ML19282D140
| ML19282D140 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 04/26/1979 |
| From: | Gilinsky V, Hendrie J, Kennedy R NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| To: | |
| References | |
| REF-10CFR9.7 NUDOCS 7905150003 | |
| Download: ML19282D140 (68) | |
Text
h qk )-j NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISFION 1
IN THF. MATTER OF:
OPEN MEETING STAFF BRIEFING ON FIVE-PLANT S9UTDOWN (SEISMIC DESIGN) i s
Place.
Washington, D. C.
Date -
Thursday, 26 April 1979 Pages 1 - 67 Telephone:
(.
(202)347 3700 ACE - FEDERAL REPORTERS,INC.
OfficialReporters 444 North Ccpitol Street Washington, D.C. 20001 NATIONWIDE COVERAGE DAILY q905t50007 I.
-s 1
CR1258
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DISC 1. AIMER
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St tes This is an unofficial transcript of a meeting of the Unite N
le oa-ul'ocry Cc= mission held on Tim rMw. 24 w 41 =
Commi$'r
,.h e sicII s orfices at 1717 H Street, M. W., Wasnington;,g. g.
t I
inis eransc.10-vatinn was ccen to public attendance and observation.
lias noE been reviewed, corrected, or edited, and it may contain inaccuracies.
The transcript is intended solely for general informa'ticnal purposes.
l or inromal As provids '-/.0 Co 0.103 record o, co-1s10,. or che 2..a i t is not 1
T s c".s s ed.
Excressions or opinion in
=r.
this transcript do not necessarily re{1ect fjna. da rmi t1
{
"o pl==dino or other pa. r may b,.11-b1 sacce ina $$ the result of or addressed to any statement or argumen,e ay contained ' erein, except as the Ccmmissaan may author 1_e.
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ELfZer /Mm 2l NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 3i 5;
I I
OPEN MEETING 6!
l t
I 7!
I STAFF BRIEFING ON FIVE-PLANT SHUTDOWN 8'
i (SEISMIC DESIGN) 91 10 1
i 11 i Room 1130 1717 H Street,N.W.
l 12 Washington, D.C.
j l
I3 Thursday, 26 April 1979 I
i i
14 '
The hearing in the above-entitled r
- was convenet 15,
pursuant to notice, at 2:50 p.m.,
JOSEPH M.
HENDRIE, Chairman, 16 !
i presiding.
37,!
PRESENT:
g, I
JOSEPH M.
HENDRIE, CHAIRMAN gl VICTOR GILINSKY, COMMISSIONER 20,
i RICHARD KENNEDY, COMMISSIONER 21 l i
j PETER BRADFORD, COMMISSIONER l
22ll i:
1 JOHN AHEARNE, COMMISSIONER l
23 6 I!
i Als Present-24,
c.
eral Recorrers, lx..
- Chilk, Knight and Potapovs.
i!
f 4
L 1
l 3
t I
c '258 il
_P _R O_ _C _E _E _D _I _M _G S_
1 MELTZER/mm 2 [
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Could we ccme to order, pleasee?
d 3
Commissioner Bradford will be with us in just a i
4 moment.
5' The first thing I would like to do this afternoon j
i 6'
is to apologize to all of you for keeping you waiting now i
7l almost an hour and a half.
i I
8l As you may understand, the Commission has a number I
9 of pressing matters in hand, and sometimes the delays then 10 result ~
m those matters.
s q
Il II I would like to announce something about a subject i
12 ;
dif ferent than the one the Commission will meet on now.
l l
13 l We had scheduled for this afternoon a continuation 14 of our meeting with the Staff on the matter of cther plants 15 manufactured by the same reactor vendor as the Three Mile 16, Island plant.
That would have been a continuation of the i!
17 L meeting which, in effect, started on Monday, continued at
- l 18 ]t considerable length yesterday afternoon, and had been ll 191 scheduled again for this afternoon at 3.
)
20 ;
We have had a request from Mr. Harold Denton, the 21y Director of Reactor Regulation for a postponement of this iI 22 ;' af ternoon's scheduled meeting until tomorrow afternoon.
1 23 h Mr. Denton and his staff have been continuing to i
I 24 have very intense discussions about the other plants and the ral Heoorters, Inc.,
25 appropriate courses of action to take for them.
And those d
J
k 4
l Ih discussions of his are at a stage where he simply needs some "7
2 more time through this afternoon and this evening.
3' We have a hearing with Senator Hart in the morning, I
4, and therefore will try to meet as early in the af ternoon as S
that hearing schedule permits.
6:
And, I will tentatively schedule it for 1:30 with 7
the inevitable caveat that if I am still on the Hill at 3
1:30, why we may not be able to meet right on time.
9:
The Commissioners have discussed Mr. Denton's 10,
recommendatialand have agreed that we should, indeed, postpone i
Il this afternoon's meeting on the other plants until tomorrow.
12 Since many, or at least some of those present, may 13 ! hav e come to this meeting in order to hold down seats for the i
14 later one, and may not now want to stay, I will allow a few 15 l seconds for people who might want to get up and leave, to do i
16 30, 17l (Pause.)
18 Let's see.
Perhaps, sinc the bulk of the outgoing i
19 ;l traffic has moved out, and those who still have to pack up and 20 ;I go can do so relatively peacefully, let us move on then to d
21 ' the subject which was scheduled for 1:30 this afternoon, 22 ] which is a briefing by the staff on the status and progress 4
23 j of the plants that the Commission shut down about the middle 24 hl of March because of questions about the adequacy of the y
rat Recorrers, inc,
25.l seismic resistance of those plants.
l i
.I
8 8
5 Ii Lee, please go ahead.
mm 2 j.
MR.GOSSICK: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
3 Mr. Eisenhut will proceed with the briefing.
i 4
i Darrell?
i S{
MR. EISENHUT: Thank you.
1 What we would like to give you today is a status 6'
l 7!,
briefing of where we are today on the seismic piping reanalysis i
8 of the five plants that were shut down back in mid March.
9 We would like to address a number of areas that are i
10,
related to this.
I II l If I could have the first slide.
I 12 (Slide) i l
13 This is sort of a summary of the things that we i
i Id j will be talking about, the areas that we will be talking about 15 today.
i 16 i
First, of course, is the show-cause order of 3/13, P
I7 which was an order, you will recall to shut down the Surry 1 18 l and 2 facilities, Beaver Valley 1, Fitzpatrick and Maine il i
I91 Yankee.
i 20 The order specifically said they should shut down l
21 ji because they used an algebraic summation method in a computer Il 22 ) program or code as it is called, which was to used to l
23 h calculate stresses in piping.
O
!l Related activities that we will be discussing today al Reoorters, Inc. ;
4 1
^5 l are the code verification program where we are looking at the i
- i
- l
o' e!
1 ;j mm code that was used to correct the situation that was there n'
2 I!
e xisting before, and will also be discussing a computer program u
2!
used for a lot of other systems in the plant.
1 4
We will be discussing the hand calculations methods.
i i
5' Under related activities we will also be mentioning 6'
and earthquake that occurred in Maine earlier this month.
7i Other activities that we will be discussing which are 8
somewhat related, only not directly related, are three I&E 9
bulletins; one relating to the baseplates of anchors and 10 concrete supports anchors.
The other ones are one concerning 11 '
Velan valve weights which was really one of the early problems 12 that led to'the identification of the problem we are here to i
I I
13 f discuss today.
i i
14 !
The I&E bulletin 79-07, which is a sursvey of all 15,
operating plants.
16 l And lastly, the I&E Investigation on a number of 17 !i areas.
I 18 l In the way of background, very briefly let me 19 go back as to what got us to this point today.
Some o f yo u l
20 l may not have focused on this recently.
21 [
(Laugh te r. )
9 22 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: What makes you think that?
i 23 h MR. EISENHUT: Back in October of
'78, Duqesne Light i
24 l was informed by Stone & Webster, that Stone & Webster was e
ral Recorrers, Inc.
25 1 doing some systems:: modification work and they had learned 1
i 6
'l d
7 i
i mm I I, from Westinghouse, information concerning different weights on h
o i!6 check valves. That is the Velan check valve problem.
a 3
Stone & Webster found a misapplication of a hand 1
4 calculation method where they found areas of local overstress.
5 They found that the hand calculation was misapplied.
6' Basically what they did was, the 1974 as-built verification i
7ll i
check was done with a computer program called Pipe Stress.
8 They did a recheck with the piping termed New Pipe, and they 9
found that the New Pipe computer program -- the computer program,
10 gave stresses that were higher than those from Pipe Stress.
11 l l
In October -- in late October of
'78, Duquesne l '* '
Light notified our I&E office of these differences.
There was f
I l
I3 !
a number of discussions over the next months, and in March --
I I#
in fact on March 8, 1979,-- Duquesne notified us of those 1"; !
differences in a meeting and said that they were attributable 16 '
to what is called the Shock 2 subroutines in the Pipe Stress
- l i
I7, code, and it was primarily because the Shock 2 subroutine used I8 algebraic summation of loads.
l 19 l They were calculated separate'ly, given horizontal 20 and vertical inputs in methods of providing the loads, i
2I The algebraic summation method, you will recall,
,, I
" ;! is certainly an acceptable method if you use a time-history 23 ]Iapproach to earthquakes. But what was founu that for the b
21 ' approach used on -- by Duquesne Light, that is on the Beaver e>
31 Reporters, Inc.
'5
- Valley facility, the Shock 2 approach was not conservative ti h
d a
8 I
i 1q because they used response spectrum approach uith no real time mm 3
2 j; phasing.
N 3'
During this period of time, March 8 through about I
i 4
March 12, there was considerable discussion with Stone &
I 5
Webster and the Licensee, and it was learned thatruny of the
.I i
6 piping system stresses were over-allowable, some even for 7;
the OBE.
l 8
The general thought at that time was because some 9,
of these systems were overstressed, the -- you may have a 10 situation where an earthquake can cause a failure in perhaps
.I 11 l the reactor from the pressure boundary system or the primary 12 :
system, and'in fact, the systems there to mitigate the I
i t
i 13,
consequences, perhaps the ECCS system could also be damaged by I
i 14 '
so to speak, a common mode failure.
15 It is because of this on March 13th, we issued I
16 ] some orders.
1 17 {
The next slide summarizes basically very simply i
18 !
what the order said.
I!
19 )
(glide) 20 i It was a show-cause order as to why the licensee 1
21 [! should not reanalyze the facility piping systems for seismic 22 h oads using an appropriate code.
'l 23 It says that the show-cause why the licensee should i
24 ;l not make any modifications, and third, y
rat Reporters, Inc.
25 Why the facility should not be shut down in the interim il li i
i
i 9
I I]
Now, that is a very simple sketch of what led us mm i!
2, up to this point.
i 3
Since that time we have been doing a considerable 4
amount of review effort.
