ML19274C848
| ML19274C848 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 10/12/1978 |
| From: | Ahearne J, Bradford P, Gilinsky V, Hendrie J, Kennedy R NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| To: | |
| References | |
| REF-10CFR9.7 NUDOCS 7811280031 | |
| Download: ML19274C848 (54) | |
Text
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UNITED STATES
((f,.l. f 9'o, NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
, 'g WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 ij S
S November 9, 1978 OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY DISCUSSION OF EDO TESTIMONY OF JULY-AUGUST 1977 October 12, 1978 Pursuant to the Commission's Regulations implementing the Government in the Sunshine Act (10 CFR 9.108(d)), the Commission, on the advice of the General Counsel, determined that the subject meeting record, a tape recording, should be made available to the public.
The tape recording is available on request.
DISCLAIMER This is an unofficial transcript of' a meeting of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission held on October 12, 1978 in the Commissioner's offices at 1717 H Street, N.W.,
Washington, D.
C.
The meeting was closed to public attendance and observation.
This transcript was prepared from a tape recording of the meeting.
It has not been corrected or edited, and it may contain inaccuracies.
The transcript is intended solely for general information purposes.
It is not part of the formal or informal record of decision of the matters discussed.
Expressions of opinion in this transcript do not necessarily ref'uect final determinations or beliefs.
No pleading or other paper may be filed with the Commission in any proceeding as the result of or addressed to any statement or argument contained berein, except as the Commission may authorize.
y811280030 f
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Q damuel J 8 'Unilk Secretary of the Commission
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1 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 2
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 3
4 DISCUSSION OF EDO TESTIMONY OP t
5 JULY-AUGUST 1977 6
(Closed to Public Attendance) 7 8
9 10 Chairman's Conference Room 1717 H Street, N.W.
11 Washington, D.
C.
12 Thursday, October 12, 1978 I
13 14 The Commission met, pursuant to notice, at 2:40 p.m.,
15 Joseph Hendrie, Chairman of the Commission, presiding.
16 17 PRESENT-Chairman Hendrie 18 Commissioner Gilinsky Commissioner Kennedy 19 Commissioner Bradford Commissioner Ahearne 20 ALSO PRESENT:
21 L.
Gossick 22 l
23 (NOTE: This transcript is made from a tape recording.)
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PR6CEEDINGS 2
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Okay, the Commission meets this 3
afternoon on the Discussion of the Executive Director's 4
Testimony last July and August.
5 These meetings are -- seem to go on and on.
I, for one, 6
will not regret seeing the last of them if that time ever arrives.
7 As you know, we have a letter from Chairman Udall and, Lee, I 8
have asked you to come to this meeting.
John, in particular, 9
felt that it would be useful to his consideration of possible 10 answers and so on, to discuss some of these things with you and 11 he felt that it would be useful, if we could,in fact,do it in 12 a collegial -- in a meeting of all the Commissioners so everybody 13 could hear and participate in the. discussion and save the 14 inevitable loss on occasion that you get when I go talk to Dick, 15 and then I report what we said to Peter and you don't nearly 16 get everything going back and forth.
So it is on that general 17 basis that we have convened this afternoon.
18 I guess, if I may, John, what I would ask you to do 19 is, why don't you go ahead, then, and ask questions and others, 20 please participate and ask questions of a similar nature.
21 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Lee, I don't think any of 22 us really enjoy going through this, probably.
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Well, we 'are at least more 23 24 experienced, not happier, I'm sure, but more experienced.
COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
I car ^ in to this and had hoped, 25
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1 as Joe had mentioned, would be something that would go away, but 2
I really had not gotten that involved or very much involved.
3 But since it has not gone away, I have tried to read all of the 4
material I can, and I am, at best, unclear as to some of the 5
fundamental questions or the answers to the fundamental questions.
6 As I understand it, probably the heart of the issue 7
really ends up being on the 29th and the August 8th -- or at 8
least the names keep coming up.
To what extent was there a 9
discussion between the time, prior to the 29th and -- between the 10 29th and the 8th that.:aald have indicated or lead you to this 11 no-evidence statement that it was just not a position either 12 member had endorsed or that you should be representing, and that 13 is a very blunt direct question probably to the three of you, 14 really, and you can very well say it is none of my business or 15 that you don't want to talk about it anymore.
16 MR. GOSSICK:
No, I would be perfectly happy to respond i
17 to it.
18 Actually, prior to the 29th there were no discussions, 19 that I recall, on that particular subject.
The focus of the 29 20 July hearing, at least in my mind, as I was getting ready for it --
21 that I was about to give to Udall on the letter to come down and 22 testify was the transfer of Conran, and Conran's concerns and the 1
I 23 general process that we had been through in trying ta resolve his l
l 24 concerns and sort of get him into a position where we had started and be a productive member of the staff.
So, yes, I met 25 i
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1 with the staff, the Mattson Task Force Report and the enclosures, 2
really the specific matter of Apollo, what did happen or didn't 3
happen there was not really something that I guess I would havc 4
to say I focused on and asked, hey, what am I going to say if this 5
comes up?
6 I do think that I recall one conversation, and Victor 7
was on a trip in California, as I recall which was immediately 8
prior to the hearing, but,I believe, and I recall a conversation, 9
I'm not exactly sure of the timing, ycu know, I talked to Vic 10 and I think Joe Fouchard was standing there with us, and we were 11 out in Bethesda and we were in my office.
And I said, in the 12 event the Apollo matter comes up, it seems to me that about the 13 best that I can do is say there is.something here that the 14 Commission has been briefed on, it is a sensitive matter, by the 15 Executive Branch and if you want further details, ask them for 16 the briefing.
17 Unfortunately, in the 29 th hearing, I didn't say that.
18 Cochran did.
In fact, he said the Commission has been briefed on 19 the Apollo matter by the Executive Branch or somebody, the CIA 20 or whoever.
I'm not sure exactly how he stated it.
21 Again, one would had to have been there to appreciate 22 how that 29 July hearing went.
It was kind of an all-day affair 23 and five minutes at a time they were ou't, you know, to go vote or 24 something, and it lasted a good part of the af ternoon, I think the 25 entire afternoon. Mr. Tsongas was presenu and so it was kind of i
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1 brought to a halt.
In looking back over the record it looks a lot 2
more coherent than it seems at this point.
3 Now, so as I say, with regard to the 29th hearing, there 4
really wasn't any discussion on this matter among the three of us.
5 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Myers had asked for a reference 6
out of the hearing transcript ---
7 MR. GOSSICK:
The 102 ---
8 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
The 102, which referred to the 9
Strauss memo describing this basic -- or Strauss describing to 10 the Task Force what could be told-the Task Force found out at the 11 CIA briefing.
I realize it is a period of over a year and a half 12 later, but do you recall Myer's request?
13 MR. GOSSICK:
Yes, yes,.very clearly, and sending that 14 reference down for the Commissioners to look at before we turned 15 it loose, because it was classified -- well, we were treating it 16 as classified then, but we really only classified it the day we 17 sent it over.
Kind of an administrative ---
18 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
The Strauss picture seemed to be 19 sort of cautious on the no-evidence issue.
20 MR. GOSSICK:
Well, in my view, it was an accident and 21 I'm not the only one that interpreted it as not really being in 22 line with what had happened.
23 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Ah, bu't you see, was your view 24 that the Strauss memo was not accurate?
25 MR. GOSSICK:
That's right.
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1 COMMISSIONER 5HEARNE:
What had given you that position?
2 MR. GOSSICK:
Well, the fact that -- I don't recall the 3
exact wording now, but since that hearing the Commission had, or 4
there has been statements made about there was no evidence of 5
diversion, and that there had been a Commission effort to modify 6
such no-evidence statements, and in my view in discussing it with 7
the staff that had been at the same briefing, and I happened to 8
know that John Davis had been there.
