ML19263C047
| ML19263C047 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Maine Yankee |
| Issue date: | 01/29/1979 |
| From: | Moody D Maine Yankee |
| To: | Reid R Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| WMY-79-6, NUDOCS 7902020192 | |
| Download: ML19263C047 (5) | |
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ENGINEERING OFFICE WESTBORO, MASSACHUSETTS 01581 ar 617-366-9011
' %. r S c. O January 29, 1979 WMY 79-6 B.3.2.1 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 Attention:
Robert W. Reid, Chief Operating Reactors Branch #4 Division of Operating Reactors
References:
(a) License No. DPR-36 (Docket No. 50-309)
(b) USNRC letter to R. H. Groce from R. W. Reid dated April 24, 1978,
Subject:
Amendment No. 37 to Facility Operating License
Dear Sir:
Subject:
Fire Protection Sys tem Information Submittal Table 3.2 of the Fire Protection Safety Evaluation Report attached as part of Reference (b) above required us to submit certain information on our proposed fire protection sys tem modifications. This letter contains that required information.
Item 3.2.3 Fire Barrier Penetration Seals The licensee will provide tes t data which demonstrates that existing fire barrier penetration seals are qualified to a rating commensurate with the fire loading on either side of the barrier or three hours, whichever is less (4.9).
This tes t data is not yet available. A contractor to conduct the test has been obtained, the test slab has been poured, and the test procedures are presently being written. These procedures will be submitted for your review in the near future, to insure your agreement with them.
The test will then be conducted and the resulting data submitted to you.
790202ot &
c U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission January 29, 1979 Att: Robert W. Reid, Chief Page 2 Item 3.2.8 3
Fire Pumphouse Fire Protection An analysis will be provided, supported by test data and operating experience to demonstrate that:
(1)
The proposed automatic shutof f valve for the diesel fire pump's fuel oil system is reliable enough and f ast enough to prevent a fuel oil spill from damaging both fire pumps.
(2)
The diesel fuel oil will not be degraded by storage outside the building.
(3)
A fire involving the =aximum amount of crankcase and filter bath oil present and the spilled fuel oil assuming the autocatic shutof f valve functions as designed, will not damage both fire pumps. This analysis will also assume that the entire contents of the day tank could drain from a ruptured fuel line prior to the introduction of an ignition source.
A fire protection consultant was hired to perf orm the above analysis.
Af ter a site visit and a study of the situation that exists at the fire pump house, his recommendation was not to proceed with our proposed solution.
Insteed, he proposed a solution similar to that proposed by the NRC staf f during our meetir.gs with them on this subject. Based upon the consultant's report, Maine Yankee
.31 provide a three hour rated enclosure arcund the electric fire pump and its controller, liquid tight at floor level with a sill at the door to prevent oil f rom entering the enclosure. The floor drain arrangements will be modified to prevent oil or fire from entering the enclosure through the drains. The diesel fuel return link will be rerouted so that it does not enter the enclosure, and detection will be provided to insure prompt nctification of a fire in the fire pumphouse.
We feel that this proposal will be acceptable to ycu as it is similar to that previously proposed by the NRC staf f.
Item 3.2 9 Protected Suitchgear Roon Floor Penetrations The licensee will provide t he results of an analysis which demonstrates that fires in the protected cable tray room would not result in damage to equipment located in the protected switchgear room that is required for safe shutdown. As an alternative, unsealed penetrations in the floor of the protected switchgear roo= will be sealed to provide a fire resistance equal to the fire severity on both sides of the barrier (5.3).
Our fire protection consultant did an analysis of the prctected 9
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission January 29, 1979 Att: Robert W. Reid, Chief Page 3 cable tray room as required in the Safety Evaluation Report. The results of this analysis and his recommendation are as follows:
Protected Cable Trav Room A fire occurring in the cable tray r oom would probably become ventilation controlled in a fairly short time frame even with the ventilation system operating normally. A moderate amount of combustibles are provided in the room and the switchgear above could be damaged by the products of combustion which would quickly be developed.
Since the switchgear could be damaged or false arcing could result from the products of combustion, even though manual fire fighting will not be especially dif ficult, it is recommended that s11 cable penetrations to the floor above be provided with one-hour rated fire barriers. These barriers should provide suf ficient time to extinguish a fire manually and prevent damage to the switchgear above.
The penetrations through the floor into the control room area below are now protected with Flamastic.
Although we are not aware of any fire tests which have been conducted on this specific configuration, we feel that it does provide a sufficient fire stop as presently installed to prevent fire f rom spreading between the two areas bef ore manual fire fighting ef forts can be stacessfully completed.
Maine Yankee will seal the cable penetrations up to the switchgear room as recommended by the consultant.
A commitment was made by Maine Yankee to seal the cable penetrations between various plant areas with a seal whose resistance is equal to the fire severity on either side of the barrier or three hours, whichever is less. These areas can be found in the SER.
Our consultant reviewed all these areas, and recommended the seal resistance for the cable penetrations be tween them. The attached Table I indicates the resistance these penetration seals will have. It should be noted that the words " fire stop" between areas 8 (Protected Cable Tray Room) and 10 (Control Room) are explained in the previous Item 3.2 9 of this letter. It indicates that the consultant fee's that the existing penetration seals are sufficient.
In addition to the above information, we wish to note that one item scheduled f or ermpletion during the 1978 refueling outage has not been completed. It can be found under Paragraph 3.1.12 of the SER, Control of Combus tibles. Maine Yankee had made a commitment to provide air flow supervision with an alarm in the control room for the ventilation exhaust f rom each battery room, to prevent a hydrogen gas buildup. It now appears that the schedule for this modification should have been at the end of the 1979 refueling outage. The reason is that the air flow in the ventilation system is dependent upon the openings in the fire danpers that will be installed in accordance with Section 3.1.8 of the SER.
Until these dampers are installed and the system balanced, the correct air flow cannot be obtained, and the correct supe rvisory instrumentation cannot be installed.
U. S. Nuciear Regulatory Cornission January 29, 1979 Att: Robert W. Reid, Chief Page 4 We wish, therefore, to change the scheduled completion date of this modification to the end of the 1979 refueling.
We trust this submittal of information =eets your approval. If it does not, please contact us in:=ediately, as we must proceed quickly with the sugges ted codifications to meet the scheduled deadlines.
Very truly yours, MAINE YANKEE ATOMIC POWER COMPANY llff4 h, acfA D./. Moody E
Manager of Operations
TABLE I L
FIRE BARRIER CABLE PEtiETRATI0ii SEAL
SUMMARY
Area um er Area Area rio.
t;ame 1
2 3
4 5
6 7
8 9
10 11 i
3 hr.
1 i1 l Protected Cable Vault
[ 3 hr.
l2 l Cable Entrance Area 1 hr.
l l and MCC 3
Primary Auxiliary i Building 3 hr.
1 hr.
I hr.
i 4 lContainmentSpray I hr.
Pump Building i
i l5 lFuelBuilding
' 1 hr.
i I
'6 Ecergency Feedwater i
Pump Area l 1 hr.
i e
I 7
Steam and Feedwater i
1 hr.
l l Valve Area 1 hr.
I I Protected Cable Tray fire 8
f stop 1 hr. l j
i Room l
l 1
I l
i
! Ventilation Equipment l9 l and Personnel Airlock t
i l
I hr.
I hr.
I fi re Il0 Control Room 3 hr.
stop I
i i
i
.11 Protected Switchgear 1 br.
j Room g
l
.