5 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE : Did any of the licensees 6,
object to your order?
l 7l MR. EISENHUT: Not formally, I believe.
I believe 8
most of them recognized the situation and set out to --
I 9
After a considerable discussion with one, which was somewhat 10 hesitant about embarking on a complete reevaluation program, l>
11 I believe they are now all on the program.
12 '
COM1ISSIONEP AHEARNE: The order offered them the i
i 13 oppotunity of a hearing.
I i
14 MR. EISENHUT:
I believe it did.
15 l COMMISSICNER AHEARNE:
Did any of the licensees lo request to have it?
O 17 l MR. EISENHUT:
No, sir.
MR. SHAPAR:
None of the licensees did, 18 i
19 Someparty other than the licensee
-- I believe l
20 the State of Pennsylvania -- did request, and then withdrew 21 the request for a hearing.
1 22 j By the way, I guess we should also mention that the 4
1 23 } order was made immediately ef fective for suspension, it went ll 21 ;, into effect immediately.
yd 31 Amr rers, Inc. '
25 MR. EISENHUT:
Yes. That's a good point.
e, N..
10 l
l mm l'!
I was going to mention, there are no, as of this 21 time, requests for hearing that are active.
~
COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
So that any discussions 4
we have -- (Inaudible.)
5 l
MR. EISENHUT: Yes, this is correct.
6; Following the immediately effective order, the 7
j NRC set up four review tears.
One review team set up 8-specifically to evaluate each of the plants; Surry 1 and 2 9
to be taken together.
10 1
And I should point out that Surry 2 was shut down 11 :
prior to this time because of major modifications, namely the 12 !
i steam generator repair program.
13 Since that time there has been a number of visits l
14 j i
to the site, there has been a number of meetings at Stone 15,
j Webster where most of the recalculation work is being done, 16 '
} and there has been a number of meetings here in D.C.
I 17 The next slide summarizes -- it is sort of a 18 '
thumbnail sketch of where we are as of two days ago.
19 (Slide) 20 !
Across the top you can see the name of the plant.
21 !ll And the analysis to Do is namely the number of computer runs, p
22.ip the number oif pipe runs basically from an anchor to an anchor,,
i 23 h!! that needed to be analyzed because they used an algebraic 24 hl summation method.
- n,oone,s.inc.
25:
Notice for Maine Yankee it was 19 and so forth 1
11 I
i mm ij across the page.
a n
2 ll COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: Could you comment on Surry 2?
3 MR. EISENHUT: Yes.
4 Surry 2 is not actively pursuing it because they 5
are shut down because of the steam generator issue. They are 6,
devoting most of their effort to Surry 1 and therefore we 1
7 just don't have any information, firm information on it.
It i
i 8,
will be some months before Surry 2 is ready to start up 9
following steam generator repair.
I i
10 '
We believe it to be their option, therefore, to I
I 11 l work on Surry 1 with us, to get it restarted, and then to I
12 !
devote their efforts to Surry 2.
I 13 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: Would you, as far as the analysis 14 !
to do that also -- (Inaudible.) -- at the present time, or would yo 15 assume that it is basically the same number --
16 MR. EISENHUT:
It probably would be extremely i
17 ;! roughly the same.
However, it could vary from plant to plant 18 l within an -- (Inaudible. )-- plant was designed.
19 1 The next line gives the status, basically, as of 20 April 24th.
This line points out that Maine Yankee is completed.
21 19 plant-run analyses. And you can see the status of other 22.' plants.
Il 23 l This was as of the 24th and this changed even since i.l 24. then, and calculations are continuing. We have, in fact -- we
,i nooorrers. inc. j 25 are getting closer on Beaver Valley, ad in fact some of our s
- I
I Il Staf f will be visiting Stone & Webster in Boston tomorrou mm v
2 with some of those detail analyses.
CO:OIISSIONER AHEARNE:
Throughout this chart where 4l you have, for example, completed within, completed abose, 5i is this your estimate?
You have reviewed the results and you 6
have reached this conclusion?
7 d
Or, is this what the licensee reports.
8i MR. EISENHUT:
For the purposes of this table, it i
9' is what the licensee has completed.
10 COMbiISSIONER AHEARNE:
And so if the licensee --
e 11 II
?
MR. EISENHUT: He may or may not have completed, as I
you go across the page.
And I will get into that in just a o!
moment.
i I
I 14 These are the ones that the licensee has completed.
l 15 The target date on the very bottom of this table is the 16 licensee's estimated submittal date to us and our review --
il j,' 1/ even though it is going on in parallel with this program, it 18 f really first got started for completeness, after the 19 '
submittal date.
20 The Maine Yankee evaluation that has been 21 j completed -- and you will notice they have all been completed.
ll 3, i,
" ;; So f rom this poim on basically the tabic shows Beaver Valley.
n' 23 Fitzpatrick and Surry 1 numbers. But for the sake of 2.t '! discussion today, I will concentrate on Maine Yankee since it rs Hextren, inc. ;;
- e is the one that is basically furthest along.
o a
'l f
13 t
i i
i I
The staff's criteria for getting the rest of the 1 g!
2; review resolved, the precedent will be taken on Maine Yankee,
'i 3
since it is the lead plant. So I won't really be discussing 4,
the rest of the plants from this point on.
i 5
The Maine Yankee situation at tk present time is i
6 i
6' that they have completed these evaluations.
They have i
1 7
concluded there are no hardware changes required.That is, I
8i they have rerun these piping calculations and they have 9,
concluded on using the new program, all the stresses in the
- 10) piping is still within the code allowable.
I Il COMMISSIGNER AHEARNE: And the point that I was I
12 '
trying to get to before then is that the conclusions were, I
13 !
the tables will reach conclusions as to whether something need i
i 14 not or need be corrected is the licensee conclusion at the i
15 ' present time.
16 !
MR. EISENHUT: 7es, sir, on this table.
h 17 ;
COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: Yes.
18 '
MR. EISENHUT: So basically it says, the licensee I
19. feels that no hardware change is required for piping.
For 20 i Maine Yankee only two pipe supports needed to be reanalyzed, 21 ;
because those were the only ones relating strictly to the i
22 ll Shock 2.
That is the algebraic analyses previously.
el 1
23 They completed those and they did make some minor I
24 E changes to the support.
.ral Hetx)rters, Inc,i w
f 25,
COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: I don't understand.
h a
a
14 i
l 1
CHAIRMAN HEMDRIE:
It looks like two were evaluated mm i
2, and four came out with the analysis.
d EISENHUT: There is a zero in there.
l 4
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: Where would it be?
6 MR.EISENHUT:
You nced to look between the top two 6
and the bottom two, and you need to look very pleasantly at 7,
the middle two.
It should say zero were completed within i
i, 8
original design.
i i
9{
(Laughter.)
i 10 Not a two.
11 '
MR. RUSSELL: The modification was actually basically' I
flexibility' consideration as compared to modification as a 12 I
13 ! result of increased stresses on the -- (Inaudible.)
i i
i 14 l MR. EISENHUT: Their actual reason there why those 15 were modified, for a while it was two zero, or zero two. It 16 is a little confusing as to whether what the prime motivator lI for those modifications because the actual supports in 17 I was 18 the baseplates were also being looked at by another --
l 19 "
COMMISSICMER AHEARNE: But you would certainly 20 agree --
21 >
MR. EISENHUT:
I would agree there is a zero in 22 :i there somewhere.
I' This was the status as applied to the licensee.
23
- i 24 l CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Why is the conservation of crat Haoorter i. Inc. j 25 i pipes and pipe supports principle that is applicable to this
- i 1
15 i
1y table.
II i
mm 20 MR. EISENHUT: Back to the basics.
f 3
The staff's review of these has proceeded.
What l
4 we have done is on Maine Yankee we have looked at the licensee's 1
5 19 evaluations on piping, and we have concluded that it is
{
6 acceptable, that is his analysis are appropriate, which I will 7'
elaborate on slightly in just a moment.
J i
3i And siinilarly for pipe support, we have essentially j i
9 completed our review of his submittal which states that, as i
10 we just described on this table.
4 I
11 j Now, the staff did a couple of things. When the i
12 licensee submitted his reevaluation, he used one of two i
13 !
computer programs; either a Shock 3 subroutine and Pipe Stress' i
l' or anotter program called New Pipe.
15 '
Basically what we had done, was we did a little bit i
16 more than just look and see if he has reanalyzed the ap ropriate il 17' ones.
We went through the Shock 3 and the New Pipe codes i
13 :
themselves, and we did a code verification review.
i 19 1 We, first, of course, obtained the code listings 20 '
and obtained the code listings to see whether -- to be 21 sure there was no algebraic summation method done.
l 22 ll Secondly, we did a comparative type calculation
!i I
23 0 using our own code, which we are having run at Brookhaven li 24 ' National Lab.
a rai neoorren, Inc. a 25 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
Did you have any difficulty 4
1 ii i
i nm 1
getting the codos?
i 4
2[
MR. EISENHUT:
No, we did not.
3 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: All the ones you need.
MR. EISENHUT:
All the ones up to this point. There al i
5 was, of course, some difficulty actually getting them physically 6,
for some period of time, but there was no hesitancy about i
7',
giving the codes,really.
After everyone understood the approach we were on, 3
l 9
it was straightforward. I think it is very time-consuming, 10 but it is not really a problem obtaining them.
i l
11 ;
The two pieces that were done, first there was a 12 comparative type check, where Maine Yankee sent us three 13 of their 19 computer runs. That is actual problems in the i
i 14 plant.
I 15 h We ran them on our program at Brookhaven and 16 in f act our results came out very close to their results.
17 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: That's E pipe.
h 18 '
MR. EISENHUT: That's E pipe.
19 We do have E pipe itself benchmarked as another i
20,
step.
But on the comparative type calculation first, we the 21 l have done three checks with our own program against 22 !j results of their program.
We will be doing one more.
i s
4 23 !,
We have done three or four.
l 24 h We have also done a benchmarking wherc we sent tral.Heoor ters, Inc.
25' standard problems to Stone &' Webster, and we have three standard
- 'l 9
i l
il.
17 l
i mm i13 problems that we cent to Stone & Webster, and asked them to l
2 run our well-understood standard probl els on their program 3
and get the results back.
4, And two of three of those are done, and both of 5
those two came out also very close to the comparative type 6',
calculations.
I 7'
MR.
RUSSELL:
The three runs, one run for each --
I 2'
excuse me. Three runs have been completed of four; one for l
9 each of the plants that we are currently reviewing, Beaver i
10 Valley, Fitzpatrick, Surry and -- (Inaudible.)
i Il !
Three runs completed of the 19 on Maine Yankee.
12 ;
We looked at one of the 19 on Maine Yankee. We are also i
I 13 looking at one on Surry, one on Beaver Valley and one on l
i l
i l
14 l Fitzpatrick.