I discussed it with Tom 9
Reamer who had been present at the '76 briefing, and I concluded --
10 I think at that time Peter had left, had he not, but for some 11 reason I wasn't able to get hold of Peter to ask him personally 12 about the statement, you know.
But anyway, the answer to your 13 question, I went into that hearing, rightly or wrongly with a 14 mind that the no-evidence statement was still a valid statement.
15 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
But you hadn't discussed that, 16 then, explicitly with Rowden or Victor or Dick or any of the --
17 the Commissioners who themselves had been at the meeting?
18 MR. GOSSICK:
No.
I had not really, because as I 19 recall the words in that one document were brought up at the 20 briefings.
I came to tha conclusion and had raised some questions 21 and had come to the conclusion or gathered later, looking at the 22 interviews or record from the course of the investigations, and 23 Bill Anders back to Udall, specifically' questioning it.
In his 24 view the briefing really didn't change his mind and he still 25 believes that as of this past summer that (inaudible)
i 7
1 Now, on the preparations of the MUF release and the 2
August 8 bearing, yes, we were down hear in a meeting discussing the Udall document at that time -- the MUF release document, and 4
as you have read, there was a discussion first in the large group 5
in the conference room, and then there were the five of us who 6
went across the hall in those offices, and it was there that --
7 my memory fails me -- something happened that I either pulled out 8
of the room momentarily, and I believe that is shared by other 9
people who were there, but in talking with the others, Smith and 10 Burnett afterwards, I really didn't get any impression that there 11 was some revelation that, my God, yes, there has been a diversion 12 or something that really, at least rang my bell hard enough to 13 make me respond differently (inaudible) 14 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Had you asked to go across the 15 hall, Vic?
Was that your request?
16 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Essentially, after the meeting, 17 I spoke with Dick and we felt we ought to warn Smith and Burnett 18 because they were going to go off and brief the public.
And we 19 informed Smith and Burnett about the background of NUMEC.
20 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
To be more precisely, the general 21 content of the briefing.
22 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Yes.
I think that's right.
t 23 24 25 l
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1 At any rate ds we walked back, I raised this with 2
Dick, he said, why don't we do it right now, so we got back 3
and, in fact, he said if we do that we have to tell Lee that we 4
are doing it and (imaaiWie) ran to Lee and told him we were 5
planning to do that and Lee suggested that he sit in.
6 MR. GOSSICK: I don't recall having that.
I thought 7
you asked me to get Burnett and Smith and bring them over here, 8
that you wanted to talk to the three of us.
9 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
I would -- as I have before, 10 my own recollections are essentially correct, as I recall them.
11 I would, however,
-- my recollection is that at least for 12 some major portion of whatever time this was, and this was 13 over a matter of minutes, Gossick,was not there.
I tried to 14 visualize and sense it as it was, we were standing, we weren't 15 sitting, as I recall, and I can recall Victor, who was on my 16 right and seeing Burnett and Smith who were standing more or 17 less in a three-quarters circle arrangement in front of us.
18 So I don't recall seeing Gossick physically there for most of 19 the time.
I just don't recall seeing him.
Now, where he is, 20 I don't recall his physically being there very much of the time, 21 at least during these few minutes.
22 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
What you had said is that the 23 main Purpose of that, though, was to t'alk to Smith and Burnett?
COMMISSIONER GOSSICK:
Correct.
24 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Not to Lee?
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COMl1ISSIONER'GILINSKY: Correct.
2 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
So that if -- so your 3
concentration would have been on making. Smith and Burnett 4
to make sure they knew?
5 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Correct.
6 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Do you recall whether Lee was 7
there?
8 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Well, Lee was certainly there 9
in the beginning, you know, Lee certainly came in a.d I 10 remember him remarking at sort of the end that that was about 11 what he expected.
12 I had said something toward the end, something like --
13 you know -- this may be a short c.apsuled varsion of the original 14 meeting, and I said, you know, I don't know what that does for 15 your understanding, whether it leans you one way or the other, 16 and I don't know what the result was coming out of the meeting, 17 but what I did think was significant --
c;mewhere along the way 18 that Lee said something like, well, that's about what I expected.
19 And either before or after that, I said that the one thing that 20 I felt was significant that should not be set aside easily, was 21 the fact that whatever the facts, the CIA seemed to be convinced o f 22 the fact something had occurred there, that there was a diversion.
I guess I must have said'after that, I don't know 23 24 whether it was at that meeting, but I distinctly remember 25 about Burnett, you knc", in March or whenever, having been at the i
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site.
2 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Were you trying to make the 3
point that you, as a Commissioner, beliefed or is that 4
point off ---
5 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: Believed that there was a 6
diversion?
7 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Yes.
8 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
No.
9 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Or that there was evidence of 10 a diversion.
11 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
I just felt that if these guys 12 were going to go out and fact the public, then they could not be 13 put in the position it was unfair to them if nothing else --
14 to put them in a position of having to answer questions about all 15 of this and possibly make sweeping statements that were, in fact, 16 not right and so on.
17 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
Now, you had already previously 18 made clear that you didn' t dunk that the no-evidence statement was -
19 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Well, I thought so, yes.
20 I ris t say, I thought the earlier meeting was in many ways 21 more significant, but ---
22 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
A broader review of Gossick's 23 testimony?
24 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: Right, but -- and this is sort 25 of coming out of that meeting -- in fact, it was a remark of i
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Smith's in that meeting' that caused me to feel that we 2
really had to go further.
3 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
Wasn't the focus of the 4
meeting, though, on the sort of generic question of the 5
meaning of MUF, that had left ym always in that never-never land 6
of doubt that so long as a MUF occurred it is precisely what 7
it says, it is unaccounted for material and thus, one can only 8
surmise as to whether diversion occurred or not and then in order 9
to make that surmise has to take into account other considerations 10 in light of what is essentially some judgment, but one can never 11 say with 100 percent certainty.
That was my recollection on the 12 MUF -- of the context of that other -- because the subject of 13 the meeting, as I remember, wasn't the subject the MUF Report?
14 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
The present MUF Report.
15 MR. GOSSICK:
Yes, the purpose of the meeting was 16 to report to you exactly where we were and the whole process of 17 the MUF release.
18 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: Yes.
19 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
The business of the inaccuracy 20 of the MUF was one of the examples that I used as to why we 21 ought not, under any circumstances, talk about no evidence, because 22 what one was talking about, after all, was evidence above and 23 beyond MUF.
So without getting in to ' UMEC or anything else N
24 that appeared, that was a good enough reason that we explain to 25 everybody as to why (inaudible) that the MUF itself was a a
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of a -- but I think the' meeting, to some extent, went beyond that.
2 Smith, along the way said something like -- let's see -- I guess 3
we agreed on the '68 business and that was the way that the 4
briefing would go and that the press release would be changed, but 5
then Smith made some comment like:
but if I'm asked, as far as I 6
know, there isn't any evidence before that either, or something 7
like that.
At this point, I had decided -- I wondered if they 8
ought to deal with that, because (inaudible) 9 So in a sense, the briefing was for Smith and Burnett.
10 When we started in, Lee said something like:
I have never gotten 11 the briefing or something like that or I have never heard this 12 before, and this vould be a good opportunity, or something like 13 that.
And I guess I had never focused on that fact earlier, but, 14 you know, (inaudible) to inform Cliff and Burnett.
15 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Lee, I gather when you and 0
16 Perhaps primarily because you weren't there, you did not, in a way, 17 have a strong impression that Vic had ---
18 MR. GOfiSICK:
Well, I knew, you know, that Victor had 19 expressed concera and I think, in fact, in a phone conversation 20 just after you returned, and I don't remember whether it was the 21 same morning or the day before that meeting on August 2, he 22 believed (inaudible) a bit more conclusive evidence (inaudible i
23 it wasn' t really a discussion of (inau'dible) 24 but in thinking back on this, as I have said before, on 25 August the 8th, I literally talked wben I should have stopped, i
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1 because when he asked me -- not having been there -- could I 2
give them my personal assurance of something in response to Mr.
