ML19270H412
| ML19270H412 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 06/21/1979 |
| From: | Gilinsky V, Hendrie J, Kennedy R NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| To: | |
| References | |
| REF-10CFR9.7 NUDOCS 7907160186 | |
| Download: ML19270H412 (42) | |
Text
I i
NUCLE AR REGUL ATO RY COMMISSION
(
IN THE MATTER OF:
PUBLIC MEETING DISCUSSION OF SECY-79-110A - PROPOSED EXECUTIVE BRANCH FORM.A7 FOR ANALYSIS OF EXPORT APPLICATIONS r
23f]3 306,
~
Place - Washington, D.
C.
Date. Thursday, 21 June 1979 Pages 1-41 re.onen.:
(.
(202) 3A7 3700 ACE. FEDERAL REFORTERS,INC.
OfficialRepor:ers
. tat Ncr S C:::itel Street Wcshingten, C.C. 2C00
/
NATICNWIDE COVERAGE. CAlLY 9907160 lod'
- R5436 1
D DISCLAIMER This is an unofficial transcript of a meeting of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Co= mission held on Thursday, 21 June 1979 in the Cc= missions's offices at 1717 H Street, N.W.,
Washington, D. C.
The meeting was open to public attendance and cbservation.
This transcript has not been reviewed, corrected, or edited, and it =ay contain inaccuracies.
s r
s i
The transcript is intended solely for general informational purposes.
As provided by 10 CFR 9.103, it is not'part of the formal cr informal record of decision of the matters discussed.
Expressions of cpinion in this transcript de not necessarily reflect final determinations er beliefs.
No pleading or other paper may be filed with the Cc==ission in any proceeding as the result of cr addressed to any statement or argument contained herein, except as the Conmission may authcrize.
2383 307
a 9
~
14 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA i
2 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION a
S PUBLIC MEETING I.
j s.
I i
DISCUSSION OF SECY-79-110A - PROPOSED EXECUTIVE 3 RANCH j
5 eORMAT FOR ANALYSIS OF EXPORT APPLICATIONS i
l 6,
7:
Room 1130 I
I a
1717 H Street, N. W.
l Washington, D.
C.
9, l
Thursday, 21 June 1979 i
i 10 I
l The Commission met, pursuant to not_ce, at 2:30 p.m.
11 '
i l
t' i
BEFORE :
12 !
DR. JOSEPH M.
HENDRIE, Chairman
)
13 l
VICTOR GILINSKY, Commissioner 14 I I
i RICHARD T. KENNEDY, Commissioner 15 '
PETER A. BRADFORD, Commissioner 16 ;
i i
JCHN F.
AHEARNE, Commissioner 17!
PRESENT:
la i
Messrs. Dircks, Gossick, Stoiber, Becker, Peterson, and 19 Cenne.
20
'l 2383 A08
^
n ed 23 '
co ;.cem aemmn. inc.,
25 f
l
P R0CE ED INGS
.,1a.,,
'. 3 :
I CHAI R'4A:I..;O 415 :
Can we turr Scw to One propose:
2 discussicn of :ne Executive 5cenen.Jorma: for analysis 3
of ex ort applications? I iculd es< --after :ne teams get s
I don't knew wnetner tnet's the 4
shuffled out here and we ge:
5 def ensive team or the off ensive that has cone to One taole.
6 Okay.
Executive Sremen.Cormat.
I would ask that 7
at e very early time in nis discuss ion, the Oriefers provide 3
us, Or at least provide c.e.
witn a shcr: discussion relating
' rings us here, and where tr. e 9
to pas history and wnat o
10 tssues s eem to f all, in a nutsnell.
Il CO,Vl4I55IO.iER KE:CIED t n111 you clease c.c:a :nat I, 12 Occ, would a pprecia te tna rl eat;/.
Even having read all tne 13 papers, I find it difficult to underscand wny I'm here.
14 C/ 'N I SS I0 DER AME A ltfE :
I thought it was because 15 there was still a disagree ant cetween the Executive 3ranen 16 and cursilves.
17 MR. GOSSICK: The second part of this se ssion takes IS on :na t cues tion.
1) 009'4:35I0;15R KEliiED(:
I ha' tncugn: tr.e Executive 20 Sranen was gcing to be Orcsent; is that a misunderstar. ding?
21 MR. PETERS 0?i:
lhey were invitec to One Open 22 sessi:n.
23 Ca 'JM ISS IG 3ER AME AR.'iE :
Mere tney invitec :: :ne 24 closed sessicn?
e.
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WR GCSSICX:
If I may.
.Ar.
Chai; man.
Just dv wav 2
of background 3
CO MM I 55 Ic.iER AHEARNE:
ahat it sounds like is tnat J
they we re invitec to the parts to wnicn Oney agree, and they 5
weren't invited to the parts wnich they don't disagree.
6 MR. SHEA:
de have some disagr.eements en tne open 7
part, but they were notifie d of coth parts, and a:parently 3
have enosen not to cone.
9 CHAIRMAN HE:iDRIE:
.ie verthele ss, wnat you've 10 cutlined, Jo hn, s eems to be an excellent way to deal with a 11 controversial area.
12 (Laughter.)
13 CHAIRMAN nENDRIE:
de could pu=lish a suoj ect, and s
14 say, Unly those in agr.eement witn the following pacer need 15 come.
16 COMMI55IO.iER XENiEDY:
Those who sponsored the 17 Sunshine Act might consider tnat a retrogre ssive view.
IS CHAIRMAN HE:iDRIE:
Okay.
Please go ahead.
19 MR. G055I;X:
Well, Mr. Chairman, the format for One 2J Executive 5 ranch analysis of tidC export a ppl ic a t io ns, wnile 21 not required oy statute, is closely related to and f acilitates 22 One acccnolishaent of tne inter-agency review require'ents 23 established by the ;iuclear.icn rolif erati:n Ac t Of i973.
24 The fornat was first e s tabl isned in 1975 after censultatien 25 with tne Executive 3 ranch agencies.
And One casis fo r :nis Sb00'b DQfQMT #Adn ro m
3 o
y,-
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A
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e.a p i
early format was eventually f ormaliz ed y Executive Order 2
11902 of.:ebruary 2, 1976.
3 In A ril of '75, the staff crocosed a revise: f o rm a:
)
4
- reflect the passage of One NN?A.
This cro,cosed revision 5
was f urther revised and eventually approved oy the CO mission 6
in Novemcer of 1975, and forwarded the same non:n to the 7
Executive Branch for their revisw.
S In January, the Executive 3ranen responced and :ney 9
indicate a broad di sagreement.
This is :dr..1ckering's 13 le tter, wita essentially all the NRC-croposed additions to tne
.11 fermat.
12 (Commissioner Bradford entered One room at 2s32.)
13 MR GCSSICK:
In our paper, dec y-79-!!GA, tne staff s
)
'14 provided its analysis of the Executive Sranch's response, and 15 made re:ommendations to tne Commission.
74r. Shea and his l$
staff are prepared to discuss tne forma of the staff 17 raccrnendations in greater detail and of ccurse to rescond to 13 questions.
I might jus say that as I see the picture on One 19 17 points tnat are involved in the format, Onere a: pear to 20 ce nc great proclems.
