, Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations.
Section 2.201 requires you to submit to this office, within 20 days of your receipt of Se
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2-(h Duke Power Company
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(1) corrective steps which have been taken by you and the results achieved; (2) corrective steps which will be taken to avoid further noncompliance; and (3) the date when full cocpliance vill be achieved.
Ve are concerned with apparent weaknesses in your contamination r.
control proFram as discussed in paragraph 6 of the enclosed inspection report.
Consequently, in your reply, describe in particular those actions taken or planned to improve your contami-nation control program.
In accordance with Section 2.790 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice,"
Part 2, Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, a copy of this letter and
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he enclosed inspection report will be placed in the NRC's Public Document t
If this report contains any information that you (or your contractor)
Room.
believe to be proprietary, it is necessary that you make a written application within 20 days to this office to withhold such information from public disclosure. Any such application must include a full statement of the reasons on the basis of which it is claimed that the information is proprietary, and should be prepared so that proprietary information identified in the application is contained in a separate part of the If we do not hear from you in this regard within the specified document.
period, the report will be placed in the Public Document Room.
Should you have any questions concerning this letter, we vill be glad to discuss them with you.
Sincerely, l
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jJaesP/fReilly Director
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Enclosures:
1.
Appendix A, Notice of Violation 2.
Inspection Report Nos. 50-269/78-15, 50-270/78-15 and 50-287/78-16 4
cc.v/ enc 1:
f Mr. J. E. Smith, Station Manager Oconee Nuclear Plant P. O. Box 1175 Seneca, South Carolina 29678 C
bf RII'Rpk.Kos. 50-269/78-15 I-7 50-270/78-15 and 5,0-287/78-16 during a tour of the interim radvaste building. Licensee representa-tives again acknowledged the inspector's comments, and stated that additional emphasis would be applied through internal inspections and
. sanagement discussions.
9 NeutronMonitoringPractices j
for evaluaticg and assigning At inspector reviewed the licensee's progran:
No neutron film or neutron-sensitive TLD personnel neutron expcsures.
is currently used at the plant. Personnel neutron exposures are assigned based on stay tic.e in the reactor building at power and An inspector reviewed records and verified ree-meter survey results.
that neutron doses are calculated and included in the hRC-5 equivalent The Station Healtt Physicist stated that entries computer printout.
i into the reactor building at power are infrequent; no routine, He said that all entries inside the secondary p.eriodic entries are made.
(crane vall) shielding on the operating deck or basement level are accompanied by a health physics technician with a ree-meter survey At the request of an inspector, licensee representatives instrument.
provided su= mary neutron exposure data for calendar year 1977, which indivicuals were assigned. neutron dose (although 20 of indicated 32
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these were less than 5 crem'and considered zero) for a total of 1.05 The inspector had no further questions.
neutron man-rem.
- 10. Follovup of Reactor Coolant Overflow cf May 4, 1978 On May 4, 1978, reactor coolant overfloved into the reactor building through an open manvay on the primary side of a steam generator (Ref:
R11 Insp. Rpt. 50-269/78-11). A written report describing the incident was submitted by Duke on May 19, 1978. During this inspection, an inspector reviewed records of radiation surveys conducted in the reactor building prior to the overflow, after the cleanup and decontami-nation of the overflow, and during the current inspection (August 3).
The inspector stated that, although the survey records did not support the statement in the May 19, 1978 report that radiation levels after the incident were less than those before the incident, the general radiation levels appeared to be about the same as prior to the overflow.
The inspector had no further questions.
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- 11. Shipment of Irradiated Fuel Assemblies The transfer of four irradiated fuel assemblies from Oconee a.
to the Crystal River plant.uas initiated during this inspection.
The assemblies were shipped by truck one at a time in Nuclear
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Assurance Corp. NAC-1 casks.
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-R11 Rpt. Kos. 50-269/75-15, 1-8 50-270/78-15 and 50-26 /76-16 n.
f Vben the inspectors arrived on site on July 26, the first On July 27, the inspectors b.
assembly had been loaded into the cask.
observed the loaded cask in the spent fuel pool building during A licensee representative said the cash had decontaaination.
in the dry decontamination pit. The inspectors been left overnight noted that 0?/0/A/1510/4, " Spent Tuel Shipping, NAC-1 Cask,"
states that the cast should be thoroughly rinsed as it emerges --
until decontacination f ron. the pool and sbculd be kept we*,.ation. The licensee represen-begins, to prevent airborne contar.
tative said it was better to store the cask in dry pit than to fuel pool vbere contatination cight become leave it in the spent The inspectors concurred, but stated that more deeply itbeded.
health physics should be informed in such cases in order that closer surveillance of airborne activity might be carried out.
The inspectors observed health physics personnel conduct radiation and contarination surveys during the night of c.
July 27/26, after the cask was loaded on the trailer. Radiation levels at contact with the cask were generally 6-10 mr/hr gamma and less than 1 crer/br neutron, with a maximum reading of 30 About 65 mr/ar gamma at contact with the bottom of tne cask.