3 Ward's question, I should have said, since I wasn't personally 4
there (inaudible) but at any rate, at the August 8th hearing, 5
I had had some contacts with Ward and at least I thought I knew 6
what he was getting at.
And my view in his asking about: now, 7
the Commission has given assurance have they not?
he was 8
thinking of not just that. statement in the MUF Report, but of 9
other statements that -- by others that had come out of the 10 Comm_ ssion, whatever you want to call them.
(inaudible).
11 That is why I answered it that way and it was clear that I was 12 probably on -- well, fooled around in saying that this was a 13 Commission affirmation, although that was in my mind in the 14 context of the statement (inaudible) 13 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Frankly, what puzzles me in 16 reading this stuff was that in only recent -- in the relatively 17 recent time, prior to this contact which you had where a 18 Commissioner would have given you any position, would have been 19 that conversation with Vic.
20 MR. GOSSICK:
Yes.
Well, I came away from that 21 position, again, really in my own mind not appreciating that 22 anything was all that difficult, but --
23 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
But cer,tainly he was himself ---
24 MR. GOSSICK:
Yes, and for the life of me, I ---
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COMMISSIONER'AHEARNE:
He was the only Commissioner 2
you talked to.
3 MR. GOSSICK:
No, I talked to Commissioner Kennedy 4
as well, or at least he was present and I guess -- well, at 5
any rate, I have often wondered why it didn't enter my mind at 6
the August 8 hearing, why I didn' t say, well -- you knoti --
7 eay well, Mr. Gilinsky has a problem with this.
And I guess 8
really the only answer that I can come up with is that if I had 9
said that, one, I didn't really understand what his problem was, 10 and secondly, I guess I had the feeling that I wa.s fingering 11 Vic, you know, for being called down there and saying, Hey, what 12 do you know about this, you know, tell us all about what happened 13 at Apollo.
Perhaps it was poor j.udgment, but any way it was 14 a mistake and I admit it now.
15 But it was certainly my believe, I still was of the 16 feeling, you know, there wasn't any evidence that the Commission 17 had that ~here was in fact or that there had been a diversion.
c 18 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
But, Dick, you had to take a 19 position then?
o COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
No, we had a discussion at t
21 the end of the -- I want to be sure that my recollection is 22 clear.
My recollection of the briefing was that it was a very, 23 very brief one and that it went in to 'no detail at all.
It was 24 only the most generalized sort of way, A; B,
at the end of it 25 we had a discussion about what all we said and I don't recall
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Lee being there.
I remember some interplay with Smith and Burnett.
2 I don't recall Lee being involved.
I don't know.
I couldn't 3
say one way or the other about what ought to be said.
And we --
4 we said, well, you know, you ought to be careful with the 5
implication of saying "no-evidence" means.
And I said, yes, but 6
we also want to think hard if we introduce other words that 7
because, as you introduce other words, you start raising a number 8
of questions.
What do you mean by the word?
I guess I wouldn't 9
know what the answer to that was.
Does it go to say, I recall 10 asking, does it go to say if you say there is no hard evidence --
11 toss the words,' different kinds -- we were trying to find 12 different kinds of words.
2 13 I said, what we have to.think about is when we. use 14 that word, we are qualifying.
Does it mean that there is going to 15 be some e ridence?
if so, you know, somebody asks:
well, what 16 is it?
Then what do you say now?
Do you have any evidence?
17 And the conversation sort of -- it really didn't go much beyond 18 this.
There was that discussion to try to be sure that he 19 understood that in qualifying, we were introducing ambiguity, 20 not necessarily clarity.
21 Now, it turns out that as others have viewed the 22 statement, the ambiguity arises because the qualifier, which 23 would normally introduce ambiguity, was'n't introduced.
24 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
I wasn't clear when you 25 clarified that, was that in the discussion with Lee or ---
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COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
It was in the same discussion 2
we are talking about, at the very end, at least.
3 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Well, I must say, I remember a 4
discussion like that in the Hart meeting and then we went over ---
5 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
I don't there, but I specifically 6
do when we were standing there, specifically because I ---
7 MR. GOSSICK:
I remember the discussion, but I swear, 8
I can't remember exactly where it took place.
9 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
So that was about a year and 10 a half ago.
But, Dick, you didn't talk to Lee specifically on 11 this NUMEC issue?
12 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
None other than in answering the 13 question that Fouchard and Lee raised, you know, what do we 14 say, do we say anything about this?
And we said, certainly, 15 there was a briefing, but you weren' t present and you know 16 nothing of the content, and we suggest that since the briefing 17 did come from the Executive Brnach that they request it, which 18 even though I had been given the briefing, that would have been 19 my answer, I think, because it would be far profitable for 20 the Committee to obtain the briefing from the briefer rather 21 than secondhand from somebody else.
22 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
So that the only contact that 23 you had, then as far as the Commissioners were concerned on this 24 issue, was that August 2nd or right after?
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MR. GOSSICK:
To the best of my knowledge.
2 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Did you talk to (inaudible) or 3
Starbird who were also at the August 8th hearing?
4 MR. GOSSICK:
Well, now wait a minute.
I talked to 5
Starbird, but not on this point.
He called me, there was a 6
last minute hitch in the release of their MUF document.
They 7
were out briefing the governors and there was some problem that 8
they had to call the damned report back because there was an 9
error in it or something, but not on this subject, not on che 10 matter of Apollo.
11 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
That's Apollo?
12 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
Now, you had, on occasion, 13 met with Udall and Tsongas and - -
14 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Henry Myers and company.
15 MR. GOSSICK:
We had a meeting in June.
I have 16 forgotten the exact date of this, the latter part of June just 17 before Marc left.
And it was because we had learned --
18 Burnham -- Dave Burnham called and said, I have got a brown 19 package on my desk, a 94-page or something page number document 20 listing the chronology of all of the inspections and investi-21 gations that have gone on at Apollo, and so we figured, well, 22 (inaudible) tied up in the newspapers.
And I called Marc and 23 said, I think somebody ought to go down.and tell Udall.
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24 Scntething else had happened, this was about two weeks before, l
l 25 where they had read about it, ycu know, AOR or something in the i
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i paper and hadn't been told about it beforehand, he said you had 2
better get down and tell them that this is likely to be in the 3
press ove-the weekend.
So Marc said, well, go ahead and do it, 4
and I did it.
Several people, John Davis, Jerry Page, Eddie Fay 5
and Ron Haller, I think.
They went down and met with Udall 6
(inaudible) and Scinto, I believe Scinto was there, but several 7
of the staff assistants from Mr. Udall's Office.
And in the 8
course of going over what,this document was, the fact that it 9
was merely a distillation of about 25 feet of line, so that 10 when people got questions on various events they didn' t have to 11 go through the whole damn file.
12 In the course of that, they asked:
We.'.1, how about 13 this Apollo /MUF back in the '65-66. period?
At that point -- and 14 I had mentioned this or discussed this with Marc before going 15 over, I said:
look, just what do I say?
He said:
yes, the 16 Commission has been briefed on this by thc Executive Branch 17 (inaudible)
I believe in May, then, Marc and Mattson went 18 over with the Mattson Task Force Report on the Conran letter.
19 Marc had the same thing (inaudible) 20 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
When you talked about that, did 21 he come up with what to say if they asked about the diversion?
MR. GOSSICK:
No.
I can't recall, you knOW, that that 22 23 came up.
They just said:
if this matt'er comes up, how do I treat it?
I know that you guys have been briefed on this, I 24 have not.
What do I tell Udall (inaudible) just tell 25 l
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1 them that the Commission has been given a briefing on that, 2
there is some sensitive aspects no it (inaudible) 3 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
And that was a month later 4
when you had to go up and testify on the 29th, you didn' t then 5
have an occasion to ask anyone else what you should say if that 6
question came up at that hearing?
