ML19263E382
| ML19263E382 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 05/16/1979 |
| From: | Gilinsky V, Hendrie J, Kennedy R NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19263E383 | List: |
| References | |
| REF-10CFR9.7 NUDOCS 7906140101 | |
| Download: ML19263E382 (52) | |
Text
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T' W O?i')sflb 5,3 bhh.blS NUCLE AR REGULATORY COMMISSION IN THE MATTER OF:
Public Meeting UNION OF CONCERNED SCIE:.'TISTS HEARING ON PETITION FOR RECONSIDERATION 9
Place. Washington, D. C.
Date -
Wednesday, 16 May 1979 Pages 1 - 47 2356 126 T.I.onen.:
(202)347 3700 ACE - FEDERAL REPORTERS,INC.
OfficalReponers na North Ccpitol Street Wcshington, D.C. 20001 NATIONWIDE COVERAGE. DAILY 7906140lOf
((
l' CR4815 1
DISCLAIMER This is an unofficial transcript of a meeting of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission held on Wednesday, 16 Mav 1979 in the Commissions's offices at 1717 H Street, N. W.,
Washington, D. C.
The meeting was open to public attendance and observation.
This transcript has not been reviewed, corrected, or edited, and it may contain inaccuracies.
The transcript is intended solely for general informational As provided by 10 CFR 9.103, it is not part of the formal purposes.
or informal record of decision of the matters discussed.
Expressions of opinion in this transcript do not necessarily reflect final determinations or beliefs.
No pleading or other paper may be filed with the Commission in any proceeding as the result of or addressed to any statement or argument contained herein, except as the Commission may authorize.
2356 127 e
p CR4815 MELTZER/mm 1 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 2
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 3
4 5
Public Meeting 6
7 UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS HEARING ON 8
PETITION FOR RECONSIDERATION 9
10 Room 1130 II 1717 H Street, N.W/
Washington, D.C.
Wednesday, 16 May 1979 14 Hearing in the above-entitled matter Was convened 15 pursuant to notice, at 1:50 p.m., VICTOR GILINSKY, Commissioner, 16 presiding.
b 17 PRESENT:
18 JOSEPH M.
HENDRIE, CHAIRMAN I9 VICTOR GILINSKY, COMMISSIONER 20 RICHARD KENNEDY, COMMISSIONER i
2I PETER BRADFORD, COMMISSIONER 22 JOHN AHEARNE, COMMISSIONER 23 Messrs. Bickwit, Shields and Snyder.
24
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I INgEE 2
Page 3
STATEMENT ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS:
4 By Ms. Weiss and Mr. Pollard 6
5 6
STATEMENT ON BEHALF OF COMMENTERS:
7 8
By Messrs. Wiley, Edwards and Sawyer.
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10 11 2356 129 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 l
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i 24 co Federst Reoorters, Inc.
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_P _R _O _C _E _E _D _I _N _G _S 2
COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
The Chairman has been held 3
up on the Hill, and is expected to come in about 20 minutes.
4 He has asked us to proceed.
5 We are here this afternoon to hear presentations 6
concerning the Petition of the Union of Concerned 7
Scientists filed in November of 1977.
This petition generally 6
addresses two areas of our regulatory policy; fire protection and i
9 the environmental qualifications of electrical connections.
10 The Commission has once addressed the issues raised II by this petition in a Memorandum and Order dated April 13, 1978.
I2 Subsequent to that deicsion, UCS filed a Petition for 13 Reconsideration, which the Commission voted to accept in June I4 of 1978.
15 A number of filings have been received from the 16 Staff since that time.
The UCS filed in March a Motion to I7 Expedite a Decision accompanied by further technical analysis l
18 of the Staff submissions.
I lo The Commission is now in the process of preparing a 20 final Memorandum and Order in this matter, and so it is 21 particularly appropriate that we meet at this time.
This l
22 meeting is being held at the request of the UCS to assist the I
t 23 Commission in focusing on the issues as they now appear, some 24 18 months into the proceeding.
7cz i7n a Federet Reporters. Inc.
JJ0 IJU 25 Our format this afternoon will be basically that used
5 j
for oral argument.
The Unicn of Concerned Scientists as mm 2
Petitioner will give the first presentation of 30 minutes.
Mr. Pollard, Ms. Weis will speak for UCS.
3 4
Speaking on behalf of those who filed comments 5
opposing the UCS petitions, will be Mr. Edwards of the Atomic 6
Industrial Forum.
The Commission is aware that several other members of 7
the Forum are available to assist Mr. Edwards in answering 8
9 questions.
10 The Commission has also been informed that several 11 representatives of particular utilities are also present in 12 the audience to answer questions concerning their facility.
13 Could the participants identify themselves, please?
ja MS. WEISS:
Ellen Weis from the Union of Concerned 15 Scientists.
16 MR. POLLARD:
Robert Pollard from the Union of
- 7 Concerned Scientists.
I am Charley Wiley of Duke Power Company,I 18 MR. WILEY:
i 19 representing the AIF.
1 20 MR. EDWARDS:
I am Don Edwards from Yankee Atomic i
21 Electric Company speaking on behalf of the AIF.
22 MR. SAWYER:
I'm Ed Sawyer from Yankee Atomic I
23 Electric Company.
l 24 MR.REYNOLDS:
Nicholas Reynolds from the Washington
.FMust Reconers, lrw.
25 D.C.
law firm of Debevoise & LIberman.
l l
6 mm 1
MR. MC GARRY:
Michael McGarry from the same 2
Debevoise & Liberman law firm.
3 MR. HENDRICKS: Jim Hendricks of Duke Power Company.
4 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: Thank you.
5 If you are ready, will you proceed, Ms. Weiss.
6 STATEMENT ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS.
7 MS. WEISS:
Thank you very much, Commissioner Gilinsky, 8
Commissioners.
9 Mr. Pollard and I would like to share our time.
He 10 will be giving the bulk of the presentation.
11 What we would like to do, if that is all right with 12 you, is to take 25 minutes up front and resever 5 for rebuttal.
13 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Fine.
14 MS. WEISS:
I will give 5 minutes at the beginning 15 and maybe 5 at the end of our presentation.
And 15 in the middle 16 for Mr. Pollard.
17 I want to thank you for scheduling this meeting and I
18 allowing us to speak, and just give you a few prefatory remarks.
l 19 Test results which formed the basis of our petition l
20 to you 18 months ago, showed electrical equipment failing in l
i 21 the environment in the accident which it had to survive, and 22 showed cable for redundant-_ safety division could be damaged by l 23 the same fire.
l 24 These are safety defects which I think we ought
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I 25 to agree now would have prevented the licensing of any plant had 2356 132 i
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they been disclosed prior to its licensing.
2 And I suppose our basic position, before you can be 3
reduced: to the proposition that UCS is not perceived where 4
safety is involved, a lesser standard apply after a plant goes S
into operation. To the contrary, the Commission has stated from 6
the beginning in its regulation of civilian reactors, that its 7
diligence does not stop with the issuance of an operating 6
license.
9 I think I need only quote those ringing words from 10 the power reactor case, that safety is the first, last and 11 a permanent consideration.
12 And that promise of continual diligence to the 13 adherance of basic safety standards, is the basis upon which 14 the NRC presents and justifies its regulatory schemes to the 15 Public and the Congress.
