ML19275A397
| ML19275A397 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | North Anna  |
| Issue date: | 09/25/1979 |
| From: | Bradford P, Gilinsky V, Kennedy R NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| To: | |
| References | |
| REF-10CFR9.7 NUDOCS 7910040347 | |
| Download: ML19275A397 (28) | |
Text
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Sher _T C g-~%,,, Transcript of Proceedings
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/ NUC'RAR REGULATORY COMMISSION w
If BDIEFING ON INCIDENT AT NORTH ANNA (Open to Public Attendance)
Tuesday, September 25, 1979 Fages 1 - 26 Prepared by:
C. H. Brown Of"i f e Secre,tary 3 9/&cee3 n
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DISCLAIMER f5
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Tnis is an unofficial tra.1s:ript of a mee-ine of the United Sta::es tiu: lear Regulatory Commission held on Sectcrber d 1979 in the k
C =ission's offices at 1717 H Street, N. W., Wasr.ing on, D. C.
The meeting was open to public attencance and observiti:n.
This transcMot 7"
has nc-bc:n reviewed, corrected, or edited, and it may contain inac=uracies.
}
The transcrict is intended solely for general infomational pu ocses.
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As crevide: by 10 CFR 9.103, it is not part of the femal or infomel record of decision of the matters discussed.
Expressions of opinira in tnis ranscript do not necessarily reflect final determinations or beliefs.
'io pleading or other paper may be filed witn the Conr.issicn in any proceeding as the result of cr addressed to any, statement or argument c:ntained nerein, except as the Co=ission may autneri:e.
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1 I
1 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 9
2 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 3
Briefing on Incident at North Anna 4
i (Open to Public Attendance) 5 l
i I
6 l
Commissioner's Conference Room i
1717 H Street, N.W.
Washington, D. C.
7 8
Tuesday, September 25, 1979 i
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l 10 l
j The Commission met, pursuant to notice, at 5:30 p.m.,
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Victor Gilinsky, Acting Chairman of the Commission, presiding.
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13 COMMISSIONERS PRESENT:
14 Commissioner Gilinsky Commissioner Kennedy 15 l
Commissioner Bradford Commissioner Ahearne ALSO PRESENT:
17 V.
Stello L. Gossick 18 E. Case 19 l
E.
Jordan i
S. Chilk l
L.
Bickwit-20 i
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j PROCEEDINGS j
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l COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Why don' t we get started.
l 3
Early this morning, shortly after 6:00 o' clock, 4
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the North Anna Unit 1 Station shut itself off automatically.:
5 At some later point, levels of radioactivity above normal l
were recorded in the Auxilliary Building leading to the 7
evacuation of that building.
8 1
We are here to hear the details of that occurrence 9
l from Mr. Stello, the Director of our Office of Inspect.an 10 and Enforcement.
11 I hope you will tell us, not only about the 12 details of the occurrence, but also the health and safety
'^3 significance as you see it, the NRC response, what we have 14 done, what we are doing ; and I would like to hear, and I
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think the other Commissioners would like to hea; how the I
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system of notification, both from the licensee and up our 4
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own chain worked in this case.
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Mr. Stello.
t MR. STELLO:
Well, thank you.
20 1
I will start by trying to very briefly character-l 9'
i ice, as best as we understa-A it at tnis time, and I
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22 need to get a caveat right L.
.ae beginning,dnat in a i
23 b situation like this, where any numbers that I might use
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l; or times or precise information, we, obviously, will need
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to varify.
I can't say that we have as accurate
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information as I would.like to'have, but I'm convinced E-gj 2
it is more than accurate enough to speak to the bottom 3
i line question, " health and safety to the public. "
4 If we might have that first slide.
5 (Slide) 6 I have a picture or schematic of a PWR which 7
doesn' t describe the particular plant in operation, but
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it will be used just to illustrate some points that I
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j think are important in terms of what happened in the i
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plant.
I 11 at about 6:13 a.m.
this morning, the turbine 12 tripped from a high feedwater heater level.
It is not 13 shown on this slide.
It is part of the secondary system 0
1 that is outside of the containment.
14 15 The resultant high feedwater level caused a I
16 turbine to trip, which in turn, caused the reactor to 17 trip.
In the process of the reactor tripping, there was i
18 l
still substantial energy being removed in the steam 19 generator, because there was a steam dump valve that 20 failed to close.
