ML19276E009
| ML19276E009 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | South Texas, Comanche Peak  |
| Issue date: | 02/06/1979 |
| From: | Clark R, Harris J, Parmenter F JUSTICE, DEPT. OF |
| To: | |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7903020100 | |
| Download: ML19276E009 (21) | |
Text
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UNITED STATES Or Ar1 ERICA
.,__s 31JQ/h NUCLEAR REGULATORY COtH;ISSION 1
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BEFORE TIIE ATOt1IC S AFETY A!!D LICENSING R O A R D //
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N In the fla t t e r of
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6, 4l$?
E HOUSTON LIGHTING AND POWER
)
Docket Nos. 50-498A CO.,
et al (South Texas
)
50-499A 4
o' y
Project, Units 1 and 2)
)
)
TEXAS UTILITIES GENERATING
)
Docket Nos.}50-445A C O.*1 PA N Y (Comanche Peak Steau
)
50-446A--_
IMectric Station, Units 1
)
and 2)
)
)
DESPONSE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE TO IIOUSTON LIGHTING & PCWER COMPit.NY'S OBJECTIONS AND NOTION FOR A PROTECTIVE ORDER REC 7.RDING TI:E DEPARTMENT 'S DISCOVERY REOUEST John 11. Shenefield Donald L.
Flexner Assistant Attorney General Deputy Assistant Attorney General Antitrust Division Antitrust Division Communications with respect to this Document should be addressed to:
Donald A.
Kaplan Chief Robert Fabrikant Assistant Chief Energy Section Antitrust Division U.S.
Department of Justice Washington, D.C.
20536 Judith L.
Harris Ronald H.
Clark Frederick H.
Parmenter Attorneys Energy Section Antitrust Division U.S.
Department of Justice P.O.
Box 14141 Washington, D.C.
20044 February 6, 1979 7903020(oo
~.
.. _ _ __ _._.._.-~ _ _ _ _
UNITED STATES OF Af1 ERICA NUCLl;AR REGULATORY CO:1!!ISSIO!J BEFORE Tile ATOMIC SAFi:TY AND LICENSING BOARD
)
In the Matter of
)
)
!!OUSTON LIGilTII;G AtJD POWER
)
Docket Nos. E0-498A CO., et al (South Te>:as
)
50-499A Project, Units 1 and 2)
)
)
TEXAS UTILITIES GENERATING
)
Docket Nos. 50-445A COT 1PANY (Comanche Peak Steam
)
50-446A Electric Station, Units 1
)
and 2)
)
)
RESPONSE OF TILE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICC TO IlOUSTON LIGilTING & POWER COMPANY 'S OBJECTIONS AND !!OTION FOR A PROTECTIVE ORDER REGARDING TILE Di'PARTMENT 'S DISCOVERY REOUEST I.
Introduction On ' January 11, 1979, llouston Lighting & Power ( "II L & P " )
served by mail its ODJECTIONS AND ANSWERS TO Tile DEPART-MENT OF JUSTICE'S FIRST SET OF WRITTEN INTERROGATORIES AND REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS
(" Objections and Answers").
Several days later, on January 15, 1979, llL&P served by mail its OBJECTIONS AND !!OTION FOR A PROTECTIVE ORDER REGARDING DISCOVERY REQUEST FROM DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
(" Motion for a Protective Order"). The Department of Justice
(" Department"), submits herewith its response
(" Response")
both to I!L&P's " Objections and Answers" and to its " Motion for a Protective Order."
The Department is simultaneously
filing with this Response a motion requesting the Board to compel "L&P to r.upply fuller responses to the Department's PIRST SET OP INTERROGATORIES AND REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUllENTS ("Interrogatorles").
II. IIL&P's Objections To The Department's Discovery Requests Are Privolous And Should Be Overruled IIL&P cites three general and three specific objections to the Department's Interrogatories.
Before turning to these objections, a few background observations are in order.
