ML19270C230
| ML19270C230 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palo Verde, Wolf Creek, Byron, Seabrook, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Comanche Peak, La Crosse, Midland, 05000000, Crane |
| Issue date: | 04/26/1984 |
| From: | Eisenhut D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Gilinsky, Palladino, Roberts NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19270C231 | List: |
| References | |
| TASK-AS, TASK-BN84-061, TASK-BN84-61 BN-84-061, BN-84-61, NUDOCS 8404230140 | |
| Download: ML19270C230 (8) | |
Text
jffgh 5
APR 2 6 BB4 Dn MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman Palladino Commissioner Gilintky Conmissioner Roberts Commissioner Asselstine Commissioner Bernthal FROM:
Darrell G. Eisenhut, Director Division of Licensing
SUBJECT:
EQUIPMENT TEMPERATURE RESPONSE TO HYDROGEN BURNS IN LARGE, DRY CONTAINMENT (B0ARD NOTIFICATION NO.84-061)
In accordance with present NRC procedures regarding Board Notifications, the enclosed is provided for your information. By copy of this memorandum, we are notifying the attached appropriate boards and parties.
The information provided in this Board Notification is applicable to plants with large, dry containments which include the plants identified by the Docket Numbers below.
Recently, tests were completed to demonstrate equipment operability in a large, dry containment Curing and after hydrogen burn events.
Preliminary post-test visual observation of many of the extensively burned cables revealed charring, cracking, bulging and/or wrinkling of the outer cable iacket surrounding the insulated conductors.
In some instances, splits were seen in the outer jacket such that inner insulators were visible; however, there was no evidence of exposed metal conductor. There was in many cases sufficient damage to the cable outer jacket to question its ability to protect the inner cable parts from a wet environnent. Since there was no clear indication of damage to internal parts or of a cable's inability to periom its functicn, there is no basis at this time to conclude failure or success. Since the cable was not energized during tne test, it can not be concluded that the cable would have perforned satisfactorily. Post-test evaluation of the cable will include testing to measure its current carrying and insulation capabilities. The extent of the applicability of these data to large, dry containments une their safety significance is presently being evaluated by the staff and any conclusions will be provided to the Boards.
8404230140
. The enclosed memos report preliminary observational results of EPRI hydrogen burn tests at the Nevada Test Site.
Origital signed by Robert A. Parple Darrell G. Eisenhut, Director V / Division of Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Enclosure:
Memo R. H. Vollmer, R. J. Mattson to D. G. Eisenhut dated 3/22/84 Memo R. T. Curtis to V. Benaroya, W. Butler, K. Kniel, V. Noonan, dated 2/18/84 Memo W. H. McCulloch to J. Larkins dated 2/10/84
[MS
3 Lf#3 D.E i
D 3
DL l',
s/yt g ton TMN ak RStark DGEisenhut 4/[p/84 4
84 4/ /84 4/%/84 4g/84 4/p/84
. cc: The Atomic Safety and Licensing Board; for:
Byron (Smith, Callihan, Cole)
Comanche Peak (Bloch, Jordan, McCollom)
Ginna (Grossnan, Cole, Luebke)
Lacrosse (Bechhoefer, Decker, Anderson)
Midland (Bechhoefer, Cowan, Harbour)
Palo Verde 2 & 3 (Lazo, Cole, Callihan)
Seabrook (Hoyt Luebke, Harbour)
Wolf Creek (Wolfe, Anderson, Paxton)
The Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board for:
Byron 1 & 2 (Rosenthal, Gotchy, Kohl)
Callaway (Rosenthal, Edles, Gotchy)
Diablo Canyon I & 2 (Moore, Buck, Johnson)
Midland 1 & 2 (Kohl, Buck, Moore)
TMI 1 (Edles, Buck, Gotchy, Kohl)
Docket Nos.: 50-445/446, 244, 409, 529/530, 443/444, 275/323, 289, 482, 454/455,329/330,483,486 All Parties for above preceedings
9 DISTRIBUTION LIST FOR BOARD NOTIFICATION Byron Units 1&2, Docket Nos. 50-454/455 Mrs. Juanita Ellis Callaway Unit 1, Docket No. 50-483 David S. Fleischaker, Esq.