21 The fact that it f ailed to close caused the 22 primary ecolant system to shrink in volume and decrease 23 the pressure of the system.
This continued decrease 24 caused the emergency core cooling systems to actuate 25 automatically as they are designed to do, and they did I
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automatically come on when their set point was reached, l
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which was 1765 psia.
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l The minimum pressure that was reached during i
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the transient was 1760 psia.
All of the engineered 4
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safety injection systems operated as t. bey were designed.
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The cooldown rate was in excess of what would normally 7
be allowed because of the addition of the water, but that 8
cooldown rate caused the primary coolant to cool down to I
9 where there was substantial sub-cooling, that is, the 10 concern for voids in the primary system was not there based l
on the information we had.
The indication that we have 11 right new is that there was a substantial margin of 12 1
13 sub-cooling, an estimate of about 100 degrees Fahrenheit 14 of sub-cooling during the transient, which is strongly 15 suggested that no voids were present.
16
{
The requirements that we evolved as the result 17 l
of the Three Mile Island, which required them to continue to operate the high pressure pumps, they continued to 18 19 j
perate the two of them for 15 minutes and the second --
i they had 15 minutes, turr one off and kept the second
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20 pump on for 20 minutes.
There was no nss of coolant 21 accident.
The; relief valve did open up as it was 22 designed. After the pressure started to build back up,
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it pened up and functioned correctly, it did not stay 24 open.
The safety valv?s, as best we understand now, did 2a_
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not lift.
.[4 2
COMMISSIONER BRADF0DL: When was the dump valve 3
closed, the steam dump valve?
4 MR. STELLO:
I don' t have an answer to that l
5 question.
We have -- I should have said at the outcet, 6
l what we are doing is we are sending a total of about 7
10 ceople, who are now on their way and have been since ll 8
j about 2:30 ---
f 9
COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
We have a Resident 10 l
Inspector at that site, don't we?
I MR. STELuo:
There was a Resident Inspector, 11 3
'l, and he was there since about 7:00 o' clock this morning, 12 and he was joined by another inspector shortly thereaf ter.
13 i
14
!l There have been two inspectors there most of the day.
15 I have nent one of my Division Directors, Norm Moseley, 16 as the senior NRC representative on-site.
Dr. Ross is going down with a contingent of people, and I will be 17 13 getting some factual information.to answer some of these i
19 detailed questions when they have had a chance to look i
20 at the actual strip charts and the data reduction in the 21 plant.
So there are some questions that I certainly w n't be able to answer.
22 There was -- As the result of the opening of 23 the power operated relief valve, a discharge of water 24 ver int the quench tank, and I can' t see it on that i
25 t
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picture -- but you recall, the quench tank is a tank i
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that is used to quench the steam that is discharged from 3
l' the power operated relief valve, which goes to the quench 4
tank, and if too much water builds up in there, or too 5
much pressure, there is a diaphragm on it which opens, 6
and would normally spill amy excess water over into the 7
containment sump which you can see on here (referring to l
8 1
the slide).
We have an indication that there is a 9
possibility.that the rupture disc may have opened as it 10 should have, on the quench tank, but do not have any 3
t indication that the water -- there was any water that i
12 went over into -- any unusual amounts of water went 13 over into the sump.
It functioned properly, so you would 14
]
not expect that to be the case.
1 15 The levels of radioactivity inside of the 16 containment, from the point at which the reactor scram on 17 forward, started to decrease, which is what you would 18 expect unless you are adding radioactive material to it, i
19 since the primary source is the radiation inside the 20 containment is from the reactor itself while it is j
21 operating.
l 22 There was, however -- relatively speaking, 23 an increase in the particulate amount of radioactivity in 24 h
the containment, which could mean that that rupture disc e
25 did plow out, allowing some particul.ates, which are U
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normally in the primary cooling system, to get into the I
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containment, and those have fallen back to essentially l
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normal levels, but the overall radiation level in the 4
containment, we did get confirmed, was decceasing. There 5
was no ---
6 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
How high did it go?
7 MR. STELLO:
It was running -- prior to the 3
accident, the particulate levels, on the level of about 9
10 to the 4th counts per minute, and it increased up to 13 about 10 to the 6th counts per minute, and then it 11 started on its way back down thereaf ter.