We have completed three of those four.
15 '
MR. EISENHUT: Good point. Thank you.
16 {
Basically we have, therefore, three or four 17 comparative calculations and two or three benchmarkings.
18 '
So far they come out very close, and I think based on that we 19 '
have a very high con Edence that the programs as uced in i
20 those items that we have checked is a very reliable, good I
21j-means of doing this calculation.
t i
22 So it gives us some confidence -- in fact, I should ;
i O
23 '
say quite a bit of confidence -- that the recalculations where 1
24 Shock 2 was used, have in fact been done with an acceptable 3
ral McDortef t, IOC.
I I
25 method.
1 1
18 I
mm l
1 i Now the staff has gone a little bit further since 2
chis plant, first, has shut down, and number two, since there l
3 were several other questions about it we hav e looked into 4
other evaluation practices on this plant, that there was at i
5 least some discussion as beyond the strict interpretation of I
i 6'
the order from the licensees.
l l
i 7!
On April 2nd we sent the licensee information i
3j requests --
l 9
COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
By the way, are you going i
i 10 to leave this chart up?
1 11 MR. EISENHUT: Yes, I am.
I 12 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: Could I ask a few more i
1 13 questions about the chart?
l 14 MR. EISENHUT:
Certainly.
15 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: Could you say a few words 16 )
about the pace at which the others are proceeding.
h 17 ;
First, do you think that these are realistic i
13,
dates on the bottom?
i 19 MR. EISENHUT: Well, based on past work over the q
20 L last month and a half, there has been some difficulty pinning N
21 1 the dates down.
- 1 22 ]l The reason there has been some difficulty is, first 23 hl on Fitzpatrick there has been considerable dif ficulty for a 1
I 24 / while in getting geared up to do the calculations. And, I
.ru neoorrers.inc. i w
25 : guess agreement on all parties thac in fact the extent of i
't l
19 l
i r-I calculation that was being done.
2[
On Beaver Valley and Surry, I think there was 3
some hesitancy -- not hesitancy as much as difficulty in 1
4' getting the as-builts, for example, laid out so that when the I
i l
5 reanalysis is done, they are really analyzing the actual 6
plant as it is today.
l l
7l COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: And they are -- that is --
l i
s 8l MR. EISENHUT: That is being done.
I l
9:
That is what is really meant up at the top 10 about QA accepted results.
I 11 Over the first few weeks there were lots of j
t 12 ;
calculations that had seemed -- we went through a couple of
{
13 iteration; where the results changed every other day.
I i
14 l think the licensees have now developed a much more disciplined l' 15 '
approach to it, to where they are making efforts to be sure i
i 16,l that what they are analyzing is what is in the plant. And l
17 they have actually, before they analyze a problem, they are 18 checking the plant to make sure they are in fact analyz_ng the i
19 ;
as-built case.
I 20 ;
That takes a considerable amount of time.
21 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
And do you now feel that 22.l that has been done?
I!
'l 1
23!
MR. EISENHUT: Yes, s'ir.
I i
21 MR. RUSSELL: We have verified Maine Yankee through
- v.
at Recorrers. Inc.
25 the Office of Inspection and Enforcement, that the as-built i
!i
20 i
l mm 1
conditions is what was analyzed.
And that inspection was
.i also conducted last week at Beaver Valley with very favorable 2
i 3
results.
i Scheduled for next week for Fitzpatrick.
4l And there has been already on-site inspection at Si 6
Surry.
I don't know the dates when that occurred.
l I
7; We are, through Inspection & Enforcement verifying l
1 the as-built drawings in the piping systems they're reanalyzing.
8 9' are representative of stual conditions in the field.
I 10 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Then when I see 5/6 on i
11 Beaver Valley, that is relatively close, a week or so.
l l
12 MR. EISENHUT: This is really the target date we i
f 13 still have for submittal from the licensee as of this week.
i la i As of Monday, this was the actual target date.
i 15l Now Beaver Valley is back, as I mentioned -- the I
16 j only thing I can support the S/6 with is in fact in the last
'l i
17 couple of days we have had communications and in fact a lot i
18 ] of the numbers, a lot of the calculations -- more than 66 have 19 been completed. In fact, we are sending people to S tone &
'l 20 d Webster to work on those calculations tomorrow.
21 l COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
I guess what is leading me 1
22 to question the 5/6 was, if I go back up and look at the --
0 23 h certainly at least the piping support runs lef t to evaluate d
l I
24,at that point, it seems to be fairly sizable to be completed eral Reuorfers, Ir.c. }
25 that rapidly.
I I
..i 21 i
I 6
mm 1!
MR. EISENHUT:
It is a considerable ar.ount of work.
I 2 [ However, there is a very large team of people, of course, l
that can go from plant to plant to plant.
So it is not --
2 i
4 these are all not going in parallel.
l 5
Stone & Webster, I think it is fair to say, is I
6' sequentially looking at this.
l i
i 7'
COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: And would you havc decreasing a
level of certainty as you go into the outer, so that Surry i
l 9,
and Fitzpatrick --
10 '
MR. EISENHUT:
Certainly.
Just like I believe l
11 any other -- any time you project that far into the future.
12,
The next few days are certainly less certain and I think, I
l 13 '
you know, they can go up or down depending upon the amount I
I 14,
of resources put on the problem.
i i
15 l COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: Are there any large uncertainties 16 ;
that you have, are there any major questions in your mind that I'
17 l they are going to be anywhere neo Sose?
i 18 MR. RUSSELL:
On both Beaver Valley and Surry 19 I think the dates are reasonable.
I 20,
Fitzpatrick we don't know enough yet about what i
\\
21 1 they are proposing and some of the reanalysis methods, we 0
22 h don't know how much staf f review is going to be involved.
i 1
23 !
COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
So that's the least --
I.l 24,
MR. EISENHUT:
When you see 12 of 96, that's a
.9 s,m,,,,s. irc. ]
a.r 25 j considerable number yet to be outstanding.
-- (Inaudible.)
d d
q
22 I
mm i
i CO:0!ISSIO:IER AHEAR:!E:
Thank jou.
1, II 2 'l MR. EISE:! HUT:
Next slide.
i 3
(Slide) i f
4' The bulletin we went out with on April 2nd, this i
l I
j is a bulletin that was issued to all licensees -- I'm sorry, i
!h I skipped a page nere.
6 t
Ne are on the information letter.
l 7'I I
ai The five plants, what we did, in going one step 9;
further we issued an information letter basically saying, 10 this is some information we need to look into before the plant 1
11,
is restored. However, it needs to be supplied.
t 12 !
We didn't say that to the degree to which it was 13 going to have to be analyzed. We wanted to know whether there l
I 14 ;
were any other computer codes using algebraic sums, fo r j
i 15,
example.
And if there was, to ask for a computer code listing.
I i
16 q We wanted to know the methods used for hand calcula-tl 17 tions.
I la We wanted to know the status, the response to I&E 19 bulletin 79-02, which I will be discussing in a couple of 20 moments.
This has to do with baseplates.
I 21 i We asked them to identify the safety systems in i
t 22 !,; the plant and the basic methods used to calculate pipe O
t 23 q stresses.
I l
24 For codes used for previous evaluations c+
r &l ROpor tets. lnC.
25 or reanalysis, we wanted to provide some information from them, i
l 1,
23 j
l i
j come generic information of verification.
'l 2i This was sort of a followup to try to really i
I 3
understand what was done on those plants which, as I said before, certianly couldn't be interpreted of going beyond the a
i 5
literal interpretation of the -- (Inaudible.) -- order.
I i
l 6
What we really wanted to understand, since there i
7!
was an error of this one code, some information, some confidence l
l that there were not errors in other methods analyzing piping.
l 3
l COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: This went to every --
9, I
l p)
MR. EISENHUT: Nc, I'm sorry, I corrected that.
I 11 j This one went to the five plants.
I will get to -- :
i 12 ',
there was one that also went to all operating plants which I 13 l will get to in just a couple of moments.
l l
14 !
Basically, again addressing Maine Yankee specifically, i
15 what we did find out was that there was another computer i
13 code calle. -- another cubroutine in the Pipe Stress code i
il" 17 called Shock 1, which was ased on a large percentage of the i
i 18 l safety systems in the plant.
I 19 There was some piping that was calculated using i
20 hand-calculation methods, In fact, there were some hand-21 l calculated methods used in fact to verify some of the results 22 h that came out of the Shock 2 numbers.
These basically were 231l for small lines.
I
!i i
2a Now let me address that one first, then I will Sneuorre,.mc.]
25.1 come back to tPe Shock 1 situation.
d ll n
il
24 i
i I
mm l
lj For the hand calculation methods, what we did is 2h we basically looked at the procedures they had used both 3
initially when they designed the plant, and we looked at the 4
same procedures they used also for the recalculations i
1 5
for small lines, j
6 We looked at that generically and we concluded that I I
i 7j basically the precedural approach they used does, in fact, j
8 meet our present requirements.
In fact our present review 1
9 plan requests.
10 So we found that acceptable.
11 We have looked at the Shock 1 computer program s
12 l which was used, as I said, on a large percentage of other 13 safety systems in the plant, maybe anywhere from 60, 70, 80 l
t I
i 14 percent.
I 15 '
Maine Yankee, there is around 73 piping runs that 16 ;
used Shock 1.
In fact, they use currently four dif ferent I!
17 f versions of Shock 1.
Now Shock 1, even though it was, as I said, outside 18 j!
19 the scope of our previous order, we looked at to get some 20 confidence about the methods used in analyzing the piping of 21 l the plr 1, I think it is fair to say it is certainly not 22lj equa.t to today's codes because it is basically a one-N 23 ] dimensional code # in the sense that even though it fits in o
II 24 earthquake motions in various directions, it transmits those v'
cal Reporters. In. j 25 ": through as one-dimensionut response.
v li I
4 95 i
I mm 1
.iowe ve r, there are some tradeoffs in it, because 2 lt what it does is it picks the absolute values of the first t
3 mode and combines that with the square root of scme of the i
i 4.
squares of the rest of the modes. And therefore it takes a I
i 5
sort of conservative approach in each one-dimensional array.
i i
i 6'
Therefore, what it really means is there is no way l
I i
7 to directly correlate what was done by Shock 1 through a
)
8, computer program, by comparison to other Shock -- that is i
9' for example Shock 3 or New Pipe codes -- other than doing i
10 some check calculations.
i 11 l Now, of the 73 piperuns, as I said, some of those i
12 ;
were done with each of the four different Shock 1 subroutines.
13 !
For one subroutine, that is the last version, Version 4 Shock i
14 1,
the licensee has rechecked the situation by looking at i
15 three of the 73 piperuns, doing it with New Pipe, and found i
16 ;
that in fact Shock l was conservative.
