ML19274G134
| ML19274G134 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 05/03/1979 |
| From: | Leach T METROPOLITAN EDISON CO. |
| To: | |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7908290729 | |
| Download: ML19274G134 (45) | |
Text
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA I
NUCLEAR REGULATORY CCMMISSION 1
1 1
In the Matter of:
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IE TMI INVESTIGATION INTERVIEW 3
of Mr. Thomas John Leach Radiation Chemistry Technician Junior 41 i
Si 6i f
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Trailer #203 9j NRC Investigation Site TMI Nuclear Power Plant 10!
Middletown, Pennsylvania i
11!
l May 3, 1979 12!
(Date of Interview) 131 June 22, 1979 (0 ate Transcript Typea) 107, 108 151 (Tape Numadr(s))
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NRC PERSONNEL:
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Mr. Gregory P. Yuhas I
23l Mr. Mark E. Resner I
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i 1l RESNER-The following interview is being conducted of Mr. Thomas John Leach.
Mr. Leach was employed by the Metropolitan Edison Company as a 2
3 Radiation Chemistry Technician Junior.
Mr. Leach is no longer employed 4f by that Company.
Mr. Leach worked at the Three Mile Island Nuclear Sj Facility.
The present time is 12:20 p.m. eastern daylight time and 6
the date is May 3, 1979.
The place of this interview is Room 240 of 7f the Red Roof Inn.
The Red Rocf Inn is located on Highway 283.
The i
gj individuals present for this interview are Mr. Gregory P. Yuhas.
Mr. Yuhas is a Radiation Specialist with Region I of the U.S. Nuclear g
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101 Resner.
I am employed with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, an Investigator with the Office of Inspector and Auditor.
Prior to I
taping this interview Mr. Leach was given a two page document which 13l explained the purpose, scope and the authority to conduct this investi-14!
gation.
On the second page of this document, Mr. Leach has answered 151 16l; three questions which were asked of him.
He has also signed the sheet and dated it indicating he has read both pages.
The three questions which Mr. Leach answered were:
Do you understand the above, he has 1Sl checked that he has understood what he has read.
Is that correct 19{
Mr. Leach?
20i I
21l LEACH:
Yes.
23 RESNER:
Do we have your permission to tape this interview? He has 24 l
indicated yes to this answer, is that correct Mr. Leach?
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1 LEACH:
That's correct.
2 31 RESNER:
Do you want a copy of the tape? Mr. Leach has checked yes 4
indicating that he does want a copy.
Is that correct Mr. Leach.
Si i
6l LEACH:
Yes.
I would like a copy of the tape.
7 RESNER:
8 All right, we will~ see that you receive a copy of the tape.
At this point, I'd like to ask Mr. Leach to state briefly his background g
in the nuclear industry for the benefit of thost who might be listening Ol to this tape in the future.
Mr. Leach, would you please?
12f 13li.
LEACH:
I have no background in the nuclear industry prior to my i
employment at Metropolitan Edison in 1974.
I had worked for a surgica!
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supply company who sold medical instruments ana I had worked in several hospital laboratories as a chemist and a bicod analyst.
Originally I i
16i was hired at Met Ed as a water analyst.
Through the years that I 17!
worked there I became more and more involved with the radiation and 18j health physics aspects of the job.
So actually, before I worked for 19l Met Ed I had no previous experience in the r.uclear field.
21 YUHAS:
We are going to go over some of your experience rignt now.
Are you a high school graduate?
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3 1l MACH:
Yes.
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YUHAS:
Did you take college preparatory courses in high school?
3 4
LEACH:
Yes.
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YUHAS:
So you've taken basic sciences possibly physics?
7 8
LEACH:
gj Yes, I started off majoring in biology in college and wound up with a psychology degree, eventually.
But I had quite a few chemistry 10i courses in college.
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12l 1
YUHAS:
So you have a bachelor of psychology.
13l 14i LEACH:
Psychology, yes.
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16i YUHAS:
From what school.
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LEACH:
From Lebanon Valley College in Annville, Pennsylvania.
19l 20!
YUHAS:
What year did you graduate?
21f 22 l
LEACH:
'72.
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4 YUHAS:
And you had about how many units in pure sciences?
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LEACH:
I say 12 or 16.
Including chemistry and physics.
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YUHAS:
When you joined the Metropolitan Edison Company in 1974 as a 5
water analyst, can you briefly describe the training that Met Ed gave 6
you when you assumed that position?
7 8!
LEACH: We had instructions from representatives of Babcock aid Wilcox, 9!'
10i representatives from the Alliance Larw atory in Ohio and the I.ynchburg l
facility in Virginia, I believe it is.
Most of the instructions were ll!
given by people from Metropolitan Edison.
Do you want me to name 12' names of the people?
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YUHAS:
Sure.
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16i LEACH:
Richard Zechman, Gary Reed, Ken Frederick, and most of the 17!
other bosses were at some time involved in our training, somehow.
181 19i YUHAS:
How long were you a water analyst?
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21l LEACH:
At Met Ed? The whole time that I was there.
It's a dual 22 function job, I'm sure you're aware of this by now down there, but 23 half of the time you work in health physics, radiation detection, and 241 l
half of the time you would work in the water analysis side of it.
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They were intermixed because, I guess because of the feeling that i
health physics had so much to do with the radiochemical aspect of the 2
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gf YUHAS:
All of the training that you alluded to so far, is chemistry
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training.
How about training in health physics?
ol 7l l
LEACH:
We did have training in health physics also, mostly confined 8l l
to reviewing procedures for the plant specific procedures.
For opera-9l l
tion of equipment, procedures of things to do in case of certain 10l events, what kind of instruments would be used for specific applica-11!
tions and things like that.
12l l
13l YUHAS:
Would you describe this training as classroom instruction 141 followed by written or oral examination or was it on-the-job training?
15i 16',
i LEACH:
I'd say it was a combination of both.
More on-the-job training 17!
than classroom instruction.
We reviewed tapes, instruction tapes, and 18l did take a few quizzes that were graded.
19i 20j YUHAS:
Now I'd like you to go through the scenario of your involvement 21' from the night of March 28, 1979:
how you came to work, what your 22, j
actions were, and aftc? you've gone through this in you own terms, 23l then we'll probably go back over and I'll ask you some more specific 24l I
questions as to exactly what you did cr what type of equipment used, 25j qv @
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that sort of. thing.
