ML19282A120
| ML19282A120 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 07001308 |
| Issue date: | 04/04/1979 |
| From: | Dawson D GENERAL ELECTRIC CO. |
| To: | Cunningham R NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY & SAFEGUARDS (NMSS) |
| References | |
| DMD-309, NUDOCS 7905100426 | |
| Download: ML19282A120 (4) | |
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NUCLEAR ENERGY 4
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l PROGRAMS GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY,175 CURTNER AVE., SAN JOSti, CAL 5FORNIA ss125 DIVISION iSPENT FUEL SERVICES OPERATION DMD-309 Docket No. 70-1308 Lic,nse SNM-1265
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(;i April 4, 1979
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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission W
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Richard E. Cunningham, Director W
Division of Fuel Cycle & Material Safety k,
Washington, D.C.
20555 v
SUBJECT:
RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS - DECOM'iISSIONING PLAN FOR MORRIS OPERATION Gentlemen:
We have enclosed responses to four of the questions contained in Mr. Leland Rouse's March 1 letter regarding our decommissioning plan for Morris Operation.
A statement regarding financial assurance for decommissioning is being orepared.
This statement will be available about June 1,1979.
Please contact H.A. Rogers of this office if you have questions regarding the enclosed material.
Respectfully submitted, GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY b
$ 7 7/ h
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D.M. Dawson, Manager Licensing & Transportation 403*925-6330 MC 861 DMD:HAR:bn
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RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS I
re DECO CIISSIONING PLAN FOR l' ORRIS OPERATION April 4,1979
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Section 3.2 What io meaning of "aggrecciva curfaaa ducentamination?"
lA.
Aggressive surface decontamination implies removal of surface material.
Techniques might include acid wash, sand or shot blasting, and other methods to remove the contaminated surface.
Such techniques are not applicable (normally) in maintenance operations, but would be acceptable for decomnissioning.
2.
Section 3.3.1 The plan calla for removal of radioae:ive clurry from the Im Activity Wacle Vault, colido from the Dry Chemica* Vault, and decontamination of the thrac occ te vaults (LAU, Cladding ar.i Dry Chemical).
Additional information chould bc furniched on tv tace:niq ica being concidered for uce in anptying and decontaminating -::e :: alto.
Tiiic information need not give c.ract detailc of the pro;:acci m:thcdc but should indicate menc of acccco, methoda of,mova, w: boi:Mn: tion techniqucc.
2A.
The techniques being :onsidered for each of the vaults are as follows:
a:
LAW Vault It is anticipater that a licensed nuclear services contractor would be employed to emove the slurry from the vault and solidify the material for dislosal.
Access to the vault is provided by hatches in the personnel and equipment pit (see Section 5.6.1.2, NED0-21326C).
Slurry could be solidified in the canyon, or in a temporary facility 9rected adjacent to the LAN.ault.
Appropriate measures for radiation protection would be employed.
The slurry may be solidified in con-crete, or by using other tecb iques available now or in the future.
Decontamination of the inner 3nk nay include acid wash of tank walls and floor.
We to not anticipate that the inner surface of the outer tank will require de catamiration.
(Also, see Question 3.).
b.
Cladding Vault Water in the cladding vault would be pumped to the LAW vault, and the small amount of bulls removed.
Access hatches are available in the equipment pit. The inner surfaces of the tank can be de-contaminated, using aggressive techniques if required.
. c.
Dry Chemical Vault This vault contains unirradiated uranium and chemicals.
The material in the chemical vault can be removed by scoop and vacuuming techniques; an access hatch has been provided.
It is anticipated that relatively minor decontamination of this vault will be necessary.
3.
Section 3.b.4 The rationale for backfilling the dry chemical vault chile only coating the IAW and cladding vaulta chould be fun:ished.
3A.
Section 3.5.4 has been misinterpreted; the intent is to backfill all three tanks.
4.
Scotion 3.5.5 a) Ic information availabic on the ca.:=ination level of the cand and gravel in the cand fillcr and of cha innne curfan of the concretc ste:ctura? Would it bc more reacanahlc to demaHoh tha sand filter building than dacontaminata tha innar curface? Could contaminated surfaces be concred oith concrete to alcquata chial:ing depth?
b) Accu::ing innar curface of tha eta:R :e found to bn as: tamina ted (hou?) vhat is the justification cf plugging the c:ack top and botton and leaving it clanding?
4A.
a) The estimated alpha and beta activity entering the sand filter, as observed at the pre-filter air monitor, are as follows:
mci /Yr Year Alpha Beta 1973 1.30 2.47 1974 2.27 4.22 1975 0.03 0.15 1976 0.02 2.15 1977 0.38 3.41 Total 4.05 12.40 Projecting these values to 20 years indicates alpha activity at about 16 mci and beta at about 50 mci, in a volume of about 39,000 cu. ft. of sand and gravel.
The inner surface of the sand filter enclosure will probably show less than these low levels, even allowing for higher levels that uay occur during decommissioning.
The sand filter building could be demolished. but minimal decontamination and backfill seems more effective at this time.
Although a possibility, covering concrete surfaces of the filter room may not be necessary; this and other decontamination options cannot be evaluated until actual circumstances at the time of decommissioning are knoven.
b) Although the stack could be lef t standing', our intention at this time is to remove both the stack and the air duct between stack and filter building.
Smears from the inner surface of the duct show a dose rate less than 0.5 mR/hr.