ML19274G125
| ML19274G125 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 04/12/1979 |
| From: | Dubiel D, Hilbish J, Geoffrey Miller METROPOLITAN EDISON CO. |
| To: | |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7908290695 | |
| Download: ML19274G125 (51) | |
Text
.l UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 1
In the Matter of:
l 2'
IE TMI INVESTIGATION INTERVIEW 3
of Mi. Dick Dubiel, Supervisor Radiation Protection and Chemistry Nuclear Mr. Jchn Hilbish 4
Mr. Gary Miller 5
6 7
8 Trailer #203 9
NRC Investigation Site TMI Nuclear Power Plant 10 Middletown, Pennsylvania 11 April 12,1979 12 (Date of Interview) 13 July 3,1979 (Date Transcript Typea) 14 99 15 (Tape Number (s))
16l 17l l
18l 191 1
20 21!
NRC PERSONNEL:
(
'22l Bob Long K
23 24j fx 25i 2002 345
e 1
Bob Long conversation at 3:25 on the 12th of April with Dick Dubiel, 2
John Hilbish and Gary Miller.
3 4
Okay the morning it started, on March 28, I was down in the HP 5
lab, I had been called in first of all.
Back up, I was called about 4:30 at home, told to come in, did not know any indicaticn or have any 6
indication what the problem was other than we had turbine and reactor 7
trip in Unit 2.
I imctdiately got up, got dressed, it took me about a g
half hour so somewhere around 5:00 o' clock I came in, into the control g
room of Unit 2 and was told by George Kunder that the, we had unusual 10l
-.currences in the reactor building. He really did not describe to me 3
any details other than he was very interested in getting a reactor y
building atmosphere sample and make preparations for a reactor building 13 entry.
I got the technician, we went down, we tried to get a sample f
off the HPR227, which is the reactor building atmosphere monitor, and 15j as w pened up the charcoal or the iodine monitor holding a charcoal 16 cartridge, a large amount of water came out.
Immediately closed it
,8l!
back up and with the amount of water in there my first thought was 1
that we had some type of a steam environment in the reactor building g
~
atmosphere causing the condensation in the sample lines o,f water in the monitor.
So I called George and told him we did not, could not get a sample off that monitor, it was full of water and he told me at the time that we were running into problems with a boron sample.
They had run a boron and it came out a number of about 700 ppm, he wanted me to check that because we first of all, we're running about 1050 25 i
2002 N f
P
f 2
1 while the plant was critical or at power just prior to the trip.
2 And they wanted to verify that we had, what our boron concentration 3
was so I immediately went over to the Unit 2 or Unit 1 HP Lab 4
5 Is this yours?
6 Yes.
7 8
I didn't need it, I just looked at it.
g 10 I went over to the HP Lab in Unit 1, gota, talked to the technician ll!
that ran a sample and he said he felt pretty confident of the 700 g
number but since he had been on from 11:00 to 7:00 that night he was a 13 little bit tired and he thought, inaybe he did screw up.
He wanted to have someone else verify it.
So I grabbed a second tech and I asked 15!
ea em run a samp e, grab one, one sample, split it and each 16 of them un the analysis.
They did that.
They got about 400 ppm 17 each. I think there are about 5 ppm off on the two analyses.
IS[
19l This is the kind of group we are going to assemble, right.
20l i
21l This is all, yea 22 23 You know 24 25l 2002 547 t
y 3
1 I know you can't help it, you know a guy like me, I always get 2
nailed for these interviews on a day when I am being shoved around.
3 4
I know.
5 6
Then somebody makes a (profanity) tape and I never see it.
7 You'll see this one.
8 9
Okay, I am just telling you I am going to get to a point wh:re I'm 10 going to stop talking to people.
n 12 un erstand.
13 14
- Okay, I'm... You can just (profanity) them right up the line, 15l second thing is somebody better, maybe they have, better put together the documentation that exists for the notifications and things that were made before it is gone.
19 That's what I really need.
21 The problem all going to have is we're going to get killed, that day, hour by hour, I had so many (profanity) people on the phone with me, looking for me, I was in the Lieutenant Governor's office.
24 25, l
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1; I know.
2' 3
And I know six months from now in some cool hearing room it's 4
going to sound like I don't know what I did and I don't.
And yet I I
S know I didn't run the thing off the tracks.
6 7
Right.
I think that the thing that we don't have is maybe what 8
some one had put together for us because, chat chronology that you 9
have looked at is really talking about the reactor crisis.
10 That's right.
11 12 And Decamp and Arnold and Herbein are saying, hey, we'll getting 13 pressure about did we notify people, how did we make a decision.
15l 9"Y' "9 9' 16 stuff you are making up now.
7 18i Oh yea.
19l 20 Are you sure Herman going to give it to u.s.
f 22l Yes.
23 24 25 l
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5 1l Without that I am going to make an issue of it, because Jesu:
2 Christ, you know, it's the only thing I've got, I got to refamilarize 3
myself with this stuff.
4 5
Yea, I know.
6 7
Here's the status of this thing here.
We started review with the 8
but the VP and He: man last night, they said, hey, you got some conjectures in here, we'll going to have to but they said take that out and only g
give us stuff that you can actually document either from the control 10 room logs or from an interview, not something you infer and we're to yy.
have that to them tomorrow afternoon and then it's to go on the street y
as soon as they have said okay. And that's what we are working toward.
14, 15 16l And I just got direct orders from Decamp that says I've got to keep that contained...
i 18l l
19l The way, the way I just talked to the NRC yesterday and today, why don't you let me give my version of it in stages like I'll take you from 4:00 to 8:00, and I won't go through the details of the trip but I'll take you where I was from 4:00 to 8:00 and let them fill in till 8:00 o' clock and then go from 8:00 to 12:00.
24 2s!
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1 Okay, but remember I am only trying to focus on, and I think it 2
will save all of your time, I am only trying to focus on the decision 3
to initiate site emergency, the decision to initiate general emergency, 4
what you based those on, when you did them as well as we can identify 5
that, who did them, who called who.
6 7
Before we leave here we want a copy of these things.
8 g
Well he's out, since I've got to go to an appointment here.
10 Yes, this is George Seelinger, or Jim, Jim Seelinger, right.
11 12 SEELINGER:
I'll talk a little bit and I've got it to you a little 13 chronologically, I got called at a quarter to six, in the morning and g
15ll had been told that Unit 2 had tripped.
I am the Unit 1 superintendent 1gj and frankly just the fact that they tripped it was not totally unusual sort of thing.
