ML19263D194
| ML19263D194 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 02/05/1979 |
| From: | Costello J, Hale C NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19263D193 | List: |
| References | |
| REF-QA-99900509 NUDOCS 7903260049 | |
| Download: ML19263D194 (12) | |
Text
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0 VENDOR INSPECTION REPORT U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT REGION IV Report No. 99900509/79-01 Program No. 51200 Company:
Stone and Webster Engineering Corporation P. O. Box 2325 Boston, Massachusetts 02107 Inspection at:
Boston, Massachusetts Inspection Conducted; January 22-26, 1979 Inspectors:
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/ n N J. R.,Costello, Principal Inspector, Vendor Date I'nspection Branch f
QTL, '. *Q O-S'lf C. J.-4 tale, Chief, Vendor Program Evaluation Date Section, Vendor Inspection Branch 9_ C '7 k
/r Approved by:
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C. J. ifale,) Chief, Vendor Program Evaluation Date Sectiorr;1endor Inspection Branch Summary Inspection on January 22-26, 1979 (99900509/79-01)
Areas Inspected:
Implementation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B criteria in the areas of design input, followup on a regional request, action on a previous inspection finding, and a Management Meeting.
The inspection involved forty-one (41) hours on site by two (2) USNRC inspectors.
Results:
In the areas inspected, no deviations or unresolved items were identified.
79032600 %
. DETAILS A.
Persons Contacted G. J. Ashworth, Cognizant Engineer, Lower Pump Cubicle K. M. Bendiksen, Assistant Project Engineer W. H. Bohlke, Project Engineer Y. Can, Electrical Engineer S. L. Chapin, Jr., Lead Electrical Engineer E. P. Doherty, Supervisor of Design Control Procedures W. M. Eifert, Assistant Chief Engineer, Engineering Assurance S. M. Feldman, Cognizant Engineer S. Johnis, Cognizant Engineer, Structural
- 0. W. Lowe, Principal Engineer, Structural Mechanics L. D. Nace, Chief Engineer, Engineering Assurance D. Oakes, Assistant Chief Structural Engineer A. L. Rinaldi, Electrical Support Engineer R. J. R. Rossman, Electrical Engineer D. A. Shaw, Section Head Auditing R. J. Spahl, Cognizant Engineer, Neutron Shield Tank G. E. Turnley, Cognizant Engineer, Reactor Coolant Pump Supports L. S. Varone, Cognizant Engineer B.
Action on Previous Inspection Findings (Closed) Unresolved Item (Report No. 78-05):
Present implementing procedures and the proposed Revision C to Topical Report SWSQAP1-74A which had been submitted to the NRC for approval, permit items which do not conform to procurement documents to be reported as unsatisfac-tory and returned to the vendor.
The Topical Report (Revision B) stated that items which do not conform to specifications shall be reported as nonconformances.
Revision C to Topical Report SWSQAP1-74 has now been approved by the NRC, on November 22, 1978, and this item is considered resolved.
C.
Management Meeting 1.
Objectives The objectives of this meeting were to accomplish the following:
a.
Meet with Stone and Webster (S&W) management and those persons responsible for the administration of the QA Program.
b.
Describe the Licensee Contractor / Vendor Inspection Program (LCVIP) organization.
c.
Describe the LCVIP, its implementation, and the more significant changes in the LCVIP.
d.
Describe the Vendor Inspection Branch (VIB), inspection methods, and documentation.
e.
Describe the flRC evaluation of the ASME system of inspection.
f.
Summarize our previous insnections of S&W.
2.
Method of Accomplishment The preceding objectives were accomplished during a meeting on January 26, 1979.
a.
Attendees were:
W. H. Bohlke, Project Engineer R. G. Burns, Chief Engineer N. B. Cleveland, Vice President, Quality Assurance W. R. Curtis, Engineering Assurance Engineer W. M. Eifert, Assistant Chief Engineer E. B. Fleming, Senior QA Program Administrator R. B. Kelly, QA Manager W. J. L. Kennedy, Vice President, Director of Engineering L. S. Maciejewski, Vice President, Engineering Manager R. I. Meissner, Assistant Chief Engineer L. D. flace, Chief Engineer D. Oakes, Assistant Chief Engineer W. L. Ramsden, QA Program Administrator C. O. Richardson, Project Manager b.