So, if you like to pick it up past how you got i
2l inv lved in the incident at Three Mile Island?
3 4
LEACH:
The first time that I realized that there was a problem was on g
the way to work heading down Route 283 I saw there was no steam coming 6
fr m the towers and I knew that there was something wrong.
I arrived just in back of my health physics boss, Pete Velez, I drove into the 7
gate just behind him and we stopped at the gate and got out and talked g
to the security guard, who informed us, who informed Mr. Velez that g
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personnel were being kept off the Island.
Well, we were regarded as 12,l essential personnel so they let us in.
I got into the health physics I
laboratory at about ten after seven, I'd say, at which time I would 131 14l!
say about a dozen people in the lab.
There were a couple of bosses there, people lika I'd say, came in right ahead of me.
Joe Deman was 15; 16l I asked him what was happening, and he told me that they had there.
blown Unit 2.
That's all he would say to me.
Which, I guess--no one really knew eny more than that.
A minute or so later, Pete Velez i
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asked me to get a high range radiation dosimeter, a self reader, and 191 I
run through the Aux. Building and make sure that there were no personnel 20!
I still left in the Aux. Building.
I questioned this and I asked him if i
21 we had a radiation instrument that I could take with me, a high-range 22 radiation instrument and he said that they were all out--that they had 23 been used and that there were none in the lab at the time.
So I 24 obtained a high range self-reader dosimeter and started into the Aux.
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7 Building.
As I got to the doors of the Auxiliary Building, I saw two technicians coming out, the people that I work with in the same job 3
capacity except that they are Senior Technicians, Mike Janouski and Pat Donnachie.
They had just completed a tour af the Auxiliary Building 4
i 5
dressed in full PC and md a high range radiation instrument with them, a teletector. I believe.
I asked them if there was anybody in 7f the Auxiliary Building, and they replied that there was not and that they had not seen anyone.
They had masks on and rubber suits and were 8
completely covered, so I went back to the health physics laboratory, g
i told Pete Velez what I just related ta you, about the people already 10 going through there, and he said, okay, don't bother to do that, to go through the Auxiliary Building, and he turned away.
The next person that I talked to and this was only a couple minutes later was Cary Harner, our chemistry supervisor or chemistry forsman for Unit 2, and he told me to go into the primary sampling lab and utain two samples, 15; one each of the steam generators from Unit 2.
I walked into the primary laboratory.
I had found a radiation instrument in the laundry 17!
i room, Eberlii.- E520 model.
I walked into the primary sampling lab, 18i and my first instinct was to check the dose rate on the Unit 2 letdown 19j cooler, I took the E520 over to the cooler and about three feet the 20i instrument pegged off its high scale, which is 2R.
I judged that the j
cooler was probably reading from the way the instrument pegged, which 22
/
is lot a very good way to determine dose rate, that the dose on the 23 cooler was somewhere in the range between 10 and 20R.
The instrument 24 would peg at about three feet away.
So, I think the dose rate in the 25!
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room.itself where I would be taking the Unit 2 steam generators samples 1
2j was around 75 mR, a 100 mR, somewhere in that area.
I turned on the samples for the Unit 2 steam generator and I got a sample from the B 3
generator, labelled it, dated it, and put it on the shelf in the 4l primary sampling lab, and could get no flow from the A steam generator.
5 This was not unusual and I thought that there must be either something 6l wrong with the generator or that as usual, when you can't get a flow 7
ut of a sample point, that a valve was closed downstream of that 8
sample point and this is what I assumed was the problem.
Later I g
found out that the generator was in a broken condition.
I don't 10(.
l believe that I would have been able to get a sample out of it anyway.
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I got that sample, went back outside the primary lab to the health physics lab, once again and at this time I'd say it was about 7:30 or 25 to 8.
The foreman, Pete Velez was trying to organize offsite radiation monitoring teams, and trying to determine wind direction and 15l other factors involved in setting up these radiation monitcring teams.
He told me, Pete Velez told me, to get a radiation monitoring kit and i
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take an operator, as a second person, one of the operators present, 181 and go to Goldsboro by vehicle and record the dose rates in that area, 19l Goldsboro, at one of the points on the map that we have in the radiation 20 kits.
I took the operator, Jim Randeze, who had worked all night that 21l night and we went to Goldsboro.
Drove there in my vehicle, my car, and I think we got to Goldsboro at about 8:45. We took readings at 23 the Goldsboro environmental air station that Met Ed maintains.
Tried 24 to set up our SAM 2 Unit, which is a portable multichannel analyzer.
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If We could not get that unit to function, but we did have a Pick 6 Geiger counter with us and we got no readings at that time when we 2
3l were in Goldsboro from the Pick 6.
I realize that this is a very low I
q efficiency type instrument and should only be used for specific applica-tions, but we were doing the best we could.
We had a couple self-5 reader dosimeters with us and a high range dosimeter that I'd gotten 6
earlier that morning and none of those instruments were recording any 7
dosage.
We took dose rates in that area and then thought that we i
might be able to get our multichannel analyser to work if we could 9!
I find a line power source.
So, we stopped a State policeman and enlisted 101 his aid in asking the marina owner at the Goldsboro Marina if we could lli use one of his power sources and he said yes.
We told the man that we 12!
would be doing routine radiation survey and he knew that something was going on caused he had heard it on the radio, but he said, " Fine", and 14i we set up the instrument with the line power directly across from the 15l plant.
The plume was going over our heads, I would say about a quarter 16; j
mile downriver of where we were.
The SAM 2 still did not work.
Even 17 I
with line power we couldn't get any, we couldn't get any results from 181 that instrument.
So we took readings with the Pick 6, checked our 19f dosimeters again and rendezvoused with the Bravo, the 8 radiation 20:
l monitoring team at point Northwest 21, I believe, to pick up some more 21; air filters and to use their instrument to count some of the samples 22 that we had taken.
They had to come over and assist us because of our 23 multichannel analyzer not working right.
After we did that, we were 24; in Goldsboro at the marina for quite a while, on the radio, radioing 25{
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10 back the results that we were getting from our dosimeters and our y
Pick 6 and at around noon we headed back to TMI.
