ML19283B754
| ML19283B754 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Framatome ANP Richland |
| Issue date: | 02/08/1979 |
| From: | Book H, Cooley W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19283B750 | List: |
| References | |
| 70-1257-78-08, 70-1257-78-8, NUDOCS 7903140441 | |
| Download: ML19283B754 (8) | |
Text
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGUIATORY CCMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMEhT REGION V geport go, 70-1257/78-08 Docket No.
70-1257 Licensa No. SNM-1227 Safeguards croup 1
Licensee:
Exxon Nuclear Company, Inc.
2101 Horn Rapids Road Richland, Washington 99352 Facility Name:
Richland Facility Inspection at:
Richland, Washington Inspection conducted:
December 5-8, 1978 Inspectors:
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- a. Looley, cuel racilities inspector Date signed Date Signed Date Signed Approved B":
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H. E. Book, Gnlef, ruel rac111ty and Nuclear tat 6 Signed Support Branch Summary:
Inspection on December 5-8, 1978 (Recort No. 70-1257/78-08)
Areas Inspected: Organization; facility changes and modifications; internal review and audit; safety committee activity; criticality safety analyses; criticality safety specifications; employee training; radiation protection program changes; radiation protection program data; operations review; emergency plan revision; and packaging and shipment of radioactive materials.
The inspection involved 26 inspector-hours onsite by one NRC inspector.
Results: No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
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'!T 70081409'd/
DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted
- D. Wallgren, Specialist, Planning and Scheduling
- R. B. Staphenson, Manager, UO2 Shop Operations "R. H. Purcell, Manager, Auxiliary Operations T. C. Probasco, fluclear Safety and Industrial Safety Specialist
- W. S. tiechodom, Manager. Licensing and Compliance
- M. L. Smith, Senior Engineer, Radiological Safety
- R. L. Miles, Superviser, Radiological Safety E. L. Foster, Technical Specialist, Radiological Safety M. G. Hill, Supervisor, Mechanical Operations R. H. Schutt, Specialist, Criticality Safety G. V. Mulligan, Supervisor, Shipping and Receiving L. G. Stevens, Chemical Operations
- Denotes those attending t",e exit interview.
2.
Facility Chances and Modifications The licensee has constructed and was testing a clean, cold scrap recovery facility. The facility was designed to receive UO2 in various forms; oxidize it to U30P; blend to adjust enrichment and store. A physically separated,,ortion o' this system permits dissolving the blended U308 r.ad filtration of the solution.
The recycled material can then be reintroduced into conversion line 1 or 2 for precipitation, driing, reduction, etc.
3.
Internal Review and Audit Criticality audits are performed by personnel from Auxiliary Operations and from Licensing and Ccmpliance.
Licensing and Compliance performs one audit a month while Auxiliary Operations performs two each month. Results are recorded; management is notified of recommendations for improvements; and followtp on those recommendations is done by the auditors.
This inspection included a review of the records of audits performed by both groups. That review indicated the criticality audits were performed at the established frequency. As the result of approxi-mately 15 audits made from July through tiovember,1978, about four recommendations were made by the auditors.
Those recommendations did not involve immediate safety problems.
The audits appeared to be oriented primarily towards tre UC2 plant altr.ough they included visits to the M0 plant and the Engineering Laboratory Coperation.
The licensee's internal audit program includes the subject of radiation safety.
Audits of that type are made by an individual from the Licensing and Compliance group at monthly intervals.
A review of records of radiation safety audits indicated that six had been made from May through November,1978.
Recommendations concerned the existence of visible contan.ination; moisture in the exhaust system; and one radiation detectian instrument out of calibration.
4.
Safety Committee Activities The licensee's Nuclear Fuels Health and Safety Council meets monthly. A safety inspection is conducted as part of each meeting and the results reported in the subsequent eeting.
Reccmmenda-tions resulting from those inspections are followed from c.eeting to meeting until resolution is accomplished.
A review of minutes of safety committee meetings indicated that meetings had been held monthly from June through november,1978.
Subjects discussed and oresentations made included an accident anal.ois for potential radiation doses at assembly points; review of.ne criticality drill conducted on August 10, 1978; review of in Jstrial safety programs at two other facilities; discussions regarding the addition of a public address system and a tape re-corder for emergency use; and proposals of a safety award program and more detailed industrial safety training programs.
5.
Criticality Safety Analyses The criticality analysis for the clean, cold scrap recovery facility had been completed and had received a second-party review.
The facility consists of a ventilateu utility hood; furnace loading hood and unloading hood; oxidizing furnace; ventilated enclosure for can tumbling; and a large blender.
Criticality contruls on those pieces of equipment include 45% of a minimum critical mass and 5% enrichment at the hoods and can tumbler stations. Trays of pellets and other clean scrap are confined to four inch deep trays while in the furnace. The blender is limited to 1,500 kilograms of 5% enricned material with moisture controlled at less than 1 weight percent water.
Material issuing from t e U308 facility is stored in an adjacent rocn in the UO2 building.