The VIB organization was described and its relationship ta NRC P.cgicT IV and the NRC Headquarters comnonent of the Office of Inspection and Enforcement.
c.
The LCVIP was described including its objectives, its implementation structure, and the more significant program changes relative to S&W.
d.
The conduct of VIB inspections was described and how our inspections are documented including the report, responses
_4 to reports, how proprietary information is handled, the Public Document Room, and the White Book.
The purpose, scope, and status of the NRC's two year e.
program for evaluation of the ASME inspection system as an acceptable independent third party were discussed.
f.
Our previous inspections of S&W were reviewed.
3.
Findings The meeting was well attended by S&W's management, a.
b.
No deviations or unresolved items were identified in this area of the inspection, nor were there any adverse trends indicated based on the results of our previous inspections of S&W.
D.
Lower Pump Cubicle 1.
Objectives Determine the circumstances that led to discovery of a a.
design deficiency in the lower pump cubicle which resulted
.- s in a 10 CFR 50.55e deficiency report and a stop work order.
b.
Determine the causes of the design deficiency.
Review corrective action taken by Stone and Webster.
c.
d.
Review preventive action taken by Stone and Webster.
2.
Methods of Accomplishment The preceding objectives were accomplished by discussions with cognizant engineering and quality assurance personnel plus an examination of the following documents:
(a)
Engineering Assurance Procedures EAP 2.10 Changes to Licensing Documents EAP 2.12 Control of Licensing Commitments EAP 5.3 Computerized and Manual Calculations EAP 5.4 Production Drawings (b)
Stop Work Orders E&DCR fio. 2PH-0020, dated August 7, 1978.
E&DCR fio. 2PH-0020A, dated September 18, 1978.
E&DCR fio. 2PH-0027, dated January 19, 1979.
(c)
Rework sketches:
12241-RF-140A 12241-RF-140B (d)
Drawing fio. 12241-RC Foundation Mat Details El.
690' 11", Reactor Containment.
(e)
Subsection 15.2.4.1, Figure 15.1-24, and Figure 15.1-25 of the Preliminary Safety Analysis Report (PSAR) of Beaver Valley Power Station - Unit flo. 2.
(f) Calculations - Lower Pump Cubicle (access shaft, beams and slabs, circular wall, interior radial walls, exterior radial walls).
C48.38 through C48.97 (original), dated April 23, 1973.
C48.162 through C48.255 (revised), dated October 1978.
(g)
Letter E. J. Woolever, Duquesue Light Company to Boyce H. Grier, United States fluclear Regulatory Commission, dated September 22, 1978.
(h)
Final Report on Lower Pump Cubicles at Beaver Valley Power Station - Unit fio. 2 (accompanied above letter Woolever to Grier).
3.
Findings a.
Construction organization requested a modification in placement of rebar to make it easier to pour concrete.
When structural design calculations were reviewed as a result of this request the following deficiencies were found:
(1) The ultimate strength design method committed to in PSAR Subsection 15.2.4.1 was not used.
(2) The Cofferdam was assumed to be a Category 1 structure which it was not.
Therefore, this structure could not be used in the calculations as a structure to withstand any lateral loads, i.e., the lower pump cubicle had to be designed to withstand the lateral earth pressures by itself as if no cofferdam existed.
(3) Loads imposed by backfill were omitted due to poor bookkeeping of all the loads to be considered.
These loads were of a minor nature.
b.
The causes of the above deficiencies were the result of human error.
These errors were committed in late 1973, and since that time Stone and Webster have made many programmatic changes to their QA Program which should decrease the possibility of this happening again.
Some of there changes are discussed in paragraph E.
Corrective action was taken by Stone and Webster immediately c.
following an initial review of the structural design calculations and consisted of the following steps:
(1)
Stop Work Order was issued.