12 COMMISSIONER KENNLOY: And where is it now at 13 the last ---
14 MR. STELLO:
When I spoke to him last, the 15 characterization was at about the level it was at the 16 beginning of the transient, near that level.
17 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
About 10 to the minus 4th?
13 n
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MR. STELLO: About 10 to the minus 4th, some factor times that.
20 21 I would be very cautious in using the numbers l
22 until we have had people actually look at the strip charts.
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The amount of radiation, though, in the
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24 Auxilliary Building did increase during the transient.
25 ji To characterize that increase, it increased at about --
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to about a peak of 155 times the MPC, the maximum
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permissible concentration in the Auxilliary Building, 3
and it stayed elevated for ---
4 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Can you translate that l
5 into milli-r per hour?
i 6
MR. STELLO:
I'm going to try to do that to 7
the ultimate at the site boundary, but a rough number 8
N is -- the MFC, if _ ;u had that value for the full year 9
]
at the MPC, it would give you on the order of like 10 500 millirem, which is the allowable amount of radiation.
11 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Part 20.
i 12 l
MR. STELLO:
Part 20.
I will be getting back i
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to that number in a moment.
14
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First, the numbers are, it was about -- shortly 15 af ter on the order of a half an hour.
I don' t have the 16 precise time that it began to rise.
It hit a peak 17 4
of about 155 times MPC at 7:00 o' clock.
At 8:00 o' clock il 19 ll it was ---
I 19 d
COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: Did you say 155 times?
20 MR. STELLO:
Times the MPC.
21 At about 8:00 o' clock it was down to about 22 1.5 times the MFC, and then came down to values of a 23 fraction of the MPC thereafter.
24,!!
This activity, it is in the Auxilliary Building, I,f goes up through vents that are -- filtering vents in the 25 h
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l Auxilliary Building, and from there goes out those l
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stacks, then as part of the normal operation, this t
3 activity would gat into the environment through that i
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source.
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l They did take samples at those vents at about i
6 7:30, following that transient, and;those samples indi-7 y
cated that they were -- here, I've got to be very careful 8
about the numbers -- at about the MPC value at the 9
stack.
10
.j COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: When was the peak of l
11
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the concentration in the Auxilliary Building?
The peak was at 7:05, it was 12 i
13 155, and about an hour later, it was down about two i
I 14 orders in magnitude, to about 1.5.
l 15 j
MR. CASE: That was the measured peak.
There J
- l may not have been a coincidence between the measurement 16 17 in the peak, but that was the measured peak.
13 j
COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
It is not a continuous i
measurement?
19 MR. CASE: That's not my understanding.
Is that 20 21 Y "**?
MR. STELLO:
The measurement that I gave you 22 was frem an actual taking of a sample at 7:30.
The l.;
23 specifics ---
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COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: An air sample?
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MR. STELLO: A sample right from the stack l
itself.
COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Well, let's see, we are 1
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talking about the concentration in the Auxilliary I
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Building and ---
6 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
--Auxilliary Building.
7 When you get up to 155, is that a stack measurement?
O MR. STELLO:
Those were actual measurements --
9 No, those were in the building itself.
Those are samples.
10 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: But it is not a near 11 sample, it is not a continuous reading instrument?
12 MR. STELLO:
They have continuous reading, but 13 as I understand it, the numbers were derived from actual 14 grab samples, the number I just gave you, at about 15 MPC was a grab sample right in the stack.
16
)
The d" ration of the event now, was on the 17 1
order of an hour to three hours.
To give you, then, the 1
18 feel for these numbers, that would be equivalent to 19 3 divided by 8,000 times part 20, or on the order of 20 a thousandth or less ---
21 i
COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
8,000 being the number i
l of hours in a year.
22 ll MR. STELLO:
Yes, 8,000 being the number of a
23
\\\\
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24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> in a year.
25 0
COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Approximately.
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l MR. STELLO:
So it was a very,.very small. amount
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2 of activity that lef t the stack, and if we calculate what 3
l aeMy went into the envim.mt, it was a very small amount 4
l and there is no :hcalth hazard that we feel resulted from 5
I the event.
l 6
COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: Would you repeat again 7
how it got into the Auxilliary Building?
I l
8 MR. STELLO:
Okay.
t 9
Let me have the next slide.
10 (Slide) 11 The answer to your question is:
I don't know.