Coma.che Peak Units 1&2, Docket Nos. 50-445/446 Mrs. Raye Fleming Diablo Canyon Units 1&2, Docket Nos. 50-275/325 R. K. Gad III, Esq.
Ginna Unit 1, Docket No. 50-244 Steve J. Gadler, P.E.
Lacrosse Boiling Water Reactor, Docket No. 50-409 Joseph Gallo, Esq.
Midland Units 1&2, Docket Nos. 50-329/330 Billie Pirner Garde Palo Verde Units 2&3, Docket Nos. 50-529/530 Ms. Sandra Gavutis Seabrook Units 1&2, Docket Nos. 50-443/444 Arthur C. Gehr, Esq.
TMI Unit 1, Docket No. 50-289 Mr. Thomas M. Gerusky Wolf Creek Unit 1, Docket No. 50-482 Ellen Ginsberg, Esq.
James P. Gleason, Esq.
Dr. Reginald L. Gotchy Atomic Safety and Licensing Mr. Earl Brown Mr. Rand L. Greenfield Board Panel Mr. William L. Brown Herbert Grossman, Esq.
Atomic Safety and Licensing James E. Brunner, Esq.
Mr. Lee M. Gustafson Appeal Panel Dr. John H. Buck Dr. Jerry Harbour Brentwood Board of Selectmen Mr. Ronald C. Callen Mr. Thomas H. Harris Division of Consumer Counsel Dr. A. Dixon Callihan Mr. Robert J. Harrison c/o Mr. Barry S. Zitser Mr. Calvin A. Canney Samuel A. Haubold, Esq.
Docketing and Service Section Sen. Allen R. Carter Mr. Wayne Hearn Document Management Branch Doug Cassel, Esq.
Donald L. Herzberger, MD NY State Atty Gen's Office Brian P. Cassidy, Esq.
Dr. David L. Hetrick Consumer Frauds A. Scott Cauger, Esq.
Renea Hicks, Esq.
Energy Utility Div.
Mr. Kenneth M. Chackes
- 0. S. Hiestand, Esq.
Region III, U.S.N.R.C.
Gerald Charnoff, Esq.
Ms. Beverly Hollingworth Rochester Committee for Ms. Diane Chavez Gary W. Holmes, Esq.
Scientific Information Myron M. Cherry, p.c.
Ms. Lee Hourihan Town Manager's Office Mr. Donald E. Chick Helen Hoyt, Esq.
Town Hall - Friend Street Ms,. Wanda Christy Mr. Richard B. Hubbard Town of North Hampton Mr. Mendall Clark Mr. Henry D. Hukill David E. Cole, Esq.
Sen. Gordon J. Humphrey Ms. Marjorie M. Aamodt Dr. Richard F. Cole Mrs. Phillip B. Johnson Mr. Norman Aamodt Mr. John T. Collins Dr. W. Reed Johnson Phillip Ahrens, Esq.
Mr. Nicholas J. Costello Dr. Walter H. Jordan Dr. George C. Anderson Barton Z. Cowan, Esq.
William S. Jordan,III, Esq.
Mrs. Elizabeth Apfelberg Dr. Frederick P. Cowan Mr. James R. Kates Maurice Axelrad, Esq.
Phi'ip A. Crane, Jr., Esq.
Mr. Frank J. Kelley Robert A. Backus, Esq.
T. J. Creswell, Esq.
Mr. Chauncey Kepford Charles Bechhoefer, Esq.
Charles Cross, Esq.
Janice E. Kerr, Esq.
Kenneth Berlin, Esq.
Mr. Edward L. Cross, Jr.
Stanley B. Klimberg, Esq.
Lynne Bernabei, Esq.
Mr. James E. Cummins Dr. Jerry R. Kline Ms. Frieda Berryhill Jordan D. Cunningham, Esq.
Mr. Roger W. Kober Mr. Samuel J. Birk Thomas G. Dignan, Jr., Esq.