So it gives us at Y
17 ;
least for one of the versions of Shock 1, that in fact there 18 l are some conservative results.
i 19 !
The question we have that is still an open question i
20,
that the staff is presently discussing is, how much further 21 l do we need to go with this before we let the plant start up for!
I 22 inerim operation?
4 23 We really don't have a firm position today. We l
24 h are going to be developing that over the next few weeks -- few at Recorrers, Inc. '
Mt 25 '
days, I should say.
I've been at this too long.
i i
s
26 i
1l And, in f act,all the results we hav e seen to date I
2 would indicate that Shock 1 may well be an appropria way I
t Y
3-to go.
Shock 1 I should point out was also used in a couple 4
of other plants to do some of the safety systems in those i
I 5
plants, too.
6 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Is that the last threshold
{
i 7;
for Maine Yankee?
I t
I 3
MR. EISENHUT: Yes, I think it basically is.
9 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: So that if I understand, as l
10 far as Maine Yankee was concerned, you were satisfied with l
11 '
their reanalysis on Shock 2 on both the support and 'he 12 piperuns, you were satisfied with their hand calculations.
i 13 l And you still are evaluating their use of Shock 1. Your l
la,
preliminary evaluations so far indicate no problem.
l I
I 15,
MR. EISENHUT:
Good summary.
1 And there is one more code verification we have 16 ;-
4 17 '
a little bit further to go.
However, everything we have seen
\\
la,
so far gives us high confidence there.
i 19 i And the last pieces which I will be talking about 20 in a minute -- a couple of minutes, is that there are a couple 21 of I&E bulletins, one related to the Velan valve and one 22 h related to bmcplates, which I will address how they interface.
I!
23 hl COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: Could you talk a little bit 2.! :, more about what is involved in verifying Shock l?
- e
.s nexnen. inc.
25 You did essentially the numa process as verifying
'i
27 mm l j.
Shock 2?
i 2
MR. EISENHUT:
It is a little more complicated, 3
because since it is a one-dimensional program you can't 4
really put a three-dimensional problem into it and a three-i l
I I
t 5'
dimensional problem into an approved code and see whether l
'I t,
6' they give you the right results.
j I
l 7'
So therefore, there is no real way to verify that I
8, code in the same method that you do for say a Shock 3, a
i 9
New Pipe, an E Pipe comparison.
I 10 It is just -- if you look at it as a black box, i
11 '
you can't put in a three-dimensional problem on the others i
12 and get a three-dimensional answer, and put a three-dimensional!
I i
I 13 l problem into a black box that only gives you a one-dimensional i
i I
14 ;
answer.
l 15 So you really don't have available to youthe method 16 ( of the same comparative method.
h 17 The only method you have is looking at the code i
la sort of theoretically as to what it does, which has some --
19 ', it certainly is not a three-dimensional code as we require 20 today.
It also has some areas which may not be conservative.
21 But it has some other areas which were conservative.
n 22 !j It is Just not a one-to-one correlation.
23 i
So, what we are doing there is, we are looking at t
I i
24 the code attempting to make sort of a theoretical look at it
- e -
- al Rcoorter s, !rc..
25 : as to what it calculates; and we are also doing confirmatory 1
h
- t,
i g
28 I
i i
r 1
work of picking the same problem, calculating it one-2[
dimensionally and saying, what does the design look like and 3
doing a three-dimensional calculation and seeing what the I
4; design looks like.
i I
5 We find the stresses are conservative.
i i
4 6;
COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: When you Eny that it is l
7 conservative in some places and not in oth ers, that called to I
i 8
my mind the length of pipe which may be stronger than it needs l
9!
to be in some places and not strong enough in others.
i 10 l Is that a fair assessment of what that would mean?
i i
l 11 '
MR. EISENHUT:
Yes.
12 !
Let me ask Jim Knight from our Division of System l
I I
13 !' Safety which is doing all the code verification work -- he is 14 doing that part of this giant jigsaw puzzle in the sky. So 15,
maybe I could ask him.
16 l MR. KNIGHT:
I think your analyses is certainly a
'l e
17 good one.
What you said you are concerned about is on the 18 face of it you may well have some conservatisms built in, but I
19 '
you may cancel those out later on in some other step.
20 l The proof, if you will, the proof method that 21i Darrell was referring to, I think will wash that out.
If you i
l i
22 h' are taking a problem that you have done using a code that l
23 l1 l has been verified so you have confidence in the results, you 1
24 ( now do the same problem, if you will.
You will look at the re-cal Rvoorters. Inc.
25 '
same problem done once with Shock 1, and done once with the I
'ln
[
29 i
I i
I!
new code.
m i
l 2
So that this convolution of conservatism, whatever c
it is -- and it really is, I think, impossible to define --
1 4;
will wash out. You are looking then at the total result.
f i
i 5
COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: What does that actually 6
tell you about the pipe in the plant?
l i
7l I guess you can go on analyzing problems a lot of 8l different ways until almost anything happens.
But, what does l
\\
9 it tell you about the pipe 9 I
t 10 MR. KNIGHT:
It will tell you that the methodology I
~
I employed, the Shock 1 methodology, is giving you, in general, i
I2 !
conservative results.
i i
i 13 MR. EISENHUT: That is, it would generate a design i
i la i
which would even be conservative by today's more advanced 15 '! methods, which is what we have found on the three that have i
16 k been looked at.
I 17 i l
COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: And when you say "in general,"
I I8 l does that mean there may be specific places where it wouldn't?
i 19 i MR. KNIGHT:
It is, I guess you would have to say,
^0' undefined at this point.
21 l I
What you see is a trend, and a well-supported i
'2 ll trend.
Until you do the ultimate,unless you do every single
^
^3 Il you can't say that every single one would fall l
ll run over again, l
directly within today's requirements.
But you do see not only
-9 9 Reaorters, Inc. q
'5
^
the trend, but you also see the range in which you are running i!,
a
I 30
,1 I
r and find that you are getting results that are first, 2 !!
conservative, and secondly, conservative by substantial amounts.
1 i COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: But when you say "in general,','
d then you are not saying there are some places that you know i
5 the results are not conservative.
t 6:
You are just saying that all the results you have b
I 7l seen are conservative.
Is that fair?
i 8
MR. KNIGHT: That's fair.
l 9
MR.EISENHUT:
That's right.
And that's why I i
10 referred before to -- I think this is one of the issues that II is still an open issue.
I2 The question is, do you have to do 73 piperuns all 13 over again to give y:rirself that -- erase the " general" in i
i Id there and say that it gives you confidence.
15 We think not.
Whether it is, as the licensee is I
16 proposing, doing the random sampling of maybe 10, 15, 20 more, i
I7 l we are not sure. But that is an area we are looking at.
18 l Generally our feeling is that we are comfortable i
19 ;bwith the ones we have seen.
However, we will probably get a 20 little bit more comfortable before we let the plants go back.
9 21 3 That certainly -- and I could summarize -- is basically 99 - the only open area that we really have,
,l i
,3 'j COMMISSIONER AHEARME: Do you have any approximate j
24 estimate as to when you will be ready to make a report on ai semnen. Inc. j 25 either yes or no on that?
- i 1
'i
31 i
mm 1
MR. EISENHUT:
On this issue and therefore Maine 1
2 ji Yankee, well, two days ago I thought it was going to be today, l
3' because we thought that a large number of these runs could I
4; be redone basically in a couple of days to give us that extra f
l Si confidence. And now it sounds like it may be several days.
l l
i 6
And we are going to be -- this is one of the things I l
7 we are going to be exploring.
J t
8i Also --
i 9)
COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: Several is how much more than 10 '
a couple?
I 11 MR. EISENHUT:
To me a couple is like one or two; i
l 12 l several maybe four or five.
f I
i I
13 !
I'm sorry, everyone has a different understanding.
i 14 [
It may ce, in fact, a week or two.
I 15 l (Laughter.)
16 Does that help?
17 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: That is different.
i IS MR. EISENHUT:
That makes it vague enough.
I 19 1 Again, I think it really gets down to basically, 20 '
as I mentioned before, you get down to a judgment call of I
21 where we collectively think that it is in fact good enough.
22 g And I think we generally have a comfortable feeling.
I think h
1 23 ll the staff does.
We feel confid'ent that it is going to turn l
i 24 out all right.
Ce FJl HeDortets, Inc.
25 l However, we want to see some more before --
I i
l I;
32 I
1l, COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: Did you indicate earlier cm l
2 [i at all, Darrell, whether either the hand calculations or j
ll 3 i Shock 1 had used algebraic summations?
5 MR. EISENHUT: They did not.
5:
COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
I am still having a little 6
difficulty getting a sense of, is there a date coming up l
l 7;
approximately in your mind.
i I
MR. EISENHUT:
My best guess as to that -- I can 8
give you my own personal assessment of what I think.
I have 9
I 10 sort of had a cram course in maybe the last 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
i 11 i It looks like within the week we should be able 12' to be taking a position on Maine Yankee.
i 13,
COMMISSIONER AHEARNE : That is this weekend, on i
i i
i t
14 Saturday.
15 MR. EISENHUT: On Saturday. Within the week meaning 16 "a" week.
Ev next -- it certain1v always depends a little il 17,
on activities between here and there.
18 I COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: Yes.
19 -
COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: Ani what does "taking a I
20 position" entail?
21 MR. EISENHUT:
Taking a position would be that we've; il 22 ll basically got a safety evaluation already in draf t form 23 }laddressing all the issues except this one issue.
o 211 There is at least a number of the people working 1
sai narrers. \\r c.1 25 ] on this problem already confident.
They think they could n
33 l
i write a safety evaluation today on Shock 1 and recommending
,p]
that the plant start back up.
e i
There are a few questions about that, however. That is, is this enough?
We will be discussing that, as I said, 4,
i in the meeting tomorrow with S tone & Webster and hopefully Si I
i we will be getting 2nough more information to try to reach i
6, j
4 7
a position, we hope, within a few days.
l l
l COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
And at that point the staff l
3l i
recommendation to let the plant come back up is tantamount to its doing so?
i l
COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: I think we reserce that i
11 l i
t decision.
i 12 I
i MR. SHAPAR:
I think Harold Denton at an earlier l
13 i l
i meeting indicated to you that he would not use his existing i
14,
authority delegated to him, but would come back to the Commission before taking any action, is my recollection.
COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: But, there is no further 17,
action required at that point other than a Commission acquiescence 18 i
in the staff's view that the plant should go back up.
[
19,
MR. SHAPAR: Well, there should be an order to let it go back up, i
21 I
I COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
Sure.
i
- n.. ;
COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
If that is where the staff 23 ]
j comes out.
,t z.
.e-i at Heoorters, I c.
COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: Yes, that's my assumption.
