ML19274G118
| ML19274G118 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 04/25/1979 |
| From: | Deman J METROPOLITAN EDISON CO. |
| To: | |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7908290675 | |
| Download: ML19274G118 (15) | |
Text
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA f
NflCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 1!
In the Matter of:
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IE TMI INVESTIGATION INTERVIEW I
3l o'f Mr. Joe DeMan, Health Physics Foreman 41 Si 6j 7f f
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l Trailer #203 9!
NRC Investigation Site TMI Nuclear Power Plant 10j Middletown, Pennsylvania 1 11 April 25,1979 12i (Date of Interview) l 13l June 27, 1979
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(Date Transcript Typea) 14) 97 15i (Tape Numoer(s))
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g 19l 20 21' NRC PERSONNEL:
None L
22l 23,i INTERVIEWER:
Mr. Ed O' Conner, tietropolitan Edison Company 24l I
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y O' CONNER:
This is Ed O' Conner speaking.
It's the afternoon of April 25, at approximately 1:00.
We're about to interview Joe DeMan of the Met Ed TMI staff also, there are two other individuals who are part of the inter-viewing team.
They'll introduce th'emselves now.
Bruce Benner, Energy Incorporated Gi 7
Larry Krepps, Energy Incorporated 9l
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O ' C0iil1ER: Okay Joe I really don't know where you fit into the plant staff 10l l
here at TMI but it is suggested that we talk to you because you were onsite 11!
the day the March 28, the day the event happened.
Will you briefly tell us 12l your position at the station and when you came on site that day?
13 141 DEMAN: Well, my position is a Health Physics Foreman.
And I reported on 151 site (Humming, cannot hear) 16i i
17lI O' CONNER:
This is Ed O' Conner of Jersey Central Power & Light.
The time ISI is 1 o' clock on April 25, 1979.
We are about to conduct en interview with 19i Joe DeMan of the Met Ed TMI staff.
Also with me are two other individuals 20l l
from Energy Incorporated.
Tney will introduce themselves to the State now.
21 22 Bruce Benner from the Seattle Office of Energy Incorporated.
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And Larry Krepps we are both working for Bob Long of GPU.
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0' CONNER: Joe would you please inform us how you fit into the plant staff here at TMI and when you, when you arrived outside the day of the accident?
Si 6l' DEMAN:
My present position is a Health Physics Foreman and I arrived i
onsite at approximately 6:30 on the morning of the 28th.
8 O' CONNER:
When you arrived on site had the emergency plan or the site 91 emergency been initiated?
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l DEMAN:
No, it had not.
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i 13l O' CONNER:
You were just reporting on board to start your normal work day, 14!
is that right?
15i 16i DEMAN: That's right.
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18i O' CONNER:
What, what was your first duties when you reported to the site 19i that day?
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21 DEMAN: Well, about a quarter to seven I reported to the Unit 1 HP lab and 22 noticed that my boss Dick Debeil was in a little early.
At that point he 23 told me that they had had a Unit 2 trip at about 4 o' clock in the morning 2 41 and having trouble with baron concentrations in the primary systems.
They 25;'
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yl were making up from high borated source in the boron concentrations in the primary systems were going down instead of up.
And at the same time he 2
told me that the RC drain tank ruptured disc had probably blown and the 3
electromatic release had probably stuck open for some period of time.
At 4
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that point high radiation alarm went off in the hot machine shop area in I
6l Unit 1 and sample lines burst through that area.
After investigating there y!
I discovered the Unit 2 sample line were 200 mR per hour on contact.
8l O' CONNER:
At this time, what was the time?
10l DEMAN: This time was approximately 7 o' clock in the morning.
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O' CONNER: And that was a sample line to, so the Chem Techs could take a 13l boron sample?
14i 15i DEMAN: Yes, Unit 2 RC letdown sample was of normal sample i
recirc at that time.
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18i 0' CONNER: When the site emergency was declared, what was your reactions?