12 There are several possibilities that are still being 13 looked at, and I can't get the answer as to what was the 14 source.
15 j
This is a slide that shows the chemical and
'i 16 l.l volume control system, and you will notice on the volume i
control tank, or make-up tank as it is called in some 17 l
cases, there are relief valves on it.
There was an 18 19 awful lot of water being handled in the system, so the 20 level of the make-up tank could have risen and it is 21 possible that:a relief valve could have opened.
22 It is possible, in the way in which they were transferring water going -from the emergency systems 23
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back to the normal chemical and volume control system, 24 25 that there was an excess of water in the let-down system, i
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and it could have been a relief valve in that systam, I
c),
It is possible that the waste gase compressor, 2
3 trying to take a load of gas, that it too, could have 4
developed a problem and it would have been from there.
5 The exact answer is that I don't know.
There l
is no longer any problem, and now what they are trying 6
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to do is establish exactly where it came frem.
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COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: When did they get back n
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j into the Aur Building?
10 MR. STELLO:
They had limited access to the 11 Aux Building, as I understand it, they had a precautionary 12 evacuation on the order of an hour, and thereafter, 13 allowed limited access with the necessary prctective 14 measures.
i 13 It has been confirmed that the radioactive l
material in there, from the grab samples, principally 16 noble gases.
17 The plant is now proceeding to a cold shutdown.
18 I
It had been at hot standby, and when I spoke to Mr.
19 Rag n,
I asked him if he would take the plant to cold 20 shutdown and keep it there.
I think they are about ready 21 t
g int refuelling.
They were already coasting down 22 :
the plant, and they are not to start up until both he
]-
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has had a chance to look at ir and he is satisfied, and 44 then we have a chance to be persuaded -- we are satisfied 25 il D
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too.
And I think they might go right into the refuelling l
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outage, but I don' t know that.
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COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: And that was scheduled for 4
when?
I 5
i MR. STELLO:
They were in the coast-down now.
l!
It is within a matter of a week or so.
6 7
COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
The PN said October 5th.
8 Could we go back to the storage tank question g
i:
9 ll and -- your PN of mid-day, approximately, indicated that 1
10
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during the system restoration, the operator failed to 11 realign the suction of a charging from the refuelling 12 water storage tank to the volume control tank, and as 13 a result, the control tank's pressure increased and a 1
14 relief valve opened, and the implication wr s that this 15 may have been the source of the release into the Aux li Building. And you are saying ---
16 N
17 MR. STELLO:
And I'm backing away from that, 1
18 because when I asked the scecific question: Do we now i
19 l
know that that is what the source was?
The answer l
20 I'm getting back is that could be, but they are also I
1 king at several others, and I didn't want to give 21 an incorrect answer ---
22 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
That's what I wanted 23 1
24 l to confirm.
You are no longer sticking with the statement.
1 MR. STELLO:
Yes.
Okay, now, let me turn ---
25 1 0 9 5 u,} x
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COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Could I just take you 2)-
+
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back one minute to the measurement in the stack.
These i
3 are measurements which are made by taking samples of air 4
sort of periodically but not continually?
5 MR. STELLO:
They have continuous monitors on j
6 the stack, as well.
7
[
Now, I didn't get the numbers of what the 3
monitors did read, but they have continuous moni-rs.
9
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COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: So there is a continuous 10 record of what went up that stack?
11 MR. STELLO:
I didn't ask the question. I will 12 aak the question.
I will find out.
13 COMMISSICNER GILINSKY :
Okay.
14 MR. STELLO:
I was more interested on the 1
15
!i composition of the gases, to understand what the MPC h
h values were, to know whether they were, in fact, 16
'Ih 17 principally ncble gases, which is what you expect, and
- i 13 i
that, indeed, is what they are.
Now, I didn't pursue 19 that because of the timeliness of getting down ' re, 20 and when our people are there, we will definitely have 21 an answer to that question.
22 Let me go back to the way in which we were esW) 23 notified, the second part of your question.
I 24
' COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Okay.
I hope you will i
25 [
tell us just a little more about what the NRC people are i
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I doing and what they will be doing.
2 a
MR. STELLO:
Yes.
COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Fine.
4 MR. STELLO:
I will conclude with what NRC l
5 will be doing.
6 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: Good.
7 MR. STELLO: At about 6:00 o' clock or after 8
j 6:00 this morning is when the event began.