The criticality analysis for the storre facili:y for reprocessed U2C8 had been completed ana had received d second-party review.
That storage facility consists of about four roller cor /eyorr separated by one foot.
Storage is provided for five-gallon cans ::acked one high.
The dry pc. der is stored at less than 1 weight percent water.
Primary controls on the storage are limitation to 5% enrichment; less than 1 weight percent water (analytical work was done at 2% and 5% water); and interaction (no material within ten feet). Secondary controls on the storage system include limitation to 45% of the minimum critical mass per
- ontainer; nomin 1 reflection by water; maximum uranium density of 4 g/cc; and the specified one foot spacing of conveyors.
Accident cases considered for the scrap storage included double batching every can at the highest powder density, most reactive enrichment, and 5 weight percent moisture.
Under those conditions the k effective of the array was 0.768 +
.006.
A second accident condition considered was optimum intersiiersed moderator at the maximum powder density, most reactive enrichment, and 2 weight percent water. Under those accident conditions the k effective was 0.944 +.005.
From the pawder storage conveyor: the material will go to the dissolver and then to filters located in the powder storage room.
Criticality analysis for the dissolver had been completed and had received second-par'.y review.
Primary controls on the dissolvers are geometric (top section of the dissolver is eight inches in diameter; bottom section of the dissolver is 10.02 inches in diameter); 5 weight percent enrichment; and interaction (no additional material within ten feet of the dissolvers).
Secondary criticality controls on the dissolvers are 45% of the minimum critical charge (one storage can); nominal water reflection on the array of tanks and full water reflection on an.v unit within the array.
Results of the analysis indicate the k effective of a dissolver unreflected is 0.658 +.006; and 0.869 +-
.007 reflected.
The analysis also considered the heat exchangers on the dissolvers (two) which are also subcritical by gecmetry.
Primary controls are gecmetry, nominal reflection, 5% enrichment, and no material within ten feet.
The same geometric, enrichment, nominal reflection, and interaction criteria are placed on the solution filters.
Product off-gas scrubbers and scrubber surge tanks associated with the dissolvers are also designed to be geometrically safe and the limitations are consistent with the other elements of the dissolver system.
Provisien is Lade ar :ne s:crage of four 5-gallen s:orage con-tainers on the floor adjacent to tne dissolvar system and one container of that si:e in transit.
All interacticn calculations untio,nd abava ir.cl.2de the di:sa;;3rs, he2: cdangers, ~il ters,
scrubbers. and flocr storage.
A criticality safety specification had been prepared for the storage of oxide pellets in shipping containers model CE-250-?
prior to shipment to a foreign country.
The actual storage of the pellets had begun in an area that was dedicated to that type of shipping activity. The criticality safety specification placed limits on the number of shipping containers per pallet; the maximum stacking height; the total number of containers in an array; and the number of containers permitted to be moved into and out of the array at one time. An array of model CE-250-2 containers had been arranged consistent with the restrictions in the criticality safe-guards specification. The maximum enrichment in the array was limited to 4 percent.
The Certificate of Compliance identification for that container model is USA /9022/AF. The limitation on the fissile mass container is 3 kilograms contained U-235.
6.
Ecoloyee Traininc Procram The licensee's radiation area workers are provided with an in-doctrination in Exxon Nuclear Radiation Protection Program and its requirements prior to being released for on-the-job training.
That training is scheduled to be accomplished in two weeks after employee hiring. The formal portion of the training is presented by the Technical Specialist, Radiological Safety.
The training program requires re-instruction when any change in radiation protection controls occurs. A continuing refresher instruction is given both by operations management personnel and by radiological safety personnel.
Health Physics Technicians are required to become proficient in the licensee's radiological safety programs and must pass a certifi-cation examination within six months after employment as a Health Physics Technician.
The above information was summarized from the training section of the licensee's document JN-30.
This inspection included a review of training records maintained by the licensee for a group of personnel hired between June 1976 and September 1978. Tne assignments of those persons included changing fil ters.
Records indicated formal training had been received in cost c2ses.i:hir a ce, of hiriru m i z e case..' Pi-wo weeks of hiring.
. 7.
Radiation Protection The licensee conducts a urinalysis bioassay program.
Employees are sampled quarterly for plutonium and conthly for uranium.
Employees working with unincapsulated soluble forms of uranitm submit Friday througn Monday specimens.
Employees frequenting radiation areas but not working with unincapsulated radioactive material submit semiannual specimens. The licensee does not contemplate any changes in the existing urinalysis bioassay program.
This inspection included a review of bioassay data accumulated for the months of June through flovember 1978. That data indicated approximately ten percent of the employees sampled indicated positive results. Positive results are regarded here as an indi-cation of greater than 25 ug/1. The maximum indication over the period of the review was 763 ug/l which decayed to less than 25 ug/l in 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. Resamples are obtained from individuals at or above an indication of 25 ug/l for insoluble materials and 50 ug/l for soluble material. The limit of detection of the analysis is 10 ug/1.