First, the Department's Inter,rogatories were served on November 22, 1978 and were not answered until January ll, 1979, almost two months later.
During that period, the attorneys for llL&P never contacted the Department to discuss any of the objections which are contained in llL&P's llotion for a Protective Order.
The Department is confident th5t IIL&P's objections could have been acconmodated had there been discussions between attorneys for the Department and IIL& P.
Fur ther, none of IIL&P's objections constitutes a legitimate dispute regarding legal issues. Tne Department is concerned that it may be required to continue consuming inordinate amounts of time defending against frivolous -m
...., _ _. _ _,. ~ _. __ _ _ ____... _... _. _ _, _.. _ _.. - _
motions for protective orders and filing motiens of its own to compel answers to interrogatories.
If this occurs, it may not be possible for the Department to meet the deadline now set for the cut-off of discovery.
Second, it is necessary at the outset to focus on the relationship between these proceedings and the related litigation pending before other tribunals, most notably the civil action in Dallas, West Texas Utilities Company, et al.
- v. Texas Electric Service Comnany, et al.,
No. CA3-76-0633F (N.D. Texas, Dallas Division) ("the civil case").
This Board has ordered that discovery already provided in those other proceedings be considered as material discovered here, 1/ but the Board explicitly noted that this does not mean that the discovery tools normally available to a litigant are in any way restricted in these proceedings.
Rather, the Board has specifically stated:
This order will not prevent any party in this proceeding from obtaining further discovery pursuant to 10 CPR SS2.740-2.742, 2.744 (July 13, 1978 Order at 7; December 5, 1978 Order at 5; emphasis added).
Contrary to the letter and the spirit c_
the Board's orders, llL&P has sought to limit discovery in these procee -
1/
Special Prehearing Conference Order (South Texas), datcd July 13, 1978, at 6 and Prehearing Conference Order negard-ing Issues, Discovery and Consolidation (Comanche Peak),
dated December 5, 1978, at 4. _. _ _ _..,. _
ings on the ground that discovery has been taken in other proceedings.
The Department has attempted to avoid duplica-tion of existing discovery.
It bears emphasizing, however, that despite certain nimilarities, none of the proceedings cited in the Board's orders involve issues and parties identical to those involved in this proceeding.
In the civil case, for example, fewer parties were involved and the scope of the inquiry was far narrower.
Moreover, discovery in the civil case c3osed over a year and a half ago, on July 15, 1977.
Therefore, the Department contends that merely referring to the civil case, or a6other proceeding (or evidence therein), without more, is generally an inadequate response to the Interrogatories.
Having expressod these general concerns, the Department now responds to UL&P's specific objections to the Interroga-Lorien.
A.
It is Not Burdensome to Ask HL&P To Identify Which, if Any, of the Thousands of Documents Previously Supplied to the Department Respond to the Department's First Formal Discovery Request HL&P begins its Motion for a Protective Order by objecting to the first " General Instruction" contained in the Department's Interrogatories.
That instruction reads, in relevant part:
_4_
In any situation where a document is cupplied in recponce to a requect, such document should be referenecd and iden-tified as to the interrogatory (including subpart) to which it recpondn.
Should any of the documents reouested purnuant to thin not of interroaatories and teouests Ior document production have alceady been made available ior the Departuent'n in-JS70ction, it will be nuflicient that this be 00 noted along with the following'In-formation: (1) production number, if anv1 (2) date, author, addressee (il any), persons receiving (Jistribution or nuch docun.en t or codes thereof;_and_(3) a description ot the nature of tne document.
( I n te r r og c Lo r l u.s,
Section C.
1.
at 7, er3phasio added ).
IlL&P's stated complaint is that the underlined portion of this instruction "would require [liL& P] to prepare a detailed lict of documento previously reviewed by the De pa r t me n t" (Motion for a Protective Order at 1).
The documents' referred to consist of documento produced by IIL& P in response to discovery requests in the civil case.
