ML19289C506

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Responds to W/Answers to 4 Questions Re Feedwater Sparger Mod Which Was Performed During Refueling Outage Beginning in Sept 1978
ML19289C506
Person / Time
Site: FitzPatrick Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 01/09/1979
From: Early P
POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK (NEW YORK
To: Ippolito T
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
JPN-79-2, NUDOCS 7901170147
Download: ML19289C506 (3)


Text

o POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 10 CoLUMous CIRCLE NEW YORK. N. Y.10019 (212) 337.6200 TRUSTEES GEORGE T. BERRY rREoER:Cm R. cLARx ff "'c"wie r"""u'ila"..

LEWIS R. BEN N ETT GEORGE L. INGALLS ufu'((

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ROBERT I. MILLONZI JOHN W. BOSTON

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January 9, 1979 E"*'s'd o"rfa' mon =

JPN-79-2 THOMAS F cCRANN,JR.

Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.

C.

20555 Attention:

Mr. Thomas A.

Ippolito Operating Reactor Branch No. 3 Division of Operating Reactors

Subject:

James A.

FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant Responses to NRC Questions Regarding Feedwater Sparger Modification Docket No. 50-333

Dear Sir:

Transmitted herewith are responses to your letter dated September 27, 1978 which forwarded four questions regarding the feedwater sparger modification work.

The feedwater sparger modification work was performed during the refueling outage which commenced in September 1978.

Very truly yours,

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rLA c-Paul,J. Ear f Assistant C ief Engineer-Projects O

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QUESTION 1:

Prior to commencement of work, the FitzPatrick procedure and safety evaluation should be approved by the Onsite Safety Review Committee.

RESPONSE

The FitzPatrick procedure and safety evaluation were approved by the Plant Operating Review Committee prior to commencement of feedwater sparger modification work.

QUESTION 2:

At any time during the procedure that the shield plug or any other heavy object is suspended above or in the reactor vessel, secondary containment integrity and standby gas treatment system operability shall be maintained in accordance with Techaical Specification Section 3.7/4.7B and 3.7/4.7C.

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RESPONSE

Secondary containment integrity and standby gas treatment system operability were maintained while the shield plug or heavy object (i.e. reactor internals) was suspended above or in the reactor vessel.

QUESTION 3:

Provide documentation of overhead crane handling system reliability transmitted verbally on September 22, 1978; i.e.,

reactor building crane redundancy and safety margins while handling the shield plug.

RESPONSE

The FitzPatrick Plant overhead crane has a rated capacity of 125 tons with one 125 ton main hook and one 20 ton auxiliary hook.

Preventive Maintenance (P.M.) on the crane was carried out just prior to the commencement of the outage.

The P.M.

included visual inspection for brake wear, rope wear, limit switches actuation, etc., complete electrical checkout and lubrication.

The main hook of the crane was magna fluxed prior to the outage.

The main hook is a sister hook (Twc Js back to back) and is supported by 14 individual cables.

Each of these cables is 1 1/8" Dian. and has 6 x 46 IWRC*

strands; each cable has a certi fied breaking strength of 122,000 lbs.

To each side of the hook is attached a 5" Diam, pear shaped steel link with a rated capacity of 77 tons.

Each pear link has a minimum breaking strength of 198 tons and is certified to be tested tor 148,000 lbs.

each.

To each pear shaped link are attached two v're rope slings.

These wire rope slings are 2" Diam. 5x19 class wire rope with a 198 ton minimum breaking strength and with heavy wire rope thimbles and torpedo collars at each end.

The free end of the sling is attached to a 12"x2 3/4" Jaw and Jaw Turnbuckle rated at 187 ton minimum breaking strength.

Attached to each turnbuckle is a 3"

  • Independent Wire Rope Core

I e

f.,

anchor shackle with bolt pins and nuts each having a 375 ton minimum breaking strength.

Each shackle has a safe working capacity of 75 tons.

Attached to each of these shackles is a 1 3/4" size anchor shackle with a screw pin arrangement.

Each of these shackles, which has a minimum breaking strength of 150 tons and is proof tested for 50 tons, is attached to one of the four (4) lifting eyes of the concrete platform.

The platform is estimated to weigh 51 tons.

It was determined that the reactor building crane safety margin is greater than six (6).

The lifting sling safety margin is five (5).

QUESTION 4:

Provide analysis of impact on the fuel in the unforeseen event of crane malfunction while removing vessel internals and/or installing the shield plug,

RESPONSE

Vessel internals (mositure separater, dryer, etc.)

are routinely removed during refueling outage at every BWR plant.

Therefore, the Authority believes that the analysis of impact on the fuel in the unforeseen event of crane malfunction while removing heavy objects should be performed on a generic basis.

As per our telephone conversation with Mr. Philip Polk of your of fice,the Authority requests further direction from the Commission for this item.

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