ML19269G254
| ML19269G254 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 11/14/1979 |
| From: | HOUSE OF REP., SCIENCE, SPACE & TECHNOLOGY (FORMERLY |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19269G255 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8001310184 | |
| Download: ML19269G254 (51) | |
Text
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HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES CE STzsoc2Armc T2A.m 0F
$ EARINGS stroas rax 4
COhBUTYEE ON. SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY (1)
Subcc=mittee on Energy Resear=h and Pr6 duction CVERSIGET EEAR 2iG ON THE M. ME27Y COM!CSSIO1
~~
WTHE h ittCF Wednesday, revember 14, 1971 g
1 115
- 1 PAGE TO VOLUME 2370 001 C
Columbia Reporting Company, Inc.
OF81C:AL AEPCRTERS 3& Savem< Snzrr. S.W.
Wemp.cTcM. 3.C. :0024 Tn.rms 254.4050 8 0 u 1310 I h
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i 1f STATEMENT OF DR. JOSEPH M. HENDRIE 2 !
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSICN I
c :
Dr. Hendrie.
As vou have noted, Mr. Chairman, there is 4
a response ne Commission the request ne Preside a
_ i i
0 of fice, and I will draw en that statement.
I 6 l Mr. McCormack.
Dr. Hendrie, can you speak more into the
,g
=
i a:
7 mike or louder or both?
l 8
Dr. Hendrie.
The essence of the matter can be stated l
9 very s:.mple, Mr. Chairman.
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission i
0.
10 '
agrees with the President's Cc= mission that a number of i
u y
11 l fundamental changes are necessary.
We have done cur cwn 5
12 internal reviews of the accident, as ycu knew, and have m.
a
=
13,
had nu=bers of staff and task forces working.
We have gener-5 s
i 14 i ally found that the actions recercended by the President's oa 15 Commission in the area of human factors, operational safety, emergency planning) siting and health effects and public 16 17,
information are necessarf and feasible.
3g la We intend to implement changes in our cwn organiration
- d. 4
_ij 19 practices and procedures, and in cur regulatory requirements 2=i l
2:
20 !
for operating plants and new plants so as to conform with the si ai n*
21 reccamendations of the President's ccm=ission as seen as.
3 2
22 possible.
2370 002 i
23 '
We have taken a number of actions already with respect 24 '
to operating reacters.
These are fully compatible with =ost 25 i of the applicab '.e technical recommendations of the President's l
6 i
i
't
~
43 1
Comission.
We are also considering a number of specific 2
approaches to accomplish changes that would, in =ost areas, 3
fully accomplish what we perceive to be the safety cbjectives i
4 !
of the recc.. endations, and we also have some changes that 9
=>
go en beyond those of the President's Commission.
i o !
a i
3 6 !
Cur own reviews and consideration of the President's
=
z 7 l Comission report suggests one important area to us which W
8 deserves more urgent attention than our previcus activities 9
had reflected, and that concerns the strength of technical o.
10 !
and =anage=ent ccmpetence of utilities, in particular the u
j 11 i licensees new operating plants, their ability to cperate i
5 12 f those plants safely and respend effectively to emergencies.
W j
15l We are clearly going to have to expand and expe te the m
2 i
3 14 :
activities which we had underway in this area..
c.
i u
15 !
With respect to the recccmendation of the President's 16 Ccmmission to change the agency into an executive branch AA&
17 agency with a single administrator the five nuclear la ;
regulatory ecmissioners, we believe that effective reform s!
a can and shculd be acccmplished within the existing structure.
i' 19 !
3 ;.
a
=n 25 20 I should note that my colleague, Comissioner Jchn Ah.
1i ai jj 21 believes that although he thinks ef fective reform can be 22 done and should be dcne in the existing agency, that a 23,
greater improvement is, in fact, pcssible in an administra-24 '
tive agency as reco== ended by the President's Comission, 25 '
and he fu:-ther things that the prcbability of such reform 2370 003
i I
i I
44 7 l j
being fully successful is larger in that case.
2 In another area, I think we disagree somewhat with what 3
we think is the darust of the President's Commission, and this is in the area of recommendations to, we believe, lessen E
_ l the role of NRC in responding to emergencies and providing 3
=
6 i emergency information to the public.
Based on cur cwn T!!I w
I zC 7
experience, we think that NRC's role in any nuclear emergency is bound to be essential and central, and that Government h
9 planning should reflect daat.
10 f We are doing a number of things to strengthen our cwn y
11 :
capabilities in that regard.
c=
12 :
The enclosures which go with the docu=ent that we have o
w=
13 given the ccmmittee today, which I should note was put in a
23 14 '
the public docu=ent recm yesterday at "the NRC, follow through c.
W 15 l all of the recc==endations of the President's Cc==ission and i
i 15 describes the relevant NRC actions that have been already 17.
taken, these in pregress, these ~under consideration, and i5 la where these actions that we have underway are insuf ficien*)
^n iI 19 indicate the direction we have to go to fulfill the 2-
=E Ei 2C,
recommendations of the President's Commission.
- s i
-5 A A jj 21 In a few instances, we have recommended actions of a 22 somewhat dif ferent character.
In these instances we agree 23 with the intended cbjective, as we understand it, frem the 24 President's Commission report, but differ a l'ittle on 25 the approach to be taken.
We think that for the mest part 2370 004
i i
45 1
we can carry out the recommendations of the President's 2 l Commission without legislation.
I l
There are a few places where legislation would be 3
l required, and reorganization of the agency, if that were to 4
E i
0.
be the choice of the Congress and.the P resident)is obvious 1*r"~
=
6 one of these.
mz 7
I should note that there still remains the detailed D
l 3
8 spelling out of the precise actions to be taken and regula-l 9 I tory criteria to be implemented with regard to different 10 l classes of cases.
We estimate that it will take scme time, O
I E
11 f several months, to develop the new safety requirements, the 5
12 l detailed bases and criteria for their implementation, and the s
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various bzplementation deadlines.
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14 l We have decided that new plants w'ill not be licensed I'
au 15 j until we have developed the required criteria.
n part, 16 l this approach assures daat NP.C staff can give necessary 17 !
attention to i=plementation of the changes on operating I
s?
13 p lants, and also provides time for working out the new
- E a
ij 19 requirements in detail.
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54 20,
We recognize that there will be a significant ef fect
- s 25 3;
21 on the availability of power generating capacity if those 22 plants new in the final stages of construction do not receive 23 operating licenses by the dates previously anticipated.
24 Hence, we will =ake every effort to avoid unnecessar7 delays.
25 We also recognize that a large fraction of the qualified 2370 005
3 46 i,
l 1 ;
nuclear engineering talent of Government and industry is now t
i 2 l fully dedicated and working on the implementation of the i
changes that the NP.C's cwn task forces have set f 0:":h, and l
that we have put in =otion.
E.
g 5 !
We think that this manpcwer engagement scen after the n
s 6j first of the year will fall off somewhat, since the first
- a i
z 5
7 of the year is the deadline for implementation of a number y
3 8
l of these things, and that total work force can then turn to I
9 I other recuirements that we are now developing.
10 l In conclusion, I would say en behalf of the Cc==ission i
U l
E 11 l that we appreciate the need for change, including the need
=
i
=
12 l for changes in the approach to safety.
We share the urgency c
5 13 '
attached to these matters by the President's Cc==ission.
We ms 3
14 l believe that significant change has already occurred.
o U
i 15 :
We are committed to protect the public health and i
i 16 ;
safety, and to continue our own self-examination of aspects 17 of cur responsibility to assure that safety.
3' la,
Chank you, Mr. Chairman.
". P.
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19 G
2370 006 Ii 20 ;
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24 '
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47 mjm 1 1,
Mr. McCormack.
Thank you, Dr.
Hendrie.
1 i
2 l Dr. Hendrie, I am going to pass up questions on this 3
key matter that you have addressed, except to comment that in l
4 :
1976 and '77 when we were studying the creation of a Muclear I
a i
Regulatory Commission and a Cepart=ent of Energy and there were 5
i i
g i
6 formal hearings being conducted under the Ford Adninistration
- az O
7 l at the direction of this Committee, I recommend-4 at that time E
l 4
3 8
and I recom= ended subsequently to the Government Operations 9 l Subecmmittee that we create an energy regulatory agency which I
s o.
10 i would handle all energy, not nuclear alone, but nuclear and i
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9 11 !
coal, and that it have a single head responsive to the Presi-2 1
5 12 :
dent.
This was =y idea before, and it remains my idea.
a.
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i 5
13 l I do not want to press you on tha: point, however.
I s
i 2
14 l would like to ask you another question', if I may, because I o
o i
15 l' knew you will be questioned on the subject you have discussed U
I 16 l here by others, including Mr. Wydler.
i 17 ;
I want to get to a = ore specific and more urgent question l
p-la l and that has to do with the four nuclear plants that are new 94 jL 19 awaiting operating nuclear licenses.
They are North Anna, 5
and "'VA.
Is that it?
No:-th Anna, and what 5
20 l
% 2, Seque
- f 2; l is the one in California?
i 22 Dr. Hendrie.
Diab lo Canycn.
i 23 Mr. McCormack.
Is there any specific reason why these i
24 plants should not receive a limited operaring license at this 25 time?
Is there any conEtien suggested by the Kemeny 2370 007
48 l
1i Cc==ission that these would not meet which would prevent them j= 2 2 l frem starting up, at least to go through their loading and i
3 i their zero power test and their safety checks which would take 4 i three or four months anyway, considering the fact thr.t *?ch R
i C
0 5 !
one of these plants will be prcducing the eqci, valent of 5
6 l somewhat over 10 =illion barrels of oil per year and it will i
=
z9 7
take them two or three =enths to get up to the point where ra d
aj they will even request going above 1 percent of pcwer?
9 I am wondering if th are is any reason why they should i
o.
'O not be licensed to be exploring their cwn safety provisions u
g
,-l and equipment new.
And I am wcndering if there is anything
=
M 5
12 l that is going to be recommended, any modifications to these W
h 13 plants that could not be done just as well after they are
=
1 14 l loading anci 1 percent operation, let 's, s ay, as well as before.
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13 !
Dr. Hendrie.
"he course which yce suggest, which wculd
, o. !
be to allcw at some point these near-term operating license cases to start hot functional tests staying at essentially p;
j zero pcwer,1 percent or less to complete their physics 3i ?
la N
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tests and alicw an extended period for detailed checking cut 3
,9 1A :.
of the safety systems, is a possible course which we are jj 20 2E
$3 icoking at.
o, si 3 22l-I think hcwever it centinues to be the case that we at a,.
'" ~
NRC need to shake dcwn and fulI-perhaps not ful 8' butA I
23 much bette; detail -- the points in the report of the 24 President's Ccemissien along with our own requirements frem.
2f,
2370 008 s
49 j=3 1l the lessons learned task forces of the staff, to-get those 2 !
enunciated in terms of things that we feel are essential to
_ r be implemented before various stages of operation and see that c
/
I 4* ;
these things are, in fact, being implemented by the licensees E.
5 i i.,
for these plants in a satisfactory manner before we would want ed 8
6 l to go ahead and consider that it might be useful for them to N
l Ron W l
go ahead with the 5:t fr M r :1 testing and do a thorough-7 4
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8 set of safety checks on tnose safety systems and get the 9
physics measurements done ven carefully and so on.
Clearly, with the overall fuel situation in the country) -
o.
10 u
11 l there is a high interest in not delaying just because the NRC
=o 12,
cannot get its act together) plants that could be of assistance-
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in that fuel situation.
But it is also true that we have a m2 3
14 '
nt=ber of thines to do which have to be reflected in actions o
i a
15 '
taken bv the licensees in these cases, and I think it will I
16 '
take a little while at least to get those sorted out and 17 fully clear.
3i :
la Mr. McCormack.
I wculd not reccmmend that you shortcut
?_ ?.
ij 19 any safety procedures, but I would seriously recccmend that b.
=I is 20,
in view of the critical energy situation we are f acing that si
- 9. :i gj 21 we not hold up the licenses strictly for political reasons of -
22 any scrt.
23 Dr. Hendrie.
I agree totally with that.
24 Mr. McCormack.
Thank you, Dr. Hendri.
25 Mr. Wydler.
2370 009 i
l 50 i
1l Mr. Wydler.
Doctor, of course this report has received n4 2 l great praise today, and it probably should.
But the f act is I
3 !
when you look at it, you reali:e that it is just that, a
i 4
repo rt.
It is a report or the opinions of a limited group i
o i
of people, many of them from very diverse backgrounds, and it j
5 !
4 f
is really a report that the President requested so that he 8
6 m
i z
2 7
might have some guidance or some people's opinions or whatever I.
j ai you might want to call it to make his decisions en what he 9 !
really wants to recommend.
Until he speaks, we really do I
not knew what is being requested by the Administration.
10 !
.c u
i 11 i We are treating this report al=ost like the Bible or the s
i 5
12 last word or scmething like that, and although it is a very I
sw 13 l gcod report, it is s till j us t hhat.
I am wendering if you 5s 3
14 ;
are in NRC going around making all of.these changes before t
u 15 you hear what the President finally decides he is going to recommend to you as to whnt he thinks shculd be done.
Would 16 '
it not be wiser to wait at least until we got some of his 17 13 l reaction to the report?
g:R A
S.e report is just an advisory docu=ent to him en which u
9
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to base decisions, and he may take in a lot of other matters, g
ji 20 j II jj 21 '
particularly since the Chairman has told us that the fccus 22 cf this report is narrow.
It dces not look at many of the other f acets which have to go into decision =aking, and the og 24 overall picture, and so on.
I am just wondering if we =ay
~.n ' be rushine. around here en the assumpticn that this report is o
2370 010
l 51 jm5 1l exactly what the President is going to recommend to the 2 l Congress and the country and to you.
Dr. Hendrie.
It is clear that the NRC has a respcnsibil-3 l
4 ity and has had a responsibility to examine itself pretty 3
e3' 5 I carefully in the wake of this accident, and determine for l
c itself where it thinks the regulatory system f ailed, and 3
6 l w
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7 allowed the accident to happen, and to get on with fixing those I:a i
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things in a great hurry.
That responsibility which the t,
i 9 !
statutes lay upon us and which we have accepted in serving 10 in the agency exists whether or not the President appointed c
u a co= mission or, indeed, whether Congress had chosen to have y
11 l invcstigations or the industry had chosen to have investiga-5 12,
4 2.