Gary said that there was, that they were having some kind of a problem with pressurizer level that didn't make it sound like, at that point there were no real cause for abnormal amount of alarm but he did say, you know, don't give Unit 2 any trouble about steam, Unit I was hot at that time and we were recovering from a refueling outage and the auxiliary boiler can only supply feedwater heating to one of the two units at a time.
So, I immediately got on the phone and thought well we have a shift supervisor.on both units 24 due to this circumstance so that I'll call the shift supervisor and 25 l
2002 351 i
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1 tell him, hey don't give Unit 2 any trouble.
The steam goes to Unit 2
2.
And so I tried to call him and he was in the Unit 2 contr'ol room.
3 I though ch gaz he was over there so I can't reach him and I am not 4
going to bother them in the middle of this thing if they are having 5
problems.
And so I waited ten more minutes and I knew my supervisor 6
of operations would be in by about that time, I tried to call again.
7 And I said yea he's in but he's over in Unit 2 and I thought oh my 8
g sh, y,u know, so they really do have some problems.
So I thought g
well I better go in and make sure that nobody gives Unit 2 any trouble 10 about getting steam.
That was still my objective as I started out and 11 I g t on sight at about a quarter to seven in the morning.
And as I went from the side pass between the security building and the front 12, doors for Unit 1 the word site emergency came over the public address 13 system, so it was between a quarter to seven and ten minutes to seven g
the site emergency was declared.
Cause I remember, I dumped my stuff off at my office, and then I started running the other way, not because I wanted to run the other way but I forgot to pick up my TLD and I g
I knew I was going to be, wherever I was~ going to be a long time, so I 18f figured I better have my TLD with me, so I went back to the security 19l center, got my TLD, ran to the Unit I control room, which is where I 20 am suppose to be, and also I had seen Joe Lo,an's car in the parking lot, he's the Unit 2 superintendent, so I figured, (1) I knew was I
probably the Unit 2 problem because Unit 2 was having a problem and p) I knew that the opposite unit superintendent is supposed to go and 24 take charge his respective control room, so I went to the Unit 1 2002 352 i
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control room and from the Unit I control room started to try, and 2
here's where it is foggy, in terms of what we tried to do now.
But we 3
pulled out the emergency plan, I remember that, started to fc ilow the 4
emergency pian, and started to try to do some of the offsite.:ommunicating 5
and here's where it gets foggy as if whether we were doing that or 6
Unit 2 was totally doing that.
In addition to that we broke out all 7
the iscplates and the area maps, and started trying to track the plume 8
as best we could. And establish in the necessary communications with Unit 2 per the plan.
Now that happened in relatively rapid fashion g
10 and we were pretty set up and rolling with respect to that by, weel we were set up and rolling by essentially 7:00 o' clock, five after seven.
g 12 Were you in Unit 1 at that time.
3 14i SEELINGER:
I was in Unit 1.
I don't know what time I got to Unit 2,
.S;
.t 16l but somebody finally called me over there.
17 I called you over there.
ISI 19l SEELINGER:
You called me over there.
20 21 I got here, I got cas... at a quarter of seven.
I have been on the phone since 4:00, I was suppose to go to Oyster Creek.
23 24 25 l
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Yea, John, Floyd's up there.
2 3
He is up at the control room.
4 He was.
5 6
Okay.
7 8
Hey, do you want me to call up there ahead of time.
g 10 Give me one second.
i 12i SEELINGER:
At any rate, I was in the Unit 1 control room about, i
somewhere betwsen a half hour and forty-five minutes, I think.
An 14j Gary calls me over to Unit 2 and I was in Unit I alternated between 15l the two control rooms the remainder of the day.
And the reason for that was, that periodically I was in charge of the emergency contro!
17lI station, the ECS, the first day, and Unit 2, when Unit 1 became uninhabitable, 18j l
the picts moved over to Unit 2 and then they moved back to Unit 1 when 191 Unit 1 became in habitable again.
It was a matter of habitability 20j i
that first day.
The, in the middle, this is very confused because the 21 events ran together something fierce, time wise, but I do remem"er 22 that we ended up evacuating the normal ECS, which was the HP point, 23 that went to the Unit 1 control room.
Unit I control room had to be 24 evacuated as an ECS because everybody was in masks over there for 25 l
l 2002 354 l
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awhile.
Then that moved over to the Unit 2 control room, eventually 2
we got back to the Unit 1 control room and I don't remember the time 3i frame. The, these, I
4 51 Are you using this...
6 7
SEELINGER:
What, no, I was going to because it's about the only thing 8
factual that I had.
9 10 What I did, George Printer was in the Unit 2 control room and George 11 is probably one of the people that in my mind, I think you ought to be g
talking to, to give you a feel for some of the scenerio but these are 13 the calls that George had made.
You'll find that almost all of those went from the point of site emergency just immediately - for arrangements 15!
Down to the general emergency.
17 Y"9~
18 19!
I got called, I was on the phone from 4:00 o' clock on, Okay.
i 20' Somewhere around 6:00 o' clock I even had a conference call Herbein, Lee Rogers, me and George Kunter who happened to be in the control room.
Quarter to seven, I had made the decision at that point not to go to Oyster Creek.
Is that thing on.
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11 1
Yea.
2 3
OK.
Quarter to seven, I got I call from Dan Shovlin, okay.
In 4
between there I believe I called Seelinger, 5
6 SEELINGER:
He called me at a quarter of seven.
7 8
I called Joe, Dan Shovlin and I had sort of told them to get their gl ass in here.
Jim must have been on the way, Dan was on the way, Dan I
g t here before I did.
I never got a chance to get a shower is the 10 reason I wasn't able to get in the car.
And I really didn't realize 11 the magreitude of it, I was just trying to feel like I was, you know, 12 feel like an all person and start to work.
Quarter to seven Dan 3
called me and Dan's not an ooerator. Dan said hey, there's radiation, g
he said the sample room got's it.
He said we got 1 R in the machine 15 16l shop, might have said hot machine shop, either way its some place I l
didn't expect 1 R.
Then I started getting my ass in gear to go to I
work.
By the time I got here, it was probably around five after 18}
seven, roughly.
When I got here they had apparently, had already 19l I
declared a site emergency and at that point in the Unit 1 control room I think Seelinger was, and he was helping with that end of it and in the Unit 2 control room there was Joe Logan, Dick Dubiel, Mike Ross, George Kunder and Lee Rogers came in or he was there.
24 25l 1
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1 12 1
Excuse me, would Kunder have been the senior man, would he have i
2 31 He is the technical superintendent.
I 41 5
W uld he have been the one who declared the site emergency, probably.