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DEMAN: The site emergency hadn't been declared for another hour or so after 21!
then as far as I remember hearing it over the page, Prior to the site 22 emergency being declared I took surveys in the Auxiliary building and 23 discovered high radiation levels in certain areas such as the ( ? ), the 24 doorways to the makeup tank area, and the Reactor Building personnel entrance 25l 2002 332 i
4 and the sample line going to the HPR 227 monitor which is Reactor y,
Buildin3 gas monitor and the levels were unusually high.
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0' CONNER: You mentioned that the doorway to one of these tanks was just 4
g ne a a a n n a area?
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l DEMAN:
Well, the access doorway to the makeup tank, the primary makeup 7!
tank, from the hallways is in an access area it normally reads less than SmR per hour at that point the readings were climbing up towards about 1 R per hour.
10 1 11 0' CONNER: And at to your recollection this was still before the site emergency 12l l
was declared.
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i DEMAN:
That's true.
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j O' CONNER: Could I ask what type of equipment you measured?
17) i 18l DEMAN:
Teletecto, R0 tubes, E520.
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t 201' 0' CONNER: Now what, that tank was in the basement of the Auxiliary building?
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DEMAN: The makeup tanks is in the 305 elevation of the in the first floor 23 Auxiliary building on the first floor.
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l O' CONNER: At any time that morning did you go into the basement in the Auxiliary building?
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DEMAN: Yes, I did just after measuring the dose rate at the entrance of the makeup tank and after measuring the dose rate on sample, on HPR 227 I went to the 280 elevation in the Aux building to the basement.
Noticed an appreciable amount of water backing up to the floor dra.ns.
Took a dose rate on the water, it was less than.2 mR and I walked through it in my street clothes and that did not give me any contamination, ao at that time the water in the basement was not contaminated.
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0' CONNER: How deep was the water?
12i 13l DEMAN:
Approximately 3 inches at certain points near the drain.
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O' CONNER: Have any idea where that water came from?
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DEMAN: I would say it was normally just Aux building sump overflow because 18!
nobody had pumped out the Aux building sump tank.
There was no reason to 19i suspect that it came from the primary system at that time.
20 21 0' CONNER: To your recollection has that ever happened before?
22l 23 DEMAN: Yes.
We have overflowed the sump before.
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O' CONNER: What normally drains into that pump?
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DEMAN: Most of your, some of the steam drain lines off of the auxiliary steam systems go into your as RC e saporator or your four drains in the a xiliary building going to the sump which most of the time is washing 5
water.
Some of your drains from your hot areas go in there also but none of the ( ? ).
8 DEMAN: There has been times when that water has been contaminated but 9l l
initially I just wanted to check with the dose rate instruments and see if 10l any dose was there.
Nothing worse was there and I didn't get any contami-11!
I nation because of that.
12l 13 0' CONNER: In your opinion how did the Auxiliary building get so contaminated 14:
i later on in the day?
15l 16l DEMAN: Somehow the air activity in the Auxiliary building went up drastically.
17 I did get contaminated later just by walking through it and I got contaminated 18!
to a point where I was giving off 20 mR per hour -- off my clothes.
I 19i don't know how the air activity got into the Aux building and I'm not 20 really sure to this day I know.
It was obviously some kind of release 21 from the primary letdown system into the Auxiliary building.
Through one i
22 of the systems there I am not sure yet how that happened. I am of the 43 opinion, I don't recall where I got the idea from but later in the day there was a floor was covered with water which was highly contaminated.
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DEMAN:
Yes.
Later on in the day, well approximately 1 or 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> afterward.
the the water in the Auxiliary building basement which had. increased about 4 inches in some areas was highly contaminated and indicated it was primary letdown water.
i Si 0' CONNER:
Any ideas how that got on the floor?
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DEMAN: I have no ideas how that happened.
91 O' CONNER:
We read a little blurb that indicated that about little bit 10l after 7 o' clock you apparently called the control room and was talking about a air leakage coming through HP monitor 227.
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DEMAN:
What I had requested the control room to do because of the back-141 ground levels going up on the monitor, I requested the control room to shut i
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off the sample pump on HPR 227 for two reasons:
ene to reduce the dose 16i rate in the area because the sample line was now reecing approximately 1 R 17:
i per hour.