The licensee conducts an in vivo lung count program with measure-ments made by an independent laboratory. All employees working with unincapsulated material are given a periodic in vivo exam-ination at least once each 18-month period.
In the past, those examinations have been given routinely to new hires before they were assigned to work in radiation areas.
The licensee plans to discontinue that practice based on information received in the execution of form liRC-4.
If no previous exposure is indicated, the licensee plans to forego an in vivo count on new hires.
This inspection included a review of in vivo lung count records for U-235. During the period of September 11-15, 1978, 91 employees were counted for U-235 and one for thorium lung deposition.
That number represents one-half the total force of radiation workers.
Within that total, 21 positive indications for U-235 were found with a maximum indication of 93131 ug.
Six individuals of the 21 positive indications showed possible external contamination.
The maximum permissible lung burden at 5% enriched uranium is taken as 350 ug. At 3% enriched uranium, the maximum permissible lung burden is taken as 300 ug.
A similar lung count of radiation workers was obtained on May 8-11, 1978.
Thirteen positive indications xere obtained with no external cc n tami na tic e indicatad.
The u W: f:r an trdivid.al es 75 1 33 ug U-235.
. This inspection included a review of air sample data obtained in both the M0 and UO2 buildings during June through October,1978.
The data which was reviewed appeared in monthly reports prepared by the Supervisor, Radiological Safety. About 1700 to 1200 air samples are obtained in operating areas each nonth.
Those include samples attained at fixed air sample stations and special high volume room samples.
It is not uncommon for the licensee to obtain between four and six samples per day at a single fixed sampling location in following up initial indications of high uranium airborne con-centrations.
The data reviewed indicated that approximately 2*,' of the fixed location and special room samples obtained during June and July, 1978 we 1 x 10-g in excess of the maximum permissible concentration of uCi/cc. That percentage in excess of MPC increased to 3%
in August, 5% in September and 6% in October, 1978.
The upward trend correlates with increased production activity according to a licensee representative.
traticn detected was 5.6 x 10_gaximum single, fixed sample concen-The uCi/cc obtained during October,1978.
Almost all of the elevated samples occurred in the conversion areas of the UO2 building.
Identified sources of airborne contamination include centifuge bowl cleaning; disassembly of UF6 gas lines; enrichment cleancut operations; and calciner pressurizations.
Respiratory protection of mask factor 50 or greater is required for the first three of those circumstances, constant alpha air monitors with audible and visual clarms which are set to alarm at 8 MPC hours are stationed in the conversion areas.
Those alarms signai the wearing of protection factor 50 mas' concentration of approximately 5 x 10-'y and the alarms occur at a uCi/cc.
This inspection included a search of records to determine if the 40-hour average MPC had been exceeded taking into account the protection factors indicated in those records.
In no case had the 40-hour average MPC been exceeded as determined from data over the period of August through flovember,1978 conversion areas were less than 5 x 10-)) Typical samples in the uCi/cc.
This inspection included a review of exhaust air sample data for both the M0 and U02 buildings. There was no indication that the annual average exhaust concentrations for either building exceeded the unrestricted area permissible concentrations as measured at the exhaust stack.
The licensee uses TLDs to r.onitor em loyees working with radio-active n tar uls. Thase T 05 "anc' : eta and pra mdia-icr and include an indium foil.
All otcer e :loyees and vi:,iters use a one-chip TLD plus an indir foil.
Fi'm tacge dosi;cetry is used for employees wno forget their TLD badges and for unescorted visitors.
s
.- The one-chip TLDs are not assigned to individuals but rather are rotated among visitors.
The one-chip dosimeters used by persons not working with radioactive material and by visitors are no longer analyzed but, rather, are used primarily as accident dosimetry.
TLDs dosimeters used by radiation workers permanently assigned to controlled areas are analyzed and exchanged ouarterly.
8.
Emercency Planning The licensee's emergency plan is presently under review by :lRC Headquarters.
This inspection included discussions with a licensee represe tative on some of the questions submitted ;y fiRC to the licensee concerning that plan.
Also included in this inspection was a review of the critique of the critical.ty drill conducted by the licensee on August 10, 1978.
That review indicated that the evacuation time was approximata,1y 2 minutes arid 15 seconds. One simulated injury had been provided forcing the re-entry condition. A personnel accountability problem was also reported in that four people were offsite at the time of tne drill.
Problems arose with regard to perimater gates in that one gate stuck and one was found to return to close position too fast.
The licensee has acquired a motor home and is furnishing it with cabinets, tables, counting equipment, and other emergency equipment.
That unit is intended as a mobile emergency command post in the event of an emergency at the Richland plant.
Among the furnishings of the motor home will be plant site plans, protective clothing, respirators, decontamination kits, trauma kits, first-eid kits and supplied air equipment.
9.
Management Interview The results of the inspection were discussed with licensee repre-sentatives as indicated in Section 1 of this report on December 8, 1978. Those persons were informed that no items of nonccmpliance or deviations were identified during tnis inspection.
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