Except f o r o n e -- t ha t is One num:er 2!
Onree item that we will be discussing in closed session wners 22 we celieve there are differing views ce: ween IP and.a55 en:
23 we are prepared t: ;c into tnat.
24 COMMI55I0 DER GILIN5Kf:
Can you say what tna-item 25 is?
$ D1 D
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1 VR. 0055ICK:
This nes to do vitn :ns a;;lication of 2
safeguards, international 3araguaros. ::
ne exports.
3 CMAIRMAN HE.'IDRI5:
Also saf eguards informat ion.
)
4 VR. GOS5ICK:
As regards matariels control, yes.
5 COMMI5S510NER AHEAR.iE:
A sunmarv that I guess you 6
passed out earlier does then accurately reflect tnat on most 7
o f the se.
.uncer one, we've agreed on a bunch of them; on 3
number two the re are minor disagr eements.
Do I a ssume oy
/
" minor" they're things that you celieve that can de worked 10 out?
MR. SHEA:
That's correct.
12 CO MMIS5 IodER AHEARN2:
So that it really Onen 13 narrows down to tne two items, items three and 10.
14 MR. SHEA:
Rignt.
That's correct.
15 COMMISSIONER AHEARN3 I guess I would be p erf ectly 16 willino, having read all this stuf f many times, to jus: talk 17 aoout three and 10.
IS CHAIRMAN HENORIE:
I dimly remencer -- long ago, it 19 s eems t o me -- going througn a numoe r o f the s e things, and 20 I fee. no great need to go cack.
May I just ask, item one on 21 One su na v sa'/s, Agreement reached with state, on a list of et
.:eas.
23 Okay.
No w, does thet mean :na all :nree of. :he 24 parcies are in agreement?
25 Ma. sHsA:
rha: s corre::.
2383 312~
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I CHAI LIA.l dE.!DRIE :
Tne ninor cisagreements are : nose 4 4.,,.. >- >
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3
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3 e
4 s
3 MR. 3 DEA:
.iO ce: ween staff Offices, no.
5 aff s
J offices are agreed.
It's de: ween the sta and state.
5 CHAIR 4AN MEND ~.IE:
O'< a y, c u : you :na: : nose are thrasnacle?
7 lG. SHEA:
.ie tnink tney're nresnacle, cut I think 3
we need to nave Connission agreemen; with One staf f that we 9
should pursue tnose witn state in Order to get sone 1ovenent.
10 CO VMI55I0 DER AHEAR:IE:
Is 1: a fair way of saying in 11 that if the Conmission would agree they really want " hose 12 strongly that they eculd nest li'< ely wor'< some thing out ?
13 MR. 5HEA:
That's our judgment.
)
14 COMMISSIO.lER KEICIEDY :
Ta<'s is all the ite9s in 15 number two.
15 MR. 5HEA:
Category two, yes.
17 CHAIRM A;l MEllDRIE:
- cur or five lines, and en 14 13 and 15.
19 COMM ISSIONER 52AD.roRD:
Is :nere any reason wny :ne:
2]
clearly woulcn't ce true?
OOviously, one wants 50 do :nis as 21 nuch back and f ortn as reasonsolv ;cssicle.
,1e agreed with Onese at One cine.
23 didn't we, in Novencer?
24 Co.'e4 I 55 I O.1ER AhE AR?IE :
Af ter a.cainfully lo ;
~,
25 discussion.
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^2383 513'-
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CH AIR '.i A:l HE.lD AI: s It strateneo fran April to 2
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3 00 MI55IO.iEd 3RAJF0dD You don't know wna:
/
4
" painfully leng" is.
5 (Laughter.)
6 CHAldMAN HE.NDdIE:
anen we finally wrote statemen:
7 November of '73, it was hardly, you know, e precipi:Ous 3
decision.
So if we we re to agree
- .ow, indeed, tna ve'c li'< a 9
staff to go back and try to get a best deal on tne so-called 13 m.inor disagr eement items, I don't '.< n o w whether we need to
.11 rehash those, do we?
12 COMMISSIONER KERIEDY:
I would hece not.
13 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
.ie studiad them ?
s
)
14 COMMISSIONER 3HADFORD:
I guess, though, we'd better 15 de careful about a fast deal.
de snould simply say that this 16 is what we have to have.
17 MR. SHEA:
Tha t's right.
.ie can state that.
13 CO MMIS$ I0 DER 3RA2.:0RD:
By all means, clear uo 19 misconceptions and werk ou any pr olems.
But I don't :n ink 20 you have to look on it as a situation where you have :: da:'.r 21 away.
22 MR. 5HEA:
I T.ign; ask Marv ?sterson to try ::
23 clarify ser of, I think, the cea. tral issue there.
i e. :h i.9 %
22 these can ce apcroaoned in a generic wey.
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a work ou; sonetning to get that ' n f o r,a t io n.
5 de would like 1: in On e 'orn anere we coul; agree to work 1: cut.
7 CO.'.W I55 I0 DER.<5.TJE DY :
I don' uncerst and.
Are yo u 3
saying that they will furnisn it cut they just won't do it in 9
the format?
in0 DDq d'A d d #;a, I D D
gy p\\'t 10 MR. PETER 50il:
Tna-'s right.
3 COMMISSIONER.<5:RiEDY :
I don't quite fathom that.
12 MR. ?ETEd503:
de th in't there's a basic 13 misconcepti:n of what we're after here.
de emphas iced --
s,)
la CO NNISSIONER KENNED (:
I think the misconception is 15
'eirly clear.
15 MR. PETE250il:
ile aske d for a case analysis, wnere 17 ney would cover all tnsse points, and then we'd war.c on e.Il
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focus or ite-1) taen go item :nree, wnicn is :ne cirect 3
area of disagree ent.
I em IJ nas to oc witn tne so-called 4
technical and acenomic analyses cenind excor:3.
Also 5
petroleum exports.
Also, it was se:.ip but casically 1:
das set up for these. major.,EU exports.
This is r e c o.,m e nc ed 7
on in a policy decision to the presiden: es really -- as to 3
whether these exports should proc eed.
7 The staf f believes th's information 1s entirely 1]
i rre l e vant to the export license crncess of the fiRC review 11 process of these cases.
12 cow.IISEIO:lER KE:UE.% :
Can vou explain to me wny?
13 MR.. PETER 50:1:
Secause it has to do a lot.<ith
-T 14 whether there's a justification for tne need of hign enriche'd 15 uranium for these particular reactors.
As you're aware, there 15 are e fforts underway to reduce the enrichment of certain 17 reactors aoroad and in the United Sta as.
13 COMMI55IO.iER KE:@lEJ/:
Is tnere anytning in tne law 1g
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relate to a criteri:n.
22 CD vMI55!0.iER KE:RiE Y :
Oces 1: rela e clearly an:
23 uccistakably to e decisi:n we us make, even accer ne Atomi:
21 Energy Act or the.1.lPA?
And if so, wnet?
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3 CO VMISSIO.iEd XE.1IED / :
Can you ?xplain now :na:
s a
follows?
