ML19269E200
| ML19269E200 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 05000572 |
| Issue date: | 04/20/1979 |
| From: | Lipinski W ARGONNE NATIONAL LABORATORY |
| To: | Kerr W Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards |
| References | |
| ACRS-CT-1109, NUDOCS 7906270007 | |
| Download: ML19269E200 (2) | |
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/C9V Dr. William Kerr DISTRIBUTED TO #N3 MEMUERS Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards E
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555
Dear Dr. Kerr:
Subject:
RESAR 414 Integrated Protection System The NRC and ACRS reviews have thus far focused on the basic design and functional performance of the RESAR-414 Integrated Protection System.
Dr. Hanauer, NRC, on MarcF n', 1979, stated that supervision and maintenance is outside the scope or.nis design review.
A complete review should include an examination of the man-system interface in terms of oper-ation and maintenance. The design may be acceptable in principle, but if there are interface problems between the operator and the system or if the system requires unique and sophisticated maintenance procedures, the over-all performance of the system may not be acceptable.
Such problems were uncovered in the CESSAR-80 review.
A reliability analysis of the system should be provided by the applicant to assist in the assessment of whether the system will perform satisfactorily after installation.
The reliability analysis should be sup-ported by statistical data. This should not be interpreted to mean that overall system performance is to be statistically confirmed, but that sta-tistics be used to support the component or sub-component reliabilities used in performing the overall system reliability calculation.
In addition, any selected test interval should be justified.
Westinghouse has a detailed design of the Integrated Protection System, but the NRC staff's review is based on the principles of the West-inghouse design. The NRC staff reviewed the design details of ANO-2, and Dr. Beltrachi stated on March 30, 1979 that the NRC does not have the mari-power to examine the details of the Westinghouse system.
I submit that the AN0-2 design involved the use of digital ccmputers in only two of the ANO-2 reactor trip signals (DNBR and kW/f t), whereas the Westinghouse system is,
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Dr. William Kerr April 20, 1979 unique and involves every reactor trip signal, control signals, and ESF actuation and therefore the Westinghouse system should be reviewed in greater detail than the ANO-2 system.
Effort expended prior to operation is a better investment of manpower than effort expended on a post mortem.
Sincerely, ha- ! ?. ?
'.~',0. n. A.,
Walter C. Lipinski Sr. Electrical Engineer Reactor Analysis & Safety Division WCL/at cc:
G. R. Quittschreiber, ACRS 2133 188
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