6 7
Probably but it could have 8
SEELINGER:
Yea, I talked to George on the phone and I suspect that g
e rge, George is the one who initially 0
11 I believe Bill Zewe declared it.
I believe Bill Zewe declared it r had George declare it on the basis of the number of monitors in 3
alarm.
14j t
15; I
Okay.
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17 That's what I was told here.
18 19 Okay.
21 When I got here we were obviously in an increasing radiation 22 situation moni+. ors, every monitor was going off.
The dome monitor was 23 beginning to register and I don't know what time it happened exactly, 24 my memory is that around seven twenty or seven twenty-five we passed 251 l
2002 357 l
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13 1:
through 8R and I declared a general emergency and we, at the time that 2,i I got to the control room, I got briefed and I got to the control 3
room, what I did, was I said all right I am in charge of the emergency, 4
I am the emergency director, I said Mike Ross you'll take care of the 5
plant I'll only talk to you about the plant, Dick Dubiel you run the 6
offsite and onsite thing, the interface with the State, and so forth, 7
and communicate with me.
I told Joe Logan to get the plan out.
I 8
told George Kunder to start the notifications as I remember, or get g
them started. So right away, the way I run the drill here is I talk to three or four senior guys and which is the way we run the drill and I 10 only talk to them.
The operators probably didn't even know what I was yy doing, I would guess.
And that's the way it started.
My memory is that we had calls going to that whole bunch, the NRC, the State, 3
within that first ten to fifteen minutes from 7:00 o' clock on everybody g
- '^
- 15 16 Just so it gets on the tape, you know, maybe we should read it for the tape.
And this is reconstructed from the logs of the guys who did the calling.
0650, site emergency declared.
19l 20' Excuse me Jim which logs, and are those still in the control room.
22 I think this was still on the board up in the control room.
John did you look.
24l u
i 251 2002 358 l
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It's still there this afternoon.
2, 3
It's still on the board when they called them in, these guys 4
reconstructed this essentially from them between looking at the board, 5
the times the noiifications were made and these guys being the guys 61 that did the calling, remembering what they called, versus the times on the board.
Here's what they put together for us.
CC50 site emergency 7
declared.
0702 unable to contact Pennsylvania Civil Defense Duty 8
Officer.
0704 NRC notified, no one there but secretary to beep Outy g
Officer.
Approximately 0705 attempt to notify Herbein.
10 11 Excuse me, Jim can I stop you just a couple of places.
13 Yea.
15l Which NRC.
16 17 That would have been King of Prussia, I am sure.
18i i
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Okay.
- 20l, I
2 11 Okay, 0705 attempted to notify Herbein, unable to contact him.
22 0709 ERDA RAP team notified.
Approximately 0709 attempted to notify 23 lawyer, can't get him.
0710 notified Klingerman in Met Ed.
0713 24 called Radiation Management Corp. in Philadelphia Electric number, 25i l
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15 1l answering service will forward number.
0715 notified Dauphin County 2
Civil Defense.
Approximately 0715 notified Pennsylvania Bureau of 3
Health.
0717 York Haven notifed, York Haven monitor on.
b 5
6 Let me tell you what happened there in case it is not on there.
I 7
knew the wind was blowing towards Goldsboro, I had a 10R projection at 8
Goldsboro, somewhere in the sequence we had the meter pulled and read g
and we had the State Police Helicopter called and that should be in there.
10 lli It may be as I read on, but I remember that the State Police Helicopter g
I 13l And they were over there by 7:30.
i 15) 6)!
0718 notifed Pennsylvania State Police.
Approximately 0720 attempted 1.
to contact ANI, no answer.
0724 general emergency declared.
Approximately 18{!
0730 called back the RAPP team, they will ba dispatching a team to the i
site.
Approximately 0730 contacted State Police and notifed general 19!
emergency.
Approximately 0735 notified ANI, no one there except for 201 operator, left message for them to call us and that it was important.
0738 recalled Radiation Management Corporation, Philadelphia Electric, to tell them of the general emergency, they will forwird message.
Approximately 0740 NRC returned call. They will be dispatching a team 24 to the site.
Phone was held open so they could be in constant communication 25 i
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16 with us.
1, Approximately 0930 ANI returned the phone call and were 2
notified of the general emergency.
3 4
Now I don't know whether it's on your thing or ne; 5
6 The only person that is 0702, Director Keven Malloy was called.
This hs.s been verified with Civil Defense.
0704 Civil Defense called 7
BRH.
8 9
I verified this with BRH, this is Cegaras, today.
0707 Met Ed 10, again called Civil Defense.
12 Okay.
g 14 9*
15 to tell me they had personally talked to Kevin Mulloy and I even had Kunder called him at home.
17 18l 0707 is when you asked, you told me that we had not got a call 19 back from BRH and I got on the phone and called Kevin Malloy.
I 20 personally talked to him in the Civil Defense Office, told him to get 21 somebody from the BRH on the phone back to us, gave them the telephone 22 numbers, 6017 number, within ten minutes there was a phone call back 23 and from that point on we established an open line.
24 25l i
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Okay I have one other note here and this is from George at home.
2!
George said that at 0740 the BRH called back and Jeroski was talking, 3
George was on the phone with Jeroski and George gave him a run down of 4
the plant's status and we kept the open line just like you reguested.
5 6
Right, now I got the helicopter because the wind was blowing in 7
its worst condition to me like two mile an hcur less, and that meant that it would reach Goldsboro and we had the 10R projection that had 8
first been given to me which is based on a source term out of t.;e g
building, out of the monito" of the building, that I was in trouble.
10 So we sent the helicopter, the meter was read and had nothing, the helicopter was over there and I don't know why there was none on there.
We ought to make sure that the log., of these state agencies are a part of this documentation because they've got to show what I l
did.
I don't know if it has been done yet but these guys all keep 15; 16l; logs the Civil Defense keeps logs, the State Police keeps logs and they de it normally.
They do it in emergencies. They are not like us.
I know I had no readings over there.
I Nd no readings and I had a l
guy at the west shoreline too, with no readings.
19{
20!
We had a guy out, between the screen houses on the west shore 21 which I believe 22l 23 Had a team dispatched in a car and had a team dispatched in a 24 helicopter, in the direction of the plume.
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The car would take approximately an hour to get over there.
2 3
It was 7:30 in the morning, that's why I asked for a helicopter.
4 The helicopter came right away.
S g
I remember that.
7 g
I don't know why that isn't in any of this, it's got to be in a g
log somewhere but it was confirmed to me it was here, it was dispatched.
10 Do we know where off hand maybe you do Dick, I don't, we had the 11 phone talkers, I continually remember that, the first couple of days, g
trying to get the phone talkers to write down absolutely everything 13l they heard, because..