5 lG. PETER 50N:
- .or ni;n enricned uraniun anc 5
plutoniun txports wnich are coviously of sone significance 7
and conc ern to One Co nm. iss io, ano the dxecutive - ranen anc 3
3 whether we should proceso Oney're con:erned 0 /er pnysical 9
security criteria on exoorts abroad, all of tn e casically 1J non-prolitsration bases :na: Ne nave in terms of ne nigh
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12 States and abroad, the countrias that we export it to.
There 13 is a basic concern over this tyo s of materiali the re f o r e, it
,)
14 f ollows that f.om the exoort reques:s that we get for this 15
, material, that there should be a clear justification.
As to a well-establish 30 need for tnis matarial 17 acroad, it's really a key componen of our basic non-shicping, 13 co. mon def ense =nd security planning.
19 CO MM I SS IO.iE3 3 RAD.20RJ:
I suopose 1: might also am J'
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A CO MMISSIO.iER KdN.'iEDY :
That would be true cecause 5
the materiel itself, no t cecause of an economic justification 6
for it.
I m e a n --
7 CO N.1 I 55 I O.iE R Bd AD.: odd:
Yes, exceot a
COMM I55IO.iER KE.fNdDY :
-- assuming that tna material 9
were wholly justified, wnatever that means, we would still 13 wish to establish, in a ll p roc acility, some conditions on 1:
11 as to its delivery.
~
12 COMMI5510.iER 3AAD.: odd:
They mignt vary, though, 13 it for exa.mple, some of it was to stay in storage for any la amount of time, as distinguisned from going into the reactor 15 right away.
16 COMMI5SIOiiER AMEARNE:
Marv, is the st.icking point 17 in state our request for an analysis, or is tne sticking po19:
o r request for any analyses they crepare?
13 u
17 lAR. ?ETERSON:
They're conc ernec :ne if :ney 23 provide us with tne se analyses :nat we w ill leck =: tnem 21
- losely, come up wi-h various says to improve them or 22 critici:e nem, and delay the proce ss of review.
23 Co.tlI 55IO.'iER KEmiEDY :
anat gives nem tna:
21 impression?
r.,,nA I a c., c. e. 2 3 e. A.. O R u :
isaven.< news.
to eu,
83 318 -
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CHA'RMA.1 iEdCRIE:
I can'; ima g ine.
2 CO ElI55IO.1Ed 3:E:lNEDY :
I can't, either.
I nean, we
~
3 don't do tnat more than :nree or four times on each license, 4
do we ?
5 COUMI55I0 DER A.HEA.4NE:
ahat I was trying to get at, i
Aarv, is tnere any flavor tha
- nose are int ernal doc uments,
7 decisional documents in tne 5:ste Cepartment cycle and tney 5
d idn ' t wan
- o release them?
Or is it tna: :ney take 9
excection to asking tne question, the questions of economic 10 justification for tne use of tnis material?
MR. PETERSO.i:
They regard them as internal 12 docunents.
They have a branch colicy that recuires the 13 documents in the first place as part of tneir internal 14 review, then theref ore not aporopriate 'for NF.C to look at.
15 Particularly cecause it didn': have a direct cearing on tneir 16 criteria.
17 CO Wil55IO.'IER AHEARNE :
The reason I'm asking that IS cuestion tnat way, is would Oney ob ject if we asked f r : ness 19 proposed expor:s and analysis ena osckground da:e concerning 20 the technical and economic jus ti f ic a t io n ?
In other eerds, ere 21 Oney ta%ing exception to Our ri;nt to look a: :nat, to :ne 22 e:0nomic and technical jus t if ic at io n ?
23 MR. PETERSON:
- !c, Oney are net.
- n fact, we've 24 asked then at various tines, in several cases. :: cravide.cre 25 jus tif ic ation for One n eed f:r One particular exper s. cut D0hD I
2383 319
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4 lG. S.iEA:
anat Oney seid is that any sucn 5
determination of technical justification should resioe witn 5
- ne Executive 3ranca, since 1; is Oneir decision.
Tney say
~
that a detailed J.C review of the cases for such 3
determinations is not a :p ro p r i a t e, and would ce duolicative 9
cf effort.
All cur f ormative requests did no~ say we wantec 10 to de a detailed revie,w.
.1e said provide any analyses or
'cackground data tna; they slreacy nad.
12 CO MM I SSIO.iER AME ARNE :
What I was trying to look at 13 is, I could understand and wouldn't disagree witn thair t
14 position that they do an internal decisional document and that 15 it's precaoly inacpropriate for us to try and get it from 15 then.
On the other hand. I wouldn't agree wi-b them if 17 tney're saying that we don't nave a rign: to lock at tna:
15 question.
!)
I see a distinction.
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_..m 24 af oer :he co4ning le tte r, tne re is an a :acr.nen: tr. s : is or 23 cage three, iten 10 of Onat.
Se cy-79-l l C',
the uncl ass if ie d Io 38 O'
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-55.12.13 15
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2 CO W4I5 : 50. led.<E: BED (:
" ell. :na.00in: tna: I'm I tnougnt I recall :nis ergumen: ceing nede.
I'd 3
making 4
Like your corment on it.
The point inev're making is tna 5
in the case of olutoniun and nEU these matters are matters
'hicn must ce decided by tne President n19self, and that they 7
consider thet a policy determinetion, which, naving Oeen made, 3
they don't think cught to be reexamined on eclicy grounds.
9 And I must say that I don't see an /tning in tne law, eitner 10 in tne Atomic Energy Act or tne.'iN?A tna would argue 11 strenuously against tnet view.
..ia ve a you could help e in 12
- nis regard.
13 As'it says, the decision with regard to suppl'/.of 14 significant quantities of these sensitive materials is made 15 cersonally oy the President under the present policy.
And 16 therefore, a detailed review of the cases for that 17 de termination is ina ccro. ria te, and I must say, Could you hel:
13 e and explain to me why they're wrong?
!)
MR. PETERE 0.i:
I think :nat go e s t o th e c.e a r: of 20 the Commission's crecer role in 's:in: a commen: On s ecuri:v.
2i CO ?.N I EE
- 0.iE R KE NNE D ( :
'1 hat I'n trying :: say is, 22 I agree wi:n that, it ccviously does.
I know w r.a : :ne las
~
23 says, and I know wna: they're sa/ing, and so f er I'm unao.e ::
24 s ee whe re :n ey'r a ; ong.
Can you.elo me ir :nis re; era?
25
- 42..:ETEAS' ct :
Eia ly :na if they are rignt, ve ihj)$_ d' $mvm,U h, 2383 32i'
.do.i..I' id
- a:
I
'rould nerely in :ne staff et.!RC have to make a fincing aOOJ:
2 eacn of tne criterie, that tne L ix casic criteria of :ne 3
Non-Prolif eration Ac t are
~9t.
and it would be f airly
~'
4 straightf orward to do that.
5 COWISSIONER KENi;EDY :
I"nat's unet the law says.
MR. PETER 50.'!:
Exceot for the co men cefense and 7
security fincing.
.icw. if we a ssume the: Jus: m eeting :ne 3
basic six criteria in N.1P A, tn at that satisfies tne connon de fense and security planning, in essence, then the President IJ is rignt, they're right, that we can't have to make any 11 furtner review, except at the President's de term ination.