I
34 i
i i
I i
1 That if they did this, as Darrell suggests seems likely.
mm 1 lI li2i COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
Let me ask one other i
2 question along that line.
i 4,
Do we also have to decide, in deciding uhether or i
5 not to let Maine Yankee to come back on, whether it would have 6!
to be qualified to the standards of 1972 or the standards l
l 7;
that would apply if it were being licensed in '77 --
'79, l
l 3
whatever year it is.
9 MR. EISENHUT: From a technical standpoint we I
I 10 certainly wouldn't think ittas necessary.
However
- Howard?
i 11 MR. SHAPAR:
I wouldn't think so.
12 l MR. EISENHUT:
I would think from a technical l
l 13 ;
standpoint it would be just a restart, just as any other I
i 14 '
modification in any other plant.
l 15 =
MR. SHAPAR:
I take it there are no amendments 16 to the license that are involved --
ll 17!
MR. EISENHUT:
I believe not.
I i
la MR.SHAPAR:
That is important.
i 19,
MR. EISENHUT:
I think that's right, but at this 20 6 point, I think not.
21 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
If there were, a hearing 22 would be required.
I
- 231, Yes, or no?
l 21 MR. SHAPAR:
I can't answer that yes or no.
I a
tal Reucerers, Inc.
25 l can elaborate, if you like.
i d
l 35 l
t I!
COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
I have noticed.
l I !
l 2
I (Laughte r. )
3 MR. SHAPAR:
A hearing would be required.
I prefer I
4 to let it go at that.
l 5;
COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
Okay.
6I COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
Let me ask that question l
7l another way, Darrell.
I 8
If Maine Yankee were seeking an operating license 9,
at the coment, and you had just completed the effort that you I
10,
completed here, would the plant be seismically qualified in I
11 1979?
i l
12 MR. EISENHUT: That's a perfect lead-in for my 13 1 next slide.
i 14 I think the next related question we have is --
t 15 (Laughter.)
16 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
I'll reserve judgment.
0 17 MR. EISENHUT:
There is a slide about the 18 earthquake in Maine, if you can put it up.
I 19 (Slide) 20 This question came up because we have been having t
21 some discussions.
You will recall on April 17th there was I
22 an earthquake of Magnitude 4 on the Richter scale, on an i
23 h epicentral intensity V, which is still under review with i!
- l 24 [ an epicenter of about 10 kilometers from the Maine Yankee JT tl ReOOf tf f t, IFC.
25 site.
0 t
i i
36 I
i I
l COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: All the earthquakes numbers l
i, mm 2b that I saw when this first came up were from mercalli scale.
3 MR. EISENHUT:
Intensity V is.
And I guess t
I 4
one of the characterizations of a V is that you can get i'
S' near where you get that at the epicentral area you can get
.I 6!
broken window panes.
7 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
I always liked the part on the i
I scale where -- let's see, I believe it is a VI where some 8 t 9,
people run out of doors.
10 You can distinguish that from a VII, because with II l VII everybody runs out of doors.
I i
12
~(Laughter.)
13 MR. EISENHUT:
And an VIII, you are able to leap a single building in a single bound.
I4 I
15 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
IV is any object swinging, 16 -
vibration like passage of heavy trucks, sensation of a jolt, I
17 like a heavy ball striking a wall, standing load of hard I8 rock (? ), windows, dishes, doors rattling.
I I9 !
COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: But the number for magnitude 20 and the number for epicentral intensity are the two different i
21 j scales, Richter and mercalli?
l 22 :
COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
For V you have, felt outdoors, 23 l1 direction, estimated sleepers awakened.
I 24 :
(Simultaneous discussion. )
eral Recorrers, Inc. i 25 i
I 4
N
37 l
l l
I I
i l MR. EISENHUT:
This was the largest earthquake in mn 2
that area since 1973, when there was a magnitude 5 earthquake L
l 3
in Southern Maine.
4 Basically we believe -- the seismographs, the 5l detectors at the plant, as it is called, one was out of l
t i
6; commission at the time of the event, which is permitted.
In i
i 7'
fact, Maine Yankee has no technical specifications on the 1
3l siesmographs.
l 9,
The second one did not trip.
We turned it on, and 10,
it would have turned on if the ground motion vertically had i
t Il been equal to or greater than.01 at the site.
12 !
That is the vertical ground motion which is actually; I
I i
I 13 l slightly less than horizontal ground motion.
I i
14 We believe there is little significance to the 15 >
actual regional analysis, and we -- I think it just reemphasizes, i
16 '
reconfirms our belief that earthquakes in that area will 17 '
he felt and do occur.
f 18 Now, it brought up a couple of other questions.
I 19 First I guess I should point out also in Intensity V, let 20 me say that it is still under review.
The USGS does a s
21 survey to -- since it is tied to actual occurrences, events i
- t 11 22 y and feelings, I guess they go out and survey the number of i
F i
'l 23 1! people who --
!!il 24 'l CHAIRMAN liENDRIE: You have to go around and count cer %M ReNners. inc
'5.i the number of people that came outside, the number that didn't, il
'.. l 38 i
I i
i mm 1 to tell whether it is a V or a VI.
I 2 i!
MR. EISENHUT: They send postcars, I believe to 34 the Post Office on that.
i 4i (Laughter.)
I 5
So, there are things that are done.
f 6:
We don't think it is a surprise. We think it is l
I 1
7' a basic bottom line.
i l
8i I should point out before I get to the seismic 9
conservatisms on Maine Yankee, there was some discussion 10 that there was an earthquake in New Hampshire on April 22nd.
11 However, it was an extremely small earthquake, Intensity III, i
12 considerably less.
t 13h COMMISSIONER KENNEDf:
Shown not to be a truck i
14 '
moving down the road.
15,
MR. EISENHUT: Not to be. But you coul chave fooled 15 me, probably.
17 The seismic conservatisms is an area we have 1
13 looked at as it relates to Maine Yankee. And I think we have i
19 a backup slide on the seismic design at Maine Yankee.
20,
(Slide) 21 !
You will recall the present design at Maine Yankee 22 is a Housner spectra anchored at.lg.
q 1
23 To answer your questions specifically, if the plant was licensed today we would certainly probably start off 24 ers necenm. inc. lt 25 requiring the Reg Guide 160 spectra, and it would be anchored a
9 s
' l,
39 i
i mm 1i somewhere between.13g and.20g.
a Now, I've asked the question as to basically what 2j!
3 difference is there probabilistically between, for example, 4.
an earthquake anchored at.lg or an earthquake with that 5
acceleration. And I think we want to be sure -- there is a i
note of caution here from our seismic geosciences people that l
6, 7'
we need-to be sure we exercise great caution in how we j
I i
e compare these things.
i 9l However, we can make some initial estimates i
l 10 comparing some effects.
On the second line or the second bullet there it 11 i l
12 points out'that the acceiration wculd, indeed, be larger if I
13 l Maine Yankee was designed today.
I think that specifically answers the question that if this plant would be licensed 14 i 15 today, the acceleration certainly would be higher.as it would 16 on a large number of the plants that were licensed during lit.
17 l' this vintage.
We tried to make some estimates of the differences 18 i
19 '
between the chances of exceeding a.lg and a.2g and we think 0
20 0 it is about a f actor of five.
21l COMMISSIONEB KENNEDY: Excuse me, Darrell.
I 22 h Go back over this. What does that mean?
I 23 i' MR. EISENHUT: The differences between the chance d
1 24'; of exceeding -- this is the peak accelerations in a spectrum
..t vat Retorters, Inc.
25-at.1 and.2g sould be a factor of about five is that the li b
40 1
I mm 1 peak accdcrations would be.
t The differences between the chances of exceeding 2
the existing design, that is a.lg Housner and a.2g Reg i
Guide 160 -- that is I have raised the acceleration from.1 a
i I
Si to the maximum of our -- not the maximum, but to the spectra i
I 6
that it might be anchored to, that would be
.2g, in that j
i I,.
7' area.
And I have also increased the spectrum, response l
spectrum from a Housner spectra to the Reg Guide 160 spectra, 8
I I
i 9
raised both of those things.
10 The combination is a difference of a factor of 11 :
about 25.
25 at risk.
i 12 Now, there is a lot of seismic conservatisms you 13 l have to put on the other balance when you say this is the I
l i
14 !
difference in the plant design.
15 l Basically I think it is our Judgment that -- and 16 we have looked at this over the last couple of days because il 17 0 this has been discussed by the staf f at different times.
18 Our best guess at this point is that the facility 19 l could likely withstand a 0.2g peak acceleration when you 20 are considering the design margins of the facility as it
','l is designed today.
21 y'l However, if you wanted to go back and reanalyze, 22 !i d
l 1
that is.2g 23 i redesign the plant to the maximum of _ta range, 24 and require that it be reanalyzed using the Reg Guide 160 i
y tral R000rfers, Inc.,4 there would in fact be considerable upgrading of the 25,
- spectra, l
i I
i e
i i
47 i
mm 1
plant.
i i
2 j, So, that sort of bounds it and gives you a very I
i 3
rough feel for what it looks like.
As I said, it is our I
I 4
expectation that that facility could take a.2g peak i
l i,
5 i acceleration at this time as it is designed.
t i
i 6;
COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
As it is --
l 1
1 7
MR. EISENHUT:
Presently designed.
As it exists 8;
today.
I 9!
COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: As it exists today withouc I
3 i
10 '
any improvement in hangers, anchor plates or anything else I
i 11.
that might come out of reanalysis of the code?
l i
12 MR. EISENHUT:
I think in general there may be I
i i
13 '
some minor finetuning coming out on basically things like I
i i
i 14 j that.
But in general I would say the structures, major j
i 15 l systems, components and design, the facility would -- (Inaudible.)
I 16 '
There may be some very minor finetuning which will 17 ll be done in the next couple of weeks.
18 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: Is that a hard question I
19 l actually to ask as you redo the other calculations, is it hard i
20 to do them botn at.1 and.2?
21 And does that double the amount of work?
22 q MR. EISENHUT: It certainly doubles it to go to a i
d 23 !
.1 to
.2, but it alco considerably more than doubles it to i
24 j, change from a Housner spectra to a dif ferent response spectra ce. -
al Reporters, Inc.,
25,
facility.
That would be a complete seismic redesign of the
!t i!
l d
42 I
I
^
i I
m entire facility.
2f
,j Because you can't really look at one piece of i
n' pipe hanging in the plant without looking at the response of the entire plant. So that would mean going back to ground S'
zero and doing the complete seismic reevaluation of the j
1 6l facility.
l i
7 Now, the answer I gave you on what our best j
3; judgment is at this time was based on a little more than just l
9 sort of a seat-of-the-pants feel. There is considerable effort I
10 in the agency going on right now, looking at seismic margins 11 in existing facilities.