16 When we first brought the test results to you, our 17 request for emergency relief at least with respect to the l
18 environmental qualifications of connectors, was denied -- I am le sure you will remember -- on the basis of the Staff's 20 assertions that the equipment tested at Sandia was really not l
21 representative of those in use. in operating plants.
22 You know today that is not the case. The connectors 23 are representative of those in use in at least 18 operating l
i 24 plants, and in fact water under the bridge in the past 18 i
FMwal Roonen, ine.
25 months shows that a lack of qualification extends far beyond 2356 133 l
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connectors to all other sorts of electrical equipment.
mm 2
At the time the Staff also said, with respect to 3
fires, essentially it is nothing new that you told us that a fire 4
can jump a five-foot physical separation distance. There is 5
nothing new, we have known that.
6 Well, I suggest to you that what you know today, 7
there are a minimum of 51 plants where major modifications need 6
to be made before they have the necessary shutdown capability in 9
the event of a fire.
I suggest that that qualifies as something 10 new, had you known it in November in 1978 --
'77, I guess.
II Since that time, a new reason or rationale has 12 emerged for allowing plants to operate in the face of known and 13 conceded, admitted safety defects.
It has several variations, i
14 but all involve explicitly or implicitly the assumption that 15 accident is of low probability. And all involve accepting the I0 premise that there is a distinction between interim safety and I7 long-term safety, that the public safety, in essence,can be compromised for some undefined limited period of time, but not l 18 10 for the entire license term.
In the case of fire, that is 1981 or beyond; in the l
20 21 case of environmental qualifications as we see it today, it I
i 22 is entirely openended. And I think that is precisely the concept 23 that was rejected correctly by your Appeal Board in the Vermont 24 Yankee case.
Not just the illegitimate use of probabilities,
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'S but the concept that the:e is interim safety and there is long-term 2356 134
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safety.
2 I wanc to stress that we are not asking the Commission 3
to decide today whether the configuration of : fire protection 4
in each individual plant, or whether the environmental 5
qualifications for each individual plant is sufficient.
I never 6
have been asking that.
7 What we are asking the Commission to do is to set 6
enforceable standards by which the compliance of each plant can 9
be rationally measured by us, by you, by your staff, by 10 licensees.
With respect to fire protection, we think those 11 minimum standards call for separation of cables for redundant 12 safety division in separate rooms, or three-hour fire barriers 13 betweenthem as specified in Draft Regulatory Guide 1.120.
14 With respect to electrical equipment, we think that 13 requires compliance with IEEE 323 1974 as modified by Regulatory i
16 Guide 189.
i 17 We are asking you to make it mandatory, we are 18 asking you to do it now, and we are asking you to shut down the lo plants until they are sufficiently safe.
20 Mr. Pollard?
21 MR. POLLARD: What I want to try and do is to go 22 through two subjects, one at a time. The subject of equipment i
23 qualification, which simply means, can the electrical equipment 24 cperate in the accident environment which it must operate in Ferrel Reponen, lm.
25 in order to perform the safety function?
And that question is, 2356 135 1
10 I
in fact,much broader than just the environmental qualification
.m 2
of connectors.
3 My second subject, the fire protection, simply means 4
that if a fire occurs, will there be sufficient equipment 5
remaining dter the fire damage to continue to remove the decay 6
heat from the reac tor, and thereby prevent the meltdown?
7 Although we have two separate issues, there are some 8
common principles that apply to both, and I would like to go 9
through those first before I discuss each item separately.
10 The concept of the difference between Regulatory II Guides and Regulations, and then subsequently the application of 12 the single failure criteria:
The Regulations are mandatory and 13 apply as a condition for obtaining a license. That's exactly Id what the Vermont Yankee Board said.
That that constitutes the l
15 definition of what level of safety is required in order to get 16 a license to operate the plant.
l 17 The trouble with the Regulations is that they are l
18 vague. They basically just say you should have some fire I
protection and you should qualify your equipment.
20 The Regulatory Guides, on the other hand are very 21 specific:
How do you go about doing tests to prove equipment 22 is qualified?
How far apart should cables be located?
What 23 kind of fire protection system should you have?
24 In contrast to th eir specificity, they are voluntary:
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25 and they are not applied to all pisnts.
With rare exceptions PH6 136 i
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are they ever applied to plants which receive construction 2
permits prior to the issuance of Regulatory Guides.
The single-failure criterion, I think, is one of the 3
4 most fundamental requirements in terms of understanding how your 3
regulationr are applied. The single-failure criterion does not 6
specify what kind of accidents -- or, if you would prefer, what 7
kind of design-basis events the plant should be designed against, 8
But, once you have decided what accidents you are going to 9
protect against,then the single-failure criterion sets the 10 philosophy on how you are going to evaluate the protection 11 against those accodents.
12 Basically, ad as we can see in our last filing of 13 March, the Staff and UCS are basically in agreement of what does 14 a single-failure criterion require.
15 It requires, as a starting point for the evaluation, I
i 16 all failures which cause the accident, all failures caused by-l l
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' the accident, and all failures that are not detectible as being l l
18 present by routine tests, all of those failures constitute a lol starting point for the analysis.
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20 Af ter censidering all those failures, look at the 21 romaining equipment and answer the question, can we withstand i
22 an additional single failure and still provide adequate protection 23 to the health and safety of the public?
i.
24 Now, if I can give you a concrete example.
I will ca. Federal Reporters, Inc.
25 turn now to the question of equipment qualification and use as l
2356 137
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my example a loss of coolant accident. We have a pipe break 2
which is the accident,and that's a failure.
3 You could have consequential failures from pipewhip.
4 The pipe whips and damages other equipment. You either have to 5
count that equipment as being damaged, or you have to restrain 6
the pipe from whipping.
7 Equipment located inside the reactor building will 8
be exposed to steam, temperature, radiation, caustic sprays.
9 We either have to assume that that equipment fails under those 10 conditions, or we hav e to qualify it to prove that it won' t II fail.
Then we could count in any failures we aren't able to 12 detect in our instrumentation. We are not able to detect them 13 perhaps because a periodic test does not exactly duplicate Id the performance required during the accident.
15 And, after counting all those failures, we still must havesufficientequipmentremainingsothatanadditionalsinglel 16 i
17 random failure does not defeat the ability of emergency core 18 cooling system to prevent a core melt.
lo Environmental qualification is a means of assuring t
20 we don't have any consequential failures from the accident.
21 If you tcst your instruments which are located inside
^2 the building and prove they can withstand operating in that 23 environment, then you need not consider them failed except 24 as the additional single random failure, you could consider one es Federsi Reporters. Inc.
2c I
, failed.
2356 138 i
13 mm What we are doing in our petition, the relief we are j
2 seeking, is to ask you to impose some objective criteria as 3
to how to evaluate the adequacy of the equipment qualification 4
testing. Prior to the issuance of Regulatory Guide 1.89 we only 5
had the old IEEE 323, the 1971 version.
We have presented 6
NRC documents to show that at least in some opinions on the Staff, the document is totally worthless.
I agree with that 7
conclusion.
8 9
I think we should order the application of the 1974 10 version of 323 to all plants as a basis for judging whether or 11 not the equipment is adequately qualified.
12 The Staff has already found in the course of this 13 proceeding, plants in operation where equipment was not 14 adequately tested and where that was found the plants were shut 15 down and it was replaced.
16 But,the Staff is still looking to find out, is there l
- 7 other equipment which does not adequately qualify.
ig COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: Could I ask you, Mr. Pollard, I
1e !Ms. Weiss referred to standards of safety before one grants a l
20 license, and after.