~-
13 '
tions or whatever.
5 l
3 3
14 '
Let :ne just say than we have drawn a number of conclu-ou sions out of our cwn work in the staff, and have seen areas 15 '
t where we clearly have to move ahead, and we are =cving en La them.
The President's Cor:=tission has done a very valuable 17 13 piece of work.
It provides an overriew of the accident to 3 !.
- a..
us and a set of recommendations drawn from a set of viewpoints je
- g 2=k that are not encu=bered by any particular prior associatien j*
20 ;
5i with a nuclear regulatory process.
We find, as I s ay, for
-=;3 21
=
much, much che great part of their recommendations that we 22 agree with them.
23 They, in e f fect. illuminate and help cur own recem=.enda-24 tiens.
It is not, I think, that they have recet.nended things 25 2370 011
i 52 t
t 1!
that we find strange and different and that we are running to 1
2 do just because they have recommended them.
We have said yes, l
3 we agree and we are doing that, and that is because of our 4 i cwn examination and because it is our responsibility to do so.
c 3
Indeed, we may learn some more things from the NFC special m
5 74 l
inquiry report, which will be out in another seven weeks or s
6
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n i
And there are still Congressional investigations going 5
7 i so.
i u
A 5
S l cn.
9 We have a present and continuing responsibility to take 1
10 '
action here and correct deficiencies as they are identified, ou 11 and we are trying to do that.
c=g 12 Mr. Wydler.
Well, I appreciate that.
Would yet have any u=
13 '
dif ficulty under the present organization with restructuring 52 3
14 l it?
ov i
15 '
I did not cuite understand why you are criticized for 16 spending so much time on licensing and not enough ti=e on 17 safety.
I always thought they were part of the same thing.
s7 13 But if you were to restructure the NRC into a licensing
^k[I 19 division and whatever you want to call it, safety division --
2-
- s jj 20 Dr. Hendrie.
They are, and ought to be, inextricably
- n 3j 21 involved with one another.
You cannot license sensibly unless as you understand the safety proble=bgand knew what to do to fix ---
22 '
23 them and have the cases and projects come dcwn the line in 24 '
good shape on those points.
25 Cn the other hand, there has to be a certain structure 2370 012 t
i
j 53 l
s i
1e in the process.
You cannot have people who are labeled safety i
4 2 l engineers telling people in plants to do things which are in-i
_ ic l censistent with the licensing pattern and regulations.
There 1
4 i has to be a certain order to things,
o 5
3 5 1 I must say I am not surprised at the feeling of Dr.
.n 3
6 !
Kemeny and his colleagues looking at the NRC and the regulatory w=
7 s tructure, and s aying, "My God, that's a lot of rigmarole and b
8
{
paper and formalism, and where in all of this are the rcot i
9 problems of safety?"
o.
10
- think that it would not surprise me if that was the i
U j
11 !
respense of any citizen who lcoked at it, and I think it is c
a l
12 ;
probably true of any Government regulatory agency.
I think os2 i
j 13 i what you ha re to recognize is if you under-regulate, no 5
i a3 14 !
matter hcw much you try to cencentrate on what you think are c
l U
15 I the real technical safety problems, human f actors and equip-16 ment, people are going to say -- a number of your colleagues 17 in Congress have said it to =e -
" Write that stuff down.
la,
Form a ccherent set of regulations and publish it and regulate 3:l d
'-E' 19 cn the basis of that set of rules so everybody can see what A =.
=1 E:
20 your requirements are and confers to them and you can regulate si i
15 3g 21 l against them."
22 It is si= ply the nature of the business that ycu have to 23 do that.
New, the penetrating ccmment that we have to take 24 very much to heart, which the President's Com=issien has 25 made, is along the lines " watch cut, you are getting yourself 2370 013 4
I I
54 1l trapped by paying = ore attention to the rigmarole than to the 2 l real content."
I think that is a sort of centinuing and ever-i
. f present peril in any regulatory activity.
4 4
There are sc=e places where I agree that we have begged E
2 3
5 dcwn in that kind of thing.
4 i
G 6 l Mr. Wydler.
Thank you.
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1l Mr. McCormack.
Mr. Wolpe?
l 2 l Mr. Wolpe.
Thank you, Mr. Chair =an.
l 3 i Chairman Hendrie, last week you indicated to another i
I 4
Subcc=mittee of the House the NRC's intention to institute its
?
C 5
5 !
cwn moratorium en new licensing and permits.
I want to applaud a
i n
i s
6 l you and me=bers of the Commission for that decision.
I
=
i z
E 7 l think that was a well advised decision.
5 s
8 I was a bit pu:: led having =ade that decision why you I
9 l should indicate in the same testimony opposition to the i
10 !
Congressional initiative to legislate a moratorium for a v
~
j 11 i very restricted period of time.
5 5
12 '
Dr. Hendrie.
There are several aspects tc it.
Let =e s
I 2
13 '
see if I can get to them in rapid fashion.
First of all, I 3
r 2
i
=,
14 -
tried to avoid en =y own part using the word " moratorium" in 0
I v
15 connection with our action because I notice the dif ficulty 16 that Dr. Ke=env and his group had settling on exactly what 17 that ought to mean, and see a lot of different versions in i r, la the Congress.
j '-
19 Cur situation si= ply is that it is going to take us Gt some time to shake dcwn all of these new requirements and is 20 i
jj 2'
decide exactly hcw and in what shape they apply to each case.
22 We think we ought to do it en a case-by-case basis.
We 23 cannot go ahead and license at the ccent because it is 24 going simply to take sc=e time to do that.
25 We have finite staf f, and it requires sc=e reflectica 2370 015
56 1l and some implementation action on the part of the applicants t
/
2 j and licr yees, too.
/
3 New, I think rather than some sort of blanket moratorium 4
on construction permits or operating licenses or whatever C
b i
i.
you have) that the recommendation that Dr. Ke=eny and his e
5 i
=
s group made is a very sound one, that on a case-by-case basis s
6 i azC 7
as you look at each project, you say what does it need to
_ua I,
8 i make it safe and that some of those cases are going to take 9 l a long time, and some will take a short time to get up to the i
10,
required levels.
ou i
e 7-i I think we should consider them on a case-by-case basis.
z G
c 12,
Mr. Wolpe.
You pu::le me further, I am afraid.
I under-sN i
2 13 -
stood your earlier testimony before the House subcommittee 51 to be that while you were undertaking.that analysis of cases g
14 !
a and the general set of procedures and operations within your u
15 is department, that in f act there would be no issuance of new 17 p ermits.
Are you changing that pcsition?
Dr. Hendrie.
No.
I do not think I have said anything 37, 13
" 3.j6 19 here which suggests --
2=
(Simultaneous conversation.)
-r jj 20 ii i
Dr. Hendrie.
We do not propose to license until for o,
23 a given case we have sec down what the recuirements are anc 22,
gotten the imple=en.ation appropriatelv structured.
23 24 '
- tr. Wolpe.
I understand, but then I am really mystified as to why you should oppose the Congressional initiative 25,
2370 016
i 57 l
l which says precisely the same thing.
Are you suggesting that E
you may be prepared to launch into the issuance of new permits I
_ l prior to four and a half months from now?
Are you concerned 4
about the time fra=e being too limited?
i E
i e
a 3
Dr. Hendrie.
I daink I have been hardput to say when a
3 6 i the earliest time that these things may come into place for
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^[
the first case might be, but I think it will be clearly after
+
3 8
the first of the year.
9 (Simultaneous conversation.)
I 10 Mr. Wolpe.
So in ter=s of your own contemplation, you u
5 11 ;
are really talking about not doing anything for 30 or 60 A
I y
12 j days or so=ething like that?
az 5
13,
Dr. Hendrie.
No.
I just said I think it will take
=2 3
14 past the first of the year, and as an earliest time, probably o
U lo-i late winter or early spring.
16 Mr. Wolpe.
You recognize then that late winter and r
17 l early spring, =y understanding at least is the moratorium sj 13 proposal before the Congress proposed six months and a =onth
^
~!I 19 and a half has elapsed.
So we are only speaking of four and 3-
==:j a half months at this point, which would bring us into roughtly E
20
=
m-3j 21 mid-March.
22 Are you suggestinc you would be prepared to move into 23 Licensing prior to mid-March?
24 Dr. Eendrie.
! cannot tell you exactly.
~et =e point 25 out to you that this bold measure of the Congress deals with 1
2370 017
58 1
construction permits.
Sir, the hazard in nuclear reactors 2 l has to do with fission products and plants under construction i
3 l permit are ten years away from fission products in any I
i l
quantity.
If you have insufficient confidence in us so that 4
E you feel you must go ahead with this sort of blanket cutoff e
i 5 i e
n 6 l of construction perrits, let's talk doout operating plants.
mz i
7 !
Mr. Wolpe.
I am simply trying to understand what you u
W are saying.
Some time ago you were quoted as suggesting 8 !
9 that the idea of a moratorium was political garbage.
i i
o.
10 ;
Dr. Hendrie.
You bet, you bet.
u i
g 11 l Mr. Wolpe.
And more recently you were quoted as advocat-3 12,
ing a moratorium, and Newsweek indicated that (Mr. Wolpe s
W i
~
13 reading from document).
5 I
M i
3 14,
Ncw, I submit, sir, that you have given us very little ou i
15 !
confidence, indeed, for any credibility of the proposed 16 '
moratorium you have announced by the agency.
17 Dr. Hendrie.
You can read me all kinds of newspaper 3;
la,
statements, and I am not respcnsible for those.
What I have
- 4 E'
19 said is that we felt we could not go ahead with licensing 39
-z
!?
20 :
because we have to develop on a case-by-case basis the 5
l 25 21 new safety requirements azid actions that we feel are neces-2 3 1
22 sary, and that it will take some time to do that, and the 23 appropriate way to do that is to start out and enunciate 24 those things and concentrate on the operating plants where 25 the ha:ard is if there is hazard, and then to lock on at the 2370 018
i 59 I
- p. ants in the licensing chain.
And it simply will take so=e 1
2 I time to do that.
I i
3 !
You can infer whatever motives you like, but I can assure i
i I
4 you that mine is in getting the safety situation straightened i
S l
e 0
5 !
out, ad it will take some ti=e to do that.
i 2
2 6 i Mr. McCormack.
Thank v. ou, Dr. Eendrie.
i W
I L
C 7
Mr. Carnev?
N 3
8 Mr. Carney.
Thank you verf much, Dr. Hendrie.
I would like to ask you a question, if I might.
Your 9
+
c.
10 i opinion of the Kemeny report where it pertains to changing u
i e
11 the five-man cc:=:tission to one man or one person, I should E
I 5
'2l say, who would head up the agency, could you give =e your Q.
i
=
I 13 opinion of th*at aspect of the report and can you elaborate 5
s I
g 14 l on why you have that opinion?
o i
Dr. Hendrie.
Yes, sir, I will trf.
V 15 16 I debated at considerable length and in various fo ra=s 17,
and have cited ene advantage or another of either the 3g la,
co= mission form or the administrator form.
I think it could
^ E.
3.'
9 be done either way.
I think we could do effective nuclear G-20 regulation under either the independent co= mission form or
$?
2;,
the executive branch single ad=inistrator agency form.
25 22.
I have co=e down sort of gently on the side of the com-i 23,
mission, and it is not, I would say, a view that I hold with 24 '
such ferver that no other view has any merit in my opinion.
2.c It is si=o. iv. that o coeriv structured, the co==issien form 2370 019
i 60 i
t 1 ]s does give you the advantage en regulatory policy decisiens,
2 l adjudications, of the interaction of what can be and certainly
?.
3 f are on the present Commission diverse viewpoints and backg cund 5 i
l and ways of coming at a problem.
4 E.
And I think for a regulatory process where ycu are
.D j
6 establishing the major decisions and settling adjudications, mz 7
doing rulemaking and so on, that there is, in fact, consider-
^-a i
e d
8 I able = erit in that give and take within the Commission.
9 i Mcw, in the present situation we find ourselves, in my 4
t' c.
10.
view, with a little too much give and take.
The Atomic l
3 11 l Energy Act and the subsequent amend =ent to it in 19 75 through sf 12 ;
the Energy Recrganization Act, in spite of language in there d
I' 13 i saying the Chair =an is the chief executive officer, it still Ei 2
3 14 I says that commissioners are equal and have equal responsibil-u 15 ity and authority in all decisions of the Cc==ission.
There 15 is language to that effect, anci I am afraid we have allowed 17 ourselves to make that true in all kinds of administrative, A 6.NI. YtD\\
s :';
la '
personnel, and budget -end apportienment -ed business) and get-
^R
.[I 19 ting en with the business of the agency, that is, the opera-Gs
=ii 20 tional side, to an extent that the situation has been
- E 43 3j 21 characteri:ed to you by the Prr ;ident's Commission.
22 New, that is not necessarily the prcperty of a commis-23 sion form, and I think what we cught to do is to agree that 24 the chair =an is respcnsible for seeing that the operacional 25 side of the agency runs, for car::ying out the administrative 2370 020
61 1
functions of the Cc= mission, that the commissioners,. as a j
collegial group, do the adjudications, the rule =aking and the 2
i 3 l
=ajor regulatory policy decisions.
I think we ought to deal 4
collegia 11y with the principal officers of the Cc= mission so Ee i
5 i that we all have people we have confidence in as senior s
=
6 j staff officers.
a i
z 7
The Cc= mission ought to deal collegially with the =ajor 3
1 E
3 i budget decisions that are made in the budget cycle each I
9 i year, which are in effect a substantial policy setting docu-i I
10 i ment, and ought to establish collegially a general p:cgram 0
i j
11 i and policy guidance for the agency, but then to stand back
=
5 12 and let i
run the ---'""
b the Chairman) through the Executive Director,
=
I g
13 '
operation.
I think that would have a very salutory effect m
i 1
3 14 l in ter=s of the effectiveness of the agency, and would deal c
w 15 !
with a lot of proble=s that we clearly have.
15 '
Mr. Carney.
I do not mean to get back on the cuestion 17 of the moratorium, but in a simple yes cr no, I ass cme what i;
la you are saying is you are oppcsed to Congressional moratorium, A5 19 ;
and if I read it right, the de facto moratorium, so to speak, G-
-r il 20 of the NRC right now would probably go beyond the scope, as
- i 25 3j 21 f ar as the time frame is concerned, of the proposed Markey 22 -
Amend =ent.