It is basically there by virtue of l '~
j two major programs.
13 Let me talk about the NRR one first. It is basically 14 !
the systematic evaluation program, of course, has this as an 1 ~4 item, which we are reanalyzing the seismic design of the 16 >b older plants.
And we are certainly going to learn a lot from 17 dF that in the sense that, can a facility like Dresden 2, which 18 has been designed for a certain acceleration, a certain 19 spectra, when you compare it against present-day requirements, e n
what would be the overall effect.
21 'l I think we are confident there also that I could l
'20 probably make the same general statement we did on Maine
- I
'3 d Yankee, we think our evaluation today probably is going to Il 24 conclude that the facility, basic facility as it is
.ral Recorrers, lec.
~
s
^S can withstand the higher acceleration and j' presen tly designed,
.. i 43 i
I I!, the higher spectra. There it doesn't change as much in mm d
,H
'[
acceleration, but it shows that there is some overall seismic 3
conservatisms.
I 4
j In support of the SEP we have had a considerable l
i 5!
amount of first technical assistance programs done at a 0 lI i
consultant over the last two, three years, where we went i
i l
t 7!
through the entire seismic profile item, by item, by item l
l 3
from the earthquake transmitted to the site through the soil, l
9 through the base mat, the facility, every step of the way, I
looking at margins and there going through, making estimates II on the margins.
1, i That program gives us comfort that there are l
I 13 l factors of conservatism there.
i 14 '
I l
The second thing which is sort of a somewhat more j
i i
15 recent program is, Reseirch has underway a seismic safety i
16 I margins review program, the SSMRP, as it is called.
I7 l That program is a multiphased program, it is a several i
I8 l million dollars program, each phase, and it is again looking i
the overall risk to facilities, to be able to draw some 19 :/d at ll0;! inferences from that as to the design capabilities of the I
'l facilities.
2h But I think at this point we still believe there 1
23 are considerable design margins in facilities.
i d
,g at this point, let me go on to some other related al Reporters. Inc. l 25 i activities which am somewhat miscellaneous activities.
S i!
1
j 44 i
il' Let's go on to the slide ca IE bulletin 79-04.
2i (Slide) 3 I would like to just summarize some of the other i
I 4'
things that have been going on that have been interfacing i
5 with this ongoing effort as has been mentioned to a couple 6,
of you, as to how they might be interfacing.
t i
7 This problem of different weights on Velan valves i
8; originally stemmed out of the Duquesne Light is the Beaver 1
9 Valley concern.
1 i
10,
On March 30th we issued a bulletin to all operating,
i 11 reactors asking for a response by May 1st, because we found i
12 that some valves in plants actually were heavier than the I
i 13 1 valves that were assumed in the design of thatpiping.
14 '
We have done a couple of scoping calculations to 15 see what the effect is.
I&E has been doing some investigation i
16 '
work, working with and going to the manufacturers of Velan h
17 ;
valves, and looking at how much can the weight really change.
4 18 l It sounds like what we are seeing, it would be i
19 ! less than 100 percent.
A lot of the weight changes is only i
20 maybe 15 or 20 percent in weight. That is, you could draw the
. inference that this veight problem on certainly smaller valve 21 l
.I 22,; is not -- smaller size lines is not that big of a difference.
1 1
23 h What we have done is, we have done some conserrative F
l 21 :; calculations on for example a 6-inch checkvalve -- these
%c TJI N:?OCf fetS !!'C.
25 were basically, originally checkvalve problems -- a 6-inch i
t i
l 45 i
I jj valve we assumed 100 percent increase in the valve's weight, this mm d
is 2
a very conservative approach, the maximum you could see is about a 30 percent increase in stress.
i 3
4 It is highly dependent upon, of course, where I
5 the supports of piping are, and how the system is arranged.
I l
6, However, we think in most cases the increase in stress is l
l I
7j g ing to be considerably less. Therefore, we believe this is not l
\\
g an urgent problem, more urgent than May 1st submittal date, i
like next week.
And we think, in fact, it would not be a 9
i jo basis to hold up at least on Maine Yankee. This is our tentative I
11 position at this time.
l 12 '
Similarly, if I go to the next slide, there was l
I 13 / another bulletin issued, 79-02.
I I
i ja COMMISSIONER AHEAR'!E: Can I talk about the valves?
15 'i MR. EISENHUT:
Yes.
l 16 COMMISSIONER. AHEARNE: Would you say a few words h
37 jabout how many of these valves are in a plant and -
you say l
18 h that they may be up to 100 percent off in weight. ARe these il 19 l small valves, big valves?
i 20 MR. EISENHUT: I think they vary. They are on several 21ldifferent sizes of piping, anywhere from 3 inches up to 10 or i
- l12-inch valves.
t We are doing somewhat of a generic study by 77 U
u 23 } virtue of this I&E bulletin, and we are -- ISE is doing some 74 ' investigatory work.on really more of a special inspection to e neoonm. inc. ]
i 25 ?look at how much the weights really change.
hk 1
i
.i
i 46 I
I mm ll Mayb'u I&E would like to make some comments about h
li 2E that.
3 MR. POTAPOVS:
The largest increase that we have i
i 4
seen, the largest weight difference has been a 100 percent 5
figure, and that was in a 6-inch checkvalve of a certain I
6~
type.
j i.
7l We have looked at a number of other valves and l
t 8
dif ference are considerably less. On the order of 15 percent l
9 is typical.
10,
The difference between the as-built and the Il l!
design figure.
i 12 ;
CO:1MISSIONER AHEARNE: The 6-inch valve weighs how l
l 13 l much?
I4 MR. POTAPOVS: The actual weight. The design weight 15 in that case was, I believe about 220 pounds. The actual 16 'i weight was 450.
P 17 I COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: And approximately how many i
18,
of these valves of all sizes, Velan valves, that are in a l
19 ]
plant are we talking about?
20 i A dozen, a thousand?
21 l MR. POTAPOVS: In -- probably in hundreds.
22 ]
MR. EISENHUT: It is probably in hundreds. I think 4
l 23 !
in the case that we've seen, it has been a smaller number than '
- i 24 l that where they have been identified with an actual weight
.9 Re:werers, Inc. d 25 :l that was off.
Identified in a specific system.
I think it f
f f
47 I!
was the safety injection system in the original plant we saw.
i 2[
But certainly it could vary into many, many more il than a few.
I i
4l I think, so that we don't leave the wrong l
l 5,
impression, it is not the valve design was perhaps wrong, 6'
there has been a general tiend, historically, for valves i
7' at the same pressure capability, the same size, for the I
8 valve to get heavier.
l 9!
I also think it may well have been that a valve i
10 was selected off the shelf due to availability.
It was i
II I actually a higher-rated valve, and therefore was a higher I
i 12 l weight.
l i
13 COMMISSIONER AHE.ETE: Thank you, i
i Id (Slide) 15 !
This slide is a summary of another I&E bulletin i
16 '
that was issued in early March.
We actually have a response 1
I7 due in about -- it is 120 days, I believe.
It doesn't show I3 up there.
It is July 6th, the responses are due.
10 The owners group or the licensees have formed i
20 somewhat of gn owners group have come in for a meeting.
'l l Basically this bulletin gears around two things.
i i
22 h One is baseplates. That is plates that are anchored to a h
i
.3 !!
wall by anchorbolts. There were scme questions about it i
flexing and therefore putting a higher load on certain bolts; v4 d Recorrers, Inc.,,
25 1 h
there were some questions about how well the anchorbolts were a
N l
48 i
i mm 1
actually anchored.
i 2l A very simple summary, what this bulletin requires !
3 is that the licensee go out and check to see if he has got i
quality assurance records as to how these things were i
4 i
I 5 i designed and installed.
I 6
If he doesn't have QA records, he generally is f
i I
l 71 asked -- the bulletin asked him to do some kind of a check.
i 1
8 And the check is, he can go around and check to be sure that i
9:
they are anchored properly, they are torqued properly.
i 10 l He can do this by a number of ways; by actually I
II l doing a UT, ultrasonic testing of how the bolt is installed, i
by actually doing a sample test program of either 12 1 or l
I 13 !
torquing the bolt or by actually trying to lif t of f -- if
{
14,
they are preloaded, you actually pull on the bolt trying to lif t 15I it.
i i
16 !
This is a program to insure that in fact the l
d 17 h baseplates are in fact anchored adequately, i
18 l We believe since this calls for an actual testing i
19 program if there was inadequate QA record, and many of these 20 -
plants are of the older vintage and may not haw had those, it had a 120-day time to respond to this.
21 [l i
22 Again we believe this is not --
ongoing other a
i 23 ac.tivity is not of sufficient magnitude that we would probably 24 h have it necessarily interfere with this evaluation.
.n
- ral Recorters, Inc.,
25 ;
We are certainly encouraging, however, that as much J
ii
l 49 I
of these that can be done, be done before any startup.
2 These all are areas that are going to be I
l addressed when we come forth with a proposal of when the l
3 1
I 4'
plant will start.
5 Another bulletin not as directly related to these 6
five plants, is bulletin -- the next slide --
7 (Slide) 8
-- I&E bulletin 79-07, which went out to all operating plants.
i 9
It basically was a search mission where we went l
i 1
10 '
out and asked all licensees to identify any computer codes j
i II they may have used that may have used algebraic summation 12 methods. And if so, whate were the affected safety systems 13 that they were used on.
Id If algebraic sum was used, provide the computer l
15 '
program listing, provide verification program of computer 16 program used is adequate.
And, if algebraic sum used -- if I7 they were used, estimate the capabilities to withstand a 18 seismic event.
i
}
I 19 i It is a very broad program. As you can see, it is i
i i
.' 0 going to all operating plants asking them look at all computer -
i I
21 programs and identify wherever any are used.
22 I&E bulletin 79-07 response date is quite short.
Il
{
23 In fact, response date to be sent out by the licensee, was 24 !
due to be sent out April 24th.
As of this time, a certain ral Reporters, Inc. f ce 25 i amount of responses have already been recieved. And they show i
i.
I I
i
50 I
mm 1 that in fact some plants do use an algebraic summation method.
2 The next slide is not really directly a result of the i
I submittals that have come in.
l 3
I i
I i
4' (Slide) i 5
However, what it is is while the licensees have 6
heen working on this bulletin, there has been a number of I
7 discussions with the staff,and there has been discussions l
i 8l from a couple of vendors that have pointed out places l
9' where they have found that in fact an algebraic summation i
10 '
method was used in computer codes.
j 11 The first one, of course, is the five plants 12 i we have been discussing.
13 The second -- under that also you will notice 14 the Point Beach plant.
A telephone reporc from them that i
15 '
they believe, I believe,two lines in the radwaste cystem i
l 16 was designed with an algebraic summation method. It is not 17 of the scope or extent that was used for the other five 18 plants.