(2) Calculations were completely revised.
(3) Lower pump cubicles were redesigned to r.eet PSAR criteria and take into account all applicable loads.
(4) Unconstructed portions of the structure were redesigned to the correct criteria and previously constructed elements are being supported as required to meet the design requirements.
d.
Preventive action was taken by a review of the design of the lower pump cubicle on other similar installations. A review of Beaver Valley 1 disclosed a different configuration and the design was judged to be adequate.
A review of North Anna 1 and 2 showed that the lower pump cubicle was en rock and the design was adequate.
Stone and Webster concluded that the problem was unique to Beaver Valley 2 and was not generic.
Since the design of the lower pump cubicle in late 1973, e.
the following programatic changes have been made in the QA Program which should decreare the probability of a similar type error happening again.
(1)
Geotechnical Design Criterior 2BVM-80 was published on June 23, 1977, and revised on March 15, 1978.
(2)
Structural Design Criterior 2BVM-5, originally issued on June 12, 1972, has been revised five (5) times with latest issue date April 1,1978.
(3)
Both of the above design criterior documents contain requirements which were widely scattered in the PSAR.
(4)
EAP 2.10 was issued on October 15, 1978, superseding EAP 3.2, which requires that when a design is not following a PSAR commitment the cognizant engineer must initiate a change tc the licensing document.
(5)
EAP 2.12 was issued on February 15, 1978, which requires the identification, documentation, and control of licensing commitments to ensure that these commitments are satisfied by Stone and Webster designs.
(6)
EAP 5.3 has been revised to require an independent objective review and to ensure that all source documents (e.g., drawings, specifications, calculations, codes, standards, and regulatory requirements) that are required as sources of input are used.
(7)
EAP 5.4 has been revised to require the responsible engineer to review project production drawings to ensure conformance with applicable licensing documents (as defined in EAP 2.10).
(8)
Institution of technical audits to determine the adequacy of engineering designs and calculations. The latest technical audit which was an analysis of the present design of the lower pump cubicle resulted in stop work order E&DCR dated January 19, 1979.
This stop work order was issued on the basis of the unpublished technical audit and resulted in a recheck of calculations for the present design.
This design has since been considered adequate.
(9)
Recheck of many design calculations by engineering organizations as the result of such technical audits as 12241-041 on Structural Engineering Calculations, and 12241-051 on Concrete Calculations.
f.
No deviations or unresolved item were identified in this area of the inspection.
E.
Design Inputs 1.
Objectives The objectives of this area of the inspection were to determine that:
a.
Procedures have been established and are being implemented that prescribe the system for control of those criteria, parameters, bases, or other design requirements upon which detailed final design is based.
b.
Design inputs are specified on a timely basis, their selection reviewed and approved, incorporated into the design documents, and changes in input are justified, reviewed, and approved.
c.
Commitments are properly translated into design inputs, as applicable to the following:
(1)
Basic functions (2)
Performance requirements (3) Regulatory requirements, codes, and standards (4) Design conditions (5) Loads (6)
Environmental conditions.
2.
Method of Accomplishment The preceding objectives were accomplished by an examination of:
a.
Section 17 of the Preliminary Safety Analysis Report (PSAR) of Beaver Valley Power Station - Unit No. 2.
b.
Implementing procedures to satisfy PSAR Quality Assurance Program commitments and to satisfy the intent of the objectives section above.