7 MR. GOSSICK:
Ah, on the 29 th?
8 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
Yes.
9 MR. GOSSICK:
No.
I had -- well --
10 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
He said that he mentioned that 11 to Fouchard.
12 MR. GOSSICK:
-- I had mentioned this same thing to 13 Commissioner Kennedy ---
14 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
The same qu9stion with the same 15 answer.
16 MR. GOSSICK:
Right, because ---
17 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
Although, I was not aware that 18 that was the answer he had been given earlier.
19 MR. GOSSICK: By that time, Commissioner Rowden turned 20 around and left and I just reaffirmed that same response, but 21 again, I didn't bring up -- it didn't occur to me, I guess, to 22 bring up the question, to say we have no evidence or modify 23 the no-evidence statement, which seemed'.to be the standard 24 answer that people gave in those days.
2 hat just wouldn't 25 i,
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~*
1 come up.
Again, as I say, the real thrust of that 29 July 2
hearing was brother Conran,. and not so much about Apollo.
3 I guess I would have to admit, you know, that I would expect 4
at the committee that it might come up, but he got a hold of 5
a copy of my draft testimony well before it was released.
6 How, it remains to be the question.
He called me and his 7
concern was what kind of a statement can the Commission take 8
on the adequacy of sadieguards.
9 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Henry Myers?
10 MR. GOSSICK:
Henry Myers, yes.
It really wasn't 11 something that was high in my mind as a point of concern, and 12 I guess, again, in the way I answered Mr. Tsongas when he got 13 down to it, wnen he finally mentio.ned Apollo, I just said:
14 look, I can' t speak to that.
Cochran had already brought up, 15 again, during the morning, and the thing was so hectic in the 16 nature of the question, it just didn't seem appropriate for me 17 to butt in and try to make that same point again myself.
18 It was on ---
19 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
Why was it that Cochran knew all 20 about the briefing?
21 MR. GOSSICK:
Well, it was in the 10--
let's see, how 22 did that get out?
23 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
It was' in the 102.
24 MR. GOSSICK:
It was in the 102 document, which, I guess, 25 at that time was a public document.
O e
i 21 1
COMMISSIONER HEARNE:
And it had been unclassified and 2
sent over, which would be an obstensible explanation.
It 3
might not be that.
4 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Other discussion?
5 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
No.
I think that's it.
6 My only other, I guess, question would be:
Is it fair 7
to say that, Dick, you believe that this was not a major 8
issue stressed to Lee, and you, Vic, in some way do believe 9
this major issue was stressed to Lee?
10 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: ~At the August 2nd meeting?
11 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Yes.
12 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Certainly (inaudible) 13 what the Bennett briefing -- he belabored that phrase in the 14 report and we went back and forth (inaudible) so as far as 15 there being a problem, I think that was emphasized pretty 16 strongly.
17 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
Yes, I didn't say it would 18 hold water, you know, I think there was considerable discussion.
19 I'm not at all sure, however, in my own mind that it reflected 20 that it would have been necessarily public interest, the NUMEC 21 question.
It was, af ter all, discussing the MUF Report, and so, 22 indeed, it was for that reason, I think, and according to my 23 recollection that Vic and I agreed that.we ought to have a 24 subsequent conversation and there, I think it was reasonable 25 I~
t l
l l
t
i 22 I
to say that there was some additional focus put on this, but 2
again, I would also have to say that whatever the intention 3
was, I think one can only look on the testimony of those who 4
were present and ask whether it came through as a clear and 5
unquestioned sort of, you know, this is clearly what ought to 6
be said. (inaudible)
It wasn't quite as clear to the hearers 7
as it was, I'm sure, in the mind 7 of those who were conveying it.
8 It is not alway -- well,.that is not an unusual state of events.
9 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Well, but at least I hope I 10 achieved or related that (inaudible) 11 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
- Well, I think there should 12 be no doubt that I think that Commissioner Gilinsky certainly 13 was conveying a sense of concern on his part, a concern, which 14 certainly in part, I shared.
I wasn't quite as clear in my mind 15 at that juncture how do deal with this concern simply because of 16 the ambiguity probl'em which I saw.
And as I say, it was just 17 a peculiar set of circumstances which given the total 18 circumstance, it turns out that by making something ambiguous 19 you clarify it, and that is not exactly the way most people 20 go at trying to concoct testimony, I don't mean concoct, I mean 21 put together testimony to be candid and forthright.
It is just 22 the opposite the way you would normally do it.
So I was trying 23 to wrestle that through in my mind recognizing that obviously 24 what we had to be sure of here was the utmost in candor.
We 25 could not mislead.
I was just as much afraid that by using i
i.
I 23 1
qualifiers that we hadn' t thought all the way through or 2
weren' t prepared to discuss at some length, might turn out to 3
be misleading.
We might imply something that really, we didn' t 4
mean to imply in the minds of the hearers, you see.
5 MR. GOSSICK:
I guess I would like +o add just one 6
other point from this side, on why in the hell I didn' t fix 7
this in going through my testimony af terwards, after the 8
testimony.
Nothing, I guess, would have caused me to really 9
have any problem with whTt I said and was requested from 10 Congressman Udall.
Maybe it wasn't as clear or I could have 11 gone in in a different kind of hearing, but really, I had 12 troub) and I believe I have had others say that to me.
In 13 fact, Mr. Tsongas, I'm not really,.I guess, troubled so much 14 by your testimony in front of the Udall committee, but at any 15 rate, following the Udall hearing in which we reviewed the 16 list of questions and answers, anyway, we sent back on August 19th 17 the questions, one of which was this no-evidence statement.
And 18 the answers I sent down (inaudible) and anyway, though some, 19 I didn't know exactly whether the answers went over with my 20 understanding.
Mr. Gilinsky's office (inaudible)
Vic and 21 I talked later about a revised answer that was proposed which 22 says it a little differently, but as I understand it, Mr.
23 Kennedy said he didn' t care either way.'
If it is alright with 24 you, that these had all been investigated and the investigations
{
25 had not supported the hypothesis that diversion had taken place.
24 I guess that really didn't register on me as any great poter.al, but anyway, as I pointed out to Victor, you 3
know, he b -9 been out of town, I think, and I said:
the answers 4
have already gone, they are being transmitted.
They are already 5
on the Hill.
And as I recall, in the hall right out here, I 6
think he said, well, he didn' t understand that they had already 7
gone and shrugged or something.
And we dropped it there.
8 But, I guess, you know, if there was a real problem 9
with my testimony in the course of reviewing those answers to 10 those questions, why we didn't catch it collectively.
I'm not 11 blaming Vic, I'm not blaming Dick or anyone.
And I guess I'm 12 not blaming myself, but I don't know why we didn't somehow 13 say:
Hey, there is something here that we should have turned over 14 and looked at real hard and said:
is that testimony really what 15 we want to stand on the record.
16 One other thing, and I think you understand, that was 17 a hell of a hectic time, and I had been to six hearings ---
18 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Lee, that is what I was just 19 thinking.
I have gone through ---
20 MR. GOSSICK:
As far as I know this is the only one I 21 screwed up.
22 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
-- Congressional testimony and 23 turnaround like that, and it is just a huge volume of papers 24 that you go through, and unless something is really pointed out, 25 here is the most critical item, it is very easy to skip through E
i 25 1
those subjects.,
2 MR. GOSSICK:
I understand.
3 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
If you hadn't had to do it 4
yourself, you don't appreciate it, but last year, I was going 5
through a lot of testimony, preparing for others and trying 6
to review them ---
7 MR. GOSSICK:
I think there were 46 Q and A's that 8
guys put together for me on the hearing.
There again, there 9
were statements in there (inaudible) 10 Again, I want to make one la.=* statement.