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contamination svipes were taken on the cask; the results of many of these-vere greater than the plant's beta-gacca limit of 2,000 Several evolutions of additional decontamination dpm/100 cm".
and swipes were accomplished until all results were less than the Results of all swipes-taken on the trailgr vere -
above limit.
No less than the plant beta-gamma limit of 200 dpe/200 cm.
significant alpha contamination was detected on either the cask or the truck.
While observing the radiological surveys," the inspectors noted d.
that the right front trunnion tie-down bracket (one of four which secures the cask to the trailer) was partially sprung and Step 6.7 of Procedure OP/0/A/1510/4, not bolted flush to the trailer.
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" Spent Fuel Shipping, NAC-1 Cask," which kad been initialed as completed, specified that the two fore and the two aft trunnion tie-downs were to be latched and the tie-down nuts torqued to 50.
Also, step 6.8 of the same procedure, which bad been -
ft-lbs.
initialed as completed, specified that the four bolts on tbe In closure head icpact limiter were to be torqued to 60 ft-lbs.
response to the inspectors' questions, the' cognizant engineer said that no torque wrench had been used in either of the above cases, but that the force applied probably exceeded the specified The inspectors cited the failure to follow the operating values.
procedure as noncompliance with Technical Specification 6.4.1, which requires that the station be operated and maintained in
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Ril Rpts Nos. 50-269/76-15, 1-9 50-270/78-15 and 50-287/78-16 accordance with approved procedures (269/270/75-15-01;287/78-16-01).
Licensee representatives straightened the tie-dowm bracket, secured it nearly. flush to the trailer, and torqued the nuts to the specified values.
[
.i TI'e inspectors reviewed Certificate of Compliance No. 6698,
"'v. No. 5 for the NTS-4/NAC-1 cask.
In comparing this with c.
i s ocedure OP/0/A/1510/4, the inspectors noted that the Certificate specified a maximum decay beat generation of 11.5 kr, whereas the procedure step specified determining the rate of cask cavity emperature rise. The cognizant engineer said that a separate curve was used to verify that the rate of tecperature rise represented acceptable beat generation., Based on the inspectors' comments, 40e change to the OP, incorporating the task cavity water heatup curv,e, was approved on 8-1-78.
i Prior to departure of the shipment on July 28, the f.
inspectors verified that the cask and truck were labelled and posted in accordance with Department of Transportation (DOT)
- uirements, that radiation and. contamination limits were within
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r i requirements, and that the appropriate documentation had been completed. After receipt of the shipment at its destination, Region II was notified by Florida Power Corporation (FPC) that contaminationswipesonthecaskjndicatedgeneralbeta-gac=a and a maximum of about 100,000 levels of gbout 30,000 dpm/100 cmTests conducted by FPC vere inconclusiv dpm/100 cm.
not appear to indicate that the excessive surf ace contamination resulted from any leakage of cask contents.
Licensee representa-tives specu)ated that the increased surface contamination resulted from leaching or migration of sub-surface contamination during Region II contacts with other licensees and persons transit.
experienced with large cask shipments confirmed that this phenomenon has been experienced.
The inspectors were also on site during the preparation g.
and shipment of the second assembly, which departed Oconee on August 4.
About 85 swipes were initially taken on the cask efter it was loaded on the truck.
(The cask had been decontaminated prior to loading on the trugks.) About 25 of these swipe results were above 2,000 dpm/100 cm beta gacma. Decontaminationvgs At continued until all results were less than 2,000 dpm/200 cm.
this time, an inspector took 12 independent svipes on the cask.
These were counted at the Begion II office on August 7, using a portable scaler with HP-210 pancake probe. Theresugtsindicated thatsevenofthesvipeswereabove2,00gdpm/100cm beta gacca,
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with a maximum of about 4,200 dpm/100 cm. The inspector provided O '
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these results to a. licensee representative by telephone on August 8, and stated that the licensee's counting and instrument calibra-tior. procedures would be reviewed.during a subsequent inspection (269/270/76-15-04; 257/76-16-04). The inspector noted that there
.vas about a 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> time lapse between his swipes and most of those taken by the licensee. After receipt of this second shipment,
, Region 11 was again netified by TPC that contacination on the cast was above the 10 CTF. 20.205 reporting limits of 22,000 TPC reported general levels of 15,000-20,000 dpc/100 cm,.
dpg/100 co' with bot spots of about 30,000 and 116,000 dpe/100 ct?.
A licensee representative stated by telephone on August 9 h.
that the cask for the third assembly was being swiped with cloth-type swipes, ubich appeared to have a greater removal efficiency than the k'hatman-41 paper previously used.
The greater contamination removal efficiency of the cloth-type i.
swipes apparently resulted in a more thorough decontamination of the casks used for the shipment of the third and fourth assemblies.
C-TPC reported that these case both arrived at Crystal River with loose surface contaminatign levels that were less than the reporting licit of 22,000 dpa/100cm.
12.
Exit Interview The inspectors met with management representatives (denoted in paragraph
- 1) on July 28, 1978 and again on August 4,1978 and summarized the scope and findings of the inspection. Items discussed included two items of noncompliance and one unresolved item identified during this inspection.