These procedures are as follows:
. (1) Quality Assurance Directives (QADs):
QAD-3.1 Review of Stone and Webster Technical Documents QAD-7.18 Preparation of S&W/NSSS Supplier Quality Assurance Interface Procedure (2) Engineering Assurance Procedures EAP 2.9 Preparation, Review, and Control of Licensing Reports EAP 2.10 Handling of Changes to Licensing Documents EAP 3.1 Verifications of Nuclear Power Plant Designs EAP 3.4 Nuclear Steam Supply System (NSSS) Supplier Design Interface with the Stone and Webster Design EAP 3.7 Preparation, Review, and Control of System Descriptions EAP 4.12 Processing of Master Specifications EAP 4.13 Processing of Project ipecifications EAP 5.3 Control of Manual and Computerized Calculations EAP 5.4 Review and Approval of Project Production Drawings EAP 5.9 Preparation, Review, and Approval of Flow Diar Ims EAP 5.10 Preparation, Review, and Approval of Logic Diagrams, and Logic Descriptions EAP 5.11 Preparation, Review, and Approval of Elementary Diagrams EAP 5.13 Preparations, Review, and Approval of One Line Diagrams
. EAP 5.18 Preparation, Review, and Approval of Functional Control Diagrams, and Functional Control Descriptions EAP 5.19 Preparation, Review, and Control of Structural Design Criteria EAP 5.21 Preparation, Review, and Control of QA Category I Electrical Design Criteria (3)
Project Procedures 2BVM-5 Structural Design Criteria 2BVM-10 Instructions for Preparation of Logic Diagrams and System Descriptions 2BVM-27 Containment Criteria 2BVM-28 NRC Criteria 2BVM-34 Instructions for Preparation and Control of the Project Manual 2BVM-35 Codes and Standards Requirements for Category I Specifications 2BVM-64 Instructions for Handling Design Changes, which effect descriptions contained in the PSAR occurring since Receipt of the Construc-tion Permit 2BVM-70 Seismic Data for Static Analysis and Testing 2BVM-80 Geotechnical Design Criteria c.
Documents to verify implementation of PSAR Quality Assurance Program commitments and to satisfy the intent of the objectives section.
There documents are as follows:
(1)
Specifications 2BVS-065 Reactor Containment Liner and Mat Embedment 2BVS-405 Reinforcing Steel for Reactor Containment
. 2BVS-416 Category I Concrete Embedment 2BVS-421 Steel Transmission Tower and Switchyard Structure 2BVS-511 Pipe Restraint and Support Structure 2BVS-324 Instrument Cable 300V 2BVS-307 4160V Metal Clad Switchgear 2BVS-363 AC-DC Vital Bus 2BVS-307 480V Unit Substations (2)
Drawings 12241-RA-36 Wall Sections Auxiliary Building 12241-RC-10 Control Room Extension Sections and Details 12241-RC-32 Safeguards Area Section and Details 12241-RC-48 Foundation Mat Details, Elevation 690' 11" Reactor Containment 12241-RC-49 Exterior Wall Elevation and Details Reactor Containment 12241-RC-249A Electrical Penetration Spacing Reactor Containment 12241-RV-9A Reactor Neutron Shield Tank Assembly 12241-RV-11A Reactor Coolant Pump Sepport Assembly 12241-RV-45A Pipe Break Restraints Main Steam Piping 12241-RV-68A Reactor Containment P.eirculation Pump Sump Screen 12241-RE-1AQ One Line Diagram Vital and Essential Busses
. 12241-RE-2N Wiring Diagram Emergency Trip Cabinet 12241-RE-3 DAB Wiring Diagram Emergency Shutdown Panel Section A 12241-RE-5K Wiring Diagram Reactor Trip Switchgear 12241-RE-35C Arrangement Electrical Penetrations Reactor Containment (3) Calculations 12241-SM-005 Design of Containment Structure -
Structural Mechanics Calculation 12241-GG-127 Neutron Shield Tank Stress Report 12241-NMB-126-BF Frame Stress Review 12241-NMB-170-JAA Feedwater Pipe Rupture Restraints 12241-NMB-89-DAA Design Embedment Loads for Feedwater Restraints Inside Containment 12241-E-27 480V Switchgear Short Circuit Calculations 3.
Findings In this area of inspection, no deviations from commitment or unresolved items were identified.
F.
Exit Meeting The management meeting (see Details Section C.) was combined with the exit meeting and was conducted with management representatives at the conclusion of the inspection on January 26, 1979.
Those in attendance were the same as indicated in paragraph C.2.a above.
The inspectors summarized the scope and findings of the inspec'. ion for those present at the meeting. Management representatives acknowledged the statements of the inspector.