Because the Department has reviewed the documents produced in the civil case, thc Department has attempted to avoid duplication of the discovery requests made in the civil case.
Therefore, it cannot be considered burdensome to af ford ilL&P the opportunity to compile a list of documents whose production would be duplicative of discovery in other pr oem d ing s, in lieu of requesting duplicative discovery of the documents themselves. If compilation of the list is more burdensome than producing anew the duplicative documents, IIL& P is free to adopt the less hurdensome alte r na tiv e..
The Department's request is not more burdensome than that which IH,6P would be required to do in the ordinary situation, i.e.,
where a closely related case has not already been tried.
In such a si tuation it would be necessary for the responding parties to comb its files to produce pertinent documents.
The Department should not he penalized in these proceedings simply because IIL&P has performed this task once before in connection with private litigation.
Indeed, the fact the llL&P has already performed this task will enhance its ability to repeat that task now.
IIL&P complains that to fulfill the Department's request,,IIL&P would have to review documents previously made available and sort them among the Department's "^urcent numbered requests."
(Motion for a Protective Order at 1-2).
Surely llL&P would not be able to respond fully to the Interrogatories without sorting the documents even if the specific instruction had not been included.
If HL&P did not sort the documents it would be difficult if not impossible for llL&P to ascertain which additional documents (other than those al.r_ady produced) it needed to supply.
Moreover, HL&P complains that it "would be called upon to make subjective, essentially legal judgments for no purpose other than facilitating (if it does facilitate) preparation of the Department's case".
(Motion for a Protective Order at 2).
The making of such judgments is a necessary and desirable par t of the discovery process.
A party responding to discovery requests must he subjective, even legal, judgments in identifying documents that are relevant and therefore producible.
The Motion for a Protective Order based on this obj ect ion shou] d be denied, and IIL&P should be compelled to comply with the Department's " General Instruction No.
1".
B.
Under the Circumstances Here, A Joint Discovery Request to TU aryl llL&P is Perfectly Proper and Neither Company Is Being Asked to Provide Information Which is Not Reasonably Available llL&P objects "to having served upon it a discovery request directed jointly to l ilL& P] and the Texas Utilities Companies [TU]."
(flotion for a Protective Order at 3. ),2_/
This objection is preserved and repeated throughout ilL&P's Objectives and Answers. 3/
IIL&P contends that, to the extent this joint request
" implies that [11L& P] is in any way responsible for respond-ing for unaffiliated corporations, the request is improper".
2/
See also, " General Objections" section of IIL&P's Objec-tions and Answers at 1.
3/
- See, e.g.,
answers to interrogatories 1, 2,
4, at 8.
(Motion for a Protective Order at 3.)
In defense of its position, IIL&P explains that it does not have access to information in the possession of these non-affiliated power companies, and [IIL&P] can in no way respond to questions directed at such non-affiliated utilities. (Objections and Answers at 1).
Contrary to IIL&P's assertion, the Department is a.
seeking te compel IIL & P to produce information not available to it.
Moreover, Section 2.710b(a) of the tinC Rules, states that a party responding to interrogatories is required only to " furnish such information as is available to the party" (emphasic added).
By submitting the same discovery request to both HL&P and TU, the Department was merely attempting to simplify and expedite discovery by consolidating requests and thereby reducing the number of documents to be produced and reviewed.
The Department adds, however, that this proceeding involves, inter alia, possible antitrust violations consist-ing of a conspiracy, contract or combination '.etween TU, IIL&P and perhaps others.
Therefore, to the extent IIL& P and/or TU are in possession of information about each other, such information is relevant to these proceedings and is covered by the Interrogatories.
For these reasons, IIL&P's Motion for a Protective Order should be denied insofar as it is based on an objec-tion to the submission of a joint discovery request.