21 Would you say that given some level of uncertainty 22 about whether or not a requirement is met, which might lead you I
I 23 lbefore a license is granted, to hold up the granting of a 24 license, would you say that that would then lead you to shut Federal Reporters, Inc.
25 down a plant after a license had been granted?
2356 139
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MR. POLLARD:
I think if you ask yourself the question, 2
do we have reasonable assuraace that the health and safety 3
of the public is protected; and you can answer that question in 4
the affirmative, then it would not be necessary to shut down the 5
plant.
6 I think here what we have is no reasonable assurance.
7 If you look at the record of this proceeding, the most recent 8
development was in February of this year the NRC Staff, 9
recognizing inadequate responses to an earlier circular, upgraded 10 the circular to a bulletin, and then gave all the utilities 11 another four months, which won't expire until June, to provide 12 the information that die Staf f told you in November of 1977 they 13 are sure they could obtain with a few phonecalls.
14 But, to answer your question, I don't think the 15 standards should change.
I 16 The reason why I think die existing plants were not i
- 7 : adequately qualified is because prior to 1971, there were no-l I
18 standards. The 1971 standard was, in fact, used as a basis for 19 licensing, but we now know that document is totally worthless.
I 20 '
Sc, I am back to the question, what else do we have 21 other than the current standards, so as to judge the adequacy 22 of the environmental qualification.
23 I turn now to fire.
The problem here again to use l
24 the same analogy, the fire is the accident; the fire causes Federal Reporters, Inc.
25 consequential damage by burning cables.
After assessing that 2356 l40 i
15 mm j damage you must have remaining, sufficient equipment such that 2
even with an additional single failure you are still capable of 3
cooling:the reactor and preventing a meltdown.
4 It is important to recognize we are not considering 5
any other accident in coincidence with the fire. That is not the 6
subject of discussion in this proceeding.
7 The Staff has already told you that they will allow 8
redundant saf ety systems to be destroyed by fire, if those 9
systems play no role in mitigating the consequence of a fire.
10 All the Staff is focusing on is the capability to achieve and 11 maintain safe shutdown conditions following a fire and no other l 12 accident.
13 What we have seen in the course of this proceeding, l
14 the original Sandia tests show that the current physical j
i 15 separation standards of Reg Guide 175 are inadequate to l
16 prevent damage to redundant circuits.
The Staff argued that g lthose Sandia tests didn't count because therecwere no fire l
18 suppression systems present.
19 Then UCS brought to your attention a consultants h
20 [! memo to the NRC Staff saying in many operating plants, even in the i
i 21 present fire-suppression systems redundant circuits would be i
l 22 destroyed. And finally, we have the Underwriters' Laboratory i
23 tests in September of '78, showing that in addition to meeting 24 the requirements of Reg Guide 175 with fire blankets, smoke
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25 detectors and sprinklers, once again redundant cables were 2356 I41
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damaged.
2 The Staff again argued that test didn't count in 3
terms of its implications of the safety of operating plants, 4
because the specific arrangement tested at Underwriters' 5
Laboratories is not known to be installed in any existing plant.
6 But the Staff went on to add, the existing arrange-7 ment in operating plants is worse than the arrangement in 8
Underwriters' Laboratories' tests from the standpoint of protec-9 tion against fire.
10 So once again here the relief we are seeking is not 11 for you to judge wheth c fire protection in the operating plants 12 is adequate, but to order the Staff to use the proposed 13 Regulatory Guide 1.120 as a basis for judging the adequacy of 14 fire protection, except to che extent that that Regulatory Guide 15 relies upon 1.75.
16 And furthermore, to add the condition that after a i
17 fire, there will be still remaining sufficient equipment to I
l 18 withstand a single-failure and still cool the reactor.
19 Once again we are not asking also that the plants t
20 be shut down until hearings be held, only 'El the Staf f can tell l l
21 you that these objective criteria of Reg Guide 189, and Reg j
22 Guide 1.120 have been met.
Then the plants would be allowed to.
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23 resume operation.
24 If the Staff could tell you today that those
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i 25 Regulatory Guides would be met, the plants would not have to 2356 142 i
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shut down.
2 The reason we want to go on and have a public hearing 3
is because I think much of the information presented to you by a
the Staff and to the Staff by the utilities, is at best 5
doubtful as to its accuracy. And those are the kind of questions 6
which, in your routine procedures, should be discussed before 7
a Licensing Board with opportunity for cross-examination and 8
discovery.
9 MS. WEISS:
To respond a little further to 10 Commissioner Gilinsky's question, which obviously is the question 11 which is on the minds of the Commissioners, we are not arguing 12 to you, and never have been, that any violation of the 13 Commission's regulations with respect to an operating plant, 14 requires a shutdown.
15 All we cze saying is, any time you don't have 16 reasonable assurance that operating plants can operate safely 17 without posing a threat to the public, you must remove the 18 threat.
19 If it is a shut dor., so be it. But that, it seems 20 to me is sine qua non of your responsibility as a regulatory 21 agency.
22 So, ask yourselves, in all due respect, these 23 questions:
l Do you have reasonable assurance that if there was 24 Federsi Reporters, Inc.
25 a fire, equipment would remain operable to cool the reactor 2356 143 l
18 mm down and prevent a meltdown?
j And if so, fine.
2 Do you have reasonable assurance that if there were 3
a LOCA, the equipment necessary to mitigate that and to prevent 3
a maj r disaster, would survive the accident?
5 If you have reasonable assurance, where does it come 6
from?
7 And I suggest to you, that what is on the record 8
can be characterized as follows:
9 10 The Staff has faith in the safety of the machines it 11 has approved.
It has faith that what we have analogized to 12 y u as the bank account, can afford some withdrawals, although it doesn't have a bankbook.
13 If Three Mile Island taught us anything, I think it 14 15 is that all levels of defense in depth can be slashed through, 16 and that you can't have confidence simply in this inchoate faith, 17 in your conservatism and in the safety of your machinery.
l l
18 I just want to conclude by giving you one ill2stration l
19 of why you need to act and not leave this question entirely in the hands of the Staff.
20 l
21 Staff has said to you, and Mr. Pollard alluded to it --
i 22 and it is really quite remarkable that th y still not have the l
23 documentation to show that electrical equipment is qualified.
I 24 And you will see that in the most recent response of March 15, Federat Reoorters, Inc.
25
'79. They found that licensees weren't paying enough attention to 2356 144
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Circular 7808 which had asked them to go back and see whether 2
their electrical equipment was qualified to survive the 3
accident environment.
4 So, in February of this year, that circular was 5
upgraded to a bulletin, and the licensees were given another 6
120 days to respond.
And this is for equipment where there is 7
not documentation to show environmental qualification.
Licensees 8
have been given another 120 days, to expire sometime in June, 9
to look at it again -- cnly this time we really mean it -- and to tell the Staff whether the plant is safe or not.
11 Now the Office of Policy Evaluation directed some 12 questions tothe Staff, and one of them was:
What is the 13 legal and regulatory basis for allowing continued reactor 14 operation while the Staff and licensees continue to pursue the 15 question of environmental qualification and documentation 16 remains a state.
17 Well, if in the answer to that question, number 18 three in your response number three, the Staff's answer -- I 19 guess it was of March -- tells me to go back to August 31,
'78.
l i
20 And that is where I am going to find the legal and regulatory
{
21 basis for continued operation.
