ML19274C764
| ML19274C764 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 11/03/1978 |
| From: | Casey Smith NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY & SAFEGUARDS (NMSS) |
| To: | |
| References | |
| SECY-78-552A, NUDOCS 7811170300 | |
| Download: ML19274C764 (18) | |
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November 3, 1978 SE_CY-78-552A COMMISSIONER ACTION For:
The Commissioners From:
Clifford V. Smith, Jr., Director Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards Thru:
Executive Director for Operations
Subject:
PROPOSED COMMISSION COMMENTS ON THE DRAFT REPORT T0 THE PRESIDENT BY THE INTERAGENCY REVIEW GROUP ON NUCLEAR WASTE MANAGEMENT (IRG)
Purpose:
To obtain Commission approval on draft response to subject report.
Discussion:
Since the formation of the IRG last March by Presidential Memorandum, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission's (NRC) role in the IRG has consisted of the following activities:
- NRC represrntation (as a non-voting member) at the meetings of the IRG principles.
- NRC technical staff participation in preparation of subgroup reports.
- NRC representation at Small Group Meetings held in Washington and the larger Public Meetings held in San Francisco, Denver and Boston.
- NRC technical staff review (NMSS, SD, NRR, ELD, OSP) of two earlier drafts of the Report (SECY 78-487 and SECY 78-528).
gg The current version of the Report was released for public comment on October 19, 1978 and the next day copies were forwarded to all the Office
The Commissioners Directors with a request for comments.
In most cases comments provided were of a preliminary nature since there was not sufficient time to perform an extensive office-wide review.
NMSS staff performed its own analysis and all the policy-relevant comments were incorporated in the draft response which is enclosed.
At this time, it is my intention to forward the more specific technical or editorial comments directly to Dr. Deutch.
Prior to doing this, I will forward them to you for your information.
To briefly characterize the enclosed draft response, there is positive reaction to the objective tone of the document, its identification of the several key issues, its usefulness as a basis for establishing policy and its significant attention to public parti-cipation.
Weaknesses addressed include the failure to acknowledge current agency programs, the lack of sufficient information to either assess the impli-cations of the recommendations or the requirements for their implementation, recommendations not sup-ported by analysis, and insufficient attention to some of the key issues.
The Summary of the Report is a concise presentation of the main findings and recommendations.
In addition to outlining the main elements of the Report, we will be prepared to address any questions you may have or provide elaboration at the Commission meeting scheduled for November 7, 1978.
To the extent possible, we will also provide information on the possible implications of the recommendations on NRC resource requirements.
One open question that remains is whether or not the staff should attempt to provide a more rigarcus analysis of the document for the purpose of quan-tifying the impacts on NRC programs, during the remainder of the comment period.
My judgment is that such an effort would be unproductive for the following reasons:
- 1) There is insufficient detail in the information provided to quantify impacts on NRC's program,
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The Comissioners 2)
There is also insufficient guidance provided as to changes in direction that might be required in NRC's program, and 3)
Generally, the recomendations are not stated specifically enough for NRC to judge whether or not we could be in agreement.
In the near future the staff will forward to the Comission an information paper describing how NRC will conduct the study required by the FY79 Authorization on extending the Commission's regulatory authority over non-licensed Federal waste storage and disposal activities.
Recommendation:
That the Comission review the enclosure, provide guidance for revision if necessary, and approve its transmittal to the Secretary of Energy.
Scheduling:
The public coment period ends on November 18, 1978.
Coordination:
Except for OELD, other Office concurrence was not solicited. OELD has no legal objection.
OELD's major comments have been included.
Clifford V. Smith, Jr., Director Office of Nuclear Material Safe;y and Safeguards
Enclosure:
Draft Comission Response to IRG Report to the President
. Commissioners' comments should be provided directly to the Office of the Secretary by c.o.b. Wednesday, November 15, 1978.
Commission Staff Office comments, if any, should be submitted to the Commissioners NLT Noveinber 9,1978, with an information copy to the Office of the Secretary.
If the paper is of such a nature that it requires additional time for analytical review and comment, the Commissioners and the Secretariat should be apprised of when comments may be expected.
SECY NOTE: Tnis paper is identical to advance copies issued to Commission offices on November 3,1978. This paper is currently scheduled for a briefing on November 7,1978.