C. The Department in Only Asking That It be Inforned Ubich Documents HLEP is Claiming Are Privileged; For Purposes of Safety and to Avoid Delay, T..ese Purportedly Privileged Documents Should Then He Turned Over, Under Seal, to the Board I!LEP objects to the instruction, in section C of the Interrogatories, "that a new list of documents withheld from production by reason of privilege be prepared and produced."
(Motion for a Protective Crder at 3,
emphasis added).
This is not an accurate restatement of the Department's request.
The Department in no way implied that a "new" privilege list had to be prepared.
1:a t he r, instruction C Simply reads, in relevant part:
It is requested that any documents with-held l>y the Applicant by reason of any assertion of privilege, he identifled in-dividually by listing the person (s) prepar-ing, sending, or receiving the same, the subject and date thereof, and a brief state-ment on the basis Cor asserting privilege as to each document.
(Interrogatories at 6).
HL&P correctly states that it has "previously provided the Department with a complete list of all documents with-held from production in the U.S. District Court procecling (and therefore withheld from the Department's previously completed review) on grounds of privilege." (Motion for a Protective Order at 3).
If IIL&P is asserting the identical, and g additional, privileges with respect to documents now being sought by the Department, 11L& P should simply notify the Department of this fact. 1/
The Department wishes to emphasize again that it is making every effort, in accordance with the Board's instruc-tions, to avoid duplication of discovery e f f orts.
The Department, however, is largely frustrated in its efforts to proceed expeditiously when, as ncu, the civil case is erected as a roadblock to, rather than as a resource for, discovery in these proceedings.
The Department has every right to ask HL&P to identify the documents it is withhold-ing in this litigation based on a claim of privilege.
Nothing more is asked in the instruction to which HL&P objects.
Next, ilL&P " objects most strenuously to the instruction that all documents as to which privilege is claimed be submitted to the Licensing Board" (Motion for a Protective Order at 3).
In proceedings of this complexity, especially involving as many parties as these procecjdings do, there is a substantinl risk that relevant documents might be inad-1/
It bears noting again that these proceedings are different, in scope and wi".b respect to ultimate issues and parties, than the civ.1 litigation in Dallas.
- Moreover, a year and a half has elapsed since the close of discovery in that case.
Therefort, at first glance it would appear incongruous if the privileges asserted were identical in both instances.
vertently lost or destroyed.
It is:only when documents are under seal and in the Board's possession, that the parties can be certain that the documents will remain safe and confidential.
While the Depar tment has not yet decided whether to contest any assertions of privilege, it might well decide to do so later, especially after it is in possession of more facts.
Por example, many of the documents with respect to which privilege has been claimed appear to be correspondence and memoranda between parties and their attorneys.
On their face, these documents seem privileged.
lloweve r, it might develop during depositions (especially in view of the possibility that the existence of a combina-tion, contract or conspiracy wi.'1 be an issue) that son,e of the purportedly privileged documents vare shown to third parties or their attorneys, thereby destroying any privilege which might otherwise have existed.
These documents would then be immediately producible.
For this and other reasons, the Department believes it essential that the documents be kept in a safe place.
Moreover, it is vital that the documents be in a place where they can be readily retrieved. Because of the delays already encountered and others which are forseeable, the Board should ensure that matters proceed as exp litiously as possible.
This can be accomplished, in part, by allowing all par' ties to know exactly where the purportedly privileged documents are being kept.
This is especially important should the documents become relevant to the proceedings and should it becomc necessary for the Board (or a master) to rule on the appropriateness of any assertion of pr ivilege.
The Departmen; is suggest ing not that the Board now perform an in camera inspection of the documents, but merely that the documents be se al ed and deposited with the Board.
If an examination of the documents later proves necessary, this could be performed by a master so as to assur e their c o n f id e n t iality.
In view of this, the Department does not feel that what it is asking for " collides with the privilege itself," as HL&P asserts.
(Motion for a Protective Ord, r at e
3).
For the foregoing reasons, HL&P's Motion for a Protec-tive Order must be denied.
