ML19269D034

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Minutes of ACRS 781117 Subcommittee Meeting to Review License Application of Cincinnati Gas & Electric Co for License to Operate Unit.W/Encl Applicable Federal Register Notices,Attendance List & Schematic Drawings
ML19269D034
Person / Time
Site: Zimmer
Issue date: 01/11/1979
From:
Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards
To:
Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards
References
ACRS-1598, NUDOCS 7902260606
Download: ML19269D034 (49)
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{{#Wiki_filter:4 p, DTTE ISSUED: 1/))/79 I " ';* '* L J wb> HIntITES OF 'E!E 1.CRS SUBCOdMITTEE MEETII G ON h'4. !!. Zlf7ZR NUCLEAR POER STATIO:, UNIT 1 CI?CI?nMTI, CHIO I;OVR4BER 17,1978 kh jg9 Pb2 ch/77 She ACRS hb. H. Zinner Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1 Subcocraittee held a meating on ibvember 17, 1978, at the ibliday Inn, 8050 Highway 42, Florence, Kentucky. tbtice of this raceting was published on Friday, October 20, 1978, in the Federal Register, Voltrne 43, fiumber 204, Wednesday, flovember 1,1978, Volume 43, Number 212, and Thursday, Novercer 9, 1978, Volume 43, Nu.ber 218; copics are inclujed as Attacirnent A. A tentctive schedule for the meeting is includcd as Attachment B. A list of meeting attendees is included as Attachment C, and a list of the back-ground doctrnents submitted to the Subecc nittee and its consultants is incItv3ed as Attachment D. Dr. Richard Savio was the Designated Federal Dnployee for the meeting. INTi2/ITORY STATFFZNT BY THE CHAIRMAN Mr. F. ender, the Subcomittee Chairman, convened the meeting et 8:30 a.m., reviewed briefly the schedule for the rneeting, and introduced the other Subcommittee member and the A 25 connutlants. I:e noted that the purpse of this meeting was to review the application of the Cincinnati Gas & Electric Company (CGr.E) for a license to operate the h5. H. Zimmer Nuclear Power Staticn, Unit 1. She Subcommittee had received neither vritten statements nor recu2sts for time to racke oral statements from the members of the public. IN1 BOD'JCTION ^% SU"ARY OF ISSUES - NR. I. PELTIER, NRC STAFF Mr. Peltier indicated that Zir.imer plant is the first BhR-5 with Mark II containmont to be reviewed by the tac Staff for an operating license. 'ihe IRC Staff had issued the Safety Evaluation Rcrort (SER) on Novemb 1978 for the operating license review of the Zirmnar plant. Shere are 17 outstanding issues identified in the SER. ?c.ong those 17, the NRC Staff has reached a position for the following issues: -2 f0'p 790226044N

2jmmer November 17, 1978 1. Etwaterira of compacted backfill 2. Reactor vessel supports 3. Preservice and inservice inspection programs 4. Effects of recirculation pump trip in overpressurization analyses 5. Protection of motor / generator sets - reactor scram system 6. Physical separation and electrical isolation 7. Fire protection 8. Plant and support staffing 9. Industrial security Mr. Peltier indicated that the following issues need additiona) infomation from the applicant so as to enable the tac Staff to reach a final position: 1. D2 sign for pool dynamic loads 2. Seismic qualification of mechanical and electrical equircent 3. Conservatism in transient analyses 4. Iow Pressure Coolant Injectiur. (LPCI) diversion effects on Daergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) and long term cooling S. Pool dynamic loads and load combinations 6. Safety related display instrumentation 7. All other instrumentation required for safety C. Preoparational and startup test progra fir. Pelticr noted that the 130 Staff has also considered the ACRS generic concerns in the evaluation of the Zimmer plant. Several task action plans are being underway to resolve the ACRS generic concerns, and the MC Staff intends to provide a status report on the resolution dates of these matters in December 1978. Cr. Catton raised several questions to be answered either during the cr orse of the meeting or at a near future date: 1. Indicating that during one of the recent Power Burst racility (PBF) tests it was found that a fuel pin came apart at 240 calories per gram, Dr. Catton asked,

Zimer November 17, 1978 is this an appropriate issue for the Zimer plant, and has it been considered? 2. What are the provisions to preclude the thermal stress problems, if any, on the collet retainer tube? 3. How is the fuel bundle lift potential during the blowdown phase of a LOCA eliminated? 4. Indicating that the downcomers are over 30 feet long and have no lateral restraints, Dr. Catton asked, what would be the dynamic behavior of the downcomer tubes during blowdown? PRESENTATION BY THE APPLICANT Organization E.tructure and Construction Schedule - Mr. E. Boraman, CG&E Mr. Borgman provided a brief review of the organicational structure of the CG&E (Attachment E). In response to a question from Mr. Bender as to how many of the operating personnel have prior nuclear power plant experience, Mr. Schott from CGLE noted that none of the operating staff members has actual boiling water reactor experienes. However, several of them have prior Navy reactor (sutraarine and surface ship) experience. Besides, all the licensing Staff have gone through the boiling water reactor training course. With regard to the schedule, Mr. Borgman noted that the projected fuel loading date is expected to be some here in the third quarter of 1979. Plant Description - Mr. Brinkman, CG&E Mr. Brinkman stated that the Zimmer plant is located on a 632 acre land on a floodplain of the Ohio River in Washington Toanship of Clermont County, in Southwestern Ohio. 'Ihe site is located approximately 24 miles southeast of Cincinnati, C%io and 1/2 mile north of Moscow, Ohio. 'Ihe Zimmer plant is owned by the Cincinnati Ces & Electric Company, the Dayton Power & Light Company, and the Colunbus & Southern Ohio Electric

Zinper November 17, 1978 Company. Cincinnati Gas & Electric Company has the prime responsibility for the design and construction of the Zimmr plant. The Zimmer plant has a nuclear steam supply system which uses a BWR-5 class of boiling water reactor supplied by the General Electric Company. We total capacity of the Zimmer plant is 2436 Mdt (839 Mh'e). Cbnstruction permit for the Zimmer plant was received by CG&E in October 1972. We comercial operation date for the Zimmer plant is expected to be in January 1980. Mr. Brinkman discussed briefly the general arrangement of the Zimmer plant, indicating the location of the various buildires and essential components associated with the plant (Attachment F, pages 1 and 2). In response to a question from Mr. Bender, Mr. Brinkman noted that there has been some icing on the Ohio River over the years. Ibwever, in case of ice fomation at the Ohio River, provisions are made to take suction of the water from the bottom of the river.

Besides, they also have provisions to melt the ice by pumping warm water.

Mr.' Brinkman provided a brief description of the Mark II containment features (Attachment F, pages 3 and 4). We Mark II contairrnent system includes a primary containment structure and a secondary con-tainment building. Be primary containment structure is a vapor suppression system which encloses the reactor vessel, the reactor coolant recirculation loop, and other partions of the nuclear steam supply system. It consists of a drywll, a suppression chamber, a vent system connecting the drywell to the water pool, isolation valves, containment cooling system and other service equipnent. Be primary containment is a reinforcea, prestressed concrete structure with a thickness of 6 feet. % e entire containment structure is lined with a 1/4-inch steel liner which is leak tested. % e contain-ment is designed to withstand 45 psig internal pressure, 2 psig ex-ternal pressure, and a temperature of 34UUF in the drywell. A series of steel tendons are also used to prestress the containment. TT