I don't know what happened to Don Berry's Log.
15 16i Ig The one thing I can say is there was a box in the control room 18l l
it.
Now... I have a feeling that that's where the phone talkers log 19!
and everything else probably ended up in there.
Remember..
21, There was only the boxes in the control room got to Brottin's trailer.
23 1
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Brotten's probably, there was nothing left in mine.
2, 3
And then those have been transfered over to in the trailer 26, at 4
the observation center.
5 6
S mebody better look in there for any of these you got to look for 7
logs and phone talkers and things of this morning.
8 Now, one other thing is, now you're talking about all this occurring g
in the time from when I got here until a quarter till 8.
Management 10 was notified and what I also had done around that same time, was I had either, I had Logan going through the plans, telling me that everything in the plan was met. That's why I aksed you to read the plan before you came down here, because there were things going on, I'm sure, that 14,,
was confirmed to me that I don't remember.
I would only have worried 15i about exceptions.
17 And I was involved in that same action too.
19l At the same time, when I first came in and got briefed on this, I 20l also realized that the situation we were in was one that I don't ever.
21 remc.mber being trained en and that is, the pressurizer was solid, the locos went steam bubbles in them and the pumps wouldn't run, and there 23 were attempts made to start the pumps somewhere in that scenerio, in 24l that same time frame, and we had like a 100 amps, we knew we were 25' t
2003 004 i
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running on less than water.
That may have gone on before I got to the 2.
control room.
3 4
That's sequence is what the other guys have put together.
5 That's right but I at that time, decided that once the emergency 6
drill was running and we had offsite and onsite things going on and 7
the ECS was moving and the State was moving then we turned our attention 8
to the plant, in an hour by hour fashion and I brought Seelinger to g
Unit 2 because of his qualifications on Unit 2 being that he spent a 0
year as a technical superintendent down there, and that I had Lee Rogers there and I had Seelinger and I had Ross and I had Logan helping l
with the plan. What I basically did was every twenty to forty minutes 131 we met in a room back there and assessed where we were and where we 14 15l were going to go.
And Dubiel handled his end of it with offsite, I
onsite communications with the State, with Maggie and then I also at 161 the same time, there were calls from Herbein, there were calls from 17l I
Persippany, there were calls from Lynchburg, the whole thing got 18i compressed into a very pressurized almost break you type atmosphere.
19!
i 20l l
Did, do you use these check lists and are they initialed, are they 21l' somewhere, You know.
22 23 Perhaps you... check this over for a second.
24 25 2003 005 i
I f
21 1
This is out of the bi',.; umes of the emergency procedures.
2 3
No as a matter of fact there is changes, is this an up-to-date?
+
5 It doesn't look like an up-to-date one.
'6 7
It is suppose to be, but it might not be.
8 g
You also go to Washington to get out Unit 1 information on the emergency plan. It ain't...
10 11 I am sure that this is not the up-to-date plan.
This checklist g
is 1974.
3 14j I'm p sitive.
You've got to get current a copy of the two volumes 15
- "9'"'#
16 l
17' Okay.
Where do I do that.
I was...
18}
l 19l You've got to get it through Bill Parker, I would guess.
Bill Bolie trying to get...
22 This is what Bill Parker gave me.
24 251 i
2003 006 i
I
22 1
That can't be right.
What...
2 3
You know, I brought a copy.
I didn't bring the whole two volumes.
4 5
Yes.
I know...
What we're following was right out of Section II.
6 1670.2...
7 That in there.
g 9
1670.3 wnich would be Site Emergency and General Emergency Procedures.
10 11 But you didn't, you didn't follow the checklist.
g, 13 Whether or not anyone checked off all of the actions, they were spelled as if there were a checklist.
16{
What we did do is, because I remember physically doing this, is I went to the procedure, the heavy procedures essentially the Site 18t l
Emergency Procedure, there is very little difference between the Site 19 Emergency and the General Emergency Procedure, and I went through this, item by item, and I read each item and then I verified by looking around.
22 23 This is 1670.2.
Okay.
24 25 l
l 2003 007 i
23 1
I went through that and I made sure that everything that was in i
2 here was physically being done.
Then I went over and I looked at 3
1670.3 and I priodically got distracted from this so I had somebody 4
pick it up when I was not there, a Senior Guard and I can't tell you 5
who it was right now because it changed.
But, I physically made sure 6
that everything that was written down here was in fact being done, or 7
in progress.
That's essentially how we did that.
As far as the ffsite notifications goes, the fellows who made that call made it in 8
accordance with the, there's a thing in here...
g 10 Telephone list.
3 12 Yeah.
Immediately in accordance with that.
3 14.
l Yeah.
That's...
15i i
16i That's the one that we used.
This is referenced information right here...
18!
191 Okay.
You're gonna make a copy of that stuff for me.
21{
I'll make a copy of this stuff, for you, that's right.
But se used 22 1670.2 and 1670.3 to confirm where we were and to make sure we were 23 doing r.'arything in accordance with that.
I felt like, we had this drill yearly and I guess I've been involved in about four of them now.
25l 2003 003
24 1
I ran the first one the year I was first on site.
We usually come off 2
on the drill pretty well.
We usually get some compliments on the 3
drill, particularly from a fellcw by the name of Chick Gallina, who 4
used to be the primary inspector, and I felt like, as I saw us go 5
through *.ne thing even though the pressure was intense, as Gary has described.
Our drilling had really paid off, I mean there was not, a 6
7 real element of confusion at all as far as the Emergency Plan was concerned. We were carrying out the notifications as prescribed, we 8
were doing everything just completly as written down.
We always t
g Wondered if We ever had one of these things what we would do when the wind blew from east to west, because transportation is terrible, to the west shore from here.
You have to go around.
When Gary was just right on top of that with his helicopter, you know what I mean, it was
,3 2
during the rush hour sr.d (unintelligible)... that really showed some 14!
I presence of mine, I thought I didn't realize he had done that last 15, thing. The helicopter thing, but boy that came.
17 When I came through the license nearings in Unit 2, I realized the 181 i
vunerability 0.1 the west shore in my own mind or what I felt to be 19!
i vuneraoility.
At ten after seven in the morning and I remember, I went, we dry run the helicopter this year and it was there that morning.
I I feel, and of course that would be very...
22 23' I was able to tell within the first hour that there was nothing to 24 l
the west shore boundary, nothing in Goldsboro.
Nothing.
25j l
2003 009 i
i
25 1
Right.
2 3
That's all I worry about.
4 5
You mentioned the 8 rem, is that one of the conditions...
6 7
That's one of the general emergency conditions.