12 CO MMISSIOi;ER KEiiiEDY :
I think what th ey' re saying 13 in that connection is that 'the Presidedt, having ned to make
,3 14 that dec ision himself, certainly could not be presumed to have 15 ceen acting inconsistent with the connon defer.se and security.
1.$
And that tne re fo re, that ought to be a prima f acie case for 17 us in this regard.
You know, I think that's what they're IS saying, and I'm having difficulty in understanding wna it is IJ we're being called upon to do nere.
I certaini-an ac: going 20 to si: here and f rca my vantage acint say, "I'm sorry, 4r.
21 President, it's perfectly clear :na: you don't understand :ne 22 nature of our common defense and security.
'e: me nelo you 13 in Chis regard."
24 I don't th i n'<
- net's my job.
I cor'
- n in '< :nere's 25 anything in :ne law, ir eitner Of tne laws tha: I'n t alk in ;-
D i\\
3b 3N
}
D
-A..n.l=.
Ii
- so I
accu:, 'ini:n woulo sugges that it is.
And I'm tryi."
to 2
finc out, Onerefore, wha: casis it is for ne to -ake Ona:
3 c o nc lus io n.
x 4
COMMI55IO.iEA GILI:iSK /:
Are you sayin; :na once 5
that determination nas been nade, in One Execut..ve dranch, 6
there is nothing more for eldC to do?
7 CO M.AI55IOciEd <5?IiiEDf :
It's not in the Executive 3
3 ranch.
It's vnen the President o f tne Jnited States decices 9
th is.
He coviously has to decide it in the context of comnon 10 defense and security.
And having made that cecision, I do no
.11 believe th re's anything in tne law which either reouires or t
12 even authorizes me to say he didn't know what he was *alking
\\
/
13 abo.ut in the connon defense and security.
Because that is nis my
_ _,1 14 f undanental responsibility and not mine.
15 COMMI5 ISO.iER SRAD.0020:
But tna: is just tnis
!5 President and this administration.
17 Co.'W I SS I O.lER KE.'UE0 f : That's r ight.
iiow, if :ne:
IS we re not the policy, and it cnanged, then I tnink ve would 19 vant to go cack and say, Okay, how does tnat determine:icn ge 20 made and ' y wnom?
But :nat's ne way it is rign: now, a nd yo u o
21 cannot, it seems to me, ignore tne realities in favor of the 2,
c,-
2383 323-2:
ogQD 0yl3$)b 5
18 i
CR 5436 1l COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Even where the decision is 9
Hoffman 411 ros 1 21 not made by the President, there is a finding that has to o,
3 be made by the Secretary of State, or someone acting for him, 4
that the export is not inimical to common defense and security.
I 5
I think that is true for every export that we get 6
over here; isn't it?
And are you saying that there is nothing i
7 more for us to do?
That the law says, at that point, i
i a
COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
I think the law makes it 9,
very clear that we have to review the criteria on the NNPA l
i i
10 side, whether we think those criteria are met.
And as I
ll i Commissioner Bradford so rightly points out, if we are talking l.
12:
about highly sensitive material, we also want to be certain m
i
)
13 ;
that whatever controls should be excercised by transport, and 14 !
the' like, have been effected.
l 1
I t
COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
I am just trying to 15 ;
16 '
understand wr.at you are saying.
i N
17 1 The law recuires us to make favorable findings a
la also on defense and security.
These cpen the possibility 19 that we would make an unfavorable finding.
2C '
COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
I am only suggesting than when the President of the United States has, himself, made 21 '
22,
that finding, I think it presumptious, ander the law or any 23 other way, for me to make another decision.
24 ;
COMMISSICNER GILINSKY:
Do you draw distincticns a.ews :i.oor.m. inc. '.
25 between the President and the Secretary of State?
a 2383:324 :.
I 19
'l COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
I cost certainly do, on the res 2
- 1 2j assumption that the Secretary of State is acting en behalf I
3 of the President.
When the President of the United States makes a personal finding, and reserves it unto himself, it 4
is not a delegated action.
That is the c..se here.
That is 5
i the point.
i I certainly draw a very clear distinction between 7
i g'
that, and normal delegable functions.
COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
In other words, when the 9
i Secretary of State has found that an expert is not inimicable 10 to common defense and security, you can still conceive of 11 yourself making a different finding.
12 i
i
)
COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
I can conceive of myself l
13,
l I
raising the question with him; which is different from I
34,i t
making another finding.
1.c,
COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
But you find yourself in 16 a different pcsition with the President?
l,e -
i COMMISSICUER KENNEDY:
I certainiv do.
18 i l
CCMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
I mean after all, the 79 [
, t, Congress could have simply left that out of our part of the 3
1 l"**
21,
COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
No, I don't tnfnk so.
i.
- y. "i Secause, in the Atomic Energy Act, dating from 1954 -- the 1
issues that we're talking about are, therefore, only 25 years --
33 I,
CS 4*Cerat Recor3ft.IFC.,e j arising 25 years subsecuent to that very carefully descr'. bed 4.
i t
j
20
't ros 3 il language; which, as we well know, has had some question anyway.
i
,23 No one that I know of has been able to clearly define it in 3
quantitative terms.
^
i 4;
CCMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
But the Congress could have i,
~!
said that where the Secretary of State, or certainly the President, makes a favorable common defense and security 6
7 finding, the Commission will not make any further findings.
COMMISSIONE KENNEDY:
It crobablv relied upon the 8
good judgement of those who would be appointed to these 9
10 positions, which I personally would like to be able to show I
1 11 them that they had good judgement of their own.
i t
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Listen.
Let me sort of make a le
')
j3 l slight shift to the direction of this discussion, and ask l
ja the following:
In making the non-imicality determina tion,
!l 15 'l how do you see it a technical and economic analysis entering there?
16 i l
That is, suppose you had a situation in which the 77 la lI physical security and the material accounting means, and 1
whatever else, satisfied all.
Even satisfies NMSS, for pity's 39 sake.
That is practically, under the circumscance of a
,0 hypothetical,
- )
u' (Laughter.)
-e CEAIRMAN HENDRII:
Nevertheless, it was also clear
'3 o
chat 3 ] that the HEU, which is going to be used fcr this purgese,
.c.;,eem =eco,.n inc. f with some medest difficulty, and no very much effect.on
,3 l
~
2383 3262
I 21 s
res 4 1
performance -- say a research reactor with 20 percent enriched 1
21 elements could, in fact, be used.
Wou'd ': circumstance 1
3' mean that, in effect, no amount of ser:urity provisiens wculd m
fulfill the non-imicality requirement?
-~
4,.
5 That is, is it your conclusien that there has to t
6 be A -- no other option, and 3 -- it has to be economic?
7, And/or in order that one be able to reach here?
a!
MR. PETERSON :
I think the key area where it could i
g provide assistance is in this engoing effort that has been i
l to going on for at least a year, more than a year new, to produce 11 the reliance on the Commission -- particularly the staf f --
)
)i I
12 l following closely with your efforts in this area with Argon i
National Lamps, to phase in, where appropriate, the reduced l
i 13 i
q I
14 !
cmission of fuel I
15,
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Just so.