And I assumed that the line would get hottar if I kept the pump 18i l
running and kept taking samples.
so I wanted them to securs tne pumps, 191 second of all in case there wa; any leakage on the panel or the sampling 201 i,
panel or the monitor, I didn't want it to contribute any water toward the 22/
auxiliary building.
So I had to shut the pump off and shut the isolation 22 valves.
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0' CONNER: So there wasn't anything wrong with the monitoe was there?
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DEMAN:
3l It was contributing quite a bit to the background and if there was any small leak that at one time wouldn't mean anyU1ing under normal conditions
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but could give you a very real problem down through the airborne ducts into g
the reactor building.
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0' CONNER: Did you get acknowledgement that they shut the pump off and isolated the air lines?
10 DEMAN:
I never got acknowledgement but when I talked to the operator he 11:
I said he would do it and normally he would get a chance to walk over and 12!
just shut the pump off.
Its a one second operation on the switch.
The valves sometime later he could check, I was interested in mainly getting 14!
the pressure off the header.
I didn't check back to see that he had done 15i i t.
I just assumed that he had done it.
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17 0' CONNER.
But you didn't see any direct leakage of the reactor building 18l a;r coming out anywhere?
19i 20h DEMAN: No I couldn't see any leakage, no I just didn't want to take any 21 j
chances.
And I also was trying to keep the background levels down.
But 22l since the dose rates had gone up from 10 mRto 1 R per hour in the sample 23 I
line I assumed they were gonna get higher, so I just stopped flow.
With a 24 dose rate that high, your monitor really doesn't do you any good.
You 25:
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2002 337 l
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can't read anything in the gas right on channels when the air coming in is 2;.
reading 1 R per hour or more.
The meters are just going to peg out.
The monitor wasn't really serving any purpose.
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_i O' CONNER: You feel that's true in general for all the HP monitors?
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DEMAN: Yes, I do because I don't think they design the type of levels that 7{
we experienced since this accident.
Certain monitors such as your dome monitor, your area dome monitor is designed for that, but your local area 9
monitors are not designed to see that kind of a gross activity you can say 10j you monitored it but nothing gross, as far as actual levels.
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O' CONNER: Let me go back and dwell a little bit that on you indicated that 131 you'd first your first observation of water in the basement of the Auxiliary 141 building was not contaminated and it wasn't too deep?
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DEMAN-That's true.
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18 0' CONNER: It sounded like somebody told you that later on that water got 191 deeper and were they, taking samples that was showing that there was highly 20 active 21i 22 DEMAN: No, at a point later in time another technician went into the Auxiliary 23l building noticed the water and took a dose rate off of it. And that proved 24i t,
to be highly activated.
You talking a dose rate in the 1 R range.
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0' CONNER: Was he in the same physical area down there?
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DEMAN: Yes.
He went into the same physical location that I'm in, okay and the water by then had become very very active.
5 O' CONNER: Can you explain a little bit where that area is or not that 6,;
familiar with the area?
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DEMAN: Yes, going from the reactor building personnel entrance there is an access way into the Unit 2 Auxiliary building, 305 elevation and you make a 10 right go down the stairwell and you're in the basement in the area of the 11!
l A & B decay heat valves and the A & B reactor building spray valves.
12i 13 0' CONNER: Do you know if that particular area is down there by the RR pump?
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i 15i DEMAN:
It was.
16j 17 0' CONNER: I guess those things were on and they were known to have a fairly 1
181 significant leak rate on those pumps?
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DEMAN:
They are in the vicinity, I think, of tne RR pumps, you have to 21!
check a map.
They are either in the vicinity of the RR or the RV 22 pumps.
Can't remember right now which one it is.
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j 11 0' CONNER: But this Tech didn't observe where the water was coming from?
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DEMAN:
No, he couldn't see where the water was coming from he just noticed a gross amount of water on the floor and took a dose rate on it and it discovered that it was active.
5 6i O' CONNER: Joe when you were down in the basement initially, did you actually see water bubbling up out of the drain?