They told us to come 2
back, either because they thought they were finished with us or because I
our instruments weren't working correctly.
We got back tu Three Mile 4l gl Island at somewhere, after noon, I think about 12:30 or 1:00.
The rest of that day for me was hanging around the observation center, 6
checking people for contamination at the 500 KEV substation, and 7
basically just waiting in the observation center until 7:00 when they sent us home.
The next day, I arrived at work at 7:00 and the first thing we were told to do, the first thing that I was told to do was I
take the shuttle bus into the security console at the site protection 11!
l building out in front of the service building and clean respirators 121 i
and try to assist people in anyway that I could in getting into the 131 contaminated areas and getting into the building to do the work that 14!
they had to do.
We stayed in the site building there until, I think, t
15i about noon or 1:00 and during that time I went down to get a sample.
16i During the morning, twice I went down to get samples from the industrial 17j waste treatment facility.
I got two samples from there at two different 18'
.The afternoon I was relieved for lunch, as I times in the morning.
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say about 12:30 or 1:00 and relieved by Mike Gabner I belive, went 20l back over to the observation center and from there to the 500 KEV 21!
substation, where I got something to eat.
We were checking contaminated 22 personnel at the 500 KEV substation most of the afternoon and the rest 23 of my afternoon was spent at the observation center.
That's about it.
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I 11 1l YUHAS:
This was the day of the 29th?
I 2!
LEACH:
Yes.
3 4i S
What time did you leave the observation center that afternoon?
YUHAS:
6l LEACH:
7:00.
7 8
YUHAS:
That evening, 7 p.m.
g; 10i LEACH:
Yes.
12 YUHAS:
Did you come to work the following day, which would have been 13!
Friday?
14i 15!
LEACH:
No.
I did not.
16; I
17l YUHAS:
Was that a scheduled day off for you?
18!
19i LEACH:
No, it was.n't.
I had decided the evening of the 29th that I 20 was going to terminate with the Company and then on Friday morning we 21I heard the civil defense sirens in Harrisburg go off and there was all 22l kinds of talk of evacuation.
I had already made my decision that I 23l wasn't going to return to work, so I got a couple of my friends and we 24l left the area.
Not so much for fear of the effects of radiation or 25l l'
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anything like that, it was more in fear of the results of a general
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Panic, which I thought there was going to be in the area.
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YUHAS:
Why or what was the basis for your decision? Apparently 4
5l sometime before 7 p.m. on the 29th to terminate your employment with Metropolitan Edison?
6 7
LEACH:
Well, I had been planning on quitting for quite some time, 8
gj anyway.
I'm going to be moving out to the West coast, and when I saw i
the kinds of exposures that the people I was worPing with were receiving, 10 I decided I would terminate immediately to avoid any chance of getting I
into a position where I would either receive that exposure or be 12l 13l expected to receive that exposure and have to say, "no",
to it.
14!
I YUHAS:
Can you be more specific in terms of you said the kind of 15; l
exposure that your fellow workers were receiving.
Can ycu give us 16i some names and some exposures that caused you to have this concern?
17l l
18j LEACH:
Well, I had talked to people during the two days after the 19!
accident, talked to my fellow workers and there was one, two attempts 20j I believe to draw letdown samples made by individuals.
One was Tom Thompson who juct lot the line flow for a couple of seconds and got a 22 sample that read I think 200 mR.
The other one was Ed Houser, chemistry 23 foreman, who went in to draw a primary letdown sample later that day.
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Thursday, I believe he did this in the afternoon.
I had heard that 25{
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If the sample, a one ml sample was reading 4 R with a, I presume, a l
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teletector and that a hundred m1 sample of the letdown was reading 3.
1000 R.
When I hear 1000 R, I presume that the machine had pegged.
4 1000 R is the top range of that instrument and I assume that a 1000 R 5
w uld be a peg and that you wouldn't really have any idea what the 6
exp sure or what the field actually was.
7 YUHAS:
Are you aware of the dosage that either Mr. Thompson or Mr. Houser g
received in taking th. a samples?
g 101 LEACH:
I'm not aware of the exact numbers.
I heard that Mr. Houser had received 4 R, somewhere in the vicinity of 4 R, from taking that i
letdown sample.
Mr. Thompson, I'm not sure how much he received in 131 14(;
that initial sample that he tried to take but it was probably just a j
water that was left in the lines before the sample, before he drew it.
16l YUHAS:
Is there anything else that contributed to your decision?
l 18l 19!
-LEACH:
There were other instances of people being asked to do things i
that I thought were dangerous and perhaps needless.
I heard during 20!
j the day that one of the maintenance men, his name was Ron Natale, and 2 11 j
a crew of two other maintenance men, an HP named Dave Ethridge and a 22l foieman, had been assigred the duty to go and change the makeup filters 23 in Unit 2.
Now I had done that job before and the filter that we had 24 changed the one time that I had done before, was a 70 R' filter, was 25i lh j
1@4 3
l 14 li reading 70 R on contact.
These filters are enclosed in a concrete i
2 ro m.
The walls are about 2 feet thick and there's a hole about 8 3
feet in which you can insert a radiation instrument into.
The technician 4
that was with the workers when they did the job, got into the area and 5
said he put his high range radiation instrument up against the wall, 6
up against the hole in the wall and it read a 1000 R and pegged, and he said it pegged hard.
The foreman that was on the job, I believe, 7
still wanted to go ahead and do the job.
And reasoning like this is 8
one of the main reasons that I quit.
g i
10' YUHAS:
Did Mr. Ethridge stop them from performing the job?
12lj LEACH:
Yes, he did.
He suggested that they don't stay in the area and suggested that the job not be done and the workers, I believe, the workers that were there finally decided for themselves that the job 15!
i would not be done and refused to do it.
16i 17 YUHAS:
But the foreman was still vehement about performing the tast?
19!
LEACH:
I'm not sure if he was vehement, but from the feedback that I got, he still wanted to go ahead and do the job regardless.
22 YUHAS:
Do you know of any other instances where you considered an unnecessary amount of exposure would have been taken?
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15 11 LEACH:
Well, I think the job that I was asked to do the morning that 2
I got there, which was run through the Auxiliary Building, would have i
3l been a very dangerous thing to do.