23 Dr. Hendrie.
I will take it in two parts.
Yes, I am 24 '
cpposed to a Ccngressional =oratorium er whatever kind.
I 25 think it is unnecessary and will turn out to cast toc broad i
2370 021 I
i e
62 W
a net in some ways and too garrow a one in others.
l 2 l With regard to the second point that I was discussing i
I 3
with the gentleman at the other end of the bench, I think i
4 i for constru tion permits, in particular, it is probable that I
e i
the six =onths contemplated in :tr. Markey 's amendment is verf 5 i i
2 6 !
likely to run out before -- that would take us to mid-April, M
l I
z E
7 I believe.
It is vert likely to run out before act'ons are I
I 4
i 8 j taken on a construction permit.
I think we need to devote i
i j
our attention to)in e sequencegoperating plants, plants 9
i t
10 !
ready to operate, that is, near-term operating license cases b
u hk h g
11 i because those can have er M: 1_
- f the energy supply situa-5 12 tion, and then work back down the line and end up with t.
l 2
13 !
construction permits and limited work authori:ation cases.
,s
- )
14 l But I continue to think that a ca,se-by-case approach in b
l 15,
which we determine for each of these classes of cases the 16 l requirements that are necessary before action is taken, what 17 !
actions can be taken post-licensing or during some interim 35 13 period, tnat that case-by-case approach is a much better one o e.
than some sort of blanket mandate of legislation.
9, 7
,5 _-
-i 55 20 lir. Carney.
Would it be out of order for me to ask Dr.
i 2i
$5 21 Kemeny to say yes or no on that one question?
x3 22 '
Mr. McCorrack.
Make it very quick.
l 23 Mr. Carney.
Dr. Kemeny, on the question of a rcratorium, 24 Congressionally propcsed or one of the de facto type of the 25 NRC, would you agree with what Cr. Hendrie had to say, or 2370 022
i 63 i
7 i
[
would you support a Congressional =oratorium?
2 l Dr. Kemeny.
First of all, I would not tell Congress what 1
- i 0 l to do.
I am here as head of a Presidential commission and 1
4 !
therefore have to stand on those recom=endations that the I
5 i
5 i Commission, as a commission, adopted, and what the C== mission
-=
6 ;
adopted was a case-by-case holdup until three things are w
i z
S 7
checked in each individual case.
N 8
Therefore, as Chairman of the Ccmmission, I wculd have 9
to recem=end that.
i 10 '
fir. Carney.
Thank you, Dr. Hendrie.
y 0
5 11 '
I thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
E i
o 12.
Mr. McCormack.
Mr. Irtel?
sd 5
13 !
Mr. Irtel.
Thank you, Mr. Chair =an.
a2 3
14 i Dr. Hendrie, I had asked Dr. Kemeny a question, and
=
U 15 l having read your letter, it seems that you are somewhat in i
16 '
an oppcsize position, and that is the function of the NRC 17 in the event of a nuclear mishap or an emergency, and as I i;
la understand Dr. Kemeny's position, he feels that tne utility
^ E.
!b 19 cught to make the decisions and communicate those to the o-
=3 Ei 20,
public generally.
si 25 gj 21 The NRC really is, I guess, in an advisory role, but I
22 not in a decision-making role.
Is it your pcsition that 23 when an emergency happens and' the NRC is on site thac they 24 should have a vote pcwer over the decision-making of the 25 utility in the event of an emergency, er should they have i
2370 023
64 I
i l
1 more control than just being an advisor?
l I would like to know what your posicion would be on that 2
i 3
and why.
4 Dr. Hendrie.
I think the NRC ought to have a little S
i o
0 5 i more control than just being in an advisory situation, and I k
6 l think that is the difference that we have with what we think
=
zC 7 l is the thrust of the Commission recommendations.
E t
a I would add though -- let me say why first, and then I d.
8 I i
9 !
would like to make a ccmment because I am not sure that our o.
10 differences on this point are really as clearcut and strong i
v i
o
,,i as thev. might seem.
2
.. i o
12 '
The why is that the NRC has a responsibility for public s
W i
2 13.
safety in a general sense and in the sense of particular 5
4 l
- 4 ;
plants and particular incidents.
We are, in effect, the people oa 13 i that all the taxpayers have hired because it is pretty
,gi hard for all the taxpayers to be nuclear experts.
And it has been our judgment as a society that there ought to be a j8 ig !
group of people who are reasonably expert to watch out for A. ~
these things on our behalf, and for better or worse NRC is i.s
,9 G-20 that agency.
=
ti g3 I think that our view carticularly when it comes to off -
f5 2., i site protective actions in a nuclear emergency situation 22 i
could conceivably be different from a utility 's judgment.
23 Mr. Ertel.
Is that based upon what you might conside r 24 the predisposition of the people involved -- not predisposition 25 2370 024
65 1
-- you might want to say framework of reference?
i 2 l Dr. Hendrie.
I SF. ink framework of reference is a f air
- i way to put it.
I think inevitably, just as when we come to 4
discuss a piece of safety hardware, there turns out to be a e
E, 5
sort of different place you are coming frem if you are the guy n
who is going to have to buy it and put it in your plant, 6
or y
zC 7
if you are the regulator who thinks he sees a clear need for 73 3
8 Lu.
9 There are those dif ferences.
Let =e j ust say though 10 I that there is no argu=ent from our side with the propcrition u
E 11,
that the utility has a primary responsibility in an emergency i
12 situation.
They, after all, are going to be the people who w=
5 13 I are there operating the plants when it happens, and they a2 3
14 l will have first knowledge.
There is no ar7ument from our o
u l
15j side wi th the general proposition that if actions have to be i
16 taken rapidly, they are taken by the people who are there on 17 the ground and are able to take them, and that there just ji 18 -
should not be second guessing back up the line.
_. r.
19 And, indeed, if sc=ething happens and the utility j)t
=!,j 20 i operation supervisor who
..u on the ground thinks we ought
\\
25 gj 21 ;
to get people out, why, it is his responsibility to get that l
22 word to the local emergency of ficials and get it r.oving, and 23 you certainly ought not cycle that through NF.C.
24 If there is = ore ti=e, as there was on a number of the i
25,
aspects of Three Mile Island, to consider whether it is geing 2370 025 9
66 i
1 i to be a good idea to keep this pump running or shut it dcwn, 2
discharge this water new or hold it until later, and a series i
3 l
of things like that where there is some time to argue back I
4 and forth, then I think it is proper that people check with E>
-U us.
=
6 I e
i Mr. Erte l.
Mr. Chairman, may I just ask one technical mz
^
7 g
question?
I knew my time has run out, but I cnly asked one W
8 '.
question.
I 9 !
Mr. McCormack.
Ckay.
I would like to ask you and Dr.
10,
Hendrie to hurry though because it is 11:45, and we still have s
t u
,,I e
2 two uitnesses to go.
t g
12 Mr. Ertel.
I appreciate that, m=
13 i
The NRC has about 110 censtructicn inspectors. I have a2 i
3 14 !
been advised, and they state that this is inadequate to cover o
u 15 l new plant construction.
The NRC has also overicoked human 16 I factors engineering, i' we are to believe the report, and 17 $
based on everything I have seen, especially in the TMI, to sj 18 concrcl rcom design.
- n 3I 19 :
Number one, hcw many people dces NRC empicy, and of those 5-
=5 ij 20 '
how many have pcwer plant design experience and field cen-
$=
l
- t. 2 gj 21 struction experience?
i 22 :
Dr. Hendrie.
The employment level is typ roximately 23 2,300.
I would guess --
24 '
- tr. McCornack.
Would you like to submit that in writing?
25 Dr. Hendrie.
Maybe I should because I could only make 2370 026
67 1
the most crude guesses.
2 Mr. E rta l.
Could we have a crude esti= ate and then follow
- l 0 l up?
l 4 t Dr. Hendrie.
I would guess people with plant design E.
- i; 5.
experience probably run several hundred, and what was the n
l 6
other one?
mZo 7
Mr. Ertel.
Field construction exper:. ence.
IW U
8 Dr. Hendrie.
Something of the same order, several hundred.
9 Mr. Ertel.
Would the design plant people be the same i
C.
10 as the field construction experienced people?
O S
11 !
Dr. Hendrie.
About half of them would.
n i
,i 5
12 :
Mr. Ertel.
You have a couple hundred there, and you G
t c:
13,
have 2,300.
Are the rest of them lawyers, the other 2,500 m
s 2
14 '
oecc. le?
a o
15 f I have nothing against lawyers.
I am one of them.
16 '
Dr. Hendrie.
Lawyers are very valuable people, no 17 ;
question: about it.
ij la "o, they are engineers, geologists, seismologists,
n r.
ij 19 4 hydraul sts and all of the other "clogies" that can come
-z i4 20,
to the mind of man.
They are nuclear engineers who simply sI
-5 21
- have not worked on the industry side in design, lots of
{j 22 '
these.
23 Cne of my concerns is, in fact, that as -dme goes on we 24 have a staf f that has less and less practical experience in 25 '
actually building, constructing and operating these plants.
2370 027
68 1
On the other hand, gentlemen, I get a steady pressure from 2 l the Congress of the United States about revolving door and l
O there is the atmosphere in scme quarters up here that anybody who has ever worked for the industry in any cap 4 city has 4
8 I
5 l d.
committed a =crtal sin and he should not be employed by NRC.
a s
6 l I have some doubt as to hcw you can have experienced and W
l z
7 mature professionals under those circumstances.
I E
8 !
Mr. Ertel.
Thank you, Dr. Hendrie.
i I
9 i Mr. Wydler.
Nould Dr. Kemeny like to cem=ent on the i
O.
10 i lawyers?
i U
11 {
Dr. Kemeny.
I would not dare.
My chief is sitting right G
- p 12 j behind =e.
t i
2 13 :
I would ~ agree with Dr. Hendrie that lawyers are useful 3
l 23 14 I in some circu= stances.
o u
15 {
(Discussion off the record.)
16 I Dr. Kemeny.
Excuse me.
I think what I shculd have said 17,
is that I am all in favor of '.awyers as long as dey are en i.
s?
13 :
=y side.
at ij 19 Mr. McCormack.
Mr. Walker?
Gi
=
i:
20 Mr. Walker.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ii 25gj 21 Dr. Hendrie, folicwing the release of the Kemeny Commis-22 '
sien report -- this may be coincidental, but it was in da 4
23 sequence -- the Commission announced that dey were going to 24 require a full-scale environmental impact staterent be dcne 25,
at Three Mile Island rather than ce simple environmental 2370 028 3
t l
69 l
I 1
assessment that had previously been announced.
I 2 l What I am wonderine is:
will you prevent Unit i from l
j being reopened until that full-scale environmental impact
.c I
4 statement is completed?
.o C
Dr. Hendrie.
Let me try to make you an answer, Mr.
i
-~
6 Walker, but let me first of all preface it by noting that w
z r it I and with regard to Unit 2, the 7 l both with regard to a
M
}
5 8
recovery cperations in particular, there are for=al proceed-9 ings unde::way in the ccm tissien's adjudicatory system, and i
=.
10 !
that ecmments I make en aspects of these cases need to stay u
i
's 11 !
away from the =erits.
i 3
9
=
12,
I think I can make some ccmrents about the procedural s
W i
2 13 !
aspects you asked about, but even there with the understanding 5
1 2
l 3
14 I that it is an off-hand judgment and =y, own decisions down o
U 15 l the line in both of these adjudicatory matters will be made 16 '
strictly en the record developed in these cases.
I think 17,
that appropriately covers the necessary caveat.
35 la i Mr. Walker.
Maybe I can =ake it simpler.
Is there a aA i
"t 19,
tie-in at all between the environmental impact statement and i
3i
-54 20 the quar.icn of reopening Unit I?
I IE 23 s*
21 Dr. Hendrie.
I am not sure daat there is.
On the other.
3 2
S 22 l hand, part of the consideration with regard to the Unit 1 i
23 proceeding are the considerations connected with the f act 24 !
that there is a, damaged unit en this same site, that recovery 25 cperations are going forward.
And then ene of the cuestions i
i 2370 029 i,
1 70 1l with regard to a resumption of Unit 1 operation is what does t
2 I all of that stuff going on on Unit 2 mean with regard to 3
safe operation of Unit 1.
So there is that kind of connection.
i l
Cbviously an environmental i= pact statement on the 4
?
5 recovery operation would be highly useful information, but 0
~
s 6
I am not sure that there is necessarily a direct coupling.
=z 7
Now, let me look over =y shoulder and f ee if I have told b
E 8 i you scmething that counsel thinks is wrong or have gotten l
9 l
=yself deeply into trouble on the ex parte grounds.
I i
o.
10 i The environmental i= pact statement is on the cleanup.
u I
j 11 l Mr. Walker.
The other thing I wanted to pursue a little C_
5 12 i bit -- and maybe Dr. Kemeny would be good enough to respend 5
i x
13 i to this as well.
Cne conclusion I have ccme to after living 3
s 14 :
with Three Mile Island new for, it seems, an interminal length ou if of time is that maybe store are scme companies that should 16 '
not cwn a nuclear plant, or at least maybe sc=e ccmpanies 17 that should have not the financial whereaithall to cwn a i:
la nuclear plant, but maybe alcnq the line sc=ewhere we need to a 3, ij 19
=ake a judg=ent about the ability economically and through 5
i
=s E
20,
other f actors of ccmpanies to be involved in the business of 1
33 3;
21 generating pcwer with this very expensive invest =ent that is 22 l involved.
23 Would you have scme thoughts on that?
24 '
Dr. Hendrie.
I would just ccament d:at I think it is 25 a valid point, and we have decided recently, in good part i
2370 030
71 1
frem consideration of Dr. Ke=eny 's report but also scme other 2 l things of our own, that we are going to have to pay a lot i
3 :
= ore attention to the =anagement cc=petence and strengths and i
4 l ability of operating organizations, in fact, to have these 9
t
?
5 kinds of =achines in chem.
i l
There have been a nu=ber of co==ents that these kinds of s
6 w
i z
s 7 l machines are best operated by a large and strong organization I
8 l that has a substantial technical ec=petence and can afford I
to have independent, in e f fect, safety engineer channels that 9
i o.
10 '
overview the thing, and that have a centinuity of institution-u i
j 11 al me=ory built into them that can carry this kind of 3zo 12 technolo. gy.