9 Our Resident Insoector was at the site by 10 about 7:30 this morning.
11 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: Was he called to be 12 there or did he -- is that his normal -- _
13 MR. STELLO: As I understand it, he was called.
14 MR. JORDAN:
That's his regular reporting hour.
3 15 h
MR. STELLO:
He wasn't called, he reported il 16
.i regularly.
4 ll 17 j
COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: When was the fir.it time l
18 I
that anyone associated with the NRC was informed about l
19 the incident,which began at roughly 6:13, as I understand 20 it.
21 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
It sounds like 7:30.
22 MR. STELLO:
At 7:30, when the Resident 23 reported -- Apparently, his normal work hour is 7:30, 24 and that's when he was aware of it.
25 He, in turn, called Region II at 8:00 o' clock, 1095
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l 1-i and then I can take you through the chronology through i
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that.
3 Our system,which we have in place, the phones 1
4 that are there were not used.
We were not notified 5
through than systet.:.
6 I have read, again, the instruction which we 1
7 i
have out, and I now can understand where they still, 8
.i probably allow for an interpretation, which says if
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you have a condition where there is a problem in a
' O reactor for an hour, and you don' t have things well under i
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control at that time, you should let us know.
j 12 Well, the reactor event was, essentially, over 13 l
in terms of what was in the reactor, but then you had i
14
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things going into the Auxilliary Building.
So I take i
15 the responsibility for what we have issued as instructions.
I 16 I'm not persuaded they are as clear as they need to be, a
17 h
and I will commit that I will go back and think about this 13 i
very carefully and try to develop some more words as 19 to what one ought to do.
I'm beginning to wonder if 20 eventually we are going to come to the point where the 21 phones will need to be used whenever a reactor is tripped.
22 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
But you agree with me, 22 as I have been trying to ---
24
'MR.
STELLO:
Yes.
I said, if that serves as 25 l an answer to your note, why I do commit to do it.
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COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Yes.
Good.
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MR. STELLO:
And we will have instructions that 3
go out to make this very, very clear.
I guess my thinking 4
might cause me to somewhat overreact to it now.
i 5
COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
I had been of an 6
impression, and I can' t say where I got this, but of an i
impression that each morning the person in the Incident 3
Response Center mems a quick canvass of reactors, to be 9
sure that all th a direct lines were in operation.
10 MR. STELLO: That was done.
11 COMMISSIONER KE INEDY:
It was done?
In other 12 words, someone in our Incident Response Center talked 13 to someone in that pl.at at 7:00 o' clock this morning?
14 MR. STELLO:
I do not know the exact hour.
h 15 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
Or approximately?
i 15 j
MR. STELLO:
Tha:'s true. Every plant is h
17 lj called ---
13 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Every day?
19 MR. STELLO:
Every day.
20 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
Okay, now, so someone 21 from our Incident Response Center was in contact with 22 somebody in that plant at 7:00 o' clock this n.orning, 23 [
some 45 minutes after the incident had initiated.
Is i
24 1
that correct?
- l' COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
I don't think he's sure 25 i
i k
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18 of the 7 : 00 o ' clock.
I TZ) 7 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: Well, approximately.
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3 MR..STELLO: They were definitely contacted.
4 Our routine is to do it in the wee hours of the morning.
5 Now, I do not know if that was at 7:00 o' clock 6
or at 6:00 o' clock, but they were contacted.
The 7
response that I got back is that we were -- that when tl 8
that fellow made the call, he was told there was a 9
l reactor trip, but nothing else.
Just that the reactor 10 ll had tripped.
It was not being reported to him -hat 11 J
there was a reactor trip.
That's part of his routine 1-19 call to ask:
"What's the status of the plant"?
And 13 he was told that it had tripped, and as I understand it, d
3.
that's all we had, but I do not know the time.
I can't 15 l
speak to that.
0 16 l
COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
It will be on his log, 17 l
though?
18 MR. STELLO:
It will definitely be on his 19 log, and we will know what hour that was.
20 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: And could you inform 21 me, please?
22 MR. STELLot 1 will, indeed, do that.
"{,-
23 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: It seems to me, that 24 even if the instructions were not absolutely precise, 25 and even if they didn't cover every conceivable t
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contingency, including this one, there ought to be just 2
E3 a general understanding that if something important 3
happens from the safety point of view, we get notified.
