ML19280A774
| ML19280A774 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Dresden  |
| Issue date: | 08/29/1980 |
| From: | Pappas H NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8009120117 | |
| Download: ML19280A774 (3) | |
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION n
.E REGION 11:
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GLEN ELLYN,ILLIN0lS 60137 rAUG 2 91980I MEMORANDUM FOR: Those on Attached List FROM:
Helen Pappas, Chief, Administrative Branch
SUBJECT:
IE SUPPLEIIENT 3 TO BULLETIN NO. 80-17 The enclosed IE Supplement 3 to Bulletin No. 80-17 titled " Failure of Control Rods to Insert During a Scram at a BWR" was sent to the following licensees on August 22, 1980 for:
ACTION Commonwealth Edison Company Dresden 1, 2, 3 (50-10, 50-237, 50-249)
Quad-Cities 1, 2 (50-254, )-265)
Consumers Power Company Big Rock Point (50-155)
Dairyland Power Company LACBWR (50-409)
Iowa Electric Light & Power Company Duane Arnold '50-331)
Northern States Power Company Monticello (50-263)
INFORMATION Cleveland Electric Ill. Company Perry 1,2 (50-440, 50-441)
Cincinnati Gas & Electric Company Zimmer (50-358)
Commonwealth Edison Company LaSalle 1, 2 (50-373, 50-374) 8009120117
Those on Attached Sheet I yg g g f
Detroit Edison Company Fermi 2 (50-341)
Illinois Power Company Clinton 1, 2 (50-461, 50-462)
Northern Indiana Public Service Bailly (50-367)
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elen Pap s, Chief Administr ive Branch
Enclosure:
IE Supplement 3 to Bulletin No. 80-17 cc w/ enc 1:
Resident Inspectors, RIII AEOD
Addressees - Memorandum dated August 25, 1980 Central Files Reproduction Unit hPC 20b
SSINS:
6820 Accession No.:
8006190074 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPEr~'ON AND ENFORCEMENT WASHINGT05., D.C.
20555 August 22, 1980 IE Supplement 3 to Bulletin No. 80-17:
FAILURE OF CONTROL RODS TO INSERT DURING A SCRAM AT A BWR NRC staff evaluation of a potential single failure mechanism of the control rod drive control air system has identified the need for licensee actions in addition to those requested by IEB 80-17 and Supplements 1 and 2.
The potential single failure was discussed in IE Information Notice 80-30, which was issued on August 19, 1980.
It involves gradual or partial loss of control air system pressure, which could cause partial opening of scram outlet valves without rod motion.
The resultant accumulated seal leakage could conceivably fill the scram discharge volume in a few n.inutes.
Since not all operating BWR's have instrumentation presently installed to continuously indicate water level in the scram discharge volume headers and to provide a control room alarm or scram function, the possibility exists for the scram discharge volume to fill to a level which could prevent reactor scram before automatic protective action or before the operators could be warned.
In view of the possible single failure mechanism described above, the following actions are requested in addition to those specified in IE Bulletin 80-17, Supplements 1 and 2:
1.
For those plants in which the scram discharge volume headers are connected to the instrument volume by a 2 inch pipe, within five days of the date of this Bulletin, provide or verify that procedures are in effect to:
a.
Require an immediate manual scram on low control rod drive air pressure with a minimum 10 psi margin above the opening pressure of the scram outlet valves.
b.
Require an immediate manual scram in the event of:
(1) Multiple rod drift-in alarms, or (2) A marked change in the number of control rods with high temperature alarms.
Installation of water level instrumentation in the scram discharge volume with level alarm and continuous level indication in the control room, in response to Item B.1 of IEB 80-17 Supplement No. 1, may provide a basis for relaxation of the time for initiating a manual scram.
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IE Bulletin No. 80-17 August 22, 1980 Supplement No. 3 Page 2 of 2
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In addition, every BWR licensee is requested within five days of the date of this bulletin to provide and implement procedures which require a functional test using water for the instrument volume level alarm, rod block and scram switches after each scram event, before returning to power.
This procedure should remain in effect until modifications in addition to Item B.1 of IEB 80-17 supplement No. 1 are complet.ed to substantially increase reliability of water level indication in the scram discharge volume (s).
s Licensees of all operating BWRs shall submit a report summarizing action taken in response to the above items within 10 days of the date of this Bulletin Supplement.
Accordingly, you are requested to provide within 10 days as
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specified above, written statements of the above information signed under oath or affirmation.
Reports shall be submitted to the Director of the appropriate NRC Regional Office and a copy forwarded to the Director, Division of Reactor Operations Inspection, NRC.
Office of Inspection and Enforcement, Washington, D.C.
20555
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Approved by GAO, B180225 (R0072); clearance expires July 31, 1980. (Application for renewal pending before GA0.) Approval was given under a blanket clearance specifically for identified generic problems.
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IE Bulletin No. 80-17 August 22, 1980 Supplement 3 RECENTLY ISSUED IE BULLETINS Bulletin No.
Subject Date Issued Issued To 80-20 Failures of Westinghouse 7/31/80 To each nuclear Type W-2 Spring Return power facility in to Neutral Control Switches your region having an OL or a CP 80-19 Failures of Mercury-7/31/80 All nuclear power Wetted Matrix Relays in facilities having Reactor Protective Systems either an OL or a CP of Operating Nuclear Power Plants Designed by Combus-tion Engineering 80-18 Maintenance of Adequate 7/h3/80 All PWR power reactor Minimum Flow Thru Centrifugal facilities holding OLs Charging Pumps Following and to those PWRs Secondary Side High Energy nearing licensing Line Rupture Supplement 2 Failures Revealed by 7/22/80 All BWR power reactor to 80-17 Testing Subsequent to facilities holding OLs Failure of Control Rods to Insert During a Scram at a BWR Supplement 1 Failure of Control Rods 7/18/80 All BWR power reactor to 80-17 to Insert During a Scram facilities holding OLs at a BWR 80-17 Failure of Control Rods 7/3/80 All BWR power reactor to Insert During a Scram facilities holding OLs at a BWR 80-16 Potential Misapplication of 6/27/80 All Power Reactor Rosemount Inc., Models 1151 Facilities with an and 1152 Pressure Transmitters OL or a CP with Either "A" or "D" Output Codes 80-15 Possible Loss Of Hotline 6/18/80 All nuclear facilities With Loss Of Off-Site Power holding OLs 80-14 Degradation of Scram 6/12/80 All BWR's with an Discharge Volume Capability OL