D. HL&P's Objections to Specific In ter r og a to r ies Are Without Merit and Should be Overruled The Department turns now to the three specific objec-tions upon which llL&P relies in its Motion for a Protective Order.
First, HL&P objects to interrogatory 5(b) on the ground that it calls for legal conclusions.
As such, according to HL&P, "it calls for the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, and legal theories of HL&P's attorneys and cannot lead to the discovery of relevant evidence."
(Motion for Protective Order at 4).
The interrogatory to which HL&P objects reads as follows:
- 5. With respect to the South Texas Project, identify and describe:
(b) all pro-visions of the South Texas participation agreement, if any, which limit participa-tion to Electrical Utilities engaged only in intrastate commerce; (Interrogatories at 9).
First, this interrogatory asks for a fact and not for the " legal theories of [HL&P's] attorneys".
Second, even assuming that this interrogatory asks for HL&P's (not its attorneys') opinion as to the meaning of an agreement under which it is operating, the inquiry is still proper.
The NRC rules relating to discovery are patterned after the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Fed.
R.
Civ.
P.
33(b), dealing with the scope of interrogatories to parties, states, in relevant part:
An interrogatory otherwise proper is not necessarily objectionable merely because an answer to the interrogatory involves an opinion or contention that relates to fact or the applictcion of law to fact, but the court may order that such an interrogatory need not be answered until after designated discovery has been completed or until a pre-trial conference or other later time.
(Emphasis added).
C'nsequently, IIL&P's objections to interrogatory 5(b) should be over ruled and IIL&P should be compelled to supply an answer in timely fashion.
IIL&P next objects to interrogatory 13 on the ground that it is " vague and ambiguous to the point that a meaningful answer is not possible".
Motion for a Protective Order at 4.
That interrogatory, as written, reads:
- 13. (a) Do IIL&P an(
assert that the costs of regul:
in under FERC regulatory authority woa)<
greater or less than the costs o,
regulation under the Texas Public Utility Commission; (b) If IIL&P and TU assert that greater costs will result from PERC regulation, state the basis upon which that contention rests; and (c) provide all documents which relate to (a)-(b) above.
(Inter-rogatories at 14).
One of the arguments repeatedly made by the applicants (and othera) in defending their desire to remain outside the jurisdiction of federal agencies is that federal regulation would be enormously expensive and that the costs of that regulation would have to be passed on to their customers.
The Department has posed interrogatory 13 in an attempt to ascertain the underlying factual basis (if any) for this assertion.
In its Objections and Answers, IIL&P explains further its objection to interrogatory 13:
The phrase "the costs of regulation" is wholly undefined, and without a definition the question and any answer that might be given are meaningless.
(Objections and Answers at 9).
Within the context of the inte r rog a to ry, the phrase "the costs of regulation" is clear and the type of information sought is obvious.
Nonetheless, since it is a phrase which has of ten heard used by representatives of the Department various Texas utility companies, the Department invites HL&P to supply its own definition of the phrase in responding to the interrogatory.
Lastly, HL&P objects to interrogatory 19(a) "on the ground that it requires UL&P to speculate about a course of events that never occurred.
As such, the question calls for argument and conjecture, not facts, and is not proper."
(Motion for a P otective Order at 4).
Because HL&P has, in effect, not responded to any subparts of interrogatory 19, that interrogatory is here set out in full.
- 19. (a) Do HL&P and TU contend that, if, pursuant to the July 21, 1976, PPC order (based on S202(d) of the Federal Power Ac t) authorizing reconnection without attaching FPC jurisdiction, they had reconnected with the Electric Utilities with which they had been interconnected prior to May 4, 1976, that the result would have been either economically debilitating or detr imental f rom an engineering perspective?
(b) if the answer to part (a) of this interrogatory is in the affirmative, explain in detail precisely why such action would have been economically debilitating or detrimental from a.
engineering perspective, specify-ing each assumption, premise, calcula-tion, or conclusion upon which that response is based; (c) if the response to part (a) of this interrogatory is negative, identify the basis upon which it was determined not to interconnect under authority of the FPC's order.