16 What I am asking is: would you find it difficult, i
17; or even impossible, to make a non-imicality finding in a circumstance where it was clear that the 20 percent elemencs 13,
19 3 could be used, but highly enriched elements were being n.
l
- c. roc.esed in the license?
And everv.bcdv. was satisfied on the i
21 ] safeguards, material accounting and physical security re9uirements.
s I
MR. PETERSCN:
At scme point in time, definitelv.
,, o.
6 24,
yes.
- t Feerae Recor+ers, Inc.
25 COMMISSIONER EENNEDY:
Ecw would we,do.that?. Whac 2383 327 1
J
1 ros 5 1i would be the grounds for it?
How would you describe it?
i i
2l Because, saying that something would be inimical l
3, to the common defense and security of the United States is 4:
a very serious statement, indeed, when you are talking about i
5 relations with another country.
6 How would you describe that?
That is precisely I
7" my concern?
Tell me precisely how you would describe that i
I 3
it would be inimical to the common defense and security of i
I 9!
the United States to approve a license for the case which i
i 10 ;
Mr. Hendrie just suggested -- a 20 percent, or a 60 percent, Il i or 70, 80 percent -- fully enriched.
12 l CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Fully enriched.
m i
j
,)
13 l COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
Fully enriched uranium I
{
i 14 i for a reactor operating.in a country in Europe where it could 15 ;
he shown that, in fact, you could operate that reactor with 16 20 percent enriched material.
I 17 i New how would you describe hcw that is inimical to
'i n
la the ecmmon defense and security of the United States, and i
o 19 i therefore, illegal?
i 2c o CCMMISSICNER GILINSKY:
May I interject?
-l 21 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
I really neec che answer to 2; '
the question.
That is what troubles me.
And if he can tell 23 li me the answer to the question, I don't have a problem.
j 1
24,l Don' t you want him to answer the question?
.~.,,,......%
3 25 j COMMISSICNER GILINSKY; I do, but ! think ic is
,1
^
3 2383'328 1
23 j
ros 6 1
related to the question of ef fectiven.ess of safeguards and i
2-the application of safeguards.
3 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
We just said --
m CCMMISSICNER AHEARNE:
The gentleman said that he 4,
s I
5' was perfectly satisfied with the safeguards.
l 6-CCMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Cnce you say you are i
7 perfectly satisfied --
a CCMMISSICNER AHEARNE:
Rick, Marv is the guy who 9
made the position; and Dick is new asking him a question.
i 10 '
COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
I don't need his answer to l
1 i
11!
be led.
I think he must have reached a conclusion, because j
l 12' he has been arguing the point.
I would like to know exactly t
1 i
--')
13 what he thinks about this.
i 14 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
And we can turn, in a mcment, 15 )
and recognize that it is an imperfect world.
Indeed, it may l
16 I be a limited case, which has no practical paralel.
And that, 17; indeed, in all cases there is some questien about safeguards, 13 and so on.
19, But I am just trying to see: in a limited case, in
!I l
20 which everybody is absciutely confident and signed Of f en the 21,
physical security of the material, accounting and all the 22, rest of it, so there are no safeguards questions whaescever 1
- 3 !l in anybcdy's mind -- you knew, there still is the element.
24 It could be done a different way, which would not invcive
- c. ;.em a.oo, m.,ne.
bomb-grade material.
Which would lead you then to a pcssible 25 -l 2383'329
I 24 ros 7 1! negative finding on non-imicality.
2 It is not clear to me.
I don' t know quite how you i
3 get there.
i 4
And then, o f course, there is a paralel question 5
with regard to the economics.
Suppose that you could show 4
I 6,
in a given case, in spite of the safeguards being above I
7 reproach in e*rerybody's view, that it was more economical to do 1
a a certain thing with 20 percent enriched material, rather than f
l 9
fully enriched material.
10 Would that constitute a situation?
l COMMISSIONER KENNIDY:
It would be inimical to the l
11 i i
12, common defense and security.
I i
13 :
MR. PETERSON:
If there is to be any meaning at all, i
I la to our cooperative program with these other nations to reduce 15 ;
enrichments, at some point there has to be an appropriatc time 16 l to indeed, adopt reduced enriched fuel in these reactors.
17 h As we have gone on --
la CHAIRMAN EENDRII:
Why?
MR. PETERSON :
As we've gone, we've been concerned 19 )i 20 that too much time has passed and they should be accepting 21
.this reduced uranium.
CHAIRMAN EENDRII:
That has to do with our view ; hat i
- 3 in the real world, safeguards cannot, in fact, be perfect 24 and absolutely assured.
Okay?
- wece,
=e:c, m. me.
25 And in that case, why, you want to see sc=e reascn
~2383 s30
,2
~
d I,
i i
1)whyyouwant to accept whatever residual safeguards risk there ros 8 2 !
may be in putting the material abroad.
Right?
3 That is not the case I posed to you.
What I am 4,
precing is:
whether this feeling you have, that no matter how i
5 good the safeguards are, and how satisfied everybody is with l
6l the safeguards, that nevertheless, we can' t export material i
7:
because of the non-imicality finding, if there is -- even if the economics are better with 20 percent material, or the i
3, I
i technical feasibility is there with non-bomb grade material.
9 i
ja As I say, the limiting case may be, you know, sort I
i l
11 of intellectual interest, as a curiosity only, and not 12 applicable to the real world.
But I am some difficulty in
~)
13 getting where you are going, which is to say, "Yes.
It is s-
-i la l against the NNPA."
t i
15 {
COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
And the Atomic Energy Ac..
I 16 CEAIRMAN HENDRIE:
If it is feasible, in that l
j[
application, to use 20 percent or less material; or if the l
13 ;
ecencmics are favorable with 20 percent material, then I 19 quess I have a lot of trouble agreeing with that.
f
- g '!
MR. SEEA:
If I could offer just a couple of thcughts o
I of my own, on that?
21,
n]
I think, in making the non-imicality finding, that has always been viewed as a broad finding, that takes into n,
account a nu=her of different elenents.
24 3 FMerat F moriers,Inc.
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
A balancing.
25.
,l 1
2383 431 a,
1 26 ros 9 1i MR. SHEA:
A balancing of those facters.
I s
1 2
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Is it better?
You know, you win
'l I
and en balance, I some parts of it,and you lone sc=e parts of it; 3
s 4
is this a winner or a loser for the USA?
,s 5
MR. SHEA:
That's right.
In some cases --
l' 6
CEAIRMAN HENDRIE:
I think in the practical case, i
I 7
in the real world case; Shat, in fact, is where you always are.
t a
Because I don' t see any perfect safeguard propositions.
9' MR. SHEA:
That's right.
i i
10 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
The limit is, nontheless, of some i
11 !
interest to me to know how you read a non-imicality.
l I.
i 12 MR. SHEA:
I tend to look at it in terms of the I
i i
i 13 l balancing of factors, since that is the laay the cases are almost m
i 14 always done.
3 a
'l 15 In that case, it would be, I think an element.