There was about 8
three or four things in there for Site Emergency, 125 at the site.
g That's so many times on the stack vent and 8R in the building and I, and the building was going above 8R.
That was the first thing that I 10 remember, that stack probably...
11 12 What were the first specific action levels?
3 14 The first one is the double monitor read screener reads greater 5
than 8R per hour.
17 That the one that triggered.
i 18l 19i That's the one that triggered the General Emergency.
21 Okay, not long after that, that went off scale.
That's another one, but, you know.
24l 25!
,l i
2003 010
{
26 1
Is that an alarm that's printed out anywhere so there might be a 2
record of the...
3 4
Yes, as a matter of fact it is on a strip chart, Don Ruthford had 5
copies of all the strip charts a couple days ago.
6 7
I've got those too.
8 One of the things I have never had is the benefit of looking at g
any documentation to see whether any of the times I gave were anywhere 10 near accurate.
Okay? So what I give I've told the NRC is to the best of memory.
Those hours went by, those 20 or 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br /> in a very fast fashion, and when I woke up Thursday morning I couldn't remember any i
of it.
I was even, you know, I was at the Lt. Governor's office at 2 14:
I in the afternoon.
15j 16l See, I think you fellows have told me and this should be,... be able to let me tell th.: most of what I need is..
18l l
19l (Unintelligible) I don't believe that if we hadn't had, I believe the kind of capability we kept here, kept the State out of as much 21.
trouble as anybody because we were able to man teams, to give them 22 advice, to put teams out, to respond, to tell people positively where 23 the readings were, before they ever came on with any kind of, the NRC 24 or anyone.
25 i
i 2003 011 i
27 1.
That's the other thing that I was going to ask you about.
Is the 2
survey that was going on, did, that was something Dick was in charge 3
of?
Getting people out....
4 5
On or off is 6
7 (Unintelligible) 8 On or off site teams.
Radio communications to those
.ams.
The g
ECS, Dick is overall charge, remember there that's why we gotta look 10j f r any ECS documentations.
There was a guy in charge of the ECS, ll probably Mulleavy...
13 I was initially part of...
15!
You were initially.
They have a whole, they get the isopress out 16 I
17!
What we were doing 'is, we were taking all the readings from the 18l radio, they were on slips of paper, and I can't even remember if that 19) was the first or the second day, but I started logging all those readings down.
Now, I have some of tne early logs...
22l (Unintelligible) 24!
i 25l i
i 2003 012 I
1
28 1
I have copies of some logs but they con't start till, the ones I 2
just saw started, I believe, at 1900 on the EPth.
3 4
I wouldn't be surprised if that was log type...
5 Yeah.
6 7
It doesn' t include the slips of paper... '
8 9
In the early hours of this event and through the afternoon, I 10 don't remember anything offsite (unintelligible)...
12 One of the reasons for that...
I 14ly The wind stopped.
16l The winds shifted died 17 18l Dead.
19 l
20 Then it went... swirled 21 22 We had it on site.
I was more worried about where people were 23 assemblied.
We moved people in assembly areas. And I discnarged 24 people from the gates to go home because of the fact that the wind was 25 stagnant and the control room weren't getting it.
I 2003 013
29 1
We had one indication of a re ding which, as a matter of fact in
-8 2
Goldsboro they had an indicate of an iodine level that was 10
,y
-8 3
don't remember what the exact number was, it was 10 level which I 4
was very hesitant to believe because of the SAM-2.
We immidiately 5
made arrangements to get the sample flown up to the State, made arrangements 6
for the helicopter to take it to, I believe.... the Holy Spirit Hospital, 7
at Camp Hill....
8 (Unintelligible)... I forgot all about that g
10 I was thinking of that earlier....
11 12 It was that the Holy Spirit Hospital at Camp Hill and the state 13 picked it up there.
They analyzed it and determined that it was less g
than their MDA, which was extremely low.
The levels at the fences over here on the west shore, we did start seeing some levels.
I don't 6
remember...
18{
l 6 mR, 6-7 mrR at that pipe... that sort of thing.
But nothing in 191 l
Goldsboro and then the wind died and shifted.
It shifted east..., it shifted south 21, 22 (Unintelligible)...
24 25 2003 014
30 1,
We had the helicopter who brought the guys back.
2 f
3 We had readings being taken over at the observation center after a while.
4 t
5 6
The highest levels that I remember were in the evening of the 7
first day and they were taken north of the airport along either 230 or 283, north of the airport.
8 9
Yeah.
10 11!
And there were readings as high as 12 or 13 mR/hr.
There was a school that's northeast of the Turnpike interchange, over there maybe half a mile or three quarters of a mile...
15)
Yeah.
16i l
17l l
Yeah, they're east of the interchange and that was at 12 or 13 mR/hr.
And that was the highest offsite reading, I think, tnroughout j
the entire...
20-21 I guess, Gary, you've already identified it is a problem and li, 22 may be that we needed to try to do something to get all of the notes 23 the people have together.
24:
25 i
2003 015 i
i f
B 31 1
Yeah.
My problem is that...
2 3
What I my job is data, management is to try to da get all the 4
stuff assembled, make sure we got it in a file and I've gotten a lot 5
f pecple working to do that.
We didn't get it started probably soon 6l enough because some things were out there in the trailer and people 7
come and go and, but even now in this emergency thing, this may be the g
most important one when you look at the offsite impact, how did we handle....
g 10 (Unintelligible)... I also encourage you to get people's notes..
g i
12 Yeah.
I've already got that note...
3 14!
151
-- Because I think that they've got to show that there was constant contact and there was constant communication, because there was.
We knew the conditions offsite for all day and where wind was blowing.
I never, in fact, that was after we got that under control, the hardest l
part of this thing was the plant.
And my fear that I couldn't get 19l this thing down.
21!
John can you pick any questions you want to aks these fellow.
22 (unintelligible)..
23 24 i
25' l
2003 016 i
i
?
l
l.
32 1
I just want to go back to make sure of a few, a few things.
2 Quick, to straighten to my mind, as far as the General Emergency..
3 Looking at the plan, bang, what triggered it?
On the, at 6:50, 4
approximately 6:50 a Site Emergency was declared.
And again, there 5
are six action levels in the plan.
A general comment I heard, I just 6
want to sure, what we really based that on, was essentially the section 7
that says a high alarm, the RMs in two separate buildings due to a single event.
I'm pinnin it what I heard the radiation monitors were 8
going...
g 10 My memory is that what their looking, talking to say...
g 12 John, at around quarter to seven, twenty to seven, somewhere g
there, just as the 7 to 3 shift was coming in I just had people coming in the decr.