The letter 11 we got to answer is truthful in the complete testimony, and 12 contrary to that, your opinion is untruthful, and I, by God, just 13 can't stand it.
(inaudible) 14 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
No, I view that as two 15 separate question:
A, truthful; B,
complete, and I guess my 16 own personal point of view is that the answer to (a) is yes; and 17 the answer to (b) unfortunately (inaudible) 18 MR. GOSSICK:
I know.
I think that's it right now 19 on the testimony.
20 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Okay, Lee, thank you very much.
21 (Mr. Gossick departed the meeting at 3:30 p.m.)
22 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
I would like to keep the 23 Commissioners if I could, just for a minute.
I know, you 24 have got to sprint, Vic.
25 I
i I
i 26 1
COMMISSIONER dILINSKY:
In about five minutes.
2 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Okay.
3 Are you going to be able to give us a speech?
4 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
(inaudible) 5 It's your speech, you know.
6 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
If it comes out -- I'll tell you 7
wnat, if it comes out good, we will flip a coin and we will 8
all spread it.
If it comes out bad ---
9 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: If it comes out bad, I'll take it.
10 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Vic has to leave.
11 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Yes.
12 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
I believe we have got to answer 13 this letter as a Commission letter.
14 I think it is addressed to us as the Commission, and 15 I think we have really got to take a position.
And I believe 16 the issues -- again -- we will just quickly rush ahead because 17 you do have to leave -- I think we really have to decide, do 18 we ask Lee to leave?
do we give Lee a reprimand or do we 19 say we believe this issue is now over and if Udall wants to 20 push it back, it is on us.
And I say "us" as I don't think it 21 is appropriate anymore to have Joe take the heat or Lee take I
I l
22 the heat.
t 23 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
I never, thought it was.
24 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
I'm not saying you did.
I'm 23 not saying Vic did.
I'm just saying, at this stage it is really l
i
I 27 1
we who have to do it.
And I think Udall's letter this tim s is 2
appropriately written.
It asks the Commission position.
3 I guess in my own perscnal summary, I have concluded 4
that I think that Lee gave incomplete testimony in the sense of 5
the strict statement was not complete.
I think that he did 6
have a reason, certainly there is enough reason for him to 7
understand that Victor had concerns about this.
You, also, 8
Dick, with some concerns of a strict interpretation of no 9
evidence was probably a little uncomfortable and I think he was, 10 to the best of his intent, truthful and I don' t believe that he 11 deliberately mislead, which is to my mind the only really 12 (inaudible)
.a 13 Truthful means, if you g.et up and swear an oath, I 14 promise to tell the truth, the whole truth and to my knowledge --
15 to tell the truth which means in my mind when the question comes 16 in, I'm answering as I believe to be the truth.
17 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
It is the reverse of lying.
18 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
It is the reverse of lying.
19 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
(inaudible) 20 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Absolutely not, that is complete.
21 Truthful, in my mind and certainly in any discussions 22 I have ever had with congressional people, truthful 's a 23 question that when a guy is up there or a woman is up there 24 and is answering a question, that they mean what they are saying.
25 That's a question of truth.
i
I 28 1
COMMISSIONER dILINSKY:
Truth, not intent.
2 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Intent, absolutely.
That is the 3
most serious charge raised against an individual.
Do they 4
intend to be homst, and my conclusion is that Lee tended to be 5
haxst, and I think that he did not give a complete answer.
6 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
And I think unintentionally so.
7 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
And I think part of the -- and 8
my suspicion as part of the reason is the role of the Executive 9
Director is a very fuzzy role, and had been and there have been 10 a whole host of reasons for that.
And I'm prepared to say that 11 I think it was incomplete, that I certainly would expect 12 that as the EDO who goes up to testify on behalf of the 13 Commission and gives complete answ.ers to those things that 14 aren't really known to issues, that one should be knowledgeable 15 on, my own feeling is that having sat through a number of the 16 developments of that, on the other side, on the ERDA side, the 17 NUMEC issues just wasn't the dominant issue.
The MUF issue was 18 the dominant issue, the release of MUF.
So I can understand 19 and appreciate how that might have been folded in.
20 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Well, of course, the Commission 21 has already (inaudible) you have got words " inaccurate and 22 incorrect" here.
23 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
You hdve got to answer this 24 directly in ---
25 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
Udall also wrote a letter to Gossick in this regard.
i
i 29 1
COMMISSIONER 'AHEARNE:
Right, but obviously, there has 2
been this disagreement on the record between Joe and Victor, and 3
so I think we have got to, whether it is a 5-0, 4-1, 3-2 ---
4 COMMISSIONER KENMEDY:
Well, there hasn't between 5
Joe and Victor.
It is my understanding it has been between 6
the Commission and Victor.
7 (Laughter) 8 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
My understanding is Dr.
9 Hendrie has been signing these letters for the Commissioners.
10 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
That's true.
There are points 11 in the letter if it were not for the Commission, I would have 12 taken a somewhat different position 13 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
Yes, that's right.
14 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
You know, we have got several 15 very straightforward questions and I think we can answer them 16 at their request very straightforwardly, and whether it is unanimous 17 or not, I think we have just got to be ig COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
I think Victor is right to hold 19 his view, but you know ---
20 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
(Inaudible) 21 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
I think I have an idea of that, 22 but the practical matter, you know, I also feel that I have an equal right to hold my view, which I do.
23 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
I'm not trying to change anybody's 24 views.
25 I
i.
i 30 1
COMMISSIONER $RADFORD:
Do we need to meet with the 2
draft in front of us or shenld we ---
3 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
I think we have to have a 4
draft.
5 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
What I would like to do is -- I would 6
be delighted to have a paragraph that might be used in one or 7
another of these sections.
I will also try to put together a 8
draft.
It seems to me that the discussion today has been very 9
helpful, that the August 3rd letter, representing a long -- the 10 outcome of a long series of meetings, that between today's 11 discussion and the August 3rd letter, there is a basis for my 12 being able to draf t something that deals with most of the 13 four questions.
But I think we ought to see that draf t and 14 discuss it, because I'm never going to get it just right, but 15 there is one thing which I want to be very clear about.
16 Vic and I have disagreed as to whether we have, in 17 fact, talked about diccipliaing Lee, and what level of 18 discipline, and I would like to have that explicit -- let me 19 just say:
I think we ought to consider it. Let us, please, now 20 consider it explicitly so that we have indeed done so.
21 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Yes.
22 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
I will make my recommendation, 23 amongst the various options which range';from asking him to 24 resign, which I believe we have discussed before when we started.
25 It is my view that a reprimand represented by the e
e
i 31
~
1 Commission's discussion that he testified incorrectly, by the 2
commission's letter to him, telling him that was our decision.
3 And the Commission's direction to him to correct the testimony, 4
at least to him, constitutes a sufficient level of reprimand.
5 That is where I vote and I would like to see if we 6
can -- where everybody else stufb, see if there is a consensus 7
position or what we at least -- what we can describe, because 8
I think it is a matter that we are asked explicitly to answer 9
and I want to know where we stand.
10 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
You have to answer that 11 specifically, right.
12 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Vic?
, ell, I mean, this thing has 13 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
W 14 dragged on so long, and there has been a certain amount of 15 discussion (inaudible)
I have to go back and take a look at 16 that letter, which I guess was sent out while I was away, and 17 (inaudible)
I don't remember it that well.
18 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Well, do you think he ought to 19 be fired?
20 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
For this reason?
21 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Yes.
22 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
I guess, it is pretty awkward a year and a half later to fire him now'.
l 23 l
24 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Awkward, but not necessarily 25 impossible.
i
i 32 1
COMMISSIONER CILINSKY:
Yes, I've got my own views about 2
Lee as the Executive Director.
I don't think ---
3 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
But that's probably a different 4
issue, isn't it?
5 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Yes, that is a different issue.
6 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
You certainly wouldn't want to 7
fire him for a false reason.