From what I heard later that day, i
4 they had pumped primary coolant onto the floor in the Auxiliary Building.
5l Now, how much fission products or anything like that was in that water I don't know, but I heard that the dose rates in the basement were 10 6
R just from the gases being given off from that water.
I considered 7
that to be a needless risk.
g 9l YUHAS:
Had you not met Janouski and Donnachie coming out of the 0
auxiliary building were you prepared to do as they had asked you to do at that time?
12' 13-LEACH:
I had reservations about it, but I was going to try to go in 141 I
there and run through there and make sure that there was no personnel 15:
in that building.
Yes.
17l YUHAS:
How were you dressed at that time?
18j i
191 LEACH:
I had my street clothes on.
The only kind of protection that I
I had was a dosimeter and a TLD.
21 22 YUHAS:
What are the 'icense requirements for enterin, a High Radiation i
Area?
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1l LEACH:
We were not sure at the time t' n the area was a High Radiation 6
2l Area.
As I said, the man that asked me to do it came in the door 3
right ahead of me and I don't think he really knew what the situation was either.
4 5
YUHAS:
In an emergency situation where you suspect that there might 61 I
7 be High Radiation Areas, you obviously because of your concern that 8
y u put forth to Velez, you must have suspected there must be high radiation.
g t
10l LEACH:
Yes.
I had heard in the HP lab that morning I heard people saying things like a 1000 R at HPR 227 and very high readings in 13l Unit 2.
But we really didn't know that there was a problem in Unit 1 I
at that time.
14 l
15i YUHAS:
So this is the Unit 1 Auxiliary Building that you were going to go through?
1Sf LEACH:
Yes.
I'm not really sure.
He said, Velez said, grab a dosimeter 19I and run through the Auxiliary Building and make sure no one is in 201 l
there.
He did not specify which Unit.
21l 22l t
YUHAS:
And what Unit were you headed toward?
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17 1.
LEACH:
I was heading te Unit 1 because that's where the HP lab is.
I 2
would have had to go through the Unit 1 Auxiliary Building first.
3l 4j YUHAS:
We're going to flip the tape at this time, it is 12:50.
l Si i
6f YUHAS:
This is a continuation of the interview with Mr. Thomas J.
Leach, the time is 12:52.
Okay, Tom we'd like to start going back now 7
over the first period of concern.
One of the things that I wanted to g
ask you about is, Cary Harner apparently told you to go and take a g
steam generator sample and this would be in the primary sample room 10 right?
12j i
LEACH:
That's correct.
13t 14i YUHAS:
You said you did collect a B steam generator sample.
Did you take a dose rate on that sample?
16i 17 LEACH:
No, I didn't.
I didn't even bother.
19i
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YUHAS:
Do you routinely samp1e
..?
I 21i l
LEACH:
I did have an instrument with me, c. hough, and I think I would 22 have seen if that instrument would have been---if it would have been 23 gross radiation. I think I would have noticed on the instrument.
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18 1,
YUHAS:
Do you routinely take Unit 2 steam generator samples at that z
point?
I 3!
l LEACH:
No..It was something special, it was something that Cary ask 4!
5; me to get because he believed that B&W would want to look at these 1
6l samples after the event had happened.
7 YUHAS:
Are those sample vials labelled?
8 9l LEACH:
There numbered, but they are not labelled.
No, they are 10 labelled, they're labelled with marking labels.
11; i
12; YUHAS:
So when you say B steam generator, you're going by the basis of that was the tap that was labelled B steam generator?
15 LEACH:
Right.
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YUHAS:
The reason we are bringing this out, apparently those were 18!
l mislabelled.
It may not have been in fact the B steam generator.
191 l
20i LEACH:
This is a point of contention several times during the time 21l l
that I worked there, whether those sample points were labelled correctly 22l or not.
I remember, I can recall them having discussions about whether 23l they were labelled correctly or not, but we thought for the past year 24 I
or so we were sure they were labelled correctly.
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19 YUHAS:
When you say they talked about whether... who specifically 1.
2 was they?
31 LEACH: Just, general hearsay.
I can't...
4 5
YUHAS:
6 Who reassured you a year ago they were labelled correctly?
How did you come to the conclusion that they were labelled properly?
7 LEACH:
I think one of the shifts just passed it on.
We got the g
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.f information that they were labelled correctly.
,1, 12; YUHAS:
Getting back to the request Mr. Velez gave you as far as touring the auxiliary building in search of personnel.
You said that 14]
a dose rate survey instrument wasn't available.
Could you elaborate 15i on that?
16i 17 LEACH: There were none available in the lab.
There were no.cperating 18j instruments that were available to the personnel.
All of them had l
been checked out and were in use at the time.
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YUHAS:
Was this a common occurrence to be short of instruments or not 22!
having enough available to
..?
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ilj LEACH:
It was not a common occurrence not to be able to find any type i
2 of dose rate instrument.
3t i
4f YUHAS:
When you left to become part of the environmental survey team, 5
what team was that?
Si LEACH: That was team Charley, C team.
7 8
YUHAS:
That was you and Mr. Randisi or C team? Did you pick up the g
suney m youneU, ne ewgucy W 101 I
11l l
LEACH:
Yes, I did.
12; I
131 YUHAS:
Did you check it out t:efore you took it offsite?
15i
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LEACH:
No, I did not, I just took it and went.
I assumed that it would be in order.
i 17!
18 YUHAS:
Have you been through emergency planning drills before?
19i 20 LEACH:
I was through a couple when they first had them a few years 21 l
ago.
I was the South gate monitor, and I was the liquid sample collector, 221 at each of those times, and every year after that when it came time 23 for a radiation drill I was either not present, on vacation, or had a i
24I day off, or I was in the chemistry department and was not involved in 25l 09 0
e e
c., o j )
i a'
I
r 21 I
i 1l the drill.
We received memos and orders on what to do if we were in 2
the drill.
I was present in the HP lab several times during the 3
drills, without a function, just to watch what was going on.
t 41 i
5 YUHAS:
Had you ever been trained in the use of the SAM 2 instrument?
61 LEACH:
I have had the procedure read to me once about two years ago.
7 8
i g'
YUHAS:
Wad you ever taken the instrument yourself and collected an air sample and counted it on the SAM 2 instrument?
10 11:
LEACH:
No.