DISTRIBUTION Commissioners Commission Staff Offices Exec Dir for Operations Regional Offices Secretariat
Enclosure DRAFT COMMISSION RESPONSE TO IRG REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT The Honorable James R. Schlesinger Secretary of Energy U.S. Department of Energy Washington, D.C.
20545
Dear Jim:
Consistent with its decision to participate in the activities of the Interagency Review Group on Nuclear Waste Management (IRG) as a non-voting member, the Commission has waited until the publication of the draft " Report to the President" before providing formal comments.
In conducting our review of the Report, we have considered it from two perspectives. The first is the extent to which it fulfills the President's mandate to establish an Administration policy for the long-term management of nuclear waste and ':he programs necessary for its implementation.
The second is the manner in which the Report's findings, determinations and recommendations affect the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC) regulatory authority and responsibilities for pro;;ecting the public health and safety and the environment.
For the most part, the Report provides a balanced identification of key issues associated with waste management and establishes a general philosophic basis which can serve as the foundation for a coordinated and disciplined approach to solving waste management problems.
In addition, the deliberate and substantial efforts
The Honorable James R. Schlesinger expended by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) to obtain the public's views in developing recommendations and to provide opportunity for public review and comment should be commended.
We, the,efore, consider this document as a credible first step in the procass of developing a comprehensive national waste management policy.
The recommendations that are submitted to the President will be greatly strengthened by having been critically evaluated by the public and other Federal agencies. Hopefully, this will lead to an improvement with regard to the recommendations a :d the suppr.' ting information which are not sufficiently specific or detailed to provide guidance for program implementation.
In an area as controversial as waste management, imprecise recommendatioas will lead to arbitrary inter-pretation and, therefore, more confusion and uncertainty. With respect to NRC's evaluation, it wat difficult to assess the implications from the standpoint both of determaning the extent of our agreement with the recommendations and their potential impact on the direction and scope of NRC's waste managemer t program.
Furthermore, the Report often recommends increasing efforts, accelerating schedules, or increasing resources without recognizing that a substantial level of effort already exists. We believe that much of what the IRG recommends in this regard is already underway. Therefore, the report
The Honorable James R. Schlesinger should state at the beginning that the involved Federal agencies have taken significant steps since 1976 to accelerate the development of a comprehensive waste management program and that in some instances the IRG recommendations are only reaffirming programs already in place.
Specific Commission coments relating to these general statements are contained in the enclosure.
In addition, more detailed technical and editorial comments will be forwarded by the staff directly to Dr. Deutch.
In conclusion, I would like to commend you for the effort put forward by your agency to respond to the President's request.
For the first time, the problem of waste management and the need to obtain a coordinated national approach has been raised to the appropriate level of discussion. Hopefully, the momentum you have generated can be maintained to develop the substantive analysis and information this document needs in order to provide sufficient guidance for the implemer.tation of its recommendations.
To the extent possible, NRC plans to contribute to meeting that objective.
In that regard and to assist us in meeting our own responsibilities, it would be extremely useful if you could provide us with ccpies
The 1:'onorable James R. Schlesinger of those public coments that specifically refer to NRC licensing authority, State participation and the relationship between nuclear waste disposal and the future use of nuclear energy.
Sincerely, Joseph M. Hendrie Chairman
Enclosure:
Comission Coments on Draft IRG Report to the President
ENCLOSURE COMMISSION COMMENTS ON DRAFT IRG REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT Introduction The relationship between nuclear waste disposal and the future use of nuclear energy is controversial; and the IRG's approach of remaining neutral, seeking public comment and informing the President of the nature and extent of public views is a wise course of action.
The Commission has already been called upon to address this issue in two instances:
- 1) in denying a Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) petition PRM-50-18 which requested a safety determination on waste disposal before the issuance of new reactor licenses; and 2) in revising Table S-3 of 10 CFR Part 51. Moreover, the Commission has a commitment to keep this question under surveillance in light of new data that is developed and progress that is made in reaching a solution for the disposal of all nuclear wastes.
f0neoftheunresolvedquestionswhichstillremainsis,"Whatare the implications of doing without nuclear energy for power generation?"
