ML19263B680
| ML19263B680 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 07000734 |
| Issue date: | 12/05/1978 |
| From: | Book H, Cooley W, Thomas R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19263B677 | List: |
| References | |
| 70-0734-78-10, 70-734-78-10, NUDOCS 7901220360 | |
| Download: ML19263B680 (8) | |
Text
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O U. S. tiUCLEaR REGULATORY C0""ISSIO::
OFFICE OF II;SPECTION AND E:!?O'.CEME"T REGI0fl V Report No. 70-734/78-10 1
Decket No.70-734 License fio.
Stim-696 Safeguards Group Licensee:
General Atcmic Ccmpany P. 0. Box 81608 i
San Diego, California 9213C Facility Name: Torrey Pines Mesa and Sorrento Valley Sites Inspection at: San Diego, California Inspection Conducted: October 24-27, and November 3, 1978 Inspectors:
2,M 6 fg /,yh/
W. J. Coo [ey, Fh Facilities Inspector Date Signed I / ') L( b/
/A)y/rf R. 5 Thomd,[ Radiation Specialist Date Signed Approved By: h,
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H.
E'. Book, Chief, Fu'el Facility and Materials' Date Signed Safety Branch Summary:
Inspection on October 24-27, and November 3,1978 (Recort No. 70-734/78-10)
Areas Inspected: Facility changes and modifications; procedure control; housekeeping controls; maintenance; operations review; criticality safety; emergency plans and procedures; radiation protection; packaging and shipment of radioactive materials; and followup on noncompliance.
The inspection involved 38 inspector-hours onsite by two i:RC inspectors.
Resul ts:
No items of noncompliance or deviations were found in the ten subject areas inspected. The licensee was found to have corrected the items of noncompliance observed during the inspection en April 24-28, 1978.
7901,?2 s a I :V Forn 219 (2)
DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted
- F. O. Bold, Manager, Health Physics Services S. D. Stevens, Health Physics Administrative Assistant G. D. Trimble, Health Physics Operations K. C. Thompson, Health Physics Technician
- W. R. Mowry, Licensing Administrator
- D. C. Pound, Manager, Nuclear Safety Control
- W. H. Morris, Nuclear Safety Coordinator, Fuel Manufacturing Department H. O. Johnson, Supervisor, Hot Cell Operations
- J. A. Kline, Staff Engineer, Fuel Manufacturing Decartment J. C. Navaez, Nuclear Material Accountability D. E. Hampton, Staff Technician, Uraniun Recovery
- Denotes those attending exit interview.
2.
Facility Changes and Modifications Since the last inspection, the licensee has redesigned the vacuum cleaning equipment used at the bed converters 'n the Fuel Production Department in Sorrento Valley, Building A.
The vacuum cleaner ex-haust is used.inside the glove box to collect radioactive material from the conversion chamber and the glove box floor. The exhaust line is now equipped with a trap and a pre-filter, both of which are mounted inside of the box. The vacuum motor is mounted on the outside of the box with its exhaust returning to the box. That design pennits the collection and retrieval of fines inside the box; eliminates vacuum cleaner filter changes outside the box; and reroutes the exhaust to the box. Additionally, the licensee has mounted a ring type exhaust at the base of the box, through which the bed converter charge is removed.
The purpose of those two changes was to reduce tha airborne contamination levels at the bed converter operation, in part, in response to the NRC, Region V, Notice of Violation, cated June 9, 1978.
Since approxinately April,1978, the licensee has pursued a program of refurbishing hot cells at the Torrey Pines facility.
Cell in-teriors have been sandblasted, chipped, and wasFed. The average radiation level at the intericr of the cell is ?.5 mR/hr.
Plans include painting the interior of cells, replacing lighting fixtures, replacing cell windows, and introduction of new analytical eouip-ment. An additional decontamination cell will be constructed. A
port in the roof of the facility will be constructed to accept shielded containers of highly active material. A new stack sampler for particulate activity, iodine, and noble gas measurement will be installed. The refurbishod facilities are planned for readiness in January, 1979.
During the last inspection of this licensee (t:RC Inspection Report No. 70-734/78-05, Section 5), a number of observations concerning the general housekeeping and industrial safety matters at the Sorrento Valley Building A were made.
During the presently reported inspection it was observed that each of those matters had been addrFssed and corrected. The li-censee had constructed a barrei rack to house and cover several 55 gallon barrels used to segregate waste. Additionally, a barrel waste sorting station had been constructed using high velocitv ventilation. That station had been modeled after a similar scrting station used at the waste processing facility with which the licensee has had considerable experience. The fuel production areas of Sorrento Valley Building A had a greatly improved appearance of housekeeping compared tr that observed during the last inspection.
3.