4 And if they get above normal readings in cart of the reactor that.are sufficient to -require the personnel to 6
leave, it strikes me that that crosses a threshold.
7 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: When did they declare i
8 U
the limited access, or whatever term you used?
9 l
MR. STELLO:
I'll give you an approximate time.
10 It was in the neighborhood of 6:30 or 7:00 o' clock.
The
,d 11 i.l exact time, I don't know, but of that order.
1 j
12 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
So it is conceivable that 13 this could have occurred before that telephone contact?
l 14 h
MR. STELLO:
It could have, that's right.
Il f
15 I want to make clear, we were ---
16 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
I want to be sure of i
17 this.
I'd like to be sure that we nail that down, 13 i
precisely what time this occurred, and the relative times, 19 that is, the time this telephone call occurred, and the 20 l
times in which these other events occurred.
21 MR. STELLO:
I will do that, and I will make 22 sure that you are notified.
}
23 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: Because there may be 24 l
some misunderstanding about what people think are I
25 j
significant matters.
1093 r
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MR. GOSSICK:
Might I just add that I asked
[j 2
Mr. Stello this afternoon via memo,.and I'm sending 3
a copy of that down to you, for a complete run-down, 4
l a chronology on how this information was handled, the 5
chronology of events, and so forth.
6 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Yes, I think that's good.
7 r
MR. GOSSICK:
And also, our obligation to that 8
)
line, do we need to revise that in light of the events.
9 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: Well, that's what I 10 have been trying to do for several months.
11 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: Could we briefly 12 continue and run through the rest of it, and how it 12 went up our own system?
i 14 MR. STELLO:
Okay.
15 Region II was called both at 8:00 and 9:00 16 o' clock, the 9:00 o' clock was an update of what was 17 going on ---
13 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: That's by our inspectors 19 at the plant?
MR. STELLO:
Our inspectors at the plant.
20 We were notified here in Washington, initially 21 10:30 -- 11:45 ---
22 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: Excuse me.
Region II 23 was aware.at 8:00 o'cloch, and we were first notified 24 h
i at the Incident Response Center or Headquarters, at 10:30?
25 l
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MR. STELLO: At Headquarters, not the Incident t
2 l
Response Center.
3 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: Right, 10 : 30, Headquarters? i l
A l
MR. STELLO:
Mr. Jordan, who is sitting next to I
5 me, was notified at about 12:00 and at about 12:15 I 6
was notified, then there was a series of calls made to l
7 Commissioners and their assistants, following that, through 8
the af ternoon, initially, and then periodically 9
l updating through the af ternoon.
I won' t go through the 10 details of all of those.
There were several calls made 11 to each of the Conmissioners' offices.
12 We, of course, notified Mr. Gossick, and we 13 talked.
I have made certain and assured myself that 14 the State of Virginia was, indeed, notified, and also 15 j
called and made sure that someone in the Governor's q
16 1
office was aware of this.
1 17 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: What time was the State of 13 Virginia notified?
i 19 MR. JO RDAN :
Before 11:30.
20 MR. STELLO:
About 11:00-11:30.
They were 21 notified by the Region, and I also spoke to someone l
from the office this af ternoon myself.
22 23 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: The licensee did not notify the State?
24 :
25 MR. STELLO:
My understanding is that after I O
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1 1
spoke to the licensee this af tarnoon, which was in the 2
neighborhood of about 3:00 o' clock, subsequent to that 3
my understanding is that they had spoken to someone 4
~i in the State.
5 MR. CASE:
In the Governor's of fice.
6 MR. STELLO:
In the Governor's office.
I do 7
not know for certain they did or didn't notify or discuss 8
this with the State prior to that.
9 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Could you assess the health 10 and safety significance of this?
11 MR. STELLO:
Based on what I have right now, 12 I don' t see any significant health and safety issue, 13 whatsoever.
As I. indicated earlier, it is an extremely 14 small fraction of part 20, because the total duration of 15 9
the release was very, very small.
b 16 i,
COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: Were there any worker a
)
17 exposures?
1 Il 13 MR. STELLO:
I don' t know the answer to that.
19 That's part of what we want to get into, what we will 20 be looking at, today, what our inspectors are going to 21 be doing and are doing now.