One l
i 16 l of the elements that one would look at, for example:
if you a
17 had that f actor, let's say a weak technical /econc=ic la justification, coupled with some information that the country A
19 had some peer non-proliferation credentials, the two put 1
20 ' together perhaps --
1 21 COMMISSICNER KENNEDY:
The peor non-proliferatica 22 credentials would be, alone, enough to be concern to me.
a 23 1 I wouldn't giie a damn, for instance, if sc=ebcdy 4
1 22 i wants to operate their plants inefficiently.
I recognize tha:
es Federa6 Recor ers, Inc. ]l 25 glorious notic- -"=~'s been abroad in this country since 1932, 2383 332
- ?
I
l 27 ros 10 1
that all wisdem resides in the minds of bureaucrats, who either 2'
are borg or have existed for a substantial portion of their 0
3 life, alongside the banks of the Potomac.
I think it's crap.
4i It isn't true.
l l
5 Now, that's particularly not true when we are talking '
l 5'
about something as big as the world.
I don't think it's true i'
7, about the United States itself, but it sure isn't true about 3
the world.
And that is what we are talking about here.
i i
9, Look, why don't we stop all this Talmudic i
I 10 '
discussion, and get down to the word which we are talking 11 about.
It is coercion.
You are trying to drive people to 12 '
do what you have decided is the right thing to do..
13 !
Now, that may be true.
That may be the right thing s
I 14 !
to do.
But we ought not to kid ourselves, end cloak it in f
15.
all kinds of other guf f.
If that is what we mean to do, that l
16 is our national policy that, by God, ought to be stated.
i 17 And, if it is stated by the President cf the United 13 '
States, he will have my full support.
But he hasn't stated it.'
19,
COMMISSIGNER GILINSKY:
Well, it is the policy of i
20 [I the United States.
i 21 '
CCMMISSICNER KENNEDY:
No, it is not the policy of i
the United States.
22 l
23i If the Presifent of the United States sends this 1
i 24 thing over and says, "I want it done," he's the guy that makes a ss:ws. m.oenm. ine.,;
25 j the policy for the United States -- unless it is in the law.
97GL 4 ( 7, L J G.*
J-
>l
28 1
ros 11 1
And it isn't.
That is exactly my point.
2 We are new the policy makers for the President of i
3 the United States, or the Government of the United States; and 4
that isn'* true.
The law dces not give us that authority in l
5 any way.
Look it up.
I have read every bit of it, and it l
l 6
isn't true.
l l
7 COMMISSICtIER GILINSKY:
I was going to.
True.
3 It is the policy of the United States to encourage 9
contries to shift to lower enrichment for use of highly i
10 i enriched uranium, f
i 11 '
COMMISSICNER KENNEDY:
" Encourage" is a grand word, l
i 12 s and it does not, in the dictionary, mean the same thing as I
3, 13 '
" coercion", because I looked it up just before I came down
.J 14 {
here.
15 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
I think, in spite of that policy, 16 when the President sends this fellcw over and says, "Lcok, 17 '
please.
We think it's okay to ship this batch of highly la enriched uranium ever here," he has taken it under his personal i
19 survellance.
- c l COMMISSIONER GILINSK'-
But he's also saying tha:
/
21 ] all the criteria have been met.
So, why should we be
- 2 ]I recc= mending it?
4 23 l COMMISSIONER KINNEDY:
We, in the law, are required I
f
- a ' to leck at the criteria.
We are not required, by the law, l
.ne,em, neco,w,..-e. f to icok at his decisiens.
25 There is a difference.
'l 6
i 2383 134 l
l
]
29 l
l I
ros 12 1
COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
I want to get back to what s
1 2
Sill was saying.
3 It seems to me we did get off on a Talmudic --
i 4
actually, I don't like using that in a pejorative way.
s 5
(Laughter.)
COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
I didn't think it was 6
7 pejorative.
I think of it terms of learned -- extensive to the point of being limitless.
3 i
COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Angels on the head of a pin.
9 I
I COMMISSIONER AHEARHE:
Well, now wai.
to i
i 11 !
(Laughter.)
I 12.i COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
What all this comes down to, i
i and what cur job is, is to see that the material is protected l
- 'N 13i s/
i I
ja jl from use in explosives, c
And the difficulty is, particularly with highly 15 16 enriched uranium and plutonium, the safeguards are just not 17 adequate.
They are not ef fective.
We all know that.
,a' CEAIRMAN HENDRIE:
There are varicus views a=cngst
..i 19 us, about how effective they are.
Sut there is no argument 1
COMMISSICNER GILINSKY:
The difficulties are greater 20.iI 21 '
than they are with power reacecrs.
CHAIRMAN HENCRII:
Yes, and I don't think an"bcdv.
'2 s
- 3l would argue that they are cerfect.
COMMISSIONER KENNEOY:
Of course.
- 4
- Fn:ersi mecemri, inc, !
CCMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
And we continue with expcrts.
2.c 4
t bYb bb0
.I
l 30 l
i ros 13 11 A number of our customers -- because they have been going on i
?i it for some time, and what doesn't lightly turn them off.
i 3'
But, at the same time, because the safeguards are simply not 4,
what they should be, I seems to me perfectly legitimate to
~'
5 be inquirir.g whether this trip is necessary.
And that, it I
6-seems to me, is what it's all abou" t
7 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
I don' t disagree with that.
i 3
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Yes, yes.
I am not arguing with t
9 that either.
I was just trying to get out --
l 10 !
COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
The part, Mary, where I think I
4 t
11 you got yourself way out over the cliff, is that this item I
12 alone could mean a "yes" or "no".
I l
i
)
13 Certainly, my interest in finding out why does a s
14,
country want HEU or plutonium, relates to the fact that I i
i 15 l disagree with you back at the beginning where you said it was 16 l a straightforward matter to decide on those six criteria.
17; I haven't had the enjoyment of participating in many of those, la yet; but in the enes that I have, it has not been a simple 19 l straightforward matter.
i 20 There are a lot of factors that I find that I have i
21.
to balance and try to understand.
And the question of why 22 did they really want, or what is the justification for the 23 HEU cand plutonuim, I thought was an interesting factor that 3
a 24 I would like to have more infcrmation on.
a.eersi newnm. u c.
25 '
So that is why I was willing to support that item.
!l n(..s t.,,
z,)e g.-
on
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i I probably wouldn't be pushing on that.
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documents.
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I am interested in getting an analysis of economic end $11 5
and technical justifications.
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C h A I R M A ci.i Eri O R I E :
How, le: me see if we can move 2
- nis ccject in 2ny direc icn. because we haven't go: Oc t he 3
interesting part yet.
4
( Laug nte r. )
s 5
CH AIR. TAN HEi10RIE:
This was just a little sor cf o
sica g h-o f: i;e= at ne beginning.
Vfhat co you cnink your 7
chances are, by the way; wr.a t would nave ceen your intent wi:n 5
tr.e tecnnical anc scencaic analyses anc their cencern : na t,
f or Occ sakes they don'; wan; you coing a review on their y
10 analyses, anc so on.
What i s t he :nru s t there?
What do you pro.co se ;o co?