8 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
I think once one has let it 9
drag on for so long, I don't think we could say at this point we 10 are firing him, because of his testimony at that point.
11 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
Are you suggesting that we once 12 should have?
13 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
.I think so, yes.
14 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
You think we should have fired 15 him for his testimony?
16 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
I think so, yes.
17 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
No. I would not go that far.
18 I would have said, with maybe this frame of though, but maybe 19 reversing the time order, that is, if similar testimony were given 20 under the circumstances that we have today, with a full Commission, 21 and the opportunity to get clear guidance on this, and this is 22 not just on NUMEC or on any issue, and that if someone missed 23 by that much, it might well be cause for, firing (inaudible) 24 what still seems to me to be an unclear situation, at that time, 25 and it seems to me that firing would be too strong or considerably
I 33 1
too strong for Lee's hav'ing done'as he did in that context.
2 I still think that his failure to mention Vic's separate position 3
was clearly wrong, but I don't think there is any dispute 4
about that.
I don' t think that that adds up ---
5 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
(inaudible) 6 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
Yes, but I don't think that is 7
something in itself that you would fire someone for.
But it does 8
seem to me that Lee was under -- I should think, under a duty, 9
given his position, could have been a little more aggresive about 10 finding out a little more about the NUMEC situation.
But again, 11 I can' t assess the involvement in the role of the EDO and the 12 atmosphere in which he was working before.
13 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
But that's critical.
14 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
Well, all.right ---
15 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
I don't think it is, John.
16 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
The role of the EDO, I think, 17 is not.
18 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
I agree with you.
19 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
The role of the EDO, I think, 20 is not critical, I agree with Victor about that, but for me to 21 say that Lee should have -- I would want Lee today, to push harder 22 to find something out.
That is not to say that I feel that I l
23 should say that he ought to be fired for. not doing it in times 24 before this.
25
i 34 1
COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
In order to jump ahead, because 2
Vic does have to leave, I guess my position is that I think that 3
our answer to No. 4 ought really to be:
A, yes.
B, we've done it 4
as Joe just described and certainly telling our man that his 5
testimony is incomplete, we have reached that conclusion and 6
it must be corrected.
That is disciplinary action.
7 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
That's my view as well.
8 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
I mean, that's ---
9 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Well, I'll tell you something.
10 The thing that this Commission has not done, I believe, is to 11 indicate how seriously we regard this, you know, it is like 12 saying (inaudible) 13 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Yes, let me finish and I will 14 answer that.
15 I think that if Dingell's letter is correct, we didn't 16 really explain what Lee was supposed to correct, and Lee's letter 17 back saying, please correct the testimony, without giving what the 18 corrected testimony should be is inadequate.
And it is 19 inadequate from their ---
20 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
Well, if I understand this, 21 there is a procedural problem which the committee is suggesting, 22 to wit, it closed the hearing record.
23 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Sure it did.
24 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
Actually, that's what I thought 25 he was referring to.
I i
35 1
~
COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Well ---
2 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
So he says, how am I going to 3
do it?
4 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
But if you read what Lee sent 5
back, Lee didn't say in place of this, this is what should be 6
said.
He didn't say that which I thought ---
7 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: (inaudible) 8 9
COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Can I please answer your 10 question.
11 Had I been here at the time, I would not have viewed 12 that as okay, if in this meeting we just had, if it had been 13 clearly said, you know, Vic, if you could say, look, I remember 14 telling Lee Gossick, this is a very important issue and it is 15 one in which I, as a Commissioner, although we don't have a 16 Commission, I as a Commissioner feel that you have got to 17 represent my views, and my view is that no evidence just cannot 18 be said.
This is a guy who was in the midst of a number of 19 hearings, he has been thrown into a situation to be that 20 ostensible head of an agency in which he has not had that role 21 carved out for him ---
I 22 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
Is that what you meant by the l
23 role of the EDO?
l 24 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
That's right.
25 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
Oh, well, that's different.
1 i
Il
36 1
That's some thing ---
2 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
That's right.
That's what he 3
was up there testifying as.
4 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
That's different, though, from 5
what I meant by it, so maybe we can ---
6 COMMISSIONE3 AHEARNE:
Okay.
And in fact, even right 7
now there is no very explicit -- that I have found -- clear 8
understanding down in the staff of the EDO as the representative 9
of the five commissioners.
So that I view what he was
-- he was 10 also in a situation where Marc and this sudden release of a large-11 of MUF information was the dominant focus, certainly as far 12 as the Administration was concerned.
This was a small element, 13 and that I don't want to address the question, is he a good man 14 for the EDO's job or not, I think really, that in my mind is a 15 completely separable issue.
This specific testimony is a bad 16 job.
If I had a man working for me as an assistant secretary 17 who went up and testified like that, I would call him in and 18 chew him out, that look, blasted you are supposed to be up there 19 representing my view, I want you to start thinking about it.
20 I know you have got 10 million things that you are suppose to 21 be addressing and understanding.
Just realize, think all of the 22 time that you are up there testifying, you are not just there 23 testifying for yourself, you are representing me or us in that 24 case, and I want you to think about it.
But I certainly wouldn't 25 fire the guy for giving that answer.
i 37 1
COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
Now, what you said at the 2
end touched on what I had to say and never quite finished is that 3
it does seem to me that it is one thing to say that we have done 4
all that we can do in the context of what happened a year ago, 5
and another to say that a similar type of mistake would be 6
treated the same way.
7 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Well, I think right now -- I 8
haven't dug up all of the information, maybe there is some clear 9
statement on what Lee's role is and that has been gone over by 10 the four of you with him, but I tell you, I have been spending a 11 lot of time talking to those people out in Bethesda, a number of 12 the people in tha staff, there just is not a very clear picture 13 of what the EDO's ---
14 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
There are two separate role 15 of the EDO issues, though, John.
One is the very strange one 16 when there is no quorum in the agency ---
17 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Yes.
I'm talking about -- if 18 he goes up there to testify, who is he supposed to represent?
There are a lot of people out there rho view that the EDO 20 represents the staff.
COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
Right, but when he goes up 21 22 there in that siatuation where there is no quorum, he really 23 is going up there as the NRC.
I could'see your point in that context.
What I meant to say about the role of the EDO is 24 25 what goes through the OGC/OIA conclusions that there -- the i
I l other role of the EDO question is what the Commission has been
.4 i
'l it
i 38 1
debating all spring, and that was whether he was the chief 2
administrator involved or ---
3 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
All I'm trying to say, Peter, 4
is the view out in Bethesda in many peoples' minds is the EDO is 5
supposed to represent the staff and the Commissioners represent 6
the Commission.
And when the EDO testifies or anything, that ---
7 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
How does that bear on this?
8 COMMISSIONER BRADFCRD:
Yes.
9 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
And this is getting back to 10 Peter's other issue, and I got hold of a whole set of questions 11 and answers that were prepared for the testimony, pervasive, 12 completely pervasive.
No evidence.
It just runs through it 13 consistently, there is no evidence.
So it is obviously, that 14 as far as the bulk of the staff, certainly the kr.ssledgeable staff 3
who would have been indoctrinating Lee, haven't indoctrinated 16 him.
17 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
You are applying some GS-ll 18 standards to the guy who is in a position of an assistant 19 secretary.
He is a guy that sat around with the Commissioners 20 who knows how the; react, who knows if they are concerned or 21 not.
I agr,3e that he went up on the Hill ---
22 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
I don' t know if he is that 23 (inaudible) 24 COMMISSIGNER GILINSKY:
Well, not enough, but you know ---
25
i 39 1
COMMISSIONER'AHEARNE:
And that gets back to your 2
other issue which I really would defer.
3 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: But anyway, I agree that he 4
went up there and did what he thought was, quote: "the right 5
thing to do. "
I'm not sure I go beyond that.
6 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
That's very important, though.