Christine N. Kohl, Esq.
Mr. Richard E. Blankenburg Mr. John F. Doherty Dr. James C. Lamb, III Peter B. Bloch, Esq.
Ms. Jane Doughty Robert M. Lazo, Esq.
Mr. Dan I. Bolef Mr. Owen B. Durgin Ms. Jane Lee Mr. Donald Bollinger Gary J. Edles, Esq.
Dr. J. Venn Leeds, Jr.
Ms. Louise Bradford Eric A. Eisen, Esq.
Mr. Howard A. Levin Mr. Glenn 0. Bright Mr. Frederick Eissler John Levin, Esq.
DISTRIBUTION LIST FOR BOARD NOTIFICATION Byron Units 1&2, Docket Nos. 50-454/455 Callaway Unit 1, Docket No. 50-483 Comanche Peak Units 152, Docket Nos. 50-445/446 Diablo Canyon Units 1&2, Dccket Nos. 50-275/323 Ginna Unit 1, Dockr' No. 50 244 Lacrosse Boiling E Reactor, Docket No. 50-409 Midland Units 1&2, Docket Nos. 50-329/330 Palo Verde Units 2&3, Docket Nos. 50-529/530 Seabrook Units 1&2, Docket Nos. 50-443/444 TMI Unit 1, Docket No. 50-289 Wolf Creek Unit 1, Docket No. 50-482 Mr. Marvin I. Lewis Ms. Marjorie Reilly Mr. Harry M. Willis Stephen H. Lewis, Esq.
Harold F. Reis, Esq.
Maxine Woelfling, Esq.
Mr. Frank Linder Joel R. Reynolds, Esq.
John F. Wolf, Esq.
Mr. Gustave A. Linenberger,Jr. Nicholas S. Reynolds, Esq.
Sheldon J. Wolfe, Esq.
Mr. Harold Lottman Warren B. Rosenbaum, Esq.
Mr. Robert A. Wooldridge Dr. Emmeth A. Luebke Alan S. Rosenthal, Esq.
Mr. Robert G. Wright Mr. Fred Luekey Ms. Mary Ellen Salava Mr. Angie Machiros Mr. Alfred Sargent Mr. John Marrs Fritz Schubert, Esq.
ACRS Members Mr. Wendell H. Marshall Mr. James 0. Schuyler Dr. Robert C. Axtmann Mr. Robert D. Martin Lewis Shollenberger Esq.
Mr. Myer Bender Michael W. Maupin, Esq.
Mr. Steven C. Sholly Dr. Max W. Carbon Michael McBride, Esq.
Ms. Jo Ann Shotwell Mr. Jesse C. Ebersole Dr. Ker.neth A. McCollom Ms. Barbara Shull Mr. Harold Etherington Patrick J. McKeon Jay E. Silberg, Esq.
Dr. William Kerr Mr. Edward F. Meany Mr. Gordon Silver Dr. Harold W. Lewis Mr. Marshall E. Miller John M. Simpson, Esq.
Dr. J. Carson Mark Michael I. Miller, Esq.
Ms. Mary Sinclair Mr. William M. Mathis Prof. William H. Miller Mr. Lanny Alan Sinkin Dr. Dade W. Moeller Mr. Bruce Molhold Mr. Michael Slade Dr. David Okrent Thomas S. Moore, Esq.
Ivan W. Smith, Esq.
Dr. Milton S. Plesset Ms. Pat Morrison Mr. C. W. Smyth Mr. Jeremiah J. Ray Mr. H. Daniel Nix Carol S. Sneider, Esq.
Dr. Paul C. Shewmon Bruce Norton, Esq.
Mr. Michael D. Spence Dr. Chester P. Siess Mr. George Nygaard Ms. Barbara Stamiris Mr. David A. Ward Dr. Hugh C. Paxton Major Howard Steffen Spence Perry, Esq.
Mr. Bob Stein C. Edward Peterson, Esq.