2 I don' t have any information that there are 23 any, it is just that I don't want to say there aren't
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24 r.
without tine to go through and check.
n 25
'l COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
But as far as what you i
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I lI-1 have at the present time, you know of no health and safety II)
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2 significance of the ---
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MR. STELLO:
From the public point of view, 4
i that's the thrust of your question?
5 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: Yes.
6 MR. STELLO:
And the answer to that is I don't t
7 see any.
With respect to what went on in-plant, we 8
are lcoking at that.
That's a different question.
9 I could make some judgments now, but I prefer to reserve 1.0 until we have had a chance to get ---
11 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
In any case, you will 12 prepare a detailed chronology of the notification, 13 steps that were taken, and the way the communication 14 system functioned?
15 MR. STELLO:
Yes.
16 h
COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: And the reactor is on --
17 at the moment on its way to cold shutdown, or?
18 Q
MR. STELLO:
The reactor is being taken to i
19 a cold shutdown, and there is a cooldown rate specified 20 which we have asked them to follow, and go to a normal i
1 21 l
cold shutdown.
It is typically 7 or 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> before it would 22 be in that condition.
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23 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: Could you tell us what r
24 l NRC is doing?
i:
25 d MR. STELLO:
Yes.
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We have two inspectors who, as I have already t
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2 indicated, have been on site and are continuing to follow i
3 what is going on.
There are two health physicists who I
4 already should be at the site, who will be looking at some i
i 5
of the questions that have been raised here, in terms of l
6 worker exposures, the actual strip charts in terms of f
7 what quality the monitors did during the course of the 8
event, doing any surveys that are needed.
And they 9
should already be at the plant and started.
10 I have sent Mr. Moseley, who works for me as 11 a division director, to be our spokesman at the site,
'(
12 and to monitor and to be in charge of the activities that 13 will go on at the site.
14 Dr. Ross has also gone down with specialists 15 j
in the a::ea of understanding the transient that happened
.I in the plant, to review the records and nderstand its
[1 16 f
significance.
17 i
13 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: This is Dr. Ross from 19 NRC -- I mean NRR?
l 20 MR. STELLO:
Yes.
He has taken four additional 21 people down with him.
The expectation is that they 1
22 will have been there by abouc 6:00 o' clock, just about now.
When I get back to Bethesda, I will expect to
}
23 get briefed and see what the status of their activities 24 n
has been, and I'm hoping that by this evening we will have 25
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109 b.
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25 1-answers to all of the questions that you have raised and
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much more details in understanding all that has happened 3
today, as well as a better understanding of the plans 4
on behalf of the licensee and on behalf what we need to 5
do.
I won' t have that worked out until scrne tine tuceu.
6 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
Did you say that the 7
licensee has agreed that he will retain his -- the plant h
f in cold shutdown until further discussion?
8 I
MR. STELLO:
That's correct.
9 10 j
COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: The amounts of radiation 11 involved, do they give you any concern about the fuel 12 damage?
I 13 MR. STELLO:
No. The isotopes are principally i
14 nobel gases that are associated with a normal operation.
15 There are not unusual quantities, and we are not seeing 16 any increase in the radiation, but that is clearly an issue that will be examined very carefully primary core 17 l
samples.
But based on information we have in terms of 13 i
19 the temperatures in the system, I would say it would be very unlikely that there should be any concern, because 20 they were sub-cooled, highly sub-cooled, so there 21 l
shouldn't have been any voids of the system, but that 22 will be checked out thoroughly to substantiate that that's, 23 indeed, the case.
24 i
. i, COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: Peter?
22 i l
1095 4
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26 i
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COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: What does the word
- f?
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"sub-cooled" mean?
3 MR. STELLO:
It is the amount that the water i
4 is cooled in temperature below the saturation temperature, i
5 that is, the: temperature in which the steam is formed from I
6 L
the water.
Water at 180 degrees atmospheric pressure d"
7 was 32 degrees sub-cooled.
S l
COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Sub-cooled is good.
9
![
COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: It just doesn't appear i!
10 in the Constitution.
11 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: Very well.
12 You will keep us informed of things as they 13 develop, and of anything significant that you find out.
14
.l MR. STELLO:
Yes.
I COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: Very well, and we will 15 i
be 1 coking forward to this chronology.
16 Thank you very much.
17
.l (Whereupon, the meeting in the above-matter
.8 l
was concluded at 6:04 p.m.)
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20 21 22
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