I 19 1 That is not in reactor coolant pressure boundary l
1, 20 :
and not also in safety-related systems that support that.
l 21 There is a computer program, as we call it, ADLPIPEs i
22 It is an A.D. Little program, pipe program. We have had I
23l generic discussions with A.D.
Little and in fact, the GINNA I
I 24 facility has iin fact informed us that they believe a
,e ne m e m s.inc.
25 l some of their piping was an alyzed with A.D.
Little program, i
fl
51 mm 1
which, in fact, uses an algebraic summation method.
2 Again, it has been somewhat of a limited portion i
t i
3i of some piping,and they have, I believe, done on that plant i
1 l
I 4'
some reanalysis which shows that in fact the situation is i
l 5
acceptable.
I 6
COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: When you say limited.
I 7
Portion of the plant?
s!
MR. EISENHUT: As opposed to, for example, on the l
9 Maine Yankee plant, if that followed the order, we would i
J t
10 !
not have any feeling, rally, as to the extent to which the l
11 l shock program,our subroutine in the Pipe Stress code, was i
12 used. It could have been used extensively in the reactor 13 coolant pressure boundary. It could also have been used 14 extensively in the systems designed to cope with and mitigate 15 l the consequences of an accident, that is the emergency safety l 4
16 l system.
l 17 So, therefore, you could have had a situation I
i 18 where the information we had led us to believe that it could i
19,
have been in both the system that could cause an accident i
l 20 and also the system that could cope with an accident in a i
i t
21 common mode way.
22 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
And here you --
1 i
23 1 MR. RUSSELL: We are only talking about two j
24 l specific lines on Ginna.
The steam generator main steam ral Reporters Inc. l co -
25 !
line and RHR line.
These lines were being selected as being 4
I I
I i
I,
l
..l 5,.
I l
i I
I mm 1
typical on which a dynamic analysis was done to support l
i 2
carlier calculations which were done without using the computer i
I 3'
code.
I I
l 4l And those reanalyses used for Code ADLPIPE and l
5 RHR line has been recalculated.
It is not a problem.
That l
I l
6t would be a caution in the reactor cooled pressure boundary I
7!
coming off the reactor coolant loop and going to the containment i
I 8
wall.
9 The main steamline off the B steam generator is 10 '
in progress now.
It much larger line, and we are not as 11 concerned with a steamline break on a pressurized water reactor 12 as we would with a loss of coolant accident.
13 So that's why it is indicated in progress --
i 14 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
Is that still true?
15 i (Laughter.)
i l
l 16 MR. EISENHUT: Probably.
i i
COMMISSIONER BPADFORD: Did I understand -- you 17 ;
18 say then that the use of ADLPIPE on Ginna was simply -- in i
19 h reanalysis it was not used in b 4Lding plants originally?
20 !
MR. RUSSELL:
It was a check on analyses which I
i 21 were doine earlier.
It was a dynamic analysis of typical j
i I
22 !!
lines that was requested by the ACRS and it was done on l
23' those two particular lines.
It was not used for the basis 24li of denying those lines.
rui nemrters. ine. l
=
25 !
MR. EISENHUT: The next cne is a Westinghouse code, i
l'l i
f
8 53
.a mm 1
WESTDYNE, which was used on again, Turkey Point 3 and 4, 2
Robinson, and we believe on Cook 1, but again it was based on i
l 3
telephone information.
The licensee has reanalyzed the piping i
i l
I and Westinghouse is working with them reanalyzed the piping.
i 4'!
5:
That was in question here also as -- checked out on those l
6; plants as acceptable.
I 7
COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: What about Cook?
8 MR. EISENHUT:
Cook is in progress, and the I
9 information we have is very preliminary based on telephone I
I 10 >
calls at this time. Therefore, we are not really relying on 1
l 11 l that.
We are waiting on the written answer which is due here l
12 ;
momentarily.
13 COMMISSIOPER AHEARNE: Due here a few days ago.
14 MR. EISENHUT:
It was due to be sent to the region 15 on the 2 4 th. And, in Sct, right before we left we got the i
16 responses. We do have the written response from 11 of them.
17 So they are coming in.
l l
t 18 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: Are we handling those the I
I 19 1 samo way we handled the Shock 2 plants?
l 20 l MR. EISENHUT:
Perfect lead-in for my next slide.
I l
21 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: I'm getting good at that.
l i
22 (Laughter.)
23 1 I have led you beyond where you want to be, because l,
24 h the next --
a.r 3i ae m rreri.inc.
25 j MR. EISENHUT:
Yes, I want to talk about DAPS for a I
i
I 54 i
mm 1
moment.
l 2
That was a perfect lead-in, but --
l I
i 3i CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
I was going to ask when you I
l I
4 fellows were going to break into your finale.
i l
5 MR. EISENHUT: The DAPS program is a GE program that was used for recirculation piping on Pilgrim and Brunswick 6
7 1 and 2.
W-believe it is again based on a telephone report, which oftentimes has a tendency to change by the time they 8
1 9
get to be written word.
l 10 !
They are being analyzed and we do have some i
11 written responses in from those two, and we will be continuing j 12 '
to look into them.
13 Now, it brings up the generic question which 14 was just asked and that is:
As these come in are we going to l
15 be using the same approach?
i 16 I think if we find plants where we don't really j
i 17 have information as to the extent to which it was used, other I,
r la !. than it was used extensively in the plant, we may well be i
l 19 in the same situation as we were on the five plants that were i
l R!
shut down.
i t
21 However, if we have some good information as to 22 the extent that it was really used, it enables us to do a l
J 23 ;l little bit more.
l t
24 !
( Slide ).
- rai Reporre,s. inc. !
- c. c.
25 :
This is a sort of tentative draft decision criteria i
i li
- l
ss l
.m I
that we -- in fact, even since we wrote it this morning it i
i 2 ll changed a little.
Let me try to give you the change on it. It l
I 3,
has been changing over the last two or three days.
1 I
1 4'
Basically what we are going to try to do is --
5i and we are hoping to have this laid out as an actual threshold 6,
criteria by the time we start going through all the responsea -
7 and that is we are going to examine the methods used for the 8
piping and determine if algebraic summation was used. or i
9, whether it was not used.
I l
10 !
If it was used in the safety system, whether it be on the safe shutdown system, reactor coolant pressure boundary,I 11 I2 or on systems to prevent or mitigate consequences, then in 13 fact you go to the next phase 1. And there will be probably on l
4 that first little arrow, probably another little box.
And 8
i 15 that box will probably say something like:
If the SSE fraction for the total pipe stresses is less than some amount of the 16 17 ;
allowable, you go one of two ways.
18 That is, you will go back and look to the way the 1
i 19 lplant was analyzed in the past. And it will say -- for example i
20 ! it might my, if the SSE fraction is less than -- let me l
21 l arbitrarily pick 50 percent of the allowable number -- it may l
22 li say you mustn' t shut down and redo an analysis now.
l You must 23 l go to the path where it is --
24 l COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Less than?
- r ai neporms. inc.,
25 l MR. EISENHUT:
If it is less than some number, the i
i e
e
56 i
I I
number yet to be determined -- we are having extensive discussions.
mm i
o 2 ll One of the. items that will be discussed also tomorrow in the I
l i
3, meeting with Stone & Webster is some background information j
i a!
which will help us better define what that number is.
l l
For the sake of discussion here I will use 50 i
5 il U
6 Percent.
I CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Sounds more than.
7 I
i COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: That's what I was thinking.
8 9l MR. EISENHUT:
If the SSE fraction is greater than l
l 10 50 percent of the total allowable.
I i
l 11 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Yes.
That's a lot like more than.l 12 l MR. EISENHUT:
At least we didn't make a mistake 13 in the slide.
14 (Laughter.)
l I
l 15 If it is more than, for example, 50 percent of the i
16 l allowable, it could tell you to -- and let me do the one 17 that is less than, first, because it is easier.
I, u3 i If it is less than, you might say you hav e some i
i l
19 j confidence that it is going to turn out reasonably all right, l
20 l and therefore complete the reanalysis in 120 days.
It may be the little box down in the lower left and it would say, 21 there is sort of an intermediate step. You look at what the 22 l
23 piping is also in making that step.
24,
If, in fact, the SSE fraction of the total pipe I
.ce-
'ai Reporters, Inc.
25 j stress is more than 50 percent, you may say, look at step two, i
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that it evaluates the function of each system and perform 21 a safety evaluation to determine if operation is acceptable l
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3 during reanalysis. That is, look at those systems effectively.
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4 If, for example the system would be a system on a 5
boiling water reactor, a control rod drive return line, I
6 l; which is not really as important to safety, one might argue I
7; that if that is the only line in the plant, even if it is i
I i
8 greater than 50 percent, it is acceptable to keep operating, 9;
recognizing you can valve out the line.
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10,
That line is not really necessary from a safety l
11 !
standpoint.
l l
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12 '
I am picking the easy one. There is certainly a 13 spectrum of all these kinds of things,and that is really what 14 is meant by box 2.
l 15 If, in fact, there are a considerable number of 16 important systems where the SSE fraction of the total pipestress' i
17 is more than 50 percent, it may lead you to the box on the 18 lower right, that is, shut down until reanalysis is complete i
19 l and modifications implemented.
l 20 l Very similar to the order on the plants.
e 21 The information in these previous ho::es we just 22,j didn' t have when we went into the order, show-cause order, 23 'l and therefore we had to jump th6 steps.
I 24 !
COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: When you say we didn't have e-F 9 Reporters, Inc.
25 it, you had over that weekend done the first step?
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MR. EISENHUT: We had done steps that told us that, I
2 l, indeed there was an algebraic summation used, and it was used 3
in a large variety of systems. That is, both as I said in systems I
i 4'
that can give the accident, and systems that can mitigath the i
l 5
accident.
6 Therefore, at least a couple of stages in your 7'
defense program could be invalid, i
8 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
It also at least got some i
9 preliminary calculations indicating magnitudes --
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MR. EISENHUT:
Yes, I'm sorry.
I 11 The box that is not shown, we did have some good i
12 information'that says considerably more than, for example, t
13 50 percent.
i 14 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
So, following that it I
t f
15 would have been a yes, they would shut.
i 16 MR. EISENHUT: Now, 50 percent may not be the right 17 !
number. We are still working on it.
18 It may turn out that we have two different thresholds, i
19 !
one threshold for those plants, the older plants that were I
20 j designed for one type of allowable stress. That is, a number i
21 l as it is called 1.8Sh, where Sh can be considered 5/8 of yield i
l 22 j or 1/4 of alternate.
And later plants where the allowable 23 !l stress has gone ' up.
For example, on the SSE -- these are i
i 24 h SSE numbers throughout, you have to also go through it for the al Recorrers, Inc. j 25 ! OBE -- where the allowable stresses are higher.