The alarm went off in the hot machine shop, there's a 15l gamma monitor back there.
Mike Janouski and Pat Donnchie immediately 16 went back.
I was right behind them when we walked, we got into the 17l 18;!
area right by the machine shop and we were ready to go into the hot machine shop when they noticed. hat, the dose rate meter in their 19I hand, was reading about 3 to 400 mR/hr as they just turned it towards 20l l
the sample line, you kncw, where they...
21l 2
I was just going to say that didn't affect that the fact that they 23 were taking baron samples...
24l 25j i
2003 017 i
i
33 1
That was because of the letdown sample was purging, okay.
2 3
Okay.
I 4
5 Or it was on recirc and they, as they moved the thing up towards 6l the sample line, they, it went up over 1R per hour and they were still 7
several feet away from the., aple line.
We, they got the security guard our, I appointed Janous ' in charge at tb ECS until a supervisor 8
could get in because I hadn't seen any at that point.
And I called g
Kunder, gave Kunder that information, and before I could even get out 10 of the Unit i neutralizing tank, a Site Emergency was declared and the siren was going off.
Okay, so I think that that plus what was happening g
in the Aux Building, I'm sure they got several gamma monitors over 3
there going off.
Could very well went to that declaration.
i 15i The one thing, just in going through these actions, which may keep in my memory a little bit, I remember that we tried throughout the 17 morning to say things on the paging system.
At times we probably 18l' didn't say as much as in retro-spec, now we might say, but we, you 19l l
know, we just didn't frankly know totally what we had so we kept 20 trying to announce to people the places to go, what we thought we had 21 and we tried to do that every half hour or so, in keeping *ha people 22 out of the plant informed of how bad or how stable the situation was.
23 We did have the assembly and accountability, we did account for everybody, 24'!
we didn't release them after we had the accountability...
25l 2003 018
34 1
When was that done?
2 3
John, I remember it is in the..., I would say 9:00 o' clock and I'd 4
be plus or minus...
5 6
(Unitelligible) I'd ask Jim Stacey if he has any documentation of 7
that.
8 g
But I do remember that we dia assemble all the peoch and we had 10 assembly areas in the warehouse, in the auditorium, and in the turbine 11 building in Unit 2.
12.
Plus we sent people, we eventially sent people from the gates to 13 the observation cer.ter and put someone in charge at the observation 14 center, so we then knew where the people were and we knew where the 15 p ume was.
6 17 And, in fact, we had the observation center, I directed somebody g
I that was coming in, to go down from the observation center to the 19l i
north gate that morning and eevert all traffic, all incoming traffic,
,g and this would have been the no later than 7:00 because the people, the maintenance people come in and get there by 7:30.
To devert everybody to the obc.rvation center, so that was one of the first things I did when I got to the Unit 1 control room, I remember that now.
We had the communications, most of the time our communications i
2003 n19
35 1;
was on the red and the white phone between the two control rooms till I
2!
we got the phones established.
We had status boards at both control 3
rooms, on or off site teams.
4 5
And Unit I was in a hot shutdown, following the refueling in 6
preparation for a startup of testing for the site, the Unit I was hot 7
conditions, but not power conditions.
8 9
We also later on that day made the decision to keep Unit I where 10 it was.
I decided thar., based on the fact that it... We could have 11 taken more people than we had at that point and time to try and cool l
12l it down, so we didn't want to try anything like that.
13 14 That night was around midnight I got permission to cool down Unit 15 1, we did that on a, as manpower permitted basis the next day.
That 16l decision was based on the fact that we felt that where we were was p
would merit not going anywhere in Unit 1 at the time.
18{
I remember we had an emergency repair party, I remember I've seen g
them in the control room a few times when we had to evacuate the..
0 21l We had
, was in charge of maintenance in the control room.
He moved all the maintenance people around, he made sure that who got sent home and who was sent in where people we would need possibly so Dan, even though I'm not aware of it, Dan would have kept the vital i
2003 020 1
i
I 36 1,
discipline here, the vital supervisors here, and people by name that 2
he knew he might need.
3 4
The repair parties or whatever else we would end up with.
As we went, I think that the Emergrncy Plan was run by the book.
5 e
6 7
Id too.
e g
Was run the same way, I run the drill.
Right down.
I had a set 10 f emergency drill cards that 1 picked up.
I have always kept them.
lli I had the whale emergency plan on two cards, and I got in there and I did exac..., you know, I started that and my mind was right on it...
13 Did you have those with you?
p 15l t
i Oh, yeah.
I didn't need those cards, but they start your mind Ga
[
thinking.
Its hard to realize you're really doing this.
i 18' I've been through one, not on a power plant, but, on a research reactor and I, thats when that first day I saw you on Thursday, I told you...
22 I
Yeah, that what I...
24 25l
\\
t i
2003 021 t
f
37 i
Il I know the feeling.
Its...
2f Then,tous,wehad,IfeltthatDickbubielhadtheEmergency 3
gl Plan part that he had where he began to get people like Sid Porter 5
involved, and he'had onsite and offsite, he had Maggie on the phone.
6 That part of it was really under pretty good control.
The part we 7
turned our attention to around 8:00, probably 8:30 on, except to make 8
sure of the other things, was the plan.
9 10 Could you identify when somebody from NRC first appeared in the control room?
11 12 13
- S *****
i 14!
Yes.
I can't tell you the time, but there were five guys to show 15 up, the first ones that came there.
They came to the Unit I control 6
I room first, is where we sent them and I think that this note here, I
17 would say that they got there around 10:00 in the morning.
181 191 i
20j We can tell that from the security guards.
l 21l But it would have...
22 23 l
That's why I want to you to get... the security records 24l I
25j t
l 2003 022 I
i
38 1
Ii. would have been close to 10:00 in the morning until...
We were 2
having respirator problems at that time because we were periodically 3
in and out of respirators and we had so many people in the Unit 2 4
control room that what we did with the NRC is we said that two of we 51 would take two of them over into the Unit 2 control room but we'll I
6 leave the others in...
7 8
We began to move the (unintelligble).. people outa there to Unit g
1 so two of them we sent over in respirators and the others stayed in 10 Unit I con:rol room without respirators.
I '.
12, You need to get security on it., I believe there were a lot more of 13 them on site by afternoon.
14l Oh, there were.
The first group, there were a group of five that 15 arrived at about 10:00....
16 17 The SWAT team, or whatever I call them, the SWAT team arrived or 18j the RAP team probably arrived, people like Brookhaven were on the g
9 20 21g They responded great.
23 The RAP team...
later that morning the helicopter, the aircraft from RAP team, I don't remember a time, but it was either late in the l
2003 023 i
i i
39 1{
morning or early in the afternoon, they were flying overhead giving us 2
readings.