12l i
13!
14l:
YUHAS:
You and Mr. Randisi drove over to Goldsboro.
Can you specifi-cally describe the problem you were having with getting the SAM 2 on 151 line and counting?
17l l
LEACH:
The machine would not register any counts, that's all.
That 18[
was the only thing that I could figure out that was wrong with it.
191 20l i
YUHAS:
You also had no response?
21' 22 LEACH:
No response.
23 i
KQ 25l r7- ] b L. '
f
i l
t l
22 i
1l YUHAS:
Was there any other survey instrument other than the Pick 6A?
i 21 LEACH:
That was all we had.
3 4
t YUHAS:
Could you tell me a little about the Pick 6 and its limitations?
5 61 LEACH:
7 The Pick 6 is a two range instrument, the first range goes from 1 mR to a 1000 mR and the second range goes from 1 R to 1000 R.
8 It's got a small Geiger Mueller tube in it and a small beta window on g
the bottom of it.
Its a beta gamma instrument and I would assume that 10 the beta efficiency is less than the gamma.
I 12!
YUHAS:
Could you describe to me how to take a beta reading with that 13 I
instrument?
146 f
15; LEACH:
You open the window.
First you take the reading of gamma, determine what the gamma dose rate is, open the window and the difference is the beta dose rate.
18!
i 19!
l YUHAS:
You said you contacted the other team which was team Bravo 20!
~
j' right?
21, t
22 LEACH:
Yes.
23 1
24l c.' g )
25j l
l
23 l
1 YUHAS:
Did they come down to your location and try to get your SAM 2 2
working?
3 4f LEACH:
We met. them about half way, as I said.
I believe the point Sj was Northwest 21 that we met them at.
don't know why that sticks in I
6{
my mind, but I think that was the point.
It was in a farmer's -field, 1
7{
we met the team there, team Bravo.
We
.so met a helicopter there that was bringing supplies to us.
8 9
YUHAS:
Did they have there SAM 2 operating?
10t
{
11; 12l LEACH:
Yes, they did.
I 13!.
i YUHAS:
Who was on that team?
14!
t 151 LEACH:
Ed Egenrider and Jim Dupes, I believe.
l 17l YUHAS:
Did Egenrider try to check out your instr 0 ment?
18l 19!
LEACH:
No, he didn't.
We-just marked that up as a non-operating 20!
instrument.
2 11 22I YUHAS:
Did Mr. Egenrider count any of your charcoal cartridges that you had collected at that time?
3 25!
c.m p
24 LEACH:
No.
He didn't.
But he did take a sample in Goldsboro and y
counted.
2 3
YUHAS:
Do you remember what he found?
4 I
St LEACH:
He found 5700 counts, which we thought was iodine from the 6
instrument.
But then I heard later that they were not sure that the discriminators on those instruments were set correctly to discriminate 8
So, really it was a worthless reading if you don't know g
whether the discriminators were set right.
j lli I
YUHAS:
Was Mr. Egenrider familiar with the setup of the instrument?
12l 13,
(
LEACH:
Yes, I would say that Mr. Egenrider was the most competent 14!
technician that we had at Three Mile Island.
I worked with him directly, i
15l he was my senior technician.
16i 17 YUHAS:
In the kits, was there a barium source provided to check the 18{
window setting?
19!
20 LEACH:
Yes.
21l 22 YUHAS:
Did you, well you couldn't get any response on yours so there's 23 no point in trying to....
Did Egenrider have with him the barium 24 25l c cb i
m n
[
25 i
tli LEACH:
Yes, I believe there was one in every kit.
I 2'
3 dH 5:
On the sample you were talking about, Goldsboro,...?
4, 5'
LEACH:
Except I am not sure it was a barium source.
I'm not sure about that.
But there was a filter that had a...
6l 7
YUHAS:
Pre-doped filter?
8 9f LEACH:
Right.
10 11 YUHAS:
Do you know what the background radiation levels were when you tried to count the sample in Goldsboro that you said was indicating 13l fairly high? Was it 2 mR or 3 mr per hour?
14l e
15!
LEACH:
We were getting no indication on our beta gamma instruments 16,i that measured in mR.
No.
None.
17i t
18i YUHAS:
Again, these were tha Pick 6, both of you had Pick 6 and the minimum reading would have been 1 millirad per hour?
i 21!
22l LEACH:
Right.
i 23l YUHAS:
Fine.
At any time during the morning that you were over there 241 I
with team did you find any detectable radiation levels?
. ')h G,3 2
i
I l
{
26 i
!lj LEACH:
Nothing detectacle, no.
The only time that we saw any offsite 2
readings were when we were enroute back to Three Mile Island after our 3f Goldsboro monitoring we passed by the boat dock on 441, Steins Landing, i
4; and there with the instrument in the car and the windows open we got 5l about 4 to 5 mR reading at Steins Landing.
6i YUHAS:
This was when you were returning to TMI?
7 8j LEACH:
g Yes, the wind was shifting around all morning.
I presume that at that time it was blowing towards Stein's Landing.
10 lli YUHAS:
Can you describe the atmosphere when you returned to the observation center on the afternoon of the 28th? Where specifically did you go, did you go right to the 500 KEV station or did you go to the observation cent'er..?
16i LEACH:
I went to the observation center.
17!
I 181 YUHAS:
What was going on at the observation center?
20j i
LEACH:
Some people were just trying to determine what they should do.
21!
I Everyone was confused.
Most of the people that I talked to didn't 22 really have any conception of what was going on at all.
There were 23 l
numerous reports of damage that ranged anywhere from slight cracks in 24 the claading toga 100% fuel failure to 50% melt.
No one real-ly had I
a m, u
l
i l
27 11 any conception of what was happening inside.
We were sitting around t
2j n the lawn.
It was a nice day.
They kept bringing food in to us, 3
sandwiches and cokes.
I guess people were trying to contact other 4l plants and get some decent instruments into the place and some quantity f them.
Trying to set up for the Senators and the Congressman that 5
61 were going to be coming down to the place.
And, just basically, i
7l trying to keep calm.
8 YUHAS:
Okay, you did that for most of the afternoon to after about 7 g
p.m. that night?
10 l
11l LEACH:
Yeah, I drifted back and forth between the observation center and the 500 KEV substation.