' Zimmer November 17, 1978 In repsonse te some qJestions from Mr. BefK3er, it was noted that CG&E has an inservice inspection program to inspect the tendons at an interval of 1, 3, and 5 years. We superintendent of the plant is responsible for impicrnentirrg this program, and written procedures are being prepared to carry out this program. In response to a qJestion from Dr. Zudans as to how the integrity of the concrete is maintained at a temperature of 3400F, Mr. Krishnaswamy from Sargent & Lundy noted that the 340 F is the raximum tcznperature during a loss of Coolant Accident (LCCA). We nomal operating tempera-ture of the drywell is about 140 F. In the event of a LOCA, the temp rature of the concrete immediately behind the steel liner will be about 1900F for a short period of time. he average long tem tcznpera-ture increase during a ILCA will b. about 30 F. Dr. Plesset wondered how the temperature could drop from 340 F to 190 F through a 1/4-inch thick steel liner. Mr. Bender suggested that the lac Staff look into this issue and provide the necessary infomation to the ACRS at a near future date. In response to a question.from Dr. Zudans as to whether the acttal temperature distribution experienced during normal operating conditions and during tran-sient conditions has been factored into the design of the floor that connects the suppression pol to the drywell, Mr. Krishnaswamy from Sargent & Lundy noted that the acttul increase in temperature of the drywell floor and the containment structure tus been studied for both the nomal operating and transient conditions and also has been considered in the design of the containment. Dr. Catton raised a question regarding the computational procedures used to get bounding temperatures in the concrete and bounding pressures in the drywell. He also asked whether the heat transfer coefficient used between the drywell evnrionment and the steel shell is the same as tlut tced to obtain the p'

Zimer 14avenber 17, 1978 Since there were no proper personnel to provide an adequate answr to Dr. Catton's questions, Mr. Bender suggested that the 20 Staff wrk with the Applicant to establish what the computational procedures are and submit to the Subcommittee at a near future date. In response to a qJestion from Mr. Bender concerning the possible byp ss paths of the suppression pool, Mr. Brinkman noted that the possible bypass areas m uld be: 1. Cracks in the floor 2. Leaks adjacent to the downcomer pipes that penetrate the floor 3. Leaks in the downcomer pipes 4. Icaks in the vacuum breaker valves which communicate from the drywell to the wetwell. Mr. Brinkman reviewed the design, construction, and min functions of the drywell, suppression pool, primary and secondary containments, spent fuel pool, and refueling pool. In response to a qJestion from Mr. Bender regarding the main steam isolation valves, Mr. Brinkman noted that there are two isolation valves, one is located inside and another one is outside of the primary containment, which is consistent with the General Design Criteria. Ibwever, under certain conditions, the Zimmer plant took some exceptions to the General Design Criteria in locating other containment isolation valves. Mr. Bender asked when and how the mC Staff decides the location of the containment isolation valves. Mr. peltier noted that he wnl provide this information at a later date. T

Zimmer riovember 17, 1978 Indicating that the control rod drive tubes are located very close to the recirculation line, Dr. Catton expressed concern about the vulner-ability of the control rod drive tubes from a failure of one of the recirculation lines. P.r. Bender suggested that the NRC Staff look into this issue and provide appropriate informatrion to the ACRS at a near future date. Training Progrcm - P.r. J. Schott Mr. Schott noted that the main objective of the Zimmer plant training progra:n is to develop and maintain an organization to asstrne the responsibilities for operation, maintenance, and technical considera-tion of the plant. Cincinnati Gas & Electric Company has formulated three separate training programs to accomplish this objective: 1. Initial plant Staff program - This is designed to produce competent trained personnel at all levels of the organization. The guidelines delineated in ANSI-N18.1 were incorporated into this program as appropriate. 2. Requalification program - This program prov V a continuing training for all plant perso- ,1 cccmnsurate with their area of rest - aility. 3. Replacement training program - This program is designed to supply qualified personnel throughout the life of the plant in the event of come turnover or attrition. The subprograms incorporated ini.o the above mentioned main training programs are included in Attachment G. Mr. Schott indicated that several of the plant personnel has been cent to the operating BWR nuclear plants, such as Hatch and Monticello, for observation and training. v-

Zimmer tbvember 17, 1978 In response to a question from Mr, Dender regarding notable differences in training the personnel for a BWR-5, Mark 11 plant and for a BWR-4, Mark I plant, Mr. Schott noted that the Zimmer plant training program is some-what different from the generic General Electric training program. A senior operator for the Zimmer plant is usually trained first in a IMR-4, Park I plant, and then he will be instructed on the unique features of the Zimmer plant so as to enable him to understand the main differences between Mark I and Park II plants. He also roted that most of the Zimmer plant Staff are aware of the main differences between Park I and Park II plants. Emergency Plan - Mr. J. Schott Mr. Schott noted that the emergency plan for the Zimmer plant exceeds the minimma requirements of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50, and also incorprates the guidelines delineated in Regulatory Guide 1.101, " Emergency Planning for I;uclear Power Plants". Mr. Schott indicated that appropriate arrangements have been made for medical, fire, police, trans p rtation, and radiological support services in an coergency situation. Relationships between the Zinner plant organization and, State and federal agencies, and local support services are included in Attachment H. Mr. Schott reviewed briefly the emergency p an for the Zimmer plant, indicating that it provides a comprehensive plan that includes adequate organization, communication procedures, monitoring information, training, first aid, transportation, assessment, decontamination, and offsite support to adequately cope with and assure that mesures can be and will be taken to protect the health, safety, and property of the public in the event of an csnergency.

\\e ~ Zimmer - - november 17, 1978 I T. In respnse to a question from Mr. Bender concerning the fire protection program for the Zirrer riant, Mr. Schott noted that they have in-plant ~, fire orotection group which was t .ned by the professional fire consui-tants. In addition, they have made arrangements with the Washington i-. Township Fit. Department which is located in Moscow, Ohio, as the initial offsite response agency that would respond to a fire call. Washington Township Fire Department will ba backed-up by the Richmond City Fire Department. In response to another question from Mr. Bender, Mr. Schott noted that the departments with wSich they have agreementr for fire protection are not professional fire-fighting groups; they are volunteer organiza- = tions. Mr. Bender remarked that it snuld be advisable to make certain arrangements with some professional fire-fighting departments. In respanse to a question from Dr.Zudans, Mr. Schott noted that Kaiser Engineers, the constructor for the limer plant, will be responsible for fire protection during the construction phase. After completion of the plant, the in-plant fire protection group of the CG&E will assume the responsibility. However, the transition phase of this issue has not yet been clearly defined. Mr. Bender suggested that the IGC Staff carefully look into the aspect of transferring the respnsibility for fire protection from construction phase to the operating phase. Quality Assurance and Quality ' Control Programs - Mr. J. Schott Mr. Schott reviewed the quality assurance and quality control programs formulated for the Zimmer plant. '1he quality assurance programs consist of managerial, administrative, and operational controls and procedures 2 3

Zimmer November 17, 1978 used to assure the safe operation of the plant. All safety-related operucing, maintenance testing and modification activities are con-ducted in accordance with the written procedures approved by the Plant Operating Review Committee. Industrial Security - Mr. J. Schott Mr. Schott noted that the security plan for the Zimmer plant is in conformanc vith the requirements delineated in Regulatory Guide 1.17, " Protection of Nuc7 *ar Power Plants Against Sabotage". A revised security plan intended to meet the requirements of 10 CFR Part 73.55 had been submitted to the NRC Staff in May 1977, and it is being re-viewed by the Staff. In response to a question from Mr. Sender, Mr. Schott noted that they call e7,n the local police, which is a small organization, under certain circumstances. Ibwever, the basic responsibility for offsite security support lies with the Clernont County Sheriff. CG&E has radio communi-cations with the Sheriff's dispatcher. In the event of an emergency, they expect help from the Sheriff'c office within ten minutes. In addition, they can also call the nearby Ohio State Patrol for assistance as required. Quality Assurance and Ouality Control Experience for the Zimm? Plant - Mr. Schwiers Mr. Schwiers provided an overview of the quality assurance and quality control activities at the Zimmar plant site. CG&E involves nostly in the quality assurance activities. However, there are certain depart-ments within CG&E who involve in the ;uality control activities. Ibiser Engineers, the constructors for the ';immer plant, are basically responsible for most of the quality control act'.vities. She quality assurance and