3 4
Some of that kind of documentation gotta exist outside of our 5
organization.
Because those kind of people keep logs as the normal 6
thing.
I think that, you know, from there on we began to try assess 7
and figure out how to get the damn, you know, the data keep...
Out 8
goal was to somehow to convince ourselves the core was covered, the I
g' whole time from there on.
The instrumentation that I had available 10 was not unconvincing but it wasn't proof positive.
When I got to the 11 control room, TH was pegged high and TC was pegged low and the pressurizer 12 was solid, the pumps were off.
I sent Ivan Porter out to get a computer 13 reading on the thermolcouples and he got question marks.
Then I sent 14j him down to the penetration and I got 200 degrees, 300 degree, no 2400 15 degrees.
So, you know, we being, me and Lee Rogers, had called Lynchburg l
pretty early.
You.
We sat in the room every hour trying to figure 16j out.
First of all we tried to just keep the thing pumping water, all y
we were doing was pumping that BWST to the electromatics in the floor, g
I nothing was changing.
So, you know, we pumped 12 or 13 feet out of g
the thing, and my fear was do we 50 feet cut of the, it would still be 20 there and that thing's still hot and me no water.
5.0, we, our goal was to somehow get some circulation going...
I 23 Alright.
25j l
i 2003 024 i
40 1!
Either natural circulation with the steam generators or the l
2+
reactor coolant pump.
Using a HP the whole time.
3 4
We got the reactor coolant back, pump back in the neighborhood of 5l 3:00 in the afternoon...
6 7
It was after that...
8 g
Was it after that?
10l 11l Because it was after I came back from the...
I 12 (Unintelligible)...
13 14l 1s!
Probably 5:00, 5:30, my guess.
16!
The time sequence is just, anybody I talked to...
y7 1
18l We..
g, 20l 21l (Unintelligible)...
i 22l My memory...
24 l
25!
'e 7nn-
-nr r
i i
41 1l Lose all sense of time.
2i 3
My memory is that we pumped against the electromatic at very high 4
pressures like 20, 2000, 1800, 2200, we topped HP injection against 5
the electromatic, we could have pumped against the codes, but we 6
assessed, we being this group assessed that, what we do is get the 7
same flow tarough the codes without being able to see pressure.
We g
pumped through there till around 11:00 in the morning at which time we g
decided to take a shot at getting on core flood.
The reason we took a 10 shot at core flood, now remember Lynchburg was on the phone, and 11 pr bably some people from Reading were on the phone, there was a lot 12' f g od advice, but it was clear that it was my decision.
We assessed 13 that if we could get down near core flood tanks and we saw them dump 14j n the core we could get assurance that the core had some water on it.
15l We couldn't tell that.
We were scared that wasn't happening.
Radiation 16 was all over the place, there was nothing, everything was off scale, g
you got nothing, you have nothing in the core that tells you about water level, you got no pressurizer levels that sits out the top, you g
got no way of drawing the bubble, I didn't have any heaters, I didn't have letdown, you had radiation in every room you went to, didn't even have oil pumps for some of the RC pumps, couldn't get in some of the rooms cause the readings were horrendous.
At around 11:00, we started down for core flood.
We got down, if I remember to core flood and we did that and I think we saw about a foot decrease in the core flood 24 tanks and at the same time the A loop responded for about the first 2003 026 i
4 i
s
{
42 1
time, that is the temperatures moved a little hit, and we then, I may i
2f be wrong on the time, but it was somewhere in that sequence we ended
- 3 up trying to get TC or TH to respond.
We knew TC was 240, we knew TH 4,
was off scale, it didn't tell you notning.
5 61 The sequence of events there is based on the. instrumentation so 7
that most of those things can be pinned down.
8 g,
Any other questions on that? On that emergency plan.
I know you 10 guys are busy now.
I don't want to take any more of your time.
Do 11 y u think I ought to try to talk to Kunder or wait awhile.
12' 13 No, I don' t think you're gonna get anymore, personnally.
14; 15l Just the first couple hours, Tercy...
I 16!
I think that with....
g IS(
The one thing else....
You might, that has probably got addressed g
20l s mehow is people, we isolated the B steam generator and we were steaming off the A because we didn't have a vacu.m timiter.
We lost steam.
We lost steam because, you know, there's no way of getting steam.
So, we had to go to the atmospheric, that was the big contention.
We were steaming out the A pipe, out the A atmospheric relief which was our heat sink.
25;l As long as I at least steaming, I know it was I
I t
2003 027 i
.I
43 I
.i 1
taking some heat off.
It also, I thinP., we were taking readings up 2
near there.
3 4
We took some readings up on the roof.
5 6
We didn't have indications that, I was given that we were letting 7
anything out.
Now, there's a lot of contention about the fact that I 8
was letting radioactive steam off. We were not steaming the B steam gl generator, we were steaming because we had no vacuum, we were trying 10 to get the vacuum back.
We had no steam, we had to get aux boilers i
11j on, get them up, get them on.
You know, Unit l's hot and Unit 2's not l
121 y u can't supply both units so we lost steam, we had to come back, you 13 know, you went to a power condition in Unit 2 and no steam.
Unit 2 14{
was probably supplying Unit I with aux steam so you didn't have aux b ilers on when this star'..id.
Ok, so we didn' t have steam, we had 15 16l vacuum, you had to steam the atmosphere, we were taking readings up p
near tnere and we weren' t getting anything.
Now, there was, I was 18{
told somewhere around noon to stop that steaming because of the pressure.
7g;l Then we did stop it.
We drew a vaccum and stopped it.
20f 2
-- Because of the external pressure.
2q Right.
g 24 25 2003 028 I
l
44 If We were t. King readings in that plume and we.en't getting anything.
2 31 As much as you could?
4 5
We sampled before we steamed.
6 7
Yes, we do.
8 g
Okay.
I lot I
11 We sampled both steam generators and we confirmed that it was the B steam generator that had tae activity and that the f did not have 13 the activity.
14l t
15; And in fact, we had a lines, we had lines crossed on the sample list.
16 I
17l l
Yeah.
Because we had to go back and check them to make sure that g
19l' it was the B that had the activity....
20 There was some early confusion both generators had it.
And what that confusion resolved to be was a switch of lines in the sampling recrt.
Now we pemanently, as I remember it, got the steam shut off in I
the early afternoon.
By 2:00, the steam was shut off.
That time is 24!
I certainly not exact.
It was very disarming to the public, in the 25l i
l 2003 029 i
45 s
1 initial pressure was to stop that because you could see the steam 2
coming.