I was asked to go on a helicopter monitoring 13l
,j flight that someone else haJ already been asked to do.
I wound up not im going on that, but I set up the instruments or got the instruments and was going to go.
i 17!
YUHAS:
What type of instruments were you going to take on the nelicopter?
18j 19!
LEACH:
Ah, I'm not sure what they finally used.
I was going to take 20l a E520.
22 YUHAS:
Okay.
gh 23 nt O 'u J o
n 24l 25l l
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i
l 28 I
11 YUHAS:
You said you had surveyed some people at the 500 KEV, were 6'
2 there numerous individuals coming out with contamination on their 3
clothes or bodies?
4l 5
LEACH:
Yes, almost everyone.
Well, I wocid say without exception 6l Everyone that was in the plant was contaminated when they came out to 7
some degree.
Most of them were 5 or 10,000 counts on their---most of it was on their trousers, around tiie knees.
There were some individuals g;
I that were contaminated all over.
g I
101 i
YUHAS:
Did you note if tiiis contamination was particularly present in I
those people who had double knit slacks on?
12!
13l j
LEACH:
Yes, definitely.
That's seems that that polyester really, for 14; some reason attracts the particulates.
,5i 2
16l YUHAS:
Did that provide any information as the type of airborne problem you were seeing?
ISI 19!
20!
-LEACH:
No, I have no idea what that would indicate.
l 21l YUHAS:
When you surveying personnel, what type of instrument were you using?
23 24 25j 301 l
p0,3
29 1
LEACH:
An RM 14.
It a..
2 YUHAS: What type of probe?
31 I
4l i
LEACH:
A HP 210 probe.
For the most part, we did have some RM 14 I
5 61 down there that were being used with a regular Geiger Mueller tube, a i
hotdog type tube.
7 81 YUHAS:
Did you take any directly measurements personnel thyroid?
g i
10lj LEACH: No.
12 YUHAS:
Did you see anybody else during that?
l 14!
i LEACH:
No.
I wasn't aware that that should have been dor,e?
15i i
16i YUHAS:
Ok.
17l When you left that night, what information, when you left the observation center, what did you know was going on the plant after 18!
being there all day.
Did you know the condition of the plant? Did 19:
you have an idea what the source term was? Were you apprehensive when 20!
you left that, all hell was going to break loose.
When you left the 21 plant, basically what did you know about all that was going on?
22 l
1 23!
LEACH:
The first day or the second day?
24i l
i N
25i
-4 n@n 3
/
r N
t l
30 i
yl YUHAS:
The first day.
l 2l LEACH:
After the first day we really didn't know, as I just described 3,
4 a few minutes ago what the conditior, was inside the building, whether i
1 5
r n t there was still fission going on, we just had no idea.
Si YUHAS:
Did you think it was a very serious problem at the end of the 7
first day?
g 9j LEACH:
Oh, we knew that it was very serious.
It was something that O
nobody down there expected.
It was beyond anything that had been 11l 12l indicated by the drills that we had had or the information that we had t
been given.
I asked several people if they ever seen---some of ';..a 131 f
more experience people that I worked with, Navy people that was in 14; submarines and had worked at other plants if.l1ey had ever seen anything 15 i
like this before, and they said, no.
And when we saw what the ' eadings 10 were, when I saw what the readings were Saing that day, I knew that i
17i there was a very serious problem.
I knew that it was on the verge of 18!
catastrophe.
19!
20j t
YUHAS:
Okay.
So you went home that night, did you listen to '.ny form 21l of media reports?
22 23 LEACH:
I can't remember specifically listening then, to any news.
I 24!
was pretty tired I think I went to bed about 9:00; went to bed about 2 25,;
I
^103 309
?
?
31 1!
hours after I got home.
I was going to try to stay up and see the news but I couldn't stay awake that long.
2 3
4l YUHAS:
Okay.
The next. day you said you came in about seven and you 5
w rked to noon setting up the process center?
61 7l LEACH:
Yes.
i 8!
gl YUHAS:
Okay what were the conditions when you came through the gate?
Y*" '*** # *"9 9 *
- '" "9 10 i
11{
l LEACH:
Yes.
12!
13l 14li YUHAS:
What was going on at the north gate?
15!
16l.
LEACH:
There were two security guards there, and---I believe two or three security guards.
They were just checking the peoples' badges as 17l they went through and calling on the radio to make sure the personnel that were entering were allowed to enter.
201 l
YUHAS:
Okay, when you get to the process center, what were the condi-2 11 tions in the process center?
22 23 LEACH:
There were respirators around in bags and lying on the floor.
24 i
There was nobody else in the place when we arrived, guard's (; oats 25!
l l
I
(_ s. a.)
t
~
f
(
32 i
lj around.
It was just deserted---the aftermath of contamination, used 2
coveralls, and paper coveralls and stuff and we set up a garbage, like I
3l a plastic garbage pit, to throw all this stuff in on one side of the 4
room and starting setting-up and cleaning-up respirators on the other gf side.
i 6!
YUHAS:
These respirators, were they canister type respirators?
7 8I LEACH:
Yes, they were.
We got most of the respirators that we used, g
i I believe came from Berwick, out of their warehouse.
They looked---
10l they were brand new.
There were large purple iodine canisters; on the bottem, charcoal cartridge::.
They seemed to be better than the respirators 12;,
13{
that we had at Three Mile Island.
l 14!
YUHAS:
Okay.
The afternoon, you went back out to survey... well let 151 me see, do you remember about what time you took the IWTS samples?
i 17!
LEACH:
It was--- I can't remember, but I did mark it on the bottles 18; that were sent out.
19i 20f YUHAS:
Did you take any direct radiation measurements on those bottles?
211 22l LEACH:
No, I didn't.
23 l
24i 2sj
$gg W,0
33 y{
YUHAS:
Where did you send the bottles to?
i I
2 l
LEACH:
The bottles were picked up by Bob McCann, or someone that he 3
4j had sent to pick them up, he was the one who requested that I get those samples.
5 6l YUHAS:
Okay.
Do you know where they were counted?
7 al LEACH:
No.
Oh, yes I do.
They took them to the guy in Harrisburg g
.. ?. ?. ?.
1g 111 l
YUHAS:
State Bureau of Radiological Health.
121 i
13)
LEACH:
Yeap.