(Interrogatories at 16).
To begin, the Department again cites the language of Fed.
R.
Civ.
P.
33(b; that "(a] n interrogatory otherwise proper is not necessarily objectionable merely because an answer to the interrogatory involves an opinion or conten-tion".
Moreover, as subparts (b) and (c) of this inter-rogatory clearly indicate, the Department is asking for facts.
The Department wants to know whether HL&P had economic or engineering reasons for not wanting to reconnect after July 21, 1976 with the utilities with which they had been interconnected prior to May 4, 1976 and, if so, upon what data, facts, prior studies, or the like were these reasons based.
If it is HL&P's contention that such reconnection would have been either economically debilitating or detri-mental from an engineering standpoint, UL&P should supply.
the underlying facts which support that contention.
Similarly, HLEP chould make clear whether it contends that such a reconnection would not have been either economically debilitating or detrimental from an engineering standpoint and, if so, HL&P should supply the facts upon which that contention is premised.
Thus, UL&r's objections to interrogatory 19 are without merit and HL&P chould be required to supply an answer.
III. Conclusion For all of the foregoing recsons, HL&P's Motion for a Protective Order should be denied in all respects, all of the Department's instructions should be followed and full answers should be supplied forthwith to all those interrog-atories regarding which HL&P has raised objections.
Respectfully submitted, Judith L.
Harris Ronald H.
Clark Frederick H.
Parmenter Attorneys Energy Section Antitrust Division U.S.
Department of Justice Washing..a, D.C.
20530 February 6, 1979 _. - - _... _.. - _ - _. _, _. _ _ _ _.
UNITED STATES OF AI1 ERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COili1ISSION BEFORE TliE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD
)
In the Matter of
)
)
IlOUSTON LIGilTING AND POWER
)
Docket Nos. 50-498A CO.,
et al.(South Texas
)
50-499A Project, Units 1 and 2)
)
)
TEXAS UTILITIES GENERATING
)
Docket Mos. 50-445A COf1PANY (Comanche Peak Steam )
50-446A Electric Station, Units 1
)
and 2)
)
)
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that service of the foregoing RESPONSE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE TO HOUSTON LIGHTING
& POWER COMPANY'S OBJECTIONS AND MOTION FOR A PROTECTIVE ORDER REGARDING THE DEPARTMENT'S DISCOVERY REQUEST has been made on the following parties listed hereto this 6th day of February, 1979, by depositing copies thereof in the United States mail, first class, postage prepaid.
Marshall.E. Miller, Esquire Atomic Safety and Licensing Chairman Appeal Board Panel Atomic Safety & Licensing Board U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Panel Commission U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Washington, D.
C.
20555 Commission Washington, D.
C.
20555 Richard S.
Salzman, Esquire U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Michael L.
Glaser, Esquire Commission 1150 17th Street, N.W.
Washington, D.
C.
20555 Washington, D.
C.
20036 Jerome E.
Sharfman, Esquire Sheldon J.
Wolfe, Esquire U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Atomic Safety & Licensing Board Commission Panel Washington, D.
C.
20555 U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission Chase R.
Stephens, Secretary Washington, D.
C.
20555 Docketing and Service Branch U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Samuel J.
Chilk, Secretary Commission Office of the Secretary of the Washington, D.
C.
20555 Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Jerome Saltzman Commission Chief, Antitrust and Washington, D.
C.
20555 Indemnity Group U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.
C.
20555
Rof f Ilardy Michael I.
Millet, Esquire Chairman and Chief Executive Richard E.
Powell, Esquire Officer David M.
Stahl, Esquire Central Power and Light Thomas G.
Ryan, Esquire Company Isham, Lincoln & Beale P.
O.
Box 2121 One First National Plaza Corpus Christi, Texas 78403 Chicago, Illinois 60603 G.
K.
Spruce, General Manager Roy P.