I think that is a valid consideration and one m.$
wdA.
j 13 l that we locket pretty hatd at.
=s 3
14 !
Mr. Nalker.
Dr. Kemeny, could yeti co==ent on that, too?
oa 15 Dr. Kemeny.
Yes.
It certainly was the conclusion of is our Cc= mission that there should be significantly higher 17 standards, and we did not primarily mean financial standards.
la I think Dr. Hendrie =entioned the kinds of censideration we 3 )::
d j'
19,
had in =ind in ter::s of management capability and unders tand-3 =t l
ii 20 ;
inq of the very high technology industry and the ability to si l
23 jj 21,
attract. the kind of technical e:cpertise necessa::7
- 2 Mr. Walker.
The reascn I raise the financial side is 23 because it seems to =e, in reviewing the history of Ihree 24 Mile Island, there may be sc=e validity in saying that part of 25 the problem of Three Mile Island ste=s frem the f act of the 1
2370 031
72 i
1l hurry-up procedure that was used in order to get a tax break l
at the end of the year because the utility felt that that 2
i i
.4 financial side was extre=ely important to them at that time.
4
-That is a reason why I think all of a sudden the finances
~2 1
5 i might come in, too, on the ability of other companies to 2
~
i 6 I sustain the kind of investment and do it in a way that econem-a i
z 4
S 7
ic considerations do not stand in the way of judgmental sa E
8 decisions.
9 Dr. Kemeny.
We did t::7 to look at that and had outside o.
10 financial censultants look at that specific questions and u
E 11 did not get any conclusive evidence that that was a signifi-
=f 12 !
cant factor here.
I have to tell you whether they started a
2 1
3 13 ;
then or six months later, I really do think that the problems
=2 3
14 +
we identified would have been there six =cnths later, as ou 15 I well.
I think you would agree with that.
i 16 Dr. Hendrie.
I agree with that.
17 Dr. Kemeny.
Dnd I may point out that NRC has imposed 3j la certain fines en that particular utility and critici:ed them
^ r.
3I 19 for very much the same kind of things we also identified.
2t
=Ii 20,
I do not think six months would have made any~
ifference in d
~l 22 3j 21 '
terms of the prcblems we found.
22 Mr. Walker.
"* hank you,:!r. Chairman.
23 Mr. McCo rmack.
I want to suggest that we might talk 24 about the econcmic pressures en the utilities when we talk i
25 to Dr. Culler and Mr. Lewis, about the econc=ic pressures 2370 032 i
73 en the utilities to avoid any kind of accident in the future.
2 !
That is something you may want to bring up which is a rele-
.4 l vant, although not directly associated, question.
t f
Gentlemen, we have a problem in that we have a quorum 4
E.
l 5 -
call which will be followed by a vote.
So we are looking at
~g 6 i the very least at 20 or 25 minutes before we can return.
I
- sz 7 l would like to suggest that we recess until 12:30, which will y
a 3
8 '
give you a half an hour.
9 I as sorry to do this to you.
Dr. Culler and Mr. Lewis, 10 will you still be available at 12:30?
x O
3 11 [
Mr. Iawis.
Yes.
t g
12 Dr. Culler.
Yes.
w=
5 13 :
Mr. McCormack.
Then we would like to invite all of you i
n 1
3 14 to stay, and we will recess until 12: 30, which gives us about oU 15 '
35 minutes.
16 (Whereupon, a short recess was taken.)
17 '
Mr. McCormack.
The meeting will come to order.
s:5 We will continue our hearing and our next witnesses are la
^
~j 19 i Mr. Floyd Lewis who is Chairman of the Three Mile Island 2
=a jj 20 Ad Hoc Nuclear Cversight Committee of the electric utility
- =
i m7 3j 21 '
industry, and Dr. Floyd Culler who is President of the 22 !
Electric Power Research Institute.
23 In their testimony they will be discussing what the 24 response of the indust::/ to the Ad Hoc Ccemittee and to the 25 Electric Pcwer Research Institute has been as far as applying 2370 033 8
74 1l the leascns learned in making the corrections necessarf to 1
2 I improve the safety of nuclear plants to a higher degree than 3
they already are.
i I would like to ask Mr. Lewis if you would :'ake an open-4 i I
E.
3 5 I ing state =ent for the two of you.
I believe you have an 2
6 I opening statement which applies to both of you.
- u I
z j
7 Without objection, your entire testimony will be placed D
E 8 l in the record at this point.
9 (The complete prepared statement of Dr. Floyd L. Culler, o.
10 l President, Electric Pcwer Research Institute, is as follows.)
uc 11 a
2 12 l o
2 i
2370 034 13 '
Ei s
1 14 '
o U
15 li l
10 i i
i 17,
I l
s:
18
^ 1.
iI 19,
3*I f
Ii 20 l 23 i
gj 21 22 i
23 1
24 25
~
i i
i i
99 1
to do with safety, but may improve operations.
()
2 l And frem now on, formally, we believe that the intention 1
3 :
and scheduling of such safety reviews should be done in a semi-h*
4 formal to formal ranking by probablistic failure analyses.
a i
5 I And last, of all, I repeat again that many of our i
g i
6 I recom:nendations have been made on the basis of simplifying
- u I
z O
7 the regulatory process.
We suggest that there be a single
=.
j 8 !
line or clear line of authority in the new agency, that an i
l advisory or oversight commission is marvelous technically but 9
I c.
10 ;
it should not be given the authority to intervene, that the u
g 11,
AC2S should not be allowed to intervene in hearings nor start 5
12 !
its own rulemaking proceedings, just to keep from difusing a.
d i
{
}
13,
the authority in an already complex regulatory proceeding.
m i
3 3
14
"' hank you very much.
o i
u 15 i Mr. McCor=ack.
I would like to ask if Dr. Hendrie l
16 l would li%e to come up and joi. the gentlemen at the table.
17 l We welcome you back, i;
la i I have questions I would like to bounce around amongs.
- n. R j
1 9,'
the three of you very quickly.
You have =entioned several 3.
i
.i5 20,
. times the concept of the oversight committee for nuclear
- s. 1
=
$j 21 sa #e ty and also ACRS.
Isn ' t ACRS in f act an ove rsight a-
{-
22 l cc:=tittee for nuclear safety?
Is it two different animals 23,
in mality?
i 24 Dr. Hendrie.
I think it clearly is an oversight co=mit-25 '
tee in nuclear safety.
It has many of the characteristics 2370 035
1 i
\\
I 100 i
l
' 1 that the Kemeny group recom=ende1 for that second. oveesight O
2 ce=rittee, but of course the ACRS deals specifically with D
safety matters and not other pelicy matters,
c.
i Mr. McCormack.
So you think there is room for ancther
.o i
3 5 l committee that would be parallel to ACRS?
I take it f rom the i
6
- =
1 lock en your face you are not enthused about the idea.
m i
z S
7 Dr. Hendrie.
I think f.t is an idea that ought to be
^3 i
j 8 j examined on its own merits.
It.would provide an organized l
9 forum for a regular, periolic sitting down of the NRC with an 10,
advisory body to talk about problems that may' be more clearly x.u e
perceived on the part of the merters of such a body frem A
z t
i
.,3 9
e, public groups, state bodias and so on.
d
(.
13,
I believe we ought to think about the value of that.
5 a
2 3
14 '
I think investing such a committae with substantial pcwers o
y 15 l cf its cwn would be a mistake, if !
21r. McCormack.
It could be an ad hec committee created 17 l by the Cc-i ssion.
I3
'3
~;r. Eendrie.
i'es, we could go ahead and do that sort a5 l
j) 19 t of thing right new, a.
=3 jj 20 :
Mr. McCormack.
Can the ACRS intervene acw in licensing
- a ax 3j 21 hearings?
(
M!
Dr. Hendrie,
Well, I guess in principle any 'merter of 23 the ACES could either intervene personally, if he had stand-(.
24 '
inc in a case, which under NRC rules reans that he has scme 25 '
legitimate intarest in che area or lives in the general area 2370 036
l t
l 10 1 1;
cf the plant, or could join another group of intervenors who b
2 already have been admitted to the ecse.
,j l
3 l I would point out that the ce=mittee =e.ders are unani=cus
(.-
i 4
ly and very strongly against that sort of parti pation.
It -
i E
i
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just destrov.s the collegial nature of their deliberations, l
-g i
s 6 l and they have appealed to the Cer:=tission for protection w
i z
l against subpcenas from cur cwn boards.
O 7
N E
8 i Mr. McCormack.
Ckav.
i 9
Very quickly, Dr. Culler and Mr. Lewis, is it correct C.
10 new to say that the experience of Chree Mile Island and the i
u i
g 11 l heavier fine assessed by N?.C in the case of the Michigan 5
12 l utility are symptomatic of economic incentives for utilities 2.
m.
~
2 13 l to do a gecd job and to avoid accidents in the future?
Is it 3
2
=
14 l fair to say that it is a matter of ove' vhelming econcmic
-ou 15 interest to utilities the=selves to avcid accidents in the is '
futurs?
17,
Mr. Lew is.
I think that is a fair statement.
I do not i:
13 knew that I would characterize the heavy fine against
^ 5.
19 Consumers Pcwer in that category.
Frankly, I have hJ i no rn ::!
-x.
i i.i 20
" discussion of that, Mr. Chair =an.
I would say that the 0'e 2;
financial i.:plications for Met Ed and its parent company, s3 b
22 GPU, has not been a lesson icst in ter=s of impact en 23 manage =ent of the cc=panies in the industry who are cc:.=itted b
24 to nuclear power plants.
It is a sericus, sericus =atter 25 that has received a lot of attention, and frankly, when you 2370 037
a 102 i
1,l
=sasure the i= pacts of the Three Mile Island accident, this l
(bf 2
is bv far the mest sericus thing that has h.4ppened, in my 4 !
cpinion, in terms of people who have been hurt, the investors
(?
4 in GPU and the management, the enus that it bears for the E
i 5
consequences to its steckholders.
n I
6 !
So all of the pressures, in my opinion, are to make your wz h
7 plant as safe as possible, to keep it cperating en a safe w
j 8
basis to the maximum extent possible, and that there is no l
9 deviation between the public interest, in quotes, as represent-I C.
10 ing these who live arcund and are served by a nuclear pcwer ue
-- I plant and these who invest in it.
=
G c
I C
12 Mr. McCormack.
Ckay.
' dill INPO and the NS AC, the i
([i E
la i Nuclear Safety Analysis Center, and the Institute of Nuclear 5=s
-3 34 Pcwer Operations, will they set higher standards for these o
u 13 -
plants than NRC would set?
Is it going to be a matter of 16 the industry literally outdcing NRC in order for a utility 17 to qualify in the insurance field?
NE la tir. Lewis.
It would be =v ex=ectatien that the stand-
? 9.
s 2
ards as finally set will be above what might be regarded as 1
a.
i
=5 i
jj 20,
mini =us acceptable standards as set by the NRC, yes, sir, in
-1 25
- 3 2 ',,
=any cases.
(-
L 22 Mr. McCormack.
- That about the application of the lessens 23,
learned?
I would like to ask both Dr. Hendrie and you, Mr.
(r 24 Lewis, and Dr. Culler en this ene.
The lessens learned group 25 came back with rece==endations, I guess, ab out e.<o men ths 23/0 038
10 3 i
1i af ter the accident, and they included a series of, I think, (P
2 23 different specific recommendations.
A lot of them were 3
such things as be sure that the pressure release valve has
(-
l 4
a signal en it to shew whether it is really closed or whether i
.O f
4 it has been told to close.
Ar2 these lessons learned being
.m 5
0 l physically i=plemented new in the existing plants?
Are the m
zj 7
existing plants being upgraded and made safer because of what W
5 8 !
has been learned from TMI and because of the recc==endations 9 l of the lessons learned group?
i O.
10 !
I would like to ask Dr. Hendrie that, and also you u
11,
gentlecen frem the industry.
i c
12 '
Dr. Hendrie.
The answer is clearly yes, Mr. Chairman.
s d
i s
13 !
These i=plementing actions started very seen after the
=s 3
14 l accident.
In fact, they predate the shcrt-term lessons
=
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learned report and the implementation of its provisions.
16 !
There was a series of bulletins and orders that wenc out from i
17 l the inspection and enforcement office dealing with a number s:
la of crevisions, s=.ecifically in the B &W Line of clants, and
.g ij 19,
then on to other PWRs.
These predated the short-term lessens G=i ii 20 learned, and the short-te rm lessens learned report came and i
a2 3y 21 that is being i=plemented new.
([
22 A nu=ber of the essential provisions have deadlines of 23 the first of the year.
So that werk is going ahead, ha==er k
24 '
and tengs, all over the place, and I think there has been a 25 '
sd:stantial improvement the reby.
2370 039 1
4
i l
i 104 1l!
Mr. McCor=ack.
Do you have further co==ent en that?
2 Mr. Lewis.
I would simply second what the Chair =an has i
4 I said.
Our B&W reactor at Arkansas Nuclear 1 near Russellville, I
C..~
4 i Arkansas is dcwn right new in an agreed upon outage scheduled
.3 l
3 5
M the latter part of Oc cber to i=ple=ent so=e of the changes
=
3 6
required, having to "do with fir =ing up the electrical supply w:
7 g
to certain safety systa=s.
w i
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So things are being done even to the extent of shutting i
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9 l dcwn plants that are otherwise operating, and incurring the O.
10 l added cost of replacement power in order to do sc=e of the u
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things required by these lessons learned.
-+
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12 ;
Mr. McCormack.
In our erevious hearings, we talked s
W L
x
=
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g 13 about =aking those plants = ore forgiving, especially the
=23 14 '
3&N design, so they wculd not be so highly sensitive to a oU 15 ;
Is this being done?
16 I mus t s ay that I was shocked co learn that the eso 17,
stea= generators on the B&W design are in parallel -- are in i
35 la series rather than parallel, or are ccnnected rather than
- A jI 19 separate.
Is this particular proble= being lecked into of a-
==
l I5 20 l
. =aking plants more forgiving?
- E i
n2gs 21 Dr. Culler.
Yes, it is, and there are several recc==en ~
(]
22 dation sicwly working their way through the engineering 22 feasibility.
There are sc=e things that can be done te 24 '
inc re ase, say, the water supply by changing water levels and i
25 a few =easurements.