Zimmer November 17,15,8 quality control requirements are included in the equipnent specifications prepared by Sargent & Lundy, the Architect Engineer for the Zimmer plant. With the assistance of the Vaiser Engineers" Quality Assurance Division, CG&E will perform the necessary audit to assure that the requirements delineated in the egiupment specifi ations are fully complied with. Mr. Schwiers noted further that Region III of the NRC has conducted about 70 inspections at the Zimmr plant site, and identified about 65 non-compliances. bst of the non-compliances are considered in-fractions and the rest are considered deficiencies. He indioted that all of the non-compliances have been resolved satisfactorily. Mr. dehwiers discussed some of the quality assurance and quality control experiences encountered at the Zimmer plant (Attachment I). In response to a question from Mr. Bender concerning the nature of the work performed on the recirculation pumps, Mr. Schwiers noted that the bearings of the recirculation pump motor at the Zimmr plant was changed as suggested by the supplier of that pump. IL added that it was not a specific problem to the Zimmer plant; it was 2dentified as a generic pro-blem by the supplier of the recirculation prnp after experiencing failure of one of the recirculation pump motors in another nuclear power plant. In response to another question from Mr. Bender regarding the role of Sargent & Lundy, the Architect-Engineers for the Zimmer plant, in examining the installed products at the Zimmer plant site, Mr. Schwiers noted that Sargent & Lundy does not have any responsibility to review any of the installed products.- 2 eir main function is to prepare equipnent specifications and design drawings. 03&E, in conjunction with the Kaiser Engineers, has the responsibility at the site to assure

Zimmer IJovmber 17, 1978 that the design documents are implemented and are completely emplied with. Ibwever, Sargent & Lundy Engineers constantly visit the rite, at least once a month, to check and make sure that the design is properly interpreted. Mr. Bender wsndered at the role of the constructing engineers as com-pared to that of the design engineers in checking the adequacy of the final design. lie suggested that the lac Staff provide a compari-son of the quality assurance and quality control progra-s for the Zinner plant with those for some other plants. DISCUSSION OF O'JTSTANDING ISSUES - MR. I. PELTIER, faC STAFF Mr. Peltier provided a brief sum.ary of the itms that remain outstanding as of November 2,1970, the date at which a draft copy of the Safety Evaluation Report was issued. A brief discussion of some of the out-standing items are as follows: Dewatering of Compacted Backfill 'Ihe lac Staff's position on this issue calls for dewatering of the compacted backfill under a seismic Category I struc-ture. 'Ihe lac Staff's p>sition also states that the water level in the compacted backfill should be maintained at or below 457 feet mean sea level elevation. Cincinnati Gas & Electric Company (the Applicant) has agreed to provide a seismic Category I structure.

Ibwever, the Applicant has not agreed with the faC Staff on the n3ximum water 1cvel that should be permitted. ib feels that excessive floor pres.

.a in the compacted backfill can be prevented even by maintaining water level at 480 feet mean sea level elevation as agreed upon during the construction permit. tage.

Zimmer November 17, 1978 Mr. Peltier indicated that this issue is being reviewed by the NRC Staff and its consultants and a resolution is expected in the near future. Reactor Vessel Supports The Applicant has provided the necessary information re-quested by the tac Staff such as the forces and moments on the reactor vessel resulting from a Loss-of-Coolant Accident. We tac Staff has been perfoming independent analyses to verify the information submitted by the Applicant. 'Ihey do not anticipate any problems on this issue and expect to resolve it in the l ear future. Preservice and Inservice Inspection Program The Applicant in revising the preservice and inservice inspection programs to include an acceptable inservice inspection method for an early detection of feedwater and control rod drive rozzle and blend radii cracking. He plans to submit this revised program six months prior to the commercial operation. Effects of Recirculation Pump Trip in Overpressurization Analyses The Applicant did not include the effects of recirculation pump trip in the overpressurization analyses. The NRC Staff has asked the Applicant to include this effect in his analyses, and .d also requested him to provide a sensitivity analysis for the effects of initial operat-ing pressure in the vessel dome. In addition, the hRC Staff requested e Applicant to provide more pertinent data on the operating experience and qualification testing of the safety / relief valves.

2 inner dovember 17, 1978 Physical Separation and Electrical Isolation The NRC Staff has identified several deficiencies in this area. The Applicant has agreed to make the neces-sary modift:ations to resolve the problems identified by the tac Staff. He also agreed to perform qualifi-cation testirrg af electrical isolators tred between redundant safety systems circuits, and non-safety grade and safety grade circuits. Design for Pool Dynamic Lods 'Ihe Applicant has been reassessing various structures, systems, and components by using different load com-bination methodologies proposed by the NRC Staff. Those structures, systems, and components fall into the following three categories: 1. Those which meet the code stress limits when dynamic loads are combined by the absolute sum method. 2. Those which meet the code stress limits when dynamic loads are conbined by the square root of the sum of the squares method where applicable, but do rnt meet the code stress limits when the loads are combined by the absolute sum rethod. The Applicant has requested permission from the NRC Staff to apply this method on a case-by-case basis. 3. Those which do not meet the code stress limits when dynamic loads are combined by either the absolute sum method or the square root of the sum of the squares method. For those systams which fall into this category, the Applicant is analyzing the loads by using the absolute sum method,

Zimer -D-tiovember 17, 1978 and modifying the systems as necessary to meet the Code stress limits. Low-pressure Coolant Injection Diversion Effects on ECCS and Long-term Coolina The Applicant's design diverts automatically the low-pressure coolant injection flow to the wetwell sprays after ten minutes in order to increase the allowable bypass of the suppression pool during a small break LOCA. The flRC Staff has requested the Applicant to analyze the effects of the low-pressure cooiant injection diversion on ECCS and long-term pool cooling and show that any core temperature increase is within accept-able limits. The f1RC Staff has not yet received all the necessary information pertinent to this issue. Pool Dynamic Loads and Load Combinations The tiRC Staff has issued its acceptance criteria for the Mark II con %inment design to accommodate pool dynamic loads (fiUREG-0487). If the Applicant takes any exceptions to these criteria, then the fiRC Staff will. review those exceptions and provide its position. This issue is expected to be resolved in the near future. Safety-related Dispay Instrumentation The liRC Staff has identified some unacceptable designs in the area of safety-related display instrumentation (e.g. rod display system powersource). The Applicant has proposed some modifications to ensure the availability of rod scram indication in the event of power source failure during an event requiring rod scram. All Other Instrumentation Required for Safety l The tiRC Staff may not be able to come to a final position on this I m

November 17, 1978 Zimmer -2o-issue until they reach a final position on the use of non-safety grade equipment for the mitigation of abnormal transients. APPLICANT'S RESPONSE TO NRC STAFF'S

SUMMARY

ON O'JTST-1'; DING ITEMS Mr. Flynn stated that CG&E basically agress with the infonnation provided by the NRC Staff on the outstanding issues. They will provide complete cooperation to the NRC Staff for early resolution of the outstanding issues. In relation to the issue on the pool dynamic loads and load combinations, Mr. Brinkman noted that the Mark II containment owners group is reviewing the NRC Staff's acceptance criteria. Major portion of the NRC Staff's criteria seems to be acceptable to the Mark 11 owners group. The areas in whic! ; hey do not agree with the NRC Staff will be discussed and re-solved in the near future. However, if necessary, the Zimmer plant will be more flexible than the Mark II owners group in accepting the NRC Staff's criteria. In response to a question from Dr. Zudans regarding the adequacy or the downcomer design, Mr. Brinkman noted that the downcomer for the Zimmer plant was designed by Sargent & Lundy. They performed an analysis of both the static and dynamic loads; the results of the analysis show that the loads are within the capability of the downtomer. Dr. Plesset suggested that since this is a generic problem for the Mark II containment plants, it may be discussed in detail at the ACRS Fluid Dynamics Subcommittee meeting scheduled to be held at San Francisco on November 28-30, 1978. In relation to the NRC Staff's concern about the adequate performance of the non-safety grade equipment during some abnormal transient conditions, Mr. Johnson from the General Electric Company remarked that there is no definitive data to prove that the non saf<.cy grade equipment will not operate during abnormal transient conditions. lie believes that these equipment have some degree of reliability and it is appropriate to consider these operable during some abnormal transient conditions.