I 22
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So I went back to their memo of August 31, '78, page !
1 I
23 4 of that.
And that tells me to go back to December 13, ' 77, or:
24 l July 6, '78, where I am going to find a summary of the legal andl
.FMeral Reporters, Inc.
I 25 regulatory basis for continued operation.
l 2356 145
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So, I went back to that, to July 6,
'78, enclosure 2
1, item 11, to which I had been directed. And that contains a 3
list of: all of the things that the Staff is doing.
And these a
things are asserted to provide the assurance that environmental 5
qualifications are close enough to being demonstrated.
6 First on that list, the first thing on that list is 7
Circular 7808, the very circular which die Staff now tells you 8
nobody was paying any attention to, so they upgraded it to a 9
bulletin to see if they could get a little bit of attention.
10 I think that is really conclusive, Mr. Commissioners, 11 that the time has come for you to act, to set an objective 12 standard to satisfy all of us, that can be measured against, and 13 to do it now.
14 Thank you very much.
15 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: Thank you, Ms. Weiss.
16 rou have 8 minutes left.
Any questions?
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17 (No response)
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18 Mr. Edwards, are you captain of your team?
19 MR. EDWARDS:
Yes, Commissioner Gilinsky, that's 20 correct.
21 STATEMENT ON BEHALF OF THE COMMENTERS.
22 MR. EDWARDS:
I have a prepared statement, that due I
23 to logistic difficulties,I can't give to you. We will make 24 that available to you as soon as we can, hopefully during the
-FMpal Rroorters tnc. l 25 time I'm speaking.
2356 146 l
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I would like to ch a acterize the presentation a 2
little bit. The Committee on Reactor Licensing and Safety 3
of the Atomic Industrial Forum is responding on behalf of the d
industry.
We have had the opportunity of discussing this matter 5
with a number of utilities that have provided input. But I 6
would like to characterize our comments as our perspective on 7
the issue which we really view as a dispute between the UCS and 8
the Staff. And we are not going to be able to comment in detail 9
about the Staff's work.
10 We will give you our perspective on that.
I am sure Il you are aware that the Committee on Reactor Licensing and 12 Safety consists of about 100 senior specialists in licensing I3 and safety analysis, anu today's pasentation includes input from
~
Id Duke Power, Yankee Consumers Power, Washington Public Power 15 Supply System, Texas Utilities Generating Company, Niagara-16 Mohawk, American Electric Power Company, and Houston Light &
I7 Power.
18 If I can have the first slide, please?
I9 (Slide) 20 This has been gone through a little bit before, so 21 I will try to move through these rather quickly.
22 I think you will find that one of the cornerstones 23 of our position is reflected in the summary from the PRDC case 24 that Ms. Weiss cuoted from before. And that case said that the
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l 25 nuclear technology is an evolving discipline which contemplates 2356 147 l
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that while chcnges in advancement may be made, nevertheless, 2
prior designs are not to be deemed inadequate or unsafe.
That was a Supreme Court ruling.
And I would presume 3
a that they contemplated that new information would become 5
available as time went on.
6 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: You are not saying that once 7
something has been approved, it is approved forever, are you?
8 MR. EDWARDS:
I am saying new info rmation does 9
not necessarily establish the inadequacy of existing designs 10 and existing hardware.
11 The Petition for Emergency and Remedial Action of 12 November lith,
'77, after its denial, was followed by a Petition 13 for Reconsideration, and that was granted in May of
'78.
14 And in '79, we had the Motion for Expedited Decision-15 making.
That suggested shutdown of operating plcnts, a 16 moratorium on new construction peanits and licenses, and cessation 17 of activities of construction at construction sites.
18 Now, our impression of the allegation by the UCS 19 is that the Staf f has waivered minimum safety requirements.
I i
20 And apparently this assumption, or this assertion derives from 21 the fact that as a result of new information an impressive array:
22 for criteria for evaluation of fire protection has been i
developed. This appears as guidance for new plants in Reg Guide !
23 24 1.120.
rene amon n. inc.
l 25 It also has been used as a basis for analysis of 2356 148 l
23 I
existing plants in Branch Technical Position 9.5-1.
mm 2
And, it provides a basis to identify areas for 3
corrective measures and this basis has been applied against d
existing, plants.
5 These corrective measures have been instituted of 6
scheduled.
7 Now, the UCS characterizes this as an activity or 8
as a relaxation of regulations. And our position is that is 9
exactly not the case. The plants have been carefully reviewed 10 against these criteria, they were carefully reviewed when they II were licensed, and subsequent to that the reviews have 12 continued.
I3 And I would like to characterize just
>s a background, Id the type of review that is involved when the NRC has evaluated 15 fire protection. They have looked at a facility, they have 16 identified areas where potentially redundant systems could be l
l 17 affected if a fire occurred, and they then said a fire does i
18 occur at that location and then tried to judge whether or not --f i
and then based on that imposition of the assumed fire, tried to !
I 20 judge whether damage would have occurred to both of the redundant l
21 shutdown trains.
I 22 And in the case where the conclusion was yes, they l
i 23 have then required hardware modifications.
But, in addition 24 l gg - that, they required modification of administrative controls.
FMerst Reponers. Inc.
I 25 Now, that's a very conservative way to approach fire' l
l 2356 149
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protection.
In talking with the fire protection engineers 2
that I've had the opportunity to talk with in the last days or 3
so, this review has been on a biplant basis. In cEvidual plants a
have been considered against this body of information.
~
5 But, the application of this information to the 6
individual plants is a very specific process.
In other words, 7
understanding how systems are constructed and how they relate to 8
one another, certain improvements can be selected that will 9
optimize the fire protection,and application across the board of 10 all of the requirements that have been derived is not the way 11 to derive an optimal protective suit or system for the plant.
12 The Browns Ferry Report, the special review group 13 points that out repeatedly in their report.
14 May I have the next slide, please?
15 (Slide) i 16 The UCS suggests that electrical equipment is l
l 17 inadequate to perform its function; that it isn't environmentally l
18 qualified.
And there was a specific standard that has been i
19 cited, IEEE 323 of 1974.
l 20 The suggestion is, if the equipment does not i
21 satisfy the requirements of that document, that the plant should.
I 22 be ordered shut down.
23 The Staff's position on this matter, is that the 24 relief requested isn't commensurate with the situation; that swer.i neponers w.
25 electrical equipment is qualified.
2356 150 i
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Our position is that the electrical equipment is 2
qualified to sustain itself in the adverse requirement that it 3
would seek under accident conditions. It is selected by the a
design engineers in the process of making their designs at the P ant and selecting equipment.
And that in the cases where the l
5 6
documentation does not exist, that doesn't necessarily mean that 7
the equipment itself is not adequate.
8 The point I am trying to make is that the design 9
engineer has always considered the environmental aspects of the 10 requirements that are placed on a piece of equipment when we 11 select it.
12 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
Don't we have instances, in 13 fact, in which this equipment itself has been inadequate?
14 These aren't instances in which the documentation 15 has been missing.
16 MR. EDWARDS:
We have situations where equipment has 17 been identified -- I'm going to say this wrong.
Is In a lot of cases we have a lot of equipment replaced:
19 at operating plants. In many of the cases, the equipment was l
20 replaced for expediency reasons.
i 21 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
I'm talkingabout connectors.