Mr. Michael J. Strumwasser Ms. Rouerta C. Pevear George F. Trowbridge, Eso Ms. Gail P. Phelps Dr. Mauray Tye Mr. Robert N. Pinkney Paul C. Valentine, Erq.
William C. Potter, Jr., Esq.
Ms. Anne Verge Sen. Robert L. Preston Harry H. E igi;, Esq.
Dr. Lawrence R. Quarles Dr. Bruce von Zellen Ms. Diana P. Randall Ellyn R. Weiss, Esq.
Mr. Paul Rau Mr. Howard A. Wilber Mr. John G. Reed Mr. Frederick C. Williams Branch service lists of addressees receiving material on the following dockets:
, BYRON DOCKET Mr. Dennis L. Farrar Mr. William Kortier Mr. Michael Miller, Esq.
Mr. Edward R. Crass Mr. Julian Hinds CALLAWAY DOCKET Mr. D. F. Schnell Mr. Nicholas A. Petrick Mr. J. E. Birk Resident Inspector Mr. Donald W. Capone Regional Administrator, Region III COMANCHE PEAK DOCKET Robert A. Wooldridge, Esq.
Mr. H <.r C. Schmidt Mr. H. R. Rock Mr. A. T. Parker William Burchette, Esq.
DIABLO CANYON DOCKET Mr. Malcolm H. Furbush Mr. Lee M. Gustafson Resident Inspector /Diablo Canyon NPS Dr. ilose Roesset Dr. William E. Cooper Mr. W. C. Gangloff Regional Administrator, Region V GINNA DOCKET Ezra Bialik Resident Inspector U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Supervisor of the Town of Ontario Jay Dunkleberger Regional Administrator, Region I
Page 2 LACROSSE DOCKET
- 0. S. Heistand, Jr.
Mr. John Parkyn Resident Inspector Towr Chairman, Town of Graca Chairman, Public Service Commission of Wisconsin U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Regional Administrator, Region III Clarence Riederer MIDLAND DOCKET Mr. J. W. Cook Stewart H. Freeman Ms. Julie Morrison Mr. R. B. Borsun Mr. Don van Farrowe Resident Inspectnr Mr. Paul A. Perry Mr. Walt Apley Regional Administrator, Region III Mr. Ron Callen Geotechnical Engineers Billie Pirner Garde Commander, Naval Survace Weapons Ctr.
Mr. L. J. Auge Mr. Neil Gehring Mr. I. Charak Clyde Herrick Mr. Patrick Bassett PALO VERDE DOCKET Mr. E. E. Van Brunt, Jr.
Mr. Charles R. Kocher, Esq.
Ms. Margaret Walker Resident Inspector Regional Administrator, Region V
Page 3 SEABROOK DOCKET Bruce Beckley D. Pierre G. Cameron, Jr., Esq.
Regional Administrator, Region I E. Tupper Kinder, Esq.
Resident Inspector Mt. John DeVincentis Mr. A. M. Ebner Mr. Stephen D. Floyd Ms. Letty Hett Honorable Richard E. sullivan Seacoast Anti-Pollution League TMI DOCKET Board of Directors, P. A. N. E.
J. B. Lieberman, Esq.
Earl B. Hoffman Union of Concerned Scientists c/o Harmon & Weiss Mr. E. G. Wallace Ms. Virginia Southard Mr. David D. Maxwell EPA, Rgn III, Reg. Rad. Representative Senior Resident Inspector General Courisel, Federal Emergency Mngt Agency Karin W. Carter, Esq.