12 MR. ?ETERSON:
We would pro po se, anc I think this 13
=ay be a cce ptable, that they not provide us the f&E analysis 14 with the intent tha; we review it and comment upon it and so is on, it would be part of the basic available relevan: da :a.
~j lo CHAIR laAN HENDRIE:
Regarc the results as part of 17 ene inrormaticn --
c.,. R. p c._..,c..o s. :
-- that they have ava.,.iac_3e,
- ..a t they ic to 1y would provice as a ma::er of routine, anc their acvan ced 20 ccaments must cirectly relate to the.iNPA recuiremen fcr 21 available relevant da;3, that we would consider nis as per:
22 of cur overall cecisicn.
23 CO.41.!I d5 IONER GI LI SE f.Y :
Ycu're nct suggesting :na:
24 we're preclucec rrc asking questicns accu: i t.
2d liR. PETER 501:
.N o, in any case we will Ics: 1:4317 2383 U8 o 3, 0 ( B M pA k3 s"
- 6.12.s, 23
.( A ?
I ask nuestions that will ce able to be enswered by having 2
access to the technical and economic analysis.
And in 9any
~N 3
cases would elininate the need.
.s a
Co.T.iI SS I O.iER KE M4EDY :
That's exactiv :ne acint to 5
which they coint with scos concern.
They think :nat that is 6
not a:Orocriate.
7 JR. PETER 30.i:
levertneless -
5 COMMI S5 I0 DER KE::NED (:
If they nac to co througn all that analysis an had to go tnrcugn all that 1J justification uncer the current rules of the gane that the
.11 President of the United States could sand over here in the 12 first place, isn't that correct?
13 MR. PETER 50.I:
That's true.
14 COMMISSI0dE.4 KE:CIEDY:
We should understand that 15 what we're saying here is that we then now have,to go back and say, Mell, Mr. Pres ident, alceit 70u think that, 17 nonetheless, we dcn't, and we have all tnese cues:10ns accu:
13 it so we think you Ought to take anctner lock at it, 07 :nese 19 grounds.
The grounds of the 007. mon da fense and security.
23 There snould be ro misunderstanding accet what we're doing.
21 I, for ene, think tha: that's wrong.
So at least you will 22 knew :nat Onere will be an additional caragra:n in most 23 letters, but 00n't worry, ' ' 11 vr..e it.
24 C01'?.! I SS IO.iER 3R AD. 0RD:
Jonn, wr.en ycu were sayi.;
25 Onere were certain ;yces of informati:n you woul:n' w a r.: :
23hs.k.ij 7 DfgdEShbs3
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see?
2 C0'fti!:5IO;iER AriEAR;iE:
/;nat I was saying, is, if 3
- ne 5:sta epar::en write s an internal memorandum, a a
decisional memo f or tne Presicen; adcre ssing :hi s, I can':
s 5
feel hat I wan: :o try to force :ha cu:.
I can see :nem o
saying that's internal, t o ne m.
I:'s the question of the 7
- ecnnical and economic justificati:n.
I delieve I dc want s
Ena.
y COM.iil55 IOciE.4 SR AUFORO:
Sucpesing :nat an agency 10 o:ner : nan 5cate has cone an analysis as part of putting the ll Executive 3 ranch back in it, and has concluced this is
!2 cefinitely technically and economically justifiec, or no, i t's 13 not.
Supposing COE or someone hac dona a pacer of th a t sort, 14 whien hac been suc=1::ed to 5: ate.
I guess I would like at
)
15 leas to know of that documen t's exis tence, so more people a
lo have the chance to review it.
If it were any thing acove sort i7 of the back of the envelope kinc of thing.
i:
COM!4ISSIONER AHEARNE: I hasn't really icokec througn
!v sert of wta: legal rights I nave to try anc pry ou
- nose 20 cocuments or to get : nose dccumen:s :na: I have f ccusec en.
21
! s O na information germane?
Mac I concludec, yes. :he 22 informa:icn was, anc :cule I see hcw I could use it?
23 Yes.
So I was intarestec scre ir the inferma:icn 24 than I was necessarily in any of :ne papers :na; naa deer 25 pre:arec.
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- papers r=ccatending ne approval.
They tend o be fairly 2
de:sile; cc ucen:s.
.his it particularly what we went :o see.
..r e nese analyses done in cases tha:
4 MR. CEVINE:
o con' go to :he President?
o MR. SHEA:
Jus above 15 kilograms.
7 MR. ? STER 50ri:
15 kilogreas and acove.
e i.i R. DdV I!iE:
I know :na:, but are analyses prepared for tna: case?
y 10 MR. SHEA:
tes.
11 CO.'4MI 55 IO:lER KEmlEDY :
Since I've already wri :en 12 croadly on the sub ject. I'll be glac to state my view that 13 I don't think :ne law, ei the r --
I'm terribly sorry I upset 14 you, Icc.
Don't worry.
You can't have to listen.
The law doesn't in any sense convey to us the 13
~
to au-hori:y or the responsibility to be our bro ther's k eeper.
It t his is not a government tha: nas createo a whole series of la agencies the purpose of wnich is to subver:
ne activities of ly otners, and so, che Executive 5rancn in :ne name of he 20 Eecre:ary of 5 tate senos a le ::er over 5.ere, saying wha the l
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22 encumoen on this agency to write back ano say, ah, no, i:
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- lea se c ;c continue to acvise and consult on a generic 4
casts wit.5 respec Oc these ce:ermina:Lons -
I gue ss t ho se
" - - or :o answer 5
were the tecnnical anu eccncaic me :ars o
eny questions on specific export license applica:icns wnich i
s aff cay have."
a iney oe leve nat any suca cetern4 nation or=
=
g.
y t e cnn i cal justifica:icn snould resice wi:n the Executive 10 3 renc h in :ne.cerson 'o f the ?resicent, thus it is our view il tna; a ce:eiled 52C review of the basis for such 12 catermina-ions is no: appropriate, and would be duplicative 13 of effort.
Have ycu talked to them and indicated a I-disinclination to make detailed reviews?
~)
13 MR. PETERSOri t At the lower staff level, yes, we v
16 haYe.
'f e s.
17 CHA IR.MCil"H ENvR I E:
I agree with John.
If there are le specific cocuments of this kinc preparea for presidential ly decisicn, i;'s no t clecr to ae na: 1-'s the prerogative here 2C to pry r.c sa l oo se, to weigr nem into the recoro cf he 21 case here.
On the other hand, :he results of ;r.ose analyses, 22 John's in te re s ec in :nen, anc it seems :: me what : hey say in 23 the answer in here is na we'll answer any questions alcng x....
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4
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a u
a 25 analysis cocuments :nat go u.o the line over :nere.
Those 0
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i are cur Ousiness, anc we can't want you 41boi::ing line cy 2
lina anc nuncer by nunder.
3 CD'JMISSIONER 3R A0FORO :
I would no: a cc e o: :na: as 4
a ganeral principle in regar: to Executive Branca documents
_s 5
even in this case, wnich is necessarily as sensitive as some o
o tne r s.
I can conceive of plenty of situations in which ee 7
wouic cne way or another learn of :ne exi s ten c e o f a e
dccucent or an assess,sent :nat was part of cneir a sse ssmen:.
v I woulc wan to insis; cn it, and not just en this subject.
