ML19269E855
| ML19269E855 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Haddam Neck File:Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Co icon.png |
| Issue date: | 05/14/1979 |
| From: | Counsil W CONNECTICUT YANKEE ATOMIC POWER CO. |
| To: | Grier B NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7906290732 | |
| Download: ML19269E855 (2) | |
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- s CONNECTICUT YANKEE ATOMIC POWER COMPANY BERLIN, C O N N E CTIC U T P.O. BOX 270 H ARTFOR D. CONN ECTICUT 06101 203 666 e 11 May 14, 1979 Docket No. 50-213 Mr. Boyce H. Grier Director, Region I Office of Inspection and Enforcement U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406
Dear Sir:
In ISE Bulletin 79-06A--P.evision 1, you requested that CYAPC0 propose changes, as required, to those technical specifications which must be modified as a result of implementing various items spec!fied in the bulletin. You further requested that we identify any design changes presently contemplated for implementing some of the long term resolu-tions to the bulletin items.
CYAPC0 has carefully evaluated the bulletin items, the responses to those items forwarded to you on April 24, 1979, and the various administrative and technical methods of implementing those responses.
Based on our review, we have identified one area where a modification to the technical specification appears to be required.
We plan to propose changes to the Limiting Conditions of Operation, Section 3.8,
" Turbine Cycle", whereby we will specify operability requirements for both steam driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps. This proposed change will be forwarded by June 1,1979.
Following our design review of item #1 listed below, we intend to propose changes to Section 3.9 and 4.2 of the Technical Specifications.
However, in the interim,;we intend to discontinue functional testing of the low pressurizer level instrument channels as required by table 4.2-1 of the Technical Specifications.
Since the low pressurizer level instrument channel has been placed in the tripped condition, there is no need to verify the operability of the level trip.
In addition, under the present circumstances, functional testing of the pressurizer level instrument channels would significantly increase the probability of spurious reactor trips. We have discussed this action with members of your staff and have obtained your verbal approval.
2142 063 7 906200 7f2
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As part of our engineering review effort of the Three Mile Island incident, we will continue to evaluate the need for revisions to our Technical Specifications. Any further changes will be proposed in a timely manner.
Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Company is presently reviewing a few selected design changes as a result of our response to the above bulletin and our independent review of the Three Mile Island event.
These conceptual design changes include:
- 1) Modification of the reactor protection system logic to actuate safety injection solely on low pressurizer pressure.
- 2) Modification of the Containment Isolation logic such that a safety injection signal will initiate isolation of non-essential systems.
- 3) Modification to permit reactor coolant pump operation with a coincident safety injection and/or containment isolation signal.
The above design changes are being evaluated on an expedited schedule.
Other changes may also be required as a result of our continuing engineering reviews.
Very truly yours, CONNECTICUT YANKEE ATOMIC POWER COMPANY Y
LAdi W. G. Counsil Vice President 2142 064