The radiation was coming therefore, the radiation was coming 3
from the steam.
I 4(
5 Yeah.
Well, this, let me get at least some initial system, those l
6l notes will be extremely helpful...
i 7
8 Let me...
9 10 I think what, what I'm gonna do is just put together kind of a 11; brief review of the Emergency Plan and here'a the way it was done.
12 I think in tenas...
13 14!
And so, I don't know, does anybody else have, did NRC ask you 15 about this kind of thing?
16 17l 18l Yes, they did yesterday.
19f l
Oid they? Okay.
Or 21, I think in terms of the plan everything... that they...
23 No one, I think, around here had time to focus on that kind of 24 l
thing.
I was made suddenly that nobody had really asked about the
]
251 l
impiementation...
i 2003 030 t
46 I
l 1!
They introduced me to of those Commistnoners and I just kindly to 1
2.
tell them that the NRC not being notified was a real misnomer because 3
the, I showed him the board up there, I said, you see that.
It says 4{
NRC, I say, gotta talk to each other.
I Si i
61 Yeah.
That...
I 7
8 That guy tried to explain to...
9l 10 (Unintelligible)...
11, 12 I said, well, I said I thinks irresponsible for the industry for 13 y u to say things that of our organization.
14!
Id too.
15 16i igj I think, myself, Gary, we did a better job with this, from a I
standpoint, and this is a subjective comment, but we did a better job g
with this than any of the drills we've ever run in terms of actually 191 handling it frem an outside coordination and so forth.
I mean, I think everything was that we had ever practiced we did plus we had all 21l the adrenaline, in the thing being real.
22' I
23 24]
25j i
I 2003 031
{
47 1,
You know, and, you know there were a lot of asken faces around, 2
mine included, but I'll tell you, we didn't hesitate to know what 3
we're doing.
That was very obvious.
And our organization reflected 4
it, just like the drill.
You came in, said you were in charge, you 5,
talked to very few people, and I think they'll back you up...
6 7
The atmosphere in the control room was never other than calm.
It 8
may have been hany, but it was never excited.
9 10 That's very true.
i 11!
12 The discussions we held were held, in the Shift Supervisor's office. We came out, and that's all we did.
13, i
14l 15l The one thing different from this then any other drill we'd ever run before is with the drills, you always exercise all the off site g
portion, but in tne you never have a permanent plant problem..
after we g t all the off site stuff going, we dropped back to Jiminey 8
Christmas, we still have plant problem here that normally wc're able
,gI
-g to assign to the Shift Foreman you know in the drills.
And it, it didn't distract our attention from the release to the public but 21l frankly, we still recognized it as our major problem.
23 Our major concern was that the fuel didn't degrade anymore than it i
had degraded from there cn, and somehow, figure out how to prevent 25j i
2003 139 4
48 11 that and how to stop this thing.
I didn't really feel that we were 2.I stopping it at that initial stz.te.
I was scared we'd run out of 3
water.
4 Sl I think the sequence is that yeah that's what you should have been 6
afraid of.
7 8
And the pressure I was getting was you could just punch this g'
thing solid and I couldn't get this thing solid.
You could have 10 pumped all day at that time, I'm convinced, witnout pumping water up in the hot legs because you had to collapse them bubb' s.
You didn't yy have a 4000 pound system.
So-you know, we, it was a hell of a scenario.
12 13 Okay.
I appreciate very much your time.
I am sorry to bother 13j you...
I 15j (Unintelligible)... No, if you need to come back 18 I'll convey your concern here, I...
19!
l 20' I think its really gonna be necessary for a guy, for the guys that I had that were Senior in that control room that they give their scenario that you put together, like I read the sequence of events.
We need a scenaric for that day so we could all read through it, and first of all comment on it.
25l i
2003 033
49 1!
Yes.
2 3
And second of all put in you mind because I'm certain if some of 4
us six months from now are gonna be sitting in a cool room somewhere 5
where somebody's smoking a cigar and they're gonna wanta disect what 6
you did 7
g Well, I think the guys who have been working on it have really g
done a good job...
10l 11l Oh I don't have problem there, I'm saying this part of it here is l
gonna be more important.
I 131 Which?
14!
15 This part with the...
Si 17)
Offsite stuff.
g 19l And I really do.
,g 21l Can you, or one of you do it? Can you put out the inquiry about any notes that anybody has, see that I get a copy.
24 25l i
i l
t 2003 034
0 50 lIt I'll see if I can trace some of that down...
2, 3
You know, in this case it has going into the permanent file.
Any 4
time copy, the first thing I do is copy it you know, file, locked file SI safe.
61 7
One thing I would recommend for any other plart, including Oyster g
Creek if they don't have it, is somebody who is in the public relations 9
field be familiar with this emergency plan bacause, what I feel happened 10 was this emergency ran over a period of hours.
This drill or this 11 event we had an emergency that started at 7:00 in the morning and it 12, was still going at 7:00 at night.
We had people trying to talk to 13f outsiders, even my our managers didn't, didn't really know what I was doing.
We need a guy that's knowledgable of the events and a LOCA, 14 15 and a LOCA isn't c uy that could talk to the press about what was going on, you know if a Blane maybe would have known that I had to 7
call the Civil Defense... you know what I'm saying?
181 l
(Unintelligible)...
191 l
20!
i Interesting thought becausa Dick Klingeman and I were doing just 2 11 22;l what you were doing because Blane naturally, with the technical aucstions I
coming in.
Blanes group has to fail, open.
Dick and I were manning 23 the phones until midnight that night and trying to help.
At that point in time those were not the questions that were being asked. Or 2003 035 t
i k
51 1,
even concerned with.
Four days later they were, but those were not 2
the questions being asked or the possibility of those questions being 3
conveyed, Wednesday night, Thursday night, which, you know, both of us 4
there till midnight, on the phones with the press...
5 6
The press went bananas.
7 8
We took those little 15 minutes of video tape and the decay core g
vaults, CBS reporter barged into the trailer, I didn't know who the 10 guy was.
I had to push him out of the way to get by him to get to 11l another desk an I asked him, you know, can I help you? Where can I I
gi get those tapes?
I said, well that's the only one that exists, we're 13 n t even sure what we're looking at.
We had go to an operator to tell 14!
us what we're seeing.
"I want those tapes." And I said, you know, go 15 see a manager.
And the guy went out anc he went to see Keisch.
7gl (Unintelligible).
Or anybody he could get, apparently, that was j
typical of what the reporters were doing, they just barged in...
Okay, thanks very much felTows.
18 19l 20 21 22 23 24 2s 2003 036 t
i f
!i