To answer this question (by providing both the public and the decision-makers with an informed basis for choice) it would be appropriate for the IRG to recommend that a comparative analysis of the impacts of alternative energy supply technologies and options for energy conservation be performed.
The problem of nuclear waste cannot be adequately assessed in isolation.]
,,7. f.
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I.
Objectives and Procedures The IRG clearly recognized that the NEPA process is an essential part of the nuclear waste management program by calling for the development of an overall plan for addressing NEPA requirements.
However, the present recommendation requires each agency to prepare its cwn com-prehensive plan and provide it to the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) and the public for comment.
It is difficult to envision how this approach will yield an "overall plan".
Since several interrelated major Federal actions will take place resulting in nany overlapping and duplicative environmental reviews, the resource implications and potential delay caused by insufficient coordination could be significant.
In its recommendations to the President, the IRG should suggest an appropriate mech @an' ism for coordinating the NEPA
(.f requirements of individual agencies to provide a comprehensive plan which (a) minimizes duplication; (b) recognizes the responsibilities and goals of the individual agencies; and (c) contains a formal means for obtaining public and agency comment on the proposed plan.
In addition to the problem of coordination, there are other aspects of the NEPA process that require analysis.
One critical aspect is the range of alternatives which must be considered. With regard to high-level waste disposal especially, the question of what constitutes
4 " reasonable alternatives" must be addressed.
In theory, it would be possible to dismiss various alternatives on the basis that there is insufficient information. However, in order to do so, the -isk of proceeding in the face of incomplete data and the impact of delaying the action to obtain the information must be evaluated.
In developing its final recommendations to the President, the IRG should propose a mechanism Qii ;7 for addressing and resolving these NEPA-related concerns.
The development of standards and criteria is another major issue which we feel received insufficient IRG attention.
NRC has experienced difficulty in the past as a result of dual agency responsibility in implementing radiation protection standards for the uranium fuel cycle.
Similar difficulty can be expected to occur in implementing environmental standards for waste disposal.
In theory, there is a distinction between the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) role (the development of generally applicable environmental standards) and NRC's role of developing its own regulatory framework.
In practice, however, the implementation of this theory results in programs that are over-lapping, duplicative, inconsistent or out of phase.
For example, NRC can develop and promulgate regulations in the absence of EPA standards.
However, these reguletions must be mcde consistent with those standards when they become available.
. In the case of waste management NRC is in the position of having to develop regulations prior +9 the promulgation of EPA numerical standardt.
Acceleration of EPA's schedule or the availability of a " waste standard rationale document" will not alter the mismatch in schedules.
As we have previously stated, we strongly feel it is not practicable to post-pone developing and issuing NRC regulations ur.til EPA standards are promulgated.
We would suggest two possible avenues by which the IRG could address this issue.
The first would be to evaluate the current EPA approach in which it is developing different standards for each waste type.
(This approach appears to be based on EPA's understanding of best available technology for that type of waste and " risks that are not unacceptable.") The evaluation of this approach should consider the technical validity of the approach as well as the implications for DOE and NRC programs. A second avenue would be to evaluate the advantages and disadvantages of having EPA defer radiation standards setting authority for waste management activities to NRC.
EPA could review the standards that NRC develops through its regulatory process and the public could have the benefit of this independent scrutiny.
Finally, the discussion of licensing determinations does not reflect the Congressional interest in this issue.
The NRC Authorization Bill for
. Fiscal Year 1979 requires the NRC to conduct a study concerning the extension of the Commission's licensing or regulatory authority over non-licensed Federal nuclear waste facilities.
To avoid prejudging the results of tnat study, we have limited our observations to the following general concerns:
- 1) The three licensing options considered are 1,. complete in that the Report does not consider NRC regulatory processes that do not con o ci tu u censing.
For example, legislation could be enacted requiring an independent NRC review and report to Congress and DOE on the safety hazards associated with categories of DOE waste management activities not subjected to licensing.
Also, NRC could prepare minimum national standards with which DOE would be u;'iqated to complv without further NRC review or licensing.
- 2) The benefits of licensing discussed are limited to increased public safety. The value of independent safety and environmental reviews, formal public participation, and the potential for increased public and scientific confidence must also be evaluated.
II. Technical Strategies for High-Level and Transuranic Wastes The last three areas for which Dr. Dettch specifically asked for public comment are contained in this chapter.