Zimer Novenber 17, 1978 In rt.sponse to a question from Dr. Zudans regarding the settlement of the foundation mat, Mr. Crail from CG&E, noted that they are continuously mea-suring the settlement at various points throughout the plant and all the information pertinent to this matter are documented. In response to another question from Dr. Zudans regarding the qualification of the energy absorb:ng capability of the pipe whip restraints, Mr. Rurka noted that these restraints are designed for energy absorption. Mr. Bosnak from NRC Staff added that General Electric Company has conducted a series of tests on these restraints. Mr. Bender suggested that the NRC Staff provide in writing the technological basis for the design of these pipe whip restraints at a near future date. RESPONSE TO SOME QUESTIONS RAISED BY THE SUBCOMMITTEE AND ITS CONSULTANTS IN THE MORNING SESSION In relation to an earlier question by Dr. Catton concerning the vulnerability of the control rod drive tubes to withstand the consequences of the failure of one of the recirculation pipes, Mr. Brinkman noted that there are two banks of control rod drive modules located about 180 degrees apart. Control rod drive tubes are arranged in a lattice pattern such that there is an even distribution of the tubes in each banks. If the tubes in one bank fails, reactor shutdown can be accomplished with the use of the remaining 50-percent of the tubes in the other bank. In addition, boron injection system can also be used as a backup system to the control rod drive system to accomplish the reactor shutdown. With regard to an earlier qucstion from Dr. Zudans as to how the integrity of the drywell concrete is maintained at accident temperatures, Mr. Krishnaswamy, with reference to Figure 3.8-30 (Attachment J) of the Final Safety Analysis Report, noted that the maximum temperature of the concrete after one hour of the accident is about 140 F, after 20 U hours about 175 F, and after 40 hours it is about 160 F. The integrity of the concrete is maintained because the contoinment is designed for both steady state and transient thermal gradients.

Zimmer November 17, 1978 In response to a question from Dr. Catton regarding the value of '.n3 heat transfer coefficient used for the thermal coupling of the centainment atmosphere to the liner, Mr. Krishnaswamy noted that he will provide the information at a later date. In relation to another earlier question from Dr. Zudans as to whether any analysis has been performed to show that the long and slender down-comer will stay in place as needed, Mr. Krishnaswamy noted that the down-comer was designed for a static load of 8.8 kips. The frequency of the downcomer is some where between 4 and 5 hertz when it is empty. When additional mass is added because of water, the frequency will be lower. He added that the static load produces a maximum moment of 300 Ft.-Kips, and the dynamic load produces about 120 Ft.-Kips. Therefore, the dynamic load produces smaller effects compared to the static load which is more conservative. In response to a question from Dr. Catton regarding the time at which chugging is nearing completion and the maximum pool temperature at the end of chugging, Mr. Crawford from Sargent & Lundy noted that he will provide the information at a later date. Dr. Butler, NRC Staff, indicated that they will look into this issue and provide the appropriate information at the Subcommittee meeting on Fluid dynamics scheduled to be held at San Francisco on November 28-30, 1978. STATUS OF MARK II CONTAINMJNT ISSUES DR. BUTLER, NRC STAFF Dr. Butler provided a brief summary on the status of the Mark II containment issues. He noted that the NRC Staff has recently issued NUREG-0487. " Mark II Containment Lead Plant Program Load Evaluation and Acceptance Criteria," which delineates NRC Staff's acceptance criteria for Mark II containment plants. The Mark II owners group has been requested to examine the bounding loads V

Zimmer November 17, 1978 prescribed in the document NUREG-0487. to determine whether they could meet the llRC Staff's criteria. After examination of this document, the Mark II owners group feels that they need to take some exceptions to the NRC Staff's criteria. He believes that Zimmer being a lead Mark II plant could proceed with fewer exceptions. Dr. Butler reviewed some of .those outstanding issues pertine. .o Zimmer plant: 1. Asymmetric pool swell loads 2, Safety Relief Value (SRV) bubble phasing and frequency 3. Loss-of-Coolant Accident SRV submerged drag load. Dr Butler indicated that the Applicant has committed to perform necessary analyses in some areas to provide additional information for the resolution of the outstanding issues. He added that subject to the resolution of the Square Root of the Sum of the Squares (SRSS) load combination method for the SRV and operating basis earthquake loads, the NRC Staff believes that the issues associated with LOCA pool dynamic load can be found resolved in tne near future. With regard to a question from Mr. Bender regarding the reasons for cutting the flanges off the downcomer and also in relation to a question from Dr. 2udans as to whether there are any test data to replicate the close spacing of a fairly large number of downcomers, Dr. Butler noted that 'he would provide the appropriate information at the Fluid Dynamics subcommittee meeting scheduled to be held at San Francisco on November 28-30, 3978. XPPLTCANT'S RESPONSE TO NRC STAFF'S PRESENTATION ON THE STATUS OF MARK II CONTAINMENT ISSUES - MR. BRINDIAN, CG&E Nr Brinkman provided a brief response to the NRC Staff's presentation on the status of the Mark II containment issues. He indicated that the Applicant is in agreement with the information provided by the NRC Staff on this -issue.. :He provided a summary of the Mark II containment issues, ww

Zinner -eu-tioverber 17, 1978 Applicant's approach to handle these issues, and some of the plant modifi-cations performed to meet the fiRC Staff's criteria (Attachment K). STATUS OF ACTI0f;S 0:1 ACRS GEt;ERIC ITEMS - MR. I. pELTIER, t;RC STAFF Mr. Peltier reviewed the actions taken by the f1RC Staff in resolving the ACRS generic concerns. The action by the f1RC Staff on some of the ACRS generic concerns are discussed below: Stress Corrosion Crackino With regard to ACRS generic concern on the stress corrosion cracking, Mr. Peltier indicated that, as a result of several incidents of intergranular stress corrosion cracking occurred in some of the operating plants, the fiRC Staff had fonned a special task group to investigate this problem. The results and conclusions of the task group are outlined in fJUREG-75/067, " Investigation and Evaluation of Cracking in Austenitic Stainless Steel Piping of Boiling Water Reactor Plants". Mr. Peltier noted that the Applicant has been incorporating the recommendations of the task group by making necessary design changes so as to preclude or minimize stress corrosion cracking problem. However, Mr. Peltier added, there were several other stress corrosion cracking incidents experienced recently in some of the operating plants. Because of these recent incidents, the f4RC Staff feels that this problem may have to be discussed further with the Applicant so as to identify and incorporate additional means, as necessary, to preclude the occurrence of similar type of incidents experienced recently.

Zimmer November 17, 1978 Loss of Onsite and Offsite AC and Reliability of DC Power Systems Mr. Scholl, NRC Staff, indicated that the reactor core isolation cooling system for the Zimmer plant is a turbine driven system. The speed controls for the turbine system come off of an inverter which is connected to a de power source. Therefore, in the event of loss of at power, the plant is capable of operating for at least 30 minutes just with the de power source and the stored steam in the reactor vessel. In addition, Zimmer plant has three full-size diesel generators to supply power as necessary in the event of loss of ac power. The de power system in the Zimmer plant has three divisions. There-fore, loss of one division will not create any problems. In addition, Zinner plant is provided with battery monitors to determine whether the battery is connected to the de bus. In response to a question from Mr. Bender regardino the minimum time for restoring offsite power subsequent to a flood, Mr. Scholl noted that restoration of the power depends on the magnitude of the flood and the damage caused by it to the distribution systens. Therefore, he may not be able to set a minimum time for restoring the offsite power. Instrumentation Follow the Course of An Accident Mr. Peltier indicated that the requirement delineated in Regulatory Guide 1.97 for instrumentations following the course of an accident will not be applicable to Zimmer plant. It is applicable to plants docketed after September 30, 1977. Mr. Israel added that implementation of Regulatory Guide 1.97 is not definite at this time, and also it is not intended to be implemented at the Zimmer plant.