10 So wnile I agree with the general thrust of wha: Jonn has 11 said, that for example one woulc not reques the Presidential 2
ceci sicn memorancum, I woulcn't wan to orcaden : hat into 13 a sweeping sta:Oment that we co not want their specific la coCuments.
's, 15 COMMISSIONER GILINS:;Y:
It doesn't seea to me tha:
v lo they're saying that they won' t su pply anything.
17 CHAIR.AAd HEHORIE: I agree witn tha.
I was just Ic joing to say, i; dic sounc to me like somewhere between the Iv answer +.ere anc wha I hear :nere a the tacle, : hat there is 20 a n a r ea --
21 CO:JMISSIONER GILINSKY:
I: seems :: me wha: :ney're 22 saying is. Sure, we'll give you wna ever you ask for cut we 23 ccn't :nine yce cugnt to be censicering these ma::ers.
2c COMM I SS ion 2R A -i).RN E :
My impre ssion is a strong 25 impression : hat there are a cruple of k;ncs of cocuments tha; io
35 56.la.7 h
..\\ r' I
- ney'll resis; provicing anc the c:c.ers and :no se
. a; Oney 2
ti:n: provice a su mary of.
Anc tne c hers that :ney procacly 3
acula be willing to provice.
And
.a
- ney were just trying m
I hac :ne impre ssion :nis was no:
to e s:ablish the cein:
e s
5 tnat, :nat there was really only one item ena ney were o
acemantly against anc that was number tnree.
7 C3.i!.II 5S IGU ZR UI LI5 SKY :
I believe they have a o
s t encara form tnat impor:= rs are su poo sec to f ;11 out, or a:
9 least hac to fill out at one point, which goes uncer the 10 justification for the export.
11 C0;.(M I55 ION E.4 AM EARN E :
I don't think this is :na:
12 big an issue.
13 MR. SHEA:
I think their real concern is w1:n naving 14 to provide tais regularly, on hign enricnec cases, Oc us.
s-15 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
I think it's jus: :he i
lo Presidential decision memorancum that they're adamant on.
17 Co.'4MI SS I0iiEd Kd.'WEDY :
There's also a basic 15 ques;icn, after the Presicent has cecided the ques:1cn that
!v we ough; to do this in respec t to nis particular country, 20 f or u s ;o say, No, it's inconsistent with ;clicy.
think 21 their view is, in this regard, since the autnority f or making 22
- na: pclicy wasn't giv.en Oc semedccy else, then it resizes 23 witn the Presicen t.
- nd I agree witn them.
Tha 's wha; :ney 24 say.
I agree with :nem.
25 CO E4I 55 I0d50 GILIN5KY:
Sun is 1
.ncons
- e-; wi:e
\\ ND
,e ogjU 8
2583 544
,ca.;2.:
39 a..e 1
Oc.s question of Odfeguards!
2 CO'% I SS IJh ER :;52.a EsY :
Ina:'s a cifferen: cuestion, 2
we're r.o; ciscussing tha.
CO:f:,iI5SIO idR GILIN54Y :
I don't see how you can o
secarate t he m.
~
o CHAIRAAd HEliDRIS:
But I'm hoping :o ge: those socn.
7 CO.:.iMI 55 ION ER KEidiEu f :
Tnat's no t what we're discussing.
y CodMISSIori2R GILINSKY :
I though: we were.
10 COMMI 55 I0 DER.<ENiiEDY :
'faybe we could go anc discuss 11 it now, anc we'c all ce talking a' out the same :ning.
c 12 CHAIRJMi HENORIE:
Let me tell you what I'd like to 13 do.
I woulc like to ceclare that the commissioners shoula 14 lcok at the next pro posea letter f or the State De partmen: wt h l
15 regarc to.this item in the light of these conversations an5 N.
Ic the ir cwn vi ew, anc I would say no more at this time accut it, 17 but just move on.
I'c lika o talk some eccut item number le tnres, which I'm assurec is really the tning we came here to ly discu ss, anc get scoe discu ssion, wnich I assume will all go 20 swimmingly, so we'll get en :hrougn :ne af terncen.
21 Mow accu
- nat?
Like tne penguin, I new.<now more 22 acout ice-10 than I really wanted to know.
23 MR. SH r i. :
Anc:ner cessiollity Tere i s t ha t for 24 item three one might consider conferring with tne 5: ate 25 D e,:a r tm e n t,
g g o $IB 2383 H 5
-:: s ! 2.y 40
.Ae i
CO.f..tI 55 IOciER AhEARS E:
Inat's frankly what I thougn:
2 was going to napcen.
3 CO.4 4 I55 Ica ER f,2 d ED Y :
I :hought :na: was the 4
purpose of :nis meeting.
I would tell you it's One only o
reason I'm nere.
I can't neec to go througn :nis ciscussion o
all tnat many more times, ou I thougnt we were here to have 7
a ciscussion witn the Executive 3ranen on wna: :ney t houg n.o c
chey meant, insteac of wna we Enink they mean, CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Gooc heavens!
I s :na why we're y
10
- h. era?
11 COMMIS5IONER AHEARNE:
Certainly on number three.
12 C("4:4I5SI0 DER KENNEUY :
We discussed this a long time 13 ago.
I thought tna:'s wny we were having the mee ting.
14 MR. SdEA: ' If we nave the nee:ing on :nree, we can
()
15 put 10 in to tnat, too, for further discussion.
Io CHAIRMAci HENDRIE:
Le t u s do tha t.
17 COR4I5SI0 aid 5.dADR)Rb:
I woulc go ahead wi th ' O.
Ic We've already seen wnat 10 can co to three, in the course of 19 one afternoon.
20 (Laugnter.)
21 CO'4MISSI0 DER 3 RAD. 0RCs If there's to ce a meeting 22 wi n the Sta te ce partmen:, I woulc say, fine.
23 MR..:ETERSON:
Jus: one more comment oefore as ge:
2-to :nree.
Item la, che staff is recommencing that we agree 25 with the State Lepar ment cencerning this area, anc :na: we 2.583 446 owy,4 k
0
(
e eg.
EC L'i I d. l C 4l
. A?
I nct nave Onat in the format.
2 CHA I R..i A.'i HE!!J R I E :
Okay.
2 MR. 5nEA:
1e'll folc up one out of 16.
a CHAIRiaA.i HE.iuRI E:
ilo w, will some~oody instruct m.e a t 5
wnst coint we have finisned'tne
,0 colic meeting anc are acout o
to emoark on a closed se ssion?
Is it now?
7 MR. SHEA:
It is now, c
CHAIRMAN HEduR IE:
I want to turn to item three now.
v Do';s all of that f all into the closed se ssion?
IU MR. SHEA:
Yes.
ii CHAIRAli HE!1DRI E:
Very gooc.
This meeting of the 12 Commi ssion now terminates.
The Com.mi ssion will now take a 13 fiva-minute recesc : ~ d re turn here to a closed meeting.
I-Othereupon, at 3:25
,0.m.,
cne meeting went into
~
(s 15 closed se ssion.)
'T w
lo 17 2383
<47 ie ly 2C 21 22 u.
24
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+-
.