14!
15',
YUHAS:
Janouski?
16:
17l LEACH:
Janouski, right.
19I YUHAS:
Okay.
In the afternoon you went back out to the 500 KV?
20i t
21l LEACH:
Yes.
22l 23 YUHAS:
Again, were you surveying personnel out there?
24 25:
1 q* s\\
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t i
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l 34 l
LEACH:
Yes, l was, g
i 2!
YUHAS:
And, what sort of things were you finding?
3 4l LEACH:
UM... pretty much the same type of thing.
Personnel were 5
contaminated on their clothes.
Thay were contaminated mostly on their l
clothes.
4 or 5000 counts, usually around there, for the ones that 7
were Contaminated.
i 91 YUHAS:
Okay.
And you worked essentially doing that same thing til 7:00.
11!
12!
LEACH:
Yeah.
13l i
14!
YUHAS:
Did you document the extent and location of contamination on 15 these people?
16; i
17l t
LEACH:
No, we were in a situation where we were just surveying the 181 personnel and trying to get them to wash, in a very small facility in 191 the 500 KEV substation.
All there was there was a sink and just 20j trying to make do with what we had and get the people through it as 21 quickly as possible.
There wers a lot of people coming through.
22 23!
{
YUHAS:
Okay.
But no records were maintained of who you surveyed or 241 i
the extent of their contamination?
25!
s\\b n
t\\ y) c L
i
35 f
LEACH:
Not that I'm aware of.
1 2'
3{
YUHAS:
What was the cutoff point where you were allowing people to go I
4l home with their contaminated clothing?
5 LEACH:
A 1000 counts per, a 100 counts over background was usually 6
i the point at which you would stop somebody from leaving.
7 8
I YUHAS:
Okay.
Do you know that if every person coming out of the site g
proceeded to the 500 KEV to be surveyed?
10l n!
I LEACH:
They were supposed to.
12!
i 13j YUHAS:
Was there any positive steps taken to assure that people, once 14' I
they got to the Northgate, they just didn't take off?
15 16i i
LEACH:
No that I'm aware of.
The times that I came out, I was left 17l to my own free will.
Of course, you would want to go over and find 18t out if you were contaminated.
You would want to know.
191 20!
YUHAS:
Did it seem like a real possibility to you the people came out i
21t and, say, went directly to the observation center rather than going 22 down to 500 KV and get surveyed?
23 d
1\\A i
24 1
J c-'u) 25j C'
i i
i i
i t
i I
[
36 If LEACH:
There may have been instances of that.
We also had monitoring 2
equipment at the observation center that could have done everything 3
that the monitoring equipment at the 500 KEV substation would have done.
4 I
5 YUHAS:
Okay.
When did you finally make the decision that you would el n t return to TMI?
7 8
i LEACH:
I think it was Thursday night.
g 10 YUHAS:
After you got home?
11:
i 12l LEACH:
Yes.
I was considering it during the day on Thursday.
14!
YUHAS:
Was the media's preeantation of what was going on, did that 15i have any bearing on your decision to terminate?
161 17!
i LEACH:
No, not really at all.
The media didn't have any thing to do 1Si with it.
They were lost for the most part.
I didn't feel that the 19!
media knew anywhere near as much as we did about what was going on, 20!
which was very little anyway.
21!
t 22I YUHAS:
When you made this decision did you call Velez or McCann. or 23 any of your 241 25!
t 3
4 )\\
+
3' u
37 i
1!
LEACH:
No.
I didn't have the phone numbers or...
2j 3
YUHAS:
How did you handle the termination, did they call you up the 4l next morning and say where you're at or did you
..?
Si 1
6j LEACH:
No. We left the area that morning, Friday morning, and I 7
stayed with some friends up in Northern Pennsylvania for almost a week.
I sent my letter of resignation down from there.
8 9!
10l YUHAS:
Oh, I see.
- Okay, i
11!
LEACH:
And I didn't really inform anybody until I got back.
I 13l YUHAS:
Okay.
Has a representative of Metropolitan Edison contacted you since your resignation?
16i LEACH:
No.
But I talked to the Personnel Director.
17l l
18!
YUHAS:
Did you initiate that communication?
20\\
l LEACH:
Yes, I did.
21; 22 YUHAS:
And what was the purpose of your discussion with the personnel 23 department?
24l i
25 l
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)
c.,
g, i
I
i 38 i
1, LEACH:
I wanted to call him up and confirm that I had terminated.
I i
2!
wasn't sure whether they had gotten my letter or not.
i 3i i
4 YUHAS:
And what was the Personnel Director response?
Si 61 LEACH:
He was quite calm about it and seem to, he didn't seem angry 7f or anything.
He just was very businesslike about it and wanted to i
g wrap things up neatly, it seems.
9i YUHAS:
Okay.
Do you know what your accumu ative whole-body exposure 101 l
is to date?
' 1!
12j 13l LEACH:
I'm not sure, I think its somewhere in the vicinity of 5 rem.
14!
YUHAS:
And that would be about five years worth of work?
15 16i LEACH:
g Yes, somewhere in that vicinity.
IS!
YUHAS:
Okay.
Have you ever exceeded 1.25 rem per calendar quarter?
g; 20!
LEACH:
No, I don't think so.
21l l
22l l
YUHAS:
I'd like to talk just a few minutes about some basic percep-23l I
tions of the health physics department at TMI.
Was there a sufficient 24l 25l number of dose-rate type instruments available to personnel in the l
initial stages of the emergency?
0 1
P 39 i
yf LEACH:
No.
I don't think so, I couldn't find one when I got there and I thought that I should have one.
2 3l YUHAS:
Okay.
Can you offer an explanation for where the ins +.rumenta-g tion was?
g Was it down for repairs frcm the Unit 1 outage, or you just didn't have that big a bulk available or..?
06 7
8 line for repairs.
There were quite a few instruments that were supposed to be repaired, but they weren't sure if they could do it or not and 10l they were holding on to them to see if they could repair them.
I
,1; 2.
I believe there was a lot of instruments in Unit 2 but the area was 12l t
inaccessible that morning.
We couldn't get to any of them.
13!
14i YUHAS:
Are you familiar with any difficulties wit.n maintaining the 15i operability of the teletector survey instruments?