Ziimier tiovember 17, 1978 Mr. Bender expressed concern about the NRC Staff's attitude in not pursuing this matter more vigorously. He noted that the NRC Staff's position has not been made clear to the ACRS, and the ACRS did not indicate that it would accept a position that all the existing plants will not have to be monitored further. He suggested that the NRC Staff has to look into this matter very carefully and decide what it plans to do in response to this issue. Recirculation Pump Overspeed During a LOCA Mr. Peltier noted that the fiRC Staff is still reviewing this issue. The Applicant's position on this issue is that part' of the impeller cannot form destructive missiles because of the restraints. The NRC Staff does not have a definitive position on this issue. However, after completion of their review, they may require decouplers if it is found necessary. In response to a question from Mr. Bender, Mr. Peltier noted that the NRC Staff may not be able to reach a decision regard-ing the use of decouplers prior to the issuance of operating license for the Zimmer plant. Mr. Robare from General Electric Company noted that they studied this problem and submitted a report to the fiRC Staff providing justification that decouplers are not needed. In respanse to a question from Mr. Conder as to why Germans have decided to use decouplers, Mr. Robare noted that the results of a previous study on this issue indicated that decouplers would be helpful and advisable. He thinks that th? Germans might have decided to implement the recommenda-tions o' that study. r-

?imer -e ruovember 17, 1978 fjp., Bender sugges_ted that the NRC Staff look into this problem god determine the bases _ for the. German action and also decide v,i.hether. us,i_ng decouples is. a gcod. idea or not.. Loose parts and Vibration Monitorinn . =.... fft., P.eltier noted that. the. Applicant has committed to install loose parts monitors-at the. Zimer plant. Two sensors,. capable o,f de,te,ct.ing a loos _e. part. impact.ing with a kinetic energy of 0,.5 ft..lb.. within 3 feet. from the sensors. will be installed a;t cach natural coolection region in the primary system. There is; no vibration monitors ins.talled at the Zimmer plant'.and the NRC Staff does not intend to require any. vibration monitors for the, Zimer plant. In response. to-a; question from Dr. Zudans: regarding: specific design provisions-at-the Zimer plant for precluding water hamer proble 1, Mr. _ Israel noted that. operating; experience:ir.dicates tha+ one;of. the recurring causes; for water hamer -in-the.BWRs is n voided. lines;in ECC;syste'as Zimmer plant uses. Jockey. pumps to;kpep-these lines -filled:with water all'the timelto: preclude this problem. Other types of water hamers:such as:the:one caused 3 by.valye.cl,osings.and openings, have.not. appeared :ta :cause :signi-fi ca_nt.probl ems -so ;far. APPLI_ CANT!S -ACTION ON ACRS GENERIC -ITEMS Mr Brintman. indicated that the Applicant-has: developed'arinservice igspection. program for detec_ ting th.e cracks at nozzles :and -has been discussing this with the NRC_ Staff. He. believes.that the Applicant l is in. agreement with the NRC Staff on this. issue and.the inservice t inspection program will be included.in. the FSAR through. one of the future. amendments. Ignrelation.to,,the, issue,on the Anticipated. Transients. Without Scram, f Mp,.. Bqin,Lman noted that; the Applicant tias-been: foll'oiting.the.discusssions r-

Zimmer November 17, 1978 on this matter and he ,'s proposed some solutions for the Zinmer plant. If it is acceptable to the NRC Staff, the Applicant will incorporate those solutions in the Zimer design. In relation to the issue on instrumentation following the course of an accident, lir. Schott noted that Zimmer plant has a Seismic Category I post-LOCA monitoring system. The radiation monitoring portion of that system consists of redundant ionization channels that provides readings in the control room. This system continuously monitors the containment atmosphere. They also have provisions to predict the dose levels at the site boundary, low population zones, and at any point up to 50 miles located in the direction of the downwind. SUBCOMMITTEE REMARKS After the presentation by the NRC Staff and the Applicant, Mr. Bender commented that the Subcommittee is not too happy about the way the NRC Staff is handling the issue on instrumentation following the course of an accident. The Subcomittee would like to hear more definitive information on this matter prior to reconmending the Zimmer operating license application to the ACRS full Committee fo_r review. He also noted that depending on the outcome of the Fluid Dynamics Stbconmittee meeting scheduled to be held at San Francisco cn November 28-30, 1978, the Subconmittee may wish to have another meeting to discuss some of these issues. Mr. Bender indicated that he would recommend this project to the ACRS full Committee for review in the near future subject to the resolution of several concerns raised by the Subcommittee during the course of the meeting and also subject to the issuance of the final version of the Safety Evaluation Report by the NRC Staff. v ----

Zimer flovember 17, 1978 Mr. Bender thanked all the participants and adjourned the raeeting at 3:15 p.m. tiOTE: Fce 6dditional details, a complete transcript of the meeting is available in the NRC Public Document Room,1717 H St., N.W., Washington, DC 20555, or from Ace-Federal Reporters, Inc., 444 liorth Capital Street,fi.W., Washington, D.C. P

} 940TICE4 discuss pertinent activities which

  • Reactor Operaltons, November 1 process DT90-.01-M]

1978. Rescheduled from October 31-affect the. curnnt Itcensing November 1. Washtnston. D.C. ne and/or reactor operations. Dclante of HUCLEAR REGULATORY subconuntttee w1U restew NRC Offiw

  • ArtMtect En7tncer COMMISSkON

" "#I E Pionf. December 18, 1978. Resche-21,1978. Wash-doled from November grams belng conducted by the Re-acarch Support Branch, and will hear inston. D.C. The subcommittee 51U ADYtS'XT CCMM.'TTIf CN HACTO4 Power Serh Inc. .syw.m nt

a. briefing by representatives of the Balance of Plant Standard Ba!ety Analysis Repon GOPml aM hs hwines se yg es Notice of this meeting was published relauerr. hip to the Essbcock and es In order to provide advance Inform >

en e, the ACRS subcommittees and worth: September 21 and October 17.1978 (43 Wilcox Standard Reference System B-(2cn regard:ng proposed tnectings of FR 42826 and 47803, respectively), SAR-205 for a pic11minary design ap-groups. and of the full committee, the 'Adtanced Recelors. November 1. proval 197c. Washington, D.C. The subecm. 'Sckm Buclear Potoer Stahon. Unit prelimbr.ry schedule re-fonosingme current musuen, tam - 19,1978. Washington. mittee stu continue its review of mat-No. 2. DectsnberWWee WE Me* d' into _ account add!!1ont.1 meetings which have been scheduled and meet-ters related to NRC sponsored re-RC. We W search a the saMy of n&M reac-application of the Pubuc Service Elee-tot dalgus. Notice of this meeting sas tric and Oss Co. fw a Ucense 2 om-ce[ed ce t e list pbushed Oc2ber n,1978 H3 m ste Unit No. 2 of this station. meetings published Septemtwr 21 3. Actir4Hes, Jantrary 1970 (43 FR 42826). nose meetingy

  • Regulatory 47c02).

wh!ch are dennitely scheduled have

  • Reg.datory Acurilles, November 1.

1979, Washington, D.C. We subcom-Inittee wm review working papers and 1978. a 2n. C. Cancelei had. or win have, an tndtrfdas! nettce Notice of this meeting was published future regulatory guides; sho. It win Ten ap. published tu the Prnt=At. Rec::

  • Wtiliom H. 2tumer Nuclear Potect disenss pertinent actfrities Wich prmtmately 15 days (or more) prior to September 21.~ 1978 M3 FR 42a2S).

Station. Unff No. J November 16-17. Mfect th* current Ucensing process the metting. thcne subcommittee and g working group meetings for which it is ud/w nx%r operauons. 1978. Rescheduaed imm November 15-

16. Cincinnati Ohio, The subcommit-
  • Ech Mernal Phmena. Jan-anticipated that there wiu be a per.

tec wm unew the appumh of.the nary 9,1979. Ias Vegna. Nev. The sub-tion er an of the meeting open to the uwed public are indicated by an astert&. (*). w de NRC CMenli Gas and Electric Co. for a full cotnmittee meeting desttnated by beense to operate Unit No.1 of this c,c n:h regarding seismic design,af It ts erpected th.t the Pee slons of the an astertrk (*) wiH be open in v. hole or 816U03-NOUT Of.this toceting was ztuelear power planta. in part to the pubbe. ACRS full ecm-pahWhM September 21,1#78 (43 FR OCRSPou CohnIIrizz MzrrIncs - mittee meet!ngs beg 2 at 8:30 a.tn. and

  • AreMecMnc'ineer Falance c/Pfmf No1pember2-4,'f 978 423M 3-subcommittee r.nd strting group

.9 21.1078. Ras-The exact time wban items listed on cj)eduled for December,18. Washtc& N, T at W per-(TentaIne). November meetings usurll:e begin at 8:30 a.m. the agenda wm be decuesed during ton. D.C. Notice of this meetin; wra g,gg full committee meetings and whess pubbshed September 21,1978 H31R -Review NRC Safety Resesreb Pro-subcommittee and working group d Dynamit: November 1.m tram. ~ '. -