22 MR. EDWARDS:
Yes.
Didn'tyouhavesomeconnectors!
23 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
24 l that failed some tests?
e were n eoneri,ine.
25 MR. EDWARDS: I believe there were some connectors 2356 151
26 j
that failed some tests.
2 COMMISSIONER AEEARNE: So there have been some 3
equipment that did not meet the standards?
4 MR. EDWARDS:
Yes, sir.
5 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: So that the absence of the 6
documentation, you feel, nevertheless, still doesn't -- should 7
be of no cause for concern, even though you note that there have 8
been some equipment that did fail the tests?
I 9
COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
I wonder if I could follow 10 that up and ask you how you would deal with a situation 11 where the documentation is inadequate?
12 MR. EDWARDS:
I could show you situations where -
l i
13 people have found ~ documentation to be inadequate. Quite often 14 they have replaced the equipment with equipment that is 15 documented.
16 The alternative of chasing back through whole l
l 17 construction records, you quite often find a dead end.
Or, i
18 going through a test program is much more lengthy.
The expedient 19 thing to do is to buy a new piece of equipment and install it j
i 20 complete with its documentation.
i 21 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
But what, in your view, is 22 the right course for NRC to take in these situations?
23 You are here, after all, to help us make reasonable 24 decisions.
Federal Reporters, Inc.
25 MR. EDWARDS: I think the NRC Staff is proceeding along 2356 152
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the course that it needs to take. It is gathering information.
2 One of the requirements of the bulletin that was pointed 3
out that is required to be fully responded to in June, is that 4
in the course of review, if any equipment is identified as 5
inadequate, there is a 24-hour notification requirement immediately 6
to the Staff.
And to my knowledge, that immediate notification 7
hasn't taken place.
8 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: So, do you feel though, that 9
if thereare equipment that cannot be documented, then based upon 10 I think what you were just saying, would you feel it appropriate 11 then for that~ equipment to be replaced with equipment that is?
12 MR. EDWARDS: That is a course that has been taken 13 quite often.
14 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
But are you saying that's what 15 you believe is the appropriate course?
16 MR. EDWARDS:
I believe that's the appropriate course.
17 I believe in the current environment, that's what's 18 done by the utilities.
j 19 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
What's the option?
{
20 MR. EDWARDS: The option available to the utility j
21 today is to take a similar piece of equipment and rur. it i
22 through a test program.
23 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
Maintaining the other equipment 24 in'. service, meanwhile?
Federal Reporters, Inc.
25 MR. EDWARDS:
Maintaining the other equipment in 2356 153
28 service, yes.
1 I take it, the context of your question to be, is it reas nable to assume that the public health and safety is not protected while the Staff takes its intended action?
4 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: Well, the context of my question was, I was trying to follow -a chain which seemed to start with -- that there was no cause to be concerned that 7
there was no documentation; which then seemed, sell, yes, 8
there might be because some equipment had failed; to then try to see what your conclusion was, what was the appropriate action to take if there was no documentation available.
And I'm not sure -- is it y cur position then that the.
appropriate action should be to have that equipment then j
qualified?
I thought you had just a little while earlier said that that might be a lengthy and expensive undertaking.
MR. EDWARDS:
Excuse me just a minute. I think I have just dug a very deep hole, and I'd like to talk to somebody;.
18 i
(Laughter.)
l (C6mmenters conferring.)
MR. WILEY: This is Charlie Wiley of Duke Power.
j 21 I
First of all, I would like to say that I think what 22 they are going to find as a review of 7901, is by far you are i
going to find documentation that verifies that the equipment is Federet Reporters, Inc.
t 25 '
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Now, in those instances where you find that-the 2
documentation is inadequate, or is hard to come by in these 3
older plants, the option is either to requalify the equipment 4
or to replace them.
5 Now, I think what youare going to find is, you are 6
going to find from minor hardware, off-the-shelf-type items, 7
that possibly you are not going to find the documentation for.
8 But by and large,the important safety-related equipment has 9
adequate documentation.
10 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: When you say " minor hardware,"
I 11 would that include electrical connectors on which safety-related 12 equipment depended?
13 MR. WILEY:
It may include terminal blocks and things.
14 of that type.
15 I think the conne ctor issue has already been l
16 addressed. And these plants have been thoroughly reviewed in l,
17 regard to the qualification of connectors and penetrations and i
18 ca lles. This was done several years ago.
19 And as far as I know, just about every -- well, 20 every plant was reviewed by the Staff and adequate documentation!
21 was either produced or the connectors were eliminated or 22 replaced.
23 So I don't think you are going to find much there.
l l
24 And at least the reviews that we have done, we have found very Foceral Reporters. Inc.
25 little that we could not support by documentation.
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Now, you have got to remember that this has been 2
going on several years and some companies have gone out of 3
businest in the meantime. So it gets very difficult, sometimes, a
to find the documentation on some of the equipment that has 5
been -- the companies have gone out of business.
But the 6
equipment, the safety equipment for these plants were qualified 7
under the specifications of the qualification program by the 8
designers. And then the qualification tests were conducted, and 9
documentation was produced in just about all the cases of i
10 safety-related equipment.
11 Now the question is whether or not it meets IEEE 12 323 1974.
And I believe the statement was made that IEEE 323 13 1971 was inadequate.
14 If that is the case, '74 is too, because 1974 version 15 is about 90 percent version of 1971 version.
There has only 1
16 been some additional identification of the sequences of tests l
i 17 and things like that made in the later version.
j 18 I don't know whether that answers the cuestion or I
19 not.
l 20 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Why don't you go ahead, i
i 21 Mr. Edwards.
l 22 MR. EDWARDS: Thank you.
I 23 May I have the next slide, please.
l 24 (Slide)
Federsi Reporters, Inc.
25 In its Motion for Expedited Decisionmaking, the UCS 2356 156 i
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cites failures of various equipment as the basis for their 2
need to have some immediate relief.
3 The four tests that they specifcally cite involve 4
ceramic fiber blankets, sprinkler heads, configuration of 5
cable trays which we have heard before, and cable coating, 6
fire retardancy.
7 The test results are then cited as the basis for 8
saying that protection within operating plants is inadequate.
9 The first one, ceramic fiber blankets; the test to configuration involved a vertical cable tray that was wrapped II with a fiber blanket that extended down to the floor level.
12 A flammable liquid was poured on the floor at the base of the 13 cable tray and ignited.
And the liquis was drawn up inside the Id blanket like a wick, and the fire was severely damaging to the 15 cables.
16 Well, the point is, that configuration does not 17 exist in any plant.
The only usage of blankets to date are 18 two proposed installations, where the blankets were laid i
across horizontal cable trays, which in testing at B&W test l
l9 20 facilities, has been demonstrated to be adequate in protecting i
21 cable trays.
22 And the test has shown that you would never want to 23 install a vertical tray with a blanket on it extending down 24 to the floor unless tha t floor area were orotected so that
. Federal Reporters, Inc.
~
25 i fluids couldn't flow in under the blanket.
2356 157 i
i
32 mm 1
But, it doesn't correspond to a configuration in the 2
plant.
3 The second one, the sprinkler head test. The a
sprinkler heads were located on a header, and three heads were 5
placed on it in a position to activate under the heat of the 6
fire.
The header was valved off, and the decision in the test 7
was to wait until all three heads had fused and then turn the 8
water on to the header.