161 17l LEACH:
The only difficulties that I ever had with that instrument 18; were getting readings sometimes when I pull out the extendaole probe.
19{
Sometimes the needles would jump around a little bit.
And also in 20; very hot areas, sometimes we would have trouble with that instrument, 21 which makes it virtually worthless inside a reactor building type 2 25 situation because it usually about 150 in there anyway, between a 100 23 and a 150, and any type of instrument that is heat sensitive you 24l would have problems with.
I had heard of other people having trouble 25!
i ey Q n
c.u a a
e i
f I
{
40 llj with them in hot areas, hot thermal areas and I never really had that much trouble with it.
I thought that the teletector was one of the 2
better instruments that we had.
3 4I YUHAS:
Who is in positive control of the emergency teams? Who were ti you taking your orders from?
7l LEACH:
The emergency control station and that's it.
I don't know who 81 it was.
I believe it was John Banks who was working the emergency Sl I
control station.
I thought I recognized his voice.
10!
11l YUHAS:
Okay.
How are doing on time?
12l 13 LEACH:
About two minutes at most.
14l 15 YUHAS:
OKay.
Let me go ahead and break the tape now.
I don't want 16i to ask another qucstion and get cut off in the middle.
The time is 17!
i 1:22.
181 19f YUHAS:
The time is 1:25 p.m., this is a cantinuation of the interview 20 with 21l Thomas J. Leach.
I'd like to give you.the opportunity row to exr:ess 22' l
any comments or criticisms about the program at TMI.
23 24i l
25j g r 13 'J 1, } 9 L
u i
j i
i
{
41 LEACri:
Well, I would have like to have seen, during the most of the l{
2 time that I worked down there, I would have like to have seen better training for the people that worked there.
I thought that the personnel 3
that were employed, for the most part, were undertrained and many 4
c!
times put in charge of situations that I don't believe they had a full d
6l knowledge of what was involved.
Workers were working in radiation areas not knowing the differences between the types of radiation and contamination that they could pick up, or in fact, the difference g
between radiation and contamination.
I think that all of the people 91 that worked down there should be better educated.
10l l
11l YUHAS:
Let me interject there.
10 CFR Part 19 requires that workers 128 be informed of radiation and its possible hazards, its presence and j
whereabouts, all this sort of thing.
Wasn't that information being 14!
conveyed to the workers?
15, 16i j
LEACH:
I think they could have gotten a copy of the 10 CFR 19 somewhere 17 at Three Mile Island, if they'd wanted to, but I don't ever rememoer 18i them, the management, making a point of getting the workers to read 19!
that document.
20j i
21l YUHAS:
No.
You're missing my point.
19 is the regulation that 22l I
requires that they be trained.
It doesn't say what they have know.
23l' It just says the licensee is responsible for instructing them in the 24!
I hazards of radiation and the~.e's five or six topics.
Are there instances 25; i
I
I i
[
42 that you know of where workers were permitted to enter and work in 2j radiation areas and they had not been told of the relative hazards or the difference between contamination and radiation and these sort of 3
things that your mentioning?
5
^
Si they were given the HP course tha everyone down there has to undergo, 7
but it didn't seem that when the workers were working there, it didn't seem like they took the information seriously.
They just, a lot of them seem to feel that radiation was a myth almost something that just t
10l l
didn't exist.
They didn't worry about it.
And seems to be the same ll!
I type of psychology as the coal miners have about working around coal 12l dust, from what I've seen in interviews with them.
13 14[
i YUHAS:
Is there any specific instances come to mind where workers 15l were taking unnecessary exposure and you had to counsel them or ask them to be more careful or to leave an area until they were to do the 171 I
job?
18l 19i LEACH:
Well, it was, that's what the health physicist was for in a 20' i
nuclear power plant, to teli people when their doing something wrong.
21i It was a matter of daily course to tell people to be more careful with 22i radioactive materials or to whatever the situation would entail.
23 Asking people to leave an area because the dose rate was too high or 24 telling them to wash their hands when they're done working with some piece of equipment.
Suggestions like that were made all the time.
O i ?.) 7 L L. U )
43 i
YUHAS:
You appear to indicate that this was a chronic problem.
I Didn't your supervision, or the licensee management---did you make them aware that you felt the people was not being responsive to the I
needs of radiation safety?
i Si LEACH:
I never made any official type comment to any of the management about it, no.
71 l
a!
YUHAS:
Did you document those instances of where you had to repeatedly counsel individuals as to not using good radiation safety practices or 10 procedures?
11:
1 12l l
LEACH:
.No.
We had forms to be filled out in the event of a noncompliance 131 i
with the HP department, but they were very rarely used.
It was just a 14!
slip of paper and you would-- you didn't want to create any negative 15i feeling between yourself and the workers that worked there by doing 16i something like that, by reprimanding someone officially with a written 171 I
notice that they had done something wrong, if you could correct the 18j situation just by telling them about it.
19j 20' l
YUHAS:
You give me the impression though, that these forms were 21I rarely used then, if though there were repeated instances of noncompliance I
22l with Health Physics department instructions.
Is that true?
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LEACH:
They were very rarely used, yes.
They were very rarely used.
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YUHAS:
Were there repeated instances of noncompliance with health 3
physics department instructions?
5 LEACH:
I wouldn't say they were intentional, they were things that 61 people were doing that they weren't really aware of that they were doing things wrong.
8l 9l YUHAS:
Were there instances were licensed operators for instance 10!
entered lock High Radiation Areas, without first getting the permission of the HP supervisor as required by procedures?
13 LEACH:
I don't believe so.
I didn't---I wasn't aware of any instances 14!
like that.
15, 16i YUHAS:
Do you have any reason to believe that any individual or group 17!
of individuals may have intentionally caused improper valve lineup, or 18j improper maintenance, or securing of vital equipment connected with i
19l this incident or any time previous to this incident?
20!
21I LEACH:
I have no reason to believe it, no.
22' 23 YUHAS:
Unless you have any thing else to say I think we've covered 24 j
it.
I certainly appreciate your cooperation in coming here today and 25l I
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45 1
talking with us and I hope things work out for you in your new prospects ahead.
2l i
3l 4l Thank you.
51 The time is 13:31 and this is concluding the interview with Mr. Thomas J.
6 Leach.
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