33. 1978. Rescheduled frecn Octcher

. Bovember p-fl. 2978 aD ro y da prior t a WS Information as to whethe.r a 2MS-f,4. San Franebco. Cahf. *Ine

  • Representatives of the ACRS WH1 Inecting has teen firr.'.ly scheduled.

subemittee will meet with rewecen-canceled, or re:c!wdufM or wh*the.y tativos of the NRC to discum metho:ts meet with represents.tves of the Rea:- changes have been made in the agenda C b IteMg by the NRC staff rad tor Esfety Comm!ulon (RSK) of the fcr the Novcsnbee 1973 ACRS full the noclear industry for calculating Federal RepubMe of Germuy to dis-mmmsttee mocting can be obtatn'd t.y cc:itahunent system response. Con-cuss items of mutual interest relat a prepaid teicphone call to the Car = tain.nent leak testlng will also be das. to nuclear safety and regulation. of the Executive Director of the cr*, cussed. In addition. the subcommittee mittee (telephone 207-634 32C7. Atte. will review the design basis and con-December 7-9' 1978 strue lon of the Mark 11 Boinng Water tion: Mary E. Vanderholt) between 2:15 a.m. t.nd $:00 p.rn e.d.t before Reactor (BWR) Containment System. Agenda to be announce1 October 23 and e.s.t. af ter that dr.te. Notice of this meettng wr.s published Stracosmn rzz an Woaxmo Caocy September 21,1978 (43 FR 42326).' January M.1979 'Potoer and Electricci Systems. De-cember 1,1073. Washington. D.C. The Agenda to be announced. Mzrrmes

  • Elutd Dracrties. October 2+25-26 subecmmittee win :neet with represea.

Datei October 18,1978. bli8. S:tn funcisco. Ca!!f. Resche-tauvcs of Westinghouse Corp. and the duled to Noveicber 23-29 30,3D"S. NRC staff to review the potential ad. ~ Plant Arrangemenf4. October 25 U 1978. Wr.shington, D.C. ne subcom-verse interactions through the inter-Nancoement Officer. mittee wn! baa,in its review of the NRC connection of protection s.nd snietv p De.w2p MedW m Nad Generic Program. Systems Interaction In Nuclear Power Plants. Tnsk A.17' [e edinRb 14. and s'ill rerler the Zion Station Sys-e Rems. December 5.1978. tems. Interaction Study. Notice of t tts Washington, D.C. De subcommittee meeting was published September 21 wc review the status of the rancus and October 10.1978 (43 FR 4:225 and generic items contained in the comrnit-40611, respectjecly). tee'l November 15,1977. " Status of

  • Surry Potter Station. October 25.

Generic items Relating to IJ aht-1918. Washin'gton. D.C.. the subcom. Water Reactors. Ret ort No. 6.*' Irlttee will discuss the steam gener.

  • Regulatory Activttics. December C.

ator repair program for Unit Nos.1 1972. Washington. D.C. The subcom. and 2. Notice of th!s meeting was pub. mittee win review working papers and g g lished October 13.1978 (43 FR 47335). future regulatory guides; also, it Ivnl restaA1 ttststER. Vot. 43. sco, so4 tIDAY, OOO$at 30, ttM i

m* *e). e e NOTICH [7590-01-M] In addition. It may be nemury for the subcommittee to hcid one or more ADMY CON CM RIACTCWt closed sendons for the puJpose of Cx. SAProuAtps ploring matters involving proprietary informadon. I have d3 ermined, in ac-bettaa of h h en b Watens H. cort'uce with subsechon 10(d) of Pub. imm== Ndem rw ha e.... I. 92-463, that, should such sessions - W ACRS subec'nmltee on the WD ~ be required, it is nemmary to close llam H. '72mmer Nuclect Power sta. these sesslotu to protect proprietary 110n t'.11 hold a meet!n: on Noven'Jer information (5 U.S.C. 55:b(cX4)). 26-17, 1978, at the Holidsy Inn. EMO Further information - regarding Elrhway 42, Florence, Ky. 41094 to topics to be discussed, whether the ycilew the application of the Cb:In-c2eeting has been c:meeled or resche-natJ Oss t.nd Electric Co. for a permit duled, the chairman's ruling on re-to operate Unit 1 of this station. quests for the opportunity to present Nouce of this meeting was pubushed oral statements and the time anotted on October 20.1978 (43 FR 49020). therefer can be obtained by a prepald ~ 1n accordance with the procedures telephone call to the Designated Fed-outuned in the FenA1. RectsTra on err.1 Dn;1oyee for this meevnz. Dr. October 4.1978,(43 FR 45;26), orn) or Richard P. Bavio, telepbor e 203-635-written statements may be presented . U67 between 2:15 a.m. and 5 p.m.. by members of the public, recordings eJ.t.

  • Background information cencernin::

will be perm!:ted only during those Jtems to be cons!dered at this meetinir portJens of the mecting when a trtn-cr.n be found in documents on !Ue and script is be!ng kept, and questions may available for public inspection at the [ be asked only rneminra of the subcom. NRC Pubtle Document Room.1717 H mittee. Its consultanta, and staff. Per. Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20:55 - sons desiring to mr.ke ors.lptatements and at the Clermont County I.!brr.ry, abould notify the Designated Pederal Third and Dreadway Street.s, Entarla, Dnployee as f ar in advance as prr.cti. Ohio 45103. cable so that appropriate arrsnge. I menta can be made to EUow the neces-Dated: October 26,1978. aary time during the meeting for such ~ Jottx C. Hortr, statements-Adefsory Committee g The agenda for subject meettng shall be as follott Thursday, Novem-Maragemnf Officer. s ber 16 and Frktav, Novenber 17,1978, 3 p.m., November 16. and 8:30 c.m., y g g_gesggpg,4 y.gggg g November 17, untU ihe conclusion of-bushess each dav.

  • The subcocunitee may meet in ex-ecutive session, with any of its con:ul-tanta who ms.y be procent, to explore t

and exchante their preltminary opin-tons regarding matters which should be considered during the meeting and to formult.te a report and recommen-dations to the full comm.'ttee. At the conclusion of the executive session, the submmrnittee win hear presentations by and hold discussions with representativcs of the NRC staff, the Cincinnati Gas and Electric Co and their co=sultants, pertinent to .this rtview. The Wmmittee may then caucus to detennine whether the matters idenufled in the initial session have becu adequately covered and ' whether the project is ready for re'tiew by the fall cornmittee. Fbef>1 t!ct3 tty, YC4. 43, No. 212-WEENt10AY, NOVIM1!11, IF8 M77Ad HN ENT A g--

rivin.42 (77/O-01-M] NUCLEMt REGULATORY COMMLI52CN Anytsotr cou;4nTE! cx asActot sAms. GUAZ (V*00.'WJTTEE CN TK WTLWW R ZUWit HUCLEAR N fADON Moedeg Dde '*Its Novemte 15-17, 1573 meeting DI. Lhe ARCS ShmT.te 00 the Wmtam IL hm-r Nucle::r Power Station hrs been rosace:f ed to be teld onNovember 17 only, r.t the Holl-day Inn. M50 H!shway da Floretze. M &l09L rir.rLing si E.30 Act until the conchtston of bn fnru. All cther 11 ems re..arfar this mec;i:4 n imaln the same as putnished on Or.tober 2D and November 1.19 t (43 PP. GC81 and 50975 respec'JvtlyL Da.ted: November 2,1978. 3osts C. Eonr. Adviscry Commt ttre Mar.cGenerst Officer. IFR Doc TB.31555 Mled it-6-W.eM5 m:n] ff.DE* AL afGliTEA. VOL 4.' MC. 213-UNE50A'**e MN19. M ATTNHustri R 7 ~ ~{ 3 s t