Procedure Changes During the last inspection (TC Inspection Report No. 70-734/78-05, Section 3), a number of discrepancies were observed during a review of operating procedures. Those discrepancies existed between the index list of onceating procedures maintained by the Fuel Manufac-turing Department and the counterpart procedures filed as conditions of work authorizations. That circumstance was regarded as an item of noncompliance by the hspector.
Since the last inspection, the licensee has revised the work authorization procedure.
Provision has been made to insure complete review of the procedure by the Nuclear Material Control Division and transmittal to the Fuel Manufacturing Department while the pro-cedure is still in draft fom. This change places the review by four components of MMCD in parallel; provides a more formal presenta-tion of suggested procedure revisions to the Fuel Manufacturing Department; pemits the incorporation of suggested changes into a single, final version; intends to insure that the same procedure appearing as a condition of tM work authorization is that version used by the Fuel Manufacturing Department.
During this inspection, a second revica was made of the current Fuel Manufacturing Decartment operating procedure index as com-pared to the procedures referenced in active work authorizations issued to that department. The review included 13 active work authorizations which, in turn, included approximately 54 separate operating procedures.
Although considerable progress had been made since the last inspection in coordinating those two systems, there remained 13 discrepancies between the issuance dates of the FPD procedure and that referenced in the work authorization.
Those discrepancies were identified to a representatives of the licensee for further correction.
4.
Criticality Studies The licensee has had in place for several years an array calculation for 55 gallon drums.
The parameters used were a 350 gram Uranium-235 leading per drum with optimum moderation; single layer stacking. When applied to real, larger arrays, those arrays were isolated because the calculation had not taken interaction with other components into account.
In order to accomodate large arrays of scrap located in the Sorrento Vallay Building A, the licensee has studied very large square arrays and single line arrays of barrels.
The proposed loading per barrel is 350 grams Uranium-235 at optimum moderation, and single layers.
The study included variation of the height to width of the array as the height to diameter ratio of individual array cylinders was varied. While the study is immediately applica' ale to the Sorrento Valley Building A, the results may be used by the licensee as one of several available storage standards.
The licensee has begun use of 20% enriched uranium in fuel studies in the Sorrento Valley facilities.
These studies will involve a total of 20 kilograms of enriched uranium. All equipment used with the lower enrichment has been sized for 93% enriched uranium. The two different enrichments are used in two distinct material balance areas.
5.
Radiation Protection The licensee has acquired by lease a whole body counter. The counter is presently in use and is capable of detecting and measuring gamma emitting isotopes and thorium.
Instructions for use of the counter are posted permitting employees to do their own counting for gamma emitters.
In the case of thorium, the detecting unit must be posi-tioned over the employee's chest and, therefore, require the attend-ance of a Health Physics Services person.
The output of the counter is automatically telephoned to the data processor and high results are returned within a mattar of a few hours. An output option provides the data locally for immediate evaluation, if needed. Results of all whole body counts are re-ported monthly by the leasing organization. The counter scan per-mits the localization of any disposition within five or six segments of the body.
Health Physics Services has begun a contaminated clothing study.
Detailed records are being kept of the level of contanination of clothing released for laundering and the results of piece by piece check of returned clothing. The purpose of this study is its benefits provided to the health physics group, accountability, and security interests. Measurements made on outgoing laundry have been made on a segmented gamma scanner providing a good measure-ment on how much is going out.
First indications of measurements on returned laundry tend to indicate that about the same activity is being returned, as if it were fixed on the clothing. Not enough measurements have been made on returned clothing to arrive at a conclusion.
On September 21, 1978, Region V was informed that two packages had been received at the San Diego Airport marked for delivery to the subject licensee. The report indicated that one package was marked empty while the other indicated the contents included about 190 grams of uranium,19.9% enriched uranium-235.
The container indicating uranium contents did not exhibit the yellow Class III label as required. The shipment had been made by Lufthanza from Germany to Los Angeles and had been transshipped to a United Airline passenger flight (No. 328) from Los Angeles to San Diego. The report was made to Region V by a freight handl-ing representative of United Airlines. That person's concern was that the shipment may have been roughly hanaled because it did not exhibit a yellow Class III label and, if roughly handled, could have caused contamination on a passenger flight.
The report by United Airlines had originally been made to the Department of Energy and that organization at San Francisco alerted the Radiological Assistance Team at the licensee's organ-ization. Two members of that team responded by going to the San Diego Airport. Their observations and measurements indicated no damage to either of the two containers in question; no radio-active material contamination on the surface of either container; no detectible radiation levels were present at the surface of ei-ther container; and confirmation that the container indicating an uranium content was improperly labeled. The RAT persons made
' ' their measurements en Sectember 21, 1978. The two containers were forwarded, after. passing custons requirements, to the General Atomic premises on September 22, 1978.