So it may mean {
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that you can buy a different number.
2 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: I was just going to ask Jim if I
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3 indeed the SSE on piping system dynamic analysis turns out to l
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be typically defined, or is it the OBE with a different-l 5
allowable combination.
6 MR. EISENHUT: The very next slide will give you 7
some numbers.
8 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: Just noting that the point here, 9
is when you design a pipe support or look at a pipe to see if i
10 l it will be overstressed, there are a number of loads that 11 contribute.
And some of thse may occur simultaneously, and l
i 12 some may not.
13 So, there can be situations in a plant in which l
i 14 it really doesn' t make any difference whether you are designing !
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15 for a big earthquake or a little earthquake, that other i
16 conditions, pressure loading, weight, or whatever just mandate l
I 17 a certain strength of section which is vastly greater than you i
18 would need for any earthquake loading load. In which case,you 19 t know, never mind what kind cf analysis was done.
20 !
I just wondered --
i 21 MR. KNIGHT: I think above that you may well have I
22 l a situation where, because of the OBE we require that it be 23 li considered a normal situation, thereby the philosophy is it j
i i
e 24 l could happen repeatedly over the life of the plant, you design ii neoonen, ine. ;
+i 25 to a much lower stress. Although you exceed that stress, you in l
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no way endanger the i'tegrity of the system.
I 2j It binds you from the standpoint of design.
I t-i 3
certainly doesn' t bind you from the standpoint of integrity i
4' or safety.
l 5!
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: Charge ahead, Darrell.
6 MR. EISENHUT: This is the perfect lead-in. That i
7 !
was the point we were going to make here with this slide.
8 (Slide) 9 We picked a couple of exmnples; one where it mcets 10 '
the threshold, one where it doesn'f:.
i 11 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: Perhapsifyoutalkthroughitl 12 line by line, there are some of us who might not look at it 13 and say, ah, simply one can see.
14 MR. EISENHUT: It is an exercise for the reader.
I I
15 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
The serious student will follow l
16 slide 7.
(Laughter.)
l l
17 MR. EISENHUT:
This is an exercise for the reader.
i 18 On the 6-inch pipe -- and these numbers can certainly vary l
19 :
considerably -- for the 6-inch pipe, these are psi, we have I
! about 2000 for the deadweight, 5000 for the pressure. For the 20 I
I l
21 SSE it may be 16,000. Therefore, the total is 23,000.
And 22,l you really have something like an allowable for the SSE case 23 l of 27,000.
2ti COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: And you would get from the al Remrters. Inc.
25 !
total to the allowable how?
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1 MR. EISENHUT:
The allowable is defined as a code
~
l 2l allowable independent of the numbers actually preceding.
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3' So you must stay below the SSE allowable stress.
l 4l l
In this case we picked a pipe for example, that may 5
have a 27,000 psi allowable stress.
6 The -- right below it you see the case where the 7
OBE may be 11,000 psi.
As you can see, it is less than an SSE, 8
and you add that to the dead plus pressure and you gct 18,000.
9 And you see the allowable stress,as Jim Knight mentioned, for j
I n
10 '
an OBE is, in fact, considerably less than the SSE allowable, II COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: Now that as opposed to the i
12 !
SSE allowable being code allowable, this is now a design 13 allowable?
I 14 MR. EISENHUT: That is right.
15 In fact, this is often, sometimes, more limiting i
16 as was said. In this case you can see, for example, that a 6-17 inch pipe, whether you use the SSE or the OBE, they both 18 trip a 50 percentile system where you had the SSE is 16,000 is 1
19 ! over half of the SSE allowable.
And the OBE at 11,000 is over I
20 I half, over 50 percent of the 18,000 allowable.
t 21 That would say if you had that situation it must be i
22 i reanalyzed.
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1 23 COMMISSIONER AHEARNEi Yes.
l 24 l MR. EISENHUT: Now we gave one other example. On e-F l Reporters, lec.
25 l the 30-inch pipe where, of course, you can see -- you can do the!
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mm same thing.
The SSE is 9000 as opposed to the SSE allowable 2
of 27,000.
The 6000 allowable for OBE is 18.
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d{
Therefore, either case you can use there it would i
4l meet the threshold.
l Sl i
Now we did this just to illustrate how we would go I
I 6I through this.
And in fact, what we are trying to do is to 7
develop the actual quantitative decision criteria so that I
8 we can try to maintain continuity, order through this process 9
of going through all these things.
I 10 I COICIISSIONER AHEARNE:
And the far right-hand lower column.
I2 MR. EISENHUT: Oh, yes. You can see an e:< ample of I3 where the LOCA stresses may be 13,500, which in this case I
I# '
gives you that the total of the dead plus pressure plus SSE 15 l plus LOCA may, in fact just equal SSE allowables, which is i
i 16 I exactly as far as you can go.
1 I7 COtGIISSIONER AHEARNE: Why would the OBE ever be 18 used as a constraint.
I 19 1 l
MR. EISENHUT: That is a very interesting question.
20 !
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: Because it is in the regulations.
2I MR. EISENHUT:
That's basically it.
Jim?
I MR. KNIGHT: I'm guilty of listening to a conversation!u 22 l
to the rear of me.
24 '
COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
My question was, why was ces al Reporters, Inc.,
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OBE used as a constraint.
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I MR. EISENHUT: Why do we use it?
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MR. KNIGHT:
I think the Chairman's answer is 3
certainly the first one.
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4 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: By the way, I hav e been trying i
S to get it changed for, I don't know, what is it, seven years.
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COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: Stop trying to influence the i
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answer.
8 (Laughter.)
9 MR. KNIGHT:
It goes to the philosophy that you 10 ' employ.
II We consider the operating basis earthquake to be, 12 in the jargon used by designers and code people, a normal 13 event.
Therefore, it could occur at any time and repeatedly Id throughout the life of the plant, and the system would remain 15 entirely elastic. There would be no residual effect, no 16 degradation at all.
i I7 That -- once you adopt that philosophy then, you 18 are into a realm where you have a rather stringent criteria 19 I placed on you.
It would be no different than a startup and a 20 shutdown of a plant.
l Whereas the SSE, of course is a 21 22 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: The SSE is supposed to be 23 l what the plant can take and safely shut down.
MR. KNIGHT: That's right.
It can take and it can
.-l si Reporters, ir*c..
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safely shut down.
However, following that you may well have a i
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large amount of inelastic action. There will be things --
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COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Now, let's consider a l
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situation where we have a plant which we have either up or l
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down, and we find that it meets the SSE requirements,but it i
S doesn't meet the OBE requirements.
6i MR. KNIGHT: My personal reaction to that would be, 7
if in fact the plant is safe to run, if in fact an OBE should l
l 8
occur, something either just at that level or at the level, I 9
think the response is a very simple one; you would ten inspect 10 '
the plant.
11 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: Yes.
I was trying to see if l
12 I understood the two earthquake correctly.
13 I am still having difficulty understanding why you i
14 would either shut it down if it doesn't meet the OBE, or not l
15 let it up if it doesn't meet the OBE, as long as it meets the 16 SSE.
17 MR. EISENHUT:
I think as Jim said -- I would I
18 share his view.
In fact, the reason we use the example of an i
19 ;
SSE fraction is because certainly our present thinking is i
l 20 i the threshold of whether the plant is safe or not could be t
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21 the SSE.
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22 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: At least the way it is defined 23 ! it seems to me that is the safety question.
I I.
I think that's right.
ce. '
il Recorters, inc. l 25 j And I think in our decision criteria the reason we l
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k
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mm use the example of 50 percent of the SSE is because that is 2
also the way we worked it.
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3 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: But you had gone on in talking!
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l 4l about the OBE also was the same criterion.
I was puzzled at 8
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that.
6 MR. EISENHUT: No, I said if you use that criteria --
l 7
because that critericn is not fixed.
l 8
And there is a large number of people that have input!
9 into it, of course.
10 '
If you look also you will notice that, for example, there is no real necessary reason that the OBE licits could notl 11 12 f be changed.
It has been pointed out that the OBE/SSE I
I3 relationship has been discussed for more than eight years, Id because I think I have been with the Commission twelve years, i
15 and I can remember it being discussed f cr about that long.
l 6
CO3D1ISSIONER AHEARNE: Just asking a question.
I 17 MR. EISENHUT: Certainly l
18 That, really, is where we are today.
We are trying l
l 19 3 l
to -- we will be developing this decision criteria over the i
- 0'! next couple of days to be used when we go through reviewing l
21 responses to 79-07 bulletin.
i 22 We will be continuing our evaluation of these other 23 i
! plants. We expect on Maine Yankee we will be coming forth 24 bl with a decision recommending -- my crystal. ball would view s#
ni Recorrers, Inc.
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within the next few days recommending startup for Maine Yankee, l
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tarring some unforeseen problem.
mm lli 2
COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: In applying to the five plants 3
shut down, are you using the SSE or the OBE?
l i
a MR. EISENHUT: We are not really usis.g the decision I
5, criteria in the same sense.
All the plants who have found a i
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6 l large amount of piping that used an algebraic sum, and since l
7' it is a broad amount of different piping in plants, there is j
l 8; sort of another system, other boxes on our logic even below i
9 that.
That is, you look at the piping, that is all of the I
10 ;
piping, you may reach a different conclusion.
11 l We are not really using that criteria per se, because,:
i 8
12 those plants are already embarking upon an evaluation program.
13 ;
I think it is probably conceivable -- and I don't i
1 i
14 l know on any of these plants -- it is probably conceivable that l
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15 l if we adopt a decisio'n criteria such as we have been talking l
16 l about, it may be possible for a plant to get so far down the i
0 17 ' road on its evaluation to turn around and come back and say, t
18 I would like to have interim operation because I meet your 19,
criteria.
l 20 i However, they have had this option before them for 4
21 a long period of time and they did not, because those plants --
22 i there is a broad spectrum of piping, safety-related piping (Inaudible.) -- I mean, it is quite an extensive 23 that is 24,
amount of piping, it is not -- (Inaudible.)
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al Reoorters, Inc l 25 j CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: Any questions?
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(No response. )
m 2
Good, an excellent discussion, Darrell.
l 3l MR. EISENHUT: Thank you.
l 4l CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: Before we break this meeting, i
l l
5!
since I started this session out with one announcement about I
i 6
other B&W plants.
7 For those stalwarts who have stayed through this 8i meeting and are interested in the other subject, you might 9
note that the hearing that was scheduled to go off in the l
l 10 t morning, has been moved back to Monday, and the Commission l
II will then be able to meet on having the discussion about l
12 l other B&W plants at 11:30 rather than 1:30.
13 Thank you very much.
I I4 (Whereupon, at 4 : 2 5 p.m.
the hearing in the above-I, entitled matter was adjourned.)
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