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DEMAN: no, I didn't see any bubbling on any floor or anything.
More or 101 less just water laying there.
I didn't notice any ripples or any increase ll!
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in water.
It was just there.
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O' CONNER: Did you ever become aware of activity level high, activity levels 141 in the fuel handling building?
15i 16; DEMAN:
After a period of time I became aware of it.
Yes.
Not not 17i i
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O' CONNER: Not on the 28th?
191 20 DEMAN: Not in this week. You mean on the 18th? On the 28th, I mean.
21l 22 C' CONNER:
Right.
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DEMAN: Initially when the accident happened at 7 o' clock we didn't have any g
airborne problems, not for a couple of hours.
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O' CONNER: In the fuel handling.
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5l 6l EMAN: In the fuel handling or the Auxiliary building? When you get the i
Auxiliary building in Unit 2, when you get a problem in air activity I
there you'll end up with it in fuel handling building.
It might raise 0l right up.
With the ventilation design and the door accesses and 9f i
passages, you'll end up with it in the fuel handling building.
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0' CONNER: Did you put this information in the emergency plan.
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l 13l DEMAN: Yes.
Approximately just guessing around 9 o' clock the site emergency 14!
l was declared and at that point I was the only supervisor in the emergency 15!
control station.
I started organizing teams and setting up phone communi-cations.
About 20 minutes later Tom Malaney showed up and he took control.
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j O' CONNER: What did you do at that time?
19i 20f DEMAN: At that time I just stood by and just assisted in communications and 21.
readings and things of that nature.
22 23 O' CONNER: From where you stood, how did you feel the conduct? How did you 24l feel the emergency plan was conducted?
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DEMAN: The initial setup of the emergency and was conducted in a routine j
manner from all the previous drills we've done.
There was no confusion as far as what people were supposed to do or where they were supposed to go.
From the previous drills we've had, everybody knew exactly what they were 4l supposed to do and where they were supposed to go.
And that went just f
according to the plans.
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0' CONNER: Do you recall what some of the high highest radiation-levels here on site during the event?
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DEMAN:
Outside the perimeter of the building?
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12 O' CONNER: Right.
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r DEMAN:
No, I don't off hand.
I don't recall getting those readings.
15i 16i O' CONNER:
You have any idea what the the levels got up to in the control t
I 17l room that caused them to go into respirators?
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191 DEMAN: Well, at the time they went in the respirators I was in the Unit 1, 20!
HP lab.
Actually I was in the decon shower getting deconed after getting 21 contaminated in the Aux building.
And the RM14, with an HP210 frisker 22 probe was starting to climb frcm 100 counts per minute to about 1000 counts 23 per minute.
By the time I got out of the shower, and got to the HP lab the 241 l
count rate had gone to 3 or 4 thousand counts.
And about that point we 25}
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14 decided to leave the HP control area and go in respirators in the control room.
I don't know as far as the microcuries per cc, the concentration of the level of contamination. You have any idea what that equates to mR per hour?
In mR per hour? No.
No.
It would depend on the isotope.
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I 0' CONNER: Well you don't you don't really know then what the radiation 6I l
level dose rates were in the control room?
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DEMAN: The dose rates no, not in this.
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O' CONNER: Was the control room H and 8 on external intake or recirc?
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12l' DEMAN: That I don't know at the time.
I don't know how they had the venti-13!
i lation line opened.
I assumed it was probably on recirc after the accident.
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At some time later I was told it was on recirc, initially I don't know what 15j it was.
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0' CONNER: I think we've run out of questions did you have any other obser-18l vations that you would just like to make and 191 1
20 DEMAN: The only real observation is that initially up to about 7 o' clock in 21l l
the morning when the radiation level started to increase and contamination 22
level and the air activity level started to go up nobody really knew what 23 was happening and I can understand that.
There was a little bit of confusion 24 as far as trying to isolate and determine what the problem was and as far 25l 2nn? '43 0 -
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as the organizational setup going into the emergency plan or anything like 2l that that went according to the routine. That's about the only obsrevations I have to comment on.
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0' CONNER:
Thank you very much Joe DeMan.
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