During the presently reported insoection, the above information was confirmed in discussions with a licensee representative. That repre-sentative added that the shipment had been expected by General Atcmic and that paper work in hand indicated that one container would be enpty and the second container would contain a single Triga type fuel element. The licensee had made photographs of the container baring the fuel element and the fuel element itself. The element had been one which had been rejected before irradiation by the customer.
During the last inspection (NRC Inspection Report No. 70-734/73-05, Section 4), it was noted that the licensee's survey measurenents at the FMD indicatgd contamination 1evels considerably in excess of 2000 dpm/100 cn. That circumstance was regarded by the inspector as an item of nonccmpliance. During the presently reported inspec-tion, the health physics technician's log book for the Fuel Manufac-turing Department was reviewed for the period May through October 25, 1978. That review indicated contamination levels in the production areas of Sorgento Valley Building A were between 200 and 1400 dpm al pha/100 c.n. Survey results indicated occasiona spots of con-tamination ranging from 4,000 to 10,000 dpm/100 cm}.In general, there appeared to be a factor of six reduction in production area contamination as compared with those levels reviewed during the last inspection.
A detailed review of average airborne uranica concentrations for the first three quarters of 1978 was also made during this inspection.
That review indicated a steady reduction in average concentrations from approximately 3% MPC for the first quarter,1978, to approximately 1% MPC for the third quarter,1978. An occasional individual sample indicated results in excess of 10 MPC.
The marked reduction in surface contamination levels in the production area is considered indicative of corrective acticn taken by the licensee in regard to the apparent item of noncompliance noticed dur-ing the previous inspection. The reduction in airborne concentrations may be attributed, in part, to the licensee's attention to surface contamination; to greater care in SNM handling by operators; and to ventilaticn modifications in local ventilation systems mentioned in Section 2 of this racort, above.
The licensee's bicaseay program is consistent with the average and individual sample concentrations of airborne contamination listed above. The licensee is presently providing monthly, quarterly,
. semi-annual, and annual urinalysis bicassays for employees exposed to radioactive naterials. The variation in analysis frequency is based on exposure potential of the employee and his exposure history.
The licensee is presently providing four in vivo lung counts per year for possible fissile material inhalation. The licensee places his con-fidence in the in vivo measurements and regards the urinalysis studies as a screening technique.
6.
Emergency Plans and Procedures The licensee has recently submitted his emergency plans to NPC Headquarters for review.
During the presently reported inspection, the NRC inspector witnessed a criticality drill at the Sorrento
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Valley Building A.
The drill consisted primarily of building evacuation upon the criticality signal.
It was observed that the criticality signal was clearly audible from the outside of the building; personnel evacuated promptly acccmplishing complete evacuation in approximately two minutes; health physics technicians made initial re-entry of the building with appropriate instrumenta-tion and acted as an aid to security after the drill by performing certain required surveys. The building was evacuated from the north and south roll up doors.
Evacuation routes were clearly marked by painted lines on pavements outside the facility and by " evacuation route" signs. Prearranged assembly areas to the north and south of the building were marked and were located approximately 400 feet from the building. Those locations were selected with consideration of intervening shielding of buildings (to the south) and direct line of sight to the building (assembly area to the south is icwer than the base of Building SVA).
No special exercises were planned for that evacuation drill.
On November 3,1978, representatives of Region V attended a meeting hosted by the licensee at the licensee's facilities. The purpose of that meeting was a coordination effort on the part of the licensee with outside support groups and agencies which might be called upon for assistance in the event of an emergency. Attendees included re-presentatives of Script r Menorial Hospital, San Diego Police Depart-ment, FBI, County Sheriff Office, Office of Defense Preparedness, San Diego Fire Department, NRC, and General Atcmic personnel in the areas of industrial safety, security, and radiological safety.
The program consisted of a presentation by representatives of the licensee indicating the types of work being done at the San Diego facilities, the emergency capabilities of the licensee, and scme emergency experience of the licensee over the past years.
I
.- The attendees then separated into three groups generally identified as nedical, security, and industrial safety. Those groups inde-pendently toured the facility to inspect facilities and emergency equipment. The three grouos assembled separately to discuss mutual interests in emergency procedures.
Iri the rneeting of the medical-radiological category of attendees tentative plans were made be-tween the licensee and personnel of Scripps Memorial Hospital for an emergency exercise involving those two entities.
7.
Management Interview The scope and results of the inspection were discussed with licensee representatives on October 25, 1978, at the conclusion of the inspec-tion. Those persons were informed that corrective action taken by the licensee on apparent items of nonccmpliance noted during the last inspection was considered adequate. Those persons were in-formed that no items of noncompliance or deviations were observed within the scope of the inspection.
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