The full effects of this, cf course, 2370 040
I j
105 1
have to be reviewed, but the reviews on that particular question; are going on at present as to hcw to make the
($
2 3
syste=s no.re forgiving.
B&W has initiated a full study on 4 !
their own of this as to how to make the plants safer and = ore I.
em 3
5 ;
forgiving, particularly with respect to this.
l 6
I talked to their management yesterday before this =eet-m i
z 7
ing.
I uw I
-u 8
In the other safety issues, those that were requesred in l
the July memorandum of lessons learned, actions not only were 9
O.
10,
taken, but the utilities set up a =echanism for implementing.
u 11 i There were four users groups formed for the four different G
I
[
12 l reactor types who acted as a clearing house immediately for w
2
=
i e
4 13 the reco==endations and correlated the actions of individual 52 3
14 reactor cwners with the group.
c u
15 :
They sought assistance frem the Nuclear Safety Analysis i,
I 16 Center where needed.
But our main role has been to inherit 17 the generic issues that were at the base of the quick-fixes,
pr 13 '
and we are new adding those to the list of generic safety it 19,
issues to be resolved with NRC by improvements or some other 1-
=a i
I:
20 action.
- 1 2i 3j 21 So there is a formal =ethed of incorporating the lessons -
ih 22 learned on the i==ediate fixes, as well as their generic
\\..
23 i=po rtance.
{.
24 Mr. McCor=ack.
Mr. Wydler?
I 25
- tr. Wydler.
Yes.
What dces all of this cost?
It socnds i
2370 041
106 I
1i like a lot, and yet when you really think about it, it dces I
h 2
not sound like it might be very expensive.
What kind of l
3 l analysis can you give me as to what this is going to cest, i
C-'
4 i t
or add to the cest?
Hew can we measure what this is going to
?
5 3
cost the industry and the consumer, cbviously, in the final 6 !
analysis?
~
w z
7 Mr. Lewis.
I do not have an overall figure.
The coopera-zm d
8 tive effort which we are doing as an industry. is.o rcb ab ly i
9 en the order of maybe S20 millien per year.
When you get to e.
10 the individual plants as to what it costs to make the changes u
g 11 there to implement all of the lessens learned, it will vary 5
- 2 plant to plant, and seme of the fixes run into the hundreds of 2.
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13 thcusands of dollars.
2
- En 14 Some changes well eculd run into the millions of dollars ev 15 en a particular plant.
It is =y opinien that when it is all 16 said and done, that the costs of changes that flew frem Three 17
- lile Island will not affect the fact that nuclear energy 3 g.
13 continues to be an economic scurce and an essential source,
^ P.
E'c 19 as Iinve already said, but still an ecencmic source in compari,
-a-a i4 20
.sen to whatever the alternatives might be.
- E.
$j 21 I do not think the ecenemy of nuclear will be =aterially -
a-22 adversely affected by the costs that ficw frc= Three Mile 23 Island and th'e studies of Three :411e Island.
24 Dr. Culler.
I have another com=ent on that.
The less I
as of pcwer or shutdcun by a f ailure of sc=e kind is so great an a
2370 042
107 1,
burden for the utilities to bear -- this is one of the pri=ary d
2 lessens learned, that the buying of pcwer from some other 3
utility or sera other network is so expensive that the. changes I
(I 4
that are made to i=crove safety, to improve operability can G
i 5 !
be justified easily.
i a
8 6 l Most everything we have lecked at is covered by the loss
'4 i
zC 7
of pcwer for a few days to a few weeks.
So the economic IM I
3 8 i incentive at the =c=ent for = cst of the fixes that we have I
9 l locked at, not necessarily the long-term generic issues, the i
c.
10 ;
econcmics drive the utilities to make the change to avoid v
i g
11 {
future less due to shutdown.
i D
c 12 Sc far the econcmics are favorable rather than unfavorable L
E
([I 2
13 Mr. Nydler.
For example, what would the total cost be 5
I s
m, 14 l in this upgrading of the personnel thart work in the plants?
o u
15 ;
Has anybcdy ever tried to figure out what that is really going i
15 '
to cost, to hire = ore qualified and trained people and pay 17 them bigger salaries, at least sc=e of them who are better i:
la trained and want = ore =cney?
Has anybcdy ever tried to figure nR
-j 'j 19 ;
that out?
6-
-z 54 20 i Dr. Culler.
That has not been done.
Ne were asked the st
$=0 21 same question, incidentally, this =orning by telephone.
The x3
(,
22 functional arrangements for INPO are act quite far encugh 23 along to have done that detailed an estimate.
(
24 Mr. Nydler.
I am Iceking for a ballpark figure.
I did 25 '
not assume you ceuld give me anything very precise.
I was l
23/0 043
l l
10 8 t
1 just wondering do we have any idea what we are dealing with.
I h
2 l Cr. IIendrie, do you have any idea what the Presidential
-)
l 3 l Commission % report would cost the Federal Government?
C. --
4 Dr. Hendrie.
Cost the Federal Govern =ent?
O e
I
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5 !
Mr. Wydle r.
It is going to be basically the NRC.
i
=Q t
S 6
Dr. Hendrie.
I' expect we are going to need scr.e more i,
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7 '
resources, and we will increase the pace of sc=e of the re-t.
-a i
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search work, which will add, I think, to the budget.
I do not i
9 l have any sort of overall numbers to associate with the Ke=eny i
o.
10 !
report.
I chink something I would guess of the order of --
4 w
i c
11 '
for a few years it might run up in the S50 to $10* million
=
r 12 !
per year range for NRC costs just because what is happening
~
o C
A
=
g 13,-
is that the engoing long-term, large water reactor safety n
a2:
14 research projects are in a ceak sc.endine. new for c=.erations.
a ou 15 You have the ic(3. test ec=ing in.
Ycu cannot step that stuff.
S t. -.
15 It has to go on and have that inf0=mation developed, and we 17 have to add on to that a nu=her of TMI related jchs.
S c.i e s:
la are going to get a peak in our research work.
- a. 5 19 That, as veu knew, tends to be cretty ext. ensive stuf f.
1 m-
-x 55 20
.Then there will be some staffing needs daat we will be talking
- 1 x;
3j 21 to at budget time.
Cn the utility side, the kinds of things we (ji 22 were mentioning, sete of the staffing i=provements that we 23 have talked about, I would act be surprised to find that if
(
24 these staffing improvements resulted overall in the opera-25 tion of a plant, say, in cutting cut en the average five or i
2370 044
109 i
1 six days' dcwn time per year, which could well be the case. cn (s)
I 2j a shutdewn, say, with a strenger utility organization that 1
I you would pay for these staffing, the kinds of staffing changes o
(.~-
4 i we are talking abcut.
So I agree with the overall ec= ment 2=
5 -
here that I think the changes that are centemplated, both
- - =
i 3
6 j hardware and personnel, frem all standpoints here, are not 5
i
~
7 l of such magnitude as to changa the basic econc=ic picture of i
j S i nuclear electricity and the bulk electric supply market.
9 Mr. Wydler.
Thank you.
c.
10 '
Mr. Lewis. The insurance premium on this insurance u
j 11 program is targeted at something less than S2 million per 5
12,
year per reactor, and the coverage that would be included L
w
(~.
=
g 13 would have a six-month waiting pericd.
In other words, the os 14 !
first six months you have to find sc=e' other way to deal ou 15 '
with than through this insurance program, and it is limited 15 to S2 millien ecst of replacement pcwer per year and $1 17 million per week for the second year.
pg la,
That cost in that first six =cnths of an cutage, if you
^2 19 were not able to recover that added pcwer cost through rate 3~ i=i 20, regulation, I am convinced would far exceed the total cost I! 2= 2; 21 that we will be putting out to implement all of the lessens 2 - k 22 learned from Three Mile Island. 23 Mr. McCormack. Cn just ene plant? (c. 24 Mr. Lewis. Yes. 25 Dr. Culler. The overall ccsts are surely at the level 2370 045
e I j 110 l 1 of hundreds of =illions per year for a few years, spread h 2 over 40 to 90 reactors. That is well recognized. We have - l l been trying to multiply out what they might be, and we do not 0 4 l have a good number, but it is not $10 or s20 =illion per year. E. i a i o It is a big invest =ent. n 6 l fir. McCor=ack. I think it is i=portant to recogni:e that it! I i 7 j the revenue from a single plant runs about a =illion dollars 4 j 8 per day, and the loss of 30,000. barrels of oil per day at I 9 i S25 is $750 =illion per day of replacement oil. So even o. 10 l keeping the plant on line a week longer per year would =ake U l j 11 ! a very significant difference. p 5 12 Dr. Hendrie, we have heard this testi=ony as to d ings 2. d. 13 are already going on, the lessons learned group you have 5
- i 14 l talked abeut, and the action wi din th'e utilities to upgrade ou 15,
the safaty requirements of the plants and the performance 15 ) requirements, to go through all of these checks and install 17 better equip =ent, all as a result of TMI. Is it a fair si g la statement to say that what we have done already in response s e. Ij 19 to TMI is to reduce the probability of a serious nuclear G- -z il 20 accident? i 25 s* 21 ' Or. Hendrie. I think so. x3 h 22 Mr. McCormack. O f ou think the p.obability o f a serious na.,a 1 23 accident is substant',,11y n... .;u by w' tat has happened since I h 24 ' TMI? 25 i Dr. Hendrie. I do think so. TMI revealed sc=e weaknesses I 2370 046
e 111 i 1 in the regulat'ory system to us, and we have been trying to O l deal with those just as rapidly as we can. It has been seven, 2 r i 3 i going on eight, conths, and I think substantial progress has (? 4 1 been made. O 8 '3 5 I think, indeed, the lEcelihcod of yet another accident n i 8 6 I has been reduced in that time. w I z 9 7 Mr. McCormack. Cne of the weaknesses of the TMI accident E a f 4 8 I was the fact that the plant did not close itself dcun as l 9 ; quickly as it should, did not physically close as quickly as I a 10 ' it should, and that in cleaning up the primary ecolant, there cu e 11 ; was a hole in one of the tanks outside the plant so we were i U i 5 12 getting fission products cutside of the plant. Oh LF Q 13 ' ncluded in the lessens learned have we taken into 53 3 14 i consideration those sorts of things? o u Or. Hendrie. Absolutely. 7: ,a' Mr. McCormack. To make an accident, if it haccens, less 1 17 damaging te the environment? I y; 13 ; Dr. Hendrie. Absolutely. 97 1
- 9 Mr. McCormack.
So-we have two things. The accident is 7 3 I m Gz 55 20 ' . less likely to happen, and if it does happen, there is less sf .= f5 likelihcod to be loss of fission products. Is that a f air 2; In r. t kl 22 statement? i 23 Or. Hendrie. Yes. 1 ( 24 ' Mr. McCor=ack. Today I was reeting with a grcup discuss-25 in; NRC and licensing today, and semeene said, "Well, but Nnc 2370 047
1 l 112 1 may still be pro-nuclear." Now it strikes =e that regulatory b 2 j agencies for hospitals do not have to be anti-hospital or i 3l fcod and drug administration dees not have to be anti-food (:- 4 or building inspectors do not have to be against buildings. i O I. -= i j 5 ! Do you feel you have an cbligation to be anti-nuclear? e i i E 6 l Dr. Hendrie. No. w 4 l
- C 7
Mr. McCormack. Do you feel you have an cbligation to i 4 i "g 8 ! provide safety? l 9j Dr. Hendrie. I think I have an obligation to provide t C. 10 l the best professional effort in auclear safety in this jcb. 3 u c 11 I do not notice, just along the line hhat you were =entioning, M kM that anybcdy has asked :tr. - h; A r.na. 5 12 ' rn Bondawhether he is for s. l\\ nN W "2 13 or against airplanes and then said if he thinks en balance 3 2g 14 i airplanes are not a bad thing to have 'around; then to suggest cu 15 ' to him that that would disqualify him and he cught to resign. is I have had a number of these approaches made to me. '7 I red ect them. Nhat is required in reculating this industry s 3a is ' is scee kncwledge of what it is docut, cbjectivity and a a3 e 19 willingness to look at the varicus points of view en a record -u -e o a-2 55 20 i that comes before you in adjudications to try to exercise -1 i '= 2, ' .'5 a =ature, professional judg=ent in rulemaking and other a3 h' i 22 regulatory pelicy decisions. i 23 I do not think that the f act dr.at, en balance, I think i (JJ 24 nuclear pcwer is a goed and reascnable way to make electricity 2.c as c. art of the bulk electricity s u =. =. l v. o f the councrv. has c.et I f 2370 048
,,s. 113 l 1l verf much to do with whether I cught to be a =e=ber of the b, 2,l regulatorf bcdy. I 3 ~ Mr. :!ccor=ack. Finally then -- new, as we sit here, C 4 Dr. Hendrie, you are sitting at a table with representatives O t
- i
5 l of the industry that you regulate, and we are sitting here -n s 6 l under the auspices of this co=mittee in a semi-formal discussicr.
- a i,
= 3 7 ! where we are exchanging ideas back and forth, and I wculd like u M I 3 8 ! to ask each of you about the interrelationship between the l 9 industry and the NRC. I C. 10 I have at times heard in the past that de NRC would u ,l j 11 ' refuse to talk with the indust cf because they might be 5 12 ' accused of supporting nuclear energy, and I have at ti=es a ~s d j } 13 ' heard that the industry felt that it could not talk with the a23 14, NRC, and I should li%e to ask you if 'le take away the context c u 15 i of the Cc=mittee, is it pessible for the industry and NRC t 16 ' to sit dcwn across the table-and discuss mutual problems of 17 ; getting the plants en line =cre quickly and =aintaining the 35 la highest pcssible standards of safety that can reasonably ^ 9. i '- 19, be obtained and do that in a eccperative way?