Dauphin County Office Emergency Preparedness Harrisburg, Pa Mr. Robert Borsum Ms. Lennie Prouch Governor's Office of State Planning and Development, Harrisburg, PA Regional Administrator, Region I Bruce Molholt Dr. David L. Hetrick Dr. Janes C. Lamb, III WOLF CREEK DOCKET Mr. Glenn L, Koester Mr. Nicholas A. Petrick Mr. Donald T. McPhee Resident Inspector Teri Sculley Regional Administrator, Region IV Mr. Joe Mulholland Regional Administrator, Region III
ENCLOSURE
' pm Ric
+
o UNITED STATES
[ 7)
)
NilCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D. C. 205s5
%..." / t March 22, 1994 MEMORANDUM F FROM:
Richard H. Vollmer, Director Division of Engineerir.g Rc?r J. Mattson, Director Div:sion of Systems Integration
SUBJECT:
AMENDMENT TO MARCH 16, 1984 BOARD NOTIFICATION MEMORANDUM REGARDING EQUIPMENT RESPONSE DURING HYDROGEN BURN EVENT
Reference:
Memorandum from Robert T. Curtis, Chief, Containment Systems Research Branch, RES to Vincent 5. Noonan, Chief, EQB et. al. dated February 16, 1984 Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) has recentl, completed hydrogen burn equipment tests at the Nevada Test Site (NTS) as part of a jointly sponsored program with the NRC.
The tests resulted in a number of failures and cable burning which had not been exper4.enced in previous equipment tests conducted by NRC and Industry.
The referenced memorandum, which is attached, transmitted the visual observation performed by Sandia National Laboratory (SNL) on the equipment.
Since then, EPRI has also transmitted a "Second Quick -
Look Status Report on EPRI Hydrogen Burn Equipment Tests (RP-2168-3)"
by memorandum dated February 17, 1984.
The purpose of the final two tests, conducted during the month of January,1934 was to demonstrate equipment operability in a large, dry containment during and after the hydrogen burn event for a 75% metal water reaction (13% H., with 30% steam).
A video cassette recording of these experiments shows that some cable burned extensively, both during and after the hydrogen gas burn.
Post test visual observation of many of the cables revealed charring, cracking, bulging and/or wrinkling of the outer cable jacket surrounding the insulated conductors.
In some instances, splits were seen in the outer jacket such that inner insulators were visible.
Importantly, however, there was no evidence of exposed metal conductor; thus there is no basis at this time for concluding that the cable would not perform its function.
Unfortunately, the cable was not energized during the test; thus it can not be concluded that the cable would have performed satisfactorily during the combustion event.
Post-test evaluation of the cable will include testing to measure its current carrying and insulation capabilities.
Darrell G. Eisenhut 2-In addition to the cable burning, two to three items of equipment did not perform their function during the experiment, and evidence of water condensation and construction material, e.g.,
metal filings, were found inside the examined pressure gages.
However, no other evidence of damage was found on the examined pressure gages.
There are a number of reasons why the observed damage indicated above may conservatively exceed the damage which may occur to essential equip-ment during a hydrogen combustion event in a large dry containment.
As we noted, the above preliminary information was obtained from tests involving the ignition of a mixture containing 13 percent hydrogen.
This mixture was selected to represent a bounding case for large dry contain-ments wherein the hydrogen produced from a 75 percent cladding-water reaction is allowed to accumulate in the containment.
There is a prob-ability albeit indeterminate that the hydrogen will not accumulate to a 13 percent concentration.
This uncertainty is due to the presence of native random ignition sources inside containment, i.e., sparks from motors.
Such random ignition may result in combustion at a lower hydrogen concentration with resultant less severe consequences.
There was no burning of cable opened in the video tapes of NTS tests at hydrogen concentrations less than 13 percent.
Another reason why the data may not be an appropriate representation of the probable damage in a large dry containment is that the equipment including cabl.4 was not necessarily installed or physically arranged in a manner represer'.ative of actual plant conditions.
For examp~.o, the cables were simply looped over scaffolding in the test vessel; the cables were not laid in trays which would afford some protection.
A last item to be noted is that tha lGS facility had a relatively low spray capacity.
These results from the burn tests at 13% H should not be applicable to 7
the Mark I, Mark II, Mark III and ice condenser containments.
Hydrogen combustion will not occur in the Mark I and Mark II containments as they are operated wih inerted containments.
Hydrogen combustion with rich mixtures, i.e., greater than 9 percent, in large volumes should not occur in ice condensers and Mark III containments because these containments are all furnished with specially designed hydrogen ignition systems to assure ignition in large vo'.umes at lean mixtures, i.e., less than 9 percent hydrogen.
