ML19276H354
| ML19276H354 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 02/28/1974 |
| From: | Bernero R US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC) |
| To: | Schwencer A US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19276H349 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7910160691 | |
| Download: ML19276H354 (2) | |
Text
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UNITED STATES
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ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION N
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WASHING ton, D.C.
20545
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a Docket No. 50-289 P
A. Schwencer, Chief, Light Water Reactors Branch 2-3, Licensing SHUTDOWN FROM OUTSIDE THE CONTROL ROOM - THREE MILE ISLAND UNIT 1 On February 27, 1974, you received a memorandum from Eben L. Connor of the Operator Licensing Branch noting apparent deficiencies in the design and procedures for controlling plant shutdown from outside the Control Room at Three Mile Island Unit 1.
This matter has been discussed in some detail with Connor, Technical Review personnel, and cognizant inspectors of Regulatory Operations, Region I.
It is certain that the procedure (Emergency Procedure 1202-37) is deficient; the nature or extent of design deficiencies in this regard is not clear.
The applicant's test program for this plant includes trial conduct of EP-1202-37 during the hot functionals to be followed by a second run of this procedure during the startup test progr,
Fortunately, Connor identified there concerns just prior to the hot 1._:ional test of EP-1202-37, which is expected.to take place arouc c'. arch 1.
I have worked with RO-I to poir.'c out our specific concerns to the applicant before this test so that the conduct of the test can corroborate presently identified deficiencies and turn up any additional ones as well.
Since this is an emergency procedure, the lead responsibility is lef t with R0-I.
I have indicated to them that we in Licensing interpret the requirements of General Design Criterion No. 19 with the following amplifications:
1.
It is acceptable to tell the operator to do a number of things before evacuating the Control Room provided that the number is not excessive and the Operator is also instructed how to perform these actions from outside the Control Room as well.
2.
The i= mediate require =ent is to take the plant to a hot shut-down condition and hold it safely there. This should be accomplished by the minimum shift complement even assuming one or two of them are injured.
3.
It is acceptable to wait for additional pers nnel to arrive before trying to cool the plant to cold shutdown.
1413 354 7910160[h
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,A. Schwencer 4.
It is not necessary to assume an accident (LOCA, steam line break, etc.) concurrently.
The applicant is aware of our concerns and is being afforded the first opportunity, through the EP-1202-37 test, to identify and correct the deficiencies.
We are staying in close touch through R0-1 to ensure that all deficiencies, both procedural and design, are pro =ptly corrected.
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Robert M. Bernero, Project Manager Light Water Reactors Branch 2-3 Directorate of Licensing ces: F L. Connor fJ. F. Collins R. W. Houston i
C. R. Van Niel T. Ippolito L. Spessard, RO-I H. D. Thornburg, RO 1418 355
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FE3 2 8 374 Docket no. 50-2E9 A. Schwencer, Chief, Liaht 'Jater Reactors Branch 2-3, Licensin-SISTDOW FROM OUTSIDE THE COTROL ROOM - TICEE MILE ISLUD CIT 1 On February 27, 1974, you received a memorandum fron Eben L. Connor of the Operator Licensing Branch notint apparent deficiencies in the desirn and procedures for controlling plant shutdown from outside the control Room at Three Mile Island Unit 1.
This matter has been discussed in some detail with Connor, Technical Review personnel, and cognizant inspectors of Regulatory Operations, Region I.
It is certain that the procedure (Emergency Procedure 3202-37) is deficient: the nature or extent of design deficiencies in this regard is not clear.
The applicant's test program for this plant includes trial conduct of EP-1202-37 during the hot functionals to be followed by a second run of this procedure during the startup test program. Fortunately, Connor identified these concerns just prior to the hot functionni test of EP-1202-37, which is expected to take place around March 1.
I have worked with RO-I to point out our specific concerns to the applicant before this test so that the conduct of the test can corroborate presently identified deficiencies and turn up any additional ones as well.
Since this is an emergency procedure, the lead responsibility is lef t with RO-I.
I have indicated to them that we in Licensing interpret the requirements of General Design Criterion No. 19 with the followine, amplifica tions -
1.
It is acceptable to tell the Operater to do a number of thines before evacuating the Control Room p d'ded that the number is not excessive and the Operator is als0 instructed how to perform these actions from outside the Control Room as well.
2.
The Lumediate requirement is to take the plant to a hot shut-down condition and hold it safely there. This should be accomnlished by the minimum shift complement even assuming one or two of them are injured.
3.
It is acceptable to wait for additional personnel to arrive before trying to cool the plant to cold shutdown.
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A. ':ch" enc e r 4 It is not necessary to assume an accide t ('.1CA, s t er.: lir e Sreak, etc.) concurrently.
The applicant is aware of our cencerns and la beine afforded the first opportunit-', through the EP-1202-37 tect, to 1.!0ntify and correct the deficiencies. We are stayin; in close touch throunh 20-I to ens tra that all deficiencies, both precedural and desi~n, are prem tly corrected.
OFrir.31 Sitted by Robert M. Bernero, Project Manager Light Water Reactors Branch 2-3 Directorate of Licensinc ces:
E. L. Connor P. F. Collins R. W. Houston C. R. Van Niel T. Ippolito L. Spessard, RO-I
- 11. D. Thornburg, R0 DISTRIBUTION:
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