7 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: He felt that -- I mean, this 8
was the answer that duly. constituted authority, wherever that is 9
er whoever that is and he probably couldn't tell you exactly, 10 expect of him to say.
11 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
That's going beyonds really, what 12 Lee said.
13 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
I'm just saying what I think, 14 okay?
15 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Yes.
16 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Now, whether those answers 17 jive with other things he knew to be true, I think they did not 18 and I think he was aware that they did not.
Now how he 19 squared the circle, I don' t -- you know ---
20 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
But Vic, you didn't tell him.
21 You didn't say that to him.
l 22 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
I know.
23 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
The purpose of having him 24 in here with you and Cick here and if you think the guy is not 25 telling the truth you tell him.
- Note:
Commissioner Kennedy departed the meeting at this time.
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COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
We have been through this so 2
many times, I have had conversations with Lee -- I mean -- you 3
know -- but the point is that ne sat here -- I mean, look, we 4
discussed it, we had a meeting here, we went over in agonizing 5
detail that the reports which had been printed, they had to be 6
changed.
We discussed errata, I mean, this isn't some 7
commonality thing, and people were agonizing that they were 8
saying, Christ yes, if we,can't say conclusihe (inaudible) 9 so people were really -- well, you know -- as Dick said, 10 concerned with what the alternatives were.
And there was a 11 kind of party line and I think no one wanted to be the first to 12 break that, a
13 I mean, he was in an awkward spot, there is no question 14 about it.
Here you have the ERDA guys ---
15 COMMISSIONER AHEAFNE:
I know them well.
16 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Okay, and they were all ---
17 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Absolutely, hard line.
18 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
-- hard line, you know ---
19 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Down the line, no evidence.
20 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: -- here were the other generals 21 and here he was, and was he going to be the guy who was going to 22 break ranks?
After all, he wasn't at the meeting and so on ---
COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
I see'what you are --
All of 23 24 that, Vic, which you are saying is that he is an inadequate guy 25 to be the EDO, not really this particular issue.
COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Well, as you said, let's set
i 41 that other one aside, but I still don't see -- you know --
2 given what we have talked about today, how he could go in to 3
the Dingell hearing and say the things he said.
4 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Remember, in the Dingell 5
hearing, he was a very minor participant.
6 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
It doesn't matter, I mean, 7
the fact is you have to look at his role.
He is coming in saying 8
certain things and there-was -- they were not unaware of it at 9
the time, I mean, as to what happens if you start edging over 10 the line and these committees were looked upon with great 11 apprehension because this was soon after they had gotten 12 legislative jurisdiction, they were looked upon with great 13 suspicion and concern, and God knows what they will do to us.
14 So there was kind of an exaggerated fear of what they might 15 do and great concern about, you know, any crack in the design.
16 So, you know, I have my own theories as to how it 17 came about, but I regard that just as inexcusable and furthermore,i 18 it is not just the testimony itself, but what came after it.
19 All right, he left out the word conclusive or whatever, in fact, 20 even if he meant to say it he could have left it out.
That can 21 be corrected at the end of the hearing, or you correct it in 22 the transcript, or you write a letter afterwards.
I think there 23 was tremendous concern about what the consequences of that 24 would be.
25 COMMISSIONER'AHEARNE:
But now, he sent this answer I
e
I 42
~~
1 around, right?
2 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Yes.
3 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Vic, if that was such a big 4
issue to you, why wasn't your office primed, just as soon as 5
they got that, bring it in to you and say, Hey, look and you 6
immediately called and say, blast it, Lee, you just ---
7 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
I think that answer dealt with 8
activities since the agency formed or since -- or licensed 9
facilities or some damned thing.
I think it was handled by 10 an inexperienced guy on my staff.
You know, I'm not sure what the answer was.
11 12 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Okay, but you saw him in the 13 hall?
14 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
It was Goldberg, wasn't it?
15 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Yes.
I mean, I don't have 16 a ready answer.
17 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
But you saw him in the hall.
18 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
He is the guy that handled the 19 thing back on August 2nd ---
20 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
So I have to go back to the 21 questions and answers he gave, you know, to give a better 22 answer.
But the fact is we went over this ---
23 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Vic,'it was that big a thing.
24 When you saw him in the hall he said, look, Vic, it's gone.
25 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
I think I would have to look 4
i 43 1
at that answer.
You se'e -- In other words, I'm not sure, but 2
do you have it here?
3 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
No.
4 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
Do you mean if ---
5 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
But to me, my point is that if 6
you are saying that look, what went on after that was so important, 7
here's one of the first things that went on af ter and then the 8
question wasn't ---
9 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Wait, wait, wait.
Let me 10 see what that answer is.
I don't have a ready reply, but, look, 11 this is something that I beat on for years here.
It isn't as if 12 this just all of a sudden happened.
13 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Beat on Lee?
14 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
On the organization as a 15 whole.
I tried to scotch every one of these papers, and these 16 guys were just holding fast, and there was just sort of
-- you 17 know -- massage and it is very difficuly to deal with it because 18 this is a highly classified matter.
That is one of the reasons 19 why I emphasize that the fact that MUF itself was evidence 20 and so on.
21 These guys, for example, we had expressed -- you know, 22 if y u want us to go through the entire affair, which I don' t think you want to do, we can do that, but we expressed concern 23 all the way along the line which, I must say, they were not 24 congenial to.
They didn't want to change it.
They really wanted 25 I
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those ---
2 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Yes, I'm sure of that.
3 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
I know you must have dealt 4
with the same characters on the other side.
5 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Absolutely, and they were 6
positive, you know, and until I finally after the fact, ended 7
up getting all of those briefings, they were so positive that 8
I accepted it.
9 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Well ---
10 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
And they were, they were 11 adamant, and if you will notice, Fri, in that same August 8th 12 testimony ---
13 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:.And the fact of the matter 14 is that these testimonies were calculated in some way, leaving 15 aside whether you were telling the truth or not, to lull the 16 Congress and I think, to mislead the Congress.
It was an 17 attitude of "?.et sleeping dogs lie,"
here.
And one has a 18 little private definition of either evidence or some oth'r words 19 or whatever that makes it okay, if it even went that fa1.
20 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: (inaudible)I don't know 21 which question it is ---
22 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
Sixteen, I think, is the only 23 one that even comes close.
24 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Relevance of large Apollo MUFs?
25 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
No, it was one about -- it was -~
I 45 I
you know, we have been all through this one.
2 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
(inaudible) without the answer.
3 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Oh, yes.
That's it, yes.
4 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
But you know, these guys were 5
constantly trying to slip this stuff by ---
6 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
With the no evidence.
7 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
With the no evidence business, 8
and it -- like you knock it back 99 times, and it comes back by 9
one time and the the way -- well, that's Commission policy and you 10 proved it.
11 As I remember, there was some explanation for that 12 one why I didn't insist on them going back, but I don't have 13 it in front of me.
But how they could even.sent that after --
14 it was just, you know, as I said, a lousy -- Joe -- well, of 15 course, Joe doesn't remember, but, you know, there were a lot of 16 people there, and let me say, Smith got the message.
Whatever he 17 says now, because they changed it at a public briefing.
18 Burnett got the message and was very careful afterwards.
In fact, 19 Smith was so careful that when he was reported incorrectly in the 20 Nucleonics Week as to having made a no-evidence statement, he 21 immediately sent a note to all of the Commissioners or called us 22 up or something,.saying that ---
23 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Yes, but that was a long way dcwn 24 the line.
That was this past summer.
25 i
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COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
No, it was the previous 2
summer.
3 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
No, it was this past summer.
4 COMMISSIONER GILINKSY:
That's right, but it was 5
before Udall ---
6 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
October 20th,
'77.
7 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
-- but it was before Udall 8
had reacted.