In some other NTS tests of combustion of hydrogen at concen-trations lower than 13 percent, there were no obvious failures of equipment due to combustion, bet there were some failures by other causas that are still being studied in laboratory testing of the specimens.
The extent of applicability of these data to large dry containments and their safety significance are presently being evaluated.
In April of 1984 NRR and RES will examine the applicability of '.he NTS data for validating the HECTR computer code.
The need nor any further tests at large scale and small scale will then be identit 'ed.
The final analysis of tne NTS data, to include such matters as the test water sprays, the physical arrangements for the test specimens, ano the post-test examination 'f the damage to the specimens will require more time.
We expect to report on Lhe such longer term evaluation by the end of 1984.
The implications of these evaluations on hydrogen rulemaking or individual reactor licensing cases will be addressed on a case-by-case basis for the interim.
Darrell G. Eisenhut Pursuant to NRR Office Letter No. 19, dated October 1, 1982, wc recommend that this information be submitted for Bcard Notification for boards having jurisdiction over large dry containments.
I it 1-j.,
Richard H. Voll'mer, Director Division of Engineering m
//,ct. w Roge J.
ttson,l Director Division of Systems Integration
Enclosure:
As stated cc:
H. Denton E. Case R. C. DeYoung J. P. Knight T. Novak G. Lainas F. Miraglia V. Noonan R. Curtis B. Morris V. Benaroya W. Butler K. Kniel R. LaGrange J. Larkins C. Tinkler K. rarczewski W. Farmer H. Garg EQ Section
e o=%
UNITED STATEE
/
og NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[
p, WASHINGTCN D C.20555 7;
ij
+9,, #
FEB 1? N MEMORAhDUM FOR: Victor Benaroya, Chief Chemical Engineering Branch, NRR Walter Butler, Chief Containment Systems Branch, NRR Karl Kniel, Chief Generic Issues Branch, NRR Vincent Noonan, Chief Equipment Qualification Branch FROM:
Robert T. Curtis, Chief Containment Systems Research Branch. RES FUBJECT:
" CABLE RESPONSE DURING THE HYDROGEN BURN-DEMONSTRATION TEST AT THE NEVADA TEST SITE" As you are aware, the hydrogen combustion demonstration program at the Ne.ada Test Site was recently completed.
During the second phase of this te.
program safety related equipment was exposed to the hydrogen burn environ wnt. The obje::tive of these experiments was to assess the survivability of equipment under conditions outlined in the final hydrogen rule. A key objective was to provide a data base for closure on the issue of survivability of eacipment in a large dry containment. The purpose of this memorandum is to provide you with some preliminary observations on the response of a specific type of epipinent (cables) during these tests.
In my memorandum of January 19, 1984, I outlined three final tests to be conducted at NTS. The tests have been completed and the preliminary results from the program will be made available to you as soon as it becomes available.
Upon the completion of the program, John Larkins visited the facility to preview the results of the final tests and to make ' plans for a final report.
During the visit he made certain observations which we feel are worthwhile to bring to your attention.
In viewing the videocassette recordings of these experiments it was noted that at relatively high hydrogen concentrations, representative of approximately 75% metal-water reaction,
(-13%H with 30%
7 steam and 13% H, with sprays and f ans) the cables burned extensiveTy, both during the hydrbgen gas burn and afterwards. Post test examination revealed extensive charring, pitting, cracking and holes where a metallic surface was clearly visible. The first conclusion was that the metallic surfaces were exposed conductor, however, after later discussions with EPRI, it was concluded that the surface was probably metallic braids or metallic paper.
m e -f d 5 v W y Cf
2 A team from EPRI, utili.y representatives, Westinghouse and SANDIA visited the site on February 7 & 8, 1984 and visually inspected most of the equipment used in the various tests. A brief trip report from SANDIA is enclosed. The consensus from this team was that in none of the cable samples was metal conductor visible. The actual testing of the cable conductor and insulator will be done over the next six weeks or so and at that time we will be infot.ned as to the functional capabilities of the conductor and insulation. EPRI will provide a qualitative quick-look report on or about February 17, 1984. Also a VCR tape is available of these last series of experiments.