The technical findings indicate that the status of knowledge is such that we can initiate site specific
. studies to evaluate their suitability as locations for potential repositories and the concept of technical conservatism is well articulated.
- However, without a discussion of an overall strategy and how it would incorporate the possible development of one or several intermediate scale facilities, the earlier or later option for the first high-level waste (HLW) repository and an early transuranic (TRU) repository, we are unable to evaluate the separate elements for technical and programnatic adequacy or for their possible impacts on NRC's program.
It seems to us that there are important public concerns related both to (1) the technical uncertainties associated with geologic disposal and (2) the process to be used for selecting and accessing specific sites for further study. The first concern has been addressed by the IRG but the second has not, although it is a subject worthy of Presidential interest.
III. Technical Strategies for Other Waste Types This section discusses the need to improve present practices, high-lights some technical issues and oroblems, and notes the lack of standards.
It does not address the current efforts and accomplishments of several Federal agency programs.
For example, NRC has programs already in place addressing many of the concerns raised in this chapter.
We believa it is important for the public to understand that these activities are underway. Although much needs to be done, the accelerated efforts since 1976 are beginning to yield significant results.
Since sufficient credit
. has not been givet in the IRG Report to these ongoing programs, it could be intarpreted that there has been no progress.
IV.
Institutional Issues Our concern with the issues as they are addressed in this chapter is more relevant to what is not covered in t'e a:pporting discussion than the nature of the recommendations themselves.
With regard to State participation, the NRC ;iscal Year 1979 Authorization calls for the NRC to study the means for improving State participation in repository siting, licensing and development.
The alternatives recommended by the IRG and the information contained in supporting documents will be reviewed fully during the study requested by Congress.
Therefore, to avoid prejudicing the outcome of the study, we have restricted our comments on the Report to clarify and support of its findings.
1)
It is unclear how the proposed " Executive planning Council" will interact with the decisionmaking and NEPA processes of DOE, NRC, EPA, and other Federal agencies.
One critical issue is whether the
" Council" will compromise NRC's independent regulatory authority.
- 2) An evaluation of the concept of " consultation and concurrence" is impossible without details of the process.
An informed
" Consultation" will require the States to have a well qualified and sophisticated technical staff capability with detailed knowledge of DOE and NRC analytical tools.
Also, it is unclear who will have responsibility for final action.
- 3) The Commission has approved draft licensing procedures for HLW repositories which take into account the recommendations for State participation in the NRC licensing process. The Report should be changed to reflect this.
4)
It is not at all clear whether the NRC under current law may fund the states as suggested on page 53; but NRC will be examining funding mechanisms in the course of the mandated study.
The discussion of liability for nuclear accidents omits several important issues.
First, consideration of liability for nuclear incidents must go beyond spent fuel storage.
Rather it must cover all waste storage, disposal and transportation.
Second, it is not at all clear that Price-Anderson is the appropriate mechanism.
If NkC or DOE exercises discretion to extena Pr1ce-Anderson prctection to repository operation, the limitation on liability for accidents will apply without any waiver cf defenses.
Also, there is some question whether there should be any limitation on liability here, since the e
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major historical reason for the limitation--removing impediments to growth of the nuclear industry--is not relevant to operation of waste repositories by the Federal Government.
Finally, the protection afforded by Price-Anderson would cease if the repositc;y license were terminated after decommissioning.
Finally, the scope of the recomendat'on for voluntary transfer of State management control over commerciallv-operated LLW sites needs clarification.
The phrase " management control" can include land ownership, facilities ownership, financial liability, monitoring operations, decommissianing, inspection, long-term care and licensing.
Thus, the IRG recommendation should clearly state which of these functions are covered.
Justification for the apparent elimination of the commercial role in site operation should be provided to comply with the President's March 13, 1978 memorandumi Finally, the IRG Report should present information on how, when and under what circumstances such transfers would take place.
V.
Management Considerations NRC's main concern with this section which I would like to call to your attention was the exclusion of any discussion of regulatory costs in the sections on Costs and Financing.
If this exclusion was deliberate, then we must conclude that there will be no attempt to recover tnose costs associated with developing regulations, the
. capability for independent technical review and specific licensing activities. The final Report should clarify this issue.