- =
ii 20 i What is the actual situation and what is the legal Z. $ a-- x; 21 situation with respect to that sort of relationship? a t' 22, Dr. Hendrie. We can talk to industry pecple. We 23 cbvicusly are required, under the Administrative Precedures C 24 Act ex parte rules and under our own ex parte rules, not to 25 discuss particular cases and the =erits of these cases. i 2370 049
.~ 114 i l 1j I must say there are people around, some of them in your k$k i 2j bcdy dcwn here, who would regard any discussion of that kind 3 l cn any subject as i=preper. I do not agree with that dracon-(: l ian view of the regulator as being confined only to an ivory 4 2 5 3 tcwer and to mu=ble only to one another and not the cutside .= i E 6 world. m i zC 7 Clearly in discussions with industry people, as I say, h j 8 we would want to stick to generic =atters and not deal with I 9 ~ any particulars of cases. Chere are times, I must say, in C. 10 the actual way in which we carry out our business in which' v 2 11 l we find even =eetings of that kind to be a little awkward =c 5 12, in the sense that if we are censidering sc=e sort of policy u d i ~ 13 matters, as we are practically all of the ti=e, and sit dcwn as: 14 w th an industry group to talk Oscut h*cw we might implement Qv 15 a series of safety provisions, there are a nu=ber of other 16 parties, so-called public interest groups and so on, who will 17 feel that they cught to have as input to the Commission's i s, la policy-making process an equal opportunity to present their ^ ?. I'6 19 viewpoints en the matters at issue and the same sort of 4. -x ii 20 discussion with the Commission, 55 $j 21 New, in principle, that is fine and we can and should 1 - (' 22 ' do that, and we do do it on some cccasions, but oftimes the 23 sheer cu=bersemeness of trying to provide a really extended Y 24 availability of the Cc==ission to hear everybcdy and discuss 25 eve:7 thing limits sera of those things. 2370 050 1
i 4 l 115 s ' i tir. McCormack. You could not very comfortably have I 6.'. 2 lunch with Dr. Culler then? .i i -o Dr. Hendrie. Sure. I have known Flcyd for years and ( 4 would not hesitate to have lunch with him. e j 5 Dr. Culler. We discuss problems en very b cad issues ~ s 6 with ease, the directions that might be taken. u = i 9 7 Mr. McCormack. Would you discuss the direction that aw. 8 : INPO ed.ght be taking with Dr. Hendrie? I f 9 Dr. Culler. Mest certsinly, As seen as it was for=ed, i 10 ! I called on the phone and said, ":.cck, this is happening cu r 3 11 ' and this is what I think is going to happen. What do you _.t-5 12, think, and what shculd be put into the arrangements?" 2. w 1 Cg [< 13 ' Mr. !!cCor=ack. I would like to continue this conversatien .22 = 14 but we are encroaching en the other Subecemittee, which has aeU 15 already been gracicus encugh to grant us ten =inutes. is ' I thank Congressman Cttinger for his patience. I thank 17 you for your patience and your testi=cny today. 3s ; la Dr. Hendrie, I especially thank you for coming J..se;- A 3 e. -3 *- 19 this afterncen. I knew it was an incenvenience for you, a. -z i5 20 but it was an extremely helpful thing for this subecmmittee I! $f 21 > and the Congress, and I appreciate it. .x - .T 2~o Thank you verv much, and we stand adjcurned. l 23 (Whereupen, at 2:10 p.m., the Subecemittee was adjeurned.) (. 2,* 2370 051 25 i
j NAME.,HSC311010 PAGE 1 1 RPTR LYDA l 2 LOW-LEVEL NUCLEAR WASTE BURIAL GROUNDS i 3, I 4 Wednesday, November 7,1979 l 5 6 l House of Representatives. 1 7 l Subcommittee on Energy Research and Procuction, 8 l Committee on Science and Technology. 9 ! Washington. D.C. 10 i I 11 j The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice. at 9.00 am., in t 12 l Room 2318. Rayburn House Office Building. Hon. Mike I 13 McCormack (cnairman of the subcommittee) presiding. ,.i 2370 052 i l I l \\ l l I I C l 8001310 87 l
i NAME. !HSC311010 PAGE 106 i 2459: RPTR COPELAND 2460 ! 11:45 a.m. 2461' Mr. McCormack. Our next witnesses are Dr. _:oseph Henorie i 2462 l and Dr. Worthington Batemart I i i 2463l Dr. Henorie is Chairman of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory l 2464 Commissiert Dr. Bateman is Deputy Unoer Secretary for the f 2465 j U.S. Department of Energy, for the region that is handling l r 2466 i nuclear waste. i i l 6 2467l If you gentlemen will appear together, it will save us all i i 2466 i some time. I 2469! Dr. Hendrie. I think we would be glad to try to help the l I 2470 ! committee do that. Mr. Chairman. 24713 Mr. McCormack. We have your prepared testimony before us. 2472 l and, without objection, it will be inserted at this point in 2473 the record in its entirety. You gentlemen are free to l 2474 ! proceed as you wish. 2475j Dr. Henorie would you go first? i 2370 053 l 2476i 1 i i i i l l i l l f I t 1 I I i
t l NAME. i SC311010 PAGE 107 H l 2477I PANEL I 2478; l 2479; DR. JOSEPH M. HENDRIE f 2480 CHAIRMAN 2481 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION i 2482j l I 2483! DR. WORTHINGTON BATEMAN l 2484 DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY I l 2485: U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY 2486l l l 2487; 2488i STATEMENT OF DR. HENDRIE 2489 l 2490 Dr. Hendrie. I thank you, Mr. Chairmart We are pleased 2491 i to be able to par;icipate with you this mnorning in the very I 2492 l interesting hearing you have been having on a subject that l 2493 is of considerable importance. It has been a long morning. 2494 and there has been a good deal of discussion of the subject 2495 I l am hardly in a position of being an opening witness, and j E*f 2496 my remarks hopefully will provide some additional context.ed., 2497, the matter. I 2498 3 Since you would include my remarks in the record, why 6 2499 l don't I try to confine my verbal presentation to noting just i 2500 j a couple of points that I think are key and, while not new 1 2501 ; in the discussion this morning, I would very much like to l 23~/0 054 i i
l i NAME:HSC311010 PAGE 108 2502 l emp".asize from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission stancooint 2503: The first of these is that we have watched over the past 2504 few years the disposal capacity for low-level waste i 2505 l diminisning relative to the demand for that space, and have 1 2506l been watching this current near-crisis situation come on. I 2507l We have tned to encourage people to consider new low-1 2508 level sites. thus far without success. i l 2509 I hope that one of the results of the high attention that l 2510 the subject is now receiving will be some useful movement on i 2511 ' t'le opening of new low-level sites. 2512j ine Nuclear Regulatory Commission stands ready to move 2513 f very rapidly on applicatiLis for new sites in those areas i 2514 i where we would license the facility, and to provide l 2515 l technical assistance to agreement-States for those sites I l 1 2516 where the agreement-State would license. l 2517 Secondly, there is a very difficult situation with regard i i I 2518l particularly to the nuclear medicine waste that follows from I I 2519 l the closing of the Hanford site. The Barnwell site is not l i i 2520 accepting the liquid scintillator samples that are the 2521 particular problem. so with Hanford closed, there is no l 2522 ! place for it to go; it is backing up all along the line in l 1 l i l 2523 laboratories and hospitals, as you have heard repeatedly 2524 j this morning. It is an urgent situation. 2525. I will note that it is perfectly practical and within the y 1 2526l powers of the Governors of the States that do not have low-s l 2D0 055 ) i
i NAMS :HSC311010 PAGE 109 2527 level waste disposa! sites under their emergency powers to y 2528! simply open temporary storage depositories for these nuclear i 2529 ! medical wastes, and relieve the pressure if they so choose 2530 ! on their local institutions. and we are prepared to provide l l 2531 ! technical assistance again. and advice. l 2532l It is not a very complicated thing. All you need is 2533i fairly decent grade industrial warenousing. reasonable fire i l 2534 j protection, a modest amount of monitoring to keep track of l 2535 ; it, and there could be temporary disposal on a state-l 1 i 2536 ' cperated basis in each of the States where there is a I 2537 problem in the nuclear medicine area. I 2538l Thirdly. I agree with the thrust of the Governors mir i 2539 l morning that these problems are intrinsically the problems i I I i i 2540 j of the States in which the waste is generated. The benefits l i 2541 l from the use of these technologies flow to the citizens of l l l 2542 I each State and all citizens and all States have a i i 2543 l responsibility to deal with the waste products then from i i 2544 l that beneficial technology, and I think the only reasonable j I 2545 j course in the long run is to go much along the line l 1 2546 I recommended to you by the Governors this morning. and to i 2547 l make that responsibility crystal-clear, perhaps, if i 2548 ! necessary, by legislation at the Federal level. l l 2549: Why don't I ouit at that point, because I think my 2550 prepared statement covers other aspects. l 2551l Dr. Hendrie's complete statement follows-l 2370056l
i NAME. :HSC311010 PAGE 110 l 2552 2553. - INSERT 4-A i l I 2370 057 i i i I 1 t i i l l 1 1 1 i l l 1 r i l I t l l I f I t i
I i l l NAME: IHSC311010 PAGE 111 l l 2554l Mr. McCormack Thank you. Dr. Hendrie. We will get to 1 2555 some questions in a minute, but I will ask Dr. Bateman if he l t 2556 i would like to make a statement at this time. i i i 2557; i j ~ i 4 1 2370 058 I i l I i l i i i 1 I t t i i t I i i i i s I i l I I e t t i \\ i i I i i i
I NAME lHSC311010 PAGE 116 l 2639i Mr. McCormack. Thank you. Dr. Batemart 2640i i thank you both, gentlemert I have several questions, f i 2641 ; and I will direct them to one or the other, but either may j i 2642 l wish to answer. i 2643! First of all, Dr. Hendrie, do you believe that each I 2644 l. individual State should establish a site for storage and I i 2645 ! management of low-level radioactive waste, allowing for j l 2646l compacts between States, so you would have some regional I I 2647 l facilities? Or do you believe that DOE should establish 2648 l regional sites licensed by NRC on Federal property? Or do 2649 i you believe we should have some sort of combination of that. l 2650 starting with the DOE sites and phasing into the State [ 2651 i sites? i 1 2652l Dr. Hendrie. I believe we should stick with the State 2653 l sites' thrust There was a while a year or two ago, perhaps i I 2654 i before, when I think I would have told you that I thought 2655 I the Federal Government should step in and take over the low-1 i i 2656 } level waste disposal responsibilities across the country. 6 l 2657I I have changed my mind on it it seems to me the States I l l 2658 i could do a perfectly good job. The responsibility lies out I l 2659 ! there; the stuff is generated widely in all the States. I l 2660 j think your first alternative is the one I see now as the l 2661 ' most sensible and most likely to be executable in a prompt i i 2662 l way. 2663; Mr. McCormack. If we should take a State in our l 290 059 t
NAME: !HSC311010 PAGE 117 2664 imagination that does not presently have a waste site, let's 2665, use Oregon, which has a law that says you can't have any 2666 ' radioactive materials in our State. suppose that we should 4 2667 prohibit the movement of waste across the State lines except i 2668. by agreement of the receiving State. Now the State of l i i 2669' Oregon is then going to have to face up to handling its own l 2670 ; waste from the hospitals or whatever other waste it j I 2671 ' generates. 2672 I How long will it take the State to develop a site and to 2673 have it licensed? Could it be done in eight months. or i 2674 tnree montns? I 2675: Dr. Hendrie. I think to meet the sort of criteris we I i 2676 ! think is acpropriate, and we are publishing as Part 61 of I 2677 our regulations, we think the minimum time to do the site i 2678 l work, snake down the licensing conditions, get agreement on l l i 2679 ! them, get on with construction. and be ready to receive 2680l waste. is going to take the best part of two years, simply l 2681: because if it is going to be federally-licensed--I better l 2682 qu.alify and say if it is a Federal license. that is if it l 2683 ! is not in an agreement-State. so the NRC will have to l 2684 ' license it, the reasons all have to do with the necessary 2685I processes that a Federal agency has to go through in 2686: granting a license. We have to do an environmental impact 2687! statement---- l 2688l Mr. McCormack. Isn't it possible to accelerate this i l 237P 060
i NAME. !HSC311010 PAGE 118 2689' process? 2690' Dr. Hendrie. Not unless you are willing to relieve 2691 various requirements of the National Environmental Policy i 2692 ; Act. and so on, because it just takes a certain amount of I 2693: time to thresh through those steps. I 2694 Let me point out---- i' 2695 Mr. Wyd/er. That is acsolutely minimum probably in your 2696 [ way of thinking. because that presumes you don't have a I l i 2697 l million and one lawsuits and everything else going on at the 2698 ' same time. 2699l Dr. Hendrie. If we lose a couole lawsuits on a given case l 2700 ' like that, you can be held up for many years, so I am I 2701 l assuming we win on litigation and that the hearing goes very l l 2702 ! briskly, which is something we could all speculate about. l i 2703l But let me point out, for instance, in the case of Oregon. i 2704 j if it is an agreement-State, then the licensing would be O 2705 done by the State. itself, under N,, procedures that 2706 ! are compatible with the Federal routine. but need not be 8 i 2707 ! identical, and depending on the agreement-State, it could be l 2708 ! a little more or a little less in terms of time. I 2709j in that time. whatever time it woula take to get such a 2710 deoot into operation and properly licensed for the long term 2711 ~ burial of these low-level wastes. it would be a perf ectly 2712 l feasible coeration for the State Governor to say we have to 2713: do something witn this stuff being generated in our State. i 2370 061 4
i l NAME. 'HSC311010 PAGE 119 2714 ' and i simply am exercising my emergency powers in i 2715 ; establishing a temporary depot over here in this---- l 2716 Mr. McCormack. Could this be an existing structure an l i 2717 old airplane hangar, and they would just put the stuff in 2718' and cover it with sand? i l l 2719! Dr. Hendrie. It is not even necessary to cover it with I 2720! sand; just keep the rain off and where it won't blow around. l 2721I burn up, or people can't pick through it for items of I 2722 j interest. and so on. It is really a fairly easy i 2723 l proposition. and then when their licensed burial ground is 2724 j ready to go, the stuff could be transported over and put in l 2725 i it. i 2726f It seems to me that is a perfectly workaole way, and that 2727 each State has then the capacity to deal with its own I i 2728 l situation if it wishes. l l i 2729j l think with regard to burial sites, low-level sites, that 5 2730 I we don't, in fact. need one in every State. I think it 2731 ' makes more sense for States to gather together in regional 2732 groupings and pick a site and have it serve five or six I l 2733 l States, or whatever, but it certainly is not, on the other I 2734 hand. impractical for every State to have its own' burial l l 2735. ground. These are not difficult things to do. and there are 2736 ; available sites every place. 2737' Mr. McCormack. So delays would be procedural in getting
- i 2738 ' an environmental impact statement and a license?