Lessey, Esquire City Public Service Board Michael Blume, Esquire P.O.
Box 1771 U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory San Antonio, Texas 78203 Commission Washington, D.
C.
20555 Perry G.
Brittain President Jerry L.
Harris, Esquire Texas Utilities Generating City Attorney, Company Richard C.
Balough, Esquire 2001 Bryan Tower Assistant City Attorney Dallas, Texas 75201 City of Austin P.O.
Box 1088 R.L.
Hancock, Director Austin, Texas 78767 City of Austin Electric Utility Department Robert C.
McDiarmid, Esquire P.
O.
Box 1088 Robert A.
Jablon, Esquire Austin, Texas 78767 Spiegel and McDiarmid 2600 Virginia Avenue, N.W.
G.
W.
Oprea, Jr.
Washington, D.
C.
20036 Executive Vice President Houston Lighting & Power Dan H.
Davidson Company City Manager P.
O.
Box 1700 City of Austin Ilou s to n, Texas 77001 P.
O.
Box 1088 Austin, Texas 78767 Jon C.
Wood, Esquire W.
Roger Wilson, Esquire Don R.
Butler, Esquire Matthews, Nowlin, Macfarlane 1225 Southwest Tower
& Barrett Austin, Texas 78701 1500 Alamo National Building San Antonio, Texas 78205 Joseph Irion Worsham, Esquire Merlyn D.
Sampels, Esquire Joseph Gallo, Esquire Spencer C.
Relyca, Esquire Richm"d D.
Cudahy, Esquire Uorsham, Forsythe & Sampels Robert H.
Loeffler, Esquire 2003 Bryan Tower, Suite 2500 Isham, Lincoln & Beale Dallas, Texas 75201 Suite 701 1050 17th Street, N.W.
Joseph Knotts, Esquire Washington, D.
C.
20036 Nicholas S.
Reynolds, Esquire Debevoise & Liberman 806 15th Street, N.W.
Suite 700 Washington, D.
C.
20005
.. ~.. _
Douglas P. John, Esquire R. Gordon Gooch, Esquire Akin, Gump, Hauer & Feld John P.
Mathis, Esquire 1100 Madison Office Building Baker & Botts 1155 15th Street, N.W.
1701 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.
C.
20024 Washington, D.
C.
20006 Morgan Ilunter, Esquire Robert Lowenstein, Esquire McGinnis, Lochridge & Kilgore J.
A.
Bouknight, Esquire 5th Floor, Texas State Bank William J.
Franklin, Esquire Building Lowenstein, Newman, Reis, 900 Congress Avenue Axelrad & Toll Austin, Texas 78701 1025 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.
C.
20036 Jay M.
Galt, Esquire Looney, Nichols, Johnson E.
W.
Barnett, Esquire
& llaye s Charles G.
Thrash, J r., Esquire 219 Couch Drive J.
Gregory Copeland, Esquire Oklahoma City, Oklahoma 73101 Theoaore F.
- Weiss, Jr.,
Esquire Baker & Botts Knoland J.
Plucknctt 3000 One Shell Plaza Executive Director I)ouston, Texas 77002 Committee on Power for the Southwest, Inc.
Kevin B.
Pratt, Esquire 5541 East Skelly Drive Assistant Attorney General Tulsa, Oklahoma 74135 P.O.
Box 12548 Capital Station John W.
Davidson, Esquire Austin, Texas 78711 S aw t e l l e ', Goode, Davidson
& Tioilo Frederick H.
Ritts, Esquire 1100 San Antonio Savings Law Offices of Northcutt Ely Bu ild ing Watergate 600 Building San Antonio, Texas 78205 Washington, D.C.
20037 W.
S.
Robson General Manager South Texas Electric Cooperative, Inc.
Route 6, Building 102 Judith L.
Harris, Attorney Victoria Regional Airport Energy Section Victoria, Texas 77901 Antitruct Division Department of Justice
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