9 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
The October 20th, '77 issue, 10 but it is quoted Clifford Smith ---
11 COMMISSIONER GHiDiSKY:
Yes, incorrectly.
They ---
12 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Well, no.
It quoted him and 6
13 he wasn't the person.
14 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
That's right.
But this is 15 before Udall wrote his letter.
COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Yes.
16 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
I'm just saying that the 17 message was not lost on him, however vague he thought the yg conversation was.
19 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Well, this was the end of 20 October.
21 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
But Udall didn't write until 22 December.
COtiMISSIONER GILIMSKY:
No, Udall wrote in November.
24 na m saying is ---
25 I
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COMMISSIONER'AHEARNE:
But by the end of October, 2
the issue had gotten quite heated.
3 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Well, we hadn't heard from 4
Udall.
5 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Well, maybe you hadn't heard 6
from Udall, but the issue had gotten quite heated by the end of 7
October, because Dingell and ---
8 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
(inaudible) 9 COM?iISSIONER GILINSKY:
Yes, but we hadn't heard from 10 the Congress and Gossick was an issue and ---
11 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Smith had certainly heard from 12 the Congress.
Mike Ward or Dingell had gotten very, very hot 13 by the middle of September on that issue, and so by the. time 14 this came out ---
15 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
I'm not aware of any ----
16 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
-- on October 20th there was 17 a burning fire amongst anybody in the safeguards business.
18 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
All right, well, maybe that 19 explains it.
But in any case, when they went out for that 20 public briefing, you know, two days later after that meeting, 21 they stuck pretty closely to the guidelines.
The press 22 releases changed, I mean, I don't see how anybody could have 23 walked out of there and not understood.
And I think Lee was 24 conscious of the fact that he had made the statement before 25 at the Udall Committee and you know, after a year and a half, it is hard i
a
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to disentangle all of that, but ---
COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Your belief is that he --
3 my impression is that you really believe that he sort of 4
deliberately said less than complete information.
5 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
I must say -- I mean, I can 6
understand how he can get up before Udall and aay no evidence 7
or whatever in the hell he said, but how he could go into detail 8
for Dingela and say, I remember it, it is not saying there is 9
no evidence, I don't know that, he said the Commission has 10 given these assurances and you should know that they did this 11 after getting a full briefing by the Executive Branch.
Now, that 12 is a pretty kind of elaborate detailed statement, when there are 13 two Commissioners there, at least one of whom, you know, expressed 14 considerable concern and the other, of whom, who had never made 15 such a statement, so far as I knew.
It was a month after 16 Rowden had drawn the attention of the staff to the fact that 17 there was such a statement in the draf t environmental report 18 which he disapproved and Lee sitting right across the table.
19 You know, Rowden never made such a statement, so where does 20 this come from?
I mean, the Comm_ssion says these things.
21 I just don't have an explanation for it.
22 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
I think ---
23 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
It comes from a body of stuff 24 like that which is developed in the staff and the Commission 25 gives no Goddamned guidance and then a year on later stands back I
i 49 1
and said you should have known.
COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Victor, Victor, Victor.
This 3
13 -- look, you know, I have given lots of congressional testi-4 mony.
You get briefed by extensive -- you get big backup 5
books.
This is the backup book that was prepared for him.
6 Throughout this there are consistent statements there 2.s no evidence.
O COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
But he can always -- but these 9
are the mice putting this stuff together.
10 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
But that's what he -- I'm telling 11 out there in Bethesda that is the Commission.
You guys
- you, 12 up here or we guys up here are five individuals who happen to 13 have positions on things.
14 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Now, I think you are getting 15 a little closer to it, but ---
16 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
So in his preparction, the 17 body of knowledge is represented by what is here.
18 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Well, I tell you, I don't have 19 a terribly high regard ---
20 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
I'm not saying it is right, but ---
21 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
-- but I think you are giving 22 him less than justice.
I mean, it is true that these guys 23 will keep writing all of this stuff, churning it out for him.
24 It is also true that you have an expression on the part of 25 the Commissioners, he knows it was a CIA briefing, he talked to l
1
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.s 1
people in the briefing,' he's got a note from the General Counsel ---
2 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Yes, but even -- you know --
3 even in that OIA/OGC review, something like 9 of the 11 people 4
were in that briefing say they could come out of that briefing 5
concluding there was no evidence.
So if you say he has talked 6
to the people, most of the people in the briefing came cut that 7
way.
8 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
(i;oudible) 9 testirony he had certainly heard a lot of people give 10 testimony, and as such ---
11 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Look, I don't think he did a 12 competent job of it.
13 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
I know you don't and I'm not 14 trying to argue that point, but why does he get out there and 15 made categorical statements.
16 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Because he has been inculpated, 17 that's clear.
That's why he had all of this back-up stuff, 18 becausc that's what people prepare and go through in their --
19 it is a typical staff guy preparing testimony.
20 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
What was the name of that dog.
21 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
Listen, that wasn't half as 22 funny as what happened this morning.
The same guys who got 23 Brezhnev and Brzezinskt he wanted to transmit a letter 24 ric:ht away to Mr. Brezhnev.
25 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
This is where the phenomenon l
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1 that Burnett says, we ar'e just like (inaudible) dogs.
2 I sat through a lot of this, and you know, I have 3
inevitably a point of view and peoples' facial expressions 4
and reaction and so on, lead you to certain -- whether they are 5
agitators or not lead you to certain views of things.
6 The fact that -- I mean -- let's take even the 7
November 15th letter that Udall came up wi '_n.
Why wasn't that 8
replied to simply on the basis of just saying, okay, looking back 9
on it -- I mean -- why did it take so long to come to the 10 position that we are at now or that Lee is at now.
In other words,
11 why couldn' t one have answered that and said, all right, (inaudiblel 12 in retrospect, I think I should have aid it differei.tiv 3.nd s
13 in fact, that would have been the erd of the November 15th letter.
14 Instead, you know, we ---
15 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
I don't think so.
' Iou remember the 16 answer to the November 15th letter, I asked Lee to respond to 17 a letter to me, I talked to you, I talked to Dick, him, Smith, 18 Rowden and formed an opinion in answer.
The specific thrust of the 19 November 15th letter was :
Hendrie, explain why this guy lied 20 to us?
What I wrote back and said was in my best judgment 21 he really didn't lie to you, that he said what he though was the 22 case.
My answer didn' t deal and didn' t attempt to deal, it seemed 23 beyond, to deal with the merits, that i's, aside from the question 24 of whether he was subjectively truthful was what he said 25 bjectively truthful.
Was it actually the proper thing to say i
i 52 1
or the true case or whatever.
And I didn' t go with that 2
because (inaudible) for God's sakes, here is this stuff way 3
off in the past, I'm trying to get started on this job and I'd 4
rather not deal with it.
But I did say -- and then I went ahead 5
and said:
with regard to the NUMEC for regulatory programs and so 6
on, why, it is thus and so.
And that was -- it didn' t deal with 7
the: did he testify incorrectly or not. It dealt with the 8
question:
Did he mean -, did he do it intentionally whether it 9
was correct or not?
10 COMMISSIONER GILINSEY:
(inaudible) 11 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Do you mean Gossick's letter?
12 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Yes.
13 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Gossick's letter was written by 14 Bernie Snyder, as he says in his testimony, he got the same 15 guys who helped him prepare his testimony on July 29th and 16 August 8th, who is Bernie Snyder and I think it was Reamer.
They 17 were the ones who had helped write his testimony to start with.
18 He called them down to Bethesda and they draf ted the response, 19 because they were the ones who started it.
20 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
(inaudible) 21 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: Listen, before you go off and 22 get on this ---
23 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: First' class flight.
24 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
-- glossy first class -- no, no.
25 That's the trip back, sorry.
Can I have the customary votes to
{
53 1
withhold the tape of tihis meeting.
2 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
You may.
3 (Whereupon, the meeting was adjourned at 4:15 p.m.)
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