If you d2 sire more information on the observation from these tests or viewing of the V',R tape, please call me or John Larkins (X74478).
f Robert T. Curtis, Chief Containment Systems Research Branch
Enclosure:
As stated cc:
r Date:
February 10, 1984 To:
John Larkins, NRC From:
W. H. McCulloch, 6445 On February 6-7, 1984 Bill McCulloch, John Aragon, and Don King of SLA visited the NTS Hydrogen Burn Facility to inspect the condition of equipment and cable / splice samples after a series of hydrogen burn tests conducted by EPRI.
Also present for the inspection were Jack Haugh and George Sliter of EPRI.
Dick Miller of Westinghouse, Don Randall of Astron, and John Wanless of the NUS Corporation The calorimeters we had supplied were of special interest to use, but, at the request of John Larkins, NRC, we also inspected the other equipment and cable / splice samples from their original (new) condition, and we made no attempt to evaluate or interpret the observed conditions of the samples or to asseus their operability or reliability. The equipment and samples were tagged and photographed and the condition of each item was noted in an Engineering Record book. The inspection consisted of visually examining the exterior of the equipment and cable / splice samples and the interior of the equipment as their covers were removed.
At times unusual or unexpected " flakes", " crusts" or corrosion were removed from the equipment anc placed in sample bags.
The equipment inspected included usciute and differential pressure gages, solenoid valves, limit switches, resistive temperature devices, penetration assemblies, a fan motor, and a motor operated valve.
Cable samples were ottained from various manufactures:
Kerite, Rockbestos, Samuel Moore, Raychem, Okonite Boston Insulated Wire & Cable and Anaconda.
Most of the cable samples had been spliced into loops using a variety of splicing techniques not all of the type used in nuclear facilities. We are to be informed later by EPRI which were the higher grade splices.
In general, the equipment exteriors were scratched, discolored and corroded, evidence of their handling and exposure to fires and high temperatures. There were not however, any indications of external damage to the equipment. Upon removing the covers we found water condensed on most surfaces inside the pressure gages. The most probable source for this water intrusion is throug' the feed throughs for the experimental instrumentation (which is not typical of installation in nuclear facilities).
But there was no way to assure that the
" nuclear grade" gaskets and seais did not allow the intrusion of at least some of the water.
(It should be noted that " nuclear grade" installation procedures
s
,2 John Larkins and checks must be meticul osly followed:
other techniques judged acceptable even by experienced and careful installers, can lead to problems as occured repeatedly in this test series.) Except for the condensation and small amounts for foreign material (scale from evaporated water and bits of construction material, e.g., metal filingss) we found no evidence of damage or malfunction.
The presence of the water might give some concern if the component were expected to perform over an extended period. There was enough water present to cause shorting in a printed circu;t board if the potting material were absent or compromised.
Damage to the cable / splice samples ranged from virtually none to severe damage to the cable jacket.
Except for some splices which may not have been "nuclebr grade" our visual inspection revealed no evidence of failure of the conductors or insulators.
However, there was in many cases sufficient damage to the cable outer jacket 60 seriously doubt its ability to protect the inner cable parts from a wet environment.
For instances, if the inner insulation shrank back slightly from the splices, moisture could easily cause shorts.
In the absence of defined criteria for survivability, we cannot say that we observed success or failure.
Of approximately fifty cable samples, only two ware virtually free of damage.
Several showed slight surface melting and a few were charred without significant surface wrinkling or bulging. On many samples the jacket had expanded (either from its own phase change or from pressure generated by high temperture gases inside the jacket) and collapsed giving a heavily wrinkled or knurled appearance (like the rough bark on a mature tree).
In the more severe cases the jackets had holes and/or splits to reveal the inner layers. All but one of the splices showed some damage (usually substantial shrinkage or splitting of the splice jacket). Again, our observations were limited primarily to the cable jacket and we saw no clear indication of damage to internal parts or of a cable's inability to perform its function t