l i l 2370 062 ,i
j i NAME. !HSC311010 PAGE 120 I 2739' Dr. Hendrie. Yes, doing the proper site survey so you l 2740, understood the ground water conditions and made sure it was 2741 a good sito. i l 2742 Mr. McCormack. That could be done in a few months, 2743 ! couldn't it? 2744 Suppose we exempted the whole program from requirements of 2745 l NEoA. just required NRC to license them. How long would it 2746 take then) 2747l Dr. Hendrie. I think that would cut the time fairly l 2748 ; substantially, because then I think it is a matter of how 2749 i fast applicants--in a case where we would license, how fast 2750 f apolicants can get in with the necessary site survey ? s 2751 l ma+erial, ground water conditions. run-off patterns, and I t 2752 l associated things, and their design basis for keeping the df a'mIno> off the site, and so on. i 27531 trenches from I I would 2754 think that could go along pretty quickly. 2755 Mr. McCormack. How about waiving NEPA requirements for i 2756 ; temporary surface storage facilities? l 2757l Dr. Hendrie. I would think that would be desirable if we 1 2758 ! went down this track. lest we get caugnt in all kinds of l i 2759 l litigation over whether or not proper environmental impact i 2760 ! assessments have been mace of the temporary sites. 2761 Mr. McCormack. Dr. Hendrie, ye; heard the testimony of l 2762 ' Dr. Yalow earlier today and saw my demontration with the 2763 l Geiger counter and the Coleman gas mant.e. Do you believe f 2370 063 i
I, I NAME:HSC311010 PAGE 121 2764 i NRC standards for low-level waste are too restrictive? i 2765: Dr. hendrie. Well. pernaps. Let me point out that the 2766 ~ Energy Act efines a byproduct materiah 31Tr, sh 61 l 2767l . is something that comes from.a. fuel cycle and '.t% e W l 2768 m and tritium fall into that category. and then :.;ays we 2769 ! will license users and holoers of byproduct material. There t 2770 ! are allowances for DE MINIMIS quantities and, In fact, a l l i 2771. good many of the scintillator samples that are clogging l 2772 I tr,ings up in hospitals, research labs, and so on, probably 2773 l nre at low enough concentrations of radioactivity so that if 2774! those were simply aqueous samples, simole sewage disposal i 2775 ' would be within the regulations. l 2776 We allow for some of the isotopes of interest. for i I l 2777 ! instance, tritiated samples at less than 100 nanocuries per l l t. 2778 milliliter concentration be disposed of in a sanitary i 2779 l sewage plant. The problem with the scintillator sample is 'T t that p is an emulsion containing toluene, sometimes 2780 I 2.781 xylene. and a little water, and then the radioactive l 2782 ! material, the organic is flammaele. and the toluene is a l i 2783 ! carcinogen. I believe. l l 1 2784: We have been reluctant to just say dispose of them any old l i 2785, way that you like, more because of a concerr of the 2786: flammacility aspects than the radioactivity aspects, and we 2787 are looking at a variety of ways to. sort that out. 2788 ; incineration. solidification, separation of the toluene. I 2370 064 l
i I NAME. iHSC311010 PAGE 122 4 2789: Mr McCormack. If we use a small amount of Caroon 14 l t 2790 ; what about ar.owing that to be vented into the atmosphere if l 2791 ' it is adequateiy diluted with otner elements in the 2792 l incineration process? i i l 2793j Dr. Hendrie. Sure. Carbon 14 can go down me sewer at L 2794 j any eener tnan 20 nanocuries per milliliter if it is an i 2795 ! aqueous solution. 2796i Mr. McCormack. I understand NRC is exploring making more l 2797 ; restrictive standards for, is it radiation exposure levels i 2798l or maximum permissible concentrations of isotopes. f i 2799! radionuclides or neither? l ? i 2800l Dr. Hendrie. Well. you probably have reference to some j i i 2801 particu!ar initiative somewnere in the agency, and maybe if l i 2802 l you would be a little more specific. I don't recogniza it. i 2803) is my problem. i i
- 2804, Mr. McCormack. I will follow up in writing on that l
2805 i question, if I may. I
- 2806, Dr. Hendrie. Then we can sort it out in more detail.
i 2807 Mr. McCcemack. Dr. Bateman how fast do you think DOE can t 2808: complete an R&D program to provide proven technology for 2809: consolidating and solidifying, or otherwise concentrating i 2810 l and solidifying low-level waste? l 2811; Dr. Bateman I tnink it depends on what part you are 2812 l talking about We have a demonstration starting up at the 2813 } University of Maryland We have done various things at the j 2370 065! i
i NAME 'HSC311010 PAGE 123 2814 Hanford site. I think these are in various stages of 2815 ! readiness. My own judgment about it is that much more is 2818 i possible in this area in the near term than what is being i 2S17 j done. There are economic problems with it: there may be i 2818 i acceptability problems with it in terms of public reaction I i l 2819! to it. but I think there is the potential to do much more if l 2820 ; those barriers can be overcome with the technology that is j I 2821 ; available now. j i l 2822 Mr. McCormsek. Mr. Wydler? 2823j Mr. Wyd/er. I am just interested. Dr. hendrie, what made I 2824: you change your mind? Why were you for federally-handling 2825 i this problem at the Federal level a year ago. did you say, I I 2828i and now you are convinced the States een do it? I am 2827 interested in what brought that change of mind about? I 2828l Dr. Hendrie. Let me sketch the reasons as follows-As ! I 2829 observed the difficulties tnat we have in what clearly is. 2830 and ought to be, a Federal program and responsibility for 2831 ; high-level waste. as I view the dif ficulties that the 2832 l Federal Government has in doing even preliminary exploration 2833l of the possible geologic medium in vanous portions of the 2834 i country, I see an attitude which is, well. it is a Feceral l 1 2835I problem, and tey are not going to bring it into my State. 2838: and it has to be solved. but it will be solved on somebcdy 2837 else's place and not here. i 2838 And I am afraid if the Federal Government accepts a 2370 066
s E NAM:_ !HSC311010 PAGE 124 2839; responsibility to deal with the low-level wastes and starts 2840 ; looking for additional sites, we are going to get exactly , _, 2841 the same kind of response from the States. 2842 Now, I think with regard to low-level wastes, because they i 2843 ! are, in fact. generated in every State in the Union. because 2844 l there are very clear benefits to the citizenry-at-large from I i 2845 l activities that then yield those wastes, that putting it on i 2846 ! an individual State respoonsibility basis puts the problem l 4 li 2847 f right back where it ought to be. After all, if we look at l 2848 i what you do with assorted chemical and incustrial wastes. 2849! manufacturing processes of all kinds, there isn't a big 2850 j Federal prog.am to accept responsibility for arsenic 2851 )' compound wastes. They are out there. and the States have to i 2852 ! deal with them. 28531 Radioactive wastes are no different, and I think 2854l particularly for the low-level wastes it should be a State 2855 l responsibility. And I think furthermore, for reasons along \\ 2856l the liaas I have been talking about here, that we can get j M i 28571 decent regional disposal capacity to place the a lot faster i i 2858 l if they are a State responsibility. I 2859l Mr. Wyd/er. If I understand what you said--correct me if I 2860 i am wrong-you said you changed your mind because you i i 2861 ; despaired of trying to get a Federal progrant isn't that 2862) what it am. aunts to? I 2863i Dr. Hendrie. I think the Federal program. because of the 2370 067 :
4 NAM 8. iHSC31101C PA138 125 2064: kinds of things I have referred to, is just going to take a 2865 fong time. and there is going to be endless wrangling over i 2866; wnether the north midwestern regional site goes in 2867 l Wisconsin, or Michigan. or lilinois, or what-+. ave you, and l 2868! that one way to avoid a decade of wrangles in and out of 2869 court is to say every State is responsible for their own, 2870 and if they can't get together and wecide on a regional 2871, basis to deal with it on a compact basis of several States. 2872 l good, every State provide for its cwn. I think it would do i 2873 j 6nem a lot of good out there to deal with this stuff and 2874 understand that it isn't the end of the world, and that 2875 j there are very reasoc.abie things that can be done rather I 2876 ! simply with this material to protect it, and I think it 2877 l would be a very useful way of ocaling witn it l l 2878i Mr. Wyd/er. I toad to agree with wnat you are saying. l l l 2879 ; think we have come to the point where some of these people 2880 who have been standing up and pounding their chests and l 2881 saying I am protecting my people from the problems that 2882 ! exist because of this technology, are now going to have to j 2883 tell their people how they are going to get along without 2884 l the technology, and it is going to be an inteesting snow to i 2885 l watch, and I tend to agree with you; I think it will be 'i i l 2886: healthy, because maybe it is part of the public education 2887 l process we a e talking acout here. If you don't like it, i 2888; okay; you con't have to have it if you don't want a I i l 2370 068
i NAMB. lHSC311010 PAGE 126 I I 2889 l garbage dump. you can't eat i 2890l Dr. Hendrie. If Oregon. for instance, decides indeed that l 1 2891 under no circumstances are any nuclear wastes going to be I i l 2892 ' stored in Oregon. I think the citizens of Oregon have v 2893 decided for themselves that they are not entitled to the i l i 2894! health services from the practice of nuclear medicine in the i [ 2895 ! State, from the industrial uses of radioisotopes, and from l l I 2896 l electricity produt.uon. i 2897 Mr. Wyd/er. And from research---- l 2898l Dr. Hendrie. If they want to make that decision. tnat is i 2899, fine with me. Good enough. But I think that is the sort of I = l 2900 decision they are making. 2901f Mr. Wyd/er. Mr. Bateman, I can only say your program l l 2902 sounds to me like one of studying' it a little more. Is that l 2903. aoout where we are at DOE 7 l I l 2904{ Dr. Bateman. No, I think it is not so much a question of i 2905i studying it Really, I think it is more a question of 2906 I whether it is possible at the Federal level to devise a i 2907 i piece of legislation which clearly places the responsibility i l i 2908l for disposing of these low-level wastes on the States. and l 2909 l we think that is possible. We are working on our own i t i f 2910 i legislative proposals along those lines. I think some of l 2911, the ones that have been made this morning are interesting to i 2912 l us. l I 2913 Mr. Wyd/er. Suppose we do nothing; what is going to i 2370 069 l
NAME :HSC311010 PAGE 127 I 2914 happen? I 2915i Dr. Bateman. I tnink the problem that we are in today is 2916, that there is nothing wrong with the existing institutional l 2917 [ framework as far as it goes. I mean, we have 26 agreement-l l 2918 ! States. We have commercial low-level waste burial We have I 2919 three sites that until recently were open. l i 2920l The problem is, and I think Dr. Hendrie is saying more or f f i 2921 ; less the same thing, as long as it looks like there is no { l 2922 i framework or there is no place in this framework which j 2923 l distributes tnis responsibility regionally, and makes it a 2924 recurrement, as we have gone through the '70s and commercial 2925: sites have closed at West Valley Sheffield, Maxey Flats, i l e r 2926l and so on, it becomes a political problem for the remsining 2927 f States in the sense they don't want to be a low-level waste l i 2928: dump for the entire natiert l
- 2929, I have talked to Governor Riley about this many times, and l
2930 f he has been very explicit aoout that. He is willing to l 2931: accept his share of the responsibility for the region, but [ 2932 ! he doesn't want to be the low-level waste dump for the i I 2933 nation as a whole. And I think when we get to a point where l I 2934 the psychology is I don't want to be the last guy on the 2935, binck taking this. we are in real serious trouble. And the i i 2936. way to fix that.. in my opinion. is not to say scrap the i 2937: system that we currently have and start over agan I think 2938, that system can be fixed I think we are on a policy of 2370 0/0l i i
i NAME HSC311010 PAGE 128 i 2939! State responsibility. There can be agreement. State-2940 ! license, or NRC: I don't have a strong preference aoout I 2941 ' that but wnat is missing in this framework is not that we 1 2942 ! don't have Sta+es put in a position to do this: there is no i 2943 requirement that they do it No one is beating the door 2944 f down at NRC in these 26 agreement-States to basically open 2945 low-level waste burial grounds. It is going the opposite 2946 l directiort 3 I think if you can turn around the psychology i i i 2947 ! where responsible State officials say it looks like we have t 2948 ! a framework here; we all have to share in the responsibility l 2949! for dealing with this problerrt The problem can then be l 2950 ; solved. but it is like depression psychology-if everybody j 2951 ' thinks there is going to be a depression, there will be a 2952 l depressiort l l 2953i But if people have confidence that the problem can be i l 2954 i dealt with on a fair basis or regional basis. I think we can l 2955 i solve it more or less within the legislative, legal. l l 2956 l institutional framework we have. l 2957 Mr. Wyd/er. I tend to disagree with you strongly. l l 2958 ; don't think it will work out the way you think at all. I 2959 I think what will happen is they will all sit back and wait 2960 ; for you to do something. And they will say we are waiting 2961, for the government to tell us what they are going to do i 2962 about this wnich is what the governors are going to say. j 2963 ; Why should one go out and take responsibility for it They 2370 071 i
i i NAME.HSC311010 PAGE 129 2964 l will say. why don't you go down and talk to DCE. that is i 1 2965 j their prublem and they should handie it That is what they 2966 ! are going to say-you people holding out the idea you are l 2967 { going to give them legislation. and they will say that will 2968 work out fine for us, we will all be for the legislation and 2969 make sure our State is favored You are just going to stall i l 1 2970 l all the activity. t i 2971l Why don't we tell them there ain't going to be no ,e 2972 ! legislation. Why don't we tell them the problem is there; I l 2973 why don't you people handle it? And they will start i 2974 j thinking about it for the first time. They are not worried 2975 about it They look at it as a political problem they are 8 2976 going to dump on you 2977f Dr. Bateman. We have been saying exactly tMat; we have } I 2978 ! been taking exactly that view. We want to see the States 2979 l solve the problem. We think it is a State problem, but at l 2980 l the same time the legislative framework that we now have iws I 2981 gotten us into the situation we are now irt And we have l l t 2982 l been singing that song that you just described We have 1 2983. been saying that, but it hasn't led to States accepting i 2984 i responsibility for dealing with it on a wide enougn scale: 2985 ! otherwise, we woulont be in the situation we are in now. 2986' Mr. Wyd/er All right. Mr. Chairman. 2987 Mr. McCormack. Mr. Goldwater? 2988l Mr. Goldwater. Dr. Hendrie, is there some problem in the I 2370 072 I