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9 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of DUKE F0WER COMPANY
)
Docket No. 70-2623
)
(Amendment to Materials License
)
SNM-1773 for Oconee Nuclear Station
)
Spent Fuel Transportation and Storage )
at McGuire Nuclear Station)
)
NRC STAFF'S REQUEST FOR A FINDING PURSUANT T0 10 CFR 2.720(h)(2)(ii)
REGARDING INTERVENOR'S INTERROGATORIES TO THE NRC STAFF AND LICENSEE AND REQUEST FOR A PROTECTIVE ORDER On January 21, 1979, the Carolina Environmental Study Group (CESG) served a set of interrogatories upon the NRC Staff. The Staff construes this request by CESG as a motion to the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board (Board) to require the NRC Staff to respond to the proposed interrogatories pursuant to 10 CFR a.720(h)(2)(ii).
Without awaiting a Board order, the NRC Staff is serving contemporaneously with this pleading its "NRC Staff Responses to Carolina Environmental Study Group (CESG) Interrogatories of January 21, 1979" responding to interrogatories to which it does not object. With regard to one of CESG's interrogatories, however, the Staff would object on grounds as
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set forth more fully below.
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'The rules of discovery in NRC proceedings applicable to all parties are
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set forth in 10 CFR 2.740. This section allows discovery regarding any matter not privileged as long as it is relevant to the subject matter involved in the proceeding. The rules of discovery add additional require-ments when discovery is directed against the NRC Staff. These requirements are set forth in 10 CFR 2.720. With regard to interrogatories directed to the Staff, Section 2.720(h)(2)(ii) requires a finding.by the presiding that:
(1) answers to the interrogatories are necessary to a proper decision in the proceeding and, (ii) answers to interrogatories are not reasonably obtainable from any other source.
It is to these standards that Staff objections to CESG's inte rogatories must be judged.
Staff presents its objection to one CESG interrogatory below.
The Staff objects to Interrogatory 109.
This question is overly broad and vague. This question is not directly relevant to any CESG contention.
The Staff respectfully requests that the Board find under 10 CFR 2.720(h)
(2)(ii) that the interrogatory objected to by the Staff need not be answered.
The Staff further requests that pursuant to 10 CFR 2.740(c), the Board grant a protective order that discovery not be had by CESG on the interrogatory objected to by the Staff.
Respectfully submitted, mk
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Richard K. Hoefling Counsel for NRC StafE Dated at Bethesda, Maryland this 15th day of February, 1979.
4 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR RECULATORY C0f01ISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICEllSING BOARD In the Matter of
)
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DUKE POWER COMPANY
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Docket No. 70-2623
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(Amendment to Materials License
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SNM-1773 for Oconee Nuclear Station
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Spent Fuel Transportation and Storage )
at McGuire Nuclear Station)
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Certificate of Service I hereby certify that copies of "NRC STAFF RESPONSES TO CAROLINA ENVIRONMENTAL STUDY GROUP (CESG) INTERROGATOP,IES OF JANUARY 21, 1979" and "NRC STAFF'S REQUEST FOR A FINDING PURSUANT T010 CFR 2.720(h)(2)(ii) REGARDING INTERVENOR'S INTERR0G-ATORIES TO THE NRC STAFF AND LICENSEE AND REQUEST FOR A PROTECTIVE ORDER" dated February 15, 1979, in the above-captioned proceeding, have been served on the following, by deposit in the United States mail, first class, or, as indicated by an asterisk through deposit in the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's internal mail system, this 15th day of February,1979.
- Marshall E. Miller, Chairman Ms. Brenda Best Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Carolina Action U.S. fluclear Regulatory Commission 1740 E. Independence Blvd.
Washington, D. C.
20555 Charlotte, North Carolina 28205 Dr. Cadet H. Hand, Jr., Director Anthony Z. Roisman, Esq.
Bodega Marii e Laboratory Natural Resources Defense Council University of California 917 - 15th Street, N.W.
P.O. Box 247 Washington, D. C.
20005 Bodega Bay, California 94923 Mr. Jeremy Bloch tr. Emmeth A. Luebke Safe Energy Alliance Atomic Safety and Licensing Board 1707 Lombardy Circle U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Charlotte, North Carolina 28203 Washington, D. C.
20555 Shelley B lum, Esq.
W. L. Porter, Esq.
418 Law Building Associate General Counsel 730 East Trade Street Legal Department Charlotte, North Carolina 28202 Duke Power Company 422 South Church Street J. Michael McGarry, III, Esq.
Charlotte, North Carolina 28242 Debevoise & Liberman 1200 Seventeenth Street, N.W.
Washington, D. C.
20036
. Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board Mr. Charles Gaddy U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission P. O. Box 2501 Washington, D.C.
20555 Davidson College Davidson, N.C.
28036
- Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C.
20555
- Docketing and Service Section U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C.
20555 Mr. Jesse L. Riley, President Carolina Environmental Study Group 854 Henley Place Charlotte, North Carolina 28207 Richard P. Wilson, Esq.
Assistant Attorney General State of South Carolina 2600 Bull Street Columbia, South Carolina 29201 j$wf
'Y Ricfiard K. Hoefling Q
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Counsel for NRC Staff 9
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