Revised 11/8/78 TENTATIVE PRESENTATION SCHEDULE ZIMMER SUBCOMMITTEE HEETING AND SITE TOUR CINCINNATI, OH NOVEMBER 16-17, 1978 NOVEMBER 16, 1978 Lunch and Tour Briefing at the Zimmer Site 12:30 p - 1:00 p Site Tour 1:00 p - 3:00 p Return to Holiday Inn 3:00 p - 4:00 p NOVEMBER 17, 1978 I. Executive Session (ACRS - OPEN) 8:30 a - 8:45 a II. Introduction and Summary of Issues (NRC Staff) 8:45 a - 9:00 a III. Presentation by Applicant a) Introduction, Organizational and Operational Plans for the Facility 9:00 a - 9:10 a organization Applicant's schedule for completion of construction b) Plant Description with Emphasis on 9:10 a - 9:30 a Mark II Containment Features brief description, location, and layout of the Zimmer plant c) Trainina Programs, Emergency Planning, and Quaiity Assurance and Control Programs 9:30 a - 9:50 a d) Industrial Security Discussions (OPEN) 9:50 a - 10:00 a e) Quality Assurance / Quality Control Experience for the Zimmer plant 10:00 a - 10:15 a IV. Discussion of Outstanding Issues and NRC Staff Conclusion (Excluding Mark II Containment in ItemVI) (NRC Staff) 10:15 a - 11:00 a V./Applicant Response to Item IV 11:00 a - 12:15 p ArrnenuSNT 6 1 e P

VI. Status of Mark II Containment Issues 12:15 p - 1:00 p (Applicant and NRC Staff) LUNCH 1:00 p - 2:00 p VII. Status of Actions on ACRS Generic Items. 2:00 p - 2:30 p These discussions should address stress corrosion cracking, ATWS, loss o' on-site and off-site alternating current / reliability of direct current power systems, instruments to follow the course of the accident, recir-culation pump overspeed during a LOCA, loose parts monitoring, and vibration monitoring. (Applicant and NRC Staff) VIII. Executive Sessien (ACRS - OPEN) 2:30 p - 2:45 p IX. Presentation by Members of the Public as 2:45 p - close of requested (Interested Merbers are Requested business to Contact S. Duraiswamy or R. Savio at 202-634-3267) t B . ~ ~

ACRS SUBCOMMITTEE MEETING ON WM. H. ZIMMER NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNIT 1 CINCINNATI, OHIO NOVEMBER 17, 1978 ATTENDANCE LIST ACRS NRC STAFF M. Bender, Chairman R. Bosnak M. Plesset T. Vandel I. Catton, ACRS Consultant S. Israel S. Ditto, ACRS Consultant R. Scholl W. Lipinski, ACRS Consultant I. Peltier Z. Zudans, ACRS Consultant J. Kovacs R. Savio, Designated Federal Employee W. Butler S. Dura 1swamy, ACRS Staff T. Eaton, ACRS Fellow CINCINNATI GAS & ELECTRIC CO. LONG ISLAND LIGHTING.CO. G. Ficke J. Morin K. Chitkara W. Museler L. Albers B. McCaffrey J. Herman H. Crail W. Cooper STONE & WEBSTER J. Seibert R. Reiman G. Dawe S. Salay H. Brinkmann E. Borgaann GENERAL ELECTRIC J. Flynn J. Schott D. Robare W. Schwiers R. Johnson C. Beringhaus T. Bloom A. Badger W. Smith D. Altemuehle D. Yelten D. Kemp SARGENT & LUNDY D. Starr R. Givan S. Rurka KAISER ENGINEERS, INC. R. Cotta M. Jackson R. Turner R. Pruski R. Scheibel K. Rooney HUSKY PRODUCTS, INC. A. Meligi C. Krishnaswamy C. Duncan R. Crawford F. Banta ATTACRMENT C

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED TO THE SUBCOMMITTEE AND ITS CONSULTANTS Safety Evaluation Report by the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulations, U.S. NRC, in the Matter of Cincinnati Gas & Electric Company, Wm. H. Zinmer Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1. I i s / ATTACHMENT D "%f*,. M.* P W '6 s tw e p ga , y, g

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SLIDE #2 ZIMMER UNIT 1 CONTAINMENT FEATURES 1. PRIMARY CONTAINMENT A. MKII ARRANGEMENT A. OVER & UNDER ARRANGEMENT B. WATER P0OL FOR STEAM SUPPRESSION c. STEEL LINED PRE-STRESSED CONCRETE B. DESIGN PRESSURES & TEMPERATURES A. INTERNAL PRESSURE 45 PSIG B. EXTERNAL PRESSURE 2 PSIG c. FLOOR PRESS. DIFF. 25 PSI DOWNWARD 9 PSI UPWARD D. TEMPERATURE 275 F WETWELL 340 F DRYWELL i R TTA :H MENT F / "8 # 4

-A. INITIAL PLANT STAFF TRAINING PROGRAM B. REQUALIFICATION PROGfiAM C. REPLACEMENT TRAINING PROGRAM Rrracnuen r G7

A. INITIAL PLANT SiAFF TRAINING PROGRAM 1. OPERATIONS GROUP A. INITIAL COLD LICENSE TRAINING PHASES I THRU VI B. NONLICENSED OPERATOR TRAINING 2. SUPERVISORY STAFF A. INTRODUCTION TO NUCLEAR POWER s. ACCELERATED NUCLEAR POWER PREPARATORY TRAINING c. STATION NUCLEAR ENGINEERING n. BWR CHEMISTRY E. BWR MAINTENANCE F. NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATION G. PROCESS INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL H. BWR OPERATING FUNDAMENTALS I. OBSERVATION AND TRAINING AT OPERATING FACILITIES 3. PLANT TECHNICIANS A. ZIMMER ORIENTATION s. NUCLEAR FUNDAMENTALS c. RADIATION PROTECTION D. SPECIFIC COURSES I. -- ELECTRONIC FUNDAMENTALS II. - NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATION III. - DIGITAL LAB Iv - SYSTEMS TRAINING

v. - GENERAL MAINTENANCE (CENTRIFUGAL PUMPS, VALVE LAPPING & PACKING, RIGGING & LIFTING, ETC.)

/ E. PARTICIPATION IN PREOP & STARTUP TESTING: LAB & SHOP SET-UP; ON-THE-JOB IN THEIR SPECIALTY, G

B. REQUALIFICATION PROGRAM ~ 1. LICENSED (R0 OR SRO) PERSONNEL A. PRE-PLANNED LECTURES I.- THEORY; PRINCIPALS OF OPERATION II.- GENERAL AND SPECIFIC OPERATING CHARACTERISTICS III.- INSTRUMENTS & CONTROLS Iv.- PROTECTION SYSTEMS v.- ESF vi.- PROCEDURES vii.- RADIATION CONTROL AND SAFETY v111.- TECH. SPECS Ix.- QUALITY s. REACTIVITY MANIPULATIONS

1. -REACTOR STARTUP & SHUTDOWN II. -CR SEQUENCE CHANGES III. -SD KARGIN CHECKS Iv

-CR SCRAM TIMING

v. -REFUELING c.

APPARATUS OPERATION o. PLANT CHANGES (DESIGN, PROCEDURES, T.S., ETC.) E. PROCEDURE REVIEW (ABNORMAL & EMERGENCY) C7 - ; ; y,. -. - ~,.

y s e WM ll IIMMEll CGt1E E LECTHic CG8E SI AllON PRODUC TION CORPOII AT E SUPE HINI E ND-M ANAGE MENT M AN AG E MENT tNf ON -lall V CE NIRAL (Only if supt is nos E MEllGE NCY PUHLIC SaliF i At ARM STAllON DUTY Of tlCER INIOllM ATION SilPE RVISOH OPEllAIDH immeaately evoilatile) (E DO) NEWS MEDIA I I I AMOULANCE USERDA USNHC HEGION I-As directed lay AND/ Oft fille H ADIOL OGICAL lia COMPT _ LANCE