i NAME 'HSC311010 PAGE 130 2989 ' process by which low-level waste is packaged and put in the l 2990; ground? l I 2991 Dr. Hendrie. There are some practical problems in the l 2992 i sense that a number of shippers, generators who pack the j i 2993 i stuff originally, simply haven't lived up to the regulations l i i 2994 ' on the packaging standards; so there have been shipments 2995, made where the packaging was defective, and, needless to 2996 ' say, that upsets the receivers of the wastes. the State I i 2997. authorities in the States where those sites are located. l l 2998l We have tried to step up our inspection and enforcement i i 2999 l activity over the past five or six months. We have been j 3000 talking to the Governors of the three Statas---- l i 3001 Mr. Goldwater. But you see no ceficiencies---- 1 l 3002 Dr. Hendrie. In terms of technological problems? l 3003 ! Mr. Goldwater. The standard. How much cardboard, 3004 l plastic? I i l 3005; Dr. Hendrie. No. I don't think so. If people package i 3006l' this stuff according to the Department of Transportation I 3007 I regulations and the NRC regulations, it is appropriate for l 3008 the level of material. and I thinx those stancards are 3009 f perfectly acequate. and if they will then do sensible things i 3010 l like crive the trucks legally and operate mechanical i 3011 l equipment which is reasonably maintained. I dont see any 3012 l problem at all with the transportation. certainly minimum ~ 3013 ' problems with the transportation. i 2370 073l i
i I l NAME :HSC311010 PAGE 131 i i 3014i Mr. Go/dwater. Whose responsibility is it to enfo*ce it? i 3015i Dr. Hendrie. For DOT regulations. I guess the Department 1 3016 l of Transportation has always nad that responsibility. 3017 Recently under agreement with the Department of 3018 Transportation we have amended our regulations to allow us i I 3019 l to go out and inspect against DOT regulations for our 3020 licensees, just as a way of being able to add our inspection i 3021 and enforcement ef fort to DOTS. since'most of the low-level l 3022 i material is packaged according to DOT stancards rather than i i 3023 i NRC standards. l l 3024i Mr. Goldwater. So the NRC is the enforcing body? 3025) Dr. Hendrie. We probably have more people in the field i i 3026 j working on it now than DOT does. Their hazardous material j l' 3027 l bureau has to cover a whole range of things of which 3028 l radioactive materials are not really a large part f 3029 Mr. Goldwater. Do you have enforcement power or citation 3030! power? I i 3031l Dr. Hendrie. We have various stages. We can issue stern 3032 l letters which go on a for nal docket of the license and is 3033 I consicered in renewals, and so on. There are civil l i 1 i i 3034 ! penalties. We have a proposition we are trying to get l O I 3035 ' congressgal support for. to raise the limit on those civil 3036 l penalties. but we do have a civil oenalty. i 3037: Mr. Goldwater. My cuestion was, do you have citation ]' 1 3038 ! power? l 2370074l
I NAME !HSC311010 PAG 5 132 I I Dr. Hendrie. In the sense of being able to assess civil I 3039l 3040 ! penalties. and we could lift a person's license if we felt l i i l 3041 ! his violations were flagrant enough. f l 1 3042l Mr. Goldwater. You have plenty of muscle behind the 3043 regulations to enforce any deficiencies? I l 3044i Dr. Hendrie. Yes, I think so. Pulling the license is -l 3045 l pretty clearly a pretty stern measure. Suspending it would I 3046 l be possible. The additional civil penalty authority would i 3047 be helpful, but our problem has been that we haven't i 3048l probably devoted as much staff resource to inspection and 3049i vigorous following up in this area as we should have, and k 3050 ' there been some bad packaging. l 3051 Mr. Goldwater. Do you have individuals located at each of 3052 these three sites, NRC personnel, to inspect? 1 3053l Dr. Hendrie. I don't think so. There are regular visits j i 3054 l by NRC health inspectors, and a material licensing inspector l l I 3055l from the NRC regional office probably runs three to five 3056 l days a month at each of the sites, but we have not felt that 3057 ' we could put a person full-time at each of these sites. l 3058: Now, in connection with discussions yesterday with Governor i 3059 i Ray about the Hanford site and possible conditions for the 3060: State of Washington considering reopening that site. NRC and N 3061 ' the Department of Transportation said we would do what 3062 l we could to provide a few people out there on a temporary 4 i l I 3063l basis to do some inspection of incoming material if the site 2370 075 l
NAME lHSC311010 PAGE 133 3064 ! is opened. to in effect stand in for wnat in tne long term i 3065 ; would be State employees who would co that. but it is going I 3066 ! to take a few months for the State emplo.yees to be trained ? 3067 j and become able to do that work and we would provide some 3068 l assistance to bridge the gap. l 3069! Mr. Goldwater. In your opinion this problem should be i i 3070 handled by the States, themselves, clearly separate from the I l 3071 t, NRC or the Federal Government? i 3072l Dr. Hendrie. I think it should be handled by the States. 3073I Mr. Goldwater. Should they be able to establisn their own j 3074l standard and regulations and enforce them? t 3075l I Dr. Hendrie. I am not going to go that far. I want the l 3076 i States to und6rstand they have a responsibility to go l 3077 forward and establish more sites for the disposal of this l 3078, material. but the laws require us. NRC, to license unless it i i 3079 is an agreement-State, and they have to have an agreement i 3080 l with us in order to do that. and I think we ought to have l I 3081 ! some sort of uniform minimum standard for these sorts of 3082 l facilities. and I would thus suggest that any new sites that l 3083 ! are established, have the NRC criteria. '2084 l Mr. Goldwater. You want the States to have the l I 3085 j responsibility but the NRC to have---- l 3086; Dr. Hendrie. Set standards, set minimum Federal 3087 standards. and the law of the land requires us to license l 3088 them in States tnat are not agreement-States. You could 2370 076 l
i NAME HSC311010 PAGE 134 3089. always enange tnat. if you contemplate legislation in the j I 3090 i area. 3091i Mr. Goldwater. Dr. Bateman, obviously the closing of the i l 3092 ' three sites indicates inefficiency in the Department of 3093 l Energy to long-range planning or observation or perception i i I I 3094 of the problem. Do you agree? i 3095 l i 2370 077 j i l i 1 i i l I i f I i i i I I I i I i i l i I i l l i 4
I i NAME ;HSC311010 PAGE 135 i 3096 { RPTR LYDA s i 3097! 1200 i i 3098! Dr Bateman. I think that this is a prcblem that has been l i ~ 3099: growing for some time. We have recognized it as a problem. l l 3100 I thin 5. tnat the tnings that I described that we have cone i 3101 ; ar,d propose to do go a long way to correcting the problem. I 3102; Mr. Goldwater. I guess the bottom line is. when are you I I 31C3 ! going to come out with some recommendations and proposais? { 3101 Dr. Bateman. To the Congress? I would expect in the next i l 310!.. session of Congress. But we have made recommendations to i 3106 i the President o'1 all of these points that I described in my 1 3107 I testimon. and depending on his decision I would expect 3108 those legislative proposals to come forward in the next l 3109l session of Congress. I 3110j There is one item which I mentioned that I think will get I 3111 l action this year because it is an executive order. We l 3112 ! recommended that the President establish this State Planning 3113 Council by executive order. 3114l We have every expectation that he will do that. The I i 3115 l pacers are at OMS now. r f t 3116i Mr. Go/dwater. Is there not anything else you can do by 3117 l executive order to have legislation? i 3118j Dr. Bateman. You would have to have legislation to do 3119 ! what we believe is most essential and that is to restructure 3120l the current system in a way that we believe requires a 2370 078!
1 NAME lHSC311010 PAGE 136 l 3121 restructuring of the sites. l 3122j Mr. Goldwater. Is that the regional dumping grounds? 3123: Dr. Bateman. Yes. l l 3124j Mr. Goldwater. Under your recommendations, who will make i i 3125 l'the dec:sion as to where those will be? i l 3126; Dr. Bateman. We would work that out jointly with tne I 3127 l States involved in the region, with the NRC, in providing 3128 wnatever input we can provide by way of a technical nature l 1 3129 ' in terms of assessment of the suitability of sites. et 3130 ; cetera i t 3131i Mr. Go/dwater. Do you think Dr. Hendrie's suggestion that t 3132I if you do not open your doors for a site you should not be l j 3133 allowed to have within your State nuclear activity---- l 3134'i Dr. Bateman. I think if no regicnal solution can be I i 3135 arrived at. I think that is going to have to be a l I 3136 l requirement. yes. l i 3137' Mr. Go/dwater. Why do you have to wait until the next 3138 session of Congress? The testimony we have is that right 3139 ! now it needs fairly immediate solution from what I gather. 3140 j Maybe the previous witnesses were overexaggerating. but it i I 3141 I seems to me if there is a grain of truth in what they are I 3142 i saying, maybe we can't wait until the next sestion of i i i t 3143 ! Congress and maybe we need direction right now. l i 3144l What is the problem with that? i 2370 079l: 3145i Dr. Bateman. There are several reasons.
i NAME ;HSC311010 PAGE 137 3146 First of all, I think the problems, particularly in the i 3147 ! State of Washington. that led to the Governor's action to l 3148 i close the burial ground can be corrected and I think the t 3149 discussions between the NRC. DOT. and the Governor have gone l 3150; a long way to resolving that 3151' So assuming there is a satisfactory resolution of the 3152 j issue she has raised. Washington could. of course, be 3153 l reopened. Barnwell is still opert !t is possible that i 3154l Nevada could be reopened as well once the problems Governor ~ i 3155 l List has are cleared up. l i 3156i So I think we should note that althougn I think it is a l 8 3157 l. serious problem. we are not at a crisis point at this time. i 3158 We also have contingency plans, which I described in my I l 3159 ! testimony, which could relieve the congestion in the system. 3160 i if that is necessary, on a short-term basis. 3161i So I think there is flexibility here to deal with it on a j i 3162 ' near-term time frame. But I think that althougn much of the 3163 i existing system. I think. is adequate to deal witn the l I I 3164 ! problems. both near term and long term. I think some 3165 l legislative solution is going to have to be required. j i i 3166 I tnink we can wait until the next session of Congress. ! 3167 ' tnink the Congress has a lot on its agenda to deal with in l 3168 l this session in the energy area. We don't think the 3169 ; situation at this point warrants adding this issue to it at 3170 l the present time. 2370 080 i
] i NAME: !lHSC311010 l PAGE 138 3171 But if it looked like tne problems tnat I described could i 3172 not be resolved satisfactorily. obviously we could get right i 3173 l up here and try to deal with them as expeditiously as we 3174 could. 3175 Mr. Go/dwater. Well, we are talking about low-level l i 3176 waste. My perception of the immediacy of dealing with this j l 3177i is not accurate perhaps. but I think you have that problem l i 3178 ' and you also have the problem of high-level waste. It is 3179 kind of in the same kind of boat. 3180{ We are not doing too much in that area either. I mean, we 3181 are doing a lot of studies like that. but we don't have any 3182 program, any dynamic leadership that going to put this I i 3183 thing to bed once and for alt 3184 We sit back here in Washington twiddling our thumos while 3185 the States are the ones that a e having to deal with this. l l 3iB6 It is almost like wnat is happening in aviation to some i l 3187 degree You are getting States taking over the jurisidction l l 3188 of what is normally a Federal responsibility so as not to j i 3189 interrupt the interstate commerce. We are finding States 3190 establishing their own standards and criteria for operation i 3191 l of airports. I I. I 3192i Here we are allowing States in essence to disrupt the 3193 ; national concern. a national problem. because of the failure l I 3194l of the Federal Government to aggressively and dynamically 3195 deal with the problem of waste disposal i 2370 081 i
j NAME iHSC311010 PAGE 129 1 3196i High-level waste is another problem we are not talking 3197 l about today. But it is still symtomatic of the same thing l 3198 we are finding today as far as low-level waste. It is 3199 behind the curve before it becomes a crisis. Maybe it is l 3200 not a crisis. but it could be if in fact these States reject l 3201 these negotiations that we are talking about i 1 3202 I would like to see some aggressive leadership down there. 3203 I know it may be a somewhat difficult problem, but it is t 3204 l not insoluble. You had better start moving out in some l I 3205 i visible program that is going to develop some confidence in i i 3206 i this nuclear business. I l 3207! Mr. McCormack. I thank the gecaman from California for i ~ l 3208l his comments. I want to say I agree very much with the il 'e 3209 l thrust of what he is saying. We need more aggressive l i 3210 programs. 3211i With all due respect Dr. Bateman. I would point out tnat 3212 the last statement of the interagency review group i believe I 3213 l moved us back to before 1974, previous to the time I chaired i 3214 j hearings as a member of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy lt l 3215 on this subject l 1 3216! I think we must get with it I want to say we have i i 3217 f examples of low-le.cel wastes that have been concentrated 3218 here that have been prepared by the Brookhaven National l 3219 ; Laboratory under NRC funding. I 3220! There are a numcer of technologies that are available on j 2370 082 i I
i i l NAME lHSC311010 PAGE 140 3221 ! this. I hope we will move very aggressively in this area. I l 3222, There is no reason on earth why we could not, it seems to i 3223 ! me. in a year have several technologies available for l 3224 consolidation or considaration in one manner or another, 3225 concentration of the wastes or their residues. l 3226i i think it is essential that we do it. I tnink it is l 3227 important that we move expeditiously. j 3228 I would like to remind both of you gentlemen that I have l 3229l addressed letters to both of you as chairman of the l 3230 subcommittee. to you. Mr. Hendrie, and Secretary of Energy l i 3231 Duncan, on this subject requesting your comments on the i 3232 ! proposed legislatiort l t 1 3233: I agree with Mr. Goldwater that we must be moving ouite i 1 l 3234: expeditiously. I. frankly, don't have the slightest idea i 3235 i wnere our deliberations will take us in terms of i 3236 ! legislation, but I think we are going to have to work very [ 3237 ! hard and we are going to have to work toget*.ar very I 3238 carefully and we are going to be pointing toward having i 32391 legislation in order for congressional action this year. if 3240 l possible. but if not, then immediately upon reconvening the 3241 l Congress next year. I 3242: I want to thank you both very much for coming today. 3243 i Thank you all. I 3244l The meeting is adjourned. 3245! Whereupon at 12:40 p.m. the subcommittee adjourned. I 2370 083 l 4}}