9 Well, that's r.ot the way sprinkler systems are 10 built. And the ones in the plants have charged water available 11 at the heads.
If any one of the heads activated, you would have 12 water on the fire.
13 To say that sprinkler heads are no good just flies 14 in the face of experience in a lot of other industries where 15 sprinkler heads are always used.
l I
16 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: When you say the configuration!
17 doesn't match up with those actually in place in the plants, 18 does AIF disagree with what I understand UCS to be saying, that ;
I 19 the Staff -- that in fact some plants might be worse off than
[
I i
20 the configurations used in tests?
I 21 MR. EDWARDS:
I don't believe that was in reference l
22 to -his particular configuration.
I'm not exactly sure how.
j 23 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: It needn't be this one.
Just !
24 a general proposition.
-Feersi Reconers. Inc.
25 Is that something you would disagree with?
2356 158 i
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MR. EDWARDS: No, I don't think so.
2 The conclusion that the Staff reached, as I said 3
before,2was on the basis of an on-site inspection visit of a a
Staff team that incorporated with it, a fire-protection 5
specialist.
They looked at the results of the fire 6
hazards analys.s that the licensees had performed, they 7
examined the physical facilities under the type of ground rules 8
that I outlined before.
9 In the case where they did conclude that that fire 10 could be damaging, they required hardware modifications, as I 11 said before.
12 In the interim, befor e.the modifications could be 13 installed, they have required a number of specific administrative 14 controls at those plants. And I believe that one of the Staff 15 reports to you, delineated in an Appendix, there were three 16 plants, I believe, and delineated what specifically had been 17 done at those plants in the areas where they had reached the 18 conclusion that there could be damage.
19 Now, I assume that's what they mean by the l
20 configuration could be more extreme.
l 21 The cable tray test, IEEE 384, and Reg Guide 175 22 specifies separation of cable trays.
23 (At 2:40 p.m., Chairman Hendrie arrived.)
l i
24 Now, these separation distances are based on the i
.reer. Aneners ine.
i 25 assumption that an internal fault in the cable was the i
2356 159 l
a
34 mm 1
initiator of the fire.
And the test program that was conducted 2
looking at the cable trays, involved an external fire.
And there was damage to the cables. But the damage 3
2 a
is more of a consequence of the inadequacy of the testing, I 5
believe, than inadequacy of the requirements.
o The standards, as I said before, clearly state that 7
for external hazards, the degree of separation has to be 8
commensurate with the degree of hazard.
9 Another conclusion reached by UCS, is that fire-10 retardant coatings will burn, and that's true. In actuality, 11 the conclusions that Sandia Laboratories reached was that the 12 test showed that all coatings tested offered some measure of 13 additional protection.
14 However, there is a wide range of relative effective-15 ness of the different coatings.
16 But, evey went on to conclude that in no case was 17 there fire propagation from one coated tray of cables to another.
18 So the addition of coated materials is certainly an incremental i 19 improvement. It doesn't constitute a degradation.
i 20 The fire programs that are in place,that were in l
21 place prior to Browns Ferry, constitute a body of knowledge 22 represented in the National Fire Codes, that over years of f
23 experience in the electric power industry have proven satisfac-24 tory.
The inference that you draw from the UCS petition is
. Federal Reporters, Inc.
25 that we started -- that we are still trying to get up to k
2356 160
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ground zero.
2 And our position is that that's not the case at all.
3 The original programs were quite adequate, we have new 4
information --
5 COK1ISSIONER AHEARNE: You feel the programs prior to 6
Browns Ferry were quite adequ' ate?
l 7
MR. EDWARDS:
They were based on experience.
8 They would have been generally very successful.
9 We got new information at Browns Ferry and that was 10 factored in immediately.
11 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: Well let's see, what was 12 the new information that you got at Browns Ferry?
13 MR. EDWARDS: One of the principal things that I 14 recall on Browns Ferry was that if you have an electrical fire, 15 you are going to 1.av e to use water on it.
16 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
Is that a surprise.
17 MR. EDWARDS:
Fifteen minutes after the water was 18 used at Browns Ferry, the fire was out.
19 MR. SAWYER:
Ed Sawyer from Yankee.
20 It was no surprise to fire protection engineers 21 that water will put out a fire in electrical cables. The i
1 22 surprise was that you could do it without getting killed, i
23 Most fire protection engineers for years have main-24 tained that water is the best suppression agent for about Federal Reporters, Inc, 25 anything.
However, it is difficult to convince a fireman that 2356 161
36 I
he should put a conductive material like water on a fire which mm 2
is in electrical cable.
3 It was found out at Browns Ferry that in fact it d
could be done. The plants now --
certainly the ones that I 5
represent -- have put this in as a criterion in all firefighting 6
that is done.
If you can shut the power off before you use 7
water, do it. If you can't, then just go ahead and use water.
8 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: Do I understand VJu Correctly?
9 Are you saying that the fire itself didn't indicate.
10 any deficiencies in fire protection programs that were in place II before Browns Ferry?
I2 MR. SAWYER:
I think that there are certainly I3 indications that the programs at utilities needed some beefing 14 up because of the fire at Browns Ferry.
One of them happened 15 to be the use of water on electrical cables.
16 Another happened to be the response time for getting I7 to a fire.
18 In terms of the suppression systems that were I9 available at the utility, I don ' t think that the Browns Ferry
)
20 fire indicated very much.
Most utilities have had suppression !
21 l systems in various parts of the plant, on cables, in all other l
22 i
areas.
23 So, I do feel that the Browns Ferry fire did show 24 some problems that existed in utilities' fire protection programs,
. Federal Reporters. Inc.
25 but I don't think that there were any great deficiencies.
2356 162
'i
37 MR. EDWARDS:
T int 's not to say that there weren ' t mm 2
a number of improvements as a result of Browns Ferry. And the 3
improvements really focused on the preventing and the detecting 4
and the early extinguishment aspects of fire fighting; 5
administrative controls over work procedures were intensified in 6
the area of understanding materials and the equipment that was 7
going to be used, and where the work was going to be done; and 8
requiring consideration of the potential for fire; controls 9
over combustibles and ignition sources --
10 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: Your 30 minutes are up. But 11 we have asked a number of questions.
I propose you take another 12 five minutes.
13 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: Let me ask one more question 14 before you go on.
15 I just had never heard Browns Ferry described 16 quite this way before.
If it was a surprise to discover that 17 you could put water on an electrical fire without getting i
18 killed, what did the people who put the water on the electrical i 19 fire at Browns Ferry expect to have happen when they did it?
20 MR. SAWYER: I can't answer what the people expected 21 to have happen.
All I can say is that fire protection engineersj i
22 have known for a long time that you can put water on electrical ;
i 23 equipment and expect thct it will extinguish the fire.
24 Electrical engineers and electrical people for a long time have '
FMersI Reponers, inc.
4 25,
said that we don't want to do that because of the potential of I
2356 163
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danger of electrocution to the people using that water.
2 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: And in your view now, it would 3
be a more generally accepted tenet that you could safely put 4
water on an electrical fire in a nuclear plant?
5 MR. SAWYER: We would prefer not to put water on an 6
energized cable or piece of electrical equipment..But we know 7
that it can be done with a minimum of danger now to the people 8
putting out the fire, if you have proper equipment, if you use 9
proper procedures.
10 MR. EDWARDS: Let me go ahead and finish the kinds 11 of improvements that are very significant in terms of fire 12 protection.
