ML19269C799

Transmits Schedules & Scope of Phase 2 Work for Questions PF-8,-11,-19,-20,-22,-23,-27,-32 & -36 Re Fire Protection Program

ML19269C799
Person / Time
Site:	FitzPatrick
Issue date:	02/08/1979
From:	Early P POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK (NEW YORK
To:	Ippolito T Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
JPN-79-8, NUDOCS 7902120203
Download: ML19269C799 (6)

Text

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POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 10 COLUMBUS CIRCLE NEW YORK, N. Y.10019 (212) 397 6200 GEORGE T. BERRY EnEcutivE DIRECTOR FREDERICK R. CLARK CHAIRM AN LEWIS R. MENNETT f,,,,yagy gcyy\

GEORGE L. ING ALLS DIR E CTO R vlCE CMalRM AN JOSEPH H SC IEDER RICH ARD u. FLYNN /

ROB ERT l. MILLONZI JOHN W. BOSTON DIRECTOR OF wiLuau r. LuDOY February 8, 1979 "

JPN-79-8 " ^c 'JiR"'C",,^"""-

tE Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 Attention: Mr. Thomas A. Tppolito Operating Re,ctors Branch No. 3 Division of Operating Reactors

Subject:

James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant Response to NRC Staff Concerns / Staff Positions Relating to Fire Protection Program Docket No. 50-333

Dear Sir:

As we indicated in our letter of January 4, 1979 regarding the subject matter, we hereby transmit schedules and scope of the Phase II work for questions PF-8, PF-ll, PF-19, PF-20, PF-22, PF-23, PF-27, PF-32 and PF-36.

The Authority had requested the Technical Servicas Support Contractor to evaluate the nine (9) fire protection questions listed above and to provide necessary design and engineering support.

The Contractor has recently completed a Phase I study which consisted of review of the questions and a schedule for Phase II.

The Phase II effort will develop answers to the USNRC's questions and provide a quantitative basis for either proposed modifications or for a justification of an acceptable alternative position.

The Authority has evaluated the results of the Phase I study to develop an acceptable scope of work for Phase II. Listed below is a schedule for Phase II work for each question.

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79021202O5

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Estimated Date of Completion NRC Question for Phase II Work PF-8 4/23/79 PF-ll 9/10/79 PF-19 8/23/79 PF-20 8/23/79 PF-22 8/23/79 PF-23 8/23/79 PF-27 1/7/80 PF-32 N/A PF-36 8/23/79 The scope of work for each question is attached to this letter.

Very truly yours,

'/

/ICGk Paul J. Early Assistant Ch'ef Engineer-Projects

SCOPE OF WORK PF-8 Fire Doors The Authority has determined which doors require electronic supervision. The contractor will select the type of electronic supervision needed for the doors.

PF-ll Fire Hazards Analysis This task will determine the exact location of electrical cables for those systems and auxiliaries required to safely shutdown and cooldown the plant. The study will define safe shutdown functions, the degree of redundancy required, and the diversity available for safe shutdown functions. The syste:a components (e.g. pumps MOV, SOV) required to perform a safe shutdown function an,d their related control and instrument cables will be listed. In this manner only a portion of all safety-related components and their related cables will be listed. This list will be compared with an area-by-area list of electrical and control cables. The resulting area-by area and system-by-system analysis will demonstrate whether or not redundant and diverse functions are vulnerable to a fire within a fire area. The exact location and functional relationship of cables will be identified within vulnerable areas to evaluate existing separation and fire detection and suppression. Specific fire protection recommenda-tions will be developed based on the NRC " defense in depth" concepts for vulnerable fire areas. The taak will investigate the potential for smoke and heat propagation as well as the potential effects of water spray damage. Modifications will be recommended for areas where added fire protection would improve safe shutdown capability. The task basis will specifically not include the postulation of an exposure fire in each area be-cause the potential effects of any fire are difficult to predict under any but laboratory conditions. The task, however, will provide a quantitative justification for proposed modifications or alternative solutions. The sequence of detailed steps in this task is:

1. Perform an area-by-area study of the potential need for additional fire protection for safe shutdown.

2. Develop criteria for postulating area-by-area analysis to ensure that the plant could be brought to cold shutdown condition with loss of offsite power and fire-induced failures (valves assumed to take the " fail" position, affected motors are assumed to fail to start, or to stop once started).

3. Identify safe shutdown functions.

4. Identify minimum requirements for redundant systems.

5. Identify alternate means for performing the same function.

6. Identify components required to perform the function based on system logic, elementary, wiring und flow diagrams.

7. Cable schedule sort by safe shutdown component and fire areas eliminating fire areas and zones where protection is known to be adequate.

8. Locate the remaining cables and trays using tray, conduit, wall sleeve, and floor sleeve drawings within fire areas and zones.

9. Determine if redundant or alternate shutdown functions are available for a fire in any fire zone.

10. Identify potential paths for smoke or heat propagation on an area-by-area basis.

11. Identify areas of exposed structural steel and potential building collapse.

12. Assess water damage effects - area-by-area.

13. Develop additional fire protection measures where necessary.

14. Prepare summary report including marked-up fire protection drawings showing added hose stations, detection, sprinklers, etc.

PF-19 Fire Detection and Signaling Systems A detailed review of each area identified by the Commission will be conducted in order to determine the type, location, and number of fire detectors required to provide adequate coverage of each area. The task involves a review of existing fire detection drawings and an evaluation of the type (ionization, photoelectric, thermal) of detector required for each area.

PF-20 Interior Hose Stations This task will be worked in conjuction with PF-36 which involves the separation of hose station and sprinkler connections to the yard main.

Phase 2 work on PF-20 consists of locating new standpipes or indicating new branches to feed the new stations. All hose stations will be numbered and scheduled with the proper type nozzle, hose lengths, and other data listed for each station.

PF-22 Exposed Structural Steel A preliminary review has identified ten areas of the plant where fire resistant materials may be required to provide a three-hour fire rating to prevent the failure of structural components which could otherwise affect safe shutdown:

Crescent Area West El 227'0" Emergency Diesel Generator El 272'0" Emergency Generator Switchgear El 272'0" Battery Room El 272'0" Turbine Building Operating Floor El 300'0" Safety-Related Pumps El 255'0" Diesel Fire Pump Room El 255'0" Foam Room El 272'0" Cable Spreading Room El 272'0" Relay Room El 284'0" This task includes a review of these areas and others such as structural steel for the reactor building crane, turbine building crane, and screenwell. nouse crane. These areas will be reviewed with respect to <urrent regulatory criteria and the fire protection requirements imposed by the NRC on other operating plants. The review will define the extent of fire-resistant material required.

PF-23 Crescent Arec Fire Protection The Authority vtll perform a detailed review of the crescent area for the equipment / systems which will require separation, and develop recommendations for installation of a fire barrier or barriers to provide separation. The task will include a review of structural piping and electrical drawings in order to determine the location and type of barrier suitable for use in the crescent area.

PF-27 Electrical Cable Penetration Qualification This task includes an identification and characterization of all types of category 1 fire barrier penetrations in floors, ceilings, and walls for cable trays, conduit, ducts, and sleeves to identify a worst case test configuration. The task will further identify appropriate test cable loading, cable tray arrangement, anchoring, and penetration size and design. The task will include development of recommendations for supplemental fire stop coatings and/or replacement penetration seals to be used for test. This task also includes the per-formance of the tests, an analysis of the results and develop-ment of recommendations for Phase 3 modification to JAFNPP.

PF-32 Diesel Fire Pump Room Sprinklers The NELPIA approved shop drawings show 6 heads in a 540 square foot room and this has been confirmed by a field count. The room is classified as " extra hazard occupancy" per NFPA - 13 because of the diesel oil day tank. Coverage for this type of occupancy is normally limited to 100 sq. ft.

per head. Pipe sizing has been verified in accordance with NFPA - 13.

Our conclusion is that the system is adequate.

PF-36 Fire Water Piping System mhis task, to be addressed in conjunction with PF-20, will

p. ovide and justify an alternate approach. The alternate approach consists of separating certain sub-headers for hose stations and fixed subsyctems and by providing redundancy through connections from the internal, versus underground, loop where feasible.