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Ot PAlli ML N T S asses (ANCE OFFICE Cl t 64 MONT 01410 DISASTER ' 00110 cot 17J IY,Of fl0 SE RVICE S E NVillONMENT-AL PHOIECTION Sill HIFF AGENCY fli[fjCY CAMPDEtt/ 8t 'e ruca y 01110 RIVER Pt Niet E TON Mesipse or VALLEY SAF#- D' " AM8 T A T ION l f>ft fC s N s*c s"s ' COMutSSION i iOCAL MEDICAL ML DIC AL CONSUt TAPITS l ASSIST AN CE a GENl_.IlOSP NEW RICleMOND U S COAST SClK)DI. DIST. ' GUARD PORT (MOSCOW 0F CINCINNAid SCllOOL) j g i 06110 NATIONAL MUNfCIPAL GUAHD (f *)ll WAIER WOHKS A1.iEllP'.IL Q er INTER OflCINN ATI,OlllO NE #8 TON 00, NY f Mf 06I#Y HE WPOff T, MY CALL LISI-SI ATION I'f flSONNLt. e N(W lllCNMOND i tot ICE & IIHE 5 r4SPAIClif R Atrac n nenT H

v. .y.., :f- ~ However, we have encountered several experiences 1 which at this time I'd like to relate to you. The first one occurred in late February of 1976. A former employee of Kaiser Engineers alleged a that Class-I nuclear materials had not, received proper inspection by CG&E prior to installation. He also alleged that materials purchased as Class-II materials were being occasianaD.y installed in Class-I areas. This incident received v.ot of publicity. Television stations came in, and the individual was inte viewed, and it was felt that in some cases many of the things that he had stated were misinterpreted or blown out of proportion by the news media. As a result, he was inclined to resign as the quality assurance supplier QA engineer. The NRC then conducted special investigations in which they reviewed all these allegations. In each case, both the one concerning qualification of the materials, and also the use of Class II material in a Class I area, it was found to be not in non-compliance with NRC requirements.! In 1976 the GAO decided to perform an audit at the Zimmer project. Zirmer was chosen because of the percentage completion that existed at the time. It was a BWR, and also it was in Region III. ATTAC HN E N T M

A' i_ i t.se GAO provided a team of three auditors, who came in for a period of seven days, and individually inter-viewed construction personnel at the site. The interviewed quality assurance personnel, management personnel, and they did, at the completion of their audit, decide that ,l { there were various areas that they identified as being QA concerns. These were then turned over to Region III, since it was felt that they were the most qualified to investigate any allegations concerning QA, and they made a thorough investigation and found that a majority of these either did not cover safety-related equipment, or were not construction deficiencies. There were a couple others that the NRC was concerned about, and they, in turn, at a subsequent inspection came in and assured that the allegations or the items identified by the construction people were not of a - generic nature. These were closed out, and we feel that there were no problems that were identified by the GAO. Recently a former employee of a supplier of our cable trays made an allegation in which he sent a letter to, the NRC. The letter was drafted and sent to architect-engineers that may or may not be concerned, and various ] other interest groups. 2. ..=-

.u ~ He alleged that the materials that were being f used in the f abrication of the cable trays were out o specification, they were inferior, they did not meet the requirements of the specifications. He further alleged that the welders who were d performing welding on the cable trays were unqualified an ~ t that they had supplied within those trays many weld defec s The NRC, in conjunction with ourselves, made a special investigation in which we went into the manufactur-i er's facilities, reviewed all of his records. concern ng had the materials, and we found that he had independently [amaterialsanalysiscompanymaketestsonallofthe i materials, and they exceeded, in all cases, the specif ca-tion requirements as far as structural strength. We also reviewed all of the weld records, the On our cable trays most of qualifications of the welfers. in the welds are done with resistant spot welding, and for accordance with Section 9 of ASME it is not necessary the welders to be qualified 4 To further assure that there was no validity to the allegation, CG&E took it upon themselves to extract l camples from cable trays at the site, and we took a tota tions of seven samples which represented different configura and different vintages of shipment. l-3 .e-

From these samples we extracted materials samples and sent them to an independent material analysis company located in Cincinnati, and in all cases all of the seven samples that were analyzed far exceeded the specification requirements. In fact, they were anywhere from 30 to 35 percent higher than spec requirements. To validate that the welds were satisfactory, we then took seven samples from these same pieces, and destructively tested the welds in accordance with American Welding Society requirements. There were a total of 32 welds that were destructively tested, and all of them demonstrated that the welds were satisfactory. In all cases the material, as opposed to the weld, the base material is where the failure occurred. We have had several other incidents at the site, three in nature, some of which are not at the site.

However, these are still under investigation, and we have complete confidence that when these allegations are investigated that it will be proven, similar to the others, that there's no validity to the allegations.

We feel that we have a strong QA program that 4 5 complies with 10 CFR 50. We have complete support of our management. And we are interested in safety as well as anyone in the whole Cincinnati area. ,_,/ 4

.w n.,- r.w. n i..c.+ w.. :se.S & d. !:: * ' r.- ...-. ;;.X '.h. .'OSE.Ci$iiO.:?2chEWii.'. G 150 Ao wn. E 2O NR. ej 1 HR.." I-- 19 9g, lllW O HR. O s 6-. 10 0 m D.I u_1 I-- g W Q 6TE.EL LtWE.R 3s 30 go l 1 2 3 4 S WALL THICKNESS (pT.) A n ne w en t .T WM. H. ZIMMER NUCLEAR POWER STATION. UNIT I FIN AL SAFETY AN ALY SIS REPORT N FIGURE 3.8-30 TEMPERATURE DISTRIBUTIONS 'iHROUGH CONTAINMENT DRYWELL WALL

... r-STATUS MKII C0tlTAINMENT ISSUES MKII CRITERIA UNDER REVIEW ON ZIMMER A. DRAG LOADS ON SUBMERGED STRUCTURES A. LOCA 1. LOADS ARE BEING EVALUATED 2. f1KII REVIEWING WITH NRC THIS WEEK s. SRV 1. LOADS ARE BEING EVALUATED 2. TEE QUENCHER GEOMETRY NEEDS TO BE CONSIDERED 3. PRELIMINARY DISCUSSIONS HELD WITH NRC I4. FOLLOW-UP DETAILED REVIEW WITH NRC PLANNED B. SRV PHASING & FREQUENCY A. BOTH WERE CONSIDERED IN DESIGN BEFORE NEC CRITERIA WAS ISSUED B. ZPS ADDRESSED THE INTENT OF NRC CRITERIA c. FOLLOW-UP DETAILED REVIEW WITH NRC PLANNED C. A-SYMETRIC LOCA LOAD A. CONSIDERED EXTREMELY CONSERVATIVE s. PLANT EVALUATION UNDERWAY c. EXPECT CONTAINMENT CAN ACCOMMODATE D. FOLLOW-UP DETAILED REVIEW WITH NRC PLANNED arrac m sar A PageI 93

..s-.,, SLIDE #0 SUhl%RY MKil CONTAINMENT ISSUE ZIMMER UNIT 1 ZIMMER APPROACH: 1. USED B0UNDING LOADS APPROACH 2. REPLACED RAMSdEAD WITH QUENCHER (MITIGAfFS LOADS) 3. USED RAMSHEAD FOR DESIGN BASIS LOAD (TOOK NO CREDIT FOR LOAD MITIGATERS) 4. COMBINED DYNAMIC LOADS ABS 5. USED VERY CONSERVATIVE STRESS ALLOWABLES 6. IMPLEMENTED SIGNIFICANT PLANT MODIFICATIONS 7. COMMITTED TO IN-PLANT TESTS (CONFIRM LOADS LESS i DESIGN BASIS) CONCLUSION: CONTAINMENT ISSUE ADEQUATELY ADDRESSED k py 2-

~ i. STATUS MKil CONTAINMENT ISSUES.

SUMMARY

OF CHANGES MADE: FILLED INNER CORE OF REACTOR SU 1. REMOVED PLATFORM FROM SUPPRESSION POO T ADDITIONAL STEEL ADDED JUST 2. 3. PIPING. TAKE SUBSTANTIAL UPGRADING OF STR 4. ABS LOAD COMBINATIONS. REROUTED ALL SRV DOWNCOMER PIPING. RELOCATED VACUUM BREAKER VA 5. 6. DRYWELL FLOOR. SUCTION STRAINERS WERE RELOCATED. IN THE ONE RHR RETURN LINE WAS RE-L 7. 8. TWO EQUIPMENT DRAINS WERE R POOL. LOWER FLANGES ARE BEING REM ESIGNED. [ 9. ALL PIPING RESTRAINTS IN THE 10. DITIONAL ALL PIPING SNUBBERS WERE RE-DESIGi 11. 12. SNUBBERS WERE ADDED. ED. SEVERAL EQUIPMENT FOUNDATIO 13. ~.,... .....}}

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