13 Fire protection as explained to me is very much a 14 logical, straightforward, common sense kind of process.
It is 15 not necessarily esoteric at all, it is not necessarily involved 16 in a lot of sophisticated hardware.
I 17 It involves the kinds of administrative controls I I
4 18 was talking about before that give real significant payback i
19 in improvement, like fire brigade training and integration of 20 training with offsite fire fighting units; familiarity with the 21 facility of offsite fire fighting units; availability of 22 equipment in critical locations and adequate quantities of l
23 equipment in reserve.
24 As a result of Browns Ferry, people spent a great FMetal Reporters, lN.
25 deal of time at all plants upgrading cable penetrations and 2356 164 i
39 mm 1
firestops.
And there has been a very much increased management 2
involvement in the fire program; increased on site inspection.
3 There is now an IEE module for fire protection alone.
4 I know the principal inspectors at all the plants have a 5
quarterly check of areas considered to be significant or 6
important in the facilities -- and those are made -- NRC pays 7
a great deal of -- NRC I&E inspector pays a great deal of 8
attention now to the fire insurance inspectors who are 9
independent of the utilities and have their own set of codes 10 and standards and are very concerned about fire prrtsction 11 from protection of the investment standpoint.
12 So that on site inspection, besides the efforts of 13 the licensees, have upgraded significantly.
These improvements 14 and hardware modifications that are underway, provide reasonable 15 assurance that the plants are being operated safely and are 16 protected from a fire-protected standpoint.
i 17 Speaking as an industry, our conclusion is that the l
18 Request for Reconsideration of the Order of April '78 is 19 inappropriate; that the heavy burden cf proof that comes with i
20 the Request for Reconsideration has not been borne --
t 21 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: We have already granted 22 reconsideration, so that's besides the point.
23 The question is what we can do with it.
24 MR. EDWARDS: We don't believe that significant new Jeme n monm. inc. '
25 issues have been presented. We think the Staff is taking 2356 165
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appropriate action.
2 We don't see any basis to modify your original 3
Me_morandum and Order, and we think the Petition should be a
denied.
5 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: Thank you, Mr. Edwards.
6 MR. EDWARDS: Yes, sir.
7 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Ms. Weiss, you have got 8
a more minutes.
9 MS. WEISS: Mr. Gilinsky, much as I find it amazing, 10 I find I don't feel it necessary to rebut that argument.
We 11 would be happy, if the Commissioners have on reflection, any.
12 '
questions, we would be happy to take those.
12 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
Let me come back again to 14 this business about the standards for shutti ry down all plants 15 with deficiencies.
16 You basically said that if the deficiencies -- don't 17 let me articulate it for you -- but for significant safety defect, l
18 then even if it affected all operating reactors, you would say j
19 that upon its discovery they should be shut down as fast as they!
20 could be brought to a cold shutdown condition?
I 21 MS. WEISS: Well, I certainly think that that is a 22 prima facie result of that.
We hav e taken the position in the 23 past -- and I understand this to be the question that you are t
24 fundamentally asking, whether there is some other sort of risk FMerst Reconers. Inc.
25 that you can consider.
2356 166 i
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mm There has been established a threat to safety from 2
the operation of those plants.
And essentially the question is 3
whether'you can consider any threat of public health or safety or economics from the shutdown of the plant which might 5
countervail the threat posed to the public while they are 6
operating.
7 Our legal position is that the law prevents you, 8
essentially, from considering those.
It says your duty is to 9
assure the safety of the public from the plants, and if you 10 can't do it one way, you have got to do it the other way, which 11 is to shut them down.
However, if you can, consider other 12 factors, and maybe on sort of an emergency sort of an action you.
13 can.
We believe that it is a matter of balancing the 15 threat, balancing of the real threat from the operation of the 16 plant against the real threat from the shutdown of the plant.
1 I7 And as we argued to you in the context of the Babcock & Wilcox t
I8 case, that has got to be a lot more than assertion of a power I
19 supply pr-oblem. And we -- very early on I think the original 20 petition suggested a formulation that you might use if it were 21 your belief that you could consider the countervailing sorts 22 of factors. And we suggested that if a licensee could demonstrate 23 to you that a shutdown of his particular plant would result, 24 Federsi Reporters, Inc.
25 of power from outside, all measures that he could take to shed I
i 2356 167 i
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load, dust that would present a health and safety problem 2
because, for example, of hospitals blacking out, and neighbor-3 hoods blacking out, that then you would have to balance those 4
two threats and ' view question of assessing the risk on either 5
side.
6 But you certainly haven't yet heard anything to 7
suggest that there is a real risk on the other side.
8 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: Would you take cost into I
9 account in setting the standards in the first place?
As opposed i
10 to taking it into account in an enforcement?
I i
11 MS. WEISS: You mean establishing the minimum l
12 regulation?
13 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: Yes.
14 MS. WEISS:
I haven't neard any satisfactory 15 formulation of how one could take cost into account except the 16 arguments that one hears that above a certain level of safety 17 you have to show that the return is sufficient when you get l
l 18 into higher increments, yc: know, in order to order those higher 19 increments of safety.
20 l But I think that we have always taken the position I
! that the question to ask yourself is whether the plant is safe 21 22 or not, and you have regulations which essentially provide you 23 with the definition of whether a plant is safe or not.
And 24 we have resisted the argument which has been offered to you Federal Reporters, Inc.
25 that it is a question of safe enough for new but not safe enough 2356 168
43 1
for then.
2 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: No. Well, in formulating 3
those regulations would you take cost ~into account?
4 MS. WEISS:
De you have an answer to that?
5 I really haven't thought much about that.
I haver't 6'
heard any satisfactory way that one would consider them.
7 But, Mr. Pollard may have.
8 MR. POLLARD: If you want to ch alg e your basic way 9
of running this agency and rev'.ating nuclear power, I suppose 10 you can think to do that.
II But we came before you with this Petition with an 12 existing set of regulations which your Appeal Board has saiu, 13 meeting these regulations is a necessary prerequisite to 14 o btaining a license. And therefore we argue that meeting those 15 regulations is a necessary prerequisite to continued operation.
16 Now you, of course, have Be option as you have i
17 done in the past, of waiving your regulations. You could, in i
18 this particular case, waive the requirements of general 19 design criteria 3 and 4 and say to the public for some period 20 of time, which is 4:erencially what t!.e Staff is saying, we are 21 going to al'.c; t-
., ants to operate even though we know that 22 if a fire occurs we couM have a meltdown, and even though we I
23 have some doubt as to whether or not if a loss of coolant 24 accident occurs the equipment won't work.
Federal Reporters, Inc.
25 It would be analogous to the Staff esming before you,
2356 169 a
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44 I
and arguing, now that we know from Three Mile Island the 2
emergency core cooling computer codes are no good, we are 3
going t6 rely upon the low prdability of having a loss of coolanu 4
accident as a basis for allowing the rest of the plants to 5
continue to operate.
6 And you have done.that in the past, you have waived 7
all of the requirements of the boiling water reactor containment 8
buildings to allow them to continue to operate.
9 But the fundamental question you are asking is, 10 should we take cost into account in writing regulations.
I II submit, sir, that's a subject for a different forum than this 12 particular Petition.
13 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Let me ask you a bout the 14 application of the single-failure criterion --
l l
15 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: Vic, before you move to anotherj 16 could I qualify that?
I I7 COMMISSIONER GILNSKY:
Sure.
I i
18 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
I'm not sure, Bob, that that i
l9 was the point Vic was asking.
I 20 What I thought he might have been asking, assuming 21 you meet the regulations with equipment that is in place, and l
22 the question still comes, you have now, by whatever standards 23, you have set up met your definition of safe, there is still the 24 ne.it question beyond that, should you put in additional Fmeral Reconers, inc.
25 equipment. And in that additional equipment -- or require 2356 170
45 mm 1
additional equipment put in -- should you then take cost into 2
account?
3 MR. POLLARD: I think, yes, that could be a correct 4
answer of yes there, because you have already done that as 5
well with your Appendix I, as-low-as-rea sonably-achievable.
6 with Part 20 and Part 100, sets some absolute limits to the 7
amount of radiation exposure. But you go above that and say it 8
would be nice to reduce the radiation exposure as-low-as-9 reasonably-achievable, and you set up a cost-benefit test for 10 doing that.
Yes, sir.
11 I also should add that in imposing some fundamental 12 requirements in the equipment qualification on the plant, I 13 also recognize there might be differing ways to implement a 14 basic requirement, and clearly cost would come into assessing 15 that. You are not in an existing plant going to tear down the 16
-)ntrol building for the purpose of installing separate 17 c..'ble spreading rooms. That might only be an option on future l
l 18 pr nts.
I i
19 So, in the existing plants you might have to go i
i 20 about it a different way to provide the three-hour fire barrier ;
I 21 and your choice in doing so is clearly a matter of cost.
i l
22 But the fundamental safety requirement would still be met.
l 23 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: You talked about applying a 24 I single-f ailure criterion in the context of fire protection.
i j
-Feere neoonen. ine.
25 That seems to imply some basic reference fire that you would i
l 2356 171
46 I
mm apply.
2 I wonder if you could expand on that a little bit.
3 hm. POLLARD: Well, I will j ust try and express my a
understanding of what the Staff's position is with respect to 5
fire.
6 The tests that they performed at Sandia with the 7
two gallons of heptane -- or perhaps that was Underwriters' 8
Laboratory -- they said they considered that to be a credible 9
fire, not necessarily the worst kind of fire.
And in the 10 analyses that are required under Regulatory Guide 120, as well 11 as the National Fire Protection Association, you do take some 12 account of the amount of combustible material that is present.
13 I clearly think that is a reasonable situation.
Id Well, what we are coming to you in this particular 15 case on fire asking to meet single failure is, we are not 16 postulating a fire. All we are reporting to you is what the I7 Staff itself has reported to you.
IS "We require modifications.
l And I read now from their February 12, 1979 filing.
l l9 i
20 They --
1 I
21
. require modifications because of a few
'2 specific plant locations where the Staff does not 23 have reasonable assurance that a postulated fire will 2 '*
not damage both redundant divisions of shutdown
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systems."
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I
47 mm 1 Now your question gets to the heart of what is the 2
fire being postulated?
3 I don't know.
I leave that up to the Staff.
4 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
Ms. Weiss, on page 21 of your 5
March 7 Petition or Motion, you indicate that this proceeding 6
shows that any other course of action than shutdown of the 7
plant, violates the Commission's regulations.
8 Could you tell me which regulations you have in 9
mind specifically?
10 MS. WEISS:
Well, the ones that we fundamentally 11 rely on are General Design Criteria 3, General Design Criteria 12 4 -- I always get them mixed up, but one applies to fires and 13 one applies :to environmental qualifications -- and 10 CFR 50.55 (a),
1 14 I think, the single failure.
15 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
Thank you.
16 MS. WEISS: Those are listed in some great detail in l
l 17 the original petition.
j 18 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: Well, I think we have no 19 further questions.
I 20 Thank you very much.
i 21 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: Does anyone else have anything 22 they want to offer?
l 23 (No response) i l
24 l COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Thank you.
FMersl Reporters, lx.
25 I (Whereupon, at 3:05 p.m.,
the hearing in the above-entitled matter was adjourned.)
p3gg j73
1 CR4887 DISCLAIMER This is an unofficial transcript of a meeting of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Ccmmission held on ~ Wednesday, 16 May 1979 in the Commissions's offices at 1717 H Street, N. W., Washington, D. C.
The meeting was open to public attendance and observation.
This transcrip has not been reviewed, corrected, or edited, and it may contain inaccuracies.
The transcript is intended solely for general informational purposes.
As provided by 10 CFR 9.103, it is not part of the formal or informal record of decision of.the matters discussed.
Expressions of opinion in this transcript do not necessarily reflect final determinations or beliefs.
No pleading or other paper may be filed with the Commission in any proceeding as the result of or addressed to any statement or argument contained herein, except as the Commission may authorize.
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t:
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2 cr4887 MELTZER/mI UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 2
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 3
5 Public Meeting 6
AFFIRMATION SESSION 7
79-13 8
9 10 Room 1130 II 1717 H Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C.
Wednesday, 16 May 1979 14 Hearing in the above-entitled matter was corvened, pursuant to vote, at 3:05 p.m., JOSEPH M. HENDRIE,' Chairman, presiding.
PRESENT:
18 JOSEPH M. HENDRIE, CHAIRMAN VICTOR GILINSKY, COMMISSIONER RICHARD KENNEDY, COMMISSIONER PETER BRADFORD, COMMISSIONER JOHN AHEARNE, COMMISSIONER Messrs. Chilk and Bickwit.
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3 N
1 PgqqEEglggg 2
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Can we construct en'ough order 3
at this end of the room so that the Commission can do a couple f
~~
4 of affirmation items.
5 MR. CHILK:
Two affirmation items.
6 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: Steady now.
7 The first thing I would like to do is to ask 8
my colleagues to join me in voting to hold a meeting on less 9
than one week's notice for these affirmation items.
10 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
Aye.
11 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Aye.
12 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Aye.
~
l
~.!
13 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
Aye.
14 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: So ordered.
15 SEm?
16 MR. CHILK:
Two affirmation items concerning 17 Propposed orders for Toledo Edison dealing with Davis-Besse 18 nuclear power statio Unit No. 1.
19 The second order being the Florida Power Corporation 20 dealing with Crystal River Unit No. 3.
21 The orders relate to the shutdown of those 4
22 installations in accordance with the agreements between the 23 licensee and the Staff.
24 It is my understanding that you have all agreed to Ace Federal Reporters, Inc.
25 vote in favor of these orders, and I would now ask you to 7356 176
4 e w.
mm j affirm your votes.
2 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: Aye.
3 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: Aye.
a COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: Aye.
. s
.)
5 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Aye.
6 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: So ordered.
7 Is that it?
MR. CHILK: There is a third one floating around that 8
9 we had not put on that I just got this morning, and I don't 10 know whether any of you are prepared to address that matter as 11 Well-12 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Well, I think since we have an 13 affirmation session scheduled for tomorrow morning, I think ja the thing to do would be to vote a short notice on that item 15 for tomorrow morning. That would at least give you people a 16 chance to --
17 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: Which'one is this?
18 MR. CHILK: Arkansas Power & Light'.
19 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
All of these,'I assume, afe coming 20 through in the same format as far as I have been able to tell. I 21 think it is straightforward.
22 But, it will just give you a chance to check it out.
23 Okay, so that concludes the affirmation session.
24 (Whereupon, at 3:08 p.m., the hearing